_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, OutputSpender, SignerProvider};
  21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
  22 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, COINBASE_MATURITY, ChannelPhase};
  24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  25 use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, ChannelError};
  26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  29 use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, get_route, RouteParameters};
  30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  31 use crate::ln::msgs;
  32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  33 use crate::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
  34 use crate::util::test_utils::{self, WatchtowerPersister};
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
  38 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
  39
  40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  44 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
  45 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  46 use bitcoin::{Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
  47 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  48
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  50 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  51
  52 use crate::io;
  53 use crate::prelude::*;
  54 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  55 use core::iter::repeat;
  56 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  57 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
  58
  59 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  60 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  61
  62 use super::channel::UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS;
  63
  64 #[test]
  65 fn test_channel_resumption_fail_post_funding() {
  66         // If we fail to exchange funding with a peer prior to it disconnecting we'll resume the
  67         // channel open on reconnect, however if we do exchange funding we do not currently support
  68         // replaying it and here test that the channel closes.
  69         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  70         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  71         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  72         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  73
  74         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
  75         let open_chan = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  76         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan);
  77         let accept_chan = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  78         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan);
  79
  80         let (temp_chan_id, tx, funding_output) =
  81                 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
  82         let new_chan_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_output);
  83         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
  84
  85         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  86         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(new_chan_id, true, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer)]);
  87
  88         // After ddf75afd16 we'd panic on reconnection if we exchanged funding info, so test that
  89         // explicitly here.
  90         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
  91                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
  92         }, true).unwrap();
  93         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(), Vec::new());
  94 }
  95
  96 #[test]
  97 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  98         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  99         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
 100         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
 101         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
 102         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 103         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 104         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
 105         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 106
 107         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
 108         // funding satoshis
 109         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
 110         let channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
 111         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 112
 113         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 114         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
 115
 116         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
 117         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 118
 119         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
 120         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
 121         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
 122                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
 123                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 124                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
 125                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
 126                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
 127                         match action {
 128                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
 129                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
 130                                 },
 131                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 132                         }
 133                 } else { assert!(false); }
 134         };
 135
 136         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 137
 138         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 139         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 140         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 141
 142         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 143
 144         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 145
 146         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 147
 148         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 149
 150         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 151
 152         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 153
 154         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 155 }
 156
 157 #[test]
 158 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 159         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 160         // them.
 161         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 162         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 163         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 164         *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
 165         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 166         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 167
 168         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None, None) {
 169                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 170                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 171                 },
 172                 _ => panic!()
 173         }
 174 }
 175
 176 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 177         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 178         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 179         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 180         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 181         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 182         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 183         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 184         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 185         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 186
 187         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 188         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 189         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 190         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
 191         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 192         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 193
 194         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None, None).unwrap();
 195         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 196         if !send_from_initiator {
 197                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 198                 open_channel_message.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 199         }
 200         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
 201
 202         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 203         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 204         if send_from_initiator {
 205                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 206                 accept_channel_message.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 207         }
 208         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
 209         {
 210                 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
 211                 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
 212                 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
 213                 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
 214
 215                 let channel_phase = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
 216                 match channel_phase {
 217                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
 218                                 let chan_context = channel_phase.context_mut();
 219                                 chan_context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 220                                 chan_context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 221                         },
 222                         _ => assert!(false),
 223                 }
 224         }
 225
 226         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 227         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 228         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 229
 230         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 231         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 232         if send_from_initiator {
 233                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 234                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 235                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 236                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 237                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, &channel_type_features));
 238         } else {
 239                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 240         }
 241 }
 242
 243 #[test]
 244 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 245         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 246         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 247 }
 248
 249 #[test]
 250 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 251         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 252         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 253         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 254         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 255         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 256
 257         // balancing
 258         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 259
 260         // A                                        B
 261         // update_fee                            ->
 262         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 263         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 264         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 265         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 266         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 267         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 268         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 269         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 270         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 271         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 272         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 273         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 274         //                                       <- RAA
 275         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 276
 277         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 278         {
 279                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 280                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 281         }
 282         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 283         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 284
 285         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 286         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 287         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 288                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 289                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 290                 },
 291                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 292         };
 293
 294         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 295
 296         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 297         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 298         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 299                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 300         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 301
 302         let payment_event = {
 303                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 304                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 305                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 306         };
 307         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 308         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 309
 310         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 311         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 312         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 313         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 314         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 315         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 316
 317         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 318         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 319         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 320         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 321         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 322
 323         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 324         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 325         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 326         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 327         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 328         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 329         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 330         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 331
 332         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 333         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 334         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 335         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 336         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 337         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 338         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 339         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 340
 341         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 342         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 343         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 344         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 345
 346         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 347         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 348         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 349
 350         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 351         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 352
 353         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 354         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 355         match events_2[0] {
 356                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 357                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 358         }
 359
 360         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 361         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 362 }
 363
 364 #[test]
 365 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 366         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 367         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 368         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 369         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 370         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 371         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 372         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 373
 374         // balancing
 375         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 376
 377         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 378         {
 379                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 380                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 381         }
 382         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 383         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 384
 385         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 386         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 387         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 388                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 389                         update_fee.as_ref()
 390                 },
 391                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 392         };
 393
 394         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 395
 396         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 397         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 398         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 399                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 400         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 401
 402         let payment_event = {
 403                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 404                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 405                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 406         };
 407         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 408         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 409
 410         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 411         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 412         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 413         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 414         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 415         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 416
 417         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 418         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 419
 420         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 421 }
 422
 423 #[test]
 424 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 425         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 426         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 427         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 428         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 429         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 430
 431         // A                                        B
 432         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 433         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 434         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 435         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 436         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 437         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 438         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 439         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 440         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 441         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 442         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 443         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 444         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 445         //                                          B should send no response here
 446         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 447         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 448         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 449
 450         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 451         let initial_feerate;
 452         {
 453                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 454                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 455                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 456         }
 457         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 458         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 459
 460         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 461         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 462         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 463                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 464                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 465                 },
 466                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 467         };
 468
 469         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 470         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 471         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 472         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 474
 475         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 476         // transaction:
 477         {
 478                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 479                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 480         }
 481         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 482         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 483         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 484
 485         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 486         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 487                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 488                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 489         };
 490
 491         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 492
 493         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 494         // Deliver (3)
 495         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 496
 497         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 498         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 499         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 500         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 501         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 502         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 503         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 504         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 505         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 506         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 507         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 508
 509         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 510         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 511         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 512         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 513         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 514
 515         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 516         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 517         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 518
 519         // Delever (4)
 520         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 521         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 522         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 523
 524         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 525         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 526         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 527
 528         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 529         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 530         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 531         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 532
 533         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 534         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 535         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 536 }
 537
 538 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 539         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 540         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 541         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 542         // Node objects.
 543
 544         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 545         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 546         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 547         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 548
 549         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 550                 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
 551                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 552                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 553         }
 554
 555         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 556         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
 557         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 558
 559         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 560         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
 561         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 562
 563         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 564         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
 565
 566         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 567
 568         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 569         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 570         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 571         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 572
 573         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 574         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 575         {
 576                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 577                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 578                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 579                 added_monitors.clear();
 580         }
 581         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 582
 583         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 584
 585         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 586         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 587         {
 588                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 589                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 590                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 591                 added_monitors.clear();
 592         }
 593
 594         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 595         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 596         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 597
 598         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 599         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 600
 601         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 602         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 603         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 604         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 605         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 606 }
 607
 608 #[test]
 609 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 610         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 611         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 612         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 613         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 614         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 615         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 616         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 617         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 618         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 619         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 620         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 621         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 622         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 623         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 624         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 625         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 626         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 627         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 628 }
 629
 630 #[test]
 631 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 632         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 633         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 634         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 635         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 636         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 637
 638         {
 639                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 640                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 641         }
 642         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 643         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 644
 645         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 646         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 647         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 648                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 649                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 650                 },
 651                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 652         };
 653         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 654
 655         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 656         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 657         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 658
 659         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 660         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 661         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 662
 663         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 664         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 665         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 666         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 667
 668         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 669         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 670         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 671 }
 672
 673 #[test]
 674 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 675         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 676         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 677         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 678         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 679         let channel_value = 5000;
 680         let push_sats = 700;
 681         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
 682         let channel_id = chan.2;
 683         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 684         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 685         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 686
 687         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
 688
 689         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 690         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 691         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 692         // remote limit.
 693         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 694         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features)) as u32;
 695         {
 696                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 697                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 698         }
 699         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 700         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 701         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 702
 703         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 704
 705         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 706
 707         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 708         {
 709                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 710
 711                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 712                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 713                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000;
 714                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 715                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 716                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 717         }
 718
 719         {
 720                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 721                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 722                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 723         }
 724         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 725         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 726         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 727
 728         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 729
 730         // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 731         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 732         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 733                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 734                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 735                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 736                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 737                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 738                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 739                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
 740                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 741                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 742         };
 743         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 744                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 745                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 746                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 747                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 748                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 749                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 750                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
 751                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 752                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 753                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 754         };
 755
 756         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 757         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 758                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
 759
 760         let res = {
 761                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 762                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 763                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 764                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 765                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 766                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 767                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 768                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 769                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 770                         push_sats,
 771                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000,
 772                         local_funding, remote_funding,
 773                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 774                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 775                         &mut htlcs,
 776                         &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 777                 );
 778                 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 779         };
 780
 781         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 782                 channel_id: chan.2,
 783                 signature: res.0,
 784                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
 785                 #[cfg(taproot)]
 786                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
 787         };
 788
 789         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 790                 channel_id: chan.2,
 791                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 792         };
 793
 794         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 795
 796         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 797         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 798         //Should produce and error.
 799         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 800         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee", 3);
 801         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 802         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 803         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") },
 804                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], channel_value);
 805 }
 806
 807 #[test]
 808 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 809         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 810         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 811         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 812         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 813         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 814
 815         // balancing
 816         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 817
 818         {
 819                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 820                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 821         }
 822         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 823         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 824
 825         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 826         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 827         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 828                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 829                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 830                 },
 831                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 832         };
 833         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 834         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 835         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 836         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 837
 838         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 839
 840         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 841         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 842                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 843         {
 844                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 845                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 846                 added_monitors.clear();
 847         }
 848         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 849         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 850         // node[1] has nothing to do
 851
 852         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 853         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 854         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 855
 856         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 857         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 858         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 859         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 860         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 861         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 862         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 863
 864         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 865         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 866         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 867         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 868         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 869         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 870
 871         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 872         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 873         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 874         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 875
 876         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 877         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 878         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 879
 880         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 881         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 882         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 883         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 884
 885         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 886         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 887         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 888
 889         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 890
 891         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 892         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 893         match events[0] {
 894                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
 895                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 896         };
 897
 898         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 899
 900         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 901         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 902         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 903         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 904         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 905 }
 906
 907 #[test]
 908 fn test_update_fee() {
 909         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 910         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 911         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 912         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 913         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 914         let channel_id = chan.2;
 915
 916         // A                                        B
 917         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 918         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 919         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 920         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 921         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 922         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 923         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 924         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 925         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 926         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 927         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 928         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 929
 930         // Create and deliver (1)...
 931         let feerate;
 932         {
 933                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 934                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 935                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 936         }
 937         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 938         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 939
 940         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 941         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 942         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 943                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 944                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 945                 },
 946                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 947         };
 948         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 949
 950         // Generate (2) and (3):
 951         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 952         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 953         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 954
 955         // Deliver (2):
 956         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 957         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 958         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 959
 960         // Create and deliver (4)...
 961         {
 962                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 963                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 964         }
 965         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 966         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 967         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 968         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 969         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 970                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 971                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 972                 },
 973                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 974         };
 975
 976         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 977         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 978         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 979         // ... creating (5)
 980         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 981         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 982
 983         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 984         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 985         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 986         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 987         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 988
 989         // Deliver (5):
 990         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 991         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 992         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 993
 994         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 995         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 996         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 997         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 998         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 999         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1000         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1001         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
1002         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1003
1004         // Deliver (7)
1005         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
1006         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1007         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1008         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1009
1010         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
1011         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1012         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1013
1014         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
1015         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
1016         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
1017         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1018         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1019 }
1020
1021 #[test]
1022 fn fake_network_test() {
1023         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
1024         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
1025         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
1026         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
1027         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
1028         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1029
1030         // Create some initial channels
1031         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1032         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1033         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1034
1035         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
1036         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1037         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1038         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1039         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1040
1041         // Send some more payments
1042         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1043         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
1044         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1045
1046         // Test failure packets
1047         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1048         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1049
1050         // Add a new channel that skips 3
1051         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1052
1053         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1054         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1055         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1056         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1057         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1058         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1059         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1060
1061         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1062         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1063         hops.push(RouteHop {
1064                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1065                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1066                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1067                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1068                 fee_msat: 0,
1069                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1070                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1071         });
1072         hops.push(RouteHop {
1073                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1074                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1075                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1076                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1077                 fee_msat: 0,
1078                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1079                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1080         });
1081         hops.push(RouteHop {
1082                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1083                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1084                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1085                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1086                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1087                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1088                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1089         });
1090         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1091         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1092         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1093                 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1094                         &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1095
1096         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1097         hops.push(RouteHop {
1098                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1099                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1100                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1101                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1102                 fee_msat: 0,
1103                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1104                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1105         });
1106         hops.push(RouteHop {
1107                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1108                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1109                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1110                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1111                 fee_msat: 0,
1112                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1113                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1114         });
1115         hops.push(RouteHop {
1116                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1117                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1118                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1119                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1120                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1121                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1122                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1123         });
1124         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1125         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1126         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1127                 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1128                         &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1129
1130         // Claim the rebalances...
1131         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1132         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1133
1134         // Close down the channels...
1135         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1136         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1137         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1138         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1139         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1140         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1141         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1142         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1143         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1144         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1145         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1146         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1147 }
1148
1149 #[test]
1150 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1151         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1152         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1153         // commitment dance rounds.
1154         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1155         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1156         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1157         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1158         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1159         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1160
1161         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1162         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1163
1164         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1165         for _ in 0..50 {
1166                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1167                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
1168                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1169                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1170         }
1171         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1172
1173         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1174         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1175         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1176         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1177
1178         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1179         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1180         // another HTLC.
1181         {
1182                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
1183                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
1184                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1185                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1186         }
1187
1188         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1189         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1190         {
1191                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
1192                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1193                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1194         }
1195
1196         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1197         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1198         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1199         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1200
1201         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1202         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1203         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1204         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1205         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1206         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1207         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1208
1209         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1210         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1211         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1212
1213         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1214
1215         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1216         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1217         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1218         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1219
1220         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1221         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1222         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1223         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1224
1225         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1226         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1227         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1228
1229         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1230                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1231         }
1232         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1233         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1234         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1235         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1236         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1237
1238         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1239         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1240         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1241         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1242         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1243
1244         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1245         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1246
1247         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1248
1249         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1250         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1251         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1252                 match event {
1253                         &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1254                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1255                         },
1256                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1257                 };
1258         }
1259
1260         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1261                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1262         }
1263
1264         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1265 }
1266
1267 #[test]
1268 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1269         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1270         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1271         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1272         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1273         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1274         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1275
1276         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1277         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1278         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1279         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1280         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1281         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1282
1283         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1284
1285         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1286         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1287
1288         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1289         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1290
1291         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1292         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1293         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1294 }
1295
1296 #[test]
1297 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1298         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1299         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1300         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1301         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1302         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1303         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1304         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1305
1306         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1307
1308         // balancing
1309         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1310
1311         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1312
1313         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1314         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1315         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1316
1317         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1318         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1319         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1320         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1321
1322         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1323         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1324
1325         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1326         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1327         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1328                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1329                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1330                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1331                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1332                 }
1333         }
1334         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1335
1336         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1337         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1338         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1339         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1340
1341         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1342         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1343
1344         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1345         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1346         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1347         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1348         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1349                 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1350         } else {
1351                 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1352         };
1353
1354         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1355         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1356
1357         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1358         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1359         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1360
1361         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1362         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1363         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1364         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1365
1366         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1367         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1368         for e in events {
1369                 match e {
1370                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1371                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg } } => {
1372                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1373                                 assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1374                         },
1375                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1376                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1377                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1378                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1379                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1380                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1381                         },
1382                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1383                 }
1384         }
1385 }
1386
1387 #[test]
1388 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1389         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1390         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1391         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1392         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1393         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1394
1395         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1396         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1397
1398         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1399         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, &get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1400         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1401         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1402                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
1403         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1404         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1405                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1406         match err {
1407                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1408                         if let &APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. } = &fails[0] {}
1409                         else { panic!("Unexpected error variant"); }
1410                 },
1411                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1412         }
1413         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1414
1415         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1416 }
1417
1418 #[test]
1419 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1420         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1421         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1422         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1423         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1424         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1425
1426         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1427                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460000);
1428         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1429         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1430         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1431         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1432
1433         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
1434
1435         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1436         let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret);
1437         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1438                 3460001, &recipient_onion_fields, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1439         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1440         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1441                 channel_id: chan.2,
1442                 htlc_id: 0,
1443                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1444                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1445                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1446                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1447                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1448                 blinding_point: None,
1449         };
1450
1451         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1452
1453         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1454         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1455         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1456
1457         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1458
1459         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1460
1461         // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1462         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1463         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1464                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1465                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1466                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1467                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1468                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1469                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1470                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1471                 chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1472
1473                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1474                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1475                  chan_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1476                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1477                  chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1478         };
1479         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1480                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1481                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1482                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1483                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1484                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1485                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1486                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1487                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1488                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1489                  chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1490         };
1491
1492         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1493         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1494                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1495
1496         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1497         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1498         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1499
1500         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1501                 offered: false,
1502                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1503                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1504                 payment_hash,
1505                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1506         };
1507
1508         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1509
1510         let res = {
1511                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1512                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1513                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1514                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1515                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1516                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1517                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1518                         commitment_number,
1519                         95000,
1520                         local_chan_balance,
1521                         local_funding, remote_funding,
1522                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1523                         feerate_per_kw,
1524                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1525                         &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1526                 );
1527                 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1528         };
1529
1530         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1531                 channel_id: chan.2,
1532                 signature: res.0,
1533                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1534                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1535                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1536         };
1537
1538         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1539         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1540         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1541
1542         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1543         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1544                 channel_id: chan.2,
1545                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1546                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
1547                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1548                 next_local_nonce: None,
1549         };
1550         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1551
1552         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1553         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1554         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1555         match events[0] {
1556                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1557                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1558                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1559                 },
1560                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1561         };
1562         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
1563                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", raa_msg.channel_id), 1);
1564
1565         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1566 }
1567
1568 #[test]
1569 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1570         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1571         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1572         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1573         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1574         // this situation.
