1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, EntropySource, KeysInterface};
21 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
22 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
23 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
24 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
26 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
27 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
28 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
31 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
32 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
33 use crate::util::test_utils;
34 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
54 use crate::prelude::*;
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use core::iter::repeat;
58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
59 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
66 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
67 use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
68 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
69 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
70 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
71 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
72 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
73 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
75 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
77 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
78 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
79 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
81 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
82 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
84 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
85 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
87 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
88 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
89 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
90 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
91 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
92 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
93 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
94 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
96 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
97 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
99 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
101 } else { assert!(false); }
104 use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
106 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
107 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
112 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
116 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
118 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
120 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
122 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
127 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
129 use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
130 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
131 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
132 node_cfgs[1].features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_wumbo();
133 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
134 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
136 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
137 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
138 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
145 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
146 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
147 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
148 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
149 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
150 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
151 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
152 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
153 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
155 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
156 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
157 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
158 let opt_anchors = false;
159 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
160 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
162 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
163 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
164 if !send_from_initiator {
165 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
166 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
168 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
170 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
171 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
172 if send_from_initiator {
173 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
174 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
176 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
178 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
179 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
180 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
181 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
182 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
183 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
184 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
187 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
188 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
189 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
191 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
192 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
193 if send_from_initiator {
194 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
195 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
196 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
197 // well as an additional HTLC.
198 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
200 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
205 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
206 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
207 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
211 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
212 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
213 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
214 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
215 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
219 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
223 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
224 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
225 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
226 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
227 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
228 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
229 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
230 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
231 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
232 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
234 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
236 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
238 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
240 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
243 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
246 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
247 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
248 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
249 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
250 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
252 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
255 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
257 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
258 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
259 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
262 let payment_event = {
263 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
264 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
265 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
267 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
268 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
270 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
271 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
272 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
273 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
274 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
277 // deliver(1), generate (3):
278 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
279 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
280 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
283 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
284 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
285 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
286 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
287 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
288 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
289 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
292 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
293 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
294 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
295 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
296 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
297 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
298 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
301 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
302 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
303 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
306 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
307 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
310 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
313 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
314 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
316 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
317 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
320 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
325 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
326 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
327 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
328 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
329 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
330 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
331 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
332 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
335 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
337 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
339 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
342 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
345 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
346 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
347 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
348 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
351 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
354 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
356 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
357 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
358 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
361 let payment_event = {
362 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
363 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
364 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
366 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
367 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
369 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
370 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
371 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
372 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
373 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
376 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
379 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
383 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
384 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
385 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
386 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
387 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
388 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
391 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
392 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
393 // update_fee (never committed) ->
395 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
396 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
397 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
398 // <- (1) RAA delivered
399 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
400 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
401 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
402 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
404 // B should send no response here
405 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
406 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
409 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
412 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
413 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
414 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
416 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
419 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
420 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
421 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
422 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
423 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
425 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
428 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
429 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
430 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
431 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
434 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
437 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
438 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
440 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
441 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
442 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
444 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
445 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
446 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
447 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
450 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
452 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
454 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
456 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
457 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
458 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
460 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
461 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
462 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
463 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
464 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
465 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
466 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
468 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
469 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
470 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
472 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
474 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
475 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
479 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
480 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
483 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
484 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
487 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
488 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
489 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
492 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
493 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
497 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
498 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
499 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
500 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
503 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
504 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
505 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
506 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
508 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
510 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
513 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
514 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
517 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
518 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
519 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
521 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
522 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
523 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
525 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
526 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
528 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
530 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
531 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
533 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
535 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
536 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
538 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
539 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
540 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
541 added_monitors.clear();
543 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
545 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
546 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
548 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
549 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
550 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
551 added_monitors.clear();
554 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
555 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
557 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
558 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
560 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
561 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
562 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
563 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
564 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
568 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
569 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
570 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
571 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
572 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
573 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
576 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
583 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
584 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
585 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
586 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
590 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
591 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
592 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
593 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
594 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
595 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
598 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
601 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
604 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
605 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
606 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
607 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
608 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
610 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
612 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
614 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
615 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
618 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
619 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
622 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
623 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
624 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
627 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
628 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
633 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
634 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
635 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
636 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
637 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
638 let channel_value = 5000;
640 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
641 let channel_id = chan.2;
642 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
643 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
644 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
646 let opt_anchors = false;
648 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
649 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
650 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
652 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
653 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
655 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
656 *feerate_lock = feerate;
658 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
659 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
660 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
662 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
664 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
666 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
668 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
670 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
671 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
672 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
673 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
674 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
675 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
679 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
680 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
683 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
684 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
687 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
689 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
690 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
691 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
692 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
693 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
694 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
695 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
696 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
697 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
698 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
700 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
701 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
702 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
703 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
704 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
705 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
706 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
707 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
708 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
711 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
712 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
713 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
716 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
717 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
718 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
719 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
720 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
721 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
722 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
724 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
725 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
726 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
727 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
729 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
731 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
734 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
737 htlc_signatures: res.1
740 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
742 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
745 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
747 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
748 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
749 //Should produce and error.
750 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
751 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
753 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
754 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
758 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
759 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
760 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
761 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
762 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
763 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
766 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
769 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
772 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
775 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
776 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
777 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
778 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
779 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
781 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
783 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
784 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
785 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
788 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
790 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
791 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
793 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
794 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
795 added_monitors.clear();
797 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
798 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
799 // node[1] has nothing to do
801 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
802 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
805 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
806 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
807 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
808 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
809 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
811 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
813 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
814 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
815 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
816 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
817 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
818 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
820 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
821 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
823 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
825 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
827 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
829 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
831 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
832 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
834 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
836 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
838 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
840 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
841 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
843 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
844 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
847 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
849 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
850 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
851 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
852 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
853 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
857 fn test_update_fee() {
858 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
859 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
860 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
861 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
862 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
863 let channel_id = chan.2;
866 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
867 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
868 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
869 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
870 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
871 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
872 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
873 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
874 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
875 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
876 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
879 // Create and deliver (1)...
882 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
883 feerate = *feerate_lock;
884 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
886 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
889 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
890 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
891 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
892 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
893 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
895 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
897 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
899 // Generate (2) and (3):
900 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
901 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
905 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
906 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
909 // Create and deliver (4)...
911 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
912 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
914 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
916 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
917 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
918 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
919 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
920 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
922 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
925 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
926 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
929 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
930 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
932 // Handle (3), creating (6):
933 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
935 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
936 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
939 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
940 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
943 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
944 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
945 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
946 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
947 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
948 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
949 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
950 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
954 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
956 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
957 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
959 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
961 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
963 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
964 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
965 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
966 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
967 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
971 fn fake_network_test() {
972 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
973 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
974 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
975 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
976 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
977 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
979 // Create some initial channels
980 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
981 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
982 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
984 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
985 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
986 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
987 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
988 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
990 // Send some more payments
991 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
992 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
993 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
995 // Test failure packets
996 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
997 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
999 // Add a new channel that skips 3
1000 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1002 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1003 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1004 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1005 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1006 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1007 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1008 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1010 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1011 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1012 hops.push(RouteHop {
1013 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1014 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1015 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1016 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1018 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1020 hops.push(RouteHop {
1021 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1022 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1023 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1024 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1026 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1028 hops.push(RouteHop {
1029 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1030 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1031 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1032 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1034 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1036 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1037 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1038 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1040 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1041 hops.push(RouteHop {
1042 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1043 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1044 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1045 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1047 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1049 hops.push(RouteHop {
1050 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1051 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1052 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1053 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1055 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1057 hops.push(RouteHop {
1058 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1059 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1060 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1061 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1063 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1065 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1066 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1067 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1069 // Claim the rebalances...
1070 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1071 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1073 // Close down the channels...
1074 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1075 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1076 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1077 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1078 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1079 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1080 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1081 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1082 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1083 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1084 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1089 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1090 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1091 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1092 // commitment dance rounds.
