_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use chain;
  15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use chain::channelmonitor;
  17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
  20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  25 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  26 use routing::network_graph::{NetworkUpdate, RoutingFees};
  27 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  29 use ln::msgs;
  30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
  34 use util::errors::APIError;
  35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  36 use util::config::UserConfig;
  37
  38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  44
  45 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  46 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  47
  48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  50
  51 use regex;
  52
  53 use io;
  54 use prelude::*;
  55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  56 use core::default::Default;
  57 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  58
  59 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  60 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  61
  62 #[test]
  63 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  64         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  65         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  66         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  67         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  68         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  69
  70         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  71         // funding satoshis
  72         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  73         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
  74         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  75
  76         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  77         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  78
  79         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  80         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  81
  82         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  83         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  84         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  85                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  86                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  87                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  88                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  89                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  90                         match action {
  91                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  92                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  93                                 },
  94                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
  95                         }
  96                 } else { assert!(false); }
  97         };
  98
  99         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
 100         use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 101
 102         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 103         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
 104
 105         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 106
 107         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 108
 109         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 110
 111         insane_open_helper(r"Bogus; channel reserve \(\d+\) is less than dust limit \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis + 1; msg });
 112
 113         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 114
 115         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 116
 117         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 118
 119         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 120 }
 121
 122 #[test]
 123 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 124         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 125         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 126         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 127         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 128         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 129
 130         // balancing
 131         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 132
 133         // A                                        B
 134         // update_fee                            ->
 135         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 136         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 137         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 138         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 139         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 140         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 141         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 142         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 143         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 144         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 145         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 146         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 147         //                                       <- RAA
 148         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 149
 150         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 151         {
 152                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 153                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 154         }
 155         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 157
 158         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 159         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 160         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 161                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 162                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 163                 },
 164                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 165         };
 166
 167         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 168
 169         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 170         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 171         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 173
 174         let payment_event = {
 175                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 176                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 177                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 178         };
 179         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 180         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 181
 182         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 183         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 184         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 185         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 186         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 188
 189         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 190         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 191         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 192         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 193         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 194
 195         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 196         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 197         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 198         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 199         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 200         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 201         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 202         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 203
 204         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 205         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 206         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 207         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 208         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 209         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 210         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 211         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 212
 213         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 214         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 215         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 217
 218         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 219         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 221
 222         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 223         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 224
 225         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 226         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 227         match events_2[0] {
 228                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 229                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 230         }
 231
 232         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 233         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 234 }
 235
 236 #[test]
 237 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 238         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 239         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 240         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 241         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 242         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 243         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 244         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 245
 246         // balancing
 247         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 248
 249         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 250         {
 251                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 252                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 253         }
 254         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 255         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 256
 257         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 258         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 259         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 260                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 261                         update_fee.as_ref()
 262                 },
 263                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 264         };
 265
 266         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 267
 268         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 269         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 270         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 271         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 272
 273         let payment_event = {
 274                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 275                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 276                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 277         };
 278         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 279         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 280
 281         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 282         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 283         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 284         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 285         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 286         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 287
 288         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 290
 291         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 292 }
 293
 294 #[test]
 295 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 296         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 297         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 298         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 299         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 300         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 301
 302         // A                                        B
 303         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 304         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 305         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 306         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 307         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 308         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 309         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 310         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 311         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 312         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 313         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 314         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 315         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 316         //                                          B should send no response here
 317         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 318         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 319         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 320
 321         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 322         let initial_feerate;
 323         {
 324                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 325                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 326                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 327         }
 328         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 329         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 330
 331         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 332         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 333         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 334                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 335                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 336                 },
 337                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 338         };
 339
 340         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 341         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 342         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 343         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 344         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 345
 346         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 347         // transaction:
 348         {
 349                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 350                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 351         }
 352         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 353         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 354         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 355
 356         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 357         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 358                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 359                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 360         };
 361
 362         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 363
 364         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 365         // Deliver (3)
 366         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 367
 368         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 369         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 370         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 372         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 373         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 374         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 375         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 376         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 377         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 378         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 379
 380         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 381         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 382         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 383         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 384         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 385
 386         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 387         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 388         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 389
 390         // Delever (4)
 391         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 392         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 393         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 394
 395         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 396         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 397         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 398
 399         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 400         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 401         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 402         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 403
 404         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 405         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 406         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 407 }
 408
 409 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
 410         // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
 411         // tests that we properly send one in that case.
 412         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
 413         alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 414         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 415         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 416         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
 417         bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 418         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 419         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 420         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 421         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 422         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
 423         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 424         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
 425
 426         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 427         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
 428         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
 429
 430         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
 431         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 432         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
 433
 434         for node in nodes {
 435                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
 436                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
 437                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
 438         }
 439 }
 440 #[test]
 441 fn test_1_conf_open() {
 442         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
 443         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
 444         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
 445 }
 446
 447 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 448         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 449         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 450         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 451         // Node objects.
 452
 453         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 454         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 455         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 456         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 457
 458         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 459                 let block = Block {
 460                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 461                         txdata: vec![],
 462                 };
 463                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 464                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 465         }
 466
 467         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 468         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 469         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 470
 471         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 472         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
 473         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 474
 475         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 476         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
 477
 478         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
 479
 480         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 481         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
 482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 483         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 484
 485         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 486         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 487         {
 488                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 489                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 490                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 491                 added_monitors.clear();
 492         }
 493         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 494
 495         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 496         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 497         {
 498                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 499                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 500                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 501                 added_monitors.clear();
 502         }
 503
 504         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 505         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 506
 507         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 508         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 509
 510         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 511         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 512         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 513         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 514 }
 515
 516 #[test]
 517 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 518         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 519         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 520         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 521         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 522         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 523         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 524         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 525         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 526         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 527         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 528         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 529         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 530         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 531         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 532         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 533         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 534         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 535         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 536 }
 537
 538 #[test]
 539 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 540         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 541         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 542         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 543         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 544         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 545
 546         {
 547                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 548                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 549         }
 550         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 551         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 552
 553         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 554         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 555         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 556                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 557                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 558                 },
 559                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 560         };
 561         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 562
 563         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 564         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 565         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 566
 567         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 568         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 569         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 570
 571         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 572         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 573         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 574         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 575
 576         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 577         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 578         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 579 }
 580
 581 #[test]
 582 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 583         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 584         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 585         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 586         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 587         let channel_value = 5000;
 588         let push_sats = 700;
 589         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 590         let channel_id = chan.2;
 591         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 592         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
 593
 594         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 595         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 596         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 597         // remote limit.
 598         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 599         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) as u32;
 600         {
 601                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 602                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 603         }
 604         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 605         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 606         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 607
 608         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 609
 610         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 611
 612         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 613         {
 614                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 615
 616                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 617                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 618                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0) / 1000;
 619                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 620                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 621                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 622         }
 623
 624         {
 625                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 626                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 627                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 628         }
 629         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 630         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 631         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 632
 633         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 634
 635         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 636         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 637         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 638                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 639                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 640                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 641                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 642                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 643                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 644         };
 645         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 646                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 647                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 648                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 649                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 650                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 651                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 652                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 653         };
 654
 655         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 656         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 657                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 658
 659         let res = {
 660                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 661                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 662                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 663                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 664                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 665                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 666                         push_sats,
 667                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0) / 1000,
 668                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
 669                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 670                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 671                         &mut htlcs,
 672                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 673                 );
 674                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 675         };
 676
 677         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 678                 channel_id: chan.2,
 679                 signature: res.0,
 680                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 681         };
 682
 683         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 684                 channel_id: chan.2,
 685                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 686         };
 687
 688         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 689
 690         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 691         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 692         //Should produce and error.
 693         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 694         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 695         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 696         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 697         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 698 }
 699
 700 #[test]
 701 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 702         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 703         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 704         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 705         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 706         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 707
 708         // balancing
 709         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 710
 711         {
 712                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 713                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 714         }
 715         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 716         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 717
 718         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 719         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 720         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 721                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 722                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 723                 },
 724                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 725         };
 726         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 727         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 728         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 729         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 730
 731         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 732
 733         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 734         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 735         {
 736                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 737                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 738                 added_monitors.clear();
 739         }
 740         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 741         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 742         // node[1] has nothing to do
 743
 744         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 745         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 746         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 747
 748         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 749         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 750         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 751         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 752         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 753         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 754         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 755
 756         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 757         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 758         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 759         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 760         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 761         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 762
 763         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 764         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 765         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 766         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 767
 768         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 769         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 770         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 771
 772         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 773         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 774         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 775         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 776
 777         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 778         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 779         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 780
 781         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 782
 783         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 784         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 785         match events[0] {
 786                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 787                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 788         };
 789
 790         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 791
 792         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 793         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 794         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 795         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 796         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 797 }
 798
 799 #[test]
 800 fn test_update_fee() {
 801         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 802         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 803         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 804         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 805         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 806         let channel_id = chan.2;
 807
 808         // A                                        B
 809         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 810         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 811         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 812         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 813         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 814         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 815         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 816         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 817         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 818         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 819         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 820         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 821
 822         // Create and deliver (1)...
 823         let feerate;
 824         {
 825                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 826                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 827                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 828         }
 829         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 830         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 831
 832         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 833         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 834         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 835                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 836                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 837                 },
 838                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 839         };
 840         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 841
 842         // Generate (2) and (3):
 843         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 844         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 845         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 846
 847         // Deliver (2):
 848         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 849         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 850         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 851
 852         // Create and deliver (4)...