1575         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1576         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1577         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1578         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1579         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1580         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1581
1582         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1583         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1584
1585         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1586
1587         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1588
1589         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1590         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1591         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1592         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1593                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1594         }
1595
1596         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1597         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1598                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1599                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1600         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1601 }
1602
1603 #[test]
1604 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1605         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1606         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1607         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1608         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1609         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1610         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1611         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1612
1613         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1614         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1615         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1616         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1617         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1618         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1619         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1620
1621         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1622         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1623                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1624         }
1625
1626         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1627                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1628         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 700_000;
1629         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1630         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1631         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1632         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
1633         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1634         let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret);
1635         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1636                 700_000, &recipient_onion_fields, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1637         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1638         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1639                 channel_id: chan.2,
1640                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1641                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1642                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1643                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1644                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1645                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1646                 blinding_point: None,
1647         };
1648
1649         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1650         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1651         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 3);
1652         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1653         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1654         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1655         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1656         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() },
1657                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1658 }
1659
1660 #[test]
1661 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1662         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1663         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1664         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1665         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1666
1667         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1668         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1669         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1670         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1671         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1672
1673         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1674         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1675         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1676         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1677         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1678         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1679         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1680
1681         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1682                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1683         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1684         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1685         // commitment transaction fee.
1686         route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1687
1688         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1689         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1690                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1691         }
1692
1693         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1694         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1695                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt);
1696         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1697         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1698                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1699                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1700 }
1701
1702 #[test]
1703 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1704         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1705         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1706         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1707         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1708         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1709         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1710         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1711         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1712         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1713
1714         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1715         // HTLC.
1716         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1717         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1718         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None, None).unwrap_err(),
1719                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1720
1721         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1722         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1723         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1724         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None, None).unwrap();
1725         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1726         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1727         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1728
1729         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1730         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1731         match msg_events[0] {
1732                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1733                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1734                 },
1735                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1736         }
1737 }
1738
1739 #[test]
1740 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1741         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1742         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1743         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1744         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1745         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1746         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1747         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1748
1749         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1750         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1751         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1752         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1753         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1754         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1755
1756         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1757         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1758         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1759         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1760         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1761         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1762
1763         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1764         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1765         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1766         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1767 }
1768
1769 #[test]
1770 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1771         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1772         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1773         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1774         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1775         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1776         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1777
1778         let feemsat = 239;
1779         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1780         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1781         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1782         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1783
1784         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1785         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1786         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1787         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1788
1789         // Add a pending HTLC.
1790         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1791         let payment_event_1 = {
1792                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1793                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1794                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1795
1796                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1797                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1798                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1799         };
1800         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1801
1802         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1803         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, &channel_type_features);
1804         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1805         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1806         let mut route_2 = route_1.clone();
1807         route_2.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = amt_msat_2;
1808
1809         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1810         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1811         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1812         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
1813         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1814         let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty();
1815         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
1816                 &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &recipient_onion_fields, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1817         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
1818         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1819                 channel_id: chan.2,
1820                 htlc_id: 1,
1821                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1822                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1823                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1824                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1825                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1826                 blinding_point: None,
1827         };
1828
1829         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1830         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1831         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value", 3);
1832         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1833         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1834         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1835         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1836         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() },
1837                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1838 }
1839
1840 #[test]
1841 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1842         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1843         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1844         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1845         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1846         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1847         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1848         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1849         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1850         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1851         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1852
1853         let reserve = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1854         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1855         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1856
1857         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1858         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1859 }
1860
1861 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1862         (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1863 }
1864
1865 #[test]
1866 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1867         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1868         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1869         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1870         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1871         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1872         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1873         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1874         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1875         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1876         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1877
1878         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1879         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1880
1881         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1882         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1883
1884         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1885                 ($node: expr) => {{
1886                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1887                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1888                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1889                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1890                         payment_event
1891                 }}
1892         }
1893
1894         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1895         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1896         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1897         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1898
1899         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1900
1901         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1902         {
1903                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1904                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1905                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
1906                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1907                 assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1908
1909                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1910                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1911                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1912                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1913         }
1914
1915         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1916         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1917         loop {
1918                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1919                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1920                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1921                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1922                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1923                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1924                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1925                         break;
1926                 }
1927
1928                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1929                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1930                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
1931                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1932                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1933
1934                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1935                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1936                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1937                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1938                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1939                 );
1940
1941                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1942                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1943                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1944                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1945                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1946         }
1947
1948         // adding pending output.
1949         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1950         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1951         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1952         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1953         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1954         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1955         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1956         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1957         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1958         // policy.
1959         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1960         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1961         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1962
1963         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1964         let payment_event_1 = {
1965                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1966                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1967                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1968
1969                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1970                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1971                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1972         };
1973         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1974
1975         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1976         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1977         {
1978                 let mut route = route_1.clone();
1979                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = recv_value_2 + 1;
1980                 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1981                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1982                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1983                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1984                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1985         }
1986
1987         // split the rest to test holding cell
1988         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1989         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1990         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1991         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1992         {
1993                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1994                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1995         }
1996
1997         // now see if they go through on both sides
1998         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1999         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
2000         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21,
2001                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
2002         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
2003         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2004         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2005
2006         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
2007         {
2008                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
2009                         get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
2010                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
2011                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
2012                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
2013                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
2014                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2015         }
2016
2017         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
2018         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
2019         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22,
2020                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
2021         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
2022         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2023         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2024
2025         // flush the pending htlc
2026         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
2027         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2028         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2029
2030         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
2031         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
2032         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2033         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2034
2035         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
2036         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2037         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
2038         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2039
2040         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
2041         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2042         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2043
2044         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2045
2046         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2047         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
2048         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
2049
2050         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2051         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
2052
2053         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
2054         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
2055         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
2056         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
2057         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
2058         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2059
2060         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2061         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
2062         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
2063         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
2064
2065         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
2066         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2067
2068         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2069         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2070         match events[0] {
2071                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2072                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2073                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
2074                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2075                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2076                         match &purpose {
2077                                 PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2078                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2079                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2080                                 },
2081                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment")
2082                         }
2083                 },
2084                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2085         }
2086         match events[1] {
2087                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2088                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2089                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2090                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2091                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2092                         match &purpose {
2093                                 PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2094                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2095                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2096                                 },
2097                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment")
2098                         }
2099                 },
2100                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2101         }
2102
2103         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2104         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2105         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2106
2107         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, &channel_type_features);
2108         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2109         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2110
2111         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
2112         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2113         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2114         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2115         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2116
2117         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2118         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2119 }
2120
2121 #[test]
2122 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2123         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2124         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2125         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2126         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2127         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2128         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2129         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2130         // To test this we:
2131         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2132         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2133         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2134         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2135         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2136         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2137         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2138         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2139         //    claim,
2140         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2141         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2142         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2143         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2144         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2145         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2146         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2147         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2148         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2149         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2150
2151         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2152         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2153         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2154         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2155         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2156
2157         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2158         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2159         let send_1 = {
2160                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
2161                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2162                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2163                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2164                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2165                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2166         };
2167
2168         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2169         // initial fulfill/CS.
2170         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2171         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2173         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2174
2175         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2176         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2177         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2178         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2180         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2181
2182         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2183         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2184         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2185         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2186         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_1, None, false, false);
2187
2188         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2189         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2190         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2191         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2192         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2193
2194         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2195         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2196         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2197
2198         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2199         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2200         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2201
2202         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2203         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2204         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2205
2206         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2207         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2208         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2209         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2210         // on-chain as necessary).
2211         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2212         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2213         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2214         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2215         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, false, false);
2216
2217         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2218         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2219         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2220
2221         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2222         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2223
2224         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2225         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2226         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2227         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2228         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2229         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2230
2231         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2232         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2233         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2234         let send_2 = {
2235                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_4,
2236                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2237                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2238                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2239                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2240                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2241         };
2242
2243         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2244         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2245         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2246         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2247
2248         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2249
2250         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2251         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2252         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2253
2254         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2255         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2256
2257         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2258         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2259         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2260         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2261
2262         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2263         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2264         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2265
2266         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2267         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2268
2269         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2270         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2271
2272         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2273         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2274 }
2275
2276 #[test]
2277 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2278         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2279         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2280         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2281         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2282         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2283         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2284
2285         // Create some initial channels
2286         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2287         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2288         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2289         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2290
2291         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2292         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2293         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2294         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2295         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2296         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2297
2298         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2299         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2300         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2301         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2302         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2303
2304         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2305         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2306         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2307         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2308         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2309         {
2310                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2311                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2312                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2313                 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2314                         let _ = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2315                 }
2316
2317                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2318                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2319                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2320         }
2321         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2322         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2323         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2324         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2325
2326         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2327         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2328
2329         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2330         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2331         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2332         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2333         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2334         {
2335                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2336                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2337                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2338                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2339                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2340                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2341         }
2342         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2343         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2344         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2345         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2346         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2347
2348         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2349                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2350                         {
2351                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2352                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2353                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2354
2355                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2356                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2357                                 match events[0] {
2358                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2359                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2360                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2361                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2362                                         },
2363                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2364                                 };
2365                         }
2366                 }
2367         }
2368
2369         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2370         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2371         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2372         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2373         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2374         let node2_commitment_txid;
2375         {
2376                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2377                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2378                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2379                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2380
2381                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2382                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2383                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2384                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2385                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2386         }
2387         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2388         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2389         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2390         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2391         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2392
2393         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2394         // confusing us in the following tests.
2395         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2396
2397         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2398         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2399         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2400         // buffer space).
2401
2402         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2403                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2404                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2405                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2406                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[1] {
2407                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2408                                 msg.clone()
2409                         },
2410                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2411                 };
2412                 match events[0] {
2413                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
2414                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2415                         },
2416                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2417                 }
2418                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2419
2420                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2421                 {
2422                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2423                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2424                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2425                                         false
2426                                 } else { true }
2427                         });
2428                 }
2429
2430                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2431
2432                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2433                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2434
2435                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2436                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2437                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2438                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[1] {
2439                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2440                                 msg.clone()
2441                         },
2442                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2443                 };
2444                 match events[0] {
2445                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
2446                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2447                         },
2448                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2449                 }
2450                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2451                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2452                 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2453
2454                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2455                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2456                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2457         };
2458         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2459         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2460         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2461         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2462
2463         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2464                 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
2465         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2466 }
2467
2468 #[test]
2469 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
2470         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides
2471         let mut alice_config = test_default_channel_config();
2472         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2473         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2474         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2475         let mut bob_config = test_default_channel_config();
2476         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2477         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2478         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2479         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2480         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2481         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2482         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2483         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2484         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2485         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2486         // Create some new channels:
2487         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2488
2489         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2490         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2491         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2492         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2493         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2494         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2495         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2496         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2497         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2498         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2499         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2500         // Revoke the old state
2501         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2502
2503         {
2504                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2505                 {
2506                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2507                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2508                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2509                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2510                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2511                 }
2512                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2513                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2514                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2515
2516                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2517                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2518                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2519                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2520                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2521                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2522                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2523                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2524                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2525         }
2526         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2527         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2528         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2529 }
2530
2531 #[test]
2532 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() {
2533         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2534         let mut alice_config = test_default_channel_config();
2535         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2536         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2537         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2538         let mut bob_config = test_default_channel_config();
2539         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2540         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2541         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2542         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2543         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2544         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2545         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2546         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2547         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2548         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2549         // Create some new channels:
2550         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2551
2552         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2553         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2554         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2555         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2556         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2557         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2558         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2559         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2560         // Revoke the old state
2561         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2562         {
2563                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2564                 {
2565                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2566                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2567                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2568
2569                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2570                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2571                 }
2572                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2573                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2574
2575                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2576                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2577                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2578                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2579                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2580                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2581                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2582         }
2583         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2584         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2585         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2586 }
2587
2588 #[test]
2589 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2590         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2591         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2592         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2593         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2594         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2595         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2596         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2597         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2598         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2599         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2600         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2601         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2602         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2603         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2604
2605         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2606         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2607         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2608         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2609         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2610         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2611
2612         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2613
2614         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2615         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2616         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2617         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2618         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2619 }
2620
2621 #[test]
2622 fn test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates() {
2623         do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(true);
2624         do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(false);
2625 }
2626
2627 fn do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(broadcast_initial_commitment: bool) {
2628         // Simple test to make sure that the justice tx formed in WatchtowerPersister
2629         // is properly formed and can be broadcasted/confirmed successfully in the event
2630         // that a revoked commitment transaction is broadcasted
2631         // (Similar to `revoked_output_claim` test but we get the justice tx + broadcast manually)
2632         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2633         let destination_script0 = chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
2634         let destination_script1 = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
2635         let persisters = vec![WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script0),
2636                 WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script1)];
2637         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs_with_persisters(2, &chanmon_cfgs, persisters.iter().collect());
2638         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2639         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2640         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2641         let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
2642
2643         if !broadcast_initial_commitment {
2644                 // Send a payment to move the channel forward
2645                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2646         }
2647
2648         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output.
2649         // We'll keep this commitment transaction to broadcast once it's revoked.
2650         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel_id);
2651         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2652         let revoked_commitment_tx = &revoked_local_txn[0];
2653
2654         // Send another payment, now revoking the previous commitment tx
2655         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2656
2657         let justice_tx = persisters[1].justice_tx(funding_txo, &revoked_commitment_tx.txid()).unwrap();
2658         check_spends!(justice_tx, revoked_commitment_tx);
2659
2660         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2661         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2662
2663         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2664         check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2665                 &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2666         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 0);
2667
2668         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2669         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2670                 &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2671
2672         // Check that the justice tx has sent the revoked output value to nodes[1]
2673         let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel_id);
2674         let total_claimable_balance = monitor.get_claimable_balances().iter().fold(0, |sum, balance| {
2675                 match balance {
2676                         channelmonitor::Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. } => sum + amount_satoshis,
2677                         _ => panic!("Unexpected balance type"),
2678                 }
2679         });
2680         // On the first commitment, node[1]'s balance was below dust so it didn't have an output
2681         let node1_channel_balance = if broadcast_initial_commitment { 0 } else { revoked_commitment_tx.output[0].value };
2682         let expected_claimable_balance = node1_channel_balance + justice_tx.output[0].value;
2683         assert_eq!(total_claimable_balance, expected_claimable_balance);
2684 }
2685
2686
2687 #[test]
2688 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2689         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2690         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2691         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2692         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2693         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2694         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2695
2696         // Create some new channel:
2697         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2698
2699         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2700         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2701         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2702         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2703         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2704
2705         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2706         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2707         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2708         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2709         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2710         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2711         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2712         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2713         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2714
2715         //Revoke the old state
2716         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2717
2718         {
2719                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2720                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2721                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2722                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2723                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2724                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2725                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2726                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2727
2728                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2729                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2730
2731                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2732                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2733
2734                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2735                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2736                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2737                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2738                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2739                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2740                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2741                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2742
2743                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2744                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2745                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2746                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2747                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2748         }
2749         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2750         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2751         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2752 }
2753
2754 #[test]
2755 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2756         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2757         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2758         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2759         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2760         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2761         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2762
2763         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2764
2765         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2766         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2767         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2768         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2769         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2770         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2771
2772         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2773         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2774
2775         //Revoke the old state
2776         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2777
2778         {
2779                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2780                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2781                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2782                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2783                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2784                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2785                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions(events[0..2].to_vec(), &[HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
2786                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2787                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2788                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2789                 }
2790
2791                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2792                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2793
2794                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2795
2796                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2797                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2798                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2799                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2800                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2801                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2802                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2803
2804                 // Filter out any non justice transactions.
2805                 node_txn.retain(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2806                 assert!(node_txn.len() > 3);
2807
2808                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2809                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2810                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2811
2812                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2813                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2814                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2815
2816                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2817                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2818                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2819                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2820                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2821                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2822                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2823                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2824
2825                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2826                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2827                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2828                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2829                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2830                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2831                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2832         }
2833         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2834         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2835         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2836 }
2837
2838 #[test]
2839 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2840         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2841         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2842         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2843         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2844         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2845         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2846         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2847         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2848         // towards B.
2849         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2850         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2851         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2852         // PaymentSent event).
2853
2854         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2855         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2856         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2857         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2858
2859         // Create some initial channels
2860         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2861         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2862
2863         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2864         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2865         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2866         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2867         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2868
2869         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2870         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2871         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2872
2873         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2874         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2875
2876         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2877         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2878         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2879         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2880         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2881         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2882         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2883         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2884         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2885         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2886         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2887         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2888         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2889         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2890         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2891
2892         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2893         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2894         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2895         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2896         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2897         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2898         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2899         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2900         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2901         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2902         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2903         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2904         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2905         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2906
2907         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2908         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
2909         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2910         {
2911                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2912                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2913                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2914                 added_monitors.clear();
2915         }
2916         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2917         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2918         match forwarded_events[0] {
2919                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2920                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2921         }
2922         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2923         match forwarded_events[1] {
2924                 Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
2925                         next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
2926                 } => {
2927                         assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2928                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2929                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2930                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2931                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2932                 },
2933                 _ => panic!()
2934         }
2935         match forwarded_events[2] {
2936                 Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
2937                         next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
2938                 } => {
2939                         assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2940                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2941                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2942                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2943                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2944                 },
2945                 _ => panic!()
2946         }
2947         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2948         {
2949                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2950                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2951                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2952                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2953                 added_monitors.clear();
2954         }
2955         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2956
2957         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2958         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2959
2960         match nodes_2_event {
2961                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2962                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2963         }
2964
2965         match nodes_0_event {
2966                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2967                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2968                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2969                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2970                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2971                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2972                 },
2973                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2974         };
2975
2976         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2977         match events[0] {
2978                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2979                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2980         }
2981
2982         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2983                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2984                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2985                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2986                         // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2987                         // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2988                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2989                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2990                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2991                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2992                         if $htlc_offered {
2993                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2994                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2995                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2996                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2997                         } else {
2998                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2999                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3000                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
3001                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
3002                         }
3003                         node_txn.clear();
3004                 } }
3005         }
3006         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
3007         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
3008
3009         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
3010         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
3011         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
3012         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3013         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3014         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3015         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3016         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3017         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
3018         assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
3019         let commitment_spend =
3020                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
3021                         &node_txn[0]
3022                 } else {
3023                         // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
3024                         // FullBlockViaListen
3025                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
3026                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3027                                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
3028                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
3029                                 &node_txn[0]
3030                         } else {
3031                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3032                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3033                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
3034                                 &node_txn[2]
3035                         }
3036                 };
3037
3038         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3039         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
3040         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3041         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3042         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
3043         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
3044         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
3045         // we already checked the same situation with A.
3046
3047         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
3048         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()]));
3049         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3050         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3051         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3052         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3053         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
3054         let mut first_claimed = false;
3055         for event in events {
3056                 match event {
3057                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3058                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
3059                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
3060                                         first_claimed = true;
3061                                 } else {
3062                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
3063                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
3064                                 }
3065                         },
3066                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3067                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
3068                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3069                 }
3070         }
3071         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3072 }
3073
3074 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
3075         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
3076         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
3077         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
3078         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
3079         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
3080         //            \                                  \
3081         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
3082
3083         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3084         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3085         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3086         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3087         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3088         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3089         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3090
3091         // Create some intial channels
3092         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3093         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3094
3095         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
3096         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3097         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3098
3099         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
3100
3101         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
3102         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3103         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
3104         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
3105         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
3106         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
3107         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3108
3109         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3110         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3111         match events[0] {
3112                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3113                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3114                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3115                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3116                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3117                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3118                 },
3119                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3120         };
3121         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
3122         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3123         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3124         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3125         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
3126         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
3127
3128         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
3129         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
3130         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
3131         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false
3132                 , [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3133         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
3134         let timeout_tx = {
3135                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3136                 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
3137                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
3138                 } else {
3139                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 3); // Two extra fee bumps for timeout transaction
3140                 }
3141                 txn.iter().for_each(|tx| check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx[0]));
3142                 assert_eq!(txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3143                 txn.remove(0)
3144         };
3145
3146         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
3147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3148         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3149
3150         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3151
3152         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3153         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3154         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3155         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3156         match events[0] {
3157                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3158                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3159                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3160                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3161                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3162                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3163                 },
3164                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3165         };
3166
3167         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3168         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3169         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3170
3171         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3172         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3173
3174         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3175         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3176         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3177         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
3178         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3179         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3180         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3181 }
3182
3183 #[test]
3184 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3185         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3186         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3187         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3188 }
3189
3190 #[test]
3191 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3192         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3193         // and fail backward accordingly.
