_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use chain;
  15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use chain::channelmonitor;
  17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
  20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
  23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  25 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  26 use routing::network_graph::RoutingFees;
  27 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  29 use ln::msgs;
  30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
  34 use util::errors::APIError;
  35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  36 use util::config::UserConfig;
  37
  38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  44
  45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  46 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  47
  48 use regex;
  49
  50 use io;
  51 use prelude::*;
  52 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  53 use core::default::Default;
  54 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  55
  56 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  57 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  58
  59 #[test]
  60 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  61         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  62         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  63         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  64         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  65         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  66
  67         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  68         // funding satoshis
  69         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  70         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
  71         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  72
  73         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  74         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  75
  76         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  77         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  78
  79         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  80         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  81         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  82                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  83                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  84                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  85                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  86                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  87                         match action {
  88                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  89                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  90                                 },
  91                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
  92                         }
  93                 } else { assert!(false); }
  94         };
  95
  96         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
  97         use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
  98
  99         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 100         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
 101
 102         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 103
 104         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 105
 106         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 107
 108         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 109
 110         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 111
 112         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 113
 114         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 115 }
 116
 117 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 118         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 119         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 120         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 121         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 122         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 123         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 124         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 125         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 126
 127         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 128         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 129         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 130         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 131         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
 132
 133         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 134         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 135         if !send_from_initiator {
 136                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 137                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 138         }
 139         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
 140
 141         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 142         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 143         if send_from_initiator {
 144                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 145                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 146         }
 147         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
 148         {
 149                 let mut lock;
 150                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
 151                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 152                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 153         }
 154
 155         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 156         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 157         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 158
 159         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 160         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 161         if send_from_initiator {
 162                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 163                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 164                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 165                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 166                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2));
 167         } else {
 168                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 169         }
 170 }
 171
 172 #[test]
 173 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 174         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 175         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 176 }
 177
 178 #[test]
 179 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 180         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 181         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 182         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 183         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 184         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 185
 186         // balancing
 187         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 188
 189         // A                                        B
 190         // update_fee                            ->
 191         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 192         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 193         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 194         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 195         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 196         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 197         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 198         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 199         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 200         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 201         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 202         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 203         //                                       <- RAA
 204         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 205
 206         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 207         {
 208                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 209                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 210         }
 211         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 213
 214         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 215         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 216         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 217                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 218                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 219                 },
 220                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 221         };
 222
 223         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 224
 225         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 226         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 227         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 228         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 229
 230         let payment_event = {
 231                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 232                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 233                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 234         };
 235         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 236         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 237
 238         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 239         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 240         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 241         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 242         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 243         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 244
 245         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 246         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 247         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 248         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 250
 251         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 252         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 253         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 254         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 255         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 256         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 257         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 258         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 259
 260         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 261         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 262         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 263         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 264         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 265         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 266         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 267         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 268
 269         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 270         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 271         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 272         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 273
 274         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 275         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 277
 278         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 279         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 280
 281         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 282         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 283         match events_2[0] {
 284                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 285                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 286         }
 287
 288         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 290 }
 291
 292 #[test]
 293 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 294         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 295         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 296         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 297         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 298         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 299         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 300         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 301
 302         // balancing
 303         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 304
 305         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 306         {
 307                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 308                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 309         }
 310         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 311         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 312
 313         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 314         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 315         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 316                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 317                         update_fee.as_ref()
 318                 },
 319                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 320         };
 321
 322         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 323
 324         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 325         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 326         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 327         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 328
 329         let payment_event = {
 330                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 331                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 332                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 333         };
 334         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 335         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 336
 337         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 338         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 339         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 340         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 341         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 342         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 343
 344         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 345         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 346
 347         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 348 }
 349
 350 #[test]
 351 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 352         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 353         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 354         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 355         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 356         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 357
 358         // A                                        B
 359         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 360         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 361         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 362         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 363         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 364         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 365         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 366         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 367         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 368         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 369         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 370         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 371         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 372         //                                          B should send no response here
 373         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 374         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 375         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 376
 377         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 378         let initial_feerate;
 379         {
 380                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 381                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 382                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 383         }
 384         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 385         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 386
 387         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 388         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 389         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 390                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 391                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 392                 },
 393                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 394         };
 395
 396         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 397         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 398         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 399         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 400         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 401
 402         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 403         // transaction:
 404         {
 405                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 406                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 407         }
 408         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 409         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 410         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 411
 412         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 413         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 414                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 415                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 416         };
 417
 418         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 419
 420         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 421         // Deliver (3)
 422         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 423
 424         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 425         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 426         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 427         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 428         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 429         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 430         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 431         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 432         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 433         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 434         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 435
 436         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 437         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 438         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 439         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 440         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 441
 442         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 443         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 445
 446         // Delever (4)
 447         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 448         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 449         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 450
 451         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 452         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 453         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 454
 455         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 456         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 457         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 458         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 459
 460         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 461         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 462         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 463 }
 464
 465 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
 466         // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
 467         // tests that we properly send one in that case.
 468         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
 469         alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 470         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 471         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 472         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
 473         bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 474         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 475         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 476         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 477         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 478         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
 479         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 480         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
 481
 482         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 483         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
 484         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
 485
 486         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
 487         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 488         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
 489
 490         for node in nodes {
 491                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
 492                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
 493                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
 494         }
 495 }
 496 #[test]
 497 fn test_1_conf_open() {
 498         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
 499         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
 500         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
 501 }
 502
 503 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 504         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 505         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 506         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 507         // Node objects.
 508
 509         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 510         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 511         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 512         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 513
 514         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 515                 let block = Block {
 516                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 517                         txdata: vec![],
 518                 };
 519                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 520                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 521         }
 522
 523         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 524         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 525         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 526
 527         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 528         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
 529         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 530
 531         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 532         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
 533
 534         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
 535
 536         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 537         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
 538         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 539         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 540
 541         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 542         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 543         {
 544                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 545                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 546                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 547                 added_monitors.clear();
 548         }
 549         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 550
 551         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 552         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 553         {
 554                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 555                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 556                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 557                 added_monitors.clear();
 558         }
 559
 560         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 561         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 562
 563         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 564         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 565
 566         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 567         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 568         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 569         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 570 }
 571
 572 #[test]
 573 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 574         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 576         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 577         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 578         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 584         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 585         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 586         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 587         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 588         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 589         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 590         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 591         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 592 }
 593
 594 #[test]
 595 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 596         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 597         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 598         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 599         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 600         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 601
 602         {
 603                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 604                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 605         }
 606         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 607         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 608
 609         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 610         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 611         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 612                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 613                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 614                 },
 615                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 616         };
 617         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 618
 619         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 620         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 621         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 622
 623         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 624         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 625         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 626
 627         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 628         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 629         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 630         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 631
 632         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 633         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 634         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 635 }
 636
 637 #[test]
 638 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 639         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 640         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 641         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 642         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 643         let channel_value = 5000;
 644         let push_sats = 700;
 645         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 646         let channel_id = chan.2;
 647         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 648         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
 649
 650         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 651         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 652         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 653         // remote limit.
 654         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 655         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) as u32;
 656         {
 657                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 658                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 659         }
 660         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 661         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 662         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 663
 664         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 665
 666         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 667
 668         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 669         {
 670                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 671
 672                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 673                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 674                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0) / 1000;
 675                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 676                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 677                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 678         }
 679
 680         {
 681                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 682                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 683                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 684         }
 685         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 686         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 687         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 688
 689         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 690
 691         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 692         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 693         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 694                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 695                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 696                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 697                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 698                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 699                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 700         };
 701         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 702                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 703                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 704                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 705                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 706                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 707                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 708                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 709         };
 710
 711         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 712         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 713                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 714
 715         let res = {
 716                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 717                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 718                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 719                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 720                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 721                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 722                         push_sats,
 723                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0) / 1000,
 724                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
 725                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 726                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 727                         &mut htlcs,
 728                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 729                 );
 730                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 731         };
 732
 733         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 734                 channel_id: chan.2,
 735                 signature: res.0,
 736                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 737         };
 738
 739         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 740                 channel_id: chan.2,
 741                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 742         };
 743
 744         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 745
 746         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 747         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 748         //Should produce and error.
 749         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 750         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 751         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 752         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 753         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 754 }
 755
 756 #[test]
 757 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 758         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 759         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 760         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 761         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 762         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 763
 764         // balancing
 765         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 766
 767         {
 768                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 769                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 770         }
 771         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 772         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 773
 774         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 775         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 776         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 777                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 778                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 779                 },
 780                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 781         };
 782         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 783         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 784         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 785         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 786
 787         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 788
 789         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 790         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 791         {
 792                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 793                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 794                 added_monitors.clear();
 795         }
 796         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 797         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 798         // node[1] has nothing to do
 799
 800         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 801         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 803
 804         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 805         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 806         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 807         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 808         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 809         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 810         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 811
 812         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 813         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 814         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 815         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 816         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 817         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 818
 819         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 820         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 821         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 822         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 823
 824         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 825         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 826         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 827
 828         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 829         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 830         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 831         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 832
 833         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 834         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 835         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 836
 837         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 838
 839         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 840         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 841         match events[0] {
 842                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 843                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 844         };
 845
 846         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 847
 848         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 849         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 850         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 851         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 852         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 853 }
 854
 855 #[test]
 856 fn test_update_fee() {
 857         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 858         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 859         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 860         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 861         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 862         let channel_id = chan.2;
 863
 864         // A                                        B
 865         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 866         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 867         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 868         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 869         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 870         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 871         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 872         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 873         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 874         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 875         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 876         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 877
 878         // Create and deliver (1)...
 879         let feerate;
 880         {
 881                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 882                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 883                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 884         }
 885         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 886         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 887
 888         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 889         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 890         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 891                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 892                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 893                 },
 894                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 895         };
 896         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 897
 898         // Generate (2) and (3):
 899         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 900         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 901         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 902
 903         // Deliver (2):
 904         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 905         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 906         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 907
 908         // Create and deliver (4)...
 909         {
 910                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 911                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 912         }
 913         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 914         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 915         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 916         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 917         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 918                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 919                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 920                 },
 921                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 922         };
 923
 924         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 925         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 926         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 927         // ... creating (5)
 928         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 929         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 930
 931         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 932         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 933         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 934         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 935         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 936
 937         // Deliver (5):
 938         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 939         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 940         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 941
 942         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 943         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 944         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 945         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 946         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 947         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 948         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 949         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 950         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 951
 952         // Deliver (7)
 953         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 955         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 956         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 957
 958         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 959         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 960         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 961
 962         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 963         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 964         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 965         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 966         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 967 }
 968
 969 #[test]
 970 fn fake_network_test() {
 971         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 972         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 973         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 974         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 975         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 976         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 977
 978         // Create some initial channels
 979         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 980         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 981         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 982
 983         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 984         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 985         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 986         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 987         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 988
 989         // Send some more payments
 990         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 991         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 992         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 993
 994         // Test failure packets
 995         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 996         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 997
 998         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 999         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1000
1001         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1002         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1003         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1004         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1005         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1006         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1007         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1008
1009         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1010         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1011         hops.push(RouteHop {
1012                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1013                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1014                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1015                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1016                 fee_msat: 0,
1017                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1018         });
1019         hops.push(RouteHop {
1020                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1021                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1022                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1023                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1024                 fee_msat: 0,
1025                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1026         });
1027         hops.push(RouteHop {
1028                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1029                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1030                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1031                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1032                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1033                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1034         });
1035         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1036         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1037         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1038
1039         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1040         hops.push(RouteHop {
1041                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1042                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1043                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1044                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1045                 fee_msat: 0,
1046                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1047         });
1048         hops.push(RouteHop {
1049                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1050                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1051                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1052                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1053                 fee_msat: 0,
1054                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1055         });
1056         hops.push(RouteHop {
1057                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1058                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1059                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1060                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1061                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1062                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1063         });
1064         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1065         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1066         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1067
1068         // Claim the rebalances...
1069         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1070         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1071
1072         // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1073         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1074
1075         // Send some payments across both channels
1076         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1077         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1078         let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1079
1080
1081         route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1082         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1083         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1084         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1085
1086         //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1087
1088         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1089         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1090         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1091
1092         // Close down the channels...
1093         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1094         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1095         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1096         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1097         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1098         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1099         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1100         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1101         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1102         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1103         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1104         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1105         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1106         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1107         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1108 }
1109
1110 #[test]
1111 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1112         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1113         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1114         // commitment dance rounds.
1115         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1116         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1117         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1118         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1119         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1120         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1121
1122         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1123         for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1124                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1125                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1126                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1127         }
1128         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1129
1130         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1131         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1132         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1133         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1134
1135         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1136         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1137         // another HTLC.