 853         {
 854                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 855                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 856         }
 857         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 858         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 859         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 860         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 861         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 862                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 863                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 864                 },
 865                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 866         };
 867
 868         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 869         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 870         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 871         // ... creating (5)
 872         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 873         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 874
 875         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 876         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 877         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 878         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 879         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 880
 881         // Deliver (5):
 882         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 883         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 884         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 885
 886         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 887         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 888         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 889         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 890         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 891         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 892         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 893         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 894         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 895
 896         // Deliver (7)
 897         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 898         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 899         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 900         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 901
 902         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 903         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 904         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 905
 906         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 907         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 908         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 909         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 910         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 911 }
 912
 913 #[test]
 914 fn fake_network_test() {
 915         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 916         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 917         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 918         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 919         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 920         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 921
 922         // Create some initial channels
 923         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 924         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 925         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 926
 927         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 928         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 929         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 930         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 931         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 932
 933         // Send some more payments
 934         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 935         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 936         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 937
 938         // Test failure packets
 939         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 940         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 941
 942         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 943         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 944
 945         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 946         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 947         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 948         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 949         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 950         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 951         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 952
 953         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
 954         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
 955         hops.push(RouteHop {
 956                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
 957                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 958                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 959                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 960                 fee_msat: 0,
 961                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 962         });
 963         hops.push(RouteHop {
 964                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
 965                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 966                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 967                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 968                 fee_msat: 0,
 969                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 970         });
 971         hops.push(RouteHop {
 972                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
 973                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
 974                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 975                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
 976                 fee_msat: 1000000,
 977                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
 978         });
 979         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
 980         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
 981         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
 982
 983         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
 984         hops.push(RouteHop {
 985                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
 986                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 987                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 988                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 989                 fee_msat: 0,
 990                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 991         });
 992         hops.push(RouteHop {
 993                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
 994                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 995                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 996                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 997                 fee_msat: 0,
 998                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 999         });
1000         hops.push(RouteHop {
1001                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1002                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1003                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1004                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1005                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1006                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1007         });
1008         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1009         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1010         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1011
1012         // Claim the rebalances...
1013         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1014         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1015
1016         // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1017         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1018
1019         // Send some payments across both channels
1020         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1021         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1022         let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1023
1024
1025         route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1026         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1027         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1028         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1029
1030         //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1031
1032         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1033         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1034         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1035
1036         // Close down the channels...
1037         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1038         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1039         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1040         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1041         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1042         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1043         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1044         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1045         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1046         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1047         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1048         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1049         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1050         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1051         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1052 }
1053
1054 #[test]
1055 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1056         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1057         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1058         // commitment dance rounds.
1059         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1060         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1061         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1062         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1063         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1064         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1065
1066         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1067         for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1068                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1069                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1070                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1071         }
1072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1073
1074         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1075         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1076         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1077         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1078
1079         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1080         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1081         // another HTLC.
1082         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1083         {
1084                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1085                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1086                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1087                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1088         }
1089
1090         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1091         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1092         {
1093                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1094                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1095         }
1096
1097         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1098         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1099         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1100         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1101
1102         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1103         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1104         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1105         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1106         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1107         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1108         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1109
1110         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1111         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1112         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1113
1114         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1115
1116         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1117         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1118         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1119         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1120
1121         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1122         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1123         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1124         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1125
1126         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1127         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1128         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1129
1130         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1131                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1132         }
1133         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1134         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1135         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1136         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1137         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1138
1139         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1141         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1142         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1143         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1144
1145         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1146         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1147
1148         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1149
1150         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1151         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1152         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1153                 match event {
1154                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1155                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1156                         },
1157                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1158                 };
1159         }
1160
1161         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1162                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1163         }
1164
1165         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1166 }
1167
1168 #[test]
1169 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1170         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1171         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1172         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1173         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1174         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1175         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1176
1177         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1178         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1179         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1180         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1181         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1182         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1183
1184         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1185
1186         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1187         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1188
1189         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1190         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1191
1192         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1193         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1194         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1195 }
1196
1197 #[test]
1198 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1199         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1200         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1201         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1202         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1203         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1204         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1205         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1206
1207         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1208
1209         // balancing
1210         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1211
1212         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1213
1214         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1215         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1216         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1217
1218         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1219         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1221
1222         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1223         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1224
1225         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1226         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1227         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1228                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1229                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1230                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1231                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1232                 }
1233         }
1234         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1235
1236         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1237         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1238         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1239         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1240
1241         // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1242         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1243         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1244         assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1245         assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1246         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1247         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1248         check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1249
1250         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1251         assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1252         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1253
1254         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1255         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1256         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1257         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1258         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1259         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1260         check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1261         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1262
1263         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1264         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1265         for e in events {
1266                 match e {
1267                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1268                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1269                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1270                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1271                         },
1272                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1273                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1274                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1275                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1276                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1277                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1278                         },
1279                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1280                 }
1281         }
1282 }
1283
1284 #[test]
1285 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1286         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1287         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1288         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1289         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1290         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1291
1292         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1293         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1294
1295         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1296         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1297         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1298         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1299         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1300         match err {
1301                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1302                         match &fails[0] {
1303                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1304                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1305                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1306                         }
1307                 },
1308                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1309         }
1310         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1311         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1312
1313         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1314 }
1315
1316 #[test]
1317 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1318         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1319         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1320         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1321         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1322         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1323
1324         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1325         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1326         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1327         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1328
1329         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1330
1331         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1332         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1333         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1334         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1335                 channel_id: chan.2,
1336                 htlc_id: 0,
1337                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1338                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1339                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1340                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1341         };
1342
1343         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1344
1345         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1346         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1347         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1348
1349         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1350
1351         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1352
1353         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1354         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1355         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1356                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1357                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1358                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1359                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1360                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1361
1362                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1363                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1364                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1365                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1366                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1367         };
1368         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1369                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1370                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1371                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1372                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1373                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1374                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1375                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1376         };
1377
1378         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1379         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1380                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1381
1382         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1383         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1384         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1385
1386         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1387                 offered: false,
1388                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1389                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1390                 payment_hash,
1391                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1392         };
1393
1394         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1395
1396         let res = {
1397                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1398                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1399                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1400                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1401                         commitment_number,
1402                         95000,
1403                         local_chan_balance,
1404                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1405                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1406                         feerate_per_kw,
1407                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1408                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1409                 );
1410                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1411         };
1412
1413         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1414                 channel_id: chan.2,
1415                 signature: res.0,
1416                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1417         };
1418
1419         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1420         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1421         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1422
1423         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1424         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1425                 channel_id: chan.2,
1426                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1427                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1428         };
1429         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1430
1431         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1432         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1433         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1434         match events[0] {
1435                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1436                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1437                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1438                 },
1439                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1440         };
1441         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1442                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1443
1444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1445 }
1446
1447 #[test]
1448 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1449         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1450         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1451         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1452         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1453         // this situation.
1454         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1455         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1456         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1457         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1458
1459         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1460         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1461         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1462
1463         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1464
1465         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1466         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1467                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1468         }
1469
1470         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1471         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1472         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1473                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1474         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1475         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1476 }
1477
1478 #[test]
1479 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1480         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1481         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1482         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1483         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1484         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1485
1486         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1487         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1488         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1489         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1490         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1491         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1492         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1493
1494         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1495         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1496                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1497         }
1498
1499         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1500         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1501         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1502         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1503         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1504         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1505         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1506         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1507         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1508                 channel_id: chan.2,
1509                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1510                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1511                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1512                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1513                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1514         };
1515
1516         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1517         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1518         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1519         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1520         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1521         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1522         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1523         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1524 }
1525
1526 #[test]
1527 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1528         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1529         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1530         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1531         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1532
1533         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1534         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1535         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1536
1537         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1538         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1539         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1540         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1541         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1542         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1543         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1544
1545         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1546                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1547         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1548         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1549         // commitment transaction fee.
1550         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1551
1552         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1553         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1554                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1555         }
1556
1557         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1558         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1559         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1560                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1561 }
1562
1563 #[test]
1564 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1565         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1566         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1567         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1568         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1569         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1570         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1571         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1572
1573         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1574         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1575         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1576         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1577         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1578         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1579
1580         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1581         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1582         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1583         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1584         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1585         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1586
1587         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1588         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1589         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1590         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1591 }
1592
1593 #[test]
1594 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1595         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1596         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1597         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1598         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1599         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1600         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1601
1602         let feemsat = 239;
1603         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1604         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1605         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1606
1607         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1608         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1609         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1610         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1611
1612         // Add a pending HTLC.
1613         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1614         let payment_event_1 = {
1615                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1616                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1617
1618                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1619                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1620                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1621         };
1622         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1623
1624         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1625         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1626         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1627         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1628         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1629
1630         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1631         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1632         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1633         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1634         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1635         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1636         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1637         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1638                 channel_id: chan.2,
1639                 htlc_id: 1,
1640                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1641                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1642                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1643                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1644         };
1645
1646         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1647         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1648         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1649         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1650         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1651         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1652         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1653         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1654 }
1655
1656 #[test]
1657 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1658         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1659         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1660         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1661         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1662         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1663         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1664         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1665         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1666         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1667
1668         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1669         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1670         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1671
1672         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1673         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1674 }
1675
1676 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1677         (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1678 }
1679
1680 #[test]
1681 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1682         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1683         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1684         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1685         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1686         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1687         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1688         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1689         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1690         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1691         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1692
1693         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1694         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1695
1696         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1697         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1698
1699         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1700                 ($node: expr) => {{
1701                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1702                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1703                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1704                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1705                         payment_event
1706                 }}
1707         }
1708
1709         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1710         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1711         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1712
1713         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1714
1715         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1716         {
1717                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1718                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1719                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1720                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1721                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1722                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1723                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1724         }
1725
1726         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1727         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1728         loop {
1729                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1730                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1731                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1732                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1733                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1734                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1735                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1736                         break;
1737                 }
1738                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1739
1740                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1741                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1742                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1743                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1744                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1745                 );
1746
1747                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1748                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1749                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1750                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1751                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1752         }
1753
1754         // adding pending output.
