_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource};
  21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
  22 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  25 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  29 use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  31 use crate::ln::msgs;
  32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  33 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  34 use crate::util::test_utils;
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
  38 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  39
  40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
  46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  47
  48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  50
  51 use regex;
  52
  53 use crate::io;
  54 use crate::prelude::*;
  55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  56 use core::default::Default;
  57 use core::iter::repeat;
  58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  59 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  60
  61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  63
  64 #[test]
  65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  66         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  67         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  68         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  69         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  70         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  71         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  72         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  73         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  74
  75         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  76         // funding satoshis
  77         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  78         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
  79         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  80
  81         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  82         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  83
  84         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  85         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  86
  87         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  88         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  89         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  90                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  91                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  92                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  93                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  94                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  95                         match action {
  96                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  97                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
  98                                 },
  99                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 100                         }
 101                 } else { assert!(false); }
 102         };
 103
 104         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 105
 106         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 107         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 108         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 109
 110         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 111
 112         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 113
 114         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 115
 116         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 117
 118         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 119
 120         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 121
 122         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 123 }
 124
 125 #[test]
 126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 127         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 128         // them.
 129         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 130         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 131         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 132         *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
 133         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 134         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 135
 136         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
 137                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 138                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 139                 },
 140                 _ => panic!()
 141         }
 142 }
 143
 144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 145         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 146         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 147         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 148         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 149         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 150         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 151         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 152         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 153         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 154
 155         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 156         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 157         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 158         let opt_anchors = false;
 159         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 160         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 161
 162         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 163         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 164         if !send_from_initiator {
 165                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 166                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 167         }
 168         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
 169
 170         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 171         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 172         if send_from_initiator {
 173                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 174                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 175         }
 176         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
 177         {
 178                 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
 179                 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
 180                 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
 181                 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
 182                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
 183                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 184                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 185         }
 186
 187         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 188         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 189         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 190
 191         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 192         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 193         if send_from_initiator {
 194                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 195                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 196                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 197                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 198                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 199         } else {
 200                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 201         }
 202 }
 203
 204 #[test]
 205 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 206         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 207         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 208 }
 209
 210 #[test]
 211 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 212         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 213         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 214         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 215         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 216         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 217
 218         // balancing
 219         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 220
 221         // A                                        B
 222         // update_fee                            ->
 223         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 224         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 225         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 226         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 227         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 228         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 229         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 230         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 231         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 232         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 233         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 234         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 235         //                                       <- RAA
 236         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 237
 238         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 239         {
 240                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 241                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 242         }
 243         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 244         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 245
 246         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 247         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 248         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 249                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 250                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 251                 },
 252                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 253         };
 254
 255         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 256
 257         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 258         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 259         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 260                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 261         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 262
 263         let payment_event = {
 264                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 265                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 266                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 267         };
 268         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 269         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 270
 271         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 272         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 273         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 274         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 275         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 277
 278         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 279         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 280         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 281         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 282         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 283
 284         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 285         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 286         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 287         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 288         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 289         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 290         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 291         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 292
 293         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 294         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 295         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 296         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 297         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 298         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 299         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 300         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 301
 302         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 303         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 304         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 306
 307         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 308         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 309         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 310
 311         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 312         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 313
 314         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 315         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 316         match events_2[0] {
 317                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 318                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 319         }
 320
 321         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 322         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 323 }
 324
 325 #[test]
 326 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 327         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 328         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 329         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 330         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 331         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 332         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 333         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 334
 335         // balancing
 336         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 337
 338         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 339         {
 340                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 341                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 342         }
 343         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 344         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 345
 346         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 347         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 348         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 349                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 350                         update_fee.as_ref()
 351                 },
 352                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 353         };
 354
 355         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 356
 357         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 358         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 359         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 360                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 361         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 362
 363         let payment_event = {
 364                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 365                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 366                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 367         };
 368         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 369         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 370
 371         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 372         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 373         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 374         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 375         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 376         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 377
 378         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 379         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 380
 381         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 382 }
 383
 384 #[test]
 385 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 386         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 387         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 388         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 389         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 390         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 391
 392         // A                                        B
 393         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 394         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 395         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 396         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 397         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 398         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 399         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 400         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 401         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 402         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 403         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 404         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 405         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 406         //                                          B should send no response here
 407         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 408         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 409         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 410
 411         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 412         let initial_feerate;
 413         {
 414                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 415                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 416                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 417         }
 418         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 419         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 420
 421         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 422         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 423         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 424                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 425                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 426                 },
 427                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 428         };
 429
 430         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 431         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 432         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 433         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 434         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 435
 436         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 437         // transaction:
 438         {
 439                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 440                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 441         }
 442         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 443         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 444         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 445
 446         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 447         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 448                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 449                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 450         };
 451
 452         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 453
 454         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 455         // Deliver (3)
 456         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 457
 458         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 459         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 460         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 461         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 462         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 463         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 464         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 465         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 466         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 467         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 468         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 469
 470         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 471         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 472         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 474         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 475
 476         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 477         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 478         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 479
 480         // Delever (4)
 481         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 482         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 483         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 484
 485         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 486         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 488
 489         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 490         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 491         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 492         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 493
 494         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 495         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 496         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 497 }
 498
 499 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 500         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 501         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 502         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 503         // Node objects.
 504
 505         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 506         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 507         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 508         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 509
 510         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 511                 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
 512                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 513                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 514         }
 515
 516         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 517         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 518         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 519
 520         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 521         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
 522         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 523
 524         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 525         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
 526
 527         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 528
 529         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 530         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 531         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 532         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 533
 534         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 535         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 536         {
 537                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 538                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 539                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 540                 added_monitors.clear();
 541         }
 542         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 543
 544         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 545
 546         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 547         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 548         {
 549                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 550                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 551                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 552                 added_monitors.clear();
 553         }
 554
 555         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 556         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 557         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 558
 559         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 560         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 561
 562         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 563         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 564         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 565         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 566         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 567 }
 568
 569 #[test]
 570 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 571         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 572         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 573         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 574         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 576         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 577         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 578         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 584         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 585         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 586         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 587         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 588         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 589 }
 590
 591 #[test]
 592 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 593         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 594         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 595         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 596         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 597         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 598
 599         {
 600                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 601                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 602         }
 603         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 604         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 605
 606         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 607         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 608         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 609                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 610                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 611                 },
 612                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 613         };
 614         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 615
 616         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 617         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 618         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 619
 620         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 621         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 623
 624         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 625         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 626         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 627         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 628
 629         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 630         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 631         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 632 }
 633
 634 #[test]
 635 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 636         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 637         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 638         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 639         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 640         let channel_value = 5000;
 641         let push_sats = 700;
 642         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
 643         let channel_id = chan.2;
 644         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 645         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 646         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 647
 648         let opt_anchors = false;
 649
 650         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 651         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 652         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 653         // remote limit.
 654         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 655         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 656         {
 657                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 658                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 659         }
 660         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 661         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 662         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 663
 664         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 665
 666         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 667
 668         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 669         {
 670                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 671
 672                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 673                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 674                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 675                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 676                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 677                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 678         }
 679
 680         {
 681                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 682                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 683                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 684         }
 685         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 686         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 687         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 688
 689         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 690
 691         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 692         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 693         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 694                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 695                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 696                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 697                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 698                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 699                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 700                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 701         };
 702         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 703                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 704                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 705                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 706                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 707                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 708                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 709                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 710                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 711         };
 712
 713         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 714         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 715                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
 716
 717         let res = {
 718                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 719                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 720                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 721                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 722                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 723                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 724                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 725                         push_sats,
 726                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 727                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 728                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 729                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 730                         &mut htlcs,
 731                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 732                 );
 733                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 734         };
 735
 736         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 737                 channel_id: chan.2,
 738                 signature: res.0,
 739                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
 740                 #[cfg(taproot)]
 741                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
 742         };
 743
 744         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 745                 channel_id: chan.2,
 746                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 747         };
 748
 749         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 750
 751         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 752         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 753         //Should produce and error.
 754         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 755         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 756         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 757         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 758         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 759 }
 760
 761 #[test]
 762 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 763         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 764         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 765         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 766         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 767         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 768
 769         // balancing
 770         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 771
 772         {
 773                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 774                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 775         }
 776         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 777         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 778
 779         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 780         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 781         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 782                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 783                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 784                 },
 785                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 786         };
 787         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 788         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 789         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 790         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 791
 792         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 793
 794         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 795         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 796                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 797         {
 798                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 799                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 800                 added_monitors.clear();
 801         }
 802         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 803         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 804         // node[1] has nothing to do
 805
 806         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 807         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 808         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 809
 810         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 811         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 812         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 813         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 814         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 815         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 816         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 817
 818         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 819         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 820         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 821         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 822         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 823         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 824
 825         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 826         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 827         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 828         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 829
 830         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 831         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 832         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 833
 834         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 835         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 836         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 837         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 838
 839         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 840         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 841         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 842
 843         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 844
 845         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 846         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 847         match events[0] {
 848                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
 849                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 850         };
 851
 852         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 853
 854         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 855         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 856         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 857         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 858         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 859 }
 860
 861 #[test]
 862 fn test_update_fee() {
 863         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 864         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 865         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 866         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 867         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 868         let channel_id = chan.2;
 869
 870         // A                                        B
 871         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 872         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 873         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 874         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 875         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 876         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 877         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 878         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 879         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 880         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 881         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 882         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 883
 884         // Create and deliver (1)...
 885         let feerate;
 886         {
 887                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 888                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 889                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 890         }
 891         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 892         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 893
 894         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 895         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 896         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 897                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 898                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 899                 },
 900                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 901         };
 902         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 903
 904         // Generate (2) and (3):
 905         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 906         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 907         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 908
 909         // Deliver (2):
 910         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 911         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 912         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 913
 914         // Create and deliver (4)...
 915         {
 916                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 917                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 918         }
 919         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 921         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 922         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 923         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 924                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 925                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 926                 },
 927                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 928         };
 929
 930         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 931         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 932         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 933         // ... creating (5)
 934         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 935         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 936
 937         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 938         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 939         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 940         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 941         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 942
 943         // Deliver (5):
 944         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 945         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 946         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 947
 948         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 949         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 950         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 951         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 952         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 953         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 954         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 955         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 956         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 957
 958         // Deliver (7)
 959         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 960         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 961         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 962         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 963
 964         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 965         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 966         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 967
 968         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 969         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 970         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 971         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 972         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 973 }
 974
 975 #[test]
 976 fn fake_network_test() {
 977         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 978         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 979         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 980         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 981         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 982         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 983
 984         // Create some initial channels
 985         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 986         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
 987         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
 988
 989         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 990         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 991         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 992         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 993         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 994
 995         // Send some more payments
 996         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 997         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 998         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 999
1000         // Test failure packets
1001         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1002         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1003
1004         // Add a new channel that skips 3
1005         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1006
1007         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1008         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1009         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1010         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1011         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1012         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1013         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1014
1015         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1016         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1017         hops.push(RouteHop {
1018                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1019                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1020                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1021                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1022                 fee_msat: 0,
1023                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1024         });
1025         hops.push(RouteHop {
1026                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1027                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1028                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1029                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1030                 fee_msat: 0,
1031                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1032         });
1033         hops.push(RouteHop {
1034                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1035                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1036                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1037                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1038                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1039                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1040         });
1041         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1042         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1043         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1044
1045         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1046         hops.push(RouteHop {
1047                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1048                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1049                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1050                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1051                 fee_msat: 0,
1052                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1053         });
1054         hops.push(RouteHop {
1055                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1056                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1057                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1058                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1059                 fee_msat: 0,
1060                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1061         });
1062         hops.push(RouteHop {
1063                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1064                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1065                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1066                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1067                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1068                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1069         });
1070         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1071         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1072         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1073
1074         // Claim the rebalances...
1075         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1076         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1077
1078         // Close down the channels...
1079         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1080         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1081         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1082         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1083         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1084         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1086         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1087         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1088         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1089         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1090         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1091 }
1092
1093 #[test]
1094 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1095         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1096         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1097         // commitment dance rounds.
1098         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1099         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1100         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1101         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1102         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1103         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1104
1105         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1106         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1107
1108         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1109         for _ in 0..50 {
1110                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1111                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
1112                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1113                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1114         }
1115         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1116
1117         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1118         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1119         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1120         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1121
1122         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1123         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1124         // another HTLC.