1138         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1139         {
1140                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1141                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1142                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1143                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1144         }
1145
1146         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1147         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1148         {
1149                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1150                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1151         }
1152
1153         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1154         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1155         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1156         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1157
1158         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1159         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1160         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1161         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1162         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1163         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1165
1166         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1167         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1168         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1169
1170         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1171
1172         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1173         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1174         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1175         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1176
1177         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1178         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1180         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1181
1182         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1184         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1185
1186         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1187                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1188         }
1189         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1190         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1191         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1192         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1193         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1194
1195         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1196         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1197         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1198         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1199         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1200
1201         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1202         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1203
1204         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1205
1206         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1207         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1208         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1209                 match event {
1210                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1211                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1212                         },
1213                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1214                 };
1215         }
1216
1217         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1218                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1219         }
1220
1221         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1222 }
1223
1224 #[test]
1225 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1226         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1227         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1228         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1229         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1230         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1231         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1232
1233         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1234         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1235         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1236         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1237         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1238         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1239
1240         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1241
1242         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1243         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1244
1245         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1246         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1247
1248         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1249         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1250         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1251 }
1252
1253 #[test]
1254 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1255         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1256         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1257         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1258         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1259         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1260         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1261         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1262
1263         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1264
1265         // balancing
1266         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1267
1268         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1269
1270         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1271         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1272         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1273
1274         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1275         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1277
1278         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1279         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1280
1281         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1282         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1283         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1284                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1285                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1286                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1287                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1288                 }
1289         }
1290         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1291
1292         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1293         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1294         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1295         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1296
1297         // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1298         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1299         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1300         assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1301         assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1302         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1303         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1304         check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1305
1306         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1307         assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1308         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1309
1310         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1311         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1312         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1313         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1314         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1315         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1316         check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1317         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1318
1319         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1320         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1321         for e in events {
1322                 match e {
1323                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1324                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1325                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1326                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1327                         },
1328                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1329                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1330                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1331                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1332                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1333                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1334                         },
1335                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1336                 }
1337         }
1338 }
1339
1340 #[test]
1341 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1342         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1343         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1344         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1345         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1346         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1347
1348         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1349         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1350
1351         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1352         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1353         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1354         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1355         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1356         match err {
1357                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1358                         match &fails[0] {
1359                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1360                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1361                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1362                         }
1363                 },
1364                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1365         }
1366         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1367         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1368
1369         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1370 }
1371
1372 #[test]
1373 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1374         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1375         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1376         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1377         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1378         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1379
1380         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1381         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1382         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1383         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1384
1385         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1386
1387         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1388         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1389         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1390         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1391                 channel_id: chan.2,
1392                 htlc_id: 0,
1393                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1394                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1395                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1396                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1397         };
1398
1399         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1400
1401         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1402         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1403         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1404
1405         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1406
1407         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1408
1409         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1410         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1411         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1412                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1413                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1414                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1415                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1416                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1417
1418                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1419                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1420                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1421                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1422                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1423         };
1424         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1425                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1426                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1427                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1428                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1429                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1430                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1431                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1432         };
1433
1434         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1435         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1436                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1437
1438         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1439         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1440         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1441
1442         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1443                 offered: false,
1444                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1445                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1446                 payment_hash,
1447                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1448         };
1449
1450         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1451
1452         let res = {
1453                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1454                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1455                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1456                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1457                         commitment_number,
1458                         95000,
1459                         local_chan_balance,
1460                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1461                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1462                         feerate_per_kw,
1463                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1464                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1465                 );
1466                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1467         };
1468
1469         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1470                 channel_id: chan.2,
1471                 signature: res.0,
1472                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1473         };
1474
1475         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1476         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1477         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1478
1479         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1480         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1481                 channel_id: chan.2,
1482                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1483                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1484         };
1485         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1486
1487         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1488         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1489         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1490         match events[0] {
1491                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1492                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1493                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1494                 },
1495                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1496         };
1497         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1498                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1499
1500         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1501 }
1502
1503 #[test]
1504 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1505         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1506         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1507         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1508         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1509         // this situation.
1510         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1511         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1512         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1513         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1514
1515         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1516         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1517         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1518
1519         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1520
1521         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1522         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1523                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1524         }
1525
1526         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1527         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1528         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1529                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1530         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1531         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1532 }
1533
1534 #[test]
1535 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1536         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1537         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1538         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1539         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1540         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1541
1542         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1543         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1544         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1545         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1546         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1547         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1548         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1549
1550         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1551         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1552                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1553         }
1554
1555         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1556         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1557         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1558         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1559         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1560         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1561         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1562         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1563         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1564                 channel_id: chan.2,
1565                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1566                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1567                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1568                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1569                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1570         };
1571
1572         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1573         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1574         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1575         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1576         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1577         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1578         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1579         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1580 }
1581
1582 #[test]
1583 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1584         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1585         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1586         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1587         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1588
1589         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1590         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1591         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1592
1593         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1594         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1595         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1596         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1597         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1598         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1599         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1600
1601         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1602                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1603         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1604         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1605         // commitment transaction fee.
1606         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1607
1608         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1609         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1610                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1611         }
1612
1613         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1614         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1615         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1616                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1617 }
1618
1619 #[test]
1620 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1621         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1622         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1623         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1624         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1625         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1626         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1627         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1628
1629         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1630         // HTLC.
1631         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1632         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1633         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1634                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1635
1636         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1637         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1638         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1639         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1640         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1641         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1642         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1643
1644         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1645         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1646         match msg_events[0] {
1647                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1648                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1649                 },
1650                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1651         }
1652 }
1653
1654 #[test]
1655 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1656         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1657         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1658         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1659         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1660         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1661         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1662         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1663
1664         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1665         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1666         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1667         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1668         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1669         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670
1671         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1672         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1673         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1674         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1675         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1676         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1677
1678         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1679         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1680         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1681         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1682 }
1683
1684 #[test]
1685 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1686         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1687         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1688         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1689         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1690         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1691         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1692
1693         let feemsat = 239;
1694         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1695         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1696         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1697
1698         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1699         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1700         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1701         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1702
1703         // Add a pending HTLC.
1704         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1705         let payment_event_1 = {
1706                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1707                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1708
1709                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1710                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1711                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1712         };
1713         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1714
1715         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1716         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1717         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1718         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1719         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1720
1721         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1722         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1723         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1724         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1725         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1726         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1727         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1728         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1729                 channel_id: chan.2,
1730                 htlc_id: 1,
1731                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1732                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1733                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1734                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1735         };
1736
1737         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1738         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1739         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1740         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1741         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1742         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1743         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1744         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1745 }
1746
1747 #[test]
1748 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1749         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1750         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1751         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1752         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1753         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1754         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1755         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1756         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1757         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1758
1759         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1760         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1761         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1762
1763         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1764         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1765 }
1766
1767 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1768         (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1769 }
1770
1771 #[test]
1772 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1773         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1774         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1775         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1776         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1777         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1778         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1779         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1780         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1781         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1782         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1783
1784         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1785         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1786
1787         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1788         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1789
1790         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1791                 ($node: expr) => {{
1792                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1793                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1794                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1795                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1796                         payment_event
1797                 }}
1798         }
1799
1800         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1801         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1802         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1803
1804         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1805
1806         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1807         {
1808                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1809                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1810                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1811                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1812                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1813                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1814                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1815         }
1816
1817         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1818         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1819         loop {
1820                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1821                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1822                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1823                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1824                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1825                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1826                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1827                         break;
1828                 }
1829                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1830
1831                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1832                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1833                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1834                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1835                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1836                 );
1837
1838                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1839                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1840                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1841                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1842                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1843         }
1844
1845         // adding pending output.
1846         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1847         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1848         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1849         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1850         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1851         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1852         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1853         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1854         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1855         // policy.
1856         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1857         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1858         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1859
1860         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1861         let payment_event_1 = {
1862                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1863                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1864
1865                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1866                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1867                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1868         };
1869         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1870
1871         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1872         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1873         {
1874                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1875                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1876                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1877                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1878         }
1879
1880         // split the rest to test holding cell
1881         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1882         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1883         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1884         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1885         {
1886                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1887                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1888         }
1889
1890         // now see if they go through on both sides
1891         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1892         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1893         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1894         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1895         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1896         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1897
1898         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1899         {
1900                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1901                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1902                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1903                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1904                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1905         }
1906
1907         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1908         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1909         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1910         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1911         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1912         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1913
1914         // flush the pending htlc
1915         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1916         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1918
1919         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1920         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1922         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1923
1924         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1925         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1926         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1927         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1928
1929         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1930         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1931         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1932
1933         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1934
1935         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1936         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1937         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1938
1939         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1940         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1941
1942         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1943         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1944         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1945         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1946         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1947         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1948
1949         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1950         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1951         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1952         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1953
1954         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1955         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1956
1957         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1958         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1959         match events[0] {
1960                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1961                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1962                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1963                         match &purpose {
1964                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1965                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1966                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1967                                 },
1968                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1969                         }
1970                 },
1971                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1972         }
1973         match events[1] {
1974                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1975                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1976                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1977                         match &purpose {
1978                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1979                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1980                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1981                                 },
1982                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1983                         }
1984                 },
1985                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1986         }
1987
1988         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1989         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1990         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1991
1992         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1993         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1994         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1995
1996         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
1997         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1998         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1999         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2000         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2001
2002         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2003         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2004 }
2005
2006 #[test]
2007 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2008         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2009         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2010         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2011         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2012         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2013         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2014         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2015         // To test this we:
2016         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2017         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2018         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2019         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2020         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2021         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2022         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2023         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2024         //    claim,
2025         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2026         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2027         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2028         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2029         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2030         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2031         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2032         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2033         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2034         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2035
2036         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2037         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2038         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
2039         let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
2040
2041         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2042         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2043         let send_1 = {
2044                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2045                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2046                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2047                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2048                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2049         };
2050
2051         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2052         // initial fulfill/CS.
2053         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
2054         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2055         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2056
2057         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2058         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2059         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2060         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2061         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2062
2063         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2064         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2065         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2066         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2067         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2068
2069         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2070         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2071         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2072         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2073         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2074
2075         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2076         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2077         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2078
2079         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2080         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2081         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2082
2083         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2084         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2085         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2086
2087         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2088         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2089         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2090         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2091         // on-chain as necessary).
2092         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2093         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2094         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2095         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2096         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2097
2098         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2099         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2100         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2101
2102         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2103         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2104
2105         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2106         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2107         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2108         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2109         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2110         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2111
2112         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2113         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2114         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2115         let send_2 = {
2116                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2117                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2118                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2119                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2120                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2121         };
2122
2123         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2124         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2125         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2126         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2127
2128         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2129
2130         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2132         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2133
2134         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2135         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2136
2137         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2139         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2140         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2141
2142         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2144         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2145
2146         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2148
2149         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2150         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2151
2152         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2153         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2154 }
2155
2156 #[test]
2157 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2158         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2159         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2160         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2161         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2162         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2163         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2164
2165         // Create some initial channels
2166         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2167         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2168         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2169         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2170
2171         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2172         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2173         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2174         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2175         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2176         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2177
2178         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2179         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2180         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2181         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2182         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2183
2184         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2185         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2186         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2187         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2188         {
2189                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2190                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2191                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2192                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2193                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2194         }
2195         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2196         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2197         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2198         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2199         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2200
2201         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2202         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2203
2204         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2205         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2206         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2207         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2208         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2209         {
2210                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2211                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2212                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2213                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2214                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2215                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2216         }
2217         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2218         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2219         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2220         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2221         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2222
2223         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2224                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2225                         {
2226                                 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2227                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2228
2229                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2230                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2231                                 match events[0] {
2232                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2233                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2234                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2235                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2236                                         },
2237                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2238                                 };
2239                         }
2240                 }
2241         }
2242
2243         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2244         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2245         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2246         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2247         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2248         let node2_commitment_txid;
2249         {
2250                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2251                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2252                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2253                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2254
2255                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2256                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2257                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2258                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2259                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2260         }
2261         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2262         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2263         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2264         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2265         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2266
2267         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2268         // confusing us in the following tests.
2269         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2270
2271         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2272         let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2273         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2274         // buffer space).