1755         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1756         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1757         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1758         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1759         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1760         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1761         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1762         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1763         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1764         // policy.
1765         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1766         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1767         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1768
1769         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1770         let payment_event_1 = {
1771                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1772                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1773
1774                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1775                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1776                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1777         };
1778         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1779
1780         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1781         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1782         {
1783                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1784                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1785                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1786                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1787         }
1788
1789         // split the rest to test holding cell
1790         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1791         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1792         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1793         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1794         {
1795                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1796                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1797         }
1798
1799         // now see if they go through on both sides
1800         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1801         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1802         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1803         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1804         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1805         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1806
1807         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1808         {
1809                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1810                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1811                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1812                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1813                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1814         }
1815
1816         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1817         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1818         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1819         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1820         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1821         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1822
1823         // flush the pending htlc
1824         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1825         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1826         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1827
1828         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1829         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1830         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1831         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1832
1833         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1834         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1835         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1836         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1837
1838         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1839         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1840         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1841
1842         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1843
1844         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1845         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1846         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1847
1848         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1849         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1850
1851         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1852         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1853         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1854         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1855         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1856         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1857
1858         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1859         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1860         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1861         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1862
1863         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1864         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1865
1866         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1867         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1868         match events[0] {
1869                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1870                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1871                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1872                         match &purpose {
1873                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1874                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1875                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1876                                 },
1877                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1878                         }
1879                 },
1880                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1881         }
1882         match events[1] {
1883                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1884                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1885                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1886                         match &purpose {
1887                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1888                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1889                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1890                                 },
1891                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1892                         }
1893                 },
1894                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1895         }
1896
1897         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1898         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1899         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1900
1901         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1902         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1903         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1904
1905         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
1906         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1907         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1908         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1909         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1910
1911         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1912         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
1913 }
1914
1915 #[test]
1916 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
1917         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
1918         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
1919         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
1920         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
1921         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
1922         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
1923         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
1924         // To test this we:
1925         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
1926         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
1927         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
1928         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
1929         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
1930         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
1931         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
1932         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
1933         //    claim,
1934         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
1935         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
1936         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
1937         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
1938         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
1939         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1940         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1941         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1942         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1943         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1944
1945         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1946         // Route the first two HTLCs.
1947         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
1948         let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
1949
1950         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
1951         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
1952         let send_1 = {
1953                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
1954                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1955                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1956                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1957                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1958         };
1959
1960         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
1961         // initial fulfill/CS.
1962         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
1963         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1964         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1965
1966         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
1967         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
1968         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
1969         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1970         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1971
1972         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1973         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
1974         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1975         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1976         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
1977
1978         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
1979         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
1980         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1981         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
1982         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1983
1984         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1985         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1986         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1987
1988         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1989         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1990         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1991
1992         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1993         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1994         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1995
1996         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
1997         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
1998         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
1999         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2000         // on-chain as necessary).
2001         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2002         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2003         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2004         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2005         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2006
2007         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2008         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2009         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2010
2011         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2012         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2013
2014         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2015         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2016         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2017         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2018         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2019
2020         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2021         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2022         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2023         let send_2 = {
2024                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2025                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2026                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2027                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2028                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2029         };
2030
2031         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2032         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2033         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2034         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2035
2036         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2037
2038         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2039         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2040         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2041
2042         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2043         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2044
2045         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2046         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2047         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2048
2049         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2050         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2051         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2052
2053         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2054         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2055
2056         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2057         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2058
2059         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2060         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2061 }
2062
2063 #[test]
2064 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2065         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2066         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2067         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2068         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2069         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2070         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2071
2072         // Create some initial channels
2073         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2074         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2075         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2076         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2077
2078         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2079         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2080         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2081         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2082         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2083         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2084
2085         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2086         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2087         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2088         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2089         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2090
2091         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2092         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2093         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2094         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2095         {
2096                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2097                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2098                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2099                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2100                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2101         }
2102         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2103         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2104         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2105         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2106         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2107
2108         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2109         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2110
2111         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2112         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2113         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2114         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2115         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2116         {
2117                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2118                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2119                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2120                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2121                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2122                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2123         }
2124         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2125         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2126         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2127         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2128         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2129
2130         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2131                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2132                         {
2133                                 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2134                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2135
2136                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2137                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2138                                 match events[0] {
2139                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2140                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2141                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2142                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2143                                         },
2144                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2145                                 };
2146                         }
2147                 }
2148         }
2149
2150         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2151         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2152         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2153         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2154         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2155         let node2_commitment_txid;
2156         {
2157                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2158                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2159                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2160                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2161
2162                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2163                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2164                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2165                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2166                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2167         }
2168         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2169         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2170         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2171         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2172         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2173
2174         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2175         // confusing us in the following tests.
2176         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2177
2178         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2179         let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2180         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2181         // buffer space).
2182
2183         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2184                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2185                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2186                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2187                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2188                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2189                                 msg.clone()
2190                         },
2191                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2192                 };
2193                 match events[1] {
2194                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2195                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2196                         },
2197                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2198                 }
2199                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2200
2201                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2202                 {
2203                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2204                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2205                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2206                                         false
2207                                 } else { true }
2208                         });
2209                 }
2210
2211                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2212
2213                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2214                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2215
2216                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2217                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2218                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2219                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2220                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2221                                 msg.clone()
2222                         },
2223                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2224                 };
2225                 match events[1] {
2226                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2227                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2228                         },
2229                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2230                 }
2231                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2232                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2233
2234                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2235                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2236                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2237         };
2238         nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2239         nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2240         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2241         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2242
2243         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2244         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2245         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2246 }
2247
2248 #[test]
2249 fn test_justice_tx() {
2250         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2251         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2252         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2253         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2254         alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2255         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2256         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2257         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2258         bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2259         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2260         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2261         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2262         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2263         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2264         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2265         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2266         // Create some new channels:
2267         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2268
2269         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2270         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2271         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2272         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2273         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2274         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2275         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2276         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2277         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2278         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2279         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2280         // Revoke the old state
2281         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2282
2283         {
2284                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2285                 {
2286                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2287                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2288                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2289
2290                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2291                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2292                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2293                 }
2294                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2295                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2296                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2297
2298                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2299                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2300                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2301                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2302                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2303                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2304                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2305                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2306                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2307         }
2308         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2309
2310         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2311         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2312
2313         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2314         // Create some new channels:
2315         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2316         {
2317                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2318                 node_txn.clear();
2319         }
2320
2321         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2322         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2323         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2324         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2325         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2326         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2327         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2328         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2329         // Revoke the old state
2330         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2331         {
2332                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2333                 {
2334                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2335                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2336                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2337
2338                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2339                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2340                 }
2341                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2342                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2343
2344                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2345                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2346                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2347                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2348                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2349                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2350                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2351         }
2352         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2353         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2354         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2355 }
2356
2357 #[test]
2358 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2359         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2360         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2361         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2362         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2363         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2364         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2365         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2366         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2367         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2368         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2369         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2370         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2371         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2372         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2373
2374         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2375         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2376         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2377         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2378         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2379         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2380
2381         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2382         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2383
2384         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2385         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2386         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2387         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2388         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2389 }
2390
2391 #[test]
2392 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2393         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2394         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2395         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2396         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2397         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2398         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2399
2400         // Create some new channel:
2401         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2402
2403         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2404         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2405         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2406         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2407         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2408
2409         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2410         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2411         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2412         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2413         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2414         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2415         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2416         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2417         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2418
2419         //Revoke the old state
2420         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2421
2422         {
2423                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2424                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2425                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2426                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2427                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2428                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2429                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2430                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2431
2432                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2433                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2434
2435                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2436                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2437
2438                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2439                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2440                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2441                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2442                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2443                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2444                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2445                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2446
2447                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2448                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2449                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2450         }
2451         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2452         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2453         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2454 }
2455
2456 #[test]
2457 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2458         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2459         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2460         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2461         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2462         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2463         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2464
2465         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2466
2467         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2468         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2469         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2470         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2471         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2472         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2473
2474         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2475         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2476
2477         //Revoke the old state
2478         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2479
2480         {
2481                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2482                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2483                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2484                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2485                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2486                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2487                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2488                 match events[1] {
2489                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2490                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2491                 }
2492
2493                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2494                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2495
2496                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2497                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2498                 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2499                 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2500                 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2501                 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2502
2503                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2504                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2505                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2506                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2507                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2508                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2509                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2510
2511                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2512                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2513                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2514                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2515
2516                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2517                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2518                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2519
2520                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2521                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2522                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2523                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2524                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2525                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2526                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2527                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2528         }
2529         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2530         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2531         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2532 }
2533
2534 #[test]
2535 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2536         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2537         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2538         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2539         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2540         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2541         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2542         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2543         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2544         // towards B.
2545         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2546         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2547         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2548         // PaymentSent event).