1125         {
1126                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
1127                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
1128                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1129                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1130                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1131                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", 1);
1132         }
1133
1134         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1135         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1136         {
1137                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
1138                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1139                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1140         }
1141
1142         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1143         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1144         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1145         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1146
1147         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1148         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1149         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1150         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1151         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1152         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1153         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1154
1155         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1156         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1157         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1158
1159         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1160
1161         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1162         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1163         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1165
1166         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1167         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1169         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1170
1171         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1173         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1174
1175         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1176                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1177         }
1178         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1180         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1181         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1182         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1183
1184         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1185         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1186         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1188         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1189
1190         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1191         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1192
1193         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1194
1195         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1196         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1197         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1198                 match event {
1199                         &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1200                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1201                         },
1202                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1203                 };
1204         }
1205
1206         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1207                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1208         }
1209
1210         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1211 }
1212
1213 #[test]
1214 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1215         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1216         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1217         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1218         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1219         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1220         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1221
1222         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1223         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1224         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1225         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1226         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1227         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1228
1229         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1230
1231         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1232         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1233
1234         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1235         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1236
1237         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1238         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1239         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1240 }
1241
1242 #[test]
1243 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1244         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1245         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1246         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1247         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1248         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1249         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1250         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1251
1252         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1253
1254         // balancing
1255         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1256
1257         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1258
1259         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1260         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1261         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1262
1263         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1264         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1265         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1266         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1267
1268         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1269         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1270
1271         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1272         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1273         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1274                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1275                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1276                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1277                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1278                 }
1279         }
1280         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1281
1282         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1283         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1284         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1285         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1286
1287         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1288         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1289
1290         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1291         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1292         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1293         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1294         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1295                 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1296         } else {
1297                 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1298         };
1299
1300         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1301         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1302
1303         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1304         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1305         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1306
1307         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1308         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1309         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1310         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1311
1312         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1313         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1314         for e in events {
1315                 match e {
1316                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1317                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1318                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1319                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1320                         },
1321                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1322                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1323                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1324                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1325                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1326                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1327                         },
1328                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1329                 }
1330         }
1331 }
1332
1333 #[test]
1334 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1335         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1336         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1337         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1338         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1339         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1340
1341         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1342         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1343
1344         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1345         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1346         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1347         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1348                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
1349         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1350         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1351                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1352         match err {
1353                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1354                         match &fails[0] {
1355                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1356                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1357                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1358                         }
1359                 },
1360                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1361         }
1362         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1363         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 1);
1364
1365         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1366 }
1367
1368 #[test]
1369 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1370         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1371         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1372         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1373         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1374         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1375
1376         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1377                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460000);
1378         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1379         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1380         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1381         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1382
1383         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1384
1385         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1386         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1387                 3460001, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1388         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1389         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1390                 channel_id: chan.2,
1391                 htlc_id: 0,
1392                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1393                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1394                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1395                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1396         };
1397
1398         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1399
1400         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1401         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1402         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1403
1404         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1405
1406         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1407
1408         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1409         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1410         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1411                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1412                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1413                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1414                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1415                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1416                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1417
1418                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1419                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1420                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1421                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1422                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1423         };
1424         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1425                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1426                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1427                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1428                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1429                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1430                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1431                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1432                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1433         };
1434
1435         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1436         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1437                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1438
1439         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1440         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1441         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1442
1443         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1444                 offered: false,
1445                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1446                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1447                 payment_hash,
1448                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1449         };
1450
1451         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1452
1453         let res = {
1454                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1455                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1456                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1457                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1458                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1459                         commitment_number,
1460                         95000,
1461                         local_chan_balance,
1462                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1463                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1464                         feerate_per_kw,
1465                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1466                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1467                 );
1468                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1469         };
1470
1471         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1472                 channel_id: chan.2,
1473                 signature: res.0,
1474                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1475                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1476                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1477         };
1478
1479         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1480         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1481         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1482
1483         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1484         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1485                 channel_id: chan.2,
1486                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1487                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
1488                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1489                 next_local_nonce: None,
1490         };
1491         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1492
1493         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1494         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1495         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1496         match events[0] {
1497                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1498                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1499                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1500                 },
1501                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1502         };
1503         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1504                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1505
1506         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1507 }
1508
1509 #[test]
1510 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1511         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1512         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1513         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1514         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1515         // this situation.
1516         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1517         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1518         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1519         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1520         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1521         let opt_anchors = false;
1522
1523         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1524         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1525
1526         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1527
1528         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1529
1530         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1531         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1532         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1533         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1534                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1535         }
1536
1537         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1538         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1539                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1540                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1541                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1542         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1543         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1544 }
1545
1546 #[test]
1547 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1548         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1549         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1550         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1551         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1552         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1553         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1554         let opt_anchors = false;
1555
1556         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1557         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1558         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1559         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1560         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1561         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1562         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1563
1564         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1565         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1566                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1567         }
1568
1569         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1570                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1571         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 700_000;
1572         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1573         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1574         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1575         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1576         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1577         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1578                 700_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1579         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1580         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1581                 channel_id: chan.2,
1582                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1583                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1584                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1585                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1586                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1587         };
1588
1589         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1590         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1591         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1592         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1593         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1594         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1595         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1596         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1597 }
1598
1599 #[test]
1600 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1601         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1602         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1603         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1604         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1605
1606         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1607         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1608         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1609         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1610         let opt_anchors = false;
1611
1612         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1613         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1614         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1615         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1616         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1617         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1618         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1619
1620         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1621                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1622         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1623         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1624         // commitment transaction fee.
1625         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1626
1627         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1628         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1629                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1630         }
1631
1632         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1633         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1634                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt);
1635         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1636         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1637                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1638                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1639                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1640 }
1641
1642 #[test]
1643 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1644         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1645         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1646         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1647         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1648         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1649         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1650         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1651         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1652         let opt_anchors = false;
1653
1654         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1655         // HTLC.
1656         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1657         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1658         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1659                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1660
1661         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1662         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1663         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1664         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1665         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1666         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1667         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1668
1669         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1670         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1671         match msg_events[0] {
1672                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1673                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1674                 },
1675                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1676         }
1677 }
1678
1679 #[test]
1680 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1681         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1682         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1683         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1684         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1685         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1686         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1687         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1688
1689         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1690         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1691         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1692         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1693         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1694         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1695
1696         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1697         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1698         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1699         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1700         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1701         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1702
1703         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1704         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1705         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1706         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1707 }
1708
1709 #[test]
1710 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1711         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1712         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1713         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1714         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1715         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1716         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1717
1718         let feemsat = 239;
1719         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1720         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1721         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1722         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1723
1724         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1725         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1726         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1727         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1728
1729         // Add a pending HTLC.
1730         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1731         let payment_event_1 = {
1732                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1733                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1734                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1735
1736                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1737                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1738                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1739         };
1740         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1741
1742         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1743         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1744         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1745         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1746         let mut route_2 = route_1.clone();
1747         route_2.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = amt_msat_2;
1748
1749         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1750         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1751         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1752         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1753         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1754         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
1755                 &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1756         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
1757         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1758                 channel_id: chan.2,
1759                 htlc_id: 1,
1760                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1761                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1762                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1763                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1764         };
1765
1766         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1767         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1768         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1769         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1770         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1771         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1772         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1773         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1774 }
1775
1776 #[test]
1777 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1778         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1779         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1780         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1781         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1782         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1783         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1784         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1785         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1786         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1787         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1788
1789         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1790         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1791         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1792
1793         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1794         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1795 }
1796
1797 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1798         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1799 }
1800
1801 #[test]
1802 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1803         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1804         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1805         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1806         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1807         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1808         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1809         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1810         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1811         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1812         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1813
1814         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1815         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1816
1817         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1818         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1819
1820         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1821                 ($node: expr) => {{
1822                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1823                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1824                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1825                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1826                         payment_event
1827                 }}
1828         }
1829
1830         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1831         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1832         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1833         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1834
1835         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1836
1837         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1838         {
1839                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1840                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1841                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
1842                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1843                 assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1844
1845                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1846                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1847                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1848                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1849                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1850                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept", 1);
1851         }
1852
1853         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1854         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1855         loop {
1856                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1857                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1858                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1859                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1860                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1861                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1862                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1863                         break;
1864                 }
1865
1866                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1867                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1868                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
1869                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1870                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1871
1872                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1873                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1874                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1875                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1876                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1877                 );
1878
1879                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1880                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1881                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1882                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1883                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1884         }
1885
1886         // adding pending output.
1887         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1888         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1889         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1890         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1891         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1892         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1893         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1894         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1895         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1896         // policy.
1897         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1898         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1899         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1900
1901         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1902         let payment_event_1 = {
1903                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1904                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1905                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1906
1907                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1908                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1909                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1910         };
1911         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1912
1913         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1914         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1915         {
1916                 let mut route = route_1.clone();
1917                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = recv_value_2 + 1;
1918                 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1919                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1920                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1921                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1922                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1923                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1924         }
1925
1926         // split the rest to test holding cell
1927         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1928         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1929         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1930         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1931         {
1932                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1933                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1934         }
1935
1936         // now see if they go through on both sides
1937         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1938         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1939         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21,
1940                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1941         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1942         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1943         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1944
1945         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1946         {
1947                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1948                         get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1949                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1950                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1951                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1952                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1953                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1954                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1955                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 2);
1956         }
1957
1958         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1959         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1960         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22,
1961                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1962         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1963         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1964         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1965
1966         // flush the pending htlc
1967         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1968         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1969         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1970
1971         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1972         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1973         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1974         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1975
1976         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1977         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1978         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1979         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1980
1981         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1982         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1983         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1984
1985         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1986
1987         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1988         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1989         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1990
1991         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1992         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1993
1994         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1995         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1996         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1997         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1998         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1999         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2000
2001         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2002         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
2003         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
2004         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
2005
2006         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
2007         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2008
2009         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2010         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2011         match events[0] {
2012                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2013                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2014                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
2015                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2016                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2017                         match &purpose {
2018                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2019                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2020                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2021                                 },
2022                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2023                         }
2024                 },
2025                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2026         }
2027         match events[1] {
2028                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2029                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2030                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2031                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2032                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2033                         match &purpose {
2034                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2035                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2036                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2037                                 },
2038                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2039                         }
2040                 },
2041                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2042         }
2043
2044         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2045         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2046         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2047
2048         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2049         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2050         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2051
2052         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2053         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2054         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2055         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2056         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2057
2058         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2059         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2060 }
2061
2062 #[test]
2063 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2064         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2065         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2066         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2067         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2068         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2069         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2070         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2071         // To test this we:
2072         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2073         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2074         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2075         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2076         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2077         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2078         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2079         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2080         //    claim,
2081         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2082         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2083         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2084         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2085         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2086         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2087         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2088         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2089         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2090         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2091
2092         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2093         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2094         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2095         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2096         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2097
2098         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2099         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2100         let send_1 = {
2101                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
2102                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2103                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2104                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2105                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2106                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2107         };
2108
2109         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2110         // initial fulfill/CS.
2111         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2112         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2113         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2114         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2115
2116         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2117         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2118         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2119         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2120         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2121         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2122
2123         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2124         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2125         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2126         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2127         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2128
2129         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2130         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2132         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2133         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2134
2135         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2136         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2137         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2138
2139         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2141         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2142
2143         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2144         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2145         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2146
2147         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2148         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2149         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2150         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2151         // on-chain as necessary).
2152         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2153         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2154         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2155         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2156         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2157
2158         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2159         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2160         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2161
2162         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2163         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2164
2165         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2166         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2167         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2169         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2170         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2171
2172         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2173         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2174         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2175         let send_2 = {
2176                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_4,
2177                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2178                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2179                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2180                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2181                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2182         };
2183
2184         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2185         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2186         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2187         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2188
2189         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2190
2191         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2192         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2193         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2194
2195         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2196         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2197
2198         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2199         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2200         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2201         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2202
2203         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2204         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2205         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2206
2207         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2208         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2209
2210         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2211         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2212
2213         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2214         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2215 }
2216
2217 #[test]
2218 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2219         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2220         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2221         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2222         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2223         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2224         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2225
2226         // Create some initial channels
2227         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2228         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2229         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2230         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2231
2232         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2233         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2234         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2235         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2236         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2237         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2238
2239         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2240         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2241         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2242         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2243         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2244
2245         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2246         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2247         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2248         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2249         {
2250                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2251                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2252                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2253                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2254                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2255         }
2256         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2257         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2258         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2259         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2260         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2261
2262         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2263         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2264
2265         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2266         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2267         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2268         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2269         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2270         {
2271                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2272                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2273                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2274                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2275                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2276                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2277         }
2278         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2279         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2280         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2281         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2282         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2283
2284         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2285                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2286                         {
2287                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2288                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2289                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2290
2291                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2292                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2293                                 match events[0] {
2294                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2295                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2296                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2297                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2298                                         },
2299                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2300                                 };
2301                         }
2302                 }
2303         }
2304
2305         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2306         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2307         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2309         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2310         let node2_commitment_txid;
2311         {
2312                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2313                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2314                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2315                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2316
2317                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2318                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2319                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2320                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2321                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2322         }
2323         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2324         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2325         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2326         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2327         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2328
2329         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2330         // confusing us in the following tests.
2331         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2332
2333         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2334         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2335         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2336         // buffer space).
2337
2338         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2339                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2340                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2341                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2342                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2343                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2344                                 msg.clone()
2345                         },
2346                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2347                 };
2348                 match events[1] {
2349                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2350                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2351                         },
2352                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2353                 }
2354                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2355
2356                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2357                 {
2358                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2359                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2360                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2361                                         false
2362                                 } else { true }
2363                         });
2364                 }
2365
2366                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2367
2368                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2369                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2370
2371                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2372                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2373                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2374                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2375                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2376                                 msg.clone()
2377                         },
2378                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2379                 };
2380                 match events[1] {
2381                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2382                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2383                         },
2384                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2385                 }
2386                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2387                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2388
2389                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2390                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2391                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2392         };
2393         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2394         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2395         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2396         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2397
2398         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2399                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2400         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2401         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2402 }
2403
2404 #[test]
2405 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
2406         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides
2407         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2408         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2409         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2410         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2411         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2412         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2413         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2414         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2415         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2416         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2417         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2418         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2419         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2420         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2421         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2422         // Create some new channels:
2423         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2424
2425         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2426         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2427         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2428         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2429         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2430         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2431         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2432         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2433         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2434         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2435         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2436         // Revoke the old state
2437         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2438
2439         {
2440                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2441                 {
2442                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2443                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2444                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2445                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2446                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2447                 }
2448                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2449                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2450                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2451
2452                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2453                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2454                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2455                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2456                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2457                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2458                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2459                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2460                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2461         }
2462         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2463         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2464         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2465 }
2466
2467 #[test]
2468 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() {
2469         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2470         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2471         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2472         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2473         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2474         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2475         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2476         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2477         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2478         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2479         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2480         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2481         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2482         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2483         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2484         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2485         // Create some new channels:
2486         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2487
2488         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2489         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2490         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2491         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2492         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2493         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2494         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2495         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2496         // Revoke the old state
2497         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2498         {
2499                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2500                 {
2501                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2502                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2503                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2504
2505                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2506                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2507                 }
2508                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2509                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2510
2511                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2512                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2513                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2514                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2515                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2516                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2517                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2518         }
2519         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2520         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2521         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2522 }
2523
2524 #[test]
2525 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2526         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2527         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2528         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2529         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2530         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2531         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2532         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2533         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2534         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2535         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2536         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2537         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2538         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2539         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2540
2541         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2542         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2543         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2544         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2545         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2546         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2547
2548         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2549
2550         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2551         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2552         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2553         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2554         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2555 }
2556
2557 #[test]
2558 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2559         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2560         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2561         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2562         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2563         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2564         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2565
2566         // Create some new channel:
2567         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2568
2569         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2570         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2571         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2572         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2573         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2574
2575         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2576         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2577         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2578         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2579         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2580         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2581         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2582         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2583         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2584
2585         //Revoke the old state
2586         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2587
2588         {
2589                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2590                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2591                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2592                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2593                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2594                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2595                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2596                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2597
2598                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2599                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2600
2601                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2602                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2603
2604                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2605                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2606                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2607                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2608                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2609                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2610                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2611                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2612
2613                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2614                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2615                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2616                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2617                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2618         }
2619         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2620         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2621         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2622 }
2623
2624 #[test]
2625 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2626         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2627         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2628         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2629         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2630         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2631         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2632
2633         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2634
2635         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2636         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2637         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2638         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2639         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2640         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2641
2642         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2643         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2644
2645         //Revoke the old state
2646         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2647
2648         {
2649                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2650                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2651                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2652                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2653                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2654                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2655                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2656                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2657                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2658                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2659                 }
2660
2661                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2662                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2663
2664                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2665
2666                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2667                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2668                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2669                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2670                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2671                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2672                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2673
2674                 // Filter out any non justice transactions.