2275
2276         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2277                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2278                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2279                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2280                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2281                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2282                                 msg.clone()
2283                         },
2284                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2285                 };
2286                 match events[1] {
2287                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2288                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2289                         },
2290                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2291                 }
2292                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2293
2294                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2295                 {
2296                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2297                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2298                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2299                                         false
2300                                 } else { true }
2301                         });
2302                 }
2303
2304                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2305
2306                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2307                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2308
2309                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2310                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2311                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2312                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2313                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2314                                 msg.clone()
2315                         },
2316                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2317                 };
2318                 match events[1] {
2319                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2320                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2321                         },
2322                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2323                 }
2324                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2325                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2326
2327                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2328                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2329                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2330         };
2331         nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2332         nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2333         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2334         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2335
2336         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2337         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2338         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2339 }
2340
2341 #[test]
2342 fn test_justice_tx() {
2343         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2344         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2345         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2346         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2347         alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2348         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2349         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2350         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2351         bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2352         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2353         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2354         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2355         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2356         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2357         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2358         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2359         // Create some new channels:
2360         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2361
2362         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2363         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2364         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2365         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2366         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2367         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2368         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2369         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2370         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2371         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2372         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2373         // Revoke the old state
2374         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2375
2376         {
2377                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2378                 {
2379                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2380                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2381                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2382
2383                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2384                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2385                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2386                 }
2387                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2388                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2389                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2390
2391                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2392                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2393                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2394                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2395                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2396                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2397                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2398                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2399                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2400         }
2401         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2402
2403         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2404         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2405
2406         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2407         // Create some new channels:
2408         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2409         {
2410                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2411                 node_txn.clear();
2412         }
2413
2414         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2415         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2416         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2417         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2418         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2419         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2420         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2421         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2422         // Revoke the old state
2423         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2424         {
2425                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2426                 {
2427                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2428                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2429                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2430
2431                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2432                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2433                 }
2434                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2435                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2436
2437                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2438                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2439                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2440                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2441                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2442                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2443                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2444         }
2445         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2446         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2447         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2448 }
2449
2450 #[test]
2451 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2452         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2453         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2454         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2455         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2456         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2457         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2458         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2459         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2460         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2461         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2462         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2463         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2464         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2465         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2466
2467         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2468         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2469         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2470         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2471         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2472         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2473
2474         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2475         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2476
2477         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2478         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2479         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2480         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2481         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2482 }
2483
2484 #[test]
2485 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2486         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2487         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2488         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2489         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2490         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2491         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2492
2493         // Create some new channel:
2494         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2495
2496         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2497         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2498         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2499         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2500         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2501
2502         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2503         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2504         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2505         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2506         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2507         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2508         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2509         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2510         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2511
2512         //Revoke the old state
2513         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2514
2515         {
2516                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2517                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2518                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2519                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2520                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2521                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2522                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2523                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2524
2525                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2526                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2527
2528                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2529                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2530
2531                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2532                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2533                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2534                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2535                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2536                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2537                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2538                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2539
2540                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2541                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2542                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2543         }
2544         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2545         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2546         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2547 }
2548
2549 #[test]
2550 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2551         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2552         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2553         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2554         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2555         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2556         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2557
2558         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2559
2560         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2561         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2562         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2563         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2564         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2565         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2566
2567         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2568         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2569
2570         //Revoke the old state
2571         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2572
2573         {
2574                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2575                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2576                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2577                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2578                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2579                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2580                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2581                 match events[1] {
2582                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2583                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2584                 }
2585
2586                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2587                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2588
2589                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2590                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2591                 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2592                 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2593                 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2594                 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2595
2596                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2597                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2598                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2599                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2600                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2601                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2602                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2603
2604                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2605                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2606                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2607                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2608
2609                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2610                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2611                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2612
2613                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2614                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2615                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2616                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2617                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2618                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2619                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2620                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2621         }
2622         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2623         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2624         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2625 }
2626
2627 #[test]
2628 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2629         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2630         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2631         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2632         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2633         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2634         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2635         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2636         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2637         // towards B.
2638         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2639         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2640         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2641         // PaymentSent event).
2642
2643         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2644         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2645         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2646         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2647
2648         // Create some initial channels
2649         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2650         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2651
2652         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2653         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2654         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2655         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2656         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2657
2658         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2659         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2660         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2661
2662         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2663         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2664
2665         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2666         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2667         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2668         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2669         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2670         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2671         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2672         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2673         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2674         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2675         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2676         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2677         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2678
2679         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2680         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2681         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2682         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2683         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2684         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2685         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2686         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2687         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2688         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2689         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2690         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2691         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2692         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2693         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2694         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2695         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2696
2697         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2698         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2699         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2700         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2701         {
2702                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2703                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2704                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2705                 added_monitors.clear();
2706         }
2707         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2708         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2709         match forwarded_events[0] {
2710                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2711                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2712         }
2713         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2714                 } else { panic!(); }
2715         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2716                 } else { panic!(); }
2717         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2718         {
2719                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2720                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2721                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2722                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2723                 added_monitors.clear();
2724         }
2725         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2726         match events[0] {
2727                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2728                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2729         }
2730         match events[1] {
2731                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2732                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2733         }
2734
2735         match events[2] {
2736                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2737                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2738                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2739                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2740                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2741                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2742                 },
2743                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2744         };
2745         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2746                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2747                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2748                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2749                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2750                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2751                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2752                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2753                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2754                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2755                         if $htlc_offered {
2756                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2757                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2758                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2759                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2760                         } else {
2761                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2762                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2763                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2764                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2765                         }
2766                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2767                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2768                         node_txn.clear();
2769                 } }
2770         }
2771         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2772         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2773         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2774         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2775
2776         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2777         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2778         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2779         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2780         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2781         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2782         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2783         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2784         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2785         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2786         let commitment_spend =
2787                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2788                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2789                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2790                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2791                         &node_txn[0]
2792                 } else {
2793                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2794                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2795                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2796                         &node_txn[2]
2797                 };
2798
2799         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2800         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2801         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2802         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2803         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2804         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2805         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2806         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2807         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2808         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2809         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2810         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2811
2812         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2813         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2814         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2815         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2816         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2817         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2818         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2819         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2820         let mut first_claimed = false;
2821         for event in events {
2822                 match event {
2823                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2824                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2825                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2826                                         first_claimed = true;
2827                                 } else {
2828                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2829                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2830                                 }
2831                         },
2832                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2833                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2834                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2835                 }
2836         }
2837         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2838 }
2839
2840 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2841         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2842         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2843         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2844         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2845         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2846         //            \                                  \
2847         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2848
2849         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2850         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2851         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2852         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2853         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2854         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2855         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2856
2857         // Create some intial channels
2858         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2859         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2860
2861         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2862         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2863         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2864
2865         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2866
2867         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2868         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2869         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2870         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2871         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2872         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2873         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2874
2875         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2876         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2877         match events[0] {
2878                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2879                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2880                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2881                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2882                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2883                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2884                 },
2885                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2886         };
2887         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2888         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2889         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2890         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2891         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2892         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2893         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2894         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2895
2896         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2897         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2898         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2899         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2900         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2901         let timeout_tx;
2902         {
2903                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2904                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2905                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2906                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2907
2908                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2909                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2910
2911                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2912                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2913                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2914                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2915
2916                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2917                 node_txn.clear();
2918         }
2919
2920         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2922         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2923         {
2924                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2925                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2926                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2927                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2928         }
2929
2930         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2931         {
2932                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2933                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2934                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2935                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2936                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2937                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2938                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2939                 } else {
2940                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2941                 }
2942         }
2943
2944         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2946         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2947         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2948         match events[0] {
2949                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2950                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2951                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2952                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2953                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2954                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2955                 },
2956                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2957         };
2958
2959         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2960         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2961         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2962
2963         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2964         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2965
2966         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2968         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2969         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2970         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2971         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2972         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2973         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2974         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2975 }
2976
2977 #[test]
2978 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2979         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2980         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2981         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2982 }
2983
2984 #[test]
2985 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2986         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2987         // and fail backward accordingly.
2988
2989         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2990         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2991         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2992         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2993
2994         // Create some initial channels
2995         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2996         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2997
2998         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2999         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3000         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3001         // Revoke the old state
3002         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3003
3004         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3005
3006         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3007         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3008         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3009         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3010         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3011
3012         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3013         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3014         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3015         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3016         match events[0] {
3017                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3018                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3019                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3020                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3021                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3022                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3023
3024                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3025                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3026                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3027                 },
3028                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3029         }
3030 }
3031
3032 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3033         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3034         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3035         // commitment transaction anymore.
3036         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3037         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3038         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3039         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3040         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3041         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3042         // transactions:
3043         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3044         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3045         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3046         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3047         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3048         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3049         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3050         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3051         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3052
3053         // Create some initial channels
3054         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3055         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3056
3057         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3058         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3059         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3060         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3061         // Revoke the old state
3062         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3063
3064         let value = if use_dust {
3065                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3066                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3067                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3068         } else { 3000000 };
3069
3070         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3071         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3072         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3073
3074         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3075         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3076         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3077         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3078         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3079         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3080         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3081         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3082         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3083         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3084         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3085         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3086
3087         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3088         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3089         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3090         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3091         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3092         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3093         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3094         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3095         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3096         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3097         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3098         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3099         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3100         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3101         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3102         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3103
3104         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3105         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3106         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3107         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3108         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3109         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3110         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3111         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3112         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3113         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3114         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3115         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3116         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3117         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3118         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3119         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3120         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3122
3123         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3124         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3125         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3126         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3127         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3128         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3129         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3130
3131         if deliver_bs_raa {
3132                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3133                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3134                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3135                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3136                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3137                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3138                 match events[0] {
3139                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3140                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3141                 };
3142                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3143                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3144         }
3145
3146         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3147         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3148
3149         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3151         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3152         assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3153
3154         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3155         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3156         match events[0] {
3157                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3158                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3159         }
3160         match events[1] {
3161                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3162                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3163                 },
3164                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3165         }
3166         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3167                 match events[2] {
3168                         Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3169                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3170                         },
3171                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3172                 }
3173                 match events[3] {
3174                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3175                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3176                 };
3177         }
3178         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3180
3181         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3182         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3183         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3184                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3185                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3186         }
3187         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3188                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3189                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3190                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3191                 },
3192                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3193         }
3194         if deliver_bs_raa {
3195                 match events[0] {
3196                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3197                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3198                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3199                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3200                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3201                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3202                         },
3203                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3204                 }
3205         }
3206         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3207                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3208                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3209                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3210                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3211                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3212                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3213
3214                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3215                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3216                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3217
3218                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3219
3220                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3221                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3222                         match events[0] {
3223                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3224                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3225                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3226                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3227                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3228                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3229                                         }
3230                                 },
3231                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3232                         }
3233                         match events[1] {
3234                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3235                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3236                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3237                                 },
3238                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3239                         }
3240                         match events[2] {
3241                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3242                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3243                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3244                                 },
3245                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3246                         }
3247                 },
3248                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3249         }
3250
3251         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3252         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3253         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3254 }
3255
3256 #[test]
3257 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3258         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3259         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3260         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3261         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3262 }
3263
3264 #[test]
3265 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3266         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3267         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3268         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3269         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3270 }
3271
3272 #[test]
3273 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3274         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3275         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3276         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3277         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3278         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3279
3280         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3281         {
3282                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3283                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3284                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3285
3286                 let payment_event = {
3287                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3288                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3289                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3290                 };
3291                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3292                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3293         }
3294
3295         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3296         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3297         {
3298                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3299                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3300
3301                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3302         }
3303
3304         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3305         {
3306                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3307
3308                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3309                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3310                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3311                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3312                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3313                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3314
3315                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3316                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3317                         channel_id: chan.2,
3318                         htlc_id: 0,
3319                         amount_msat: 0,
3320                         payment_hash,
3321                         cltv_expiry,
3322                         onion_routing_packet,
3323                 };
3324                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3325         }
3326         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3327         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3328         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3329         match events[0] {
3330                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3331                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3332                 },
3333                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3334         }
3335         match events[1] {
3336                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3337                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3338                 },
3339                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3340         }
3341         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3342         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3343 }
3344
3345 #[test]
3346 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3347         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3348         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3349         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3350         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3351         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3352         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3353         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3354
3355         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3356         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3357         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3358         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3359         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3360         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3361
3362         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3363         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3364         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3365
3366         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3367         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3368         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3369         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3370         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3371
3372         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3373         // registering new transactions
3374         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3375         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3376 }
3377
3378 #[test]
3379 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3380         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3381         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3382         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3383         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3384         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3385         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3386         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3387
3388         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3389
3390         let mut payment_event = {
3391                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3392                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3393
3394                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3395                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3396                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3397         };
3398
3399         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3400         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3401
3402         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3403
3404         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3405         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3406         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3407         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3408
3409         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3410         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3411         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3412         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3413         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3414
3415         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3416         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3417         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3418
3419         nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3420         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3421         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3422         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3423         let tx = {
3424                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3425                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3426                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3427                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3428                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3429                 node_txn.remove(0)
3430         };
3431
3432         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3433
3434         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3435         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3436         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3437         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3438
3439         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3440         {
3441                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3442                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3443         }
3444         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3445         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3446         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3447         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3448         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3449         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3450         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3451
3452         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3453 }
3454
3455 #[test]
3456 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3457         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3458         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3459         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3460         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3461
3462         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3463         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3464         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3465         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3466         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3467
3468         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3469
3470         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3471         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3472         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3473         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3474         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3475
3476         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3477         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3478
3479         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3480         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3481 }
3482
3483 #[test]
3484 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3485         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3486         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3487         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3488         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3489         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3490         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3491         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3492
3493         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3494         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3495         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3496
3497         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3498         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3499         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3500         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3501
3502         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3503         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3504         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3505
3506         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3507         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3508         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3509         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3510
3511         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3512         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3513
3514         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3515         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3516
3517         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3518         {
3519                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3520                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3521                 match events[0] {
3522                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3523                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3524                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3525                         },
3526                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3527                 }
3528                 match events[1] {
3529                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3530                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3531                                 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3532                         },
3533                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3534                 }
3535                 match events[2] {
3536                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3537                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3538                 }
3539         }
3540
3541         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3542         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3543 }
3544
3545 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3546         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3547         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3548         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3549         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3550         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3551
3552         let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3553         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3554                 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3555                 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3556                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3557                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3558                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3559         } else {
3560                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3561         }
3562
3563         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3564
3565         let payment_event = {
3566                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3567                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3568
3569                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3570                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3571                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3572         };
3573         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3574
3575         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3576                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3577         } else {
3578                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3579                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3580                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3581                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3582                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3583
3584                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3585                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3586                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3587                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3588
3589                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3590                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3591                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3592                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3593                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3594
3595                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3596                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3597                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3598                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3599                                         }
3600                                 }
3601                         }
3602                 }
3603         }
3604
3605         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3606         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3607         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3608                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3609                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3610                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3611                         //
3612                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3613                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3614                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3615                         //
3616                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3617                         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3618                 }
3619                 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3620                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3621                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3622         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3623                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3624                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3625         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3626                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3627                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3628         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3629                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3630                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3631         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3632                 // Everything was delivered...