2549
2550         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2551         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2552         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2553         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2554
2555         // Create some initial channels
2556         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2557         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2558
2559         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2560         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2561         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2562         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2563         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2564
2565         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2566         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2567         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2568
2569         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2570         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2571
2572         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2573         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2574         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2575         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2576         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2577         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2578         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2579         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2580         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2581         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2582         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2583         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2584         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2585
2586         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2587         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2588         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2589         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2590         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2591         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2592         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2593         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2594         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2595         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2596         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2597         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2598         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2599         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2600         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2601         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2602         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2603
2604         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2605         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2606         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2607         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2608         {
2609                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2610                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2611                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2612                 added_monitors.clear();
2613         }
2614         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2615         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2616         match forwarded_events[0] {
2617                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2618                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2619         }
2620         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2621                 } else { panic!(); }
2622         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2623                 } else { panic!(); }
2624         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2625         {
2626                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2627                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2628                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2629                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2630                 added_monitors.clear();
2631         }
2632         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2633         match events[0] {
2634                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2635                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2636         }
2637         match events[1] {
2638                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2639                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2640         }
2641
2642         match events[2] {
2643                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2644                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2645                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2646                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2647                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2648                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2649                 },
2650                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2651         };
2652         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2653                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2654                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2655                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2656                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2657                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2658                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2659                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2660                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2661                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2662                         if $htlc_offered {
2663                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2664                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2665                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2666                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2667                         } else {
2668                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2669                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2670                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2671                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2672                         }
2673                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2674                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2675                         node_txn.clear();
2676                 } }
2677         }
2678         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2679         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2680         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2681         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2682
2683         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2684         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2685         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2686         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2687         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2688         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2689         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2690         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2691         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2692         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2693         let commitment_spend =
2694                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2695                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2696                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2697                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2698                         &node_txn[0]
2699                 } else {
2700                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2701                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2702                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2703                         &node_txn[2]
2704                 };
2705
2706         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2707         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2708         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2709         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2710         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2711         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2712         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2713         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2714         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2715         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2716         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2717         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2718
2719         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2720         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2721         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2722         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2723         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2724         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2725         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2726         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2727         let mut first_claimed = false;
2728         for event in events {
2729                 match event {
2730                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2731                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2732                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2733                                         first_claimed = true;
2734                                 } else {
2735                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2736                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2737                                 }
2738                         },
2739                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2740                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2741                 }
2742         }
2743         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2744 }
2745
2746 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2747         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2748         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2749         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2750         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2751         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2752         //            \                                  \
2753         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2754
2755         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2756         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2757         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2758         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2759         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2760         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2761         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2762
2763         // Create some intial channels
2764         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2765         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2766
2767         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2768         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2769         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2770
2771         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2772
2773         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2774         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2775         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2776         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2777         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2778         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2779         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2780
2781         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2782         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2783         match events[0] {
2784                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2785                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2786                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2787                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2788                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2789                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2790                 },
2791                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2792         };
2793         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2794         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2795         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2796         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2797         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2798         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2799         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2800         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2801
2802         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2803         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2804         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2805         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2806         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2807         let timeout_tx;
2808         {
2809                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2810                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2811                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2812                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2813
2814                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2815                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2816
2817                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2818                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2819                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2820                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2821
2822                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2823                 node_txn.clear();
2824         }
2825
2826         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2827         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2828         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2829         {
2830                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2831                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2832                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2833                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2834         }
2835
2836         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2837         {
2838                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2839                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2840                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2841                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2842                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2843                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2844                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2845                 } else {
2846                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2847                 }
2848         }
2849
2850         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2851         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2852         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2853         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2854         match events[0] {
2855                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2856                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2857                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2858                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2859                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2860                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2861                 },
2862                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2863         };
2864
2865         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2866         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2867         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2868
2869         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2870         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2871
2872         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2873         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2874         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2875         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2876         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2877         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2878         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2879         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2880         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2881 }
2882
2883 #[test]
2884 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2885         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2886         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2887         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2888 }
2889
2890 #[test]
2891 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2892         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2893         // and fail backward accordingly.
2894
2895         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2896         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2897         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2898         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2899
2900         // Create some initial channels
2901         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2902         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2903
2904         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2905         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2906         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2907         // Revoke the old state
2908         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2909
2910         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2911
2912         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2913         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2914         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2915         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2916         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2917
2918         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2919         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2920         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2921         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2922         match events[0] {
2923                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
2924                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2925                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2926                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2927                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2928                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2929
2930                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2931                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
2932                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
2933                 },
2934                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2935         }
2936 }
2937
2938 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
2939         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
2940         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
2941         // commitment transaction anymore.
2942         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
2943         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
2944         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
2945         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
2946         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
2947         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
2948         // transactions:
2949         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
2950         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
2951         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
2952         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
2953         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
2954         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2955         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2956         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2957         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2958
2959         // Create some initial channels
2960         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2961         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2962
2963         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
2964         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2965         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2966         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
2967         // Revoke the old state
2968         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2969
2970         let value = if use_dust {
2971                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
2972                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
2973                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
2974         } else { 3000000 };
2975
2976         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2977         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2978         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2979
2980         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
2981         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2982         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2983         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2984         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2985         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2986         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2987         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2988         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2989         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2990         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
2991         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
2992
2993         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
2994         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2995         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2996         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2997         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2998         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2999         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3000         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3001         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3002         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3003         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3004         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3005         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3006         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3007         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3008         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3009
3010         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3011         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3012         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3013         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3014         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3015         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3016         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3017         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3018         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3019         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3020         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3021         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3022         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3023         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3024         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3025         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3026         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3027         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3028
3029         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3030         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3031         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3032         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3033         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3034         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3035         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3036
3037         if deliver_bs_raa {
3038                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3039                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3040                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3041                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3042                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3043                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3044                 match events[0] {
3045                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3046                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3047                 };
3048                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3049                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3050         }
3051
3052         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3053         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3054
3055         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3056         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3057         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3058
3059         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3060         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
3061         match events[0] {
3062                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3063                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3064         }
3065         match events[1] {
3066                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3067                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3068                 },
3069                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3070         }
3071         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3072                 match events[2] {
3073                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3074                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3075                 };
3076         }
3077         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3078         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3079
3080         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3081         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3082         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3083                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3084                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3085         }
3086         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3087                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3088                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3089                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3090                 },
3091                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3092         }
3093         if deliver_bs_raa {
3094                 match events[0] {
3095                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3096                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3097                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3098                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3099                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3100                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3101                         },
3102                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3103                 }
3104         }
3105         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3106                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3107                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3108                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3109                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3110                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3111                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3112
3113                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3114                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3115                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3116
3117                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3118
3119                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3120                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3121                         match events[0] {
3122                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3123                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3124                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3125                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3126                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3127                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3128                                         }
3129                                 },
3130                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3131                         }
3132                         match events[1] {
3133                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3134                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3135                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3136                                 },
3137                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3138                         }
3139                         match events[2] {
3140                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3141                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3142                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3143                                 },
3144                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3145                         }
3146                 },
3147                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3148         }
3149
3150         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3151         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3152         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3153 }
3154
3155 #[test]
3156 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3157         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3158         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3159         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3160         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3161 }
3162
3163 #[test]
3164 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3165         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3166         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3167         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3168         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3169 }
3170
3171 #[test]
3172 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3173         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3174         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3175         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3176         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3177         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3178
3179         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3180         {
3181                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3182                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3183                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3184
3185                 let payment_event = {
3186                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3187                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3188                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3189                 };
3190                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3191                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3192         }
3193
3194         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3195         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3196         {
3197                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3198                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3199
3200                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3201         }
3202
3203         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3204         {
3205                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3206
3207                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3208                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3209                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3210                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3211                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3212                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3213
3214                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3215                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3216                         channel_id: chan.2,
3217                         htlc_id: 0,
3218                         amount_msat: 0,
3219                         payment_hash,
3220                         cltv_expiry,
3221                         onion_routing_packet,
3222                 };
3223                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3224         }
3225         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3226         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3227         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3228         match events[0] {
3229                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3230                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3231                 },
3232                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3233         }
3234         match events[1] {
3235                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3236                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3237                 },
3238                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3239         }
3240         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3241         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3242 }
3243
3244 #[test]
3245 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3246         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3247         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3248         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3249         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3250         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3251         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3252         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3253
3254         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3255         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3256         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3257         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3258         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3259         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3260
3261         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3262         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3263         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3264
3265         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3266         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3267         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3268         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3269         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3270
3271         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3272         // registering new transactions
3273         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3274         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3275 }
3276
3277 #[test]
3278 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3279         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3280         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3281         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3282         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3283         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3284         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3285         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3286
3287         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3288
3289         let mut payment_event = {
3290                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3291                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3292
3293                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3294                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3295                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3296         };
3297
3298         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3299         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3300
3301         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3302
3303         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3304         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3305         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3306         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3307
3308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3309         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3310         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3311         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3312         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3313
3314         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3315         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3316         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3317
3318         nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3319         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3320         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3321         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3322         let tx = {
3323                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3324                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3325                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3326                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3327                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3328                 node_txn.remove(0)
3329         };
3330
3331         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3332
3333         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3334         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3335         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3336         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3337
3338         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3339         {
3340                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3341                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3342         }
3343         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3344         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3345         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3346         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3347         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3348         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3349         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3350
3351         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3352 }
3353
3354 #[test]
3355 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3356         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3357         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3358         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3359         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3360
3361         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3362         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3363         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3364         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3365         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3366
3367         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3368
3369         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3370         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3371         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3372         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3373         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3374
3375         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3376         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3377
3378         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3379         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3380 }
3381
3382 #[test]
3383 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3384         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3385         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3386         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3387         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3388         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3389         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3390         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3391
3392         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3393         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3394         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3395
3396         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3397         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3398         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3399         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3400
3401         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3402         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3403         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3404
3405         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3406         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3407         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3408         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3409
3410         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3411         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3412
3413         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3414         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3415
3416         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3417         {
3418                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3419                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3420                 match events[0] {
3421                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3422                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3423                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3424                         },
3425                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3426                 }
3427                 match events[1] {
3428                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3429                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3430                                 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3431                         },
3432                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3433                 }
3434         }
3435
3436         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3437         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3438 }
3439
3440 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3441         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3442         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3443         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3444         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3445         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3446
3447         let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3448         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3449                 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3450                 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3451                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3452                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3453                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3454         } else {
3455                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3456         }
3457
3458         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3459
3460         let payment_event = {
3461                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3462                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3463
3464                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3465                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3466                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3467         };
3468         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3469
3470         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3471                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3472         } else {
3473                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3474                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3475                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3476                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3477                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3478
3479                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3480                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3481                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3482                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3483
3484                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3485                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3486                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3487                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3488                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3489
3490                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3491                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3492                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3493                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3494                                         }
3495                                 }
3496                         }
3497                 }
3498         }
3499
3500         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3501         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3502         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3503                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3504                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3505                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3506                         //
3507                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3508                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3509                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3510                         //
3511                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3512                         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3513                 }
3514                 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3515                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3516                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3517         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3518                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3519                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3520         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3521                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3522                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3523         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3524                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3525                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3526         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3527                 // Everything was delivered...