2675                 node_txn.retain(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2676                 assert!(node_txn.len() > 3);
2677
2678                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2679                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2680                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2681
2682                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2683                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2684                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2685
2686                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2687                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2688                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2689                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2690                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2691                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2692                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2693                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2694
2695                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2696                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2697                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2698                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2699                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2700                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2701                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2702         }
2703         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2704         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2705         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2706 }
2707
2708 #[test]
2709 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2710         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2711         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2712         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2713         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2714         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2715         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2716         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2717         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2718         // towards B.
2719         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2720         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2721         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2722         // PaymentSent event).
2723
2724         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2725         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2726         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2727         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2728
2729         // Create some initial channels
2730         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2731         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2732
2733         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2734         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2735         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2736         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2737         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2738
2739         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2740         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2741         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2742
2743         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2744         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2745
2746         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2747         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2748         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2749         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2750         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2751         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2752         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2753         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2754         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2755         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2756         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2757         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2758         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2759         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2760         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2761
2762         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2763         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2764         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2765         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2766         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2767         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2768         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2769         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2770         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2771         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2772         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2773         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2774         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2775         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2776
2777         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2778         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
2779         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2780         {
2781                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2782                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2783                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2784                 added_monitors.clear();
2785         }
2786         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2787         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2788         match forwarded_events[0] {
2789                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2790                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2791         }
2792         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2793         match forwarded_events[1] {
2794                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2795                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2796                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2797                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2798                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2799                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2800                 },
2801                 _ => panic!()
2802         }
2803         match forwarded_events[2] {
2804                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2805                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2806                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2807                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2808                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2809                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2810                 },
2811                 _ => panic!()
2812         }
2813         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2814         {
2815                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2816                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2817                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2818                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2819                 added_monitors.clear();
2820         }
2821         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2822
2823         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2824         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2825
2826         match nodes_2_event {
2827                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2828                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2829         }
2830
2831         match nodes_0_event {
2832                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2833                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2834                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2835                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2836                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2837                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2838                 },
2839                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2840         };
2841
2842         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2843         match events[0] {
2844                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2845                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2846         }
2847
2848         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2849                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2850                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2851                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2852                         // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2853                         // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2854                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2855                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2856                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2857                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2858                         if $htlc_offered {
2859                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2860                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2861                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2862                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2863                         } else {
2864                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2865                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2866                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2867                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2868                         }
2869                         node_txn.clear();
2870                 } }
2871         }
2872         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2873         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2874
2875         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2876         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2877         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2878         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2879         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2880         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2881         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2882         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2883         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2884         assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2885         let commitment_spend =
2886                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2887                         &node_txn[0]
2888                 } else {
2889                         // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2890                         // FullBlockViaListen
2891                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2892                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2893                                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2894                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2895                                 &node_txn[0]
2896                         } else {
2897                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2898                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2899                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2900                                 &node_txn[2]
2901                         }
2902                 };
2903
2904         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2905         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2906         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2907         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2908         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2909         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2910         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2911         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2912
2913         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2914         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()]));
2915         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2916         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2918         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2919         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2920         let mut first_claimed = false;
2921         for event in events {
2922                 match event {
2923                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2924                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2925                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2926                                         first_claimed = true;
2927                                 } else {
2928                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2929                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2930                                 }
2931                         },
2932                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2933                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2934                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2935                 }
2936         }
2937         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2938 }
2939
2940 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2941         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2942         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2943         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2944         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2945         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2946         //            \                                  \
2947         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2948
2949         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2950         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2951         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2952         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2953         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2954         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2955         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2956
2957         // Create some intial channels
2958         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2959         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2960
2961         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2962         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2963         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2964
2965         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2966
2967         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2968         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2969         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2970         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2971         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2972         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2973         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2974
2975         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2976         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2977         match events[0] {
2978                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2979                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2980                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2981                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2982                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2983                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2984                 },
2985                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2986         };
2987         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2988         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2989         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2990         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2991         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2992         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2993
2994         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2995         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2996         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2997         check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false);
2998         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2999         let timeout_tx = {
3000                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3001                 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
3002                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
3003                 } else {
3004                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 3); // Two extra fee bumps for timeout transaction
3005                 }
3006                 txn.iter().for_each(|tx| check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx[0]));
3007                 assert_eq!(txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3008                 txn.remove(0)
3009         };
3010
3011         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
3012         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3013         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3014
3015         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3016
3017         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3018         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3019         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3020         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3021         match events[0] {
3022                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3023                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3024                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3025                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3026                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3027                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3028                 },
3029                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3030         };
3031
3032         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3033         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3034         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3035
3036         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3037         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3038
3039         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3040         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3041         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3042         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
3043         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3044         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3045         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3046 }
3047
3048 #[test]
3049 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3050         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3051         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3052         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3053 }
3054
3055 #[test]
3056 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3057         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3058         // and fail backward accordingly.
3059
3060         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3061         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3062         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3063         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3064
3065         // Create some initial channels
3066         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3067         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3068
3069         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3070         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3071         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3072         // Revoke the old state
3073         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3074
3075         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3076
3077         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3078         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3079         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3080         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3081         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3082
3083         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3084         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3085         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3086         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3087         match events[0] {
3088                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3089                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3090                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3091                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3092                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3093                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3094
3095                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3096                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3097                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3098                 },
3099                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3100         }
3101 }
3102
3103 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3104         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3105         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3106         // commitment transaction anymore.
3107         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3108         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3109         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3110         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3111         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3112         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3113         // transactions:
3114         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3115         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3116         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3117         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3118         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3119         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3120         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3121         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3122         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3123
3124         // Create some initial channels
3125         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3126         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3127
3128         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3129         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3130         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3131         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3132         // Revoke the old state
3133         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3134
3135         let value = if use_dust {
3136                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3137                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3138                 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3139                         .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3140         } else { 3000000 };
3141
3142         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3143         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3144         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3145
3146         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3147         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3148         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3149         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3150         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3151         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3152         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3153         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3154         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3155         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3156         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3157         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3158
3159         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3160         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3161         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3162         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3163         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3164         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3165         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3166         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3167         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3168         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3169         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3170         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3171         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3172         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3173         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3175
3176         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3177         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3179         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3180         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3181         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3182         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3183         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3184         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3185         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3186         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3187         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3188         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3189         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3190         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3191         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3192         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3193         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3194
3195         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3196         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3197         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3198         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, fourth_payment_hash,
3199                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3200         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3201         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3202         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3203
3204         if deliver_bs_raa {
3205                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3206                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3207                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3208                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3209                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3210                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3211                 match events[0] {
3212                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3213                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3214                 };
3215                 match events[1] {
3216                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3217                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3218                 }
3219                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3220                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3221         }
3222
3223         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3224         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3225
3226         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3227         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3228         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3229
3230         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3231         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3232         match events[0] {
3233                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3234                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3235         }
3236         match events[1] {
3237                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3238                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3239                 },
3240                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3241         }
3242         match events[2] {
3243                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3244                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3245                 },
3246                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3247         }
3248
3249         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3250         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3251
3252         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3253         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3254
3255         if deliver_bs_raa {
3256                 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3257                 match nodes_2_event {
3258                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3259                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3260                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3261                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3262                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3263                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3264                         },
3265                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3266                 }
3267         }
3268
3269         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3270         match nodes_2_event {
3271                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3272                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3273                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3274                 },
3275                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3276         }
3277
3278         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3279         match nodes_0_event {
3280                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3281                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3282                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3283                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3284                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3285                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3286
3287                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3288                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3289                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3290
3291                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3292
3293                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3294                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3295                         match events[0] {
3296                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3297                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3298                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3299                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3300                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3301                                                 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3302                                         }
3303                                 },
3304                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3305                         }
3306                         match events[1] {
3307                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3308                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3309                                 },
3310                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3311                         }
3312                         match events[2] {
3313                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3314                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3315                                 },
3316                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3317                         }
3318                         match events[3] {
3319                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3320                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3321                                 },
3322                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3323                         }
3324                         match events[4] {
3325                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3326                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3327                                 },
3328                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3329                         }
3330                         match events[5] {
3331                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3332                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3333                                 },
3334                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3335                         }
3336                 },
3337                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3338         }
3339
3340         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3341         match events[0] {
3342                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3343                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3344         }
3345
3346         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3347         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3348         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3349 }
3350
3351 #[test]
3352 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3353         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3354         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3355         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3356         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3357 }
3358
3359 #[test]
3360 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3361         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3362         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3363         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3364         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3365 }
3366
3367 #[test]
3368 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3369         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3370         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3371         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3372         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3373         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3374
3375         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3376         {
3377                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3378                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
3379                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3380                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3381
3382                 let payment_event = {
3383                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3384                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3385                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3386                 };
3387                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3388                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3389         }
3390
3391         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3392         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3393         {
3394                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, failed_payment_hash,
3395                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3396                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3397
3398                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3399         }
3400
3401         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3402         {
3403                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3404
3405                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3406                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3407                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3408                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
3409                         &route.paths[0], 50_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3410                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3411                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
3412
3413                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3414                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3415                         channel_id: chan.2,
3416                         htlc_id: 0,
3417                         amount_msat: 0,
3418                         payment_hash,
3419                         cltv_expiry,
3420                         onion_routing_packet,
3421                 };
3422                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3423         }
3424         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3425         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3426         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3427         match events[0] {
3428                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3429                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3430                 },
3431                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3432         }
3433         match events[1] {
3434                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3435                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3436                 },
3437                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3438         }
3439         match events[2] {
3440                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3441                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3442                 },
3443                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3444         }
3445         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3446         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3447 }
3448
3449 #[test]
3450 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3451         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3452         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3453         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3454         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3455         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3456         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3457         if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3458                 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3459                 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3460                 // connect_style.
3461                 return;
3462         }
3463         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3464
3465         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3466         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3467         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3468         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3469         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3470         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3471
3472         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3473         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3474         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[1].txid());
3475
3476         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]);
3477         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3478         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3479         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3480         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3481
3482         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3483         // registering new transactions
3484         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3485 }
3486
3487 #[test]
3488 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3489         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3490         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3491         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3492         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3493         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3494         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3495         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3496
3497         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3498
3499         let mut payment_event = {
3500                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
3501                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3502                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3503
3504                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3505                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3506                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3507         };
3508
3509         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3510         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3511
3512         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3513
3514         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3515         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3516         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3517         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3518
3519         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3520         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3521         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3522         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3523         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3524
3525         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3526         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3527         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3528
3529         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3530         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3531         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3532         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3533         let tx = {
3534                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3535                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3536                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3537                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3538                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3539                 node_txn.remove(0)
3540         };
3541
3542         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3543
3544         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3545         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3546         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3547         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3548
3549         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3550         {
3551                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3552                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3553         }
3554         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3555         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3556         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3557         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3558         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3559         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3560         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3561
3562         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3563 }
3564
3565 #[test]
3566 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3567         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3568         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3569         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3570         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3571
3572         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3573         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3574         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3575         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3576         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3577
3578         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3579
3580         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3581         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3582         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3583         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3584         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3585         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3586
3587         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3588         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3589
3590         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3591         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3592 }
3593
3594 #[test]
3595 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3596         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3597         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3598         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3599         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3600         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3601         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3602
3603         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3604         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3605         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3606         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3607         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3608         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3609         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3610
3611         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3612         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3613
3614         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3615
3616         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3617         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3618
3619         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3620         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3621         // broadcasted.
3622         {
3623                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3624         }
3625
3626         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3627         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3628         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3629         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3630
3631         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3632         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3633 }
3634
3635 #[test]
3636 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3637         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3638         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3639         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3640         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3641         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3642         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3643         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3644
3645         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3646         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3647         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3648
3649         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3650         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3651         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3652         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3653
3654         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3655         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3656         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3657
3658         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3659         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3660         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3661         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3662
3663         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3664         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3665
3666         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3667         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3668
3669         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3670         {
3671                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3672                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3673                 match events[0] {
3674                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3675                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3676                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3677                         },
3678                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3679                 }
3680                 match events[1] {
3681                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3682                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3683                 }
3684                 match events[2] {
3685                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3686                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3687                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3688                         },
3689                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3690                 }
3691                 match events[3] {
3692                         Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3693                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3694                         },
3695                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3696                 }
3697         }
3698
3699         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3700         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3701 }
3702
3703 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3704         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3705         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3706         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3707         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3708         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3709
3710         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3711         let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3712                 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3713                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3714                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3715                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3716                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3717                 chan_id
3718         } else {
3719                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3720         };
3721
3722         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3723
3724         let payment_event = {
3725                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
3726                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3727                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3728
3729                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3730                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3731                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3732         };
3733         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3734
3735         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3736                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3737         } else {
3738                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3739                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3740                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3741                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3742                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3743
3744                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3745                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3746                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3747                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3748
3749                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3750                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3751                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3752                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3753                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3754
3755                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3756                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3757                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3758                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3759                                         }
3760                                 }
3761                         }
3762                 }
3763         }
3764
3765         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3766         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3767         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3768                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3769                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3770                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3771                         //
3772                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3773                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3774                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3775                         //
3776                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3777                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3778                 }
3779                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3780                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3781                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3782         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3783                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3784                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3785         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3786                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3787                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3788         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3789                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3790                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3791         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3792                 // Everything was delivered...