1093 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1094 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1095 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1096 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1097 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1098 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1100 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1101 for _ in 0..crate::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1102 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1103 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1104 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1108 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1109 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1110 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1111 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1113 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1114 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1116 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1118 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1119 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1120 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1121 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1124 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1125 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1127 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1131 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1132 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1133 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1134 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1136 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1137 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1138 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1139 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1140 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1141 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1144 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1145 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1146 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1148 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1150 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1151 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1152 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1155 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1156 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1158 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1160 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1162 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1164 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1165 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1167 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1169 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1171 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1173 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1175 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1177 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1179 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1182 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1184 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1185 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1186 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1188 &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1189 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1191 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1195 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1196 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1199 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1203 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1204 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1205 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1206 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1207 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1208 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1209 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1211 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1212 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1213 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1214 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1215 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1218 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1220 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1221 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1223 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1224 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1226 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1227 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1228 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1232 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1233 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1234 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1235 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1236 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1237 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1238 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1239 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1241 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1244 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1246 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1248 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1249 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1250 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1252 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1253 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1254 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1257 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1258 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1260 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1261 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1262 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1263 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1264 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1265 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1266 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1269 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1271 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1273 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1274 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1276 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1277 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1279 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1280 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1281 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1282 let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1283 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1284 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1286 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1289 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1290 assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1292 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1293 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1294 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1296 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1297 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1298 check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1299 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1301 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1302 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1305 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1306 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1307 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1308 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1310 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1311 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1312 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1313 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1314 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1315 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1317 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1323 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1324 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1325 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1326 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1327 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1328 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1330 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1331 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1333 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1334 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1335 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1336 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1337 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1339 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1341 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1342 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1343 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1346 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1348 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1349 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1351 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1355 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1356 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1357 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1358 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1359 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1360 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1362 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1363 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1364 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1365 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1367 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1369 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1370 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1371 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1372 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1375 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1376 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1377 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1378 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1381 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1383 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1384 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1385 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1387 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1389 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1391 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1392 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1393 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1394 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1395 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1396 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1397 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1398 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1399 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1401 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1402 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1403 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1404 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1405 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1407 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1408 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1409 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1410 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1411 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1412 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1413 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1414 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1415 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1418 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1419 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1420 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1422 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1423 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1424 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1426 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1428 amount_msat: 3460001,
1429 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1431 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1434 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1437 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1438 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1439 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1440 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1441 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1445 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1446 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1448 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1449 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1451 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1454 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1457 htlc_signatures: res.1
1460 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1461 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1462 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1464 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1465 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1467 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1468 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1470 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1472 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1473 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1474 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1476 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1477 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1478 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1480 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1482 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1483 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1489 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1490 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1491 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1492 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1493 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1495 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1496 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1497 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1498 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1499 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1500 let opt_anchors = false;
1502 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1503 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1505 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1507 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1509 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1510 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1511 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1514 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1515 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1516 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1517 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1518 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1519 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1523 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1524 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1525 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1526 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1527 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1528 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1529 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1530 let opt_anchors = false;
1532 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1533 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1534 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1535 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1536 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1537 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1538 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1540 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1541 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1542 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1545 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1546 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1547 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1548 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1549 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1550 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1551 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1552 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1553 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1555 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1556 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1557 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1558 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1559 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1562 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1563 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1564 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1565 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1566 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1567 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1569 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1573 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1574 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1575 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1576 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1577 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1579 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1580 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1581 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1582 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1583 let opt_anchors = false;
1585 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1586 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1587 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1588 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1589 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1590 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1591 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1593 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1594 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1595 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1596 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1597 // commitment transaction fee.
1598 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1600 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1601 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1602 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1605 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1606 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1607 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1608 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1612 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1613 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1614 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1615 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1616 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1617 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1618 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1619 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1620 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1621 let opt_anchors = false;
1623 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1625 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1626 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1627 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1628 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1630 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1631 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1632 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1633 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1634 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1635 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1636 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg);
1638 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1639 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1640 match msg_events[0] {
1641 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1642 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1644 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1649 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1650 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1651 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1652 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1653 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1654 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1655 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1656 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1658 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1659 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1660 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1665 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1666 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1667 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1668 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1669 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1672 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1673 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1674 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1675 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1679 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1680 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1681 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1682 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1683 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1684 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1685 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1688 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1689 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1690 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1691 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1693 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1694 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1695 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1696 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1698 // Add a pending HTLC.
1699 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1700 let payment_event_1 = {
1701 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1704 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1705 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1706 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1708 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1710 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1711 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1712 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1713 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1714 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1716 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1717 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1718 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1719 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1720 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1721 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1722 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1723 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1726 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1727 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1728 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1729 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1732 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1733 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1734 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1735 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1736 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1737 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1739 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1743 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1744 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1745 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1746 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1747 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1748 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1749 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1750 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1751 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1752 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1753 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1755 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1756 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1757 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1759 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1760 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1763 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1764 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1768 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1769 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1770 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1771 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1772 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1773 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1774 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1775 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1776 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1777 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1778 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1780 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1781 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1783 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1784 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1786 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1788 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1789 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1790 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1791 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1796 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1797 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1798 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1799 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1801 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1803 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1805 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1806 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1807 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1808 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1809 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1811 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1812 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1813 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1814 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1817 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1818 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1820 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1821 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1822 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1823 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1824 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1825 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1826 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1830 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1831 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1832 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1833 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1834 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1836 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1837 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1838 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1839 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1840 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1843 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1844 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1845 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1846 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1847 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1850 // adding pending output.
1851 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1852 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1853 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1854 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1855 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1856 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1857 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1858 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1859 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1861 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1862 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1863 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1865 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1866 let payment_event_1 = {
1867 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1870 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1871 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1872 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1874 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1876 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1877 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1879 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1880 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1881 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1882 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1885 // split the rest to test holding cell
1886 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1887 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1888 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1889 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1891 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1892 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1895 // now see if they go through on both sides
1896 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1897 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1898 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1900 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1901 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1903 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1905 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1906 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1907 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1908 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1909 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1912 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1913 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1914 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1916 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1917 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1919 // flush the pending htlc
1920 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1921 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1924 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1925 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1927 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1929 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1930 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1931 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1934 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1935 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1938 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1940 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1941 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1942 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1944 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1945 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1947 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1948 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1949 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1950 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1951 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1952 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1954 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1955 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1956 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1957 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1959 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1960 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1962 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1963 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1965 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1966 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1967 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1968 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1969 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1971 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1972 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1973 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1975 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1978 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1981 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1982 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1983 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1984 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1985 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1987 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1988 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1989 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1991 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1994 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1997 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1998 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1999 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2001 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2002 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2003 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2005 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2006 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2007 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2008 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2009 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2011 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2012 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2016 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2017 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2018 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2019 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2020 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2021 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2022 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2023 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2025 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2026 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2027 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2028 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2029 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2030 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2031 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2032 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2034 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2035 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2036 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2037 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2038 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2039 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2040 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2041 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2042 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2043 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2045 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2046 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2047 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2048 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2049 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2051 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2052 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2054 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2056 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2057 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2058 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2061 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2062 // initial fulfill/CS.
2063 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2064 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2066 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2068 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2069 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2070 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2071 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2073 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2075 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2076 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2078 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2079 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2081 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2082 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2084 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2085 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2087 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2089 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2091 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2092 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2093 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2095 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2097 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2099 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2100 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2101 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2102 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2103 // on-chain as necessary).
2104 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2105 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2107 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2108 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2110 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2112 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2114 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2115 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2117 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2118 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2119 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2121 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2122 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2124 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2125 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2126 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2128 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2130 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2131 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2132 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2135 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2136 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2138 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2140 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2142 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2144 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2146 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2149 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2151 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2152 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2154 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2156 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2158 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2161 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2162 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2164 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2165 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2169 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2170 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2171 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2172 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2173 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2174 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2175 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2177 // Create some initial channels
2178 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2179 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2180 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2181 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2183 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2184 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2185 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2186 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2187 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2188 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2190 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2191 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2192 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2193 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2194 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2196 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2197 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2199 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2201 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2202 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2203 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2205 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2207 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2208 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2209 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2210 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2211 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2213 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2214 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2216 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2217 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2218 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2219 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2222 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2223 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2224 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2225 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2227 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2229 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2230 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2231 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2232 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2233 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2235 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2236 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2238 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2239 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2240 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2242 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2243 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2245 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2246 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2247 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2248 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2250 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2256 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2257 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2258 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2260 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2261 let node2_commitment_txid;
2263 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2264 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2265 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2266 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2268 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2269 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2270 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2272 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2274 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2275 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2276 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2277 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2278 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2280 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2281 // confusing us in the following tests.
2282 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2284 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2285 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2286 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2289 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2290 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2291 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2292 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2293 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2294 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2297 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2300 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2301 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2303 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2307 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2309 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2310 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2311 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2317 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2319 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2320 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2322 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2323 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2324 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2325 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2326 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2329 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2332 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2333 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2335 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2338 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2340 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2341 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2342 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2344 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2345 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2346 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2347 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2349 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2350 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2351 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2352 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2356 fn test_justice_tx() {
2357 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2358 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2359 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2360 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2361 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2362 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2363 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2364 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2365 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2366 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2367 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2368 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2369 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2370 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2371 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2372 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2373 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2374 // Create some new channels:
2375 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2377 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2378 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2379 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2380 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2381 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2382 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2383 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2384 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2385 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2386 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2387 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2388 // Revoke the old state
2389 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2392 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2394 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2395 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2396 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2398 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2399 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2402 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2403 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2405 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2406 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2407 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2408 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2410 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2411 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2412 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2413 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2415 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2417 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2418 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2420 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2421 // Create some new channels:
2422 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2424 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2428 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2429 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2430 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2431 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2432 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2433 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2434 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2435 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2436 // Revoke the old state
2437 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2439 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2441 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2442 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2443 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2445 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2446 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2449 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2451 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2452 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2453 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2455 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2456 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2457 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2459 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2460 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2461 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2465 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2466 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2467 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2468 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2469 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2470 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2471 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2472 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2473 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2474 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2475 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2476 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2477 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2478 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2479 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2481 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2482 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2484 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2485 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2486 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2488 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2490 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2491 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2492 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2494 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2498 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2499 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2500 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2501 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2502 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2503 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2504 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2506 // Create some new channel:
2507 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2509 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2510 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2511 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2512 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2513 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2515 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2516 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2517 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2518 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2519 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2520 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2521 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2522 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2523 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2525 //Revoke the old state
2526 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2529 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2531 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2532 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2534 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2535 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2536 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2538 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2539 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2541 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2542 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2544 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2545 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2546 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2547 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2548 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2549 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2550 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2551 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2553 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2554 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2555 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2556 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2557 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2559 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2560 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2561 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2565 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2566 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2567 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2568 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2569 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2570 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2571 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2573 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2575 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2576 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2577 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2578 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2579 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2580 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2582 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2583 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2585 //Revoke the old state
2586 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2589 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2591 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2592 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2593 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2594 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2595 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2596 match events.last().unwrap() {
2597 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2598 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2601 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2602 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2604 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2605 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
2607 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2608 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2609 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2610 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2611 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2612 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2613 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2615 // Justice transactions are indices 2-3-4
2616 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2617 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2618 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2620 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2621 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2622 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2624 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2625 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2626 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2627 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2628 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2629 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2630 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2631 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2633 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2634 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2635 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2636 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2637 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2638 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2639 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2641 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2642 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2643 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2647 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2648 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2649 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2650 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2651 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2652 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2653 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2654 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2655 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2657 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2658 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2659 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2660 // PaymentSent event).