3528                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3529         }
3530
3531         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3532         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3533         match events_1[0] {
3534                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3535                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3536         };
3537
3538         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3539         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3540         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3541
3542         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3543
3544         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3545         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3546         match events_2[0] {
3547                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3548                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3549                         assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3550                         match &purpose {
3551                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3552                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3553                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3554                                 },
3555                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3556                         }
3557                 },
3558                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3559         }
3560
3561         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3562         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3563
3564         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3565         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3566         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3567                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3568                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3569                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3570                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3571                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3572                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3573                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3574                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3575                 },
3576                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3577         };
3578
3579         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3580                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3581
3582                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3583                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3584                 match events_4[0] {
3585                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3586                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3587                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3588                         },
3589                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3590                 }
3591
3592                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3593                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3594                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3595                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3596
3597                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3598                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3599                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3600                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3601
3602                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3603                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3604                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3605                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3606                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3607
3608                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3609                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3610                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3611                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3612                                         }
3613                                 }
3614                         }
3615                 }
3616         }
3617
3618         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3619         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3620         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3621                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3622                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3623                         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3624                         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3625                         match events_4[0] {
3626                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3627                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3628                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3629                                 },
3630                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3631                         }
3632                 } else {
3633                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3634                 }
3635         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3636                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3637                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3638         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3639                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3640                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3641         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3642                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3643                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3644         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3645                 // Everything was delivered...
3646                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3647         }
3648
3649         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3650         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3651         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3652
3653         // Channel should still work fine...
3654         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3655         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3656         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3657 }
3658
3659 #[test]
3660 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3661         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3662         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3663         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3664         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3665 }
3666
3667 #[test]
3668 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3669         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3670         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3671         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3672         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3673 }
3674
3675 #[test]
3676 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3677         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3678         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3679         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3680         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3681         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3682         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3683         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3684         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3685         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3686
3687         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3688         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3689
3690         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3691         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3692         let chan_id;
3693         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3694         match events_1[0] {
3695                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3696                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3697                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3698                 },
3699                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3700         }
3701
3702         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3703
3704         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3705         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3706
3707         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3708         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3709         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3710         let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3711                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3712                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3713                         msg.clone()
3714                 },
3715                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3716         };
3717         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3718                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3719                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3720                         msg.clone()
3721                 },
3722                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3723         };
3724
3725         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3726
3727         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3728         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3729         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3730         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3731         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3732                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3733                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3734                         msg.clone()
3735                 },
3736                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3737         };
3738         let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3739                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3740                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3741                 },
3742                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3743         };
3744
3745         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3746         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3747         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3748         let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3749                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3750                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3751                 },
3752                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3753         };
3754
3755         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3756         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3757         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3758
3759         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3760         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3761         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3762
3763         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3764         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3765         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3766
3767         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3768         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3769         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3770
3771         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3772         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3773         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3774         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3775         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3776         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3777                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3778         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3779
3780         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3781         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3782                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3783                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3784                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3785                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3786                         keys_manager,
3787                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3788                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3789                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3790                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
3791                         channel_monitors,
3792                 }).unwrap()
3793         };
3794         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3795         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3796
3797         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3798         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3799         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3800
3801         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3802
3803         // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3804         nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3805         let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3806         let mut found_announcement = false;
3807         for event in msgs.iter() {
3808                 match event {
3809                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3810                                 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3811                         },
3812                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3813                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3814                 }
3815         }
3816         assert!(found_announcement);
3817 }
3818
3819 #[test]
3820 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3821         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3822         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3823         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3824         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3825         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3826         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3827         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3828
3829         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3830
3831         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3832         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3833         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3834         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3835
3836         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3837         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3838         match events_1[0] {
3839                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3840                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3841         }
3842
3843         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3844         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3845
3846         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3847         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3848         match events_2[0] {
3849                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3850                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3851                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3852                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3853                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3854                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3855                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3856
3857                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3858                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3859                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3860                         match events_3[0] {
3861                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3862                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3863                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3864                                 },
3865                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3866                         }
3867
3868                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3869                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3870                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3871                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3872                 },
3873                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3874         }
3875
3876         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3877         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3878
3879         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3880         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3881         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3882         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3883         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3884         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3885
3886         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3887         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3888         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3889         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3890
3891         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3892         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3893
3894         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3895         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3896
3897         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3898
3899         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3900         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3901         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3902         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3903         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3904         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3905         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3906         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3907         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3908         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3909
3910         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3911         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3912         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3913         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3914         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3915         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3916         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3918
3919         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3920         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3921         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3922         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3923         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3924         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3925         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3926         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3927
3928         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3929         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3930         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3931         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3932
3933         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3934         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3935         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3936         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3937
3938         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3939         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3940         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3941
3942         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3943
3944         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3945         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3946         match events_5[0] {
3947                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
3948                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
3949                         match &purpose {
3950                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3951                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3952                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
3953                                 },
3954                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3955                         }
3956                 },
3957                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3958         }
3959
3960         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
3961         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3962         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3963
3964         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3965 }
3966
3967 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
3968         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
3969         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
3970         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3971         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3972         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3973         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3974
3975         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3976
3977         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
3978                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
3979                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
3980                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
3981                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
3982                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
3983                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
3984                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3985                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3986                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3987                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
3988                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
3989                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
3990                 our_payment_hash
3991         } else {
3992                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
3993         };
3994
3995         let mut block = Block {
3996                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
3997                 txdata: vec![],
3998         };
3999         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4000         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4001         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4002         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4003                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4004                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4005                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4006         }
4007
4008         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4009
4010         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4011         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4012         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4013         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4014         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4015         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4016
4017         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4018         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4019         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4020         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4021         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4022         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4023 }
4024
4025 #[test]
4026 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4027         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4028         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4029 }
4030
4031 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4032         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4033         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4034         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4035         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4036         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4037         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4038         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4039
4040         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4041         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4042         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4043         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4044
4045         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4046         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4047         {
4048                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4049         }
4050         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4051         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4052
4053         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4054         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4055         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4056         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4057         if forwarded_htlc {
4058                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4059                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4060                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4061                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4062                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4063         }
4064         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4065
4066         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4067         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4068         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4069         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4070
4071         if forwarded_htlc {
4072                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4073                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4074                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4075                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4076                 match fail_commit[0] {
4077                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4078                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4079                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4080                         },
4081                         _ => unreachable!(),
4082                 }
4083                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4084         } else {
4085                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, true);
4086         }
4087 }
4088
4089 #[test]
4090 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4091         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4092         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4093 }
4094
4095 #[test]
4096 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4097         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4098         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4099         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4100         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4101         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4102         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4103         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4104         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4105         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4106
4107         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4108
4109         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4110
4111         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4112         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4113         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4114                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4115
4116         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4117         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4118         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4119         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4120         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4121         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4122         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4123         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4124                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4125         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4126
4127         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4128         let config = UserConfig::default();
4129         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4130                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4131                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4132                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4133                         default_config: config,
4134                         keys_manager,
4135                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4136                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4137                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4138                         logger: &logger,
4139                         channel_monitors,
4140                 }).unwrap()
4141         };
4142         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4143         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4144
4145         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4146         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4147         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4148         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4149
4150         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4151         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4152         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4153         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4154
4155         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4156         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4157         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4158         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4159
4160         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4161         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4162         for node in nodes.iter() {
4163                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4164                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4165                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4166         }
4167
4168         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4169 }
4170
4171 #[test]
4172 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4173         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4174         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4175         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4176         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4177         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4178         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4179         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4180         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4181         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4182         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4183
4184         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4185         let channel_value = 100000;
4186         let push_msat = 10001;
4187         let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4188         let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4189         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4190         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4191         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4192         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4193         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4194
4195         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4196
4197         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4198         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4199
4200         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4201         {
4202                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4203                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4204                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4205                 added_monitors.clear();
4206         }
4207
4208         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4209         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4210         {
4211                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4212                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4213                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4214                 added_monitors.clear();
4215         }
4216         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4217
4218         nodes.push(node_a);
4219         nodes.push(node_b);
4220
4221         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4222         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4223         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4224         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4225
4226         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4227         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4228         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4229         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4230         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4231         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4232         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4233         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4234                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4235         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4236
4237         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4238         let config = UserConfig::default();
4239         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4240                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4241                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4242                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4243                         default_config: config,
4244                         keys_manager,
4245                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4246                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4247                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4248                         logger: &logger,
4249                         channel_monitors,
4250                 }).unwrap()
4251         };
4252         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4253         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4254
4255         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4256
4257         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4258         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4259
4260         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4261         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4262         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4263         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4264         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4265
4266         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4267         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4268         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4269
4270         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4271         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4272         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4273         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4274
4275         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4276         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4277         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4278         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4279
4280         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4281         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4282         for node in nodes.iter() {
4283                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4284                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4285                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4286         }
4287
4288         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4289 }
4290
4291 #[test]
4292 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4293         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4294         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4295         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4296         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4297         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4298         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4299         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4300         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4301         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4302         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4303
4304         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4305         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4306
4307         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4308
4309         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4310         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4311         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4312
4313         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4314         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4315         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4316         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4317         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4318         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4319         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4320         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4321                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4322         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4323
4324         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4325         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4326                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4327                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4328                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4329                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4330                         keys_manager,
4331                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4332                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4333                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4334                         logger: &logger,
4335                         channel_monitors,
4336                 }).unwrap()
4337         };
4338         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4339         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4340
4341         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4342         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4343         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4344
4345         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4346
4347         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4348         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4349 }
4350
4351 #[test]
4352 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4353         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4354         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4355         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4356         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4357         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4358         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4359         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4360         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4361         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4362         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4363         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4364         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4365         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4366