3633                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3634         }
3635
3636         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3637         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3638         match events_1[0] {
3639                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3640                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3641         };
3642
3643         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3644         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3645         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3646
3647         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3648
3649         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3650         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3651         match events_2[0] {
3652                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3653                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3654                         assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3655                         match &purpose {
3656                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3657                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3658                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3659                                 },
3660                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3661                         }
3662                 },
3663                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3664         }
3665
3666         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3667         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3668
3669         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3670         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3671         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3672                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3673                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3674                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3675                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3676                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3677                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3678                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3679                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3680                 },
3681                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3682         };
3683
3684         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3685                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3686
3687                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3688                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3689                 match events_4[0] {
3690                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3691                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3692                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3693                         },
3694                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3695                 }
3696
3697                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3698                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3699                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3700                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3701
3702                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3703                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3704                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3705                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3706
3707                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3708                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3709                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3710                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3711                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3712
3713                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3714                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3715                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3716                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3717                                         }
3718                                 }
3719                         }
3720                 }
3721         }
3722
3723         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3724         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3725         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3726                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3727                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3728                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3729                 } else {
3730                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3731                 }
3732         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3733                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3734                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3735         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3736                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3737                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3738         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3739                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3740                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3741         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3742                 // Everything was delivered...
3743                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3744         }
3745
3746         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3747                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3748         }
3749
3750         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3751         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3752         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3753
3754         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3755                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3756         }
3757
3758         // Channel should still work fine...
3759         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3760         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3761         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3762 }
3763
3764 #[test]
3765 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3766         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3767         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3768         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3769         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3770 }
3771
3772 #[test]
3773 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3774         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3775         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3776         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3777         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3778 }
3779
3780 #[test]
3781 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3782         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3783         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3784         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3785         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3786         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3787         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3788         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3789         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3790         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3791
3792         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3793         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3794
3795         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3796         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3797         let chan_id;
3798         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3799         match events_1[0] {
3800                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3801                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3802                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3803                 },
3804                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3805         }
3806
3807         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3808
3809         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3810         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3811
3812         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3813         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3814         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3815         let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3816                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3817                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3818                         msg.clone()
3819                 },
3820                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3821         };
3822         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3823                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3824                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3825                         msg.clone()
3826                 },
3827                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3828         };
3829
3830         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3831
3832         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3833         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3834         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3835         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3836         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3837                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3838                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3839                         msg.clone()
3840                 },
3841                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3842         };
3843         let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3844                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3845                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3846                 },
3847                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3848         };
3849
3850         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3851         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3852         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3853         let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3854                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3855                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3856                 },
3857                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3858         };
3859
3860         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3861         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3862         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3863
3864         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3865         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3866         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3867
3868         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3869         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3870         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3871
3872         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3873         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3874         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3875
3876         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3877         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3878         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3879         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3880         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3881         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3882                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3883         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3884
3885         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3886         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3887                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3888                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3889                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3890                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3891                         keys_manager,
3892                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3893                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3894                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3895                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
3896                         channel_monitors,
3897                 }).unwrap()
3898         };
3899         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3900         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3901
3902         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3903         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3904         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3905
3906         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3907
3908         // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3909         nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3910         let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3911         let mut found_announcement = false;
3912         for event in msgs.iter() {
3913                 match event {
3914                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3915                                 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3916                         },
3917                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3918                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3919                 }
3920         }
3921         assert!(found_announcement);
3922 }
3923
3924 #[test]
3925 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3926         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3927         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3928         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3929         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3930         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3931         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3932         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3933
3934         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3935
3936         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3937         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3938         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3939         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3940
3941         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3942         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3943         match events_1[0] {
3944                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3945                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3946         }
3947
3948         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3949         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3950
3951         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3952         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3953         match events_2[0] {
3954                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3955                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3956                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3957                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3958                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3959                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3960                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3961
3962                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3963                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3964                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3965                         match events_3[0] {
3966                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3967                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3968                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3969                                 },
3970                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3971                         }
3972
3973                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3974                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3975                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3976                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3977                 },
3978                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3979         }
3980
3981         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3982         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3983
3984         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3985         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3986         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3987         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3988         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3989         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3990
3991         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3992         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3993         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3994         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3995
3996         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3997         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3998
3999         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4000         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4001
4002         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4003
4004         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4005         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4006         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4007         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4008         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4009         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4010         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4011         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4012         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4013         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4014
4015         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4016         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4017         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4018         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4019         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4020         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4021         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4022         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4023
4024         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4025         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4026         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4027         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4028         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4029         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4030         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4031         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4032
4033         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4034         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4035         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4036         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4037
4038         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4039         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4040         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4041         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4042
4043         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4044         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4045         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4046
4047         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4048
4049         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4050         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4051         match events_5[0] {
4052                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4053                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4054                         match &purpose {
4055                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4056                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4057                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4058                                 },
4059                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4060                         }
4061                 },
4062                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4063         }
4064
4065         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4066         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4067         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4068
4069         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4070         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4071 }
4072
4073 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4074         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4075         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4076         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4077         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4078         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4079         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4080
4081         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4082
4083         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4084                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4085                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4086                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4087                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4088                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4089                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4090                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4091                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4092                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4093                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4094                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4095                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4096                 our_payment_hash
4097         } else {
4098                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4099         };
4100
4101         let mut block = Block {
4102                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4103                 txdata: vec![],
4104         };
4105         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4106         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4107         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4108         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4109                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4110                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4111                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4112         }
4113
4114         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4115
4116         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4117         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4118         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4119         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4120         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4121         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4122
4123         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4124         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4125         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4126         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4127         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4128         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4129 }
4130
4131 #[test]
4132 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4133         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4134         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4135 }
4136
4137 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4138         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4139         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4140         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4141         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4142         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4143         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4144         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4145
4146         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4147         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4148         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4149         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4150
4151         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4152         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4153         {
4154                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4155         }
4156         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4157         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4158
4159         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4160         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4161         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4162         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4163         if forwarded_htlc {
4164                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4165                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4166                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4167                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4168                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4169         }
4170         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4171
4172         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4173         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4174         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4175         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4176
4177         if forwarded_htlc {
4178                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4179                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4180                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4181                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4182                 match fail_commit[0] {
4183                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4184                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4185                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4186                         },
4187                         _ => unreachable!(),
4188                 }
4189                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4190         } else {
4191                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4192                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4193                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4194                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4195                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4196                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4197                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4198                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4199         }
4200 }
4201
4202 #[test]
4203 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4204         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4205         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4206 }
4207
4208 #[test]
4209 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4210         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4211         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4212         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4213         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4214         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4215         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4216         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4217         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4218         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4219
4220         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4221
4222         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4223
4224         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4225         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4226         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4227                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4228
4229         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4230         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4231         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4232         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4233         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4234         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4235         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4236         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4237                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4238         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4239
4240         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4241         let config = UserConfig::default();
4242         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4243                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4244                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4245                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4246                         default_config: config,
4247                         keys_manager,
4248                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4249                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4250                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4251                         logger: &logger,
4252                         channel_monitors,
4253                 }).unwrap()
4254         };
4255         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4256         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4257
4258         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4259         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4260         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4261         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4262
4263         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4264         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4265         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4266         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4267
4268         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4269         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4270         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4271         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4272
4273         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4274         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4275         for node in nodes.iter() {
4276                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4277                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4278                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4279         }
4280
4281         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4282 }
4283
4284 #[test]
4285 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4286         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4287         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4288         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4289         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4290         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4291         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4292         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4293         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4294         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4295         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4296
4297         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4298         let channel_value = 100000;
4299         let push_msat = 10001;
4300         let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4301         let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4302         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4303         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4304         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4305         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4306         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4307
4308         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4309
4310         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4311         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4312
4313         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4314         {
4315                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4316                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4317                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4318                 added_monitors.clear();
4319         }
4320
4321         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4322         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4323         {
4324                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4325                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4326                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4327                 added_monitors.clear();
4328         }
4329         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4330
4331         nodes.push(node_a);
4332         nodes.push(node_b);
4333
4334         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4335         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4336         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4337         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4338
4339         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4340         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4341         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4342         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4343         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4344         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4345         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4346         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4347                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4348         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4349
4350         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4351         let config = UserConfig::default();
4352         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4353                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4354                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4355                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4356                         default_config: config,
4357                         keys_manager,
4358                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4359                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4360                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4361                         logger: &logger,
4362                         channel_monitors,
4363                 }).unwrap()
4364         };
4365         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4366         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4367
4368         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4369
4370         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4371         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4372
4373         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4374         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4375         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4376         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4377         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4378
4379         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4380         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4381         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4382
4383         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4384         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4385         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4386         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4387
4388         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4389         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4390         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4391         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4392
4393         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4394         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4395         for node in nodes.iter() {
4396                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4397                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4398                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4399         }
4400
4401         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4402 }
4403
4404 #[test]
4405 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4406         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4407         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4408         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4409         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4410         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4411         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4412         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4413         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4414         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4415         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4416
4417         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4418         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4419
4420         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4421
4422         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4423         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4424         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4425
4426         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4427         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4428         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4429         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4430         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4431         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4432         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4433         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4434                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4435         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4436
4437         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4438         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4439                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4440                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4441                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4442                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4443                         keys_manager,
4444                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4445                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4446                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4447                         logger: &logger,
4448                         channel_monitors,
4449                 }).unwrap()
4450         };
4451         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4452         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4453
4454         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4455         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4456         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4457
4458         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4459
4460         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4461         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4462 }
4463
4464 #[test]
4465 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4466         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4467         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4468         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4469         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4470         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4471         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4472         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4473         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4474         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4475         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4476         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4477         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4478         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4479
4480         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4481         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4482                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4483                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4484                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4485         }
4486
4487         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4488
4489         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4490         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4491
4492         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4493         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4494         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4495         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4496
4497         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4498         // nodes[3])
4499         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4500         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4501                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4502                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4503                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4504         }
4505
4506         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4507         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4508         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4509         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4510         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4511         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4512
4513
4514         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4515         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4516                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4517                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4518                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4519                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4520         }
4521
4522         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4523         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4524                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4525                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4526                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4527                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4528         }
4529
4530         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4531         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4532                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4533                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4534                 keys_manager,
4535                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4536                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4537                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4538                 logger: &logger,
4539                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4540         }) { } else {
4541                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4542         };
4543
4544         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4545         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4546                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4547                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4548                 keys_manager,
4549                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4550                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4551                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4552                 logger: &logger,
4553                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4554         }).unwrap();
4555         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4556         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4557
4558         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4559                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4560                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4561                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4562                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4563         }
4564
4565         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4566                 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4567                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4568         }
4569         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4570         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4571
4572         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4573         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4574         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4575         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4576         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4577
4578         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4579         let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4580         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4581         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4582         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4583         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4584         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4585                 match action {
4586                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4587                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4588                         },
4589                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4590                 }
4591         }
4592 }
4593
4594 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4595         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4596                 {
4597                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4598                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4599                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4600                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4601                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4602                                 match event {
4603                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4604                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4605                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4606                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4607                                                 }
4608                                         },
4609                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4610                                 };
4611                         }
4612                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4613                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4614                                         txn.push(tx);
4615                                 }
4616                         }
4617                         txn
4618                 }
4619         }
4620 }
4621
4622 #[test]
4623 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4624         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4625         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4626         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4627         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4628         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4629
4630         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4631         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4632         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4633         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4634         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4635         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4636         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4637         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4638         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4639
4640         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4641         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4642
4643         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4644         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4645         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4646         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4647         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4648 }
4649
4650 #[test]
4651 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4652         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4653         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4654         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4655         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4656         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4657         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4658
4659         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4660         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4661         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4662         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4663         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4664
4665         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4666         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4667         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4668         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4669
4670         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4671         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4672         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4673         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4674         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4675
4676         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4677         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4678         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4679 }
4680
4681 #[test]
4682 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4683         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4684         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4685
4686         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4687         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4688         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4689         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4690
4691         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4692         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4693         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4694         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4695         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4696
4697         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4698         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4699         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4700         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4701         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4702
4703         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4704         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4705         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4706
4707         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4708         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4709         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4710         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4711         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4712 }
4713
4714 #[test]
4715 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4716         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4717         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4718         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4719         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4720
4721         // Create some initial channels
4722         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4723
4724         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4725
4726         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4727         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4728         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4729
4730         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4731         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4732         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4733         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4734         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4735         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4736         match events[0] {
4737                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4738                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4739         }
4740         match events[1] {
4741                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4742                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4743         }
4744
4745         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4746         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4747         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4748         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4749         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4750         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4751         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4752
4753         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4754         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4755         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4756
4757         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4758         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4759         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4760 }
4761
4762 #[test]
4763 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4764         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4765         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4766         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4767         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4768
4769         // Create some initial channels
4770         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4771
4772         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4773         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4774
4775         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4776
4777         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4778         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4779         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4780
4781         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4782         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4783         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4784         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4785         match events[0] {
4786                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4787                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4788         }
4789         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4790
4791         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4792         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4793         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4794         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4795         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4796         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4797
4798         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4799         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4800         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4801         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4802
4803         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4804         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4805         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4806         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4807         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4808 }
4809
4810 #[test]
4811 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4812         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4813         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4814         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4815         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4816
4817         // Create some initial channels
4818         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4819
4820         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4821         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4822         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4823         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4824
4825         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4826
4827         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4828         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4829         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4830         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4831
4832         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4833         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4834         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4835         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4836
4837         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4838         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4839
4840         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4841         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4842         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4843 }
4844
4845 #[test]
4846 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4847         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4848         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4849         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4850         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4851         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4852
4853         // Create some initial channels
4854         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4855
4856         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4857         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4858         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4859         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4860
4861         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4862
4863         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4864         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4865         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4866         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4867         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4868         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4869
4870         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4871         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4872         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4873         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4874         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4875         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4876         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4877
4878         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4879         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4880         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4881         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4882         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4883         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4884
4885         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4886         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4887         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4888         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4889         // transactions next...