2662 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2663 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2664 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2665 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2667 // Create some initial channels
2668 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2669 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2671 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2672 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2673 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2674 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2675 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2677 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2678 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2679 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2681 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2682 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2684 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2685 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2686 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2687 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2688 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2689 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2690 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2691 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2692 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2694 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2695 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2696 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2697 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2698 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2700 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2701 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2703 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2704 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2705 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2706 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2707 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2708 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2709 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2710 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2711 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2712 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2713 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2715 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2716 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2717 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
2718 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2720 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2721 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2722 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2723 added_monitors.clear();
2725 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2726 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2727 match forwarded_events[0] {
2728 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2729 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2731 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2732 match forwarded_events[1] {
2733 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2734 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2735 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2736 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2737 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2741 match forwarded_events[2] {
2742 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2743 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2744 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2745 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2746 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2750 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2752 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2753 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2754 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2755 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2756 added_monitors.clear();
2758 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2760 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2761 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2764 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2765 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2769 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2770 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2771 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2772 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2773 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2774 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2776 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2778 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2779 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2780 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2781 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2782 // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2783 // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2784 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2785 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2786 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2787 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2789 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2790 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2791 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2792 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2794 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2795 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2796 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2797 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2802 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2803 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2805 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2806 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2807 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2808 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2809 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2810 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2812 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2813 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2814 assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2815 let commitment_spend =
2816 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2819 // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2820 // FullBlockViaListen
2821 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2822 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2823 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2824 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2827 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2828 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2829 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2834 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2835 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2836 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2837 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2838 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, 0);
2839 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2840 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2841 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2843 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2844 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2845 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2846 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2847 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2849 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2850 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2851 let mut first_claimed = false;
2852 for event in events {
2854 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2855 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2856 assert!(!first_claimed);
2857 first_claimed = true;
2859 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2860 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2863 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2864 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2865 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2868 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2871 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2872 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2873 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2874 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2875 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2876 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2878 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2880 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2881 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2882 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2883 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2884 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2885 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2886 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2888 // Create some intial channels
2889 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2890 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2892 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2893 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2894 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2896 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2898 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2899 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2900 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2901 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2903 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2906 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2907 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2909 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2910 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2911 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2912 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2913 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2914 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2916 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2918 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2919 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2921 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2922 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2923 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2925 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2926 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2927 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2928 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2929 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2932 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2933 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2935 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2936 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2938 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2939 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2940 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2941 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2943 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2947 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2949 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2951 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2953 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2955 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2956 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2958 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2959 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2960 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2961 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2962 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2963 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2965 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2968 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2969 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2970 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2972 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2973 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2975 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2976 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2977 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2978 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
2979 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2980 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2981 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2985 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2986 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2987 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2988 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2992 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2993 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2994 // and fail backward accordingly.
2996 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2997 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2998 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2999 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3001 // Create some initial channels
3002 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3003 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3005 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3006 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3007 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3008 // Revoke the old state
3009 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3011 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3013 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3014 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3015 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3017 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3019 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3020 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3021 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3022 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3024 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3025 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3026 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3027 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3028 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3029 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3031 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3032 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3033 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3035 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3039 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3040 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3041 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3042 // commitment transaction anymore.
3043 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3044 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3045 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3046 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3047 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3048 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3050 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3051 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3052 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3053 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3054 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3055 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3056 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3057 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3058 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3060 // Create some initial channels
3061 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3062 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3064 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3065 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3066 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3067 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3068 // Revoke the old state
3069 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3071 let value = if use_dust {
3072 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3073 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3074 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3075 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3078 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3079 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3080 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3082 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3083 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3085 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3086 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3087 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3088 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3089 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3090 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3091 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3092 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3093 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3095 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3096 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3098 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3099 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3100 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3101 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3102 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3103 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3104 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3105 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3107 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3108 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3109 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3112 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3113 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3115 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3116 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3117 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3118 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3119 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3120 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3121 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3122 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3123 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3124 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3125 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3126 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3127 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3128 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3131 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3132 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3133 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3134 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3135 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3136 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3140 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3141 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3142 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3144 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3145 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3147 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3148 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3151 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3152 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3154 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3155 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3158 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3159 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3161 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3163 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3165 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3166 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 3 + nodes.len() });
3168 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3169 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3172 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3173 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3175 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3177 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3179 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3180 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3182 nodes[1].node.abandon_payment(PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0));
3183 let payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3184 assert_eq!(payment_failed_events.len(), 1);
3185 match payment_failed_events[0] {
3186 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3187 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3189 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3192 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3195 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3196 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3197 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3198 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3199 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3201 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3202 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3203 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3204 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3206 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3210 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3211 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3212 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3213 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3214 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3215 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3217 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3220 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3221 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3222 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3223 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3224 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3225 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3226 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3228 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3229 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3230 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3232 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3234 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3235 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3237 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3238 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3239 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3240 // that we should update our routing table for.
3241 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3242 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3245 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3248 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3249 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3250 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3252 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3255 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3256 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3257 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3259 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3262 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3265 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3266 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3267 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3271 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3272 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3273 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3274 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3275 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3279 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3280 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3281 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3282 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3283 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3287 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3288 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3289 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3290 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3291 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3292 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3294 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3296 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3297 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3300 let payment_event = {
3301 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3302 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3303 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3305 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3306 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3309 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3310 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3312 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3313 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3315 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3318 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3320 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3322 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3323 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3324 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3325 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3326 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3327 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3329 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3330 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3336 onion_routing_packet,
3338 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3340 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3341 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3342 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3344 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3345 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3347 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3350 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3351 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3353 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3355 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3360 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3361 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3362 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3363 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3364 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3365 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3366 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3367 if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3368 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3369 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3373 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3375 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3376 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3377 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3378 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3379 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3380 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3382 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3383 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3384 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3386 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3387 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3388 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3390 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3392 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3393 // registering new transactions
3394 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3398 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3399 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3400 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3401 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3402 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3403 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3404 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3405 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3407 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3409 let mut payment_event = {
3410 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3413 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3414 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3415 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3418 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3419 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3421 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3423 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3424 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3425 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3426 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3429 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3430 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3431 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3432 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3434 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3435 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3436 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3438 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3439 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3441 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3443 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3444 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3445 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3446 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3447 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3451 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3453 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3454 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3455 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3456 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3458 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3460 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3461 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3463 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3464 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3465 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3466 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3467 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3468 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3469 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3471 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3475 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3476 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3477 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3478 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3479 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3481 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3482 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3483 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3484 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3485 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3487 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3489 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3490 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3492 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3493 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3494 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3496 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3497 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3499 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3500 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3504 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3505 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3506 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3507 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3508 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3509 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3510 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3512 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3513 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3514 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3515 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3516 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
3517 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3518 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
3520 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3521 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3523 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3525 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3526 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3528 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3529 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3532 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3535 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3536 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3537 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3538 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3540 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3541 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3545 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3546 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3547 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3548 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3549 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3550 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3551 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3552 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3554 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3555 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3556 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3558 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3559 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3560 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3561 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3563 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3564 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3565 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3567 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3568 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3569 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3570 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3572 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3573 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3575 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3576 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3578 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3580 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3581 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3583 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3584 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3585 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3587 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3590 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3591 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3592 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3594 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3597 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3598 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3602 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3603 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3606 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3607 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3608 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3609 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3610 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3611 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3613 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3614 let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3615 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3616 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3617 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3618 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3619 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3622 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2
3625 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3627 let payment_event = {
3628 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3631 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3632 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3633 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3635 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3637 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3638 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3640 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3641 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3642 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3643 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3644 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3646 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3647 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3648 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3651 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3652 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3653 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3654 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3657 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3658 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3659 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3667 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3668 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3669 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3670 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3671 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3672 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3674 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3675 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3676 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3678 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3679 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3681 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3682 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3683 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3684 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3685 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3686 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3687 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3688 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3689 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3690 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3691 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3692 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3693 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3694 // Everything was delivered...