4367         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4368         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4369                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4370                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4371                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4372         }
4373
4374         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4375
4376         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4377         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4378
4379         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4380         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4381         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4382         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4383
4384         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4385         // nodes[3])
4386         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4387         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4388                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4389                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4390                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4391         }
4392
4393         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4394         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4395         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4396         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4397         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4398         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4399
4400
4401         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4402         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4403                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4404                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4405                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4406                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4407         }
4408
4409         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4410         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4411                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4412                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4413                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4414                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4415         }
4416
4417         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4418         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4419                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4420                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4421                 keys_manager,
4422                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4423                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4424                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4425                 logger: &logger,
4426                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4427         }) { } else {
4428                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4429         };
4430
4431         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4432         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4433                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4434                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4435                 keys_manager,
4436                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4437                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4438                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4439                 logger: &logger,
4440                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4441         }).unwrap();
4442         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4443         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4444
4445         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4446                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4447                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4448                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4449                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4450         }
4451
4452         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4453                 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4454                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4455         }
4456         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4457         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4458
4459         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4460         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4461         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4462         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4463         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4464
4465         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4466         let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4467         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4468         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4469         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4470         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4471         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4472                 match action {
4473                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4474                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4475                         },
4476                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4477                 }
4478         }
4479 }
4480
4481 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4482         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4483                 {
4484                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4485                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4486                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4487                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4488                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4489                                 match event {
4490                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4491                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4492                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4493                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4494                                                 }
4495                                         },
4496                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4497                                 };
4498                         }
4499                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4500                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4501                                         txn.push(tx);
4502                                 }
4503                         }
4504                         txn
4505                 }
4506         }
4507 }
4508
4509 #[test]
4510 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4511         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4512         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4513         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4514         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4515         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4516
4517         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4518         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4519         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4520         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4521         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4522         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4523         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4524         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4525         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4526
4527         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4528         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4529
4530         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4531         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4532         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4533         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4534         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4535 }
4536
4537 #[test]
4538 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4539         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4540         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4541         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4542         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4543         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4544         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4545
4546         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4547         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4548         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4549         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4550         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4551
4552         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4553         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4554         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4555         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4556
4557         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4558         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4559         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4560         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4561         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4562
4563         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4564         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4565         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4566 }
4567
4568 #[test]
4569 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4570         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4571         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4572
4573         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4574         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4575         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4576         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4577
4578         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4579         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4580         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4581         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4582         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4583
4584         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4585         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4586         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4587         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4588         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4589
4590         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4591         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4592         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4593
4594         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4595         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4596         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4597         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4598         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4599 }
4600
4601 #[test]
4602 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4603         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4604         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4605         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4606         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4607
4608         // Create some initial channels
4609         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4610
4611         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4612
4613         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4614         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4615         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4616
4617         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4618         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4619         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4620         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4621         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4622         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4623         match events[0] {
4624                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4625                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4626         }
4627         match events[1] {
4628                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4629                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4630         }
4631
4632         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4633         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4634         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4635         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4636         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4637         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4638         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4639
4640         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4641         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4642         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4643
4644         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4645         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4646         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4647 }
4648
4649 #[test]
4650 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4651         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4652         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4653         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4654         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4655
4656         // Create some initial channels
4657         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4658
4659         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4660         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4661
4662         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4663
4664         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4665         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4666         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4667
4668         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4669         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4670         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4671         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4672         match events[0] {
4673                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4674                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4675         }
4676         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4677
4678         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4679         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4680         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4681         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4682         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4683         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4684
4685         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4686         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4687         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4688         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4689
4690         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4691         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4692         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4693         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4694         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4695 }
4696
4697 #[test]
4698 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4699         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4700         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4701         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4702         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4703
4704         // Create some initial channels
4705         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4706
4707         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4708         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4709         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4710         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4711
4712         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4713
4714         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4715         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4716         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4717         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4718
4719         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4720         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4721         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4722         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4723
4724         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4725         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4726
4727         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4728         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4729         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4730 }
4731
4732 #[test]
4733 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4734         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4735         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4736         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4737         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4738         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4739
4740         // Create some initial channels
4741         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4742
4743         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4744         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4745         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4746         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4747
4748         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4749
4750         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4751         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4752         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4753         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4754         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4755         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4756
4757         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4758         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4759         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4760         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4761         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4762         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4763         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4764
4765         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4766         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4767         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4768         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4769         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4770         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4771
4772         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4773         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4774         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4775         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4776         // transactions next...
4777         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4778         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4779
4780         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4781         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4782         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4783                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4784         } else {
4785                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4786                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4787         }
4788
4789         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4790         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4791
4792         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4793         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4794
4795         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4796         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4797         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4798         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4799         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4800 }
4801
4802 #[test]
4803 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4804         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4805         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4806         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4807         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4808         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4809
4810         // Create some initial channels
4811         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4812
4813         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4814         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4815         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4816         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4817
4818         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4819         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4820
4821         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4822
4823         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4824         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4825         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4826         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4827         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4828         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4829
4830         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4831         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4832         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4833         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4834
4835         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4836         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4837         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4838
4839         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4840         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4841         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4842         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4843         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4844         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4845
4846         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4847         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4848
4849         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4850         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4851         // transactions next...
4852         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4853         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4854         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4855                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4856         } else {
4857                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4858                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4859         }
4860
4861         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4862         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4863
4864         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4865
4866         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4867         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4868
4869         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4870         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4871
4872         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4873         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4874         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4875         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4876         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4877         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4878         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4879         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4880 }
4881
4882 #[test]
4883 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4884         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4885         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4886         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4887         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4888         // channel.
4889         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4890         // gets broadcast.
4891
4892         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4893         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4894         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4895         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4896
4897         // Create some initial channels
4898         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4899         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4900
4901         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4902         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4903         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4904         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4905         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4906
4907         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4908         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4909         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4910
4911         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
4912         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4913         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4914         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4915         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4916         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4917         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4918         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4919         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4920         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4921
4922         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4923         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4924         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4925         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4926
4927         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4928         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4929         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
4930         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
4931         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
4932         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
4933         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
4934         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4935         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4936         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4937
4938         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4939         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4940         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
4941         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4942         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4943         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4944         match events[0] {
4945                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4946                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4947         }
4948         match events[1] {
4949                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
4950                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4951                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4952                 },
4953                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4954         }
4955         {
4956                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4957                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
4958                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4959                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
4960                 b_txn.clear();
4961         }
4962         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4963         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4964         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4965         match msg_events[0] {
4966                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4967                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4968         }
4969         match msg_events[1] {
4970                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4971                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4972         }
4973         match msg_events[2] {
4974                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4975                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4976                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4977                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4978                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4979                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4980                 },
4981                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4982         };
4983         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4984         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4985         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4986         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4987         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4988         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
4989         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
4990         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4991         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
4992         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4993         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4994         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4995         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4996
4997         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4998         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4999 }
5000
5001 #[test]
5002 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5003         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5004         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5005         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5006         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5007         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5008         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5009         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5010         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5011         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5012         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5013         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5014                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5015         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5016
5017         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5018         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5019         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5020
5021         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5022         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5023         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5024         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5025         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5026
5027         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5028
5029         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5030         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5031         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5032         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5033         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5034         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5035
5036         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5037         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5038         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5039
5040         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5041         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5042         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5043         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5044         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5045
5046         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5047         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5048                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5049                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5050                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5051                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5052
5053                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5054                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5055                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5056                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5057                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5058                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5059                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5060
5061                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5062                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5063                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5064                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5065         }
5066
5067         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5068         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5069         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5070         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5071         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5072         match events[0] {
5073                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5074                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5075         }
5076         match events[1] {
5077                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5078                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5079         }
5080         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5081         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5082         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5083         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5084         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5085         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5086         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5087         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5088         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5089         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5090         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5091         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5092         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5093
5094         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5095         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5096         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5097         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5098         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5099         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5100         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5101         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5102         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5104
5105         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5106         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5107         {
5108                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5109         }
5110         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5111
5112         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5113         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5114         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5115         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5116         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5117         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5118         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5119         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5120         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5121         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5122         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5123         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5124
5125         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5126         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5127
5128         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5129         match events[0] {
5130                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5131                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5132                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5133                 }
5134                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5135         }
5136 }
5137
5138 #[test]
5139 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5140         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5141         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5142         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5143         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5144
5145         // Create some initial channels
5146         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5147
5148         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5149         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5150         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5151         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5152         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5153
5154         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5155         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5157         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5158         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5159         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5160         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5161         match events[0] {
5162                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5163                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5164         }
5165         match events[1] {
5166                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5167                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5168         }
5169         let node_tx = {
5170                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5171                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5172                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5173                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5174                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5175                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5176                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5177                 node_txn[0].clone()
5178         };
5179
5180         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5181         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5182
5183         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5184         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5185         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5186         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5187         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5188         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5189 }
5190
5191 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5192         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5193         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5194         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5195         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5196         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5197         // use the same payment hashes.