4890         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4891         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4892
4893         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4894         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4895         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4896                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4897         } else {
4898                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4899                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4900         }
4901
4902         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4903         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4904
4905         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4906         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4907
4908         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4909         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4910         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4911         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4912         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4913 }
4914
4915 #[test]
4916 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4917         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4918         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4919         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4920         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4921         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4922
4923         // Create some initial channels
4924         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4925
4926         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4927         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4928         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4929         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4930
4931         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4932         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4933
4934         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4935
4936         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4937         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4938         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4939         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4940         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4941         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4942
4943         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4944         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4945         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4946         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4947
4948         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4949         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4950         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4951
4952         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4953         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4954         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4955         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4956         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4957         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4958
4959         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4960         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4961
4962         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4963         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4964         // transactions next...
4965         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4966         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4967         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4968                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4969         } else {
4970                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4971                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4972         }
4973
4974         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4975         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4976
4977         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4978
4979         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4980         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4981
4982         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4983         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4984
4985         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4986         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4987         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4988         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4989         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4990         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4991         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4992         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4993 }
4994
4995 #[test]
4996 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4997         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4998         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4999         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5000         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5001         // channel.
5002         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5003         // gets broadcast.
5004
5005         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5006         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5007         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5008         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5009
5010         // Create some initial channels
5011         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5012         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5013
5014         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5015         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5016         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5017         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5018         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5019
5020         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5021         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5022         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5023
5024         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
5025         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5026         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5027         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5028         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5029         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5030         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5031         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5032         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5033         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5034
5035         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5036         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5037         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5038         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5039
5040         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5041         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5042         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5043         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5044         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5045         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5046         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5047         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5048         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5049         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5050
5051         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5052         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5053         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5054         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5055         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5056         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5057         match events[0] {
5058                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5059                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5060         }
5061         match events[1] {
5062                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
5063                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5064                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5065                 },
5066                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5067         }
5068         {
5069                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5070                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5071                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5072                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5073                 b_txn.clear();
5074         }
5075         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5076         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5077         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5078         match msg_events[0] {
5079                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5080                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5081         }
5082         match msg_events[1] {
5083                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5084                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5085         }
5086         match msg_events[2] {
5087                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5088                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5089                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5090                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5091                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5092                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5093                 },
5094                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5095         };
5096         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5097         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5098         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5099         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5100         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5101         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5102         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5103         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5104         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5105         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5106         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5107         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5108         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5109
5110         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5111         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5112 }
5113
5114 #[test]
5115 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5116         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5117         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5118         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5119         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5120         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5121         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5122         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5123         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5124         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5125         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5126         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5127                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5128         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5129
5130         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5131         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5132         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5133
5134         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5135         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5136         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5137         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5138         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5139
5140         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5141
5142         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5143         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5144         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5145         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5146         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5147         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5148
5149         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5150         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5151         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5152
5153         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5154         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5156         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5157         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5158
5159         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5160         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5161                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5162                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5163                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5164                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5165
5166                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5167                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5168                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5169                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5170                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5171                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5172                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5173
5174                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5175                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5176                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5177                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5178         }
5179
5180         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5181         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5182         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5183         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5184         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5185         match events[0] {
5186                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5187                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5188         }
5189         match events[1] {
5190                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5191                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5192         }
5193         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5194         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5195         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5196         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5197         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5198         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5199         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5200         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5201         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5202         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5203         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5204         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5205         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5206
5207         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5208         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5209         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5210         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5211         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5212         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5213         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5214         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5215         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5217
5218         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5219         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5220         {
5221                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5222         }
5223         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5224
5225         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5226         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5227         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5228         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5229         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5230         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5231         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5232         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5233         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5234         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5235         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5236         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5237
5238         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5239         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5240
5241         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5242         match events[0] {
5243                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5244                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5245                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5246                 }
5247                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5248         }
5249 }
5250
5251 #[test]
5252 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5253         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5254         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5255         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5256         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5257
5258         // Create some initial channels
5259         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5260
5261         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5262         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5263         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5264         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5265         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5266
5267         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5268         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5269         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5270         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5271         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5272         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5273         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5274         match events[0] {
5275                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5276                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5277         }
5278         match events[1] {
5279                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5280                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5281         }
5282         let node_tx = {
5283                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5284                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5285                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5286                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5287                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5288                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5289                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5290                 node_txn[0].clone()
5291         };
5292
5293         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5294         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5295
5296         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5297         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5298         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5299         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5300         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5301         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5302 }
5303
5304 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5305         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5306         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5307         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5308         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5309         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5310         // use the same payment hashes.
5311         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5312         //
5313         // A \         / E
5314         //    - C - D -
5315         // B /         \ F
5316         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5317         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5318         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5319         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5320         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5321         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5322         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5323         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5324                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5325         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5326
5327         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5328         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5329         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5330         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5331         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5332
5333         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5334         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5335         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5336         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5337
5338         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5339         // 0th HTLC:
5340         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5341         // 1st HTLC:
5342         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5343         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5344         // 2nd HTLC:
5345         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5346         // 3rd HTLC:
5347         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5348         // 4th HTLC:
5349         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5350         // 5th HTLC:
5351         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5352         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5353         // 6th HTLC:
5354         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5355         // 7th HTLC:
5356         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5357
5358         // 8th HTLC:
5359         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5360         // 9th HTLC:
5361         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5362         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5363
5364         // 10th HTLC:
5365         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5366         // 11th HTLC:
5367         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5368         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5369
5370         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5371         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5372         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5373         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5374         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5375
5376         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5377         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5378         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5379         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5380         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5381         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5382         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5383         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5384         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5385
5386         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5387         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5388         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5389         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5390         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5391         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5392
5393         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5394         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5395         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5396         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5397         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5398         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5399
5400         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5401         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5402         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5403         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5404
5405         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5406
5407         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5408         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5409         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5410         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5411         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5412         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5413         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5414         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5415         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5416         if deliver_last_raa {
5417                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5418         } else {
5419                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5420         }
5421
5422         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5423         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5424         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5425         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5426         //
5427         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5428         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5429         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5430         //
5431         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5432         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5433         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5434
5435         if announce_latest {
5436                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5437         } else {
5438                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5439         }
5440         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5441         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5442                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5443                 events[1].clone()
5444         } else {
5445                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5446                 events[0].clone()
5447         };
5448         match close_event {
5449                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5450                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5451         }
5452
5453         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5454         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5455         if deliver_last_raa {
5456                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5457         } else {
5458                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5459         }
5460         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5461
5462         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5463         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5464         let mut a_done = false;
5465         for msg in cs_msgs {
5466                 match msg {
5467                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5468                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5469                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5470                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5471                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5472                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5473                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5474                                         }
5475                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5476                                         assert!(!a_done);
5477                                         a_done = true;
5478                                         &nodes[0]
5479                                 } else {
5480                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5481                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5482                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5483                                         }
5484                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5485                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5486                                         &nodes[1]
5487                                 };
5488                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5489                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5490                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5491                                 if announce_latest {
5492                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5493                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5494                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5495                                         }
5496                                 }
5497                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5498                         },
5499                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5500                 }
5501         }
5502
5503         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5504         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5505         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5506         let mut as_updates = 0;
5507         for event in as_events.iter() {
5508                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5509                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5510                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5511                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5512                         } else {
5513                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5514                         }
5515                         if network_update.is_some() {
5516                                 as_updates += 1;
5517                         }
5518                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5519         }
5520         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5521         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5522         if announce_latest {
5523                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5524                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5525         }
5526         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5527
5528         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5529         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5530         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5531         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5532         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5533                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5534                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5535                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5536                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5537                         } else {
5538                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5539                         }
5540                         if network_update.is_some() {
5541                                 bs_updates += 1;
5542                         }
5543                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5544         }
5545         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5546         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5547         if announce_latest {
5548                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5549         }
5550         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5551
5552         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5553         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5554         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5555         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5556         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5557         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5558 }
5559
5560 #[test]
5561 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5562         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5563 }
5564
5565 #[test]
5566 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5567         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5568 }
5569
5570 #[test]
5571 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5572         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5573         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5574         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5575 }
5576
5577 #[test]
5578 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5579         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5580         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5581         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5582         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5583
5584         // Create some initial channels
5585         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5586
5587         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5588         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5589         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5590         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5591
5592         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5593         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5594         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5595         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5596         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5597         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5598
5599         let htlc_timeout = {
5600                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5601                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5602                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5603                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5604                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5605                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5606                 node_txn[1].clone()
5607         };
5608
5609         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5610         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5611         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5612
5613         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5614         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5615         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5616         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5617         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5618         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5619         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5620         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5621         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5622         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5623                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5624 }
5625
5626 #[test]
5627 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5628         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5629         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5630         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5631
5632         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5633
5634         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5635         let seed = [42; 32];
5636         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5637         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5638         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5639         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5640         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5641         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5642
5643         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5644         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5645
5646         // Create some initial channels
5647         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5648         // for node 0
5649         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5650         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5651         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5652
5653         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5654         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5655         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5656         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5657         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5658
5659         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5660         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5661         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5662         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5663         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5664
5665         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5666         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5667         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5668         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5669             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5670             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5671             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5672                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5673         }
5674
5675         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5676         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5677         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5678         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5679         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5680         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5681
5682         let htlc_timeout = {
5683                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5684                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5685                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5686                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5687                 node_txn[1].clone()
5688         };
5689
5690         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5691         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5692         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5693
5694         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5695         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5696         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5697         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5698         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5699         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5700         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5701         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5702         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5703         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5704         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5705                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5706 }
5707
5708 #[test]
5709 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5710         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5711         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5712         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5713         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5714
5715         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5716
5717         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5718         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5719
5720         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5721         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5722         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5723
5724         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5725         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5726         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5727
5728         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5729         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5730         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5731
5732         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5733         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5734         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5735 }
5736
5737 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5738         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5739         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5740         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5741         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5742         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5743
5744         let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5745
5746         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5747         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5748         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5749         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5750
5751         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5752         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5753         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5754
5755         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5756         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5757         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5758         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5759         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5760
5761         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5762         let mut block = Block {
5763                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5764                 txdata: vec![],
5765         };
5766         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5767                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5768                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5769         }
5770         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5771         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5772         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5773         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5774 }
5775
5776 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5777         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5778         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5779         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5780         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5781         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5782
5783         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5784         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5785         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5786
5787         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5788
5789         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5790         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5791         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5792
5793         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5794         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5795
5796         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5797                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5798                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5799         }
5800         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5801         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5803         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5804 }
5805
5806 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5807         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5808         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5809         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5810         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5811         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5812
5813         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5814         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5815         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5816         // actually revoked.
5817         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5818         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5819         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5820         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5821         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5822
5823         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5824         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5825         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5826         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5827         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5828         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5829         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5830         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5831         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5832         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5833
5834         if check_revoke_no_close {
5835                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5836                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5837         }
5838
5839         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5840         let mut block = Block {
5841                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5842                 txdata: vec![],
5843         };
5844         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5845                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5846                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5847         }
5848         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5849                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5850                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5851                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5852                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5853         } else {
5854                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5855                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5856                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
5857                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5858                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5859                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
5860                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5861                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5862         }
5863 }
5864
5865 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5866 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5867 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5868 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5869 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5870 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5871 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5872 // non-dust HTLCs.
5873 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5874 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5875 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5876 #[test]
5877 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5878         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5879         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5880
5881         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5882         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5883 }
5884
5885 #[test]
5886 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5887         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5888         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5889         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5890         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5891 }
5892
5893 #[test]
5894 #[should_panic]
5895 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5896         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5897         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5898         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5899         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5900         //Force duplicate channel ids
5901         for node in nodes.iter() {
5902                 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5903         }
5904
5905         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5906         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5907         let push_msat=10001;
5908         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5909         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5910         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5911
5912         //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5913         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5914 }
5915
5916 #[test]
5917 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5918         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5919         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5920         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5921         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5922
5923         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5924         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5925         let push_msat=10001;
5926         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5927
5928         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5929         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5930         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5931         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5932         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5933
5934         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5935         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5936         let push_msat=10001;
5937         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5938         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5939         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5940
5941         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5942         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5943         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5944
5945         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5946         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5947         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5948
5949         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5950         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5951         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5952
5953         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5954         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5955         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5956         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5957         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5958         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5959 }
5960
5961 #[test]
5962 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5963         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5964         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5965         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5966         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5967
5968         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5969         let push_msat=10001;
5970         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5971         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5972         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5973         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5974
5975         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5976         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5977         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5978                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5979                         msg.clone()
5980                 },
5981                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5982         };
5983         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5984 }
5985
5986 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5987 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5988 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5989 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5990 #[test]
5991 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5992         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5993         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5994         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5995         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5996         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5997
5998         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5999         // pending_update_fee.