3793                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3794         }
3795
3796         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3797         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3798                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3799                 match events_1[0] {
3800                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3801                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3802                 };
3803                 match events_1[1] {
3804                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3805                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3806                 };
3807         } else {
3808                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3809                 match events_1[0] {
3810                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3811                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3812                 };
3813         }
3814
3815         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3816         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3817         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3818
3819         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3820
3821         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3822         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3823         match events_2[0] {
3824                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
3825                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3826                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3827                         assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3828                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3829                         match &purpose {
3830                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3831                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3832                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3833                                 },
3834                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3835                         }
3836                 },
3837                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3838         }
3839
3840         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3841         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3842         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3843
3844         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3845         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3846         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3847                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3848                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3849                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3850                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3851                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3852                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3853                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3854                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3855                 },
3856                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3857         };
3858
3859         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3860                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3861
3862                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3863                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3864                 match events_4[0] {
3865                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3866                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3867                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3868                         },
3869                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3870                 }
3871
3872                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3873                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3874                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3875                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3876
3877                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3878                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3879                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3880                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3881
3882                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3883                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3884                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3885                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3886                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3887
3888                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3889                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3890                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3891                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3892                                         }
3893                                 }
3894                         }
3895                 }
3896         }
3897
3898         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3899         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3900         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3901                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3902                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3903                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3904                 } else {
3905                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3906                 }
3907         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3908                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3909                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3910         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3911                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3912                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3913         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3914                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3915                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3916         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3917                 // Everything was delivered...
3918                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3919         }
3920
3921         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3922                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3923         }
3924         if messages_delivered <= 5 {
3925                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3926                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3927         }
3928         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3929
3930         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3931                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3932         }
3933
3934         // Channel should still work fine...
3935         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3936         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3937         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3938 }
3939
3940 #[test]
3941 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3942         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3943         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3944         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3945         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3946 }
3947
3948 #[test]
3949 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3950         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3951         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3952         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3953         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3954 }
3955
3956 #[test]
3957 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3958         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3959         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3960         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3961         // channel_ready immediately instead.
3962         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3963         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3964         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3965         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3966         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3967
3968         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
3969
3970         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3971         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3972         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3973         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3974         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3975         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3976
3977         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3978         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3979         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3980 }
3981
3982 #[test]
3983 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3984         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3985         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3986         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3987         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3988         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3989         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3990         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3991
3992         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3993
3994         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3995         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3996         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
3997                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3998         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3999
4000         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4001         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4002         match events_1[0] {
4003                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4004                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4005         }
4006
4007         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4008         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4009         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4010
4011         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4012         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4013         match events_2[0] {
4014                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4015                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4016                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4017                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4018                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4019                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4020                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4021
4022                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4023                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4024                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4025                         match events_3[0] {
4026                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4027                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4028                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4029                                 },
4030                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4031                         }
4032
4033                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4034                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4035                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4036                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4037                 },
4038                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4039         }
4040
4041         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4042         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4043
4044         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
4045         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4046         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4047         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
4048         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4049         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4050
4051         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4052         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4053         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4054         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4055
4056         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4057         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4058
4059         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4060         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4061
4062         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4063
4064         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4065         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4066         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4067         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4068         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4069         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4070         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4071         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4072         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4074
4075         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4076         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4077         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4078         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4079         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4080         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4081         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4083
4084         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4085         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4086         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4087         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4088         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4089         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4090         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4091         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4092
4093         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4094         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4095         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4096         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4097
4098         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4099         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4100         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4101         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4102
4103         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4104         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4105         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4106
4107         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4108
4109         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4110         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4111         match events_5[0] {
4112                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4113                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4114                         match &purpose {
4115                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4116                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4117                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4118                                 },
4119                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4120                         }
4121                 },
4122                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4123         }
4124
4125         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4126         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4127         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4128
4129         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4130         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4131 }
4132
4133 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4134         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4135         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4136         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4137         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4138         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4139         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4140
4141         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4142
4143         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4144                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4145                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4146                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4147                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4148                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4149                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
4150                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4151                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
4152                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id,
4153                         &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4154                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4155                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4156                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4157                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4158                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4159                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4160                 our_payment_hash
4161         } else {
4162                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4163         };
4164
4165         let mut block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
4166         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4167         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4168         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4169         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4170                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4171                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4172                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4173         }
4174
4175         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4176
4177         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4178         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4179         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4180         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4181         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4182         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4183
4184         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4185         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4186         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4187         let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4188         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4189         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4190 }
4191
4192 #[test]
4193 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4194         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4195         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4196 }
4197
4198 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4199         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4200         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4201         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4202         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4203         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4204         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4205         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4206
4207         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4208         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4209         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4210         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4211
4212         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4213         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4214         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, first_payment_hash,
4215                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4216         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4217         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4218
4219         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4220         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4221         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4222         sending_node.node.send_payment_with_route(&route, second_payment_hash,
4223                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4224         if forwarded_htlc {
4225                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4226                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4227                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4228                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4229                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4230         }
4231         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4232
4233         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4234         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4235         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4236         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4237
4238         if forwarded_htlc {
4239                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4240                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4241                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4242                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4243                 match fail_commit[0] {
4244                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4245                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4246                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4247                         },
4248                         _ => unreachable!(),
4249                 }
4250                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4251         } else {
4252                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4253         }
4254 }
4255
4256 #[test]
4257 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4258         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4259         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4260 }
4261
4262 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4263         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4264                 {
4265                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4266                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4267                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4268                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4269                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4270                                 match event {
4271                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4272                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4273                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4274                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4275                                                 }
4276                                         },
4277                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4278                                 };
4279                         }
4280                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4281                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx) {
4282                                         txn.push(tx);
4283                                 }
4284                         }
4285                         txn
4286                 }
4287         }
4288 }
4289
4290 #[test]
4291 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4292         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4293         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4294         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4295         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4296         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4297
4298         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4299         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4300         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4302         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4303         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4304         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4305         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4306         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4307
4308         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4309         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4310
4311         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4312         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4313         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4314         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4315         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4316 }
4317
4318 #[test]
4319 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4320         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4321         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4322         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4323         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4324         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4325         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4326
4327         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4328         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4329         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4330         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4331         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4332
4333         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4334         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4335         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4336         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4337
4338         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4339         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4341         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4342         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4343
4344         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4345         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4346         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4347 }
4348
4349 #[test]
4350 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4351         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4352         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4353
4354         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4355         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4356         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4357         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4358
4359         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4360         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4361         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4362         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4363         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4364
4365         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4366         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4367         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4368         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4369         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4370
4371         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4372         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4373         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4374
4375         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4376         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4377         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4378         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4379         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4380 }
4381
4382 #[test]
4383 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4384         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4385         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4386         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4387         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4388
4389         // Create some initial channels
4390         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4391
4392         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4393
4394         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4395         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4396         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4397
4398         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4399         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4400         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4401         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4402         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4403         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4404         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4405         match events[0] {
4406                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4407                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4408         }
4409         match events[1] {
4410                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4411                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4412         }
4413
4414         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4415         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4416         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4417         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4418         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4419
4420         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4421         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4422         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4423
4424         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4425         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4426         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4427 }
4428
4429 #[test]
4430 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4431         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4432         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4433         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4434         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4435
4436         // Create some initial channels
4437         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4438
4439         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4440         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4441
4442         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4443
4444         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4445         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4446         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4447
4448         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4449         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4450         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4451         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4452         match events[0] {
4453                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4454                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4455         }
4456         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4457
4458         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4459         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4460         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4461         check_spends!(node_txn[0],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4462         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4463
4464         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4465         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4466         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4467         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4468
4469         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4470         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4471         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4472         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4473         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4474 }
4475
4476 #[test]
4477 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4478         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4479         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4480         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4481         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4482
4483         // Create some initial channels
4484         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4485
4486         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4487         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4488         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4489         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4490
4491         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4492
4493         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4494         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4495         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4496         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4497
4498         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4499         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4500         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4501         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4502
4503         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4504         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4505
4506         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4507         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4508         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4509 }
4510
4511 #[test]
4512 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4513         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4514         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4515         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4516         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4517         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4518
4519         // Create some initial channels
4520         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4521
4522         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4523         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4524         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4525         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4526
4527         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4528
4529         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4530         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4531         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4532         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4533         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4534         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4535
4536         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4537         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4538         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4539         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4540         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4541         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4542
4543         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4544         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4545         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4546         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4547         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4548
4549         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4550         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4551         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4552         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4553         // transactions next...
4554         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4555         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4556
4557         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4558         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4559         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4560                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4561         } else {
4562                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4563                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4564         }
4565
4566         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4567         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4568
4569         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4570         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4571         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4572         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4573         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4574 }
4575
4576 #[test]
4577 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4578         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4579         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4580         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4581         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4582         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4583
4584         // Create some initial channels
4585         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4586
4587         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4588         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4589         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4590         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4591
4592         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4593         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4594
4595         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4596
4597         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4598         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4599         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4600         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4601         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4602         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4603
4604         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4605         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4606         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4607         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4608
4609         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4610         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4611         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4612
4613         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4614         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4615         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4616         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4617         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4618
4619         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4620         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4621
4622         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4623         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4624         // transactions next...
4625         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4626         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4627         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4628                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4629         } else {
4630                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4631                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4632         }
4633
4634         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4635         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4636
4637         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4638         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4639
4640         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4641         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4642
4643         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4644         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4645         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4646         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4647         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4648         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4649         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4650         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4651 }
4652
4653 #[test]
4654 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4655         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4656         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4657         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4658         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4659         // channel.
4660         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4661         // gets broadcast.
4662
4663         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4664         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4665         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4666         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4667
4668         // Create some initial channels
4669         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4670         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4671
4672         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4673         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4674         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4675         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4676         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4677
4678         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4679         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4680         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4681
4682         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4683         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4684         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4685         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4686         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4687         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4688         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4689         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4690         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4691         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4692         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4693
4694         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4695         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4696         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4697         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4698
4699         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4700         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4701         check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4702         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4703         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4704         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4705
4706         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4707         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
4708         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4709         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4710         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4711         match events[0] {
4712                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4713                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4714         }
4715         match events[1] {
4716                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
4717                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4718                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4719                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4720                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4721                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4722                 },
4723                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4724         }
4725         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4726         let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4727         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4728         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4729         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4730
4731         match nodes_2_event {
4732                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4733                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4734         }
4735
4736         match nodes_0_event {
4737                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4738                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4739                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4740                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4741                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4742                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4743                 },
4744                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4745         };
4746
4747         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4748         match msg_events[0] {
4749                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4750                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4751         }
4752
4753         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4754         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4755         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4756         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4757         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4758         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4759         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4760         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4761         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4762         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4763         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
4764
4765         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4766         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4767 }
4768
4769 #[test]
4770 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4771         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4772         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4773         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4774         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4775         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4776         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4777         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4778         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4779         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4780         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4781         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4782                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4783         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4784
4785         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4786         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4787         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4788
4789         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4790         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4791         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4792         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4793         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4794
4795         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4796
4797         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
4798         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4799         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4800         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4801         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
4802                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
4803         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
4804         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4805
4806         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4807         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4808         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4809
4810         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4811         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4812         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4813         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4814         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4815
4816         let htlc_timeout_tx;
4817         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4818                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4819                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
4820                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4821
4822                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4823                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4824                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4825
4826                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4827                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4828                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4829                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4830                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4831
4832                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4833                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4834                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
4835                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4836                 } else {
4837                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4838                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4839                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4840                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4841                 }
4842
4843                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4844                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4845                 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
4846                 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
4847                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4848                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4849                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4850                 } else {
4851                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4852                 }
4853         }
4854
4855         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4856         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4857
4858         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4859         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4860         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4861         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4862         match events[0] {
4863                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4864                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4865         }
4866         match events[1] {
4867                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4868                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4869         }
4870         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4871         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4872         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4873         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4874         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4875         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4876         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4877         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4878         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4879         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4880
4881         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4882         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4883         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4884         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4885         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4886         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4887         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4888         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4889         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4890         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4891
4892         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4893         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4894         {
4895                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4896         }
4897         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4898
4899         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4900         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
4901         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
4902         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4903         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4904         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4905         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4906         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4907         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4908         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4909
4910         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4911         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4912         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, None, true);
4913 }
4914
4915 #[test]
4916 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4917         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4918         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4919         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4920         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4921
4922         // Create some initial channels
4923         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4924
4925         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4926         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4927         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4928         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4929         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4930
4931         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4932         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4933         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4934         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4935
4936         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4937         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4938         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4939         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4940         match events[0] {
4941                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4942                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4943         }
4944         match events[1] {
4945                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4946                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4947         }
4948         let node_tx = {
4949                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4950                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4951                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4952                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4953                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4954                 node_txn[0].clone()
4955         };
4956
4957         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4958         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4959
4960         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4961         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4962         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4963         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4964         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4965         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4966 }
4967
4968 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4969         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4970         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4971         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4972         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4973         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4974         // use the same payment hashes.