5198         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5199         //
5200         // A \         / E
5201         //    - C - D -
5202         // B /         \ F
5203         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5204         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5205         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5206         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5207         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5208         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5209         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5210         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5211                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5212         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5213
5214         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5215         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5216         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5217         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5218         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5219
5220         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5221         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5222         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5223         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5224
5225         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5226         // 0th HTLC:
5227         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5228         // 1st HTLC:
5229         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5230         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5231         // 2nd HTLC:
5232         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5233         // 3rd HTLC:
5234         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5235         // 4th HTLC:
5236         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5237         // 5th HTLC:
5238         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5239         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5240         // 6th HTLC:
5241         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5242         // 7th HTLC:
5243         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5244
5245         // 8th HTLC:
5246         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5247         // 9th HTLC:
5248         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5249         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5250
5251         // 10th HTLC:
5252         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5253         // 11th HTLC:
5254         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5255         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5256
5257         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5258         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5259         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5260         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5261         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5262
5263         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5264         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5265         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5266         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5267         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5268         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5269         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5270         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5271         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5272
5273         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5274         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5275         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5276         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5277         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5278         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5279
5280         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5281         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5282         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5283         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5284         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5285         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5286
5287         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5288         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5289         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5290         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5291
5292         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5293
5294         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5295         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5296         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5297         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5298         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5299         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5300         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5301         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5302         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5303         if deliver_last_raa {
5304                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5305         } else {
5306                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5307         }
5308
5309         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5310         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5311         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5312         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5313         //
5314         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5315         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5316         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5317         //
5318         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5319         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5320         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5321
5322         if announce_latest {
5323                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5324         } else {
5325                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5326         }
5327         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5328         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5329                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5330                 events[1].clone()
5331         } else {
5332                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5333                 events[0].clone()
5334         };
5335         match close_event {
5336                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5337                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5338         }
5339
5340         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5341         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5342         if deliver_last_raa {
5343                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5344         } else {
5345                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5346         }
5347         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5348
5349         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5350         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5351         let mut a_done = false;
5352         for msg in cs_msgs {
5353                 match msg {
5354                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5355                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5356                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5357                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5358                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5359                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5360                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5361                                         }
5362                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5363                                         assert!(!a_done);
5364                                         a_done = true;
5365                                         &nodes[0]
5366                                 } else {
5367                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5368                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5369                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5370                                         }
5371                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5372                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5373                                         &nodes[1]
5374                                 };
5375                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5376                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5377                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5378                                 if announce_latest {
5379                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5380                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5381                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5382                                         }
5383                                 }
5384                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5385                         },
5386                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5387                 }
5388         }
5389
5390         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5391         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5392         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5393         let mut as_updates = 0;
5394         for event in as_events.iter() {
5395                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5396                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5397                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5398                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5399                         } else {
5400                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5401                         }
5402                         if network_update.is_some() {
5403                                 as_updates += 1;
5404                         }
5405                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5406         }
5407         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5408         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5409         if announce_latest {
5410                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5411                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5412         }
5413         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5414
5415         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5416         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5417         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5418         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5419         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5420                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5421                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5422                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5423                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5424                         } else {
5425                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5426                         }
5427                         if network_update.is_some() {
5428                                 bs_updates += 1;
5429                         }
5430                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5431         }
5432         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5433         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5434         if announce_latest {
5435                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5436         }
5437         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5438
5439         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5440         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5441         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5442         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5443         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5444         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5445 }
5446
5447 #[test]
5448 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5449         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5450 }
5451
5452 #[test]
5453 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5454         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5455 }
5456
5457 #[test]
5458 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5459         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5460         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5461         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5462 }
5463
5464 #[test]
5465 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5466         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5467         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5468         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5469         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5470
5471         // Create some initial channels
5472         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5473
5474         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5475         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5476         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5477         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5478
5479         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5480         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5481         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5483         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5484         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5485
5486         let htlc_timeout = {
5487                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5488                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5489                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5490                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5491                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5492                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5493                 node_txn[1].clone()
5494         };
5495
5496         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5497         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5498         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5499
5500         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5501         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5502         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5503         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5504         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5505         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5506         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5507         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5508         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5509         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5510                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5511 }
5512
5513 #[test]
5514 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5515         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5516         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5517         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5518
5519         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5520
5521         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5522         let seed = [42; 32];
5523         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5524         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5525         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5526         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5527         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5528         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5529
5530         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5531         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5532
5533         // Create some initial channels
5534         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5535         // for node 0
5536         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5537         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5538         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5539
5540         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5541         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5542         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5543         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5544         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5545
5546         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5547         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5548         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5549         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5550         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5551
5552         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5553         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5554         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5555         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5556             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5557             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5558             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5559                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5560         }
5561
5562         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5563         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5564         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5565         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5566         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5567         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5568
5569         let htlc_timeout = {
5570                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5571                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5572                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5573                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5574                 node_txn[1].clone()
5575         };
5576
5577         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5578         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5579         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5580
5581         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5582         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5583         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5584         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5585         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5586         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5587         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5588         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5589         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5590         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5591         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5592                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5593 }
5594
5595 #[test]
5596 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5597         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5598         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5599         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5600         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5601
5602         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5603
5604         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5605         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5606
5607         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5608         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5609         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5610
5611         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5612         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5613         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5614
5615         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5616         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5617         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5618
5619         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5620         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5621         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5622 }
5623
5624 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5625         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5626         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5627         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5628         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5629         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5630
5631         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5632
5633         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5634         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5635         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5636         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5637
5638         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5639         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5640         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5641         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5642         match events[0] {
5643                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
5644                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5645                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5646                 },
5647                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5648         }
5649
5650         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5651         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5652         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5653         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5654         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5655
5656         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5657         let mut block = Block {
5658                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5659                 txdata: vec![],
5660         };
5661         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5662                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5663                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5664         }
5665         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5666         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5667         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5668         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5669 }
5670
5671 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5672         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5673         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5674         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5675         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5676         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5677
5678         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5679         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5680         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5681
5682         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5683
5684         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5685         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5686         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5687
5688         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5689         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5690
5691         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5692                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5693                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5694         }
5695         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5696         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5697         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5698         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5699 }
5700
5701 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5702         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5703         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5704         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5705         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5706         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5707
5708         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5709         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5710         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5711         // actually revoked.
5712         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5713         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5714         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5715         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5716         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5717
5718         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5719         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5720         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5721         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5722         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5723         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5724         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5725         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5726         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5727         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5728
5729         if check_revoke_no_close {
5730                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5731                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5732         }
5733
5734         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5735         let mut block = Block {
5736                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5737                 txdata: vec![],
5738         };
5739         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5740                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5741                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5742         }
5743         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5744                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5745                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5746                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5747                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5748         } else {
5749                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5750         }
5751 }
5752
5753 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5754 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5755 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5756 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5757 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5758 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5759 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5760 // non-dust HTLCs.
5761 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5762 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5763 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5764 #[test]
5765 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5766         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5767         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5768
5769         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5770         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5771 }
5772
5773 #[test]
5774 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5775         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5776         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5777         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5778         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5779 }
5780
5781 #[test]
5782 #[should_panic]
5783 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5784         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5785         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5786         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5787         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5788         //Force duplicate channel ids
5789         for node in nodes.iter() {
5790                 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5791         }
5792
5793         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5794         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5795         let push_msat=10001;
5796         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5797         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5798         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5799
5800         //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5801         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5802 }
5803
5804 #[test]
5805 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5806         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5807         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5808         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5809         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5810
5811         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5812         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5813         let push_msat=10001;
5814         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5815
5816         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5817         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5818         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5819         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5820         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5821
5822         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5823         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5824         let push_msat=10001;
5825         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5826         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5827         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5828
5829         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5830         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5831         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5832
5833         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5834         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5835         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5836
5837         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5838         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5839         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5840
5841         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5842         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5843         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5844         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5845         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5846         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5847 }
5848
5849 #[test]
5850 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5851         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5852         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5853         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5854         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5855
5856         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5857         let push_msat=10001;
5858         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5859         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5860         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5861         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5862
5863         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5864         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5865         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5866                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5867                         msg.clone()
5868                 },
5869                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5870         };
5871         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5872 }
5873
5874 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5875 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5876 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5877 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5878 #[test]
5879 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5880         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5881         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5882         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5883         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5884         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5885
5886         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5887         // pending_update_fee.
5888         {
5889                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5890                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5891         }
5892         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5893         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5894
5895         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5896         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5897         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5898                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5899                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5900                 },
5901                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5902         };
5903
5904         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5905
5906         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5907         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5908         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5909
5910         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5911         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
5912         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5913
5914         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5915         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
5916         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5917         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5918
5919         // Flush the pending fee update.
5920         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5921         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5922         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5923         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5924         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5925
5926         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5927         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5928         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5929         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5930         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5931         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5932         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5933                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5934         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5935
5936         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5937         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5938         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5939         match &events[0] {
5940                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
5941                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5942                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5943                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
5944                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5945                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5946                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
5947                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
5948                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
5949                 },
5950                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5951         }
5952 }
5953
5954 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5955 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5956 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5957 #[test]
5958 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5959         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5960         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5961         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5962         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5963         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5964
5965         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5966         // pending_update_fee.