3194
3195         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3196         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3197         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3198         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3199
3200         // Create some initial channels
3201         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3202         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3203
3204         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3205         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3206         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3207         // Revoke the old state
3208         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3209
3210         let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3211
3212         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3213         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3214         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3215         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3216         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3217
3218         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3219         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3220         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3221         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3222         match events[0] {
3223                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3224                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3225                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3226                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3227                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3228                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3229
3230                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3231                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3232                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3233                 },
3234                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3235         }
3236 }
3237
3238 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3239         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3240         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3241         // commitment transaction anymore.
3242         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3243         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3244         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3245         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3246         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3247         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3248         // transactions:
3249         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3250         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3251         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3252         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3253         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3254         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3255         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3256         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3257         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3258
3259         // Create some initial channels
3260         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3261         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3262
3263         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3264         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3265         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3266         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3267         // Revoke the old state
3268         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3269
3270         let value = if use_dust {
3271                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3272                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3273                 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3274                         .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3275         } else { 3000000 };
3276
3277         let (_, first_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3278         let (_, second_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3279         let (_, third_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3280
3281         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3282         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3283         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3284         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3285         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3286         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3287         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3288         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3289         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3290         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3291         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3292         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3293
3294         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3295         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3296         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3297         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3298         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3299         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3300         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3301         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3302         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3303         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3304         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3306         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3307         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3308         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3309         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3310
3311         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3312         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3313         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3314         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3315         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3316         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3317         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3318         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3319         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3320         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3321         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3322         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3323         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3324         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3325         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3326         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3327         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3328         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3329
3330         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3331         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3332         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3333         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, fourth_payment_hash,
3334                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3335         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3336         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3337         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3338
3339         if deliver_bs_raa {
3340                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3341                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3342                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3343                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3344                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3345                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3346                 match events[0] {
3347                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3348                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3349                 }
3350                 match events[1] {
3351                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3352                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3353                 };
3354                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3355                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3356         }
3357
3358         let mut failed_htlcs = new_hash_set();
3359         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3360
3361         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3362         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3363         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3364
3365         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3366         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3367         assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3368                 ev,
3369                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. }
3370         )));
3371         assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3372                 ev,
3373                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
3374         )));
3375         assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3376                 ev,
3377                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
3378         )));
3379
3380         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3381         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3382
3383         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3384         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3385
3386         if deliver_bs_raa {
3387                 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3388                 match nodes_2_event {
3389                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3390                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3391                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3392                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3393                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3394                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3395                         },
3396                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3397                 }
3398         }
3399
3400         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3401         match nodes_2_event {
3402                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data }) }, node_id: _ } => {
3403                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3404                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3405                 },
3406                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3407         }
3408
3409         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3410         match nodes_0_event {
3411                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3412                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3413                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3414                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3415                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3416                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3417
3418                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3419                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3420                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3421
3422                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3423
3424                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3425                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3426                         match events[0] {
3427                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3428                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3429                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3430                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3431                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3432                                                 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3433                                         }
3434                                 },
3435                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3436                         }
3437                         match events[1] {
3438                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3439                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3440                                 },
3441                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3442                         }
3443                         match events[2] {
3444                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3445                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3446                                 },
3447                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3448                         }
3449                         match events[3] {
3450                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3451                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3452                                 },
3453                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3454                         }
3455                         match events[4] {
3456                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3457                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3458                                 },
3459                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3460                         }
3461                         match events[5] {
3462                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3463                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3464                                 },
3465                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3466                         }
3467                 },
3468                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3469         }
3470
3471         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3472         match events[0] {
3473                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3474                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3475         }
3476
3477         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3478         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3479         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3480 }
3481
3482 #[test]
3483 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3484         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3485         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3486         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3487         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3488 }
3489
3490 #[test]
3491 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3492         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3493         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3494         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3495         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3496 }
3497
3498 #[test]
3499 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3500         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3501         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3502         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3503         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3504         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3505
3506         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3507         {
3508                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3509                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
3510                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3511                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3512
3513                 let payment_event = {
3514                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3515                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3516                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3517                 };
3518                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3519                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3520         }
3521
3522         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3523         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3524         {
3525                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, failed_payment_hash,
3526                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3527                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3528
3529                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3530         }
3531
3532         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3533         {
3534                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3535
3536                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3537                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3538                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3539                 let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret);
3540                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
3541                         &route.paths[0], 50_000, &recipient_onion_fields, current_height, &None).unwrap();
3542                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3543                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
3544
3545                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3546                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3547                         channel_id: chan.2,
3548                         htlc_id: 0,
3549                         amount_msat: 0,
3550                         payment_hash,
3551                         cltv_expiry,
3552                         onion_routing_packet,
3553                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
3554                         blinding_point: None,
3555                 };
3556                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3557         }
3558         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3559         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3560         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3561         match events[0] {
3562                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3563                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3564                 },
3565                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3566         }
3567         match events[1] {
3568                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3569                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3570                 },
3571                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3572         }
3573         match events[2] {
3574                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3575                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3576                 },
3577                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3578         }
3579         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3580         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3581 }
3582
3583 #[test]
3584 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3585         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3586         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3587         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3588         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3589         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3590         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3591         if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3592                 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3593                 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3594                 // connect_style.
3595                 return;
3596         }
3597         let funding_tx = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).3;
3598
3599         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3600         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3601         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3602         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3603         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3604         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3605
3606         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
3607         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3608         check_spends!(node_txn[0], funding_tx);
3609         check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
3610
3611         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone()]);
3612         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3613         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3614         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3615         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3616
3617         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3618         // registering new transactions
3619         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3620 }
3621
3622 #[test]
3623 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3624         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3625         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3626         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3627         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3628         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3629         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3630         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3631
3632         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3633
3634         let mut payment_event = {
3635                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
3636                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3637                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3638
3639                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3640                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3641                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3642         };
3643
3644         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3645         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3646
3647         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3648
3649         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3650         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3651         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3652         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3653
3654         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3655         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3656         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3657         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3658         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3659
3660         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3661         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3662         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3663
3664         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3665         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3666         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3667         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3668         let commitment_tx = {
3669                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3670                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3671                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3672                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3673                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3674                 node_txn.remove(0)
3675         };
3676
3677         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
3678
3679         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3680         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3681         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3682         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3683
3684         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3685         {
3686                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3687                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3688         }
3689         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx);
3690         let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3691         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), if nodes[2].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 2 } else { 1 });
3692         let htlc_tx = node_txn.pop().unwrap();
3693         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input.len(), 1);
3694         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, commitment_tx.txid());
3695         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3696         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3697
3698         check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx);
3699 }
3700
3701 #[test]
3702 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3703         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3704         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3705         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3706         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3707
3708         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3709         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3710         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3711         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3712         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3713
3714         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3715
3716         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3717         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3718         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3719         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3720         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3721         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
3722
3723         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3724         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3725
3726         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3727         reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3728         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3729         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3730 }
3731
3732 #[test]
3733 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3734         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3735         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted, and doesn't reconnect back within time.
3736         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3737         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3738         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3739         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3740
3741         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3742         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3743         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
3744         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3745         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3746         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3747         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3748
3749         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3750         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3751
3752         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3753
3754         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3755         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3756
3757         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3758         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3759         // broadcasted.
3760         {
3761                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3762         }
3763
3764         // The peers disconnect before the funding is broadcasted.
3765         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3766         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3767
3768         // The time for peers to reconnect expires.
3769         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS {
3770                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
3771         }
3772
3773         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` and a
3774         // `DiscardFunding` event when the peers are disconnected and do not reconnect before the
3775         // funding transaction is broadcasted.
3776         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, true
3777                 , [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3778         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false
3779                 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3780 }
3781
3782 #[test]
3783 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3784         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3785         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3786         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3787         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3788         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3789         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3790         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3791
3792         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3793         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3794         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3795         reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3796         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3797
3798         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3799         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3800         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3801         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3802
3803         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3804         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3805         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3806
3807         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3808         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3809         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3810         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3811
3812         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3813         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3814
3815         claim_payment_along_route(
3816                 ClaimAlongRouteArgs::new(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], payment_preimage_3)
3817                         .skip_last(true)
3818         );
3819         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3820
3821         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3822         reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 = 1;
3823         reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3824         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3825         {
3826                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3827                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3828                 match events[0] {
3829                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3830                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3831                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3832                         },
3833                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3834                 }
3835                 match events[1] {
3836                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3837                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3838                 }
3839                 match events[2] {
3840                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3841                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3842                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3843                         },
3844                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3845                 }
3846                 match events[3] {
3847                         Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3848                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3849                         },
3850                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3851                 }
3852         }
3853         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
3854
3855         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3856         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3857 }
3858
3859 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3860         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3861         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3862         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3863         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3864         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3865
3866         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3867         let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3868                 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3869                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3870                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3871                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3872                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3873                 chan_id
3874         } else {
3875                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3876         };
3877
3878         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3879
3880         let payment_event = {
3881                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
3882                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3883                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3884
3885                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3886                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3887                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3888         };
3889         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3890
3891         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3892                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3893         } else {
3894                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3895                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3896                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3897                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3898                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3899
3900                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3901                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3902                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3903                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3904
3905                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3906                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3907                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3908                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3909                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3910
3911                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3912                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3913                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3914                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3915                                         }
3916                                 }
3917                         }
3918                 }
3919         }
3920
3921         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3922         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3923         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3924                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3925                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3926                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3927                         //
3928                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3929                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3930                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3931                         //
3932                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3933                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3934                 }
3935                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3936                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3937                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3938                 reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3939                 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = 1;
3940                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3941         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3942                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3943                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3944                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
3945                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
3946                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3947         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3948                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3949                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3950                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
3951                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3952         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3953                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3954                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3955                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
3956                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3957         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3958                 // Everything was delivered...
3959                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3960         }
3961
3962         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3963         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3964                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3965                 match events_1[0] {
3966                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3967                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3968                 };
3969                 match events_1[1] {
3970                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3971                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3972                 };
3973         } else {
3974                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3975                 match events_1[0] {
3976                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3977                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3978                 };
3979         }
3980
3981         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3982         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3983         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3984
3985         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3986
3987         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3988         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3989         match events_2[0] {
3990                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
3991                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3992                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3993                         assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3994                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3995                         match &purpose {
3996                                 PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3997                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3998                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3999                                 },
4000                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment")
4001                         }
4002                 },
4003                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4004         }
4005
4006         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4007         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4008         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4009
4010         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4011         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4012         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
4013                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
4014                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4015                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4016                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4017                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4018                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4019                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4020                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
4021                 },
4022                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4023         };
4024
4025         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
4026                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
4027
4028                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4029                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4030                 match events_4[0] {
4031                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4032                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
4033                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
4034                         },
4035                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4036                 }
4037
4038                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
4039                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
4040                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4041                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4042
4043                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
4044                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4045                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4046                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4047
4048                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
4049                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
4050                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4051                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4052                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4053
4054                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
4055                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4056                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4057                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4058                                         }
4059                                 }
4060                         }
4061                 }
4062         }
4063
4064         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4065         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4066         if messages_delivered < 2 {
4067                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4068                 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
4069                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4070                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
4071                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
4072                 } else {
4073                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4074                 }
4075         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
4076                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
4077                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4078                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
4079                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
4080                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4081         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
4082                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
4083                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4084                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
4085                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4086         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
4087                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
4088                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4089                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
4090                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4091         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
4092                 // Everything was delivered...
4093                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4094         }
4095
4096         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
4097                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4098         }
4099         if messages_delivered <= 5 {
4100                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4101                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4102         }
4103         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4104
4105         if messages_delivered > 2 {
4106                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4107         }
4108
4109         // Channel should still work fine...
4110         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4111         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
4112         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4113 }
4114
4115 #[test]
4116 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
4117         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
4118         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
4119         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
4120         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
4121 }
4122
4123 #[test]
4124 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
4125         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
4126         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
4127         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
4128         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
4129 }
4130
4131 #[test]
4132 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4133         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4134         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4135         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4136         // channel_ready immediately instead.
4137         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4138         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4139         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4140         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4141         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4142
4143         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4144
4145         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4146         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4147         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4148         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4149         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4150         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4151
4152         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4153         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4154         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4155 }
4156
4157 #[test]
4158 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_leading() {
4159         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4160         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4161         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4162         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4163
4164         // Let channel_manager get ahead of chain_monitor by 1 block.
4165         // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4166         // in case where client calls block_connect on channel_manager first and then on chain_monitor.
4167         let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4168         let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4169
4170         nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4171         nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4172
4173         // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4174         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4175
4176         // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1,
4177         // but it's best_block is block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager
4178         // was running ahead of chain_monitor at the time of funding_created.
4179         // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4180         // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4181         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4182         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4183
4184         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4185         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4186         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4187 }
4188
4189 #[test]
4190 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_lagging() {
4191         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4192         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4193         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4194         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4195
4196         // Let chain_monitor get ahead of channel_manager by 1 block.
4197         // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4198         // in case where client calls block_connect on chain_monitor first and then on channel_manager.
4199         let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4200         let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4201
4202         nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4203         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4204
4205         // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4206         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4207
4208         // channel_manager can't really skip block_1, it should get it eventually.
4209         nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4210
4211         // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1, it's best_block is
4212         // the block before block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager was
4213         // running behind at the time of funding_created.
4214         // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4215         // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4216         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4217         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4218
4219         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4220         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4221         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4222 }
4223
4224 #[test]
4225 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4226         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4227         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4228         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4229         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4230         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4231         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4232         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4233
4234         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4235
4236         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4237         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4238         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
4239                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
4240         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4241
4242         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4243         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4244         match events_1[0] {
4245                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4246                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4247         }
4248
4249         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4250         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4251         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4252
4253         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4254         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4255         match events_2[0] {
4256                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4257                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4258                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4259                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4260                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4261                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4262                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4263
4264                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4265                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4266                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4267                         match events_3[0] {
4268                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4269                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4270                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4271                                 },
4272                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4273                         }
4274
4275                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4276                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4277                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4278                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4279                 },
4280                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4281         }
4282
4283         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4284         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4285
4286         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4287                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4288         }, true).unwrap();
4289         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4290         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4291         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4292                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4293         }, false).unwrap();
4294         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4295         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4296
4297         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4298         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4299         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4300         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4301
4302         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4303         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4304
4305         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4306         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4307
4308         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4309
4310         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4311         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4312         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4313         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4314         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4315         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4316         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4317         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4318         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4319         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4320
4321         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4322         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4323         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4324         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4325         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4326         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4327         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4328         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4329
4330         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4331         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4332         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4333         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4334         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4335         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4336         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4337         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4338
4339         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4340         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4341         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4342         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4343
4344         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4345         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4346         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4347         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4348
4349         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4350         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4351         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4352
4353         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4354
4355         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4356         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4357         match events_5[0] {
4358                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4359                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4360                         match &purpose {
4361                                 PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4362                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4363                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4364                                 },
4365                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment")
4366                         }
4367                 },
4368                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4369         }
4370
4371         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4372         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4373         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4374
4375         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4376         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4377 }
4378
4379 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4380         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4381         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4382         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4383         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4384         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4385         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4386
4387         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4388
4389         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4390                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4391                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4392                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4393                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4394                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4395                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
4396                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4397                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
4398                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id,
4399                         &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4400                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4401                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4402                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4403                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4404                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4405                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4406                 our_payment_hash
4407         } else {
4408                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4409         };
4410
4411         let mut block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
4412         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4413         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4414         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4415         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4416                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4417                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4418                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4419         }
4420
4421         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4422
4423         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4424         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4425         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4426         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4427         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4428         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4429
4430         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4431         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4432         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4433         let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4434         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4435         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4436 }
4437
4438 #[test]
4439 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4440         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4441         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4442 }
4443
4444 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4445         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4446         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4447         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4448         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4449         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4450         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4451         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4452
4453         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4454         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4455         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4456         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4457
4458         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4459         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4460         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, first_payment_hash,
4461                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4462         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4463         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4464
4465         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4466         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4467         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4468         sending_node.node.send_payment_with_route(&route, second_payment_hash,
4469                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4470         if forwarded_htlc {
4471                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4472                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4473                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4474                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4475                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4476         }
4477         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4478
4479         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4480         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4481         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4482         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4483
4484         if forwarded_htlc {
4485                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4486                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4487                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4488                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4489                 match fail_commit[0] {
4490                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4491                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4492                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4493                         },
4494                         _ => unreachable!(),
4495                 }
4496                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4497         } else {
4498                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4499         }
4500 }
4501
4502 #[test]
4503 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4504         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4505         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4506 }
4507
4508 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4509         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4510                 {
4511                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4512                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4513                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4514                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4515                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4516                                 match event {
4517                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs, channel_id: _ } => {
4518                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4519                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4520                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4521                                                 }
4522                                         },
4523                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4524                                 };
4525                         }
4526                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4527                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx) {
4528                                         txn.push(tx);
4529                                 }
4530                         }
4531                         txn
4532                 }
4533         }
4534 }
4535
4536 #[test]
4537 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4538         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4539         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4540         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4541         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4542         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4543
4544         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4545         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4546         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4547         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4548         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4549         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4550         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4551         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4552         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4553
4554         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4555         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4556
4557         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4558         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4559         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4560         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4561         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4562 }
4563
4564 #[test]
4565 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4566         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4567         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4568         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4569         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4570         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4571         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4572
4573         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4574         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4575         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4576         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4577         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4578
4579         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4580         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4581         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4582         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4583
4584         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4585         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4586         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4587         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4588         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4589
4590         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4591         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4592         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4593 }
4594
4595 #[test]
4596 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4597         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4598         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4599
4600         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4601         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4602         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4603         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4604
4605         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4606         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4607         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4608         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4609         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4610
4611         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4612         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4613         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4614         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4615         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4616
4617         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4618         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4619         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4620
4621         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4622         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4623         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4624         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4625         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4626 }
4627
4628 #[test]
4629 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4630         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4631         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4632         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4633         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4634
4635         // Create some initial channels
4636         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4637
4638         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4639
4640         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4641         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4642         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4643
4644         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4645         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4646         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4647         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4648         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4649         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4650         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4651         match events[0] {
4652                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4653                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4654         }
4655         match events[2] {
4656                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4657                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4658         }
4659
4660         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4661         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4662         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4663         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4664         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4665
4666         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4667         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4668         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4669
4670         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4671         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4672         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4673 }
4674
4675 #[test]
4676 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4677         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4678         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4679         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4680         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4681
4682         // Create some initial channels
4683         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4684
4685         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4686         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4687
4688         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4689
4690         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4691         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4692         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4693
4694         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4695         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4696         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4697         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4698         match events[1] {
4699                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4700                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4701         }
4702         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4703
4704         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4705         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4706         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4707         check_spends!(node_txn[0],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4708         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4709
4710         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4711         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4712         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4713         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4714
4715         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4716         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4717         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4718         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4719         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4720 }
4721
4722 #[test]
4723 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4724         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4725         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4726         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4727         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4728
4729         // Create some initial channels
4730         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4731
4732         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4733         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4734         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4735         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4736
4737         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4738
4739         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4740         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4741         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4742         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4743
4744         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4745         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4746         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4747         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4748
4749         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4750         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4751
4752         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4753         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4754         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4755 }
4756
4757 #[test]
4758 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4759         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4760         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4761         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4762         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4763         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4764
4765         // Create some initial channels
4766         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4767
4768         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4769         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4770         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4771         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4772
4773         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4774
4775         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4776         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4777         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4778         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4779         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4780         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4781
4782         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4783         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4784         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4785         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4786         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4787         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // HTLC-Timeout
4788
4789         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4790         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4791         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4792         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4793         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4794
4795         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4796         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4797         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4798         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4799         // transactions next...