6000         {
6001                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6002                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6003         }
6004         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6005         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6006
6007         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6008         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6009         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6010                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6011                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6012                 },
6013                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6014         };
6015
6016         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6017
6018         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6019         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6020         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6021
6022         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6023         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6024         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6025
6026         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6027         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6028         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6029         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6030
6031         // Flush the pending fee update.
6032         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6033         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6034         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6035         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6036         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6037
6038         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6039         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6040         // us to surface its failure to the user.
6041         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6042         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6043         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6044         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6045                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6046         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6047
6048         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6049         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6050         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6051         match &events[0] {
6052                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6053                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6054                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6055                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6056                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6057                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6058                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6059                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6060                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6061                 },
6062                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6063         }
6064 }
6065
6066 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6067 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6068 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6069 #[test]
6070 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6071         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6072         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6073         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6074         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6075         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6076
6077         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6078         // pending_update_fee.
6079         {
6080                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6081                 *feerate_lock += 200;
6082         }
6083         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6084         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6085
6086         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6087         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6088         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6089                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6090                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6091                 },
6092                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6093         };
6094
6095         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6096
6097         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6098         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6099         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6100
6101         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6102         let amt_1 = 20000;
6103         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
6104         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6105         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6106
6107         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6108         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6109         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6110         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6111         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6112         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6113         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6114
6115         // Flush the pending fee update.
6116         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6117         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6118         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6119         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6120         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6122
6123         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6124         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6125         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6126         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6127         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6128         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6129         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6130                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6131         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6132
6133         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6134         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6135         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6136         match &events[0] {
6137                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6138                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6139                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6140                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6141                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6142                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6143                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6144                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6145                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6146                 },
6147                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6148         }
6149
6150         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6151         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6152                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6153                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6154                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6155         };
6156         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6157                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6158                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6159         };
6160         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6161         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6162         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6163         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6164         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6165         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6166         match events[0] {
6167                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6168                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6169         }
6170         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6171         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6172         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6173         match events[0] {
6174                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6175                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6176         }
6177         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6179         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6180         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6181         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6182         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6183 }
6184
6185 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6186 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6187 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6188 // once it's freed.
6189 #[test]
6190 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6191         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6192         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6193         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6194         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6195         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6196         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6197         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6198         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6199         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6200         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6201
6202         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6203         // pending_update_fee.
6204         {
6205                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6206                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6207         }
6208         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6209         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6210
6211         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6212         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6213         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6214                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6215                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6216                 },
6217                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6218         };
6219
6220         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6221
6222         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6223         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6224         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6225
6226         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6227         let feemsat = 239;
6228         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6229         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6230         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6231         let payment_event = {
6232                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6233                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6234
6235                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6236                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6237
6238                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6239         };
6240         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6241         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6242         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6243         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6244
6245         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6246         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6247
6248         // Flush the pending fee update.
6249         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6250         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6251         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6252         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6253         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6254         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6255
6256         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6257         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6258         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6259
6260         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6261                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6262                         msg.clone()
6263                 },
6264                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6265         };
6266
6267         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6268         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6269         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6270
6271         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6272         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6273         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6274         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6275                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6276                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6277         }
6278
6279         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6280         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6281         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6282
6283         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6284         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6285         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6286         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6287                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6288                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6289                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6290                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6291                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6292                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6293                 },
6294                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6295         };
6296
6297         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6298         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6299         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6300
6301         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6302         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6303         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6304         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6305         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6306         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6307         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6308         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6309         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6310                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6311                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6312         };
6313         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6314         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6315         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6316 }
6317
6318 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6319 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6320 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6321
6322 #[test]
6323 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6324         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6325         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6326         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6327         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6328         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6329         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6330
6331         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6332         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6333
6334         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6335                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6336         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6337         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6338 }
6339
6340 #[test]
6341 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6342         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6343         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6344         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6345         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6346         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6347         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6348
6349         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6350         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6351         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6352                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6353
6354         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6355         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6356 }
6357
6358 #[test]
6359 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6360         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6361         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6362         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6363         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6364         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6365         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6366
6367         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6368         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6369         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6370         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6371         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6372
6373         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6374         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6375         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6376         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6377         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6378 }
6379
6380 #[test]
6381 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6382         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6383         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6384         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6385         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6386         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6387         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6388         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6389
6390         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6391         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6392                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6393 }
6394
6395 #[test]
6396 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6397         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6398         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6399         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6400         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6401         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6402         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6403         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6404         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6405         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6406
6407         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6408                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6409                 let payment_event = {
6410                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6411                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6412
6413                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6414                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6415                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6416                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6417                         } else {
6418                                 assert!(false);
6419                         }
6420                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6421                 };
6422                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6423                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6424                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6425
6426                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6427                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6428         }
6429         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6430         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6431                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6432
6433         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6434         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6435 }
6436
6437 #[test]
6438 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6439         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6440         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6441         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6442         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6443         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6444         let channel_value = 100000;
6445         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6446         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6447
6448         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6449
6450         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6451         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6452         // limits us to.
6453         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6454         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6455                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6456
6457         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6458         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6459
6460         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6461 }
6462
6463 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6464 #[test]
6465 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6466         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6467         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6468         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6469         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6470         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6471         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6472         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6473         {
6474                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6475                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6476                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6477         }
6478
6479         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6480         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6481         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6482         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6483         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6484         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6485         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6486         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6487         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6488         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6489         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6490 }
6491
6492 #[test]
6493 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6494         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6495         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6496         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6497         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6498         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6499         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6500
6501         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6502         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6503         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6504         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6505         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6506
6507         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6508         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6509         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6510         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6511         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6512
6513         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6514         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6515         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6516         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6517         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6518
6519         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6520         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6521         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6522         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6523         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6524 }
6525
6526 #[test]
6527 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6528         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6529         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6530         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6531         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6532         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6533         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6534         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6535
6536         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6537         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6538         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6539         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6540         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6541         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6542
6543         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6544                 channel_id: chan.2,
6545                 htlc_id: 0,
6546                 amount_msat: 1000,
6547                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6548                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6549                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6550         };
6551
6552         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6553                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6554                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6555         }
6556         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6557         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6558
6559         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6560         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6561         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6562         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6563         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6564 }
6565
6566 #[test]
6567 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6568         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6569         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6570         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6571         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6572         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6573         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6574
6575         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6576         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6577         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6578         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6579         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6580         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6581
6582         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6583         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6584         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6585         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6586         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6587 }
6588
6589 #[test]
6590 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6591         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6592         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6593         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6594         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6595         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6596
6597         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6598         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6599         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6600         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6601         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6602         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6603         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6604
6605         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6606         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6607         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6608         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6609         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6610 }
6611
6612 #[test]
6613 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6614         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6615         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6616         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6617         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6618         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6619         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6620         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6621
6622         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6623         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6624         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6625         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6626         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6627         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6628
6629         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6630         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6631         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6632         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6633         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6634         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6635         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6636         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6637         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6638         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6639         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6640         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6641         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6642
6643         //Resend HTLC
6644         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6645         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6646         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6647         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6648         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6649
6650         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6651
6652         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6653         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6654         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6655         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6656         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6657 }
6658
6659 #[test]
6660 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6661         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6662
6663         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6664         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6665         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6666         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6667         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6668         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6669         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6670
6671         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6672         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6673         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6674
6675         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6676                 channel_id: chan.2,
6677                 htlc_id: 0,
6678                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6679         };
6680
6681         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6682
6683         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6684         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6685         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6686         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6687         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6688 }
6689
6690 #[test]
6691 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6692         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6693
6694         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6695         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6696         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6697         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6698         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6699
6700         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6701         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6702         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6703         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6704         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6705
6706         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6707                 channel_id: chan.2,
6708                 htlc_id: 0,
6709                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6710         };
6711
6712         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6713
6714         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6715         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6716         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6717         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6718         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6719 }
6720
6721 #[test]
6722 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6723         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6724
6725         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6726         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6727         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6728         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6729         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6730
6731         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6732         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6733         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6734         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6735         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6736         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6737                 channel_id: chan.2,
6738                 htlc_id: 0,
6739                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6740                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6741         };
6742
6743         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6744
6745         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6746         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6747         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6748         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6749         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6750 }
6751
6752 #[test]
6753 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6754         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6755
6756         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6757         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6758         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6759         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6760         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6761
6762         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6763
6764         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6765         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6766
6767         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6768         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6769         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6770                 match events[0] {
6771                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6772                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6773                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6774                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6775                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6776                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6777                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6778                         },
6779                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6780                 }
6781         };
6782
6783         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6784
6785         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6786
6787         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6788         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6789         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6790         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6791         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6792 }
6793
6794 #[test]
6795 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6796         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6797
6798         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6799         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6800         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6801         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6802         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6803
6804         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6805
6806         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6807         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6808
6809         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6810         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6811         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6812                 match events[0] {
6813                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6814                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6815                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6816                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6817                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6818                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6819                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6820                         },
6821                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6822                 }
6823         };
6824
6825         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6826
6827         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6828
6829         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6830         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6831         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6832         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6833         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6834 }
6835
6836 #[test]
6837 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6838         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6839
6840         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6841         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6842         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6843         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6844         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6845
6846         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6847         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6848         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6849
6850         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6851         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6852
6853         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6854         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6855         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6856
6857         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6858
6859         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6860                 match events[0] {
6861                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6862                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6863                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6864                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6865                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6866                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6867                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6868                         },
6869                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6870                 }
6871         };
6872         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6873         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6874
6875         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6876         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6877         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6878         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6879         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6880 }
6881
6882 #[test]
6883 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6884         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6885         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6886
6887         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6888         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6889         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6890         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6891         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6892         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6893
6894         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6895
6896         //First hop
6897         let mut payment_event = {
6898                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6899                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6900                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6901                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6902                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6903         };
6904         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6905         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6906         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6907         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6908         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6909         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6910         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6911         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6912         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6913
6914         //Second Hop
6915         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6916         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6918         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6919
6920         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6921         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6922         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6923                 match events_3[0] {
6924                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6925                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6926                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6927                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6928                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6929                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6930                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6931                         },
6932                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6933                 }
6934         };
6935
6936         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6937
6938         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6939         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6940         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6941         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6942         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6943
6944         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6945         match events_4[0] {
6946                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6947                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6948                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6949                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6950                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6951                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6952                 },
6953                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6954         };
6955
6956         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6957 }
6958
6959 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6960         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6961         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6962         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6963
6964         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6965         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6966         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6967         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6968         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6969         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6970
6971         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6972
6973         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6974         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6975         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6976         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6977
6978         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6979         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6980
6981         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6982         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6983         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6984         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6985         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6986
6987         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6988         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6989         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6990         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6991
6992         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6993         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6994
6995         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6996         match events[0] {
6997                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6998                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6999                 },
7000                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7001         }
7002         match events[1] {
7003                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7004                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7005                 },
7006                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7007         }
7008
7009         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7010         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7011         if announce_latest {
7012                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7013         } else {
7014                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7015         }
7016
7017         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7018         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7019         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7020
7021         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7022         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7023         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7024         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7025         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7026         let mut first_failed = false;
7027         for event in events {
7028                 match event {
7029                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7030                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7031                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7032                                         first_failed = true;
7033                                 } else {
7034                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7035                                 }
7036                         }
7037                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7038                 }
7039         }
7040 }
7041
7042 #[test]
7043 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7044         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7045         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7046 }
7047
7048 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7049         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7050         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7051         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7052         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7053         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7054         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7055
7056         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7057         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7058         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7059         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7060         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7061
7062         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7063
7064         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7065         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7066
7067         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7068         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7069
7070         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7071         if revoked {
7072                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7073                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7074         }
7075
7076         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7077         if local {
7078                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7079                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7080                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7081                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7082                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7083
7084                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7085                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7086                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7087                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7088                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7089                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7090                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7091                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7092                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7093                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7094                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7095         } else {
7096                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7097                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7098                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7099                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7100                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7101                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7102                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7103                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7104                 if !revoked {
7105                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7106                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7107                         // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7108                         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7109                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7110                         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7111                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7112                 } else {
7113                         // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7114                         // commitment tx
7115                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7116                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7117                         let first;
7118                         match events[0] {
7119                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7120                                         if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7121                                         else { first = false; }
7122                                 },
7123                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7124                         }
7125                         match events[1] {
7126                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7127                                         if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7128                                         else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7129                                 },
7130                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7131                         }
7132                 }
7133         }
7134 }
7135
7136 #[test]
7137 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7138         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7139         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7140         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7141 }
7142
7143 #[test]
7144 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7145         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7146
7147         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7148         low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7149         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7150         high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7151         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7152         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7153         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7154         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7155         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7156
7157         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7158         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7159                 match error {
7160                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7161                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7162                 }
7163         } else { assert!(false) }
7164
7165         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7166         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7167         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7168         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7169         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7170                 match error {
7171                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7172                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7173                 }
7174         } else { assert!(false); }
7175
7176         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7177         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7178         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7179         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7180         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7181         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7182         let reason_msg;
7183         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7184                 match action {
7185                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7186                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7187                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7188                         },
7189                         _ => { panic!(); }
7190                 }
7191         } else { panic!(); }
7192         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7193
7194         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7195         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7196         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7197         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7198         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7199                 match error {
7200                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7201                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7202                 }
7203         } else { assert!(false); }
7204 }
7205
7206 #[test]
7207 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7208         // We want to be sure that :
7209         // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7210         //   (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7211         // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7212         // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7213         // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7214         let persister;
7215         let logger;
7216         let fee_estimator;
7217         let tx_broadcaster;
7218         let chain_source;
7219         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7220         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7221         // during signing due to revoked tx
7222         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7223         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7224         let monitor;
7225         let node_state_0;
7226         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7227         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7228         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7229
7230         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7231
7232         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7233         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7234         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7235         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7236
7237         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7238         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7239
7240         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7241         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7242
7243         // Restore node A from previous state
7244         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7245         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7246         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7247         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7248         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7249         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7250         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7251         node_state_0 = {
7252                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7253                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7254                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7255                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7256                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7257                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7258                         logger: &logger,
7259                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7260                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7261                         channel_monitors,
7262                 }).unwrap().1
7263         };
7264         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7265         assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7266         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7267         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7268
7269         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7270
7271         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7272         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7273
7274         let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7275
7276         // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7277         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7278         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7279
7280         {
7281                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7282                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7283         }
7284
7285         let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7286         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7287                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7288                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7289                         reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7290                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7291                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7292                         match action {
7293                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7294                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7295                                 },
7296                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7297                         }
7298                 } else {
7299                         panic!("Unexpected event")
7300                 }
7301         }
7302
7303         // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7304         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7305         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7306         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7307         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7308
7309         // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7310         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7311         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7312         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7313         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7314         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7315         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7316         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7317         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7318         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7319         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7320 }
7321
7322 #[test]
7323 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7324         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7325         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7326         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7327
7328         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7329         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7330         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7331         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7332
7333         // Create some initial channels
7334         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7335
7336         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7337         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7338         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[0].network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7339         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7340         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7341         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7342         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7343
7344         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7345         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7346         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7347         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7348         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7349
7350         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7351         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7352         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7353         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7354
7355         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7356         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7357         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7358
7359         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7360         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7361         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7362                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7363                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7364                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7365                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7366                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7367                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7368                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7369                 },
7370                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7371         };
7372         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7373
7374         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7375         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7376
7377         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7378         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7379         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7380         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7381 }
7382
7383 #[test]
7384 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7385         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7386         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7387
7388         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7389         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7390         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7391         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7392
7393         let short_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7394         let short_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7395         let short_id_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7396
7397         // Disconnect peers
7398         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7399         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7400
7401         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7402         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7403         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7404         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7405         let mut chans_disabled: HashSet<u64> = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7406         for e in msg_events {
7407                 match e {
7408                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7409                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7410                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7411                                 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7412                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7413                                 }
7414                         },
7415                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7416                 }
7417         }
7418         // Reconnect peers
7419         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7420         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7421         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7422         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7423         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7424         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7425
7426         // Reestablish chan_1
7427         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7428         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7429         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7430         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7431         // Reestablish chan_2
7432         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7433         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7434         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7435         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7436         // Reestablish chan_3
7437         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7438         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7439         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7440         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7441
7442         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7443         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7444         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7445         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7446         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7447         chans_disabled = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7448         for e in msg_events {
7449                 match e {
7450                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7451                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7452                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7453                                 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7454                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7455                                 }
7456                         },
7457                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7458                 }
7459         }
7460 }
7461
7462 #[test]
7463 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7464         // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7465         // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7466         // to forward through that channel.