4975         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4976         //
4977         // A \         / E
4978         //    - C - D -
4979         // B /         \ F
4980         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4981         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4982         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4983         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4984         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4985         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4986         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4987         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4988                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4989         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4990
4991         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
4992         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4993         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4994         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4995         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4996
4997         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4998         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4999         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5000         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5001
5002         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
5003                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5004         // 0th HTLC:
5005         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5006         // 1st HTLC:
5007         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5008         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5009         // 2nd HTLC:
5010         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5011         // 3rd HTLC:
5012         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5013         // 4th HTLC:
5014         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5015         // 5th HTLC:
5016         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5017         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5018         // 6th HTLC:
5019         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5020         // 7th HTLC:
5021         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5022
5023         // 8th HTLC:
5024         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5025         // 9th HTLC:
5026         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5027         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5028
5029         // 10th HTLC:
5030         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5031         // 11th HTLC:
5032         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5033         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5034
5035         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5036         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5037         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5038         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5039         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5040
5041         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5042         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5043         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5044         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5045         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5046         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5047         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5048
5049         let failed_destinations = vec![
5050                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5051                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5052                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5053                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5054         ];
5055         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5056         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5057
5058         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5059         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5060         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5061         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5062         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5063         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5064
5065         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5066         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5067         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5068         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5069
5070         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5071                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5072                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5073         ];
5074         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5075         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5076
5077         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5078         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5079         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5080         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5081
5082         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5083
5084         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5085         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5086                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5087                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5088                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5089                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5090                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5091                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5092         ];
5093         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5094         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5095         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5096         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5097         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5098         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5099         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5100         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5101         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5102         if deliver_last_raa {
5103                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5104         } else {
5105                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5106         }
5107
5108         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5109         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5110         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5111         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5112         //
5113         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5114         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5115         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5116         //
5117         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5118         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5119         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5120
5121         if announce_latest {
5122                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5123         } else {
5124                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5125         }
5126         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5127         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5128                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5129                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5130         } else {
5131                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5132                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5133         };
5134         match close_event {
5135                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5136                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5137         }
5138
5139         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5140         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5141         if deliver_last_raa {
5142                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5143
5144                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5145                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5146         } else {
5147                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5148                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5149                 } else {
5150                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5151                 };
5152
5153                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5154         }
5155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5156
5157         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5158         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5159         let mut a_done = false;
5160         for msg in cs_msgs {
5161                 match msg {
5162                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5163                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5164                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5165                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5166                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5167                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5168                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5169                                         }
5170                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5171                                         assert!(!a_done);
5172                                         a_done = true;
5173                                         &nodes[0]
5174                                 } else {
5175                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5176                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5177                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5178                                         }
5179                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5180                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5181                                         &nodes[1]
5182                                 };
5183                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5184                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5185                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5186                                 if announce_latest {
5187                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5188                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5189                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5190                                         }
5191                                 }
5192                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5193                         },
5194                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5195                 }
5196         }
5197
5198         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5199         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5200         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5201         let mut as_updates = 0;
5202         for event in as_events.iter() {
5203                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5204                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5205                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5206                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5207                         } else {
5208                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5209                         }
5210                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5211                                 as_updates += 1;
5212                         }
5213                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5214                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5215         }
5216         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5217         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5218         if announce_latest {
5219                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5220                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5221         }
5222         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5223
5224         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5225         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5226         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5227         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5228         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5229                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5230                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5231                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5232                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5233                         } else {
5234                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5235                         }
5236                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5237                                 bs_updates += 1;
5238                         }
5239                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5240                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5241         }
5242         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5243         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5244         if announce_latest {
5245                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5246         }
5247         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5248
5249         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5250         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5251         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5252         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5253         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5254         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5255 }
5256
5257 #[test]
5258 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5259         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5260 }
5261
5262 #[test]
5263 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5264         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5265 }
5266
5267 #[test]
5268 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5269         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5270         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5271         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5272 }
5273
5274 #[test]
5275 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5276         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5277         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5278         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5279         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5280
5281         // Create some initial channels
5282         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5283
5284         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5285         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5286         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5287         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5288
5289         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5290         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5291         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5293         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5294         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5295
5296         let htlc_timeout = {
5297                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5298                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5299                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5300                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5301                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5302                 node_txn[0].clone()
5303         };
5304
5305         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5306         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5307         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5308
5309         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5310         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5311         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5312         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5313         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5314         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5315         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5316         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5317         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5318         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5319                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5320 }
5321
5322 #[test]
5323 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5324         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5325         // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5326         // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5327         // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5328
5329         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5330
5331         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5332         let seed = [42; 32];
5333         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5334         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5335         let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5336         let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5337         let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &scorer);
5338         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5339         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5340         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5341         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5342
5343         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5344         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5345
5346         // Create some initial channels
5347         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5348         // for node 0
5349         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5350         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5351         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5352
5353         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5354         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5355         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5356         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5357         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5358
5359         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5360         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5361         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5362         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5363         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5364
5365         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5366         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5367         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5368         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5369             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5370             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5371             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5372                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5373         }
5374
5375         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5376         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5377         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5378         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5379         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5380         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5381
5382         let htlc_timeout = {
5383                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5384                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5385                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5386                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5387                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5388                 node_txn[0].clone()
5389         };
5390
5391         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5392         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5393         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5394
5395         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5396         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5397         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5398         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5399         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5400         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5401         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5402         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5403         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5404         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5405         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5406                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5407 }
5408
5409 #[test]
5410 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5411         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5412         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5413         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5414         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5415
5416         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5417
5418         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5419         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5420
5421         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5422         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5423         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5424
5425         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5426         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5427         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5428
5429         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5430         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5431         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5432
5433         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5434         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5435         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5436 }
5437
5438 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5439         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5440         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5441         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5442         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5443         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5444
5445         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5446
5447         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5448         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5449         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5450         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5451         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5452
5453         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5454         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5455         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5456
5457         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5458         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5459         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5460         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5461         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5462
5463         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5464         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5465         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5466                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5467                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5468         }
5469         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5470         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5471         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5472         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5473 }
5474
5475 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5476         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5477         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5478         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5479         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5480         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5481
5482         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5483         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
5484                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5485         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5486
5487         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5488
5489         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5490         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5491         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5492
5493         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5494         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5495
5496         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5497                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5498                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5499         }
5500         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5501         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5502         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5503         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5504 }
5505
5506 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5507         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5508         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5509         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5510         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5511         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5512
5513         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5514         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5515         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5516         // actually revoked.
5517         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5518         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5519         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5520         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5521         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5522
5523         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5524         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5525         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5526         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5527         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5528         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5529         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5530         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5531         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5532         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5533
5534         if check_revoke_no_close {
5535                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5536                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5537         }
5538
5539         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5540         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5541         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5542                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5543                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5544         }
5545         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5546                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5547                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5548                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5549                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5550         } else {
5551                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5552         }
5553 }
5554
5555 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5556 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5557 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5558 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5559 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5560 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5561 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5562 // non-dust HTLCs.
5563 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5564 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5565 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5566 #[test]
5567 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5568         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5569         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5570
5571         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5572         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5573 }
5574
5575 #[test]
5576 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5577         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5578         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5579         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5580         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5581 }
5582
5583 #[test]
5584 #[should_panic]
5585 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5586         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5587         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5588         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5589         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5590         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5591         for node in nodes.iter() {
5592                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5593         }
5594
5595         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5596         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5597         let push_msat=10001;
5598         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5599         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5600         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5601         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5602
5603         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5604         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5605         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5606 }
5607
5608 #[test]
5609 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5610         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5611         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5612         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5613         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5614
5615         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5616         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5617         let push_msat=10001;
5618         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5619
5620         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5621         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5622         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5623         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5624         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5625
5626         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5627         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5628         let push_msat=10001;
5629         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5630         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5631         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5632
5633         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5634         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5635         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5636
5637         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5638         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5639         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5640
5641         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5642         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5643         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5644
5645         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5646         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5647         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5648         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5649         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5650         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5651 }
5652
5653 #[test]
5654 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5655         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5656         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5657         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5658         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5659
5660         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5661         let push_msat=10001;
5662         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5663         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5664         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5665         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5666
5667         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5668         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5669         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5670                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5671                         msg.clone()
5672                 },
5673                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5674         };
5675         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5676 }
5677
5678 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5679 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5680 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5681 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5682 #[test]
5683 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5684         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5685         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5686         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5687         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5688         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5689
5690         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5691         // pending_update_fee.
5692         {
5693                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5694                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5695         }
5696         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5697         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5698
5699         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5700         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5701         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5702                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5703                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5704                 },
5705                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5706         };
5707
5708         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5709
5710         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5711         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5712         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5713         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5714
5715         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5716         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5717         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5718
5719         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5720         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5721                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5722         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5723         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5724
5725         // Flush the pending fee update.
5726         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5727         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5728         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5729         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5730         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5731
5732         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5733         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5734         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5735         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5736         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5737         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5738         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5739                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5740         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5741
5742         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5743         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5744         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5745         match &events[0] {
5746                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5747                         assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5748                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5749                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5750                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5751                 },
5752                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5753         }
5754         match &events[1] {
5755                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5756                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5757                 },
5758                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5759         }
5760 }
5761
5762 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5763 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5764 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5765 #[test]
5766 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5767         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5768         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5769         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5770         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5771         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5772
5773         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5774         // pending_update_fee.
5775         {
5776                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5777                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5778         }
5779         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5780         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5781
5782         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5783         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5784         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5785                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5786                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5787                 },
5788                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5789         };
5790
5791         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5792
5793         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5794         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5795         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5796         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5797
5798         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5799         let amt_1 = 20000;
5800         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5801         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5802         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5803
5804         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5805         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, payment_hash_1,
5806                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5807         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5808         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5809         let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5810         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
5811                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5812         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5813         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5814
5815         // Flush the pending fee update.
5816         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5817         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5818         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5819         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5820         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5821         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5822
5823         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5824         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5825         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5826         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5827         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5828         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5829         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5830                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5831         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5832
5833         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5834         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5835         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5836         match &events[0] {
5837                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5838                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5839                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5840                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5841                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5842                 },
5843                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5844         }
5845         match &events[1] {
5846                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5847                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5848                 },
5849                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5850         }
5851
5852         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5853         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5854                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5855                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5856                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5857         };
5858         let raa = match send_raa_event {
5859                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5860                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5861         };
5862         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5863         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5864         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5865         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5866         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5867         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5868         match events[0] {
5869                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5870                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5871         }
5872         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5873         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5874         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5875         match events[0] {
5876                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
5877                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5878         }
5879         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5880         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5881         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5882
5883         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5884         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5885         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5886         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5887 }
5888
5889 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5890 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5891 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5892 // once it's freed.
5893 #[test]
5894 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5895         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5896         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5897         // Avoid having to include routing fees in calculations
5898         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5899         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
5900         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
5901         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5902         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5903         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5904         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
5905
5906         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5907         // pending_update_fee.
5908         {
5909                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5910                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5911         }
5912         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5913         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5914
5915         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5916         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5917         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5918                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5919                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5920                 },
5921                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5922         };
5923
5924         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5925
5926         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5927         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5928         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5929         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5930
5931         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5932         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5933         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5934         let payment_event = {
5935                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5936                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5937                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5938
5939                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5940                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5941
5942                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5943         };
5944         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5946         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5947         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5948
5949         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
5950         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5951
5952         // Flush the pending fee update.
5953         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5954         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5955         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5956         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5957         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5958         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5959
5960         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5961         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5962         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5963
5964         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5965                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5966                         msg.clone()
5967                 },
5968                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5969         };
5970
5971         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5972         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5973         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5974
5975         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5976         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5977         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5978         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5979                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5980                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5981         }
5982
5983         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5984         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5985         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5986
5987         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5988         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5989         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5990         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5991                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5992                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5993                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5994                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5995                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5996                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5997                 },
5998                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5999         };
6000
6001         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6002         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6003         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6004
6005         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6006         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6007         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6008         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6009         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6010         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6011         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6012         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6013         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6014                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6015                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6016         };
6017         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6018         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6019         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6020 }
6021
6022 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6023 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6024 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6025
6026 #[test]
6027 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6028         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6029         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6030         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6031         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6032         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6033         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6034
6035         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6036         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 100;
6037
6038         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6039                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6040                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6041                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6042         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6043         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value", 1);
6044 }
6045
6046 #[test]
6047 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6048         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6049         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6050         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6051         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6052         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6053         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6054
6055         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6056         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
6057         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6058                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)),
6059                 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6060                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6061
6062         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6063         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6064 }
6065
6066 #[test]
6067 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6068         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6069         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6070         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6071         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6072         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6073         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6074
6075         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6076         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6077                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6078         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6079         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6080         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6081
6082         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6083         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6084         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6085         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6086         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6087 }
6088
6089 #[test]
6090 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6091         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6092         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6093         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6094         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6095         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6096         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6097         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6098
6099         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6100                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
6101         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6102         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6103         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6104                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6105                 ), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6106                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6107 }
6108
6109 #[test]
6110 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6111         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6112         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6113         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6114         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6115         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6116         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6117         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6118         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6119         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6120                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6121
6122         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
6123         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6124         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6125                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6126                 let payment_event = {
6127                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6128                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6129                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6130
6131                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6132                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6133                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6134                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6135                         } else {
6136                                 assert!(false);
6137                         }
6138                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6139                 };
6140                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6141                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6142                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6143
6144                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6145                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6146         }
6147         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6148                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6149                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6150                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6151
6152         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6153         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", 1);
6154 }
6155
6156 #[test]
6157 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6158         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6159         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6160         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6161         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6162         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6163         let channel_value = 100000;
6164         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6165         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6166
6167         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6168
6169         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6170         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6171         // limits us to.