4800         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4801         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4802
4803         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4804         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4805         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4806                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4807         } else {
4808                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4809                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4810         }
4811
4812         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4813         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4814
4815         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4816         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4817         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4818         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4819         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4820 }
4821
4822 #[test]
4823 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4824         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4825         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4826         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4827         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4828         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4829
4830         // Create some initial channels
4831         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4832
4833         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4834         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4835         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4836         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4837
4838         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4839         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4840
4841         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4842
4843         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4844         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4845         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4846         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4847         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4848         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4849
4850         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4851         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4852         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4853         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4854
4855         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4856         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4857         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4858
4859         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4860         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4861         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4862         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4863         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4864
4865         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4866         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4867
4868         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4869         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4870         // transactions next...
4871         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4872         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4873         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4874                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4875         } else {
4876                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4877                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4878         }
4879
4880         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4881         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4882
4883         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4884         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4885
4886         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4887         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4888
4889         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4890         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4891         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4892         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4893         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4894         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4895         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4896         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4897 }
4898
4899 #[test]
4900 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4901         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4902         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4903         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4904         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4905         // channel.
4906         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4907         // gets broadcast.
4908
4909         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4910         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4911         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4912         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4913
4914         // Create some initial channels
4915         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4916         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4917
4918         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4919         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4920         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4921         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4922         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4923
4924         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4925         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4926         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4927
4928         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4929         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4930         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4931         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4932         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4933         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4934         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4935         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4936         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4937         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4938         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4939
4940         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4941         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4942         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4943         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4944
4945         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4946         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4947         check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4948         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4949         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4950         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Success tx
4951
4952         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4953         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
4954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4955         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4956         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4957         match events[0] {
4958                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4959                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4960         }
4961         match events[1] {
4962                 Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
4963                         next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
4964                 } => {
4965                         assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4966                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4967                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4968                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4969                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4970                 },
4971                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4972         }
4973         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4974         let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4975         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4976         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4977         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4978
4979         match nodes_2_event {
4980                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4981                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4982         }
4983
4984         match nodes_0_event {
4985                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4986                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4987                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4988                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4989                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4990                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4991                 },
4992                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4993         };
4994
4995         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4996         match msg_events[0] {
4997                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4998                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4999         }
5000
5001         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5002         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5003         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5004         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5005         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5006         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
5007         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5008         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5009         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5010         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5011         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
5012
5013         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5014         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5015 }
5016
5017 #[test]
5018 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5019         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5020         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5021         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5022         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5023         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5024         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5025         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5026         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5027         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5028         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5029         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5030                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5031         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5032
5033         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5034         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5035         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5036
5037         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5038         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5039         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5040         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5041         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5042
5043         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5044
5045         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
5046         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5047         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5048         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5049         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
5050                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
5051         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
5052         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5053
5054         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5055         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5056         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5057
5058         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5059         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5060         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5061         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5062         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5063
5064         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5065         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5066                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5067                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
5068                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5069
5070                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5071                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5072                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5073
5074                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
5075                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5076                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5077                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5078                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5079
5080                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5081                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5082                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
5083                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5084                 } else {
5085                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5086                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5087                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5088                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5089                 }
5090
5091                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5092                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5093                 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
5094                 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
5095                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
5096                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5097                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5098                 } else {
5099                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5100                 }
5101         }
5102
5103         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5104         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5105
5106         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5107         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5108         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5109         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5110         match events[0] {
5111                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5112                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5113         }
5114         match events[2] {
5115                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5116                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5117         }
5118         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5119         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5120         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5121         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5122         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5123         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5124         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5125         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5126         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5127         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5128
5129         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5130         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5131         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5132         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5133         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5134         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5135         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5136         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5137         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5139
5140         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5141         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5142         {
5143                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5144         }
5145         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5146
5147         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5148         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
5149         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
5150         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5151         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5152         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5153         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5154         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5155         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5157
5158         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5159         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5160         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, None, true, true);
5161 }
5162
5163 #[test]
5164 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5165         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5166         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5167         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5168         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5169
5170         // Create some initial channels
5171         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5172
5173         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5174         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5175         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5176         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5177         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5178
5179         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5180         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5181         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5182         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5183
5184         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5185         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5186         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5187         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5188         match events[0] {
5189                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5190                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5191         }
5192         match events[2] {
5193                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5194                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5195         }
5196         let node_tx = {
5197                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5198                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5199                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5200                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5201                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5202                 node_txn[0].clone()
5203         };
5204
5205         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5206         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5207
5208         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5209         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5210         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5211         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5212         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5213         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5214 }
5215
5216 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5217         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5218         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5219         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5220         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5221         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5222         // use the same payment hashes.
5223         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5224         //
5225         // A \         / E
5226         //    - C - D -
5227         // B /         \ F
5228         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5229         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5230         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5231         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5232         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5233         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5234         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5235         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5236                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5237         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5238
5239         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5240         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5241         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5242         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5243         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5244
5245         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5246         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5247         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5248         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5249
5250         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
5251                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5252         // 0th HTLC:
5253         let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5254         // 1st HTLC:
5255         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5256         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5257         // 2nd HTLC:
5258         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5259         // 3rd HTLC:
5260         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5261         // 4th HTLC:
5262         let (_, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5263         // 5th HTLC:
5264         let (_, payment_hash_4, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5265         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5266         // 6th HTLC:
5267         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5268         // 7th HTLC:
5269         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5270
5271         // 8th HTLC:
5272         let (_, payment_hash_5, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5273         // 9th HTLC:
5274         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5275         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5276
5277         // 10th HTLC:
5278         let (_, payment_hash_6, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5279         // 11th HTLC:
5280         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5281         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5282
5283         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5284         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5285         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5286         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5287         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5288
5289         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5290         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5291         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5292         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5293         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5294         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5295         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5296
5297         let failed_destinations = vec![
5298                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5299                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5300                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5301                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5302         ];
5303         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5304         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5305
5306         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5307         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5308         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5309         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5310         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5311         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5312
5313         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5314         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5315         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5316         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5317
5318         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5319                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5320                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5321         ];
5322         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5323         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5324
5325         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5326         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5327         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5328         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5329
5330         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5331
5332         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5333         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5334                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5335                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5336                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5337                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5338                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5339                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5340         ];
5341         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5342         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5343         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5344         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5345         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5346         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5347         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5348         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5349         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5350         if deliver_last_raa {
5351                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5352         } else {
5353                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5354         }
5355
5356         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5357         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5358         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5359         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5360         //
5361         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5362         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5363         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5364         //
5365         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5366         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5367         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5368
5369         if announce_latest {
5370                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5371         } else {
5372                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5373         }
5374         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5375         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5376                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5377                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5378         } else {
5379                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5380                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5381         };
5382         match close_event {
5383                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5384                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5385         }
5386
5387         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5388         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5389         if deliver_last_raa {
5390                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[1..2], true);
5391
5392                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5393                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5394         } else {
5395                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5396                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5397                 } else {
5398                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5399                 };
5400
5401                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5402         }
5403         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5404
5405         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5406         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5407         let mut a_done = false;
5408         for msg in cs_msgs {
5409                 match msg {
5410                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5411                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5412                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5413                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5414                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5415                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5416                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5417                                         }
5418                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5419                                         assert!(!a_done);
5420                                         a_done = true;
5421                                         &nodes[0]
5422                                 } else {
5423                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5424                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5425                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5426                                         }
5427                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5428                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5429                                         &nodes[1]
5430                                 };
5431                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5432                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5433                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5434                                 if announce_latest {
5435                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5436                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5437                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5438                                         }
5439                                 }
5440                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5441                         },
5442                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5443                 }
5444         }
5445
5446         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5447         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5448         let mut as_faileds = new_hash_set();
5449         let mut as_updates = 0;
5450         for event in as_events.iter() {
5451                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5452                         assert!(as_faileds.insert(*payment_hash));
5453                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5454                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5455                         } else {
5456                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5457                         }
5458                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5459                                 as_updates += 1;
5460                         }
5461                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5462                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5463         }
5464         assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5465         assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5466         if announce_latest {
5467                 assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5468                 assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5469         }
5470         assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5471
5472         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5473         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5474         let mut bs_faileds = new_hash_set();
5475         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5476         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5477                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5478                         assert!(bs_faileds.insert(*payment_hash));
5479                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5480                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5481                         } else {
5482                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5483                         }
5484                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5485                                 bs_updates += 1;
5486                         }
5487                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5488                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5489         }
5490         assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5491         assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5492         if announce_latest {
5493                 assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5494         }
5495         assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5496
5497         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5498         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5499         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5500         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5501         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5502         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5503 }
5504
5505 #[test]
5506 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5507         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5508 }
5509
5510 #[test]
5511 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5512         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5513 }
5514
5515 #[test]
5516 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5517         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5518         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5519         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5520 }
5521
5522 #[test]
5523 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5524         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5525         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5526         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5527         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5528
5529         // Create some initial channels
5530         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5531
5532         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5533         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5534         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5535         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5536
5537         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5538         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5539         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5540         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5541         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5542         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5543
5544         let htlc_timeout = {
5545                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5546                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5547                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5548                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5549                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5550                 node_txn[0].clone()
5551         };
5552
5553         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5554         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5555         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5556
5557         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5558         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5559         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5560         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5561         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5562         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5563         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5564         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5565         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5566         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5567                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5568 }
5569
5570 #[test]
5571 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5572         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5573         // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5574         // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5575         // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5576
5577         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5578
5579         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5580         let seed = [42; 32];
5581         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5582         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5583         let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5584         let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5585         let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &scorer);
5586         let message_router = test_utils::TestMessageRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &keys_manager);
5587         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, message_router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5588         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5589         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5590         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5591
5592         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5593         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5594
5595         // Create some initial channels
5596         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5597         // for node 0
5598         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5599         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5600         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5601
5602         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5603         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5604         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5605         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5606         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5607
5608         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5609         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5610         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5611         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5612         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5613
5614         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5615         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5616         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5617         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5618             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5619             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5620             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5621                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5622         }
5623
5624         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5625         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5626         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5627         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5628         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5629         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5630
5631         let htlc_timeout = {
5632                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5633                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5634                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5635                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5636                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5637                 node_txn[0].clone()
5638         };
5639
5640         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5641         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5642         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5643
5644         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5645         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5646         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5647         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5648         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5649         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5650         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5651         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5652         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5653         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5654         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5655                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5656 }
5657
5658 #[test]
5659 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5660         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5661         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5662         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5663         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5664
5665         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5666
5667         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5668         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5669
5670         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5671         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5672         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5673
5674         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5675         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5676         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5677
5678         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5679         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5680         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5681
5682         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5683         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5684         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5685 }
5686
5687 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5688         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5689         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5690         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5691         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5692         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5693
5694         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5695
5696         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5697         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5698         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5699         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5700         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5701
5702         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5703         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5704         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
5705
5706         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5707         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5708         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5709         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5710         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5711
5712         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5713         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5714         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5715                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5716                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5717         }
5718         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5719         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5720         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5721         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5722 }
5723
5724 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5725         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5726         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5727         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5728         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5729         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5730
5731         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5732         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
5733                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5734         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5735
5736         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5737
5738         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5739         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5740         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5741
5742         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5743         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5744
5745         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5746                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5747                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5748         }
5749         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5750         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5751         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5752         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5753 }
5754
5755 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5756         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5757         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5758         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5759         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5760         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5761
5762         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5763         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5764         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5765         // actually revoked.
5766         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5767         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5768         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5769         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5770         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5771
5772         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5773         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5774         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5775         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5776         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5777         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5778         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5779         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5780         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5781         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5782
5783         if check_revoke_no_close {
5784                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5785                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5786         }
5787
5788         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5789         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5790         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5791                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5792                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5793         }
5794         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5795                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5796                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5797                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5798                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5799         } else {
5800                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5801         }
5802 }
5803
5804 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5805 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5806 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5807 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5808 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5809 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5810 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5811 // non-dust HTLCs.
5812 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5813 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5814 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5815 #[test]
5816 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5817         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5818         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5819
5820         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5821         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5822 }
5823
5824 #[test]
5825 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5826         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5827         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5828         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5829         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5830 }
5831
5832 #[test]
5833 #[should_panic]
5834 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5835         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5836         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5837         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5838         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5839         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5840         for node in nodes.iter() {
5841                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5842         }
5843
5844         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5845         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5846         let push_msat=10001;
5847         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
5848         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5849         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5850         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5851
5852         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5853         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5854         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5855 }
5856
5857 #[test]
5858 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5859         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5860         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5861         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5862         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5863
5864         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5865         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5866         let push_msat=10001;
5867         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5868
5869         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5870         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5871         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5872         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5873         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5874
5875         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5876         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5877         let push_msat=10001;
5878         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5879         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5880         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
5881
5882         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5883         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5884         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.channel_flags<=1);
5885
5886         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5887         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5888         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5889
5890         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5891         let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
5892         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.chain_hash, chain_hash);
5893
5894         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5895         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5896         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5897         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5898         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5899         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5900 }
5901
5902 #[test]
5903 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5904         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5905         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5906         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5907         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5908
5909         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5910         let push_msat=10001;
5911         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
5912         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5913         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5914         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5915
5916         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5917         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5918         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5919                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5920                         msg.clone()
5921                 },
5922                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5923         };
5924         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5925 }
5926
5927 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5928 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5929 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5930 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5931 #[test]
5932 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5933         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5934         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5935         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5936         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5937         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5938
5939         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5940         // pending_update_fee.
5941         {
5942                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5943                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5944         }
5945         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5946         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5947
5948         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5949         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5950         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5951                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5952                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5953                 },
5954                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5955         };
5956
5957         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5958
5959         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5960         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5961         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5962         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5963
5964         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5965         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
5966         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5967
5968         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5969         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5970                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5971         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5972         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5973
5974         // Flush the pending fee update.
5975         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5976         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5977         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5978         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5979         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5980
5981         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5982         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5983         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5984         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5985         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5986         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
5987
5988         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5989         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5990         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5991         match &events[0] {
5992                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5993                         assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5994                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5995                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5996                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5997                 },
5998                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5999         }
6000         match &events[1] {
6001                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6002                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6003                 },
6004                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6005         }
6006 }
6007
6008 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6009 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6010 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6011 #[test]
6012 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6013         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6014         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6015         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6016         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6017         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6018
6019         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6020         // pending_update_fee.
6021         {
6022                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6023                 *feerate_lock += 200;
6024         }
6025         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6026         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6027
6028         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6029         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6030         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6031                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6032                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6033                 },
6034                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6035         };
6036
6037         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6038
6039         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6040         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6041         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6042         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6043
6044         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6045         let amt_1 = 20000;
6046         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features) - amt_1;
6047         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6048         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6049
6050         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6051         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, payment_hash_1,
6052                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
6053         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6054         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6055         let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6056         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
6057                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
6058         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6059         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6060
6061         // Flush the pending fee update.
6062         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6063         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6064         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6065         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6066         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6067         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6068
6069         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6070         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6071         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6072         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6073         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6074         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
6075
6076         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6077         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6078         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6079         match &events[0] {
6080                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6081                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6082                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6083                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6084                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
6085                 },
6086                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6087         }
6088         match &events[1] {
6089                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6090                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6091                 },
6092                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6093         }
6094
6095         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6096         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6097                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6098                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6099                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6100         };
6101         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6102                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6103                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6104         };
6105         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6106         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6107         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6108         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6109         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6110         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6111         match events[0] {
6112                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6113                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6114         }
6115         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6116         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6117         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6118         match events[0] {
6119                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
6120                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6121         }
6122         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6123         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6124         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6125
6126         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6127         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6128         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6129         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6130 }
6131
6132 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6133 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6134 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6135 // once it's freed.
6136 #[test]
6137 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6138         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6139         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6140         // Avoid having to include routing fees in calculations
6141         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6142         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
6143         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
6144         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6145         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6146         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6147         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
6148
6149         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6150         // pending_update_fee.
6151         {
6152                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6153                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6154         }
6155         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6157
6158         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6159         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6160         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6161                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6162                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6163                 },
6164                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6165         };
6166
6167         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6168
6169         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6170         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6171         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6172         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6173
6174         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6175         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6176         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6177         let payment_event = {
6178                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6179                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6180                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6181
6182                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6183                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6184
6185                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6186         };
6187         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6189         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6190         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6191
6192         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
6193         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6194
6195         // Flush the pending fee update.