3695 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3698 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3699 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3700 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3702 Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3703 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3706 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3707 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3710 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3712 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3713 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3717 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3718 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3719 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3721 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3723 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3724 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3726 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
3727 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3728 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3729 assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3730 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3732 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3733 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3734 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3736 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3739 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3742 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3744 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3746 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3747 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3748 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3749 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3750 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3751 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3752 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3753 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3754 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3755 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3756 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3758 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3761 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3762 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3764 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3765 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3767 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3768 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3769 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3771 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3774 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3775 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3776 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3777 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3779 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3780 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3781 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3784 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3785 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3786 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3787 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3790 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3791 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3792 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3800 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3801 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3802 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3803 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3804 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3805 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3807 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3809 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3810 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3811 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3812 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3813 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3814 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3815 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3816 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3817 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3818 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3819 // Everything was delivered...
3820 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3823 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3824 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3827 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3828 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3829 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3831 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3832 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3835 // Channel should still work fine...
3836 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3837 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3838 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3842 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3843 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3844 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3845 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3846 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3850 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3851 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3852 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3853 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3854 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3858 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3859 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3860 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3861 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3862 // channel_ready immediately instead.
3863 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3864 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3865 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3866 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3867 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3869 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3871 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3872 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3873 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3874 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3875 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3876 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3878 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3879 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3880 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3884 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3885 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3886 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3887 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3888 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3889 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3890 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3891 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3893 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3895 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3896 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3897 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3900 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3901 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3903 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3904 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3907 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3908 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3911 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3912 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3914 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3915 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3916 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3917 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3918 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3919 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3920 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3922 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3923 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3924 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3926 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3927 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3928 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3930 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3933 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3934 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3935 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3938 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3941 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3942 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3944 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3945 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3946 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3947 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3948 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3949 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3951 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3952 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3953 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3954 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3956 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3957 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3959 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3960 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3962 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3964 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3965 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3966 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3967 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3968 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3969 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3970 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3971 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3972 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3975 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3976 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3977 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3978 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3979 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3980 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3981 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3984 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3985 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3986 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3987 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3988 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3989 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3990 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3991 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3993 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3994 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3995 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3996 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3998 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3999 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4000 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4003 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4004 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4007 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4009 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4010 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4012 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4013 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4015 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4016 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4017 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4019 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4022 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4025 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4026 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4029 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4030 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4033 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4034 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4035 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4036 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4037 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4038 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4039 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4041 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4043 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4044 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4045 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4046 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4047 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4048 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4049 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4050 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4052 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4053 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4054 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4055 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4056 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4059 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4062 let mut block = Block {
4063 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4066 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4067 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4068 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4069 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4070 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4071 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4072 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4075 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4078 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4079 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4080 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4081 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4082 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4084 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4085 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4086 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4087 let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4088 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4089 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4093 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4094 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4095 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4098 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4099 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4100 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4101 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4102 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4103 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4104 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4105 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4107 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4108 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4109 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4110 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4112 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4113 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4115 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4117 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4120 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4121 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4122 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4123 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4125 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4126 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4127 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4128 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4129 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4133 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4134 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4135 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4136 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4139 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4141 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4142 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4143 match fail_commit[0] {
4144 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4145 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4146 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4148 _ => unreachable!(),
4150 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4152 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4157 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4158 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4159 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4162 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4163 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4165 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4166 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4167 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4168 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4169 for event in events.drain(..) {
4171 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4172 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4173 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4174 all_outputs.push(outp);
4177 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4180 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4181 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4191 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4192 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4193 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4194 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4195 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4196 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4198 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4199 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4200 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4202 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4203 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4204 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4205 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4206 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4208 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4209 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4211 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4212 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4213 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4214 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4215 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4219 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4220 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4221 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4222 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4223 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4224 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4225 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4227 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4228 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4229 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4231 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4233 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4234 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4235 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4236 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4238 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4239 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4241 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4242 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4244 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4245 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4246 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4250 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4251 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4252 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4254 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4255 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4256 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4257 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4259 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4260 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4261 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4262 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4263 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4265 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4266 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4267 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4269 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4271 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4272 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4273 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4275 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4276 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4277 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4278 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4279 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4283 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4284 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4285 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4286 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4287 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4289 // Create some initial channels
4290 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4292 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4294 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4295 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4296 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4298 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4299 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4300 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4302 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4304 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4306 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4307 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4310 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4311 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4314 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4315 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4316 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4317 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4318 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4320 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4321 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4322 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4324 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4325 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4326 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4330 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4331 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4332 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4333 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4334 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4336 // Create some initial channels
4337 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4339 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4340 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4342 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4344 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4345 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4346 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4348 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4349 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4351 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4353 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4354 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4356 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4358 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4359 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4360 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4361 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4362 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4364 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4365 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4366 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4367 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4369 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4370 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4371 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4372 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4373 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4377 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4378 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4379 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4380 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4381 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4383 // Create some initial channels
4384 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4386 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4387 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4388 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4389 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4391 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4393 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4394 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4396 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4398 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4399 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4400 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4401 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4403 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4404 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4406 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4407 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4408 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4412 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4413 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4414 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4415 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4416 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4417 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4419 // Create some initial channels
4420 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4422 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4423 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4424 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4425 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4427 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4429 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4430 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4431 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4433 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4434 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4436 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4437 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4438 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4439 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4440 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4441 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4443 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4444 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4445 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4446 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4448 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4450 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4451 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4452 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4453 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4454 // transactions next...
4455 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4456 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4458 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4459 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4460 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4461 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4463 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4464 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4467 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4468 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4470 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4471 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4472 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4473 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4474 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4478 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4479 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4480 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4481 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4482 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4483 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4485 // Create some initial channels
4486 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4488 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4489 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4490 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4491 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4493 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4494 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4496 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4498 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4499 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4500 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4501 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4502 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4503 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4505 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4506 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4507 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4508 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4510 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4511 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4512 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4514 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4515 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4516 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4517 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4519 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4521 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4522 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4524 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4525 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4526 // transactions next...
4527 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4528 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4529 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4530 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4532 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4533 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4536 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4537 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4539 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4540 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4542 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4543 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4545 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4546 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4547 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4548 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4549 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4550 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4551 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4552 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4556 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4557 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4558 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4559 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4560 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4562 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4565 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4566 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4567 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4568 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4570 // Create some initial channels
4571 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4572 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4574 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4575 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4576 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4577 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4578 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4580 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4581 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4582 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4584 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4585 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4586 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4587 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4588 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4590 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4591 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4592 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4593 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4594 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4596 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4597 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4599 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4601 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4602 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4603 check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4604 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4605 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4606 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4608 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4609 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4610 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]});
4611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4612 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4613 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4615 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4616 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4619 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
4620 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4621 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4622 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4623 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4625 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4628 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4629 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4630 match msg_events[0] {
4631 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4632 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4634 match msg_events[1] {
4635 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4636 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4638 match msg_events[2] {
4639 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4640 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4641 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4642 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4643 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4644 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4646 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4648 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4649 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4650 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4651 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4652 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4653 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4654 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4655 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4656 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4657 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4658 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4660 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4661 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4665 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4666 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4667 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4668 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4669 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4670 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4671 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4672 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4673 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4674 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4675 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4676 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4677 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4678 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4680 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4681 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4682 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4684 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4685 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4686 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4687 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4688 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4690 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4692 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
4693 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4694 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4695 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4696 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
4697 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
4698 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
4699 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4701 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4702 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4703 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4705 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4706 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4708 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4709 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4711 let htlc_timeout_tx;
4712 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4713 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4714 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
4715 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4717 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4718 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4720 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4721 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4722 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4723 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4725 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4726 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4728 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4729 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4732 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4733 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4734 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4735 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4737 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[0].clone();
4740 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4741 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4743 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4745 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4746 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4748 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4749 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4752 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4753 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4755 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4756 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4757 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4758 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4759 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4760 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4761 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4762 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4763 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4764 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4766 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4767 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4768 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4769 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4770 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4771 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4772 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4773 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4774 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4777 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4778 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4780 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4782 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4784 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4785 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
4786 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
4787 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
4788 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
4789 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4790 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4791 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4792 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4793 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4794 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4797 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4798 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4800 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4802 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4803 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4804 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
4806 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4811 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4812 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4813 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4814 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4815 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4817 // Create some initial channels
4818 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4820 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4821 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4822 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4823 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4824 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4826 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4827 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4828 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4831 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4832 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4833 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4834 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4836 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4837 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4840 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4841 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4844 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4845 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4846 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4847 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4848 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4852 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4853 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4855 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4856 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4857 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4858 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4859 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4860 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4863 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4864 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4865 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4866 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4867 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4868 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4869 // use the same payment hashes.