7467         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7468         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7469         let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7470         no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7471         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7472         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7473         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7474         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7475         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7476         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7477
7478         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7479
7480         // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7481         // not send for private channels.
7482         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7483         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7484         nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7485         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7486         nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7487
7488         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7489         nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7490         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7491         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7492
7493         let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7494         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7495         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7496
7497         let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7498         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7499         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7500         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7501         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7502         let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7503         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7504         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7505         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7506         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7507
7508         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7509         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7510         assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7511
7512         // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7513         // channel:
7514         send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7515
7516         // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7517         // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7518         let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7519                 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7520                 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7521                 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7522                 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7523                 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7524                 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7525         }]);
7526         let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7527         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7528
7529         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7530         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7531         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7532         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7533         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7534
7535         let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7536         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7537         assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7538         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7539         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7540
7541         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7542         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7543         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7544
7545         // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7546         // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7547
7548         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7549         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7550
7551         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7552         let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7553         let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7554         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7555         get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7556
7557         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7558         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7559         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7560         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7561
7562         let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7563         let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7564         let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7565         let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7566         assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7567         assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7568
7569         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7570
7571         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7572         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7573                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7574                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7575                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7576                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7577                         default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7578                         keys_manager,
7579                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7580                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7581                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7582                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
7583                         channel_monitors,
7584                 }).unwrap()
7585         };
7586         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7587         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7588
7589         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7590         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7591         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7592         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7593
7594         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7595         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7596         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7597         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7598         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7599         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7600         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7601         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7602
7603         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7604         nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7605         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7606         let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7607         nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7608         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7609         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7610         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7611
7612         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7613         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7614         pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7615         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7616 }
7617
7618 #[test]
7619 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7620         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7621         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7622
7623         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7624         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7625         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7626         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7627
7628         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7629
7630         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7631         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7632         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7633
7634         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7635         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7636         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7637         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7638         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7639         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7640
7641         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7642         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7643                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7644                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7645                 }
7646         }
7647
7648         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7649         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7650
7651         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7652         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7653         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7654         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7655         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7656
7657         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7658         let penalty_1;
7659         let feerate_1;
7660         {
7661                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7662                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7663                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7664                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7665                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7666                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7667                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7668                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7669                 node_txn.clear();
7670         };
7671
7672         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7673         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7674         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7675         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7676         {
7677                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7678                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7679                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7680                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7681                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7682                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7683                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7684                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7685                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7686                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7687                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7688                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7689                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7690                         node_txn.clear();
7691                 }
7692         }
7693         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7694
7695         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7696         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7697         let penalty_3;
7698         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7699         {
7700                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7701                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7702                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7703                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7704                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7705                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7706                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7707                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7708                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7709                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7710                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7711                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7712                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7713                         node_txn.clear();
7714                 }
7715         }
7716         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7717
7718         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7719         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7720 }
7721
7722 #[test]
7723 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7724         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7725         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7726
7727         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7728         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7729         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7730         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7731         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7732
7733         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7734         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7735         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7736         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7737         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7738                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7739         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7740         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7741         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[1].network_graph, None,
7742                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7743         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7744
7745         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7746         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7747         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7748
7749         // Revoke local commitment tx
7750         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7751
7752         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7753         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7754         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7755         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7756         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7757         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7758         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7759
7760         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7761         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7762         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7763
7764         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7765         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7766         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7767
7768         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7769         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7770         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7771         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7772
7773         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7774         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7775         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7776         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7777         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7778         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7779         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7780         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7781         match events[1] {
7782                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7783                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7784         }
7785         let first;
7786         let feerate_1;
7787         let penalty_txn;
7788         {
7789                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7790                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7791                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7792
7793                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7794                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7795                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7796                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7797                 // future).
7798                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7799                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7800                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7801                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7802                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7803                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7804
7805                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7806                 // available, which we check here:
7807                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7808                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7809                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7810
7811                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7812                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7813
7814                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7815                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7816                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7817                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7818
7819                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7820                 // output, checked above).
7821                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7822                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7823                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7824
7825                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7826                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7827                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7828                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7829                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7830                 node_txn.clear();
7831         }
7832
7833         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7834         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7835         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7836         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7837         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7838         {
7839                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7840                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7841
7842                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7843                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7844                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7845                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
7846                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7847                 } else {
7848                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7849                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7850                 }
7851
7852                 node_txn.clear();
7853         };
7854
7855         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7856         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7857         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7858         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7859         let node_txn = {
7860                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7861                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7862
7863                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7864                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7865                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7866                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7867                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7868                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7869                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7870                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7871                 node_txn.clear();
7872                 txn
7873         };
7874         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7875         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7876         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7877         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7878         {
7879                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7880                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7881                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7882                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7883                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7884                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7885                 // up bumped justice generation.
7886                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7887                 node_txn.clear();
7888         }
7889         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7890         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7891 }
7892
7893 #[test]
7894 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7895         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7896         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7897
7898         // Create 2 HTLCs
7899         // Provide preimage for one
7900         // Check aggregation
7901
7902         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7903         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7904         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7905         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7906
7907         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7908         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7909         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7910
7911         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7912         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7913         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7914         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7915         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7916
7917         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7918         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7919         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7921         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7922
7923         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7924         let timeout;
7925         let preimage;
7926         let preimage_bump;
7927         let feerate_timeout;
7928         let feerate_preimage;
7929         {
7930                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7931                 // 9 transactions including:
7932                 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7933                 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7934                 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7935                 // 1 * HTLC-Timeout
7936                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7937                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7938                 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7939                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7940                 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7941                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7942                 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7943
7944                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7945                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7946                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7947                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7948
7949                 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7950                 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7951                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7952                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7953
7954                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7955                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7956                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7957                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7958
7959                 node_txn.clear();
7960         };
7961         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7962         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7963
7964         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7965         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7966         {
7967                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7968                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7969                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7970                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7971                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7972                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7973
7974                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7975                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7976                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7977                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7978                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7979
7980                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7981                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7982                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7983                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7984                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7985
7986                 node_txn.clear();
7987         }
7988
7989         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7990         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7991 }
7992
7993 #[test]
7994 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7995         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7996         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7997         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7998         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7999         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8000         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8001         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8002         // implement that).
8003         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8004         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8005         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8006         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8007         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8008
8009         let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8010         let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8011
8012         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8013
8014         // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8015         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8016         let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8017
8018         // Must revoke without gaps
8019         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8020         keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8021
8022         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8023         let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8024                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8025
8026         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8027                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8028         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8029         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8030         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8031 }
8032
8033 #[test]
8034 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8035         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8036         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8037
8038         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8039         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8040         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8041         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8042
8043         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8044         // Lock HTLC in both directions
8045         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8046         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8047
8048         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8049         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8050         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8051
8052         // Revoke local commitment tx
8053         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8054
8055         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8056         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8057         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8058         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8059
8060         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8061         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8062         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8063         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8064         let penalty_txn = {
8065                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8066                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8067                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8068                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8069                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8070                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8071                 node_txn.clear();
8072                 penalty_txn
8073         };
8074         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8075         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8076         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8077         {
8078                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8079                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8080                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8081         }
8082 }
8083
8084 #[test]
8085 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8086         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8087         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8088         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8089         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8090         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8091         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8092
8093         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8094
8095         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8096         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8097         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8098         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8099         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8100
8101         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8102         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8104         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8105
8106         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8107         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8108         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8109         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8110         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8111         match close_ev[0] {
8112                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8113                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8114                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8115                 },
8116                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8117         }
8118 }
8119
8120 #[test]
8121 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8122         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8123         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8124         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8125         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8126
8127         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8128         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8129         override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8130
8131         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8132
8133         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8134         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8135         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8136         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8137 }
8138
8139 #[test]
8140 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8141         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8142         zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8143         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8144         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8145         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8146         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8147
8148         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8149         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8150         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8151
8152         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8153         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8154         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8155 }
8156
8157 #[test]
8158 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8159         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8160         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8161         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8162         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8163         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8164
8165         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8166         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8167         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8168         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8169
8170         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8171         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8172         route.paths.push(path);
8173         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8174         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8175         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8176         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8177         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8178         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8179         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8180         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8181 }
8182
8183 #[test]
8184 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8185         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8186         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8187         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8188         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8189         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8190
8191         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8192
8193         {
8194                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200);
8195                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8196                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8197                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8198                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8199                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8200                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8201                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8202         }
8203         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8204         // values from previous calls.
8205         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8206         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8207         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8208         match events[0] {
8209                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8210                         match &purpose {
8211                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8212                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8213                                 },
8214                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8215                         }
8216                 },
8217                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8218         }
8219 }
8220
8221 #[test]
8222 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8223         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs
8224         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8225         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8226         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8227         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8228
8229         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8230
8231         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8232
8233         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8234         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8235         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8236                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8237         } else { panic!(); }
8238         let mut block = {
8239                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8240                 Block {
8241                         header: BlockHeader {
8242                                 version: 0x2000000,
8243                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8244                                 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8245                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8246                         txdata: vec![],
8247                 }
8248         };
8249         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8250         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8251                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8252         } else { panic!(); }
8253
8254         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8255         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8256         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8257         block.header.time += 1;
8258         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8259         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8260         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8261
8262         {
8263                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8264                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8265                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8266                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8267                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8268                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8269                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8270         }
8271         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8272         // values from previous calls.
8273         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8274         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8275         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8276         match events[0] {
8277                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8278                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8279                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8280                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8281                 },
8282                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8283         }
8284 }
8285
8286 #[test]
8287 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8288         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8289         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8290         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8291         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8292         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8293
8294         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8295
8296         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8297         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8298         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8299         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8300
8301         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8302         // resulting events.