6196         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6197         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6198         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6199         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6200         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6201         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6202
6203         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6204         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6205         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6206
6207         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6208                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6209                         msg.clone()
6210                 },
6211                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6212         };
6213
6214         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6215         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6216         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6217
6218         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6219         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6220         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6221         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[1] {
6222                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6223                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6224         }
6225
6226         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6227         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6228         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6229
6230         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6231         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6232         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6233         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6234                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6235                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6236                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6237                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6238                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6239                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6240                 },
6241                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6242         };
6243
6244         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6245         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6246         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6247
6248         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6249         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6250         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6251         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6252         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6253         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6254         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6255         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6256         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6257                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6258                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6259         };
6260         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6261         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6262         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6263 }
6264
6265 #[test]
6266 fn test_payment_route_reaching_same_channel_twice() {
6267         //A route should not go through the same channel twice
6268         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6269         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6270         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6271         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6272         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6273         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6274
6275         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6276                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
6277         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6278
6279         // Extend the path by itself, essentially simulating route going through same channel twice
6280         let cloned_hops = route.paths[0].hops.clone();
6281         route.paths[0].hops.extend_from_slice(&cloned_hops);
6282
6283         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6284                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6285         ), false, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6286         assert_eq!(err, &"Path went through the same channel twice"));
6287 }
6288
6289 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6290 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6291 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6292
6293 #[test]
6294 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6295         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6296         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6297         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6298         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6299         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6300         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6301
6302         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6303         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 100;
6304
6305         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6306                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6307                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6308         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6309 }
6310
6311 #[test]
6312 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6313         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6314         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6315         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6316         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6317         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6318         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6319
6320         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6321         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
6322         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6323                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)),
6324                 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6325                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6326
6327         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6328         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6329 }
6330
6331 #[test]
6332 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6333         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6334         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6335         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6336         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6337         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6338         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6339
6340         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6341         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6342                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6343         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6344         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6345         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6346
6347         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6348         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC", 3);
6349         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6350         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6351         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() },
6352                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6353 }
6354
6355 #[test]
6356 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6357         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6358         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6359         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6360         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6361         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6362         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6363         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6364
6365         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6366                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
6367         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6368         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6369         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6370                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6371                 ), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6372                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6373 }
6374
6375 #[test]
6376 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6377         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6378         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6379         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6380         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6381         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6382         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6383         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6384         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6385         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6386                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6387
6388         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
6389         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6390         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6391                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6392                 let payment_event = {
6393                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6394                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6395                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6396
6397                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6398                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6399                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6400                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6401                         } else {
6402                                 assert!(false);
6403                         }
6404                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6405                 };
6406                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6407                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6408                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6409
6410                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6411                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6412         }
6413         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6414                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6415                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6416
6417         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6418 }
6419
6420 #[test]
6421 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6422         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6423         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6424         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6425         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6426         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6427         let channel_value = 100000;
6428         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6429         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6430
6431         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6432
6433         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6434         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6435         // limits us to.
6436         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6437         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6438                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6439                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6440         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6441
6442         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6443 }
6444
6445 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6446 #[test]
6447 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6448         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6449         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6450         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6451         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6452         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6453         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6454         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6455         {
6456                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6457                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6458                 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6459                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.context().get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6460         }
6461
6462         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6463         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6464                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6465         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6466         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6467         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6468         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6469         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6470         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6471         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6472         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6473         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6474 }
6475
6476 #[test]
6477 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6478         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6479         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6480         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6481         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6482         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6483         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6484
6485         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6486         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6487         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6488         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6489         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6490         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6491
6492         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6493         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6494         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6495                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6496         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6497         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6498
6499         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6500         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6501         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6502         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6503         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6504
6505         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6506         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6507         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6508         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6509         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6510 }
6511
6512 #[test]
6513 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6514         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6515         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6516         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6517         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6518         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6519         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6520         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6521
6522         let send_amt = 3999999;
6523         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
6524                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
6525         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = send_amt;
6526         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6527         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
6528         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6529         let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret);
6530         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
6531                 &route.paths[0], send_amt, &recipient_onion_fields, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6532         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6533
6534         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6535                 channel_id: chan.2,
6536                 htlc_id: 0,
6537                 amount_msat: 1000,
6538                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6539                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6540                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6541                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6542                 blinding_point: None,
6543         };
6544
6545         for i in 0..50 {
6546                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6547                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6548         }
6549         msg.htlc_id = (50) as u64;
6550         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6551
6552         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6553         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6554         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6555         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6556         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6557 }
6558
6559 #[test]
6560 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6561         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6562         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6563         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6564         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6565         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6566         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6567
6568         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6569         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6570                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6571         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6572         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6573         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6574         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6575
6576         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6577         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6578         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6579         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6580         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6581 }
6582
6583 #[test]
6584 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6585         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6586         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6587         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6588         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6589         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6590
6591         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6592         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6593         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6594                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6595         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6596         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6597         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6598         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6599
6600         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6601         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6602         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6603         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6604         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6605 }
6606
6607 #[test]
6608 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6609         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6610         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6611         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6612         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6613         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6614         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6615         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6616
6617         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6618         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6619         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6620                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6621         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6622         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6623         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6624
6625         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6626         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6627         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6628         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6629                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6630         }, true).unwrap();
6631         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6632         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6633         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6634                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6635         }, false).unwrap();
6636         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6637         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6638         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6639         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6640         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6641         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6642
6643         //Resend HTLC
6644         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6645         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6646         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6647         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6648         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6649
6650         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6651
6652         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6653         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6654         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6655         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6656         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6657 }
6658
6659 #[test]
6660 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6661         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6662
6663         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6664         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6665         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6666         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6667         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6668         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6669         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6670                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6671
6672         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6673         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6674         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6675
6676         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6677                 channel_id: chan.2,
6678                 htlc_id: 0,
6679                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6680         };
6681
6682         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6683
6684         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6685         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6686         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6687         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6688         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6689 }
6690
6691 #[test]
6692 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6693         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6694
6695         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6696         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6697         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6698         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6699         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6700
6701         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6702         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6703                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6704         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6705         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6706         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6707
6708         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6709                 channel_id: chan.2,
6710                 htlc_id: 0,
6711                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6712         };
6713
6714         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6715
6716         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6717         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6718         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6719         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6720         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6721 }
6722
6723 #[test]
6724 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6725         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6726
6727         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6728         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6729         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6730         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6731         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6732
6733         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6734         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6735                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6736         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6737         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6738         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6739         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6740                 channel_id: chan.2,
6741                 htlc_id: 0,
6742                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6743                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6744         };
6745
6746         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6747
6748         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6749         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6750         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6751         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6752         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6753 }
6754
6755 #[test]
6756 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6757         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6758
6759         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6760         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6761         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6762         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6763         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6764
6765         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6766
6767         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6768         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6769         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6770
6771         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6772         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6773         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6774                 match events[0] {
6775                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6776                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6777                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6778                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6779                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6780                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6781                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6782                         },
6783                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6784                 }
6785         };
6786
6787         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6788
6789         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6790
6791         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6792         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6793         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6794         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6795         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6796 }
6797
6798 #[test]
6799 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6800         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6801
6802         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6803         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6804         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6805         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6806         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6807
6808         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6809
6810         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6811         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6812         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6813
6814         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6815         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6816         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6817                 match events[0] {
6818                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6819                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6820                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6821                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6822                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6823                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6824                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6825                         },
6826                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6827                 }
6828         };
6829
6830         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6831
6832         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6833
6834         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6835         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6836         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6837         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6838         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6839 }
6840
6841 #[test]
6842 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6843         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6844
6845         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6846         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6847         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6848         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6849         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6850
6851         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6852         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6853                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6854         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6855
6856         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6857         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6858
6859         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6860         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6861         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6862
6863         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6864
6865         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6866                 match events[0] {
6867                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6868                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6869                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6870                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6871                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6872                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6873                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6874                         },
6875                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6876                 }
6877         };
6878         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6879         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6880
6881         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6882         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6883         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6884         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6885         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6886 }
6887
6888 #[test]
6889 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6890         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6891         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6892
6893         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6894         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6895         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6896         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6897         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6898         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6899
6900         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6901
6902         //First hop
6903         let mut payment_event = {
6904                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6905                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6906                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6907                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6908                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6909                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6910         };
6911         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6912         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6913         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6914         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6915         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6916         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6918         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6919         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6920
6921         //Second Hop
6922         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6923         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6924         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6925         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6926
6927         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6928         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6929         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6930                 match events_3[0] {
6931                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6932                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6933                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6934                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6935                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6936                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6937                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6938                         },
6939                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6940                 }
6941         };
6942
6943         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6944
6945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6946         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6947         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6948         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6949         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6950
6951         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6952         match events_4[0] {
6953                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6954                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6955                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6956                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6957                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6958                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6959                 },
6960                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6961         };
6962
6963         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6964 }
6965
6966 #[test]
6967 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6968         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6969         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6970         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6971         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6972         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6973         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6974
6975         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6976
6977         // First hop
6978         let mut payment_event = {
6979                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6980                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6981                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6982                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6983         };
6984
6985         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6986         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6987         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6988         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6989         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6990         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6991
6992         // Second Hop
6993         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6994         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6995         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6996         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6997
6998         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6999         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7000         match events_3[0] {
7001                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
7002                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
7003                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
7004                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
7005
7006                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7007                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7008                 },
7009                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7010         }
7011
7012         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
7013                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
7014                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
7015         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7016         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7017         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7018
7019         match events_4[0] {
7020                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
7021                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7022                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7023                 },
7024                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7025         }
7026
7027         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7028         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
7029
7030         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
7031         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
7032         match events_5[0] {
7033                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
7034                 } => {
7035                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
7036                         assert!(is_permanent);
7037                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
7038                 },
7039                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7040         }
7041         match events_5[1] {
7042                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7043                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
7044                 },
7045                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7046         }
7047
7048         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
7049 }
7050
7051 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7052         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7053         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7054         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7055
7056         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7057         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7058         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7059         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7060         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7061         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7062
7063         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7064                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7065
7066         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7067         let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7068         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7069         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7070
7071         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7072         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7073
7074         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7075         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7076         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7077         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7078         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7079
7080         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7081         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7082         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7083         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7084
7085         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7086         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7087
7088         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7089         match events[0] {
7090                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7091                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7092                 },
7093                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7094         }
7095         match events[1] {
7096                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7097                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7098                 },
7099                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7100         }
7101
7102         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7103         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7104         if announce_latest {
7105                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7106         } else {
7107                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7108         }
7109
7110         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7111         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7112         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7113
7114         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7115         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7116         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7117         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7118         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
7119         let mut first_failed = false;
7120         for event in events {
7121                 match event {
7122                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7123                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7124                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7125                                         first_failed = true;
7126                                 } else {
7127                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7128                                 }
7129                         },
7130                         Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
7131                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7132                 }
7133         }
7134 }
7135
7136 #[test]
7137 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7138         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7139         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7140 }
7141
7142 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7143         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7144         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7145         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7146         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7147         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7148         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7149
7150         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7151         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7152         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7153         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7154         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7155
7156         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7157                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7158
7159         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7160         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7161
7162         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7163         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7164
7165         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7166         if revoked {
7167                 let (payment_preimage_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7168                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7169         }
7170
7171         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7172         if local {
7173                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7174                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7175                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7176                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7177                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7178
7179                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7180                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7181                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7182                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7183                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
7184                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7185                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7186                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7187                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7188                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7189                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7190         } else {
7191                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7192                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7193                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7194                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7195                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7196                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7197
7198                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7199                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7200                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7201                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7202                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7203                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7204                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7205
7206                 if !revoked {
7207                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7208                 } else {
7209                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), 11);
7210                 }
7211                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7212                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7213                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7214                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7215                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7216         }
7217 }
7218
7219 #[test]
7220 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7221         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7222         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7223         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7224 }
7225
7226 #[test]
7227 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7228         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7229
7230         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7231         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7232         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7233         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7234         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7235         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7236         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7237         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7238         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7239
7240         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in OutboundV1Channel::new()
7241         if let Err(error) = OutboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7242                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7243                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42, None)
7244         {
7245                 match error {
7246                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7247                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7248                 }
7249         } else { assert!(false) }
7250
7251         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7252         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7253         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7254         open_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay = 200;
7255         if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7256                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7257                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7258         {
7259                 match error {
7260                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7261                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7262                 }
7263         } else { assert!(false); }
7264
7265         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7266         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7267         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7268         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7269         accept_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay = 200;
7270         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
7271         let reason_msg;
7272         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7273                 match action {
7274                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7275                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7276                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7277                         },
7278                         _ => { panic!(); }
7279                 }
7280         } else { panic!(); }
7281         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7282
7283         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7284         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7285         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7286         open_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay = 200;
7287         if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7288                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7289                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7290         {
7291                 match error {
7292                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7293                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7294                 }
7295         } else { assert!(false); }
7296 }
7297
7298 #[test]
7299 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7300         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7301         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7302         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7303
7304         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7305         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7306         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7307         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7308
7309         // Create some initial channels
7310         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7311
7312         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7313         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7314         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
7315                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7316         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000);
7317         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
7318                 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7319         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7320         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7321         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
7322                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7323         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7324
7325         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7326         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7327         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7328         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7329         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7330
7331         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7332         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7333         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7334         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7335
7336         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7337         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7338         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7339
7340         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7341         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7342         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7343                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7344                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7345                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7346                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7347                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7348                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7349                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7350                 },
7351                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7352         };
7353         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7354
7355         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7356         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7357
7358         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7359         let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7360         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7361         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7362 }
7363
7364 #[test]
7365 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7366         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7367         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7368
7369         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7370         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7371         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7372         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7373
7374         // Connect a dummy node for proper future events broadcasting
7375         connect_dummy_node(&nodes[0]);
7376
7377         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7378         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7379         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7380
7381         // Disconnect peers
7382         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7383         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7384
7385         for _ in 0..DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS + 1 {
7386                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7387         }
7388         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7389         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7390         let mut chans_disabled = new_hash_map();
7391         for e in msg_events {
7392                 match e {
7393                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7394                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7395                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7396                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7397                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7398                                 }
7399                         },
7400                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7401                 }
7402         }
7403         // Reconnect peers
7404         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7405                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7406         }, true).unwrap();
7407         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7408         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7409         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7410                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7411         }, false).unwrap();
7412         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7413         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7414
7415         // Reestablish chan_1
7416         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7417         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7418         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7419         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7420         // Reestablish chan_2
7421         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7422         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7423         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7424         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7425         // Reestablish chan_3
7426         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7427         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7428         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7429         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7430
7431         for _ in 0..ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
7432                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7433         }
7434         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7435         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7436         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7437         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7438         for e in msg_events {
7439                 match e {
7440                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7441                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7442                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7443                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7444                                         // the old one.
7445                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7446                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7447                                 }
7448                         },
7449                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7450                 }
7451         }
7452         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7453         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7454 }
7455
7456 #[test]
7457 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7458         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7459         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7460
7461         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7462         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7463         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7464         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7465
7466         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7467
7468         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7469         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7470                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7471         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
7472         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7473
7474         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7475         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7476         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7477         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7478         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7479         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7480
7481         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7482         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7483                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7484                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7485                 }
7486         }
7487
7488         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7489         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7490
7491         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7492         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7493         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(header_114, 42, vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()]));
7494         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7495
7496         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7497         let penalty_1;
7498         let feerate_1;
7499         {
7500                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7501                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7502                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7503                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7504                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7505                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7506                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7507                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7508                 node_txn.clear();
7509         };
7510
7511         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7512         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7513         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7514         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7515         {
7516                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7517                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7518                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7519                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7520                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7521                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7522                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7523                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7524                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7525                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7526                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7527                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7528                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7529                         node_txn.clear();
7530                 }
7531         }
7532         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7533
7534         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7535         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7536         let penalty_3;
7537         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7538         {
7539                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7540                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7541                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7542                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7543                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7544                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7545                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7546                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7547                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7548                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7549                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7550                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7551                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7552                         node_txn.clear();
7553                 }
7554         }
7555         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7556
7557         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7558         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7559 }
7560
7561 #[test]
7562 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7563         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7564         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7565
7566         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7567         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7568         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7569         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7570         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7571
7572         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7573         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7574         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7575         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7576         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7577         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7578         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7579                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7580         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7581         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50)
7582                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7583         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7584         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7585                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7586         let failed_payment_hash = send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000).1;
7587
7588         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7589         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7590         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7591
7592         // Revoke local commitment tx
7593         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7594
7595         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7596         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]));
7597         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7598         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7599         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7600         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 50); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7601
7602         let revoked_htlc_txn = {
7603                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
7604                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7605
7606                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7607                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7608                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7609
7610                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7611                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7612                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7613                 check_spends!(txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7614
7615                 txn
7616         };
7617
7618         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7619         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7620         let block_11 = create_dummy_block(hash_128, 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]);
7621         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_11);
7622         let block_129 = create_dummy_block(block_11.block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()]);
7623         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_129);
7624         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7625         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions(events[0..2].to_vec(), &[HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
7626         match events.last().unwrap() {
7627                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7628                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7629         }
7630         let first;
7631         let feerate_1;
7632         let penalty_txn;
7633         {
7634                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7635                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7636                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7637
7638                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7639                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7640                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7641                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7642                 // future).
7643                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7644                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7645                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7646                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7647                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7648                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7649
7650                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7651                 // available, which we check here:
7652                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7653                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7654                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7655
7656                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7657                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7658
7659                 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7660                 // output, checked above).
7661                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7662                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7663                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7664
7665                 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7666                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7667                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7668                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight().to_wu();
7669                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7670                 node_txn.clear();
7671         }
7672
7673         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7674         let block_130 = create_dummy_block(block_129.block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn);
7675         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_130);
7676         let block_131 = create_dummy_block(block_130.block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
7677         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_131);
7678
7679         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7680         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7681         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7682         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7683         let node_txn = {
7684                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7685                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7686
7687                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7688                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7689                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7690                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7691                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7692                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7693                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7694                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7695                 node_txn.clear();
7696                 txn
7697         };
7698         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7699         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(header_144, 42, node_txn));
7700         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7701         {
7702                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7703                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7704                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7705                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7706                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7707                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7708                 // up bumped justice generation.
7709                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7710                 node_txn.clear();
7711         }
7712         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7713         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7714 }
7715
7716 #[test]
7717 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7718         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7719         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7720
7721         // Create 2 HTLCs
7722         // Provide preimage for one
7723         // Check aggregation
7724
7725         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7726         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7727         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7728         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7729
7730         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7731         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7732         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7733
7734         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7735         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7736         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7737         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7738         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7739
7740         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7741         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7742         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7743         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7744         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7745         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7746
7747         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7748         let timeout;
7749         let preimage;
7750         let preimage_bump;
7751         let feerate_timeout;
7752         let feerate_preimage;
7753         {
7754                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7755                 // 3 transactions including:
7756                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7757                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7758                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7759                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7760                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7761                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7762                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7763                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7764
7765                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7766                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7767                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7768                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7769
7770                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7771                         (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7772                 } else {
7773                         (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7774                 };
7775
7776                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7777                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7778                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7779
7780                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7781                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7782                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7783                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight().to_wu();
7784
7785                 node_txn.clear();
7786         };
7787         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7788         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7789
7790         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7791         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7792         {
7793                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7794                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7795                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7796                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7797                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7798                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7799
7800                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7801                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7802                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight().to_wu();
7803                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7804                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7805
7806                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7807                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7808                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7809                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7810                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7811
7812                 node_txn.clear();
7813         }
7814
7815         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7816         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7817 }
7818
7819 #[test]
7820 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7821         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7822         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7823         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7824         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7825         // TestChannelSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7826         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7827         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7828         // implement that).