4870 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4875 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4876 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4877 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4878 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4879 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4880 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4881 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4882 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4883 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4884 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4886 let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4887 let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4888 let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4889 let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4890 let chan_3_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4892 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4893 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4894 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
4895 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
4897 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
4898 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4900 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4902 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4903 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4905 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4907 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4909 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4911 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4912 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4914 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
4916 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
4919 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4921 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4922 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4925 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4927 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4928 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
4930 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
4931 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
4932 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
4933 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
4934 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
4936 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
4937 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
4938 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
4939 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
4940 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
4941 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
4942 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
4944 let failed_destinations = vec![
4945 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
4946 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
4947 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
4948 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
4950 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
4951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
4953 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
4954 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4955 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
4956 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
4957 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
4958 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
4960 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
4961 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
4962 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
4963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
4965 let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
4966 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
4967 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
4969 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
4970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
4972 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
4973 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4974 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
4975 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
4977 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
4979 // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
4980 let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
4981 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
4982 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
4983 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
4984 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
4985 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
4986 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
4988 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
4989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
4990 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
4991 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4992 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
4993 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
4994 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
4995 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
4996 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
4997 if deliver_last_raa {
4998 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5000 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5003 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5004 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5005 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5006 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5008 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5009 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5010 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5012 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5013 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5014 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5016 if announce_latest {
5017 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5019 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5021 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5022 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5023 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5024 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5026 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5027 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5030 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5031 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5034 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5035 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5036 if deliver_last_raa {
5037 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5039 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5040 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5042 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5043 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5045 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5048 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5052 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5053 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5054 let mut a_done = false;
5055 for msg in cs_msgs {
5057 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5058 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5059 // should be failed-backwards here.
5060 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5061 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5062 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5063 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5065 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5070 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5071 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5072 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5074 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5075 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5078 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5079 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5080 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5081 if announce_latest {
5082 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5083 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5084 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5087 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5089 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5093 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5094 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5095 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5096 let mut as_updates = 0;
5097 for event in as_events.iter() {
5098 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5099 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5100 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5101 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5103 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5105 if network_update.is_some() {
5108 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5110 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5111 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5112 if announce_latest {
5113 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5114 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5116 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5118 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5119 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5120 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5121 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5122 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5123 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5124 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5125 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5126 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5128 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5130 if network_update.is_some() {
5133 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5135 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5136 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5137 if announce_latest {
5138 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5140 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5142 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5143 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5144 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5145 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5146 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5147 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5151 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5152 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5156 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5157 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5161 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5162 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5163 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5164 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5168 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5169 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5170 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5171 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5172 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5174 // Create some initial channels
5175 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5177 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5178 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5179 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5180 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5182 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5183 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5184 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5185 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5186 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5187 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5189 let htlc_timeout = {
5190 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5191 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5192 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5193 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5194 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5198 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5199 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5200 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5202 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5203 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5204 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5205 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5206 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5207 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5208 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5209 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5210 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5211 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5212 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5216 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5217 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5218 // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5219 // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5220 // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5222 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5224 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5225 let seed = [42; 32];
5226 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5227 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5228 let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5229 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone());
5230 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: channelmanager::provided_init_features() };
5231 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5232 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5233 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5235 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5236 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5238 // Create some initial channels
5239 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5241 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5242 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5243 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5245 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5246 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5247 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5248 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5249 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5251 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5252 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5253 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5254 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5255 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5257 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5258 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5259 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5260 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5261 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5262 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5263 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5264 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5267 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5268 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5269 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5270 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5272 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5274 let htlc_timeout = {
5275 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5276 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5277 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5278 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5279 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5283 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5284 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5285 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5287 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5288 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5289 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5290 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5291 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5292 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5293 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5294 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5295 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5296 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5297 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5298 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5302 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5303 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5304 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5305 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5306 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5308 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5310 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5311 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5313 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5314 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5315 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5317 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5318 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5319 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5321 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5322 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5323 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5325 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5326 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5327 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5330 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5331 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5332 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5333 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5334 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5335 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5337 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5339 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5340 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5341 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5343 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5345 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5346 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5347 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5349 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5351 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5352 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5355 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5356 let mut block = Block {
5357 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5360 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5361 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5362 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5364 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5365 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5366 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5367 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5370 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5371 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5372 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5373 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5374 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5375 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5377 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5378 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5379 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5381 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5383 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5384 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5385 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5387 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5388 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5390 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5391 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5392 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5394 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5395 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5397 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5400 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5401 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5402 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5403 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5404 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5405 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5407 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5408 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5409 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5410 // actually revoked.
5411 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5412 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5413 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5414 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5417 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5418 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5419 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5421 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5422 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5424 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5426 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5428 if check_revoke_no_close {
5429 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5433 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5434 let mut block = Block {
5435 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5438 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5439 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5440 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5442 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5443 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5444 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5446 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5448 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5452 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5453 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5454 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5455 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5456 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5457 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5458 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5460 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5461 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5462 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5464 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5465 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5466 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5468 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5469 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5473 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5474 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5475 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5476 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5477 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5482 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5483 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5484 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5485 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5486 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5487 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5488 for node in nodes.iter() {
5489 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5492 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5493 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5494 let push_msat=10001;
5495 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5496 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5497 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5498 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5500 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5501 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5502 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5506 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5507 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5508 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5509 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5510 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5512 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5513 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5514 let push_msat=10001;
5515 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5517 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5518 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5519 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5520 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5521 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5523 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5524 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5525 let push_msat=10001;
5526 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5527 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5528 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5530 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5531 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5532 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5534 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5535 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5536 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5538 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5539 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5540 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5542 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5543 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5544 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5545 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5546 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5547 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5551 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5552 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5553 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5554 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5555 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5557 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5558 let push_msat=10001;
5559 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5560 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5561 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5562 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5564 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5565 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5566 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5567 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5570 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5572 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5575 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5576 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5577 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5578 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5580 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5581 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5582 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5583 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5584 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5585 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5587 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5588 // pending_update_fee.
5590 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5591 *feerate_lock += 20;
5593 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5596 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5597 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5598 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5599 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5600 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5602 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5605 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5607 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5608 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5609 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5610 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5612 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5613 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5614 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5616 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5617 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5618 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5619 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5621 // Flush the pending fee update.
5622 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5623 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5625 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5628 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5629 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5630 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5631 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5632 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5633 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5634 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5635 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5636 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5638 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5639 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5640 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5642 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5643 assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5644 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5645 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5646 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5647 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5648 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5650 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5654 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5655 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5656 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5658 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5659 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5660 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5661 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5662 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5663 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5665 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5666 // pending_update_fee.
5668 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5669 *feerate_lock += 200;
5671 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5672 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5674 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5675 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5676 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5677 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5678 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5680 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5683 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5685 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5686 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5687 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5688 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5690 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5692 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5693 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5694 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5696 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5697 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5698 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5699 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5700 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5701 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5702 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5703 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5705 // Flush the pending fee update.
5706 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5707 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5709 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5710 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5713 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5714 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5715 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5716 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5717 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5718 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5719 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5720 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5721 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5723 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5724 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5725 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5727 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5728 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5729 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5730 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5731 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5732 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5733 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5735 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5738 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5739 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5740 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5741 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5742 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5744 let raa = match send_raa_event {
5745 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5746 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5748 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5750 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5751 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5752 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5753 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5755 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5756 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5758 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5759 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5760 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5762 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
5763 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5765 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5767 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5769 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5770 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5771 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5772 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5775 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5776 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5777 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5780 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5781 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5782 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5783 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5784 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5785 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5786 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5787 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5788 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5789 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5790 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5792 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5793 // pending_update_fee.
5795 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5796 *feerate_lock += 20;
5798 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5801 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5802 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5803 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5804 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5805 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5807 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5810 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5812 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5813 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5814 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5815 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5817 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5819 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
5820 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
5821 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5822 let payment_event = {
5823 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5826 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5827 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5829 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5831 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5832 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5833 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5834 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5836 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
5837 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5839 // Flush the pending fee update.