6172         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6173         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6174                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6175                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6176                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6177
6178         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6179         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept", 1);
6180
6181         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6182 }
6183
6184 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6185 #[test]
6186 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6187         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6188         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6189         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6190         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6191         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6192         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6193         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6194         {
6195                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6196                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6197                 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6198                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6199         }
6200
6201         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6202         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6203                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6204         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6205         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6206         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6207         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6208         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6209         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6210         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6211         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6212         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6213 }
6214
6215 #[test]
6216 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6217         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6218         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6219         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6220         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6221         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6222         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6223
6224         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6225         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6226         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6227         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6228         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6229         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6230
6231         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6232         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6233         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6234                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6235         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6236         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6237
6238         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6239         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6240         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6241         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6242         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6243
6244         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6245         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6246         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6247         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6248         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6249 }
6250
6251 #[test]
6252 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6253         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6254         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6255         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6256         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6257         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6258         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6259         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6260
6261         let send_amt = 3999999;
6262         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
6263                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
6264         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = send_amt;
6265         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6266         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6267         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6268         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
6269                 &route.paths[0], send_amt, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6270         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6271
6272         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6273                 channel_id: chan.2,
6274                 htlc_id: 0,
6275                 amount_msat: 1000,
6276                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6277                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6278                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6279         };
6280
6281         for i in 0..50 {
6282                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6283                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6284         }
6285         msg.htlc_id = (50) as u64;
6286         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6287
6288         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6289         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6290         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6291         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6292         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6293 }
6294
6295 #[test]
6296 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6297         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6298         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6299         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6300         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6301         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6302         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6303
6304         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6305         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6306                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6307         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6308         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6309         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6310         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6311
6312         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6313         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6314         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6315         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6316         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6317 }
6318
6319 #[test]
6320 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6321         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6322         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6323         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6324         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6325         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6326
6327         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6328         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6329         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6330                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6331         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6332         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6333         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6334         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6335
6336         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6337         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6338         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6339         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6340         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6341 }
6342
6343 #[test]
6344 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6345         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6346         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6347         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6348         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6349         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6350         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6351         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6352
6353         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6354         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6355         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6356                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6357         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6358         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6359         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6360
6361         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6362         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6363         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6364         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
6365         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6366         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6367         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
6368         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6369         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6370         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6371         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6372         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6373         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6374
6375         //Resend HTLC
6376         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6377         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6378         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6379         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6380         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6381
6382         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6383
6384         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6385         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6386         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6387         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6388         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6389 }
6390
6391 #[test]
6392 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6393         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6394
6395         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6396         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6397         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6398         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6399         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6400         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6401         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6402                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6403
6404         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6405         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6406         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6407
6408         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6409                 channel_id: chan.2,
6410                 htlc_id: 0,
6411                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6412         };
6413
6414         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6415
6416         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6417         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6418         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6419         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6420         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6421 }
6422
6423 #[test]
6424 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6425         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6426
6427         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6428         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6429         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6430         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6431         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6432
6433         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6434         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6435                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6436         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6437         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6438         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6439
6440         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6441                 channel_id: chan.2,
6442                 htlc_id: 0,
6443                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6444         };
6445
6446         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6447
6448         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6449         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6450         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6451         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6452         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6453 }
6454
6455 #[test]
6456 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6457         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6458
6459         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6460         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6461         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6462         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6463         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6464
6465         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6466         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6467                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6468         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6469         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6470         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6471         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6472                 channel_id: chan.2,
6473                 htlc_id: 0,
6474                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6475                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6476         };
6477
6478         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6479
6480         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6481         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6482         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6483         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6484         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6485 }
6486
6487 #[test]
6488 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6489         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6490
6491         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6492         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6493         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6494         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6495         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6496
6497         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6498
6499         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6500         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6501         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6502
6503         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6504         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6505         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6506                 match events[0] {
6507                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6508                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6509                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6510                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6511                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6512                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6513                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6514                         },
6515                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6516                 }
6517         };
6518
6519         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6520
6521         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6522
6523         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6524         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6525         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6526         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6527         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6528 }
6529
6530 #[test]
6531 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6532         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6533
6534         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6535         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6536         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6537         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6538         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6539
6540         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6541
6542         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6543         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6544         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6545
6546         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6547         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6548         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6549                 match events[0] {
6550                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6551                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6552                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6553                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6554                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6555                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6556                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6557                         },
6558                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6559                 }
6560         };
6561
6562         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6563
6564         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6565
6566         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6567         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6568         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6569         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6570         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6571 }
6572
6573 #[test]
6574 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6575         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6576
6577         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6578         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6579         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6580         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6581         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6582
6583         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6584         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6585                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6586         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6587
6588         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6589         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6590
6591         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6592         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6593         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6594
6595         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6596
6597         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6598                 match events[0] {
6599                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6600                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6601                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6602                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6603                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6604                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6605                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6606                         },
6607                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6608                 }
6609         };
6610         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6611         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6612
6613         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6614         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6615         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6616         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6617         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6618 }
6619
6620 #[test]
6621 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6622         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6623         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6624
6625         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6626         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6627         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6628         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6629         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6630         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6631
6632         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6633
6634         //First hop
6635         let mut payment_event = {
6636                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6637                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6638                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6639                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6640                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6641                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6642         };
6643         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6644         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6645         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6646         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6647         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6648         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6649         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6650         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6651         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6652
6653         //Second Hop
6654         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6655         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6656         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6657         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6658
6659         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6660         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6661         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6662                 match events_3[0] {
6663                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6664                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6665                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6666                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6667                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6668                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6669                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6670                         },
6671                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6672                 }
6673         };
6674
6675         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6676
6677         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6678         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6679         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6680         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6681         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6682
6683         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6684         match events_4[0] {
6685                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6686                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6687                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6688                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6689                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6690                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6691                 },
6692                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6693         };
6694
6695         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6696 }
6697
6698 #[test]
6699 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6700         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6701         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6702         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6703         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6704         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6705         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6706
6707         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6708
6709         // First hop
6710         let mut payment_event = {
6711                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6712                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6713                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6714                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6715         };
6716
6717         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6718         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6719         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6720         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6721         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6722         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6723
6724         // Second Hop
6725         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6726         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6727         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6728         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6729
6730         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6731         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6732         match events_3[0] {
6733                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6734                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6735                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6736                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6737
6738                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6739                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6740                 },
6741                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6742         }
6743
6744         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6745                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6746                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6747         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6748         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6749         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6750
6751         match events_4[0] {
6752                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6753                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6754                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6755                 },
6756                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6757         }
6758
6759         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6760         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6761
6762         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6763         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6764         match events_5[0] {
6765                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
6766                 } => {
6767                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6768                         assert!(is_permanent);
6769                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6770                 },
6771                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6772         }
6773         match events_5[1] {
6774                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6775                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6776                 },
6777                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6778         }
6779
6780         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6781 }
6782
6783 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6784         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6785         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6786         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6787
6788         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6789         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6790         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6791         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6792         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6793         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6794
6795         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6796                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6797
6798         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6799         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6800         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6801         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6802
6803         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6804         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6805
6806         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6807         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6808         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6809         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6810         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6811
6812         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6813         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6814         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6815         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6816
6817         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6818         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6819
6820         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6821         match events[0] {
6822                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6823                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6824                 },
6825                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6826         }
6827         match events[1] {
6828                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6829                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6830                 },
6831                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6832         }
6833
6834         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6835         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6836         if announce_latest {
6837                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6838         } else {
6839                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6840         }
6841
6842         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6843         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6844         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6845
6846         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6847         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6848         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6849         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6850         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
6851         let mut first_failed = false;
6852         for event in events {
6853                 match event {
6854                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6855                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6856                                         assert!(!first_failed);
6857                                         first_failed = true;
6858                                 } else {
6859                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6860                                 }
6861                         },
6862                         Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
6863                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6864                 }
6865         }
6866 }
6867
6868 #[test]
6869 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6870         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6871         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6872 }
6873
6874 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6875         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6876         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6877         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6878         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6879         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6880         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6881
6882         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6883         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6884         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6885         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6886         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6887
6888         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6889                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6890
6891         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6892         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6893
6894         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6895         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6896
6897         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6898         if revoked {
6899                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6900                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6901         }
6902
6903         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6904         if local {
6905                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6906                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6907                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6908                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6909                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6910
6911                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6912                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6913                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6914                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6915                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
6916                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6917                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6918                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6919                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6920                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6921                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6922         } else {
6923                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6924                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6925                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6926                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6927                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6928                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6929
6930                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6931                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6932                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6933                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6934                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6935                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6936                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6937
6938                 if !revoked {
6939                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6940                 } else {
6941                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 11);
6942                 }
6943                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6944                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6945                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6946                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6947                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6948         }
6949 }
6950
6951 #[test]
6952 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6953         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6954         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6955         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6956 }
6957
6958 #[test]
6959 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6960         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6961
6962         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6963         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6964         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6965         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6966         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6967         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6968         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6969         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6970         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6971
6972         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6973         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6974                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6975                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6976         {
6977                 match error {
6978                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6979                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6980                 }
6981         } else { assert!(false) }
6982
6983         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6984         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6985         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6986         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6987         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6988                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6989                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6990         {
6991                 match error {
6992                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
6993                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6994                 }
6995         } else { assert!(false); }
6996
6997         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6998         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6999         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7000         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7001         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7002         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
7003         let reason_msg;
7004         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7005                 match action {
7006                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7007                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7008                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7009                         },
7010                         _ => { panic!(); }
7011                 }
7012         } else { panic!(); }
7013         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7014
7015         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7016         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7017         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7018         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7019         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7020                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7021                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7022         {
7023                 match error {
7024                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7025                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7026                 }
7027         } else { assert!(false); }
7028 }
7029
7030 #[test]
7031 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7032         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7033         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7034         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7035
7036         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7037         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7038         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7039         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7040
7041         // Create some initial channels
7042         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7043
7044         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7045         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7046         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7047         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7048         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7049         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7050         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
7051                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7052         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7053
7054         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7055         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7056         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7057         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7058         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7059
7060         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7061         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7062         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7063         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7064
7065         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7066         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7067         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7068
7069         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7070         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7071         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7072                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7073                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7074                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7075                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7076                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7077                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7078                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7079                 },
7080                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7081         };
7082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7083
7084         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7085         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7086
7087         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7088         let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7089         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7090         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7091 }
7092
7093 #[test]
7094 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7095         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7096         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7097
7098         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7099         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7100         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7101         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7102
7103         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7104         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7105         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7106
7107         // Disconnect peers
7108         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7109         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7110
7111         for _ in 0..DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS + 1 {
7112                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7113         }
7114         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7115         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7116         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7117         for e in msg_events {
7118                 match e {
7119                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7120                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7121                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7122                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7123                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7124                                 }
7125                         },
7126                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7127                 }
7128         }
7129         // Reconnect peers
7130         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
7131         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7132         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7133         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
7134         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7135         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7136
7137         // Reestablish chan_1
7138         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7139         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7140         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7141         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7142         // Reestablish chan_2
7143         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7144         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7145         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7146         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7147         // Reestablish chan_3
7148         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7149         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7150         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7151         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7152
7153         for _ in 0..ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
7154                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7155         }
7156         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7157         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7158         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7159         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7160         for e in msg_events {
7161                 match e {
7162                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7163                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7164                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7165                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7166                                         // the old one.
7167                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7168                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7169                                 }
7170                         },
7171                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7172                 }
7173         }
7174         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7175         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7176 }
7177
7178 #[test]
7179 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7180         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7181         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7182
7183         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7184         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7185         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7186         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7187
7188         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7189
7190         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7191         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7192                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7193         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
7194         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7195
7196         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7197         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7198         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7199         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7200         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7201         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7202
7203         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7204         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7205                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7206                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7207                 }
7208         }
7209
7210         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7211         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7212
7213         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7214         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7215         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(header_114, 42, vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()]));
7216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7217
7218         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7219         let penalty_1;
7220         let feerate_1;
7221         {
7222                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7223                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7224                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7225                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7226                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7227                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7228                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7229                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7230                 node_txn.clear();
7231         };
7232
7233         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7234         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7235         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7236         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7237         {
7238                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7239                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7240                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7241                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7242                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7243                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7244                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7245                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7246                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7247                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7248                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7249                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7250                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7251                         node_txn.clear();
7252                 }
7253         }
7254         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7255
7256         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7257         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7258         let penalty_3;
7259         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7260         {
7261                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7262                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7263                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7264                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7265                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7266                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7267                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7268                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7269                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7270                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7271                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7272                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7273                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7274                         node_txn.clear();
7275                 }
7276         }
7277         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7278
7279         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7280         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7281 }
7282
7283 #[test]
7284 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7285         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7286         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7287
7288         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7289         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7290         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7291         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7292         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7293
7294         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7295         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7296         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7297         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7298         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7299         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7300                 3_000_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7301         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7302         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7303         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7304                 3_000_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7305         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7306
7307         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7308         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7309         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7310
7311         // Revoke local commitment tx
7312         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7313
7314         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7315         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]));
7316         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7317         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7318         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7319         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 50); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7320
7321         let revoked_htlc_txn = {
7322                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
7323                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7324
7325                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7326                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7327                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7328
7329                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7330                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7331                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7332                 check_spends!(txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7333
7334                 txn
7335         };
7336
7337         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7338         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7339         let block_11 = create_dummy_block(hash_128, 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]);
7340         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_11);
7341         let block_129 = create_dummy_block(block_11.block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()]);
7342         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_129);
7343         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7344         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7345         match events.last().unwrap() {
7346                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7347                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7348         }
7349         let first;
7350         let feerate_1;
7351         let penalty_txn;
7352         {
7353                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7354                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7355                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7356
7357                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7358                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7359                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7360                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7361                 // future).
7362                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7363                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7364                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7365                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7366                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7367                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7368
7369                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7370                 // available, which we check here:
7371                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7372                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7373                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7374
7375                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7376                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7377
7378                 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7379                 // output, checked above).
7380                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7381                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7382                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7383
7384                 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7385                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7386                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7387                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
7388                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7389                 node_txn.clear();
7390         }
7391
7392         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7393         let block_130 = create_dummy_block(block_129.block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn);
7394         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_130);
7395         let block_131 = create_dummy_block(block_130.block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
7396         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_131);
7397
7398         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7399         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7400         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7401         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7402         let node_txn = {
7403                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7404                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7405
7406                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7407                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7408                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7409                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7410                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7411                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7412                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7413                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7414                 node_txn.clear();
7415                 txn
7416         };
7417         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7418         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(header_144, 42, node_txn));
7419         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7420         {
7421                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7422                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7423                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7424                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7425                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7426                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7427                 // up bumped justice generation.
7428                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7429                 node_txn.clear();
7430         }
7431         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7432         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7433 }
7434
7435 #[test]
7436 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7437         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7438         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7439
7440         // Create 2 HTLCs
7441         // Provide preimage for one
7442         // Check aggregation
7443
7444         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7445         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7446         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7447         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7448
7449         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7450         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7451         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7452
7453         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7454         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7455         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7456         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7457         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7458
7459         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7460         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7461         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7462         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7463         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7464         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7465
7466         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7467         let timeout;
7468         let preimage;
7469         let preimage_bump;
7470         let feerate_timeout;
7471         let feerate_preimage;
7472         {
7473                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7474                 // 3 transactions including:
7475                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7476                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7477                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7478                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7479                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7480                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7481                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7482                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7483
7484                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7485                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7486                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7487                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7488
7489                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7490                         (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7491                 } else {
7492                         (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7493                 };
7494
7495                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7496                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7497                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7498
7499                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7500                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7501                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7502                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7503
7504                 node_txn.clear();
7505         };
7506         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7507         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7508
7509         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7510         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7511         {
7512                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7513                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7514                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7515                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7516                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7517                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7518
7519                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7520                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7521                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7522                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7523                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7524
7525                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7526                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7527                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7528                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7529                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7530
7531                 node_txn.clear();
7532         }
7533
7534         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7535         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7536 }
7537
7538 #[test]
7539 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7540         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7541         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7542         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7543         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7544         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7545         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7546         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7547         // implement that).