7829         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7830         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7831         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7832         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7833         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7834
7835         let per_commitment_secret;
7836         let next_per_commitment_point;
7837         {
7838                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7839                 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7840                 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).map(
7841                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7842                 ).flatten().unwrap().get_signer();
7843
7844                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7845
7846                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7847                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7848                 per_commitment_secret = keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7849
7850                 // Must revoke without gaps
7851                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7852                 keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7853
7854                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7855                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7856                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7857         }
7858
7859         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7860                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
7861                         channel_id,
7862                         per_commitment_secret,
7863                         next_per_commitment_point,
7864                         #[cfg(taproot)]
7865                         next_local_nonce: None,
7866                 });
7867         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7868         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7869         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() }
7870                 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7871 }
7872
7873 #[test]
7874 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7875         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7876         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7877
7878         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7879         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7880         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7881         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7882
7883         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7884         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7885         let (payment_preimage_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7886         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7887
7888         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7889         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7890         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7891
7892         // Revoke local commitment tx
7893         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7894
7895         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7896         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7897         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7898         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7899
7900         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7901         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7902         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7903         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7904         let penalty_txn = {
7905                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7906                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7907                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7908                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7909                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7910                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7911                 node_txn.clear();
7912                 penalty_txn
7913         };
7914         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn));
7915         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7916         {
7917                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7918                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7919                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7920         }
7921 }
7922
7923 #[test]
7924 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7925         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7926         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7927         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7928         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7929         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7930         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7931
7932         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7933
7934         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7935         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7936         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7937         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7938         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7939
7940         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7941         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7942         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7943         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7944
7945         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7946         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7947         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7948         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7949         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7950         match close_ev[0] {
7951                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7952                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7953                         assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7954                 },
7955                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7956         }
7957 }
7958
7959 #[test]
7960 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7961         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7962         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7963         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7964         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7965
7966         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7967         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7968         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7969
7970         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7971
7972         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7973         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7974         assert_eq!(res.common_fields.channel_flags, 0);
7975         assert_eq!(res.common_fields.to_self_delay, 200);
7976 }
7977
7978 #[test]
7979 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7980         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7981         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7982         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7983         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7984         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7985         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7986
7987         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7988         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7989         assert_eq!(res.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7990
7991         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7992         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7993         assert_eq!(res.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7994 }
7995
7996 #[test]
7997 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7998         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7999         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
8000         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
8001         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
8002         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8003
8004         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8005         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8006         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8007         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8008         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8009         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8010         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8011         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8012         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8013         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8014         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8015         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8016
8017         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8018         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8019         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8020         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8021
8022         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8023         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8024         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8025         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8026         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8027
8028         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
8029         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
8030
8031         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8032         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8033         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
8034         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8035         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8036         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
8037
8038         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8039         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8040         // `channel_value`.
8041         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8042         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8043         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8044         // `channel_value`.
8045         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8046 }
8047
8048 #[test]
8049 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8050         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8051         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8052         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8053         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8054         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8055         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8056
8057         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8058         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8059
8060         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8061
8062         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8063         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8064         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8065
8066         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8067         match events[0] {
8068                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8069                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8070                 }
8071                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8072         }
8073
8074         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8075         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8076
8077         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8078                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8079                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8080                 }
8081                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8082         }
8083
8084         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8085
8086         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8087         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8088
8089         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8090         match events[0] {
8091                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8092                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8093                 }
8094                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8095         }
8096 }
8097
8098 #[test]
8099 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8100         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8101         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8102         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8103         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8104         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8105         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8106
8107         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8108         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8109
8110         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8111
8112         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8113         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8114         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8115
8116         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8117         match events[0] {
8118                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8119                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8120                 }
8121                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8122         }
8123
8124         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8125         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8126
8127         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8128                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8129                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8130                 }
8131                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8132         }
8133
8134         // There should be no more events to process, as the channel was never opened.
8135         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8136 }
8137
8138 #[test]
8139 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8140         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8141         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8142         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8143         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8144         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8145         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8146
8147         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8148         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8149
8150         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8151
8152         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8153         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8154         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8155
8156         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8157         match events[0] {
8158                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8159                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8160                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8161                         match api_res {
8162                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8163                                         assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8164                                 },
8165                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8166                                 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error {:?}", e),
8167                         }
8168                 }
8169                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8170         }
8171
8172         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8173         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8174         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8175
8176         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8177                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8178                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8179                 }
8180                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8181         }
8182 }
8183
8184 #[test]
8185 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8186         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8187         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8188         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8189         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8190
8191         let unknown_channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
8192         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8193         match api_res {
8194                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8195                         assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8196                 },
8197                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8198                 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error: {:?}", e),
8199         }
8200 }
8201
8202 #[test]
8203 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
8204         // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
8205         // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
8206         // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
8207         // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
8208         // a PaymentClaimable event too early
8209         let node_count = 4;
8210         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8211         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8212         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8213         let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8214
8215         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8216         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8217         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8218         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8219
8220         let total_msat = 100_000;
8221         let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
8222         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
8223         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8224
8225         let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
8226         path_1.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8227         path_1.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8228         path_1.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8229         path_1.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8230         path_1.hops[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
8231         route.paths.push(path_1);
8232
8233         let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
8234         path_2.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8235         path_2.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8236         path_2.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8237         path_2.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8238         path_2.hops[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
8239         route.paths.push(path_2);
8240
8241         // Send payment
8242         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8243         let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8244                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8245         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8246                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8247         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
8248
8249         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8250         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8251
8252         // First path
8253         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8254         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8255         let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
8256
8257         for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
8258                 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
8259
8260                 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8261                         let session_priv = [3; 32];
8262                         let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8263                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8264                         let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8265                         let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret);
8266                         let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000,
8267                                 &recipient_onion_fields, height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8268                         // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8269                         // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8270                         if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
8271                                 ref mut sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat, ..
8272                         } = onion_payloads[1] {
8273                                 *sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat = 99_000;
8274                         } else { panic!() }
8275                         let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8276                         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8277                 }
8278
8279                 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8280                 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8281                 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8282                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8283
8284                 if idx == 0 {
8285                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8286                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8287                         check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8288                         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8289                         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8290                 } else {
8291                         let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8292                         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8293                 }
8294
8295                 prev_node = node;
8296         }
8297
8298         // Second path
8299         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8300         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8301
8302         claim_payment_along_route(
8303                 ClaimAlongRouteArgs::new(&nodes[0], expected_paths, our_payment_preimage)
8304         );
8305 }
8306
8307 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8308
8309         let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8310         let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8311
8312         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8313         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8314         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8315         let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8316
8317         let src_idx = 0;
8318         let dst_idx = 1;
8319
8320         // Create channels for each amount
8321         let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8322         let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8323         let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8324         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8325                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8326                 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8327                 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8328                 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8329                 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8330                 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8331                 expected_paths.push(path);
8332         }
8333         let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8334
8335         // Create a route for each amount
8336         let example_amount = 100000;
8337         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8338         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8339         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8340                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8341                 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8342                 path.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8343                 path.hops[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8344                 path.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8345                 path.hops[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8346                 path.hops[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8347                 route.paths.push(path);
8348         }
8349
8350         // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8351         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8352         let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8353                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8354         nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8355                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8356         check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8357
8358         let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8359         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8360         let mut amount_received = 0;
8361         for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8362                 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8363
8364                 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8365                 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8366                 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8367                 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8368         }
8369
8370         claim_payment_along_route(
8371                 ClaimAlongRouteArgs::new(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, our_payment_preimage)
8372         );
8373 }
8374
8375 #[test]
8376 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8377         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8378         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8379 }
8380
8381 #[test]
8382 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8383         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8384         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8385         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8386         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8387         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8388
8389         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8390         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8391         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8392         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8393
8394         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8395         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8396         route.paths.push(path);
8397         route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8398         route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8399         route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8400         route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8401         route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8402         route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8403         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8404         claim_payment_along_route(
8405                 ClaimAlongRouteArgs::new(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], payment_preimage)
8406         );
8407 }
8408
8409 #[test]
8410 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8411         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8412         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8413         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8414         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8415         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8416
8417         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8418
8419         {
8420                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8421                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8422                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8423                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8424                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8425                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8426                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8427                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8428                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8429         }
8430         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8431         // values from previous calls.
8432         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8433         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8434         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8435         match events[0] {
8436                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8437                         match &purpose {
8438                                 PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8439                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8440                                 },
8441                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment")
8442                         }
8443                 },
8444                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8445         }
8446 }
8447
8448 #[test]
8449 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8450         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8451         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8452         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8453         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8454         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8455
8456         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8457
8458         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8459         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8460         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8461         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8462
8463         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8464         // resulting events.
8465         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8466                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8467                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8468                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8469                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8470                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8471                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8472
8473                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8474                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8475                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8476                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8477                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8478
8479                         // We should fail the payment back
8480                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8481                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8482                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8483                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8484                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8485                                 },
8486                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8487                         }
8488                 }
8489         }
8490
8491         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8492         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8493         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8494
8495         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8496         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
8497                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8498         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8499         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8500
8501         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8502         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8503                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8504         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8505         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8506
8507         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8508         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8509                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8510         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8511         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8512 }
8513
8514 #[test]
8515 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8516         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8517         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8518         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8519         // error.
8520         //
8521         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8522         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8523         // commitment at same time.
8524
8525         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8526         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8527         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8528         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8529
8530         // Create some initial channel
8531         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8532         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8533
8534         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8535         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8536
8537         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8538         let (preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8539
8540         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8541         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8542         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8543         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8544         let watchtower = {
8545                 let new_monitor = {
8546                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8547                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8548                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8549                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8550                         new_monitor
8551                 };
8552                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8553                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8554                 watchtower
8555         };
8556         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8557         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8558         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8559         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 200));
8560         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8561
8562         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8563         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8564         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8565         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8566
8567         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8568         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8569         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8570         {
8571                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8572                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8573                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8574                         if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8575                                 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
8576                                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8577                         } else { assert!(false); }
8578                 } else {
8579                         assert!(false);
8580                 }
8581         }
8582         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8583         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8584         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8585         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8586 }
8587
8588 #[test]
8589 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8590         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8591         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8592         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8593         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8594
8595         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8596         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8597         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8598         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8599
8600         // Create some initial channel
8601         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8602         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8603
8604         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8605         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8606
8607         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8608         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8609
8610         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8611         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8612         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8613         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8614         let alice_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(
8615                 Arc::new(Mutex::new(nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().clone())),
8616         );
8617         let watchtower_alice = {
8618                 let new_monitor = {
8619                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8620                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8621                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8622                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8623                         new_monitor
8624                 };
8625                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &alice_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8626                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8627                 watchtower
8628         };
8629         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8630         // Make Alice aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating transaction lock time
8631         // requirements here.
8632         const HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST: u32 = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8633         alice_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST) as usize, (block.clone(), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST));
8634         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8635
8636         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8637         {
8638                 let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8639                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8640                 check_spends!(txn[0], chan_1.3);
8641                 check_spends!(txn[1], txn[0]);
8642         };
8643
8644         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8645         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8646         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8647         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8648         let bob_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&alice_broadcaster.blocks));
8649         let watchtower_bob = {
8650                 let new_monitor = {
8651                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8652                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8653                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8654                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8655                         new_monitor
8656                 };
8657                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &bob_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8658                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8659                 watchtower
8660         };
8661         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST - 1);
8662
8663         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8664         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8665         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8666                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8667         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8668
8669         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8670         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8671         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8672         {
8673                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8674                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8675                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8676                         if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8677                                 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8678                                 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
8679                                 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8680                                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8681                         } else { assert!(false); }
8682                 } else {
8683                         assert!(false);
8684                 }
8685         }
8686         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8687         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8688
8689         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8690         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8691
8692         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8693         let bob_state_y;
8694         {
8695                 let mut txn = bob_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8696                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8697                 bob_state_y = txn.remove(0);
8698         };
8699
8700         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8701         let height = HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST + 1;
8702         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
8703         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
8704         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, false,
8705                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8706         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, vec![bob_state_y.clone()]), height);
8707         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
8708         {
8709                 let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8710                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8711                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8712         }
8713 }
8714
8715 #[test]
8716 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8717         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8718         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8719         // message).
8720         //
8721         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8722         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8723         //
8724         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8725         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8726         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8727         // before receiving funding_signed.
8728         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8729         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8730         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8731         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8732
8733         // Create an initial channel
8734         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
8735         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8736         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8737         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8738         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8739
8740         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8741         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8742
8743         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8744         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8745
8746         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8747         let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index });
8748         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8749         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8750         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true,
8751                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8752 }
8753
8754 #[test]
8755 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8756         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8757         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8758         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8759         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8760         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8761         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8762
8763         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8764         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8765         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8766         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8767
8768         // Create some initial channels
8769         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8770
8771         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8772         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8773         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8774         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8775         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8776         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8777
8778         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8779         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![local_txn[0].clone()]);
8780         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
8781         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8782         // this test before #653 fix.
8783         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &block, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8784         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8785         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8786         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8787         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
8788
8789         let htlc_timeout = {
8790                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8791                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8792                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8793                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8794                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8795                 node_txn[0].clone()
8796         };
8797
8798         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![htlc_timeout.clone()]));
8799         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8800         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8801 }
8802
8803 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8804         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8805         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8806         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8807         //
8808         // Steps of the test:
8809         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8810         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8811         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8812         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8813         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8814         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8815         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8816         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8817         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8818         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8819         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8820         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8821
8822         // Create some initial channels
8823         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8824         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8825
8826         // Steps (1) and (2):
8827         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8828         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8829
8830         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8831         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8832         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8833         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8834         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8835         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8836         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8837
8838         // Steps (3) and (4):
8839         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8840         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8841         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8842         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8843
8844         // Bob force-closes
8845         if !broadcast_alice {
8846                 force_closing_node = 1;
8847                 counterparty_node = 0;
8848         }
8849         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8850         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8851         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8852         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8853         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8854                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8855                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8856                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8857                 };
8858                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8859                 if broadcast_alice {
8860                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8861                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8862                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8863                 }
8864         }
8865
8866         // Step (5):
8867         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8868         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8869         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8870         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8871         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8872
8873         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8874         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8875         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8876         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8877         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8878         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8879
8880         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8881         let went_onchain = go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1;
8882         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if went_onchain { None } else { Some(1000) }, went_onchain, false);
8883         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8884         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8885                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8886                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8887                 match events[0] {
8888                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8889                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8890                         },
8891                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8892                 };
8893         }
8894         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8895         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8896         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8897         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8898
8899         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8900         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8901         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8902                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8903                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8904                         (*msg).clone()
8905                 },
8906                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8907         };
8908         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8909                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8910                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8911                         (*updates).clone()
8912                 },
8913                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8914         };
8915
8916         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8918         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8919         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8920
8921         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8922         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8923         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8924                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8925                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8926                         (*msg).clone()
8927                 },
8928                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8929         };
8930         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8931         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8932
8933         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8934         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8935         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8936         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8937         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8938                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8939                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8940                 if broadcast_alice {
8941                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8942                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8943                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8944                 }
8945                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8946                 if broadcast_alice {
8947                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8948                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8949                 } else {
8950                         if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
8951                                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8952                                 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].txid(), bob_txn[1].txid());
8953                         } else {
8954                                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8955                         }
8956                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8957                 }
8958         }
8959
8960         // Step (6):
8961         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8962         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8963         {
8964                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8965                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8966                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8967                 };
8968                 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8969                 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8970                 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8971                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8972                 if broadcast_alice {
8973                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8974                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8975                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8976                 } else {
8977                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
8978                         let htlc_tx = bob_txn.pop().unwrap();
8979                         check_spends!(htlc_tx, txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8980                         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8981                 }
8982         }
8983 }
8984
8985 #[test]
8986 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8987         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8988         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8989         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8990         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8991 }
8992
8993 #[test]
8994 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8995         // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8996         // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8997         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8998         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8999         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9000         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9001
9002         // Create an first channel channel
9003         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9004         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9005
9006         // Create an second channel
9007         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None, None).unwrap();
9008         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9009
9010         // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
9011         // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
9012         open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
9013
9014         // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
9015         // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
9016         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
9017         {
9018                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9019                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9020                 match &events[0] {
9021                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
9022                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9023                                 assert_eq!(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
9024                         },
9025                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9026                 }
9027         }
9028
9029         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
9030         {
9031                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9032                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9033                 match &events[0] {
9034                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
9035                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9036                                 assert_eq!(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
9037                         },
9038                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9039                 }
9040         }
9041 }
9042
9043 #[test]
9044 fn test_peer_funding_sidechannel() {
9045         // Test that if a peer somehow learns which txid we'll use for our channel funding before we
9046         // receive `funding_transaction_generated` the peer cannot cause us to crash. We'd previously
9047         // assumed that LDK would receive `funding_transaction_generated` prior to our peer learning
9048         // the txid and panicked if the peer tried to open a redundant channel to us with the same
9049         // funding outpoint.
9050         //
9051         // While this assumption is generally safe, some users may have out-of-band protocols where
9052         // they notify their LSP about a funding outpoint first, or this may be violated in the future
9053         // with collaborative transaction construction protocols, i.e. dual-funding.
9054         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9055         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9056         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9057         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9058
9059         let temp_chan_id_ab = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
9060         let temp_chan_id_ca = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[2], &nodes[0], 1_000_000, 0);
9061
9062         let (_, tx, funding_output) =
9063                 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9064
9065         let cs_funding_events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9066         assert_eq!(cs_funding_events.len(), 1);
9067         match cs_funding_events[0] {
9068                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => {}
9069                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", cs_funding_events),
9070         }
9071
9072         nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temp_chan_id_ca, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), funding_output.index).unwrap();
9073         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9074         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9075         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9076         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9077         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9078
9079         let res = nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id_ab, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone());
9080         let err_msg = format!("{:?}", res.unwrap_err());
9081         assert!(err_msg.contains("An existing channel using outpoint "));
9082         assert!(err_msg.contains(" is open with peer"));
9083         // Even though the last funding_transaction_generated errored, it still generated a
9084         // SendFundingCreated. However, when the peer responds with a funding_signed it will send the
9085         // appropriate error message.
9086         let as_funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9087         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_created);
9088         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9089         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9090         let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: format!("An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}", funding_output, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), };
9091         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_output), true, reason)]);
9092
9093         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9094         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9095         get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9096 }
9097
9098 #[test]
9099 fn test_duplicate_conflicting_funding_from_second_peer() {
9100         // Test that if a user tries to fund a channel with a funding outpoint they'd previously used
9101         // we don't try to remove the previous ChannelMonitor. This is largely a test to ensure we
9102         // don't regress in the fuzzer, as such funding getting passed our outpoint-matches checks
9103         // implies the user (and our counterparty) has reused cryptographic keys across channels, which
9104         // we require the user not do.
9105         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9106         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9107         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9108         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9109
9110         let temp_chan_id = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
9111
9112         let (_, tx, funding_output) =
9113                 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9114
9115         // Now that we have a funding outpoint, create a dummy `ChannelMonitor` and insert it into
9116         // nodes[0]'s ChainMonitor so that the initial `ChannelMonitor` write fails.
9117         let dummy_chan_id = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[2], &nodes[3]).3;
9118         let dummy_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[2], dummy_chan_id).clone();
9119         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_output, dummy_monitor).unwrap();
9120
9121         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9122
9123         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9124         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9125         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9126         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9127         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9128
9129         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9130         // At this point, the channel should be closed, after having generated one monitor write (the
9131         // watch_channel call which failed), but zero monitor updates.
9132         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9133         get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9134         let err_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned() };
9135         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_signed_msg.channel_id, true, err_reason)]);
9136 }
9137
9138 #[test]
9139 fn test_duplicate_funding_err_in_funding() {
9140         // Test that if we have a live channel with one peer, then another peer comes along and tries
9141         // to create a second channel with the same txid we'll fail and not overwrite the
9142         // outpoint_to_peer map in `ChannelManager`.
9143         //
9144         // This was previously broken.