5840 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5841 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5843 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5844 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5845 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5847 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5848 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5849 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5851 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5852 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5855 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5858 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5859 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5860 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5862 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5863 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5864 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5865 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5866 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5867 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5870 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5871 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5874 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5875 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5876 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5877 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5878 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5879 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5880 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5881 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5882 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5883 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5885 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5888 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
5889 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
5890 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5892 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
5893 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5895 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5896 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5897 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5898 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5899 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
5900 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
5901 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
5902 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5904 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5905 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
5906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5909 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
5910 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
5911 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
5914 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
5915 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
5916 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5917 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5918 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5919 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5920 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5922 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5923 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
5925 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5926 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
5927 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5928 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
5932 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
5933 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
5934 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5935 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5936 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5937 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5938 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5940 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5941 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
5942 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5943 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
5945 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5946 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
5950 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
5951 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
5952 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5953 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5954 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5955 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5956 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5958 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5959 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5961 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5962 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
5964 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5965 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
5966 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
5967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5968 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
5972 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
5973 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
5974 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
5975 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5976 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5977 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5978 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5979 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5981 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
5982 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
5983 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
5984 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
5985 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
5986 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
5990 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
5991 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
5992 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
5993 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
5994 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5995 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5996 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5997 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5998 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5999 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6000 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6002 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6003 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6004 let payment_event = {
6005 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6008 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6009 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6010 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6011 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6015 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6017 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6019 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6021 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6022 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6024 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6025 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6026 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6028 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6029 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6033 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6034 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6035 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6036 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6037 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6038 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6039 let channel_value = 100000;
6040 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6041 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6043 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6045 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6046 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6048 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6049 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6050 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6052 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6053 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6055 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6058 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6060 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6061 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6062 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6063 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6064 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6065 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6066 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6067 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6069 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6070 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6071 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6072 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6075 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6076 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6078 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6079 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6080 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6081 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6082 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6083 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6085 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6089 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6090 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6091 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6092 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6093 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6094 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6095 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6097 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6098 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6099 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6100 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6101 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6102 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6104 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6105 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6106 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6108 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6110 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6111 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6112 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6113 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6114 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6116 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6117 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6118 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6119 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6120 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6124 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6125 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6126 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6127 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6128 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6129 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6130 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6131 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6133 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6134 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6135 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6136 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6137 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6138 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6140 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6144 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6145 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6146 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6149 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6150 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6151 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6153 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6154 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6156 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6157 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6158 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6160 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6164 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6165 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6166 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6167 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6168 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6169 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6170 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6172 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6173 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6175 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6176 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6177 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6179 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6180 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6181 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6183 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6187 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6188 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6189 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6190 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6191 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6192 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6194 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6195 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6196 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6198 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6199 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6200 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6202 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6203 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6204 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6206 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6210 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6211 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6212 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6213 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6214 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6215 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6216 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6217 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6219 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6220 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6221 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6223 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6224 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6226 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6227 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6228 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6229 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6230 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6231 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6232 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6233 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6234 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6235 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6236 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6237 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6238 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6241 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6242 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6243 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6245 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6247 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6249 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6250 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6251 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6253 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6257 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6258 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6260 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6261 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6262 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6263 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6264 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6265 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6266 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6269 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6270 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6272 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6275 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6278 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6280 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6281 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6282 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6284 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6288 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6289 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6291 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6292 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6293 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6294 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6295 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6297 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6298 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6300 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6301 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6303 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6306 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6309 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6311 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6312 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6313 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6315 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6319 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6320 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6322 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6323 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6324 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6325 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6326 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6328 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6329 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6331 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6332 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6333 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6336 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6337 failure_code: 0x8000,
6340 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6342 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6343 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6344 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6346 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6350 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6351 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6353 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6354 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6355 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6356 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6357 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6359 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6361 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6363 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6365 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6366 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6367 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6369 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6370 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6371 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6372 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6373 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6374 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6375 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6377 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6381 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6383 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6385 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6386 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6387 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6389 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6393 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6394 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6396 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6397 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6398 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6399 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6400 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6402 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6404 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6405 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6406 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6408 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6409 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6410 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6412 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6413 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6414 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6415 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6416 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6417 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6418 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6420 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6424 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6426 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6428 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6429 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6430 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6431 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6432 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6436 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6437 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6439 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6440 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6441 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6442 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6443 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6445 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6446 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6449 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6450 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6452 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6454 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6456 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6458 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6460 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6461 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6462 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6463 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6464 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6465 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6466 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6468 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6471 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6472 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6474 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6475 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6476 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6477 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6478 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6482 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6483 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6484 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6486 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6487 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6488 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6489 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6490 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6491 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6493 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6496 let mut payment_event = {
6497 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6499 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6500 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6501 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6503 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6505 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6506 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6507 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6508 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6509 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6510 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6511 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6514 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6515 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6516 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6517 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6519 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6520 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6521 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6523 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6524 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6525 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6526 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6527 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6528 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6529 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6531 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6535 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6538 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6539 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6540 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6541 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6543 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6545 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6546 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6547 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6548 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6549 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6550 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6552 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6555 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6559 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6560 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6561 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6562 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6563 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6564 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6565 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6567 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6570 let mut payment_event = {
6571 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6573 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6576 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6577 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6578 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6580 payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6581 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6584 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6585 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6587 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6589 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6590 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6592 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6593 let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6594 // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6595 update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6597 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6598 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6600 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6603 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6604 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6605 node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6606 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6607 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6608 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6611 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6612 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6613 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6615 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6618 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6619 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6621 // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6622 // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6624 Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update:
6625 Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }), error_code, ..
6627 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6628 assert!(is_permanent);
6629 assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6631 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6634 // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6637 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6638 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6639 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6640 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6642 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6643 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6646 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6647 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6649 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6650 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6652 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6653 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6654 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6655 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6657 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6658 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6660 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6661 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6663 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6666 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6667 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6668 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6671 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6672 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6674 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6676 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6677 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6679 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6682 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6683 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6685 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6688 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6689 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6690 if announce_latest {
6691 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6693 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6696 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6698 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6700 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6701 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6702 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6703 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6704 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6705 let mut first_failed = false;
6706 for event in events {
6708 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6709 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6710 assert!(!first_failed);
6711 first_failed = true;
6713 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6716 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6722 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6723 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6724 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6727 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6728 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6729 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6730 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6731 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6732 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6733 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6735 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6736 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6737 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6738 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6739 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6741 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6742 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6744 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6745 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6747 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6748 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6750 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6752 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6753 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6756 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6758 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6759 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6760 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6761 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6762 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6764 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6765 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6767 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6768 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
6769 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6770 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6771 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6772 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6773 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6774 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6776 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6777 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6778 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6780 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6781 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6783 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6784 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6785 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6786 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6787 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6788 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6789 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6792 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6794 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 0);
6796 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6797 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6798 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6799 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6800 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6805 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6806 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6807 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6808 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6812 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6813 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6815 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6816 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6817 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6818 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6819 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6820 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6821 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6822 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6823 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6825 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6826 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6827 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6828 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6831 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6832 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6834 } else { assert!(false) }
6836 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6837 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6838 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6839 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6840 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6841 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6842 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6845 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6846 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6848 } else { assert!(false); }
6850 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6851 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6852 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6853 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6854 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6855 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
6857 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
6859 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
6860 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
6861 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
6865 } else { panic!(); }
6866 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
6868 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6869 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6870 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6871 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6872 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6873 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6874 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6877 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6878 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6880 } else { assert!(false); }
6884 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
6885 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
6886 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
6887 // to B, B should refuse payment.
6889 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6890 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6891 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6892 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6894 // Create some initial channels
6895 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6897 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
6898 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
6899 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
6900 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
6901 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6902 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
6903 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6906 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6907 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6908 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
6909 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6910 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6912 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
6913 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
6914 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6915 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6917 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
6918 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
6919 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6921 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6922 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6923 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6924 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6925 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6926 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6927 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6928 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6929 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6930 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
6932 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6936 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
6937 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
6939 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
6940 let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6941 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
6942 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
6946 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
6947 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
6948 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
6950 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6951 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6952 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6953 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6955 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6956 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6957 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6960 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6961 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6963 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
6964 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
6965 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6966 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
6967 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
6968 for e in msg_events {
6970 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
6971 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
6972 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
6973 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
6974 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
6977 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6981 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6982 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6983 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
6984 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6985 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6986 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
6988 // Reestablish chan_1
6989 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6990 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6991 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6992 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6993 // Reestablish chan_2
6994 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
6995 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6996 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
6997 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6998 // Reestablish chan_3
6999 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7000 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7001 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7002 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7004 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7005 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7006 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7007 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7008 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7009 for e in msg_events {
7011 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7012 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7013 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7014 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7016 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7017 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7020 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7023 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7024 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7028 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7029 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7030 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7032 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7033 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7034 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7035 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7037 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7039 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7040 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7041 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7042 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7043 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7045 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7046 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7047 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7048 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7049 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7050 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7052 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7053 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7054 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7055 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7059 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7060 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7062 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7063 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7064 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7065 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7068 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7072 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7073 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7074 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7075 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7076 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7077 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7078 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7079 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7083 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7084 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7085 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7086 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7088 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7089 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7090 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7091 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7092 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7093 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7094 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7095 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7096 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7097 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7098 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7099 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7100 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7104 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7106 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7107 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7109 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7111 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7112 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7113 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7114 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7115 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7116 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7117 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7118 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7119 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7120 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7121 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7122 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7123 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7127 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7129 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7130 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7134 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7135 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7136 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7138 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7139 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7140 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7141 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7142 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7144 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7145 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7146 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7147 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7148 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7149 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7150 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7151 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7152 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7153 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7154 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7155 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7157 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7158 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7159 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7161 // Revoke local commitment tx
7162 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7164 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7165 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7166 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7167 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7169 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7170 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7172 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7173 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7175 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7176 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7177 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7179 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7180 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7181 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7182 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7184 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7185 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7186 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7187 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7188 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7189 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
7190 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7191 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7192 match events.last().unwrap() {
7193 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7194 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7200 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7201 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7202 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7204 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7205 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7206 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7207 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7209 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7210 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7211 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7212 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7213 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7214 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7216 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7217 // available, which we check here:
7218 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7219 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7220 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7222 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7223 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7225 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7226 // output, checked above).
7227 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7228 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7229 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7231 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7232 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7233 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7234 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
7235 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7239 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7240 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7241 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7242 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7243 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7245 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7246 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7247 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7248 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7250 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7251 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7253 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7254 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7255 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7256 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7257 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7258 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7259 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7260 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7264 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7265 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7266 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7267 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7269 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7270 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7271 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7272 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7273 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7274 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7275 // up bumped justice generation.