7548         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7549         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7550         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7551         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7552         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7553
7554         let per_commitment_secret;
7555         let next_per_commitment_point;
7556         {
7557                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7558                 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7559                 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7560
7561                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7562
7563                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7564                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7565                 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7566
7567                 // Must revoke without gaps
7568                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7569                 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7570
7571                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7572                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7573                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7574         }
7575
7576         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7577                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
7578                         channel_id,
7579                         per_commitment_secret,
7580                         next_per_commitment_point,
7581                         #[cfg(taproot)]
7582                         next_local_nonce: None,
7583                 });
7584         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7585         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7586         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7587 }
7588
7589 #[test]
7590 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7591         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7592         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7593
7594         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7595         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7596         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7597         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7598
7599         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7600         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7601         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7602         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7603
7604         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7605         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7606         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7607
7608         // Revoke local commitment tx
7609         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7610
7611         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7612         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7613         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7614         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7615
7616         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7617         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7618         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7619         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7620         let penalty_txn = {
7621                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7622                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7623                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7624                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7625                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7626                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7627                 node_txn.clear();
7628                 penalty_txn
7629         };
7630         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn));
7631         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7632         {
7633                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7634                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7635                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7636         }
7637 }
7638
7639 #[test]
7640 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7641         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7642         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7643         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7644         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7645         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7646         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7647
7648         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7649
7650         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7651         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7652         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7653         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7654         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7655
7656         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7657         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7658         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7659         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7660
7661         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7662         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7663         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7664         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7665         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7666         match close_ev[0] {
7667                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7668                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7669                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7670                 },
7671                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7672         }
7673 }
7674
7675 #[test]
7676 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7677         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7678         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7679         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7680         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7681
7682         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7683         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7684         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7685
7686         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7687
7688         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7689         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7690         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7691         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7692 }
7693
7694 #[test]
7695 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7696         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7697         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7698         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7699         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7700         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7701         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7702
7703         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7704         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7705         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7706
7707         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7708         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7709         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7710 }
7711
7712 #[test]
7713 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7714         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7715         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7716         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7717         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7718         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7719
7720         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7721         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7722         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7723         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7724         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7725         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7726         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7727         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7728         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7729         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7730         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7731         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7732
7733         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7734         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7735         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7736         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7737
7738         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7739         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7740         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7741         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7742         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7743
7744         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7745         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7746
7747         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7748         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7749         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7750         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7751         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7752         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7753
7754         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7755         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7756         // `channel_value`.
7757         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7758         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7759         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7760         // `channel_value`.
7761         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7762 }
7763
7764 #[test]
7765 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7766         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7767         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7768         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7769         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7770         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7771         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7772
7773         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7774         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7775
7776         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7777
7778         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7779         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7780         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7781
7782         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7783         match events[0] {
7784                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7785                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7786                 }
7787                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7788         }
7789
7790         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7791         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7792
7793         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7794                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7795                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7796                 }
7797                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7798         }
7799
7800         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7801
7802         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7803         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7804
7805         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7806         match events[0] {
7807                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7808                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7809                 }
7810                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7811         }
7812 }
7813
7814 #[test]
7815 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7816         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7817         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7818         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7819         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7820         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7821         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7822
7823         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7824         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7825
7826         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7827
7828         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7829         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7830         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7831
7832         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7833         match events[0] {
7834                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7835                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7836                 }
7837                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7838         }
7839
7840         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7841         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7842
7843         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7844                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7845                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7846                 }
7847                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7848         }
7849         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7850 }
7851
7852 #[test]
7853 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7854         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7855         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7856         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7857         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7858         // and the channel should be closed.
7859         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7860         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7861         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7862         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7863         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7864         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7865
7866         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7867         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7868         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7869
7870         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7871
7872         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7873         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7874
7875         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7876         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7877
7878         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7879         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7880         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7881         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7882         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7883         let accept_chan_msg = {
7884                 let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
7885                 let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
7886                 let channel =  get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
7887                 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7888         };
7889         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
7890
7891         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7892
7893         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7894         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7895
7896         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7897         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7898
7899         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7900         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7901
7902         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7903         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7904                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7905                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7906                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7907                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7908                 }
7909                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7910         }
7911
7912         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7913 }
7914
7915 #[test]
7916 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7917         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7918         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7919         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7920         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7921         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7922         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7923
7924         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7925         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7926
7927         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7928
7929         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7930         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7931         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7932
7933         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7934         match events[0] {
7935                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7936                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7937                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7938                         match api_res {
7939                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7940                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7941                                 },
7942                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7943                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7944                         }
7945                 }
7946                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7947         }
7948
7949         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7950         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7951         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7952
7953         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7954                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7955                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7956                 }
7957                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7958         }
7959 }
7960
7961 #[test]
7962 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7963         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7964         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7965         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7966         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7967
7968         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7969         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7970         match api_res {
7971                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
7972                         assert_eq!(err, format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(unknown_channel_id), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7973                 },
7974                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7975                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7976         }
7977 }
7978
7979 #[test]
7980 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
7981         // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
7982         // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
7983         // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
7984         // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
7985         // a PaymentClaimable event too early
7986         let node_count = 4;
7987         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
7988         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
7989         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
7990         let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7991
7992         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7993         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7994         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7995         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7996
7997         let total_msat = 100_000;
7998         let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
7999         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
8000         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8001
8002         let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
8003         path_1.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8004         path_1.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8005         path_1.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8006         path_1.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8007         path_1.hops[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
8008         route.paths.push(path_1);
8009
8010         let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
8011         path_2.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8012         path_2.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8013         path_2.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8014         path_2.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8015         path_2.hops[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
8016         route.paths.push(path_2);
8017
8018         // Send payment
8019         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8020         let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8021                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8022         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8023                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8024         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
8025
8026         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8027         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8028
8029         // First path
8030         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8031         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8032         let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
8033
8034         for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
8035                 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
8036
8037                 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8038                         let session_priv = [3; 32];
8039                         let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8040                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8041                         let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8042                         let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000,
8043                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8044                         // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8045                         // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8046                         onion_payloads[1].amt_to_forward = 99_000;
8047                         let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8048                         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8049                 }
8050
8051                 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8052                 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8053                 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8054                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8055
8056                 if idx == 0 {
8057                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8058                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8059                         check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8060                         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8061                         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8062                 } else {
8063                         let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8064                         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8065                 }
8066
8067                 prev_node = node;
8068         }
8069
8070         // Second path
8071         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8072         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8073
8074         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8075 }
8076
8077 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8078
8079         let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8080         let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8081
8082         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8083         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8084         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8085         let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8086
8087         let src_idx = 0;
8088         let dst_idx = 1;
8089
8090         // Create channels for each amount
8091         let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8092         let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8093         let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8094         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8095                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8096                 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8097                 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8098                 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8099                 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8100                 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8101                 expected_paths.push(path);
8102         }
8103         let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8104
8105         // Create a route for each amount
8106         let example_amount = 100000;
8107         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8108         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8109         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8110                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8111                 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8112                 path.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8113                 path.hops[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8114                 path.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8115                 path.hops[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8116                 path.hops[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8117                 route.paths.push(path);
8118         }
8119
8120         // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8121         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8122         let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8123                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8124         nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8125                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8126         check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8127
8128         let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8129         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8130         let mut amount_received = 0;
8131         for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8132                 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8133
8134                 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8135                 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8136                 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8137                 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8138         }
8139
8140         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8141 }
8142
8143 #[test]
8144 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8145         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8146         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8147 }
8148
8149 #[test]
8150 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8151         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8152         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8153         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8154         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8155         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8156
8157         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8158         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8159         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8160         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8161
8162         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8163         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8164         route.paths.push(path);
8165         route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8166         route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8167         route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8168         route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8169         route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8170         route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8171         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8172         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8173 }
8174
8175 #[test]
8176 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8177         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8178         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8179         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8180         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8181         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8182
8183         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8184
8185         {
8186                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8187                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8188                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8189                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8190                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8191                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8192                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8193                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8194                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8195         }
8196         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8197         // values from previous calls.
8198         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8199         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8200         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8201         match events[0] {
8202                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8203                         match &purpose {
8204                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8205                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8206                                 },
8207                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8208                         }
8209                 },
8210                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8211         }
8212 }
8213
8214 #[test]
8215 #[allow(deprecated)]
8216 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8217         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8218         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8219         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8220         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8221         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8222         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8223
8224         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8225
8226         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8227
8228         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8229         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8230         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8231                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8232         } else { panic!(); }
8233         let mut block = {
8234                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8235                 create_dummy_block(node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(), node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, Vec::new())
8236         };
8237         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8238         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8239                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8240         } else { panic!(); }
8241
8242         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8243         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8244         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8245         block.header.time += 1;
8246         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8247         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8248         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8249
8250         {
8251                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8252                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8253                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8254                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8255                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8256                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8257                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8258                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8259         }
8260         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8261         // values from previous calls.
8262         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8263         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8264         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8265         match events[0] {
8266                 Event::PaymentClaimable { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8267                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8268                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8269                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8270                 },
8271                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8272         }
8273 }
8274
8275 #[test]
8276 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8277         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8278         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8279         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8280         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8281         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8282
8283         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8284
8285         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8286         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8287         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8288         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8289
8290         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8291         // resulting events.
8292         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8293                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8294                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8295                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8296                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8297                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8298                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8299
8300                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8301                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8302                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8303                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8304                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8305
8306                         // We should fail the payment back
8307                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8308                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8309                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8310                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8311                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8312                                 },
8313                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8314                         }
8315                 }
8316         }
8317
8318         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8319         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8320         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8321
8322         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8323         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
8324                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8325         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8326         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8327
8328         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8329         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8330                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8331         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8332         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8333
8334         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8335         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8336                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8337         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8338         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8339 }
8340
8341 #[test]
8342 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8343         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8344         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8345         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8346         // error.
8347         //
8348         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8349         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8350         // commitment at same time.
8351
8352         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8353         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8354         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8355         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8356
8357         // Create some initial channel
8358         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8359         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8360
8361         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8362         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8363
8364         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8365         let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8366
8367         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8368         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8369         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8370         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8371         let watchtower = {
8372                 let new_monitor = {
8373                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8374                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8375                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8376                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8377                         new_monitor
8378                 };
8379                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8380                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8381                 watchtower
8382         };
8383         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8384         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8385         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8386         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 200));
8387         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8388
8389         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8390         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8391         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8392         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8393
8394         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8395         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8396         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8397         {
8398                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8399                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8400                 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8401                 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8402                         assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8403                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8404                 } else { assert!(false); }
8405         }
8406         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8407         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8408         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8409         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8410 }
8411
8412 #[test]
8413 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8414         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8415         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8416         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8417         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8418
8419         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8420         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8421         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8422         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8423
8424         // Create some initial channel
8425         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8426         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8427
8428         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8429         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8430
8431         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8432         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8433
8434         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8435         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8436         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8437         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8438         let alice_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(
8439                 Arc::new(Mutex::new(nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().clone())),
8440         );
8441         let watchtower_alice = {
8442                 let new_monitor = {
8443                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8444                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8445                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8446                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8447                         new_monitor
8448                 };
8449                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &alice_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8450                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8451                 watchtower
8452         };
8453         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8454         // Make Alice aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating transaction lock time
8455         // requirements here.
8456         const HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST: u32 = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8457         alice_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST) as usize, (block.clone(), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST));
8458         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8459
8460         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8461         let alice_state = {
8462                 let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8463                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8464                 txn.remove(0)
8465         };
8466
8467         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8468         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8469         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8470         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8471         let bob_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&alice_broadcaster.blocks));
8472         let watchtower_bob = {
8473                 let new_monitor = {
8474                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8475                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8476                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8477                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8478                         new_monitor
8479                 };
8480                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &bob_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8481                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8482                 watchtower
8483         };
8484         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST - 1);
8485
8486         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8487         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8488         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8489                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8490         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8491
8492         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8493         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8494         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8495         {
8496                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8497                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8498                 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8499                 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8500                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8501                         assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8502                         assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8503                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8504                 } else { assert!(false); }
8505         }
8506         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8507         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8508
8509         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8510         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8511
8512         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8513         let bob_state_y;
8514         {
8515                 let mut txn = bob_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8516                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8517                 bob_state_y = txn.remove(0);
8518         };
8519
8520         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8521         let height = HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST + 1;
8522         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
8523         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
8524         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false);
8525         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, vec![bob_state_y.clone()]), height);
8526         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
8527         {
8528                 let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8529                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8530                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8531                 // Alice doesn't clean up the old HTLC claim since it hasn't seen a conflicting spend for
8532                 // it. However, she should, because it now has an invalid parent.
8533                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], alice_state);
8534         }
8535 }
8536
8537 #[test]
8538 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8539         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8540         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8541         // message).
8542         //
8543         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8544         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8545         //
8546         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8547         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8548         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8549         // before receiving funding_signed.
8550         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8551         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8552         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8553         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8554
8555         // Create an initial channel
8556         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8557         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8558         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8559         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8560         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8561
8562         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8563         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8564
8565         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8566         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8567
8568         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8569         let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8570         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8571         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8572         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true);
8573 }
8574
8575 #[test]
8576 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8577         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8578         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8579         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8580         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8581         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8582         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8583
8584         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8585         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8586         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8587         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8588
8589         // Create some initial channels
8590         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8591
8592         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8593         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8594         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8595         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8596         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8597         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8598
8599         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8600         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![local_txn[0].clone()]);
8601         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
8602         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8603         // this test before #653 fix.