9145         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9146         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9147         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9148         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9149
9150         let (_, _, _, real_channel_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9151         let real_chan_funding_txo = chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9152         assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(real_chan_funding_txo), real_channel_id);
9153
9154         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9155         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9156         let node_c_temp_chan_id = open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
9157         open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
9158         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9159         let mut accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9160         accept_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = node_c_temp_chan_id;
9161         nodes[2].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
9162
9163         // Now that we have a second channel with the same funding txo, send a bogus funding message
9164         // and let nodes[1] remove the inbound channel.
9165         let (_, funding_tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[2], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9166
9167         nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated(&node_c_temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), funding_tx).unwrap();
9168
9169         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9170         funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
9171         // Make the signature invalid by changing the funding output
9172         funding_created_msg.funding_output_index += 10;
9173         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9174         get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9175         let err = "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned();
9176         let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err };
9177         let expected_closing = ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(real_channel_id, false, reason);
9178         check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[expected_closing]);
9179
9180         assert_eq!(
9181                 *nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().get(&real_chan_funding_txo).unwrap(),
9182                 nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
9183         );
9184 }
9185
9186 #[test]
9187 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9188         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9189         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9190         //
9191         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9192         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9193         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9194         // updating logic for the existing channel.
9195         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9196         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9197         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9198         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9199
9200         // Create an initial channel
9201         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9202         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9203         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9204         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9205
9206         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9207         // that it is rejected.
9208         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9209         {
9210                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9211                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9212                 match events[0] {
9213                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9214                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9215                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9216                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9217                                 // move forward with it.
9218                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
9219                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9220                         },
9221                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9222                 }
9223         }
9224
9225         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9226         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9227
9228         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9229         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9230
9231         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9232         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9233         {
9234                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9235                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9236                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9237                 added_monitors.clear();
9238         }
9239         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9240
9241         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9242
9243         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9244         let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
9245
9246         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9247         // temporary one).
9248
9249         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9250         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9251         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9252         open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9253         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9254         {
9255                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9256                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9257                 match events[0] {
9258                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9259                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9260                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9261                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
9262                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9263                         },
9264                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9265                 }
9266         }
9267
9268         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9269         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9270         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9271         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9272         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9273         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9274
9275         let funding_created = {
9276                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9277                 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9278                 // Once we call `get_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9279                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9280                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9281                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9282                 match a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id).unwrap() {
9283                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan) => {
9284                                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9285                                 chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
9286                         },
9287                         _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
9288                 }.unwrap()
9289         };
9290         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9291         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9292         // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
9293         // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
9294         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9295
9296         check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[
9297                 ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_created.temporary_channel_id, false, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9298                         err: "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned()
9299                 })
9300         ]);
9301
9302         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9303         {
9304                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9305                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9306                 match events[0] {
9307                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9308                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9309                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9310                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9311                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9312                         },
9313                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9314                 }
9315         }
9316
9317         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9318         // everything is functional.
9319         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9320         {
9321                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9322                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9323                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9324                 added_monitors.clear();
9325         }
9326         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9327
9328         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9329         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9330         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9331         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9332
9333         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9334         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9335         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9336
9337         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9338 }
9339
9340 #[test]
9341 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9342         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9343         //
9344         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9345         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9346         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9347         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9348         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9349         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9350         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9351
9352         // Create some initial channels
9353         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9354         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9355         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
9356
9357         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9358         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9359         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9360
9361         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9362         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9363         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9364
9365         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9366         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9367         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9368         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9369         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9370                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9371         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9372         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9373         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9374         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9375
9376         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9377         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9378         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(), data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9379         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9380         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9381                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 100000);
9382         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9383         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9384         match events[0] {
9385                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9386                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9387                 },
9388                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9389         }
9390         match events[1] {
9391                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9392                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9393                 },
9394                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9395         }
9396         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9397         // peer_disconnected.
9398         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9399         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9400
9401         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9402         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9403         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9404 }
9405
9406 #[test]
9407 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9408         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9409         //
9410         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9411         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9412         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9413         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9414         //
9415         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9416         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9417         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9418         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9419         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9420         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9421         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9422
9423         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9424         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9425         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9426
9427         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9428
9429         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9430         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9431         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9432         // its length.
9433         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9434         let wit_program_script: ScriptBuf = wit_program.into();
9435         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9436                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9437                 output.script_pubkey = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9438         }
9439
9440         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9441         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9442         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9443         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9444
9445         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9446         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9447         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9448
9449         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9450         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9451
9452         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9453         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9454         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9455
9456         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9457         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9458         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() },
9459                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9460         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9461         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9462         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9463         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9464                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9465                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg } = action {
9466                         assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9467                 } else { panic!(); }
9468         } else { panic!(); }
9469         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9470
9471         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9472         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9473         // as its not 32 bytes long.
9474         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9475                 version: 2i32, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9476                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9477                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9478                                 txid: tx.txid(),
9479                                 vout: idx as u32,
9480                         },
9481                         script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
9482                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9483                         witness: Witness::from_slice(&channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9484                 }).collect(),
9485                 output: vec![TxOut {
9486                         value: 1000,
9487                         script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new(),
9488                 }]
9489         };
9490         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9491         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9492 }
9493
9494 #[test]
9495 fn test_coinbase_funding_tx() {
9496         // Miners are able to fund channels directly from coinbase transactions, however
9497         // by consensus rules, outputs of a coinbase transaction are encumbered by a 100
9498         // block maturity timelock. To ensure that a (non-0conf) channel like this is enforceable
9499         // on-chain, the minimum depth is updated to 100 blocks for coinbase funding transactions.
9500         //
9501         // Note that 0conf channels with coinbase funding transactions are unaffected and are
9502         // immediately operational after opening.
9503         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9504         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9505         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9506         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9507
9508         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9509         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9510
9511         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9512         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9513
9514         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9515
9516         // Create the coinbase funding transaction.
9517         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_coinbase_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9518
9519         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9520         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9521         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9522
9523         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9524         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9525         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9526
9527         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9528
9529         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9530         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9531
9532         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9533         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9534
9535         // Starting at height 0, we "confirm" the coinbase at height 1.
9536         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 1);
9537         // We connect 98 more blocks to have 99 confirmations for the coinbase transaction.
9538         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9539         // Check that we have no pending message events (we have not queued a `channel_ready` yet).
9540         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9541         // Now connect one more block which results in 100 confirmations of the coinbase transaction.
9542         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
9543         // There should now be a `channel_ready` which can be handled.
9544         let _ = &nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(&nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9545
9546         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9547         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9548         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9549         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
9550         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9551         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9552 }
9553
9554 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9555         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9556         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9557         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9558         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9559         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9560         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9561         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9562         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9563         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9564         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9565         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9566         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9567         // until we learned about an additional block.
9568         //
9569         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9570         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9571         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9572         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9573         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9574         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9575         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9576
9577         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9578         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9579         let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9580         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9581         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9582
9583         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9584         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9585         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9586         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9587         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9588         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9589
9590         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9591         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9592                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9593         }
9594         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9595                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9596         if test_height_before_timelock {
9597                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9598                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9599                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9600                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9601         } else {
9602                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9603                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9604                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9605                 let htlc_tx = if spending_txn[0].txid() == node_txn[0].txid() {
9606                         &spending_txn[1]
9607                 } else {
9608                         &spending_txn[0]
9609                 };
9610                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, node_txn[0]);
9611                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9612                 // timelock is up).
9613                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9614                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9615
9616                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9617                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9618                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9619                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9620                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, htlc_tx)], conf_height + 1);
9621                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9622                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9623
9624                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9625                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9626                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9627                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9628                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9629                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9630                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9631                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9632                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9633         }
9634 }
9635
9636 #[test]
9637 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9638         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9639         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9640 }
9641
9642 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9643         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9644         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9645         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9646         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9647
9648         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9649
9650         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9651                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
9652         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();
9653
9654         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9655
9656         {
9657                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9658                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9659                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9660                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9661                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9662                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9663                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9664                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9665         }
9666         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9667         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9668
9669         {
9670                 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9671                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9672                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9673                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9674                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9675                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9676                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9677                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9678                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9679                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9680                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9681                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9682                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9683         }
9684
9685         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9686         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9687
9688         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9689                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9690                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9691
9692                 let expected_destinations = vec![
9693                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9694                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9695                 ];
9696                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
9697                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9698
9699                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9700                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9701                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9702
9703                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9704                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9705                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9706
9707                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9708                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9709                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9710                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9711                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9712                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9713         } else {
9714                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9715                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9716                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9717
9718                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9719                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9720                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9721                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9722
9723                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9724
9725                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9726         }
9727 }
9728
9729 #[test]
9730 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9731         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9732         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9733         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9734         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9735         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9736 }
9737
9738 #[test]
9739 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9740         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9741         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9742         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9743 }
9744
9745 #[test]
9746 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9747         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9748         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9749         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9750         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9751         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9752         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9753
9754         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9755         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9756         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9757         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9758
9759         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9760                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
9761         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
9762         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9763         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9764                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9765                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9766                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9767         });
9768
9769         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9770
9771         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9772         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9773
9774         let session_privs = {
9775                 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9776                 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9777                 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9778                 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9779                 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9780                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9781         };
9782         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9783                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9784                 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9785         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9786
9787         {
9788                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9789                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9790                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9791         }
9792         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9793
9794         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9795                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9796         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9797
9798         {
9799                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9800                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9801                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9802
9803                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9804                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9805
9806                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9807                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9808
9809                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9810                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9811                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9812
9813                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9814                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9815                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9816
9817                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9818                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9819                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9820         }
9821         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9822         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9823         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9824         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9825
9826         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9827
9828         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9829         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9830         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9831
9832         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9833         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9834
9835         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9836         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9837         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9838
9839         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9840
9841         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9842                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9843                 &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9844         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9845
9846         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9847         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9848         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9849
9850         do_claim_payment_along_route(
9851                 ClaimAlongRouteArgs::new(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], our_payment_preimage)
9852         );
9853         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, Some(None), true, true);
9854 }
9855
9856 #[test]
9857 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9858         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9859         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9860         // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9861         // amount.
9862         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9863         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9864         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9865         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9866
9867         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9868         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9869         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9870         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9871
9872         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9873         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9874         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9875                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9876                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9877                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9878         });
9879
9880         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9881         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9882         // amount of time to respond to.
9883
9884         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9885         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9886         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9887
9888         let failed_destinations = vec![
9889                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9890                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9891         ];
9892         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9893
9894         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash, PaymentFailureReason::RecipientRejected);
9895
9896         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9897         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9898                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9899         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9900
9901         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9902         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9903         let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9904         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9905
9906         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9907         // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9908         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9910         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9911 }
9912
9913 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9914 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9915 enum ExposureEvent {
9916         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9917         AtHTLCForward,
9918         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9919         AtHTLCReception,
9920         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9921         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9922 }
9923
9924 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool, multiplier_dust_limit: bool, apply_excess_fee: bool) {
9925         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9926         // policy.
9927         //
9928         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9929         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9930         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9931         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9932         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9933         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9934         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9935         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9936
9937         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9938         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9939
9940         // We hard-code the feerate values here but they're re-calculated furter down and asserted.
9941         // If the values ever change below these constants should simply be updated.
9942         const AT_FEE_OUTBOUND_HTLCS: u64 = 20;
9943         let nondust_htlc_count_in_limit =
9944         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound  {
9945                 AT_FEE_OUTBOUND_HTLCS
9946         } else { 0 };
9947         let initial_feerate = if apply_excess_fee { 253 * 2 } else { 253 };
9948         let expected_dust_buffer_feerate = initial_feerate + 2530;
9949         let mut commitment_tx_cost = commit_tx_fee_msat(initial_feerate - 253, nondust_htlc_count_in_limit, &ChannelTypeFeatures::empty());
9950         commitment_tx_cost +=
9951                 if on_holder_tx {
9952                         htlc_success_tx_weight(&ChannelTypeFeatures::empty())
9953                 } else {
9954                         htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&ChannelTypeFeatures::empty())
9955                 } * (initial_feerate as u64 - 253) / 1000 * nondust_htlc_count_in_limit;
9956         {
9957                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9958                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate;
9959         }
9960         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = if multiplier_dust_limit {
9961                 // Default test fee estimator rate is 253 sat/kw, so we set the multiplier to 5_000_000 / 253
9962                 // to get roughly the same initial value as the default setting when this test was
9963                 // originally written.
9964                 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier((5_000_000 + commitment_tx_cost) / 253)
9965         } else { MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(5_000_000 + commitment_tx_cost) };
9966         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9967         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9968         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9969
9970         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9971         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9972         open_channel.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9973         open_channel.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9974         if on_holder_tx {
9975                 open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9976         }
9977         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9978         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9979         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9980
9981         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9982
9983         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9984
9985         if on_holder_tx {
9986                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9987                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9988                 match get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id) {
9989                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9990                                 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9991                         },
9992                         _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
9993                 }
9994         }
9995
9996         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9997         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9998         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9999         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10000
10001         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10002         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10003         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10004
10005         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10006         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10007         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
10008
10009         {
10010                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10011                 *feerate_lock = 253;
10012         }
10013
10014         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
10015         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
10016                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
10017
10018         let (dust_buffer_feerate, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat) = {
10019                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10020                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10021                 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
10022                 (chan.context().get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64,
10023                 chan.context().get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(253))
10024         };
10025         assert_eq!(dust_buffer_feerate, expected_dust_buffer_feerate as u64);
10026         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10027         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10028
10029         // Substract 3 sats for multiplier and 2 sats for fixed limit to make sure we are 50% below the dust limit.
10030         // This is to make sure we fully use the dust limit. If we don't, we could end up with `dust_ibd_htlc_on_holder_tx` being 1
10031         // while `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat` is not equal to `dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat`.
10032         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis - if multiplier_dust_limit { 3 } else { 2 }) * 1000;
10033         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10034
10035         // This test was written with a fixed dust value here, which we retain, but assert that it is,
10036         // indeed, dust on both transactions.
10037         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 4;
10038         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = 1_250_000;
10039         let calcd_dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis - if multiplier_dust_limit { 3 } else { 2 }) * 1000;
10040         assert!(dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat < dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10041         assert!(dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat < calcd_dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10042
10043         if on_holder_tx {
10044                 if dust_outbound_balance {
10045                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10046                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10047                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
10048                         for _ in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10049                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10050                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10051                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10052                         }
10053                 } else {
10054                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10055                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10056                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
10057                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10058                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10059                         }
10060                 }
10061         } else {
10062                 if dust_outbound_balance {
10063                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10064                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10065                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
10066                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10067                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10068                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10069                         }
10070                 } else {
10071                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10072                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10073                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
10074                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10075                         }
10076                 }
10077         }
10078
10079         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
10080                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat =
10081                         if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 };
10082                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10083                 if on_holder_tx {
10084                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10085                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
10086                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
10087                 } else {
10088                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10089                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
10090                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
10091                 }
10092         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10093                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4 });
10094                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10095                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10096                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10097                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10098                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10099                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10100                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10101                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10102                 if on_holder_tx {
10103                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10104                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10105                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10106                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10107                 } else {
10108                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10109                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
10110                                 format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
10111                                         dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + commitment_tx_cost + 4,
10112                                         max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10113                 }
10114         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10115                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = 2_500_000;
10116                 // For the multiplier dust exposure limit, since it scales with feerate,
10117                 // we need to add a lot of HTLCs that will become dust at the new feerate
10118                 // to cross the threshold.
10119                 for _ in 0..AT_FEE_OUTBOUND_HTLCS {
10120                         let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash(&nodes[1], Some(1_000), None);
10121                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10122                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10123                 }
10124                 {
10125                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10126                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10127                 }
10128                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10129                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10130                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
10131         }
10132
10133         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10134         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10135         added_monitors.clear();
10136 }
10137
10138 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(multiplier_dust_limit: bool, apply_excess_fee: bool) {
10139         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10140         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10141         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10142         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10143         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10144         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10145         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10146         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10147         if !multiplier_dust_limit && !apply_excess_fee {
10148                 // Because non-dust HTLC transaction fees are included in the dust exposure, trying to
10149                 // increase the fee to hit a higher dust exposure with a
10150                 // `MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier` is no longer super practical, so we skip these
10151                 // in the `multiplier_dust_limit` case.
10152                 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10153                 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10154                 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10155                 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10156         }
10157 }
10158
10159 #[test]
10160 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10161         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false, false);
10162         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false, true);
10163         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true, false);
10164         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true, true);
10165 }
10166
10167 #[test]
10168 fn test_nondust_htlc_fees_are_dust() {
10169         // Test that the transaction fees paid in nondust HTLCs count towards our dust limit
10170         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10171         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10172
10173         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
10174         // Set the dust limit to the default value
10175         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure =
10176                 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(10_000);
10177         // Make sure the HTLC limits don't get in the way
10178         config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs = 400;
10179         config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs = 400;
10180         config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 1;
10181
10182         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config), Some(config)]);
10183         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10184
10185         // Create a channel from 1 -> 0 but immediately push all of the funds towards 0
10186         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0).2;
10187         while nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat > 0 {
10188                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
10189         }
10190
10191         // First get the channel one HTLC_VALUE HTLC away from the dust limit by sending dust HTLCs
10192         // repeatedly until we run out of space.
10193         const HTLC_VALUE: u64 = 1_000_000; // Doesn't matter, tune until the test passes
10194         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_VALUE).0;
10195
10196         while nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 {
10197                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_VALUE);
10198         }
10199         assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, 0,
10200                 "We don't want to run out of ability to send because of some non-dust limit");
10201         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].pending_outbound_htlcs.len() < 10,
10202                 "We should be able to fill our dust limit without too many HTLCs");
10203
10204         let dust_limit = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat;
10205         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
10206         assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, 0,
10207                 "Make sure we are able to send once we clear one HTLC");
10208
10209         // At this point we have somewhere between dust_limit and dust_limit * 2 left in our dust
10210         // exposure limit, and we want to max that out using non-dust HTLCs.
10211         let commitment_tx_per_htlc_cost =
10212                 htlc_success_tx_weight(&ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()) * 253;
10213         let max_htlcs_remaining = dust_limit * 2 / commitment_tx_per_htlc_cost;
10214         assert!(max_htlcs_remaining < 30,
10215                 "We should be able to fill our dust limit without too many HTLCs");
10216         for i in 0..max_htlcs_remaining + 1 {
10217                 assert_ne!(i, max_htlcs_remaining);
10218                 if nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat < dust_limit {
10219                         // We found our limit, and it was less than max_htlcs_remaining!
10220                         // At this point we can only send dust HTLCs as any non-dust HTLCs will overuse our
10221                         // remaining dust exposure.
10222                         break;
10223                 }
10224                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], dust_limit * 2);
10225         }
10226
10227         // At this point non-dust HTLCs are no longer accepted from node 0 -> 1, we also check that
10228         // such HTLCs can't be routed over the same channel either.