7276 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7279 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7284 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7285 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7286 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7289 // Provide preimage for one
7290 // Check aggregation
7292 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7293 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7294 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7295 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7297 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7298 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7299 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7301 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7302 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7303 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7304 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7305 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7307 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7308 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7309 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7310 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7312 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7314 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7318 let feerate_timeout;
7319 let feerate_preimage;
7321 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7322 // 3 transactions including:
7323 // preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7324 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7325 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7326 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7327 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7328 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7329 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7330 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7332 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7333 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7334 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7335 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7337 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7338 (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7340 (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7343 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7344 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7345 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7347 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7348 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7349 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7350 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7354 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7355 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7357 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7358 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7360 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7361 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7362 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7363 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7364 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7365 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7367 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7368 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7369 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7370 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7371 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7373 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7374 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7375 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7376 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7377 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7382 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7383 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7387 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7388 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7389 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7390 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7391 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7392 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7393 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7394 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7396 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7397 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7398 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7399 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7400 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
7402 let per_commitment_secret;
7403 let next_per_commitment_point;
7405 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7406 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7407 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7409 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7411 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7412 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7413 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7415 // Must revoke without gaps
7416 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7417 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7419 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7420 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7421 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7424 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7425 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7426 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7428 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7432 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7433 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7434 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7436 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7437 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7438 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7439 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7441 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7442 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7443 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7444 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7446 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7447 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7448 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7450 // Revoke local commitment tx
7451 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7453 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7454 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7455 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7456 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7458 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7459 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7461 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7463 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7464 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7465 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7466 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7467 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7468 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7472 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7473 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7474 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7476 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7477 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7478 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7483 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
7484 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
7485 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
7486 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7487 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7488 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7489 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7490 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7492 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
7493 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7494 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
7495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7496 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7498 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7499 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
7500 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
7501 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7502 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7504 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
7505 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
7506 // can get our balance.
7508 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
7509 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
7510 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
7511 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
7512 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
7513 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7514 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7515 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
7517 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
7521 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7522 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7523 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7524 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7525 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7526 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7527 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7529 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7531 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7532 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7533 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7534 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7535 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7537 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7538 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7540 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7542 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7544 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7545 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7546 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7548 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7549 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7550 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7552 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7557 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7558 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7559 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7560 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7561 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7563 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7564 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7565 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7567 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7569 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7570 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7571 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7572 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7576 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7577 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7578 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7579 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7580 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7581 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7582 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7584 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7585 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7586 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7588 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7589 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7590 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7594 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7595 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7596 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7597 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7598 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7599 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7601 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7602 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7603 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7604 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7605 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7606 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7607 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7608 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7609 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7610 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7611 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7612 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7614 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7615 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7616 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7617 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7619 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7620 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7621 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7622 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7623 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7625 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7626 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7628 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7629 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7630 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7631 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7632 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7633 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7635 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7636 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7638 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7639 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7640 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7642 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7646 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7647 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7648 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7649 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7650 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7651 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7652 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7654 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7655 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7657 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7659 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7660 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7661 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7663 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7665 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7666 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7668 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7671 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7672 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7674 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7675 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7676 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7678 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7681 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7683 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7684 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7686 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7688 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7689 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7691 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7696 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7697 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7698 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7699 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7700 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7701 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7702 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7704 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7705 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7707 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7709 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7710 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7711 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7713 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7715 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7716 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7718 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7721 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7722 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7724 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7725 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7726 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7728 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7730 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7734 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7735 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7736 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7737 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7738 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7739 // and the channel should be closed.
7740 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7741 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7742 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7743 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7744 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7745 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7747 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7748 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7749 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7751 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7753 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7754 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7756 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7757 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7759 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7760 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7761 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7762 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7763 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7764 let accept_chan_msg = {
7765 let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
7766 let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
7767 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
7768 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7770 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
7772 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7774 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7775 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7777 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7778 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7780 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7781 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7783 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7784 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7785 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7786 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7787 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7788 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7790 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7793 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7797 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7798 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7799 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7800 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7801 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7802 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7803 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7805 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7806 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7808 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7810 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7811 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7812 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7814 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7816 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7817 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7818 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7820 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7821 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7823 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7824 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7827 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7830 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7831 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7832 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7834 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7835 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7836 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7838 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7843 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7844 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7845 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7846 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7847 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7849 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7850 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7852 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
7853 assert_eq!(err, format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(unknown_channel_id), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7855 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7856 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7861 fn test_simple_mpp() {
7862 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
7863 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7864 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7865 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7866 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7868 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7869 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7870 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7871 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7873 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7874 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7875 route.paths.push(path);
7876 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7877 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7878 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7879 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7880 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7881 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7882 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
7883 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
7887 fn test_preimage_storage() {
7888 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
7889 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7890 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7891 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7892 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7894 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7897 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7898 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7899 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7901 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7902 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7903 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7904 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7906 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
7907 // values from previous calls.
7908 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7909 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7910 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7912 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
7914 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
7915 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
7917 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
7920 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7925 #[allow(deprecated)]
7926 fn test_secret_timeout() {
7927 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
7928 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
7929 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7930 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7931 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7932 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7934 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7936 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
7938 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
7939 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
7940 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
7941 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
7942 } else { panic!(); }
7944 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
7946 header: BlockHeader {
7948 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
7949 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
7950 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7954 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
7955 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
7956 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
7957 } else { panic!(); }
7959 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
7960 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
7961 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
7962 block.header.time += 1;
7963 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
7964 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
7965 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
7968 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7969 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7971 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7972 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7973 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7974 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7976 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
7977 // values from previous calls.
7978 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7979 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7980 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7982 Event::PaymentClaimable { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
7983 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
7984 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
7985 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
7987 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7992 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
7993 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
7994 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7995 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7996 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7997 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7999 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8001 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8002 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8003 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8004 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8006 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8007 // resulting events.
8008 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8009 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8011 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8012 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8013 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8014 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8016 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8017 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8018 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8019 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8020 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8022 // We should fail the payment back
8023 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8024 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8025 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8026 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8027 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8029 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8034 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8035 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8036 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8038 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8039 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8040 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8041 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8043 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8044 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8045 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8046 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8048 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8049 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8050 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8051 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8055 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8056 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8057 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8058 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8061 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8062 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8063 // commitment at same time.
8065 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8066 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8067 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8068 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8070 // Create some initial channel
8071 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8072 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8074 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8075 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8077 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8078 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8080 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8081 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8082 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8083 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8085 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8086 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8087 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8088 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8089 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), nodes[0].keys_manager).unwrap().1;
8090 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8091 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8092 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8095 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8096 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8097 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8098 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8099 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8100 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8102 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8103 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8105 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8107 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8108 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8109 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8111 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8112 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8113 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8114 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8115 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8116 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8117 } else { assert!(false); }
8119 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8121 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8122 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8126 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8127 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8128 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8129 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8130 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8132 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8133 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8134 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8135 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8137 // Create some initial channel
8138 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8139 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8141 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8142 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8144 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8145 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8147 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8148 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8149 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8150 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8151 let watchtower_alice = {
8152 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8153 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8154 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8155 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8156 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), nodes[0].keys_manager).unwrap().1;
8157 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8158 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8159 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8162 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8163 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8164 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8165 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8166 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8167 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8169 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8171 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8172 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8176 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8177 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8178 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8179 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8180 let watchtower_bob = {
8181 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8182 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8183 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8184 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8185 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), nodes[0].keys_manager).unwrap().1;
8186 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8187 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8188 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8191 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8192 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8194 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8195 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8197 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8201 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8202 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8203 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8205 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8206 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8207 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8208 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8209 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8210 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8211 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8212 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8213 } else { assert!(false); }
8215 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8218 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8219 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8220 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8222 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8225 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8226 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8227 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8231 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8232 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8233 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8235 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8236 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8237 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8242 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8243 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8244 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8247 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8248 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8250 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8251 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8252 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8253 // before receiving funding_signed.
8254 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8255 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8256 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8257 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8259 // Create an initial channel
8260 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8261 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8262 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8263 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8264 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
8266 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8267 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8269 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8272 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8273 let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8274 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8275 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8276 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8280 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8281 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8282 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8283 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8284 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8285 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8286 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8288 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8289 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8290 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8291 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8293 // Create some initial channels
8294 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8296 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8297 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8298 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8299 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8300 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8301 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8303 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8304 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8305 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8306 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8307 // this test before #653 fix.