8604         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &block, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8605         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8606         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8607         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8608         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
8609
8610         let htlc_timeout = {
8611                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8612                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8613                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8614                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8615                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8616                 node_txn[0].clone()
8617         };
8618
8619         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![htlc_timeout.clone()]));
8620         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8621         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8622 }
8623
8624 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8625         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8626         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8627         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8628         //
8629         // Steps of the test:
8630         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8631         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8632         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8633         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8634         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8635         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8636         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8637         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8638         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8639         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8640         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8641         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8642
8643         // Create some initial channels
8644         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8645         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8646
8647         // Steps (1) and (2):
8648         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8649         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8650
8651         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8652         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8653         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8654         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8655         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8656         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8657         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8658
8659         // Steps (3) and (4):
8660         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8661         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8662         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8663         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8664
8665         // Bob force-closes
8666         if !broadcast_alice {
8667                 force_closing_node = 1;
8668                 counterparty_node = 0;
8669         }
8670         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8671         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8672         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8673         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8674         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8675                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8676                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8677                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8678                 };
8679                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8680                 if broadcast_alice {
8681                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8682                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8683                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8684                 }
8685         }
8686
8687         // Step (5):
8688         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8689         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8690         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8691         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8692         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8693
8694         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8695         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8696         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8697         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8698         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8699         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8700
8701         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8702         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8703         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8704         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8705                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8706                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8707                 match events[0] {
8708                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8709                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8710                         },
8711                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8712                 };
8713         }
8714         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8715         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8716         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8717         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8718
8719         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8720         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8721         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8722                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8723                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8724                         (*msg).clone()
8725                 },
8726                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8727         };
8728         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8729                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8730                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8731                         (*updates).clone()
8732                 },
8733                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8734         };
8735
8736         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8737         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8738         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8739         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8740
8741         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8742         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8743         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8744                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8745                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8746                         (*msg).clone()
8747                 },
8748                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8749         };
8750         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8751         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8752
8753         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8754         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8755         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8756         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8757         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8758                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8759                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8760                 if broadcast_alice {
8761                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8762                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8763                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8764                 }
8765                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8766                 if broadcast_alice {
8767                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8768                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8769                 } else {
8770                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8771                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8772                 }
8773         }
8774
8775         // Step (6):
8776         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8777         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8778         {
8779                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8780                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8781                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8782                 };
8783                 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8784                 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8785                 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8786                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8787                 if broadcast_alice {
8788                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8789                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8790                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8791                 } else {
8792                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8793                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8794                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8795                 }
8796         }
8797 }
8798
8799 #[test]
8800 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8801         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8802         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8803         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8804         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8805 }
8806
8807 #[test]
8808 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8809         // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8810         // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8811         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8812         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8813         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8814         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8815
8816         // Create an first channel channel
8817         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8818         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8819
8820         // Create an second channel
8821         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
8822         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8823
8824         // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8825         // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8826         open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8827
8828         // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8829         // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8830         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8831         {
8832                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8833                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8834                 match &events[0] {
8835                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8836                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8837                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8838                         },
8839                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8840                 }
8841         }
8842
8843         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8844         {
8845                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8846                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8847                 match &events[0] {
8848                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8849                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8850                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8851                         },
8852                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8853                 }
8854         }
8855 }
8856
8857 #[test]
8858 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8859         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8860         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8861         //
8862         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8863         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8864         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8865         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8866         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8867         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8868         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8869         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8870
8871         // Create an initial channel
8872         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8873         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8874         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8875         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8876
8877         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8878         // that it is rejected.
8879         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8880         {
8881                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8882                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8883                 match events[0] {
8884                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8885                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8886                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8887                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8888                                 // move forward with it.
8889                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8890                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8891                         },
8892                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8893                 }
8894         }
8895
8896         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8897         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8898
8899         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8900         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8901
8902         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8903         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8904         {
8905                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8906                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8907                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8908                 added_monitors.clear();
8909         }
8910         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8911
8912         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8913
8914         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8915         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8916
8917         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8918         // temporary one).
8919
8920         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8921         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8922         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8923         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8924         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8925         {
8926                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8927                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8928                 match events[0] {
8929                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8930                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8931                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8932                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8933                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8934                         },
8935                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8936                 }
8937         }
8938
8939         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8940         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8941         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8942         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8943         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8944         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8945
8946         let funding_created = {
8947                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8948                 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8949                 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8950                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8951                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8952                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8953                 let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8954                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8955                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8956         };
8957         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8958         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8959         // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
8960         // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
8961         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8962
8963         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8964         {
8965                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8966                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8967                 match events[0] {
8968                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8969                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8970                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8971                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8972                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8973                         },
8974                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8975                 }
8976         }
8977
8978         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8979         // everything is functional.
8980         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8981         {
8982                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8983                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8984                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8985                 added_monitors.clear();
8986         }
8987         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8988
8989         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8990         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8991         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8992         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8993
8994         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8995         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8996         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8997
8998         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8999 }
9000
9001 #[test]
9002 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9003         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9004         //
9005         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9006         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9007         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9008         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9009         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9010         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9011         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9012
9013         // Create some initial channels
9014         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9015         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9016         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
9017
9018         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9019         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9020         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9021
9022         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9023         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9024         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9025
9026         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9027         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9028         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9029         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9030         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
9031         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9032         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9033         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9034         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9035
9036         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9037         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9038         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9039         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9040         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
9041         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9042         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9043         match events[0] {
9044                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9045                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9046                 },
9047                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9048         }
9049         match events[1] {
9050                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9051                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9052                 },
9053                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9054         }
9055         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9056         // peer_disconnected.
9057         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9058         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9059
9060         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9061         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9062         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9063 }
9064
9065 #[test]
9066 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9067         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9068         //
9069         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9070         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9071         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9072         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9073         //
9074         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9075         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9076         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9077         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9078         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9079         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9080         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9081
9082         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9083         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9084         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9085
9086         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9087
9088         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9089         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9090         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9091         // its length.
9092         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9093         let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
9094         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9095                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9096                 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9097         }
9098
9099         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9100         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9101         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9102         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9103
9104         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9105         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9106         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9107
9108         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9109         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9110
9111         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9112         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9113         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9114
9115         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9116         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9117         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9118         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9119         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9120         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9121         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9122                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9123                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9124                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9125                 } else { panic!(); }
9126         } else { panic!(); }
9127         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9128
9129         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9130         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9131         // as its not 32 bytes long.
9132         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9133                 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9134                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9135                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9136                                 txid: tx.txid(),
9137                                 vout: idx as u32,
9138                         },
9139                         script_sig: Script::new(),
9140                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9141                         witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9142                 }).collect(),
9143                 output: vec![TxOut {
9144                         value: 1000,
9145                         script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9146                 }]
9147         };
9148         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9149         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9150 }
9151
9152 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9153         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9154         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9155         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9156         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9157         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9158         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9159         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9160         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9161         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9162         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9163         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9164         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9165         // until we learned about an additional block.
9166         //
9167         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9168         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9169         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9170         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9171         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9172         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9173         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9174
9175         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9176         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9177         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9178         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9179         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9180
9181         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9182         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9183         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9184         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9185         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9186         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9187
9188         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9189         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9190                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9191         }
9192         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9193                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9194         if test_height_before_timelock {
9195                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9196                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9197                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9198                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9199         } else {
9200                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9201                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9202                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9203                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[0].txid());
9204                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9205                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9206                 // timelock is up).
9207                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9208                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9209
9210                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9211                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9212                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9213                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9214                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9215                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9216                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9217
9218                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9219                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9220                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9221                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9222                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9223                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9224                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9225                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9226                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9227         }
9228 }
9229
9230 #[test]
9231 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9232         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9233         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9234 }
9235
9236 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9237         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9238         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9239         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9240         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9241
9242         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9243
9244         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9245                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9246         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();
9247
9248         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9249
9250         {
9251                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9252                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9253                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9254                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9255                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9256                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9257                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9258                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9259         }
9260         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9261         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9262
9263         {
9264                 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9265                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9266                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9267                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9268                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9269                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9270                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9271                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9272                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9273                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9274                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9275                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9276                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9277         }
9278
9279         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9280         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9281
9282         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9283                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9284                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9285
9286                 let expected_destinations = vec![
9287                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9288                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9289                 ];
9290                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
9291                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9292
9293                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9294                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9295                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9296
9297                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9298                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9299                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9300
9301                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9302                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9303                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9304                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9305                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9306                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9307         } else {
9308                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9309                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9310                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9311
9312                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9313                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9314                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9315                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9316
9317                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9318
9319                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9320         }
9321 }
9322
9323 #[test]
9324 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9325         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9326         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9327         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9328         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9329         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9330 }
9331
9332 #[test]
9333 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9334         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9335         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9336         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9337 }
9338
9339 #[test]
9340 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9341         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9342         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9343         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9344         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9345         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9346         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9347
9348         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9349         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9350         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9351         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9352
9353         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9354                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9355         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
9356         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9357         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9358                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9359                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9360                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9361         });
9362
9363         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9364
9365         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9366         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9367
9368         let session_privs = {
9369                 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9370                 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9371                 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9372                 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9373                 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9374                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9375         };
9376         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9377                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9378                 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9379         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9380
9381         {
9382                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9383                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9384                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9385         }
9386         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9387
9388         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9389                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9390         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9391
9392         {
9393                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9394                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9395                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9396
9397                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9398                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9399
9400                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9401                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9402
9403                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9404                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9405                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9406
9407                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9408                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9409                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9410
9411                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9412                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9413                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9414         }
9415         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9416         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9417         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9418         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9419
9420         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9421
9422         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9423         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9424         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9425
9426         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9427         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9428
9429         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9430         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9431         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9432
9433         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9434
9435         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9436                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9437                 &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9438         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9439
9440         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9441         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9442         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9443
9444         do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9445         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, Some(None), true);
9446 }
9447
9448 #[test]
9449 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9450         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9451         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9452         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9453         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9454
9455         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9456         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9457         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9458         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9459         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9460                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9461                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9462         };
9463         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9464         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9465         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9466
9467         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9468         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage),
9469                 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9470         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9471         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9472         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9473         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9474         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9475         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9476         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9477 }
9478
9479 #[test]
9480 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9481         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9482         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9483         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9484         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9485
9486         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9487         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9488
9489         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9490         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9491                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9492                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9493         };
9494         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9495         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9496         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9497         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9498         let route = find_route(
9499                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9500                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9501         ).unwrap();
9502
9503         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9504         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage),
9505                 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9506         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9507         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9508         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9509         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9510         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9511         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9512         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9513 }
9514
9515 #[test]
9516 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9517         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9518         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9519         // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9520         // amount.
9521         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9522         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9523         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9524         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9525
9526         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9527         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9528         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9529         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9530
9531         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9532         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9533         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9534                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9535                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9536                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9537         });
9538
9539         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9540         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9541         // amount of time to respond to.
9542
9543         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9544         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9545         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9546
9547         let failed_destinations = vec![
9548                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9549                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9550         ];
9551         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9552
9553         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash, PaymentFailureReason::RecipientRejected);
9554
9555         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9556         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9557                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9558         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9559
9560         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9561         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9562         let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9563         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9564
9565         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9566         // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9567         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9568         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9569         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9570 }
9571
9572 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9573 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9574 enum ExposureEvent {
9575         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9576         AtHTLCForward,
9577         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9578         AtHTLCReception,
9579         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9580         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9581 }
9582
9583 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9584         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9585         // policy.
9586         //
9587         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9588         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9589         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9590         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9591         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9592         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9593         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9594         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9595
9596         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9597         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9598         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9599         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9600         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9601         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9602
9603         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9604         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9605         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9606         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9607         if on_holder_tx {
9608                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9609         }
9610         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9611         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9612         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9613
9614         let opt_anchors = false;
9615
9616         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9617
9618         if on_holder_tx {
9619                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9620                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9621                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
9622                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9623         }
9624
9625         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9626         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9627         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9628         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9629
9630         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9631         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9632         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9633
9634         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9635         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9636         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9637
9638         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
9639         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
9640                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
9641
9642         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9643                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9644                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9645                 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9646                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9647         };
9648         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9649         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9650
9651         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9652         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9653
9654         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 4;
9655         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9656
9657         if on_holder_tx {
9658                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9659                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9660                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9661                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9662                         for _ in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9663                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9664                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9665                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9666                         }
9667                 } else {
9668                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9669                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9670                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9671                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9672                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9673                         }
9674                 }
9675         } else {
9676                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9677                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9678                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9679                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9680                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9681                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9682                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9683                         }
9684                 } else {
9685                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9686                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9687                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9688                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9689                         }
9690                 }
9691         }
9692
9693         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9694                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat =
9695                         if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 };
9696                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9697                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9698                 if on_holder_tx {
9699                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9700                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9701                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9702                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9703                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
9704                                 assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9705                 } else {
9706                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9707                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9708                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
9709                                 assert_eq!(err,
9710                                         &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
9711                                                 dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1) + dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1,
9712                                                 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9713                 }
9714         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9715                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 });
9716                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9717                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9718                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9719                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9720                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9721                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9722                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9723                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9724                 if on_holder_tx {
9725                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9726                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9727                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9728                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9729                 } else {
9730                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9731                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
9732                                 format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
9733                                         dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1) + dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1,
9734                                         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9735                 }
9736         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9737                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = 2_500_000;
9738                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9739                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9740                 {
9741                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9742                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9743                 }
9744                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9745                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9746                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
9747         }
9748
9749         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9750         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9751         added_monitors.clear();
9752 }
9753
9754 #[test]
9755 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9756         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9757         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9758         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9759         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9760         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9761         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9762         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9763         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9764         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9765         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9766         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9767         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9768 }
9769
9770 #[test]
9771 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9772         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9773         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9774         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9775         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9776
9777         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9778         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9779         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
9780         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9781         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
9782
9783         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9784
9785         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9786         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9787         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9788         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9789         let mut tx = match events[0] {
9790                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9791                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
9792                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 2), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9793                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9794                         }]}
9795                 },
9796                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9797         };
9798         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9799         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9800                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9801                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9802                 },
9803                 _ => panic!()
9804         }
9805
9806         // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
9807         tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9808         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9809         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9810 }
9811
9812 #[test]
9813 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9814         // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9815         // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9816         // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9817         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9818         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9819         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9820         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9821
9822         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9823
9824         // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9825         {
9826                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9827                 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9828         }
9829
9830         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9831         {
9832                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9833                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9834         }
9835         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9836         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9837
9838         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9839         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9840         match events[0] {
9841                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9842                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9843                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9844                 },
9845                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9846         };
9847
9848         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9849         // it.
9850         {
9851                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9852                 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9853         }
9854         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9855         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9856
9857         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9858         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9859         match events[0] {
9860                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9861                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9862                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9863                 },
9864                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9865         };
9866
9867         // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9868         // channel.
9869         {
9870                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9871                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9872         }
9873         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9874         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9875
9876         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9877         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9878         match events[0] {
9879                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9880                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9881                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9882                                 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() });
9883                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9884                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9885                 },
9886                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9887         };
9888 }
9889
9890 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
9891         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9892         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9893         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9894         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9895         let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
9896         let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
9897                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
9898         let recv_value = 100_000;
9899
9900         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9901
9902         let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
9903         let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
9904                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
9905                         Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
9906                 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
9907         } else {
9908                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
9909                 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
9910         };
9911         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value).unwrap();
9912         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9913                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9914         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9915         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9916         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9917         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9918         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9919         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9920         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9921
9922         if valid_delta {
9923                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
9924                         None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9925
9926                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9927         } else {
9928                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9929
9930                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9931
9932                 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9933                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9934                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9935
9936                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9937         }
9938 }
9939
9940 #[test]
9941 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
9942         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
9943         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
9944         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
9945         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
9946 }