10229         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
10230         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
10231                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[2], nodes[1], dust_limit * 2);
10232         let onion = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret);
10233         nodes[2].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, onion, PaymentId([0; 32])).unwrap();
10234         check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
10235         let send = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[2]);
10236
10237         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send.msgs[0]);
10238         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], send.commitment_msg, false, true);
10239
10240         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
10241         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10242         let node_id_1 = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10243         expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(
10244                 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(),
10245                 &[HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(node_id_1), channel_id: chan_id_1 }]
10246         );
10247
10248         let fail = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
10249         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10250         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], fail.commitment_signed, false);
10251         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[2], payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
10252 }
10253
10254
10255 #[test]
10256 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10257         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10258         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10259         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10260         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10261
10262         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10263         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10264         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10265         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10266         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10267
10268         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
10269
10270         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10271         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10272         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[&[1]]) };
10273         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10274         let mut tx = match events[0] {
10275                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10276                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
10277                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_height(best_height + 2).unwrap(), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10278                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10279                         }]}
10280                 },
10281                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10282         };
10283         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10284         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10285                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10286                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10287                 },
10288                 _ => panic!()
10289         }
10290         let err = "Error in transaction funding: Misuse error: Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned();
10291         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(temp_channel_id, false, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err })]);
10292         assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).data, "Failed to fund channel");
10293 }
10294
10295 #[test]
10296 fn test_non_final_funding_tx_within_headroom() {
10297         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10298         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10299         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10300         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10301
10302         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10303         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10304         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10305         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10306         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10307
10308         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
10309
10310         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10311         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10312         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[[1]]) };
10313         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10314         let mut tx = match events[0] {
10315                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10316                         // Timelock the transaction within a +1 headroom from the best block.
10317                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(best_height + 1), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10318                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10319                         }]}
10320                 },
10321                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10322         };
10323
10324         // Transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
10325         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10326         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10327 }
10328
10329 #[test]
10330 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
10331         // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
10332         // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
10333         // later, but for now we only accept the update.
10334         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10335         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10336         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10337         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10338
10339         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10340
10341         // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
10342         {
10343                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10344                 *feerate_lock = 5000;
10345         }
10346
10347         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
10348         {
10349                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10350                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
10351         }
10352         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10353         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10354
10355         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10356         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10357         match events[0] {
10358                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
10359                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10360                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
10361                 },
10362                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10363         };
10364
10365         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
10366         // it.
10367         {
10368                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10369                 *feerate_lock = 2000;
10370         }
10371         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10372         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10373
10374         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10375         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10376         match events[0] {
10377                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
10378                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10379                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
10380                 },
10381                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10382         };
10383
10384         // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
10385         // channel.
10386         {
10387                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10388                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
10389         }
10390         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10391         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10392
10393         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10394         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10395         match events[0] {
10396                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
10397                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10398                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
10399                                 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000".to_owned() },
10400                                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10401                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
10402                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10403                 },
10404                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10405         };
10406 }
10407
10408 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
10409         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10410         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10411         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10412         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10413         let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
10414         let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
10415                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
10416         let recv_value = 100_000;
10417
10418         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10419
10420         let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
10421         let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
10422                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
10423                         Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
10424                 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
10425         } else {
10426                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
10427                 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
10428         };
10429         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value).unwrap();
10430         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10431                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10432         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10433         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10434         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10435         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
10436         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10437         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10438         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10439
10440         if valid_delta {
10441                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
10442                         None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10443
10444                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
10445         } else {
10446                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10447
10448                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10449
10450                 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10451                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10452                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10453
10454                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10455         }
10456 }
10457
10458 #[test]
10459 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
10460         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
10461         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
10462         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
10463         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
10464 }
10465
10466 #[test]
10467 fn test_disconnects_peer_awaiting_response_ticks() {
10468         // Tests that nodes which are awaiting on a response critical for channel responsiveness
10469         // disconnect their counterparty after `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10470         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10471         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10472         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10473         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10474
10475         // Asserts a disconnect event is queued to the user.
10476         let check_disconnect_event = |node: &Node, should_disconnect: bool| {
10477                 let disconnect_event = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10478                         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action, .. } = event {
10479                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { .. } = action {
10480                                         Some(())
10481                                 } else {
10482                                         None
10483                                 }
10484                         } else {
10485                                 None
10486                         }
10487                 );
10488                 assert_eq!(disconnect_event.is_some(), should_disconnect);
10489         };
10490
10491         // Fires timer ticks ensuring we only attempt to disconnect peers after reaching
10492         // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10493         let check_disconnect = |node: &Node| {
10494                 // No disconnect without any timer ticks.
10495                 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10496
10497                 // No disconnect with 1 timer tick less than required.
10498                 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS - 1 {
10499                         node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10500                         check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10501                 }
10502
10503                 // Disconnect after reaching the required ticks.
10504                 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10505                 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10506
10507                 // Disconnect again on the next tick if the peer hasn't been disconnected yet.
10508                 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10509                 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10510         };
10511
10512         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10513
10514         // We'll start by performing a fee update with Alice (nodes[0]) on the channel.
10515         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
10516         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10517         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10518         let alice_fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10519         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), alice_fee_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10520         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_fee_update.commitment_signed);
10521         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
10522
10523         // This will prompt Bob (nodes[1]) to respond with his `CommitmentSigned` and `RevokeAndACK`.
10524         let (bob_revoke_and_ack, bob_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10525         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revoke_and_ack);
10526         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10527         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_commitment_signed);
10528         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10529
10530         // Alice then needs to send her final `RevokeAndACK` to complete the commitment dance. We
10531         // pretend Bob hasn't received the message and check whether he'll disconnect Alice after
10532         // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10533         let alice_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10534         check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10535
10536         // Now, we'll reconnect them to test awaiting a `ChannelReestablish` message.
10537         //
10538         // Note that since the commitment dance didn't complete above, Alice is expected to resend her
10539         // final `RevokeAndACK` to Bob to complete it.
10540         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10541         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10542         let bob_init = msgs::Init {
10543                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10544         };
10545         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_init, true).unwrap();
10546         let alice_init = msgs::Init {
10547                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10548         };
10549         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_init, true).unwrap();
10550
10551         // Upon reconnection, Alice sends her `ChannelReestablish` to Bob. Alice, however, hasn't
10552         // received Bob's yet, so she should disconnect him after reaching
10553         // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10554         let alice_channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
10555                 nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()
10556         );
10557         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_channel_reestablish);
10558         check_disconnect(&nodes[0]);
10559
10560         // Bob now sends his `ChannelReestablish` to Alice to resume the channel and consider it "live".
10561         let bob_channel_reestablish = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10562                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = event {
10563                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10564                         Some(msg.clone())
10565                 } else {
10566                         None
10567                 }
10568         ).unwrap();
10569         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_channel_reestablish);
10570
10571         // Sanity check that Alice won't disconnect Bob since she's no longer waiting for any messages.
10572         for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10573                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10574                 check_disconnect_event(&nodes[0], false);
10575         }
10576
10577         // However, Bob is still waiting on Alice's `RevokeAndACK`, so he should disconnect her after
10578         // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10579         check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10580
10581         // Finally, have Bob process the last message.
10582         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_revoke_and_ack);
10583         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10584
10585         // At this point, neither node should attempt to disconnect each other, since they aren't
10586         // waiting on any messages.
10587         for node in &nodes {
10588                 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10589                         node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10590                         check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10591                 }
10592         }
10593 }
10594
10595 #[test]
10596 fn test_remove_expired_outbound_unfunded_channels() {
10597         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10598         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10599         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10600         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10601
10602         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10603         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10604         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10605         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10606         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10607
10608         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10609         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10610         match events[0] {
10611                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10612                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10613         };
10614
10615         // Asserts the outbound channel has been removed from a nodes[0]'s peer state map.
10616         let check_outbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10617                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10618                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10619                 assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10620         };
10621
10622         // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10623         check_outbound_channel_existence(true);
10624
10625         // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10626         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10627                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10628                 check_outbound_channel_existence(true)
10629         }
10630
10631         // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10632         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10633         check_outbound_channel_existence(false);
10634
10635         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10636         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10637         match msg_events[0] {
10638                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10639                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10640                 },
10641                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10642         }
10643         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10644 }
10645
10646 #[test]
10647 fn test_remove_expired_inbound_unfunded_channels() {
10648         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10649         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10650         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10651         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10652
10653         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10654         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10655         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10656         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10657         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10658
10659         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10660         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10661         match events[0] {
10662                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10663                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10664         };
10665
10666         // Asserts the inbound channel has been removed from a nodes[1]'s peer state map.
10667         let check_inbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10668                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10669                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10670                 assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10671         };
10672
10673         // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10674         check_inbound_channel_existence(true);
10675
10676         // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10677         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10678                 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10679                 check_inbound_channel_existence(true)
10680         }
10681
10682         // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10683         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10684         check_inbound_channel_existence(false);
10685
10686         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10687         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10688         match msg_events[0] {
10689                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10690                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10691                 },
10692                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10693         }
10694         check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10695 }
10696
10697 #[test]
10698 fn test_channel_close_when_not_timely_accepted() {
10699         // Create network of two nodes
10700         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10701         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10702         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10703         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10704
10705         // Simulate peer-disconnects mid-handshake
10706         // The channel is initiated from the node 0 side,
10707         // but the nodes disconnect before node 1 could send accept channel
10708         let create_chan_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10709         let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10710         assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, create_chan_id);
10711
10712         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10713         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10714
10715         // Make sure that we have not removed the OutboundV1Channel from node[0] immediately.
10716         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10717
10718         // Since channel was inbound from node[1] perspective, it should have been dropped immediately.
10719         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
10720
10721         // In the meantime, some time passes.
10722         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS {
10723                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10724         }
10725
10726         // Since we disconnected from peer and did not connect back within time,
10727         // we should have forced-closed the channel by now.
10728         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10729         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
10730
10731         {
10732                 // Since accept channel message was never received
10733                 // The channel should be forced close by now from node 0 side
10734                 // and the peer removed from per_peer_state
10735                 let node_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10736                 assert_eq!(node_0_per_peer_state.len(), 0);
10737         }
10738 }
10739
10740 #[test]
10741 fn test_rebroadcast_open_channel_when_reconnect_mid_handshake() {
10742         // Create network of two nodes
10743         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10744         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10745         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10746         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10747
10748         // Simulate peer-disconnects mid-handshake
10749         // The channel is initiated from the node 0 side,
10750         // but the nodes disconnect before node 1 could send accept channel
10751         let create_chan_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10752         let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10753         assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, create_chan_id);
10754
10755         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10756         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10757
10758         // Make sure that we have not removed the OutboundV1Channel from node[0] immediately.
10759         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10760
10761         // Since channel was inbound from node[1] perspective, it should have been immediately dropped.
10762         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
10763
10764         // The peers now reconnect
10765         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10766                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10767         }, true).unwrap();
10768         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10769                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10770         }, false).unwrap();
10771
10772         // Make sure the SendOpenChannel message is added to node_0 pending message events
10773         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10774         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10775         match &msg_events[0] {
10776                 MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { msg, .. } => assert_eq!(msg, &open_channel_msg),
10777                 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
10778         }
10779 }
10780
10781 fn do_test_multi_post_event_actions(do_reload: bool) {
10782         // Tests handling multiple post-Event actions at once.
10783         // There is specific code in ChannelManager to handle channels where multiple post-Event
10784         // `ChannelMonitorUpdates` are pending at once. This test exercises that code.
10785         //
10786         // Specifically, we test calling `get_and_clear_pending_events` while there are two
10787         // PaymentSents from different channels and one channel has two pending `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s
10788         // - one from an RAA and one from an inbound commitment_signed.
10789         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10790         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10791         let (persister, chain_monitor);
10792         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10793         let nodes_0_deserialized;
10794         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10795
10796         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
10797         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).2;
10798
10799         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10800         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10801
10802         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10803         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10804
10805         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
10806         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10807         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 1_000_000);
10808
10809         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
10810         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10811         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 1_000_000);
10812
10813         for dest in &[1, 2] {
10814                 let htlc_fulfill_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[*dest], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10815                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[*dest].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fulfill_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10816                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[*dest], htlc_fulfill_updates.commitment_signed, false);
10817                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 0);
10818         }
10819
10820         let (route, payment_hash_3, _, payment_secret_3) =
10821                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
10822         let payment_id = PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0);
10823         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
10824                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), payment_id).unwrap();
10825         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10826
10827         let send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
10828         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]);
10829         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg);
10830         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10831
10832         if do_reload {
10833                 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
10834                 let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
10835                 let chan_1_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_2).encode();
10836                 reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes_0_serialized, &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized, &chan_1_monitor_serialized], persister, chain_monitor, nodes_0_deserialized);
10837
10838                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10839                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10840
10841                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
10842                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[2]));
10843         }
10844
10845         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10846         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
10847         if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[0] {
10848                 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10849         } else { panic!(); }
10850         if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[1] {
10851                 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10852         } else { panic!(); }
10853         if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
10854         if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
10855
10856         // After the events are processed, the ChannelMonitorUpdates will be released and, upon their
10857         // completion, we'll respond to nodes[1] with an RAA + CS.
10858         get_revoke_commit_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10859         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 3);
10860 }
10861
10862 #[test]
10863 fn test_multi_post_event_actions() {
10864         do_test_multi_post_event_actions(true);
10865         do_test_multi_post_event_actions(false);
10866 }
10867
10868 #[test]
10869 fn test_batch_channel_open() {
10870         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10871         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10872         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10873         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10874
10875         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10876         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10877                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10878                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10879         ]);
10880
10881         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10882         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10883         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10884         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10885
10886         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10887         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10888         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10889
10890         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10891         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10892
10893         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
10894         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
10895         check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
10896         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10897
10898         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10899         chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
10900         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10901         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10902
10903         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before persisting all monitors has been
10904         // completed.
10905         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10906         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
10907
10908         // Complete the persistence of the monitor.
10909         nodes[0].chain_monitor.complete_sole_pending_chan_update(
10910                 &ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 })
10911         );
10912         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10913
10914         // The transaction should only have been broadcast now.
10915         let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10916         assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10917         assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0], tx);
10918
10919         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10920         assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
10921                 *e,
10922                 crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
10923                         ref counterparty_node_id,
10924                         ..
10925                 } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
10926         )));
10927         assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
10928                 *e,
10929                 crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
10930                         ref counterparty_node_id,
10931                         ..
10932                 } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
10933         )));
10934 }
10935
10936 #[test]
10937 fn test_close_in_funding_batch() {
10938         // This test ensures that if one of the channels
10939         // in the batch closes, the complete batch will close.
10940         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10941         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10942         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10943         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10944
10945         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10946         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10947                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10948                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10949         ]);
10950
10951         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10952         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10953         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10954         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10955
10956         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10957         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10958         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10959
10960         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10961         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10962
10963         // Force-close the channel for which we've completed the initial monitor.
10964         let funding_txo_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10965         let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 };
10966         let channel_id_1 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_1);
10967         let channel_id_2 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_2);
10968
10969         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10970
10971         // The monitor should become closed.
10972         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10973         {
10974                 let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
10975                 let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
10976                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
10977                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10978         }
10979
10980         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10981         match msg_events[0] {
10982                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => (),
10983                 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
10984         }
10985
10986         // We broadcast the commitment transaction as part of the force-close.
10987         {
10988                 let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10989                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10990                 assert!(broadcasted_txs[0].txid() != tx.txid());
10991                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input.len(), 1);
10992                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
10993         }
10994
10995         // All channels in the batch should close immediately.
10996         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
10997                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10998                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
10999                         discard_funding: true,
11000                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_1),
11001                         user_channel_id: Some(42),
11002                         ..Default::default()
11003                 },
11004                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
11005                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
11006                         discard_funding: true,
11007                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_2),
11008                         user_channel_id: Some(43),
11009                         ..Default::default()
11010                 },
11011         ]);
11012
11013         // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
11014         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
11015 }
11016
11017 #[test]
11018 fn test_batch_funding_close_after_funding_signed() {
11019         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11020         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11021         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11022         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11023
11024         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
11025         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
11026                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
11027                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
11028         ]);
11029
11030         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
11031         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
11032         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
11033         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11034
11035         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11036         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
11037         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
11038
11039         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
11040         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
11041         check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
11042         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11043
11044         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11045         chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
11046         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
11047         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
11048
11049         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
11050         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
11051
11052         // Force-close the channel for which we've completed the initial monitor.
11053         let funding_txo_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
11054         let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 };
11055         let channel_id_1 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_1);
11056         let channel_id_2 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_2);
11057         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11058         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 2);
11059         {
11060                 let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
11061                 let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
11062                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
11063                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
11064                 let monitor_updates_2 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_2).unwrap();
11065                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2.len(), 1);
11066                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
11067         }
11068         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11069         match msg_events[0] {
11070                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => (),
11071                 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
11072         }
11073
11074         // We broadcast the commitment transaction as part of the force-close.
11075         {
11076                 let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11077                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
11078                 assert!(broadcasted_txs[0].txid() != tx.txid());
11079                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input.len(), 1);
11080                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
11081         }
11082
11083         // All channels in the batch should close immediately.
11084         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
11085                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
11086                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
11087                         discard_funding: true,
11088                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_1),
11089                         user_channel_id: Some(42),
11090                         ..Default::default()
11091                 },
11092                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
11093                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
11094                         discard_funding: true,
11095                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_2),
11096                         user_channel_id: Some(43),
11097                         ..Default::default()
11098                 },
11099         ]);
11100
11101         // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
11102         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
11103 }
11104
11105 fn do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(confirm_remote_commitment: bool) {
11106         // Tests that a node will forget the channel (when it only requires 1 confirmation) if the
11107         // funding and commitment transaction confirm in the same block.
11108         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11109         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11110         let mut min_depth_1_block_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11111         min_depth_1_block_cfg.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
11112         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg), Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg)]);
11113         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11114
11115         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
11116         let chan_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 });
11117
11118         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
11119         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
11120
11121         let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_remote_commitment {
11122                 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
11123         } else {
11124                 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
11125         };
11126
11127         closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11128         let mut msg_events = closing_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11129         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
11130         match msg_events.pop().unwrap() {
11131                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, .. } => {},
11132                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11133         }
11134         check_added_monitors(closing_node, 1);
11135         check_closed_event(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
11136
11137         let commitment_tx = {
11138                 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11139                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
11140                 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
11141                 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
11142                 commitment_tx
11143         };
11144
11145         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
11146         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
11147
11148         check_closed_broadcast(other_node, 1, true);
11149         check_added_monitors(other_node, 1);
11150         check_closed_event(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, &[closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
11151
11152         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
11153         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
11154 }
11155
11156 #[test]
11157 fn test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block() {
11158         do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(false);
11159         do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(true);
11160 }
11161
11162 #[test]
11163 fn test_accept_inbound_channel_errors_queued() {
11164         // For manually accepted inbound channels, tests that a close error is correctly handled
11165         // and the channel fails for the initiator.
11166         let mut config0 = test_default_channel_config();
11167         let mut config1 = config0.clone();
11168         config1.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 1000;
11169         config1.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11170         config0.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 2000;
11171
11172         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11173         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11174         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config0), Some(config1)]);
11175         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11176
11177         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11178         let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11179
11180         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11181         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11182         match events[0] {
11183                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11184                         match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23) {
11185                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }) => (),
11186                                 _ => panic!(),
11187                         }
11188                 }
11189                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11190         }
11191         assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11192                 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
11193 }