8308 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8309 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8311 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8312 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8314 let htlc_timeout = {
8315 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8316 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8317 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8318 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8319 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8323 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8324 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8325 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8326 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8329 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8330 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8331 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8332 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8334 // Steps of the test:
8335 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8336 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8337 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8338 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8339 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8340 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8341 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8342 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8343 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8344 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8345 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8346 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8348 // Create some initial channels
8349 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8350 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8352 // Steps (1) and (2):
8353 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8354 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8356 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8357 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8358 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8359 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8360 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8361 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8362 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8364 // Steps (3) and (4):
8365 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8366 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8367 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8368 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8371 if !broadcast_alice {
8372 force_closing_node = 1;
8373 counterparty_node = 0;
8375 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8376 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8378 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8379 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8380 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8381 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8382 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8384 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8385 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8386 if broadcast_alice {
8387 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8389 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8394 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8395 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8396 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8398 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8400 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8401 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8402 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8403 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8404 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8405 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8407 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8408 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8409 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8410 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8411 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8412 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8414 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8415 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8417 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8420 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8421 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8422 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8425 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8426 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8427 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8428 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8429 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8432 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8434 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8435 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8436 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8439 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8442 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8444 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8447 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8448 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8449 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8450 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8451 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8454 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8456 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8459 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8460 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8461 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8462 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8463 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8464 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8465 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8466 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8467 if broadcast_alice {
8468 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8470 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8472 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8473 if broadcast_alice {
8474 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8475 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8477 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8478 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8483 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8484 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8486 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8487 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8488 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8490 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8491 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8492 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8493 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8494 if broadcast_alice {
8495 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8496 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8497 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8499 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8500 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8501 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8507 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8508 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8509 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8510 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8511 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8515 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8516 // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8517 // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8518 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8519 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8520 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8521 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8523 // Create an first channel channel
8524 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8525 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8527 // Create an second channel
8528 nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
8529 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8531 // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8532 // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8533 open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8535 // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8536 // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8537 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8539 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8540 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8542 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8543 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8544 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8546 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8550 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8552 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8553 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8555 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8556 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8557 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8559 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8565 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8566 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8567 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8569 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8570 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8571 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8572 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8573 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8574 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8575 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8576 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8578 // Create an initial channel
8579 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8580 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8581 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8582 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8584 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8585 // that it is rejected.
8586 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8588 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8589 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8591 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8592 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8593 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8594 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8595 // move forward with it.
8596 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8597 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8599 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8603 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8604 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8606 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8609 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8610 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8612 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8613 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8614 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8615 added_monitors.clear();
8617 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8619 let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8620 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8622 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8625 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8626 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8627 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8628 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8629 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8631 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8632 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8634 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8635 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8636 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8637 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8638 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8640 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8644 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8645 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8646 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8647 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8648 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8649 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8651 let funding_created = {
8652 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8653 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8654 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8655 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8656 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8657 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8658 let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8659 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8660 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8663 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8664 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8665 // still needs to be cleared here.
8666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8668 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8670 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8671 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8673 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8674 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8675 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8676 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8677 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8679 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8683 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8684 // everything is functional.
8685 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8687 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8688 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8689 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8690 added_monitors.clear();
8693 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8694 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8695 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8696 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8698 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8699 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8700 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8702 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8706 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8707 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8709 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8710 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8711 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8712 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8713 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8714 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8715 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8717 // Create some initial channels
8718 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8719 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8720 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8722 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8723 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8724 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8726 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8727 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8728 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8730 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8731 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8733 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8734 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8735 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8736 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8737 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8738 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8740 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8741 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8742 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8744 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8745 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8746 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8748 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8749 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8754 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8755 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8757 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8759 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8760 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8761 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8762 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8763 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8764 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8766 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8767 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8768 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8772 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8773 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8775 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8776 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8777 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8778 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8780 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
8781 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
8782 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
8783 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8784 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8785 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8786 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8788 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8789 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8790 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8792 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8794 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
8795 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
8796 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
8798 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
8799 let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
8800 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8801 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8802 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
8805 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8806 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8809 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8812 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8813 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8815 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8816 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8817 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8819 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
8820 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8821 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8823 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8824 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8825 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8826 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8827 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8828 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
8829 } else { panic!(); }
8830 } else { panic!(); }
8831 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8833 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
8834 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
8835 // as its not 32 bytes long.
8836 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8837 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
8838 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
8839 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
8843 script_sig: Script::new(),
8844 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
8845 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
8847 output: vec![TxOut {
8849 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
8852 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
8853 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
8856 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8857 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8858 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8859 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8860 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8861 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8862 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8863 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8864 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8865 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8866 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8867 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8868 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8869 // until we learned about an additional block.
8871 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8872 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8873 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8874 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8875 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8876 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8877 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8879 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8880 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8881 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8882 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8883 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8885 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8886 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8887 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8888 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8889 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8890 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8892 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8893 if !test_height_before_timelock {
8894 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8896 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8897 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8898 if test_height_before_timelock {
8899 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8900 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8901 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8902 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8904 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
8905 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8906 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
8907 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
8908 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
8909 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
8911 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
8912 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
8914 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
8915 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
8916 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
8917 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8918 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
8919 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
8920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8922 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8923 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8924 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8925 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8926 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8927 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8928 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8929 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8930 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
8935 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
8936 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
8937 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
8940 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
8941 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8942 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8943 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8944 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8946 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8948 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
8949 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8950 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8952 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
8955 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8957 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8958 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8959 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8960 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8961 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8963 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8964 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
8967 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
8968 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
8969 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8970 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8971 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8972 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8973 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8974 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8975 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
8976 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
8977 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
8978 // the first HTLC delivered above.
8981 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
8982 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8984 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
8985 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
8986 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
8988 let expected_destinations = vec![
8989 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
8990 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
8992 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], expected_destinations);
8993 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8996 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8997 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
8999 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9000 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9001 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9003 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9004 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9005 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9006 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9008 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9009 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9010 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9012 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9013 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9014 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9015 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9017 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9019 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9024 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9025 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9026 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9027 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9028 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9029 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9033 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9034 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9035 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9036 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9040 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9041 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9042 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9043 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9044 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9045 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9046 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9048 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9049 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9050 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9051 let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9053 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9054 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
9055 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9056 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9057 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9058 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9059 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9060 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9062 let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9064 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9066 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9067 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9069 let session_privs = {
9070 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9071 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9072 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9073 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9074 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9077 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9080 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9081 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9082 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9084 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9087 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9090 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9091 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9092 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9094 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9095 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9097 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9100 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9101 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9102 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9104 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9106 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9108 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9109 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9110 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9112 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9113 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9114 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9115 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9119 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9120 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9121 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9123 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9126 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9127 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9128 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9130 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9132 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9135 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9136 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9137 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9139 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9143 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9144 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9145 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9146 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9147 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9149 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9150 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9151 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9152 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9153 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9154 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9155 final_value_msat: 10000,
9156 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9158 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9159 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9160 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9162 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9163 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9165 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9166 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9167 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9168 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9169 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9170 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9174 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9175 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9176 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9177 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9178 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9180 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9181 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9182 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
9183 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
9185 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9186 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9187 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9188 final_value_msat: 10000,
9189 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9191 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9192 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9193 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9194 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9195 let route = find_route(
9196 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9197 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9200 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9201 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9203 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9204 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9205 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9206 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9207 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9208 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9212 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9213 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9214 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9215 // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9217 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9218 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9219 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9220 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9222 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9223 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9224 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9225 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9227 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9228 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9229 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9230 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9231 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9232 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9235 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9236 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9237 // amount of time to respond to.
9239 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9240 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9241 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9243 let failed_destinations = vec![
9244 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9245 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9247 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9249 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
9251 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9252 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9255 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9256 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9257 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9259 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9260 // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9261 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9262 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9263 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9266 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9267 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9268 enum ExposureEvent {
9269 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9271 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9273 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9274 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9277 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9278 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9281 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9282 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9283 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9284 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9285 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9286 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9287 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9288 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9290 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9291 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9292 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9293 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9294 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9295 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9297 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9298 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9299 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9300 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9302 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9304 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
9305 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9306 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
9308 let opt_anchors = false;
9310 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9313 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9314 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9315 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
9316 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9319 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9320 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9323 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9324 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9326 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9327 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9328 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9330 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9331 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9332 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9333 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9334 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9336 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9337 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9339 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9340 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9342 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9343 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9346 if dust_outbound_balance {
9347 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9348 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9349 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9350 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9351 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9352 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9355 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9356 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9357 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9358 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9359 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9363 if dust_outbound_balance {
9364 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9365 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9366 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9367 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9368 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9371 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9372 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9373 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9374 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9379 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9380 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9381 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9382 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9383 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9385 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9386 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9387 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9389 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9391 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9392 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9393 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9395 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9396 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9397 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9398 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9399 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9401 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9402 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9403 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9404 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9406 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9407 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9409 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9410 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9411 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9413 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9414 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9416 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9418 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9421 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9422 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9423 added_monitors.clear();
9427 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9428 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9429 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9430 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9431 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9432 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9433 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9434 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9435 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9436 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9437 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9438 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9439 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9443 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9444 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9445 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9446 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9447 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9449 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9450 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9451 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
9452 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9453 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
9455 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9457 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9458 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9459 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9460 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9461 let mut tx = match events[0] {
9462 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9463 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
9464 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9465 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9468 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9470 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9471 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9472 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9473 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9478 // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
9479 tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9480 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9481 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9485 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9486 // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9487 // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9488 // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9489 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9490 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9491 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9492 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9494 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9496 // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9498 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9499 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9502 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9504 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9505 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9507 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9508 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9510 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9511 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9513 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9514 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9515 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9517 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9520 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9523 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9524 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9526 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9529 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9530 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9532 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9533 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9534 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9536 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9539 // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9542 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9543 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9545 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9548 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9549 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9551 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9552 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9553 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9554 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() });
9555 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9558 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),