8303         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8304                 () => {
8305                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8306                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8307                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8308                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8309                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8310
8311                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8312                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8313                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8314                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8315                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8316
8317                         // We should fail the payment back
8318                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8319                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8320                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8321                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8322                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8323                                 },
8324                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8325                         }
8326                 }
8327         }
8328
8329         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8330         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8331         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8332
8333         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8334         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8335         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8336         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8337
8338         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8339         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8340         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8341         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8342
8343         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8344         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8345         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8346         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8347 }
8348
8349 #[test]
8350 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8351         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8352         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8353         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8354         //
8355         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8356         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8357         // commitment at same time.
8358
8359         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8360         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8361         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8362         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8363
8364         // Create some initial channel
8365         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8366         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8367
8368         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8369         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8370
8371         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8372         let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8373
8374         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8375         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8376         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8377         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8378         let watchtower = {
8379                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8380                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8381                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8382                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8383                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8384                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8385                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8386                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8387                 watchtower
8388         };
8389         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8390         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8391         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8392         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8393         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8394
8395         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8396         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8397         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8398         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8399         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8400         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8401         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8402                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8403                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8404                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8405                 } else { assert!(false); }
8406         } else { assert!(false); };
8407         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8408         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8409         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8410         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8411 }
8412
8413 #[test]
8414 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8415         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8416         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8417         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8418         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8419
8420         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8421         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8422         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8423         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8424
8425         // Create some initial channel
8426         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8427         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8428
8429         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8430         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8431
8432         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8433         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8434
8435         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8436         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8437         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8438         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8439         let watchtower_alice = {
8440                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8441                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8442                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8443                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8444                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8445                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8446                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8447                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8448                 watchtower
8449         };
8450         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8451         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8452         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8453         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8454         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8455
8456         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8457         {
8458                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8459                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8460                 txn.clear();
8461         }
8462
8463         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8464         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8465         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8466         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8467         let watchtower_bob = {
8468                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8469                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8470                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8471                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8472                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8473                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8474                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8475                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8476                 watchtower
8477         };
8478         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8479         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8480
8481         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8482         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8483         {
8484                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8485         }
8486         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8487
8488         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8489         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8490         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8491         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8492                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8493                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8494                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8495                         if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8496                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8497                 } else { assert!(false); }
8498         } else { assert!(false); };
8499         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8500         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8501
8502         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8503         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8504         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8505
8506         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8507         let bob_state_y;
8508         {
8509                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8510                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8511                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8512                 txn.clear();
8513         };
8514
8515         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8516         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8517         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8518         {
8519                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8520                 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8521                 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8522                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8523                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8524                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8525         }
8526 }
8527
8528 #[test]
8529 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8530         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8531         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8532         // message).
8533         //
8534         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8535         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8536         //
8537         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8538         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8539         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8540         // before receiving funding_signed.
8541         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8542         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8543         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8544         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8545
8546         // Create an initial channel
8547         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8548         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8549         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8550         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8551         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8552
8553         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8554         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8555
8556         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8557         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8558
8559         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8560         let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8561         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8562         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8563         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8564 }
8565
8566 #[test]
8567 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8568         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8569         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8570         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8571         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8572         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8573         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8574
8575         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8576         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8577         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8578         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8579
8580         // Create some initial channels
8581         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8582
8583         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8584         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8585         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8586         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8587         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8588         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8589
8590         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8591         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8592         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8593         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8594         // this test before #653 fix.
8595         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8596         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8597         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8598         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8599         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8600
8601         let htlc_timeout = {
8602                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8603                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8604                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8605                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8606                 node_txn[1].clone()
8607         };
8608
8609         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8610         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8611         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8612         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8613 }
8614
8615 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8616         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8617         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8618         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8619         //
8620         // Steps of the test:
8621         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8622         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8623         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8624         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8625         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8626         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8627         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8628         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8629         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8630         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8631         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8632         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8633
8634         // Create some initial channels
8635         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8636         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8637
8638         // Steps (1) and (2):
8639         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8640         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8641
8642         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8643         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8644         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8645         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8646         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8647         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8648         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8649
8650         // Steps (3) and (4):
8651         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8652         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8653         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8654         if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8655         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8656         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8657         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8658         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8659         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8660                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8661                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8662                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8663                 };
8664                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8665                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8666                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8667                 if broadcast_alice {
8668                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8669                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8670                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8671                 }
8672                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8673                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8674         }
8675
8676         // Step (5):
8677         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8678         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8679         assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8680         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8681         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8682         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8683         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8684         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8685         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8686         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8687
8688         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8689         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8690         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8691         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8692                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8693                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8694                 match events[0] {
8695                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8696                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8697                         },
8698                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8699                 };
8700         }
8701         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8702         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8703         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8704         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8705
8706         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8707         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8708         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8709                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8710                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8711                         (*msg).clone()
8712                 },
8713                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8714         };
8715         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8716                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8717                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8718                         (*updates).clone()
8719                 },
8720                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8721         };
8722
8723         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8724         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8725         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8726         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8727
8728         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8729         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8730         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8731                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8732                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8733                         (*msg).clone()
8734                 },
8735                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8736         };
8737         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8738         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8739
8740         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8741         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8742         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8743         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8744         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8745                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8746                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8747                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8748                 if broadcast_alice {
8749                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8750                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8751                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8752                 }
8753                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8754                 if broadcast_alice {
8755                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8756                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8757                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8758                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8759                         // broadcasted.
8760                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8761                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8762                 } else {
8763                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8764                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8765                 }
8766         }
8767
8768         // Step (6):
8769         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8770         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8771         {
8772                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8773                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8774                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8775                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8776                 }
8777                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8778                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8779                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8780                 };
8781                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8782                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8783                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8784                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8785                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8786                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8787                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8788                 } else {
8789                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8790                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8791                 }
8792         }
8793 }
8794
8795 #[test]
8796 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8797         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8798         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8799         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8800         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8801 }
8802
8803 #[test]
8804 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8805         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8806         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8807         //
8808         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8809         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8810         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8811         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8812         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8813         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8814         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8815         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8816
8817         // Create an initial channel
8818         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8819         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8820         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8821         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8822
8823         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8824         // that it is rejected.
8825         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8826         {
8827                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8828                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8829                 match events[0] {
8830                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8831                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8832                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8833                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8834                                 // move forward with it.
8835                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8836                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8837                         },
8838                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8839                 }
8840         }
8841
8842         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8843         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8844
8845         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8846         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8847
8848         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8849         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8850         {
8851                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8852                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8853                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8854                 added_monitors.clear();
8855         }
8856         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8857
8858         let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8859         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8860
8861         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8862         // temporary one).
8863
8864         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8865         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8866         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8867         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8868         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8869         {
8870                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8871                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8872                 match events[0] {
8873                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8874                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8875                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8876                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8877                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8878                         },
8879                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8880                 }
8881         }
8882
8883         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8884         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8885         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8886         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8887         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8888         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8889
8890         let funding_created = {
8891                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8892                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8893                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8894                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8895         };
8896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8897         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8898         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8899         // still needs to be cleared here.
8900         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8901
8902         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8903         {
8904                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8905                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8906                 match events[0] {
8907                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8908                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8909                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8910                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8911                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8912                         },
8913                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8914                 }
8915         }
8916
8917         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8918         // everything is functional.
8919         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8920         {
8921                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8922                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8923                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8924                 added_monitors.clear();
8925         }
8926
8927         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8928         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8929         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8930         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8931
8932         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8933         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8934         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8935         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8936 }
8937
8938 #[test]
8939 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8940         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8941         //
8942         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8943         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8944         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8945         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8946         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8947         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8948         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8949
8950         // Create some initial channels
8951         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8952         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8953         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8954
8955         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8956         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8957         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8958
8959         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8960         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8961         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8962
8963         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8964         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8965         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8966         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8967         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8968         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8969         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8970         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8971         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8972
8973         // A null channel ID should close all channels
8974         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8975         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8976         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8977         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8978         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8979         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8980         match events[0] {
8981                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8982                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8983                 },
8984                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8985         }
8986         match events[1] {
8987                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8988                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8989                 },
8990                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8991         }
8992         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8993         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8994         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8995         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8996         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8997         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8998
8999         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9000         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9001         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9002 }
9003
9004 #[test]
9005 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9006         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9007         //
9008         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9009         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9010         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9011         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9012         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9013         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9014         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9015         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9016
9017         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9018         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9019         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9020
9021         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
9022         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9023                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9024                 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9025         }
9026
9027         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9028         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9029         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9030
9031         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9032         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9033
9034         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9035         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9036
9037         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9038         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9039         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9040
9041         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9042         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9043         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9044         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9045         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9046         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9047         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9048                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9049                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9050                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9051                 } else { panic!(); }
9052         } else { panic!(); }
9053         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9054 }
9055
9056 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9057         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9058         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9059         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9060         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9061         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9062         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9063         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9064         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9065         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9066         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9067         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9068         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9069         // until we learned about an additional block.
9070         //
9071         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9072         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9073         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9074         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9075         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9076         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9077         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9078
9079         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9080         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9081         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9082         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9083         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9084
9085         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9086         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9087         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9088         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9089         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9090         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9091
9092         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9093         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9094                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9095         }
9096         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9097                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9098         if test_height_before_timelock {
9099                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9100                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9101                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9102                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9103         } else {
9104                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9105                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9106                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9107                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9108                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9109                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9110                 // timelock is up).
9111                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9112                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9113
9114                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9115                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9116                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9117                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9118                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9119                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9120                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9121
9122                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9123                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9124                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9125                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9126                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9127                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9128                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9129                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9130                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9131         }
9132 }
9133
9134 #[test]
9135 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9136         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9137         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9138 }
9139
9140 #[test]
9141 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9142         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9143         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9144         // HTLCs.
9145         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9146
9147         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9148         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9149         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9150         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9151         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9152         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9153         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9154         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9155         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9156
9157         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9158         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9159         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9160         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9161
9162         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9163         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9164         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9165         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9166         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9167
9168         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9169
9170         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9171         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9172         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9173         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9174
9175         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9176         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9177         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9178         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9179         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9180
9181         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9182         // generated
9183         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9184
9185         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9186         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9187         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9188
9189         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9190         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9191         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9192         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9193         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9194
9195         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9196         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9197         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9198         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9199
9200         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9201         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9202                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9203         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9204         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9205         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9206                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9207         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9208
9209         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9210         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9211                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9212                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9213                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9214                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9215                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9216                         keys_manager,
9217                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9218                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9219                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9220                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9221                         channel_monitors,
9222                 }).unwrap()
9223         };
9224         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9225         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9226
9227         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9228         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9229         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9230         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9231
9232         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9233         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9234         // the commitment state.
9235         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9236
9237         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9238
9239         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9240         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9241         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9242
9243         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9244         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9245         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9246         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9247         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9248         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9249         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9250
9251         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9252         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9253 }
9254
9255 #[test]
9256 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9257         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9258         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9259         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9260         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9261
9262         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9263         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9264         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9265         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9266         let params = RouteParameters {
9267                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9268                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9269                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9270         };
9271         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9272         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
9273
9274         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9275         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9277         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9278         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9279         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9280         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9281         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9282         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9283 }
9284
9285 #[test]
9286 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9287         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9288         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9289         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9290         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9291
9292         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9293         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9294         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9295         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9296
9297         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9298         let params = RouteParameters {
9299                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9300                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9301                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9302         };
9303         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9304         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9305         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9306         let route = find_route(
9307                 &payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9308                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9309         ).unwrap();
9310
9311         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9312         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9313         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9314         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9315         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9316         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9317         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9318         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9319         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9320 }
9321
9322 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9323 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9324 enum ExposureEvent {
9325         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9326         AtHTLCForward,
9327         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9328         AtHTLCReception,
9329         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9330         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9331 }
9332
9333 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9334         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9335         // policy.
9336         //
9337         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9338         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9339         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9340         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9341         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9342         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9343         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9344         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9345
9346         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9347         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9348         config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9349         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9350         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9351         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9352
9353         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9354         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9355         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9356         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9357         if on_holder_tx {
9358                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9359         }
9360         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9361         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9362         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9363
9364         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9365
9366         if on_holder_tx {
9367                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9368                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9369                 }
9370         }
9371
9372         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9373         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9374         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9375
9376         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9377         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9378
9379         let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9380         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9381         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9382
9383         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9384                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9385                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9386                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9387         };
9388         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9389         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9390
9391         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9392         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9393
9394         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9395         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9396
9397         if on_holder_tx {
9398                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9399                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9400                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9401                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9402                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9403                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9404                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9405                         }
9406                 } else {
9407                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9408                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9409                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9410                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9411                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9412                         }
9413                 }
9414         } else {
9415                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9416                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9417                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9418                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9419                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9420                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9421                         }
9422                 } else {
9423                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9424                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9425                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9426                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9427                         }
9428                 }
9429         }
9430
9431         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9432         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9433                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9434                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9435                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9436                 if on_holder_tx {
9437                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9438                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9439                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9440                 } else {
9441                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9442                 }
9443         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9444                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9445                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9446                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9447                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9448                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9449                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9450                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9451                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9452                 if on_holder_tx {
9453                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9454                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9455                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9456                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9457                 } else {
9458                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9459                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9460                 }
9461         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9462                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9463                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9464                 {
9465                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9466                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9467                 }
9468                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9469                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9470                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9471         }
9472
9473         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9474         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9475         added_monitors.clear();
9476 }
9477
9478 #[test]
9479 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9480         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9481         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9482         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9483         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9484         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9485         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9486         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9487         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9488         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9489         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9490         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9491         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9492 }