5967         {
5968                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5969                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5970         }
5971         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5972         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5973
5974         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5975         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5976         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5977                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5978                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5979                 },
5980                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5981         };
5982
5983         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5984
5985         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5986         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5987         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5988
5989         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5990         let amt_1 = 20000;
5991         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
5992         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5993         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5994
5995         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5996         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
5997         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5998         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5999         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6000         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6001         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6002
6003         // Flush the pending fee update.
6004         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6005         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6006         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6007         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6008         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6009         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6010
6011         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6012         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6013         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6014         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6015         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6016         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6017         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6018                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6019         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6020
6021         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6022         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6023         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6024         match &events[0] {
6025                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6026                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6027                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6028                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6029                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6030                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6031                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6032                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6033                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6034                 },
6035                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6036         }
6037
6038         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6039         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6040                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6041                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6042                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6043         };
6044         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6045                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6046                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6047         };
6048         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6049         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6050         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6051         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6052         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6053         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6054         match events[0] {
6055                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6056                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6057         }
6058         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6059         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6060         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6061         match events[0] {
6062                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6063                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6064         }
6065         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6066         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6067         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6068         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6069         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6070         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6071         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6072         match events[0] {
6073                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6074                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6075                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
6076                 }
6077                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6078         }
6079 }
6080
6081 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6082 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6083 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6084 // once it's freed.
6085 #[test]
6086 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6087         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6088         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6089         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6090         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6091         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6092         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6093         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6094         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6095         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6096         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6097
6098         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6099         // pending_update_fee.
6100         {
6101                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6102                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6103         }
6104         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6105         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6106
6107         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6108         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6109         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6110                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6111                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6112                 },
6113                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6114         };
6115
6116         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6117
6118         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6119         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6120         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6121
6122         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6123         let feemsat = 239;
6124         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6125         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6126         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6127         let payment_event = {
6128                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6129                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6130
6131                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6132                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6133
6134                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6135         };
6136         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6137         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6138         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6139         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6140
6141         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6142         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6143
6144         // Flush the pending fee update.
6145         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6146         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6148         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6149         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6151
6152         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6153         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6154         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6155
6156         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6157                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6158                         msg.clone()
6159                 },
6160                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6161         };
6162
6163         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6165         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6166
6167         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6168         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6169         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6170         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6171                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6172                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6173         }
6174
6175         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6176         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6177         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6178
6179         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6180         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6181         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6182         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6183                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6184                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6185                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6186                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6187                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6188                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6189                 },
6190                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6191         };
6192
6193         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6194         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6195         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6196
6197         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6198         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6199         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6200         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6201         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6202         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6203         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6204         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6205         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6206                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6207                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6208         };
6209         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6210         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6211         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6212 }
6213
6214 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6215 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6216 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6217
6218 #[test]
6219 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6220         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6221         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6222         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6223         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6224         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6225         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6226
6227         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6228         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6229
6230         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6231                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6232         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6233         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6234 }
6235
6236 #[test]
6237 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6238         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6239         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6240         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6241         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6242         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6243         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6244
6245         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6246         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6247         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6248                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6249
6250         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6251         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6252 }
6253
6254 #[test]
6255 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6256         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6257         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6258         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6259         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6260         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6261         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6262
6263         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6264         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6265         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6266         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6267         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6268
6269         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6270         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6271         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6272         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6273         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6274 }
6275
6276 #[test]
6277 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6278         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6279         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6280         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6281         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6282         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6283         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6284         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6285
6286         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6287         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6288                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6289 }
6290
6291 #[test]
6292 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6293         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6294         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6295         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6296         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6297         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6298         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6299         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6300         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6301         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6302
6303         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6304                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6305                 let payment_event = {
6306                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6307                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6308
6309                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6310                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6311                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6312                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6313                         } else {
6314                                 assert!(false);
6315                         }
6316                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6317                 };
6318                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6319                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6320                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6321
6322                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6323                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6324         }
6325         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6326         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6327                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6328
6329         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6330         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6331 }
6332
6333 #[test]
6334 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6335         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6336         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6337         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6338         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6339         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6340         let channel_value = 100000;
6341         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6342         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6343
6344         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6345
6346         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6347         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6348         // limits us to.
6349         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6350         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6351                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6352
6353         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6354         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6355
6356         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6357 }
6358
6359 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6360 #[test]
6361 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6362         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6363         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6364         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6365         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6366         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6367         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6368         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6369         {
6370                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6371                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6372                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6373         }
6374
6375         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6376         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6377         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6378         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6379         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6380         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6381         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6382         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6383         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6384         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6385         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6386 }
6387
6388 #[test]
6389 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6390         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6391         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6392         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6393         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6394         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6395         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6396
6397         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6398         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6399         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6400         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6401         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6402
6403         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6404         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6405         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6406         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6407         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6408
6409         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6410         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6411         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6412         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6413         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6414
6415         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6416         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6417         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6418         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6419         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6420 }
6421
6422 #[test]
6423 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6424         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6425         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6426         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6427         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6428         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6429         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6430         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6431
6432         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6433         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6434         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6435         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6436         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6437         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6438
6439         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6440                 channel_id: chan.2,
6441                 htlc_id: 0,
6442                 amount_msat: 1000,
6443                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6444                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6445                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6446         };
6447
6448         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6449                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6450                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6451         }
6452         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6453         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6454
6455         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6456         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6457         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6458         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6459         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6460 }
6461
6462 #[test]
6463 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6464         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6465         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6466         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6467         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6468         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6469         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6470
6471         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6472         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6474         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6475         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6476         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6477
6478         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6479         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6480         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6481         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6482         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6483 }
6484
6485 #[test]
6486 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6487         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6488         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6489         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6490         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6491         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6492
6493         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6494         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6495         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6496         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6497         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6498         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6499         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6500
6501         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6502         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6503         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6504         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6505         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6506 }
6507
6508 #[test]
6509 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6510         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6511         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6512         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6513         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6514         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6515         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6516         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6517
6518         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6519         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6520         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6521         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6522         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6523         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6524
6525         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6526         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6527         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6528         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6529         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6530         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6531         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6532         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6533         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6534         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6535         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6536         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6537         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6538
6539         //Resend HTLC
6540         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6541         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6542         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6543         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6544         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6545
6546         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6547
6548         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6549         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6550         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6551         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6552         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6553 }
6554
6555 #[test]
6556 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6557         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6558
6559         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6560         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6561         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6562         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6563         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6564         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6565         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6566
6567         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6568         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6569         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6570
6571         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6572                 channel_id: chan.2,
6573                 htlc_id: 0,
6574                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6575         };
6576
6577         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6578
6579         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6580         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6581         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6582         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6583         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6584 }
6585
6586 #[test]
6587 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6588         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6589
6590         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6591         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6592         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6593         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6594         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6595
6596         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6597         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6598         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6599         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6600         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6601
6602         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6603                 channel_id: chan.2,
6604                 htlc_id: 0,
6605                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6606         };
6607
6608         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6609
6610         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6611         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6612         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6613         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6614         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6615 }
6616
6617 #[test]
6618 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6619         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6620
6621         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6622         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6623         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6624         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6625         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6626
6627         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6628         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6629         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6630         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6631         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6632         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6633                 channel_id: chan.2,
6634                 htlc_id: 0,
6635                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6636                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6637         };
6638
6639         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6640
6641         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6642         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6643         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6644         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6645         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6646 }
6647
6648 #[test]
6649 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6650         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6651
6652         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6653         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6654         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6655         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6656         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6657
6658         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6659
6660         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6661         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6662
6663         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6664         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6665         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6666                 match events[0] {
6667                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6668                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6669                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6670                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6671                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6672                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6673                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6674                         },
6675                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6676                 }
6677         };
6678
6679         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6680
6681         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6682
6683         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6684         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6685         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6686         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6687         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6688 }
6689
6690 #[test]
6691 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6692         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6693
6694         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6695         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6696         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6697         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6698         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6699
6700         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6701
6702         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6703         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6704
6705         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6706         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6707         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6708                 match events[0] {
6709                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6710                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6711                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6712                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6713                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6714                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6715                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6716                         },
6717                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6718                 }
6719         };
6720
6721         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6722
6723         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6724
6725         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6726         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6727         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6728         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6729         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6730 }
6731
6732 #[test]
6733 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6734         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6735
6736         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6737         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6738         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6739         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6740         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6741
6742         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6743         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6744         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6745
6746         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6747         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6748
6749         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6750         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6751         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6752
6753         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6754
6755         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6756                 match events[0] {
6757                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6758                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6759                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6760                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6761                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6762                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6763                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6764                         },
6765                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6766                 }
6767         };
6768         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6769         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6770
6771         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6772         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6773         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6774         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6775         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6776 }
6777
6778 #[test]
6779 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6780         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6781         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6782
6783         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6784         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6785         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6786         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6787         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6788         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6789
6790         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6791
6792         //First hop
6793         let mut payment_event = {
6794                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6795                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6796                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6797                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6798                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6799         };
6800         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6801         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6802         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6803         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6804         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6805         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6806         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6807         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6808         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6809
6810         //Second Hop
6811         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6812         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6813         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6814         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6815
6816         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6817         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6818         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6819                 match events_3[0] {
6820                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6821                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6822                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6823                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6824                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6825                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6826                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6827                         },
6828                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6829                 }
6830         };
6831
6832         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6833
6834         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6835         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6836         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6837         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6838         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6839
6840         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6841         match events_4[0] {
6842                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6843                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6844                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6845                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6846                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6847                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6848                 },
6849                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6850         };
6851
6852         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6853 }
6854
6855 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6856         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6857         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6858         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6859
6860         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6861         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6862         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6863         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6864         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6865         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6866
6867         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6868
6869         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6870         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6871         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6872         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6873
6874         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6875         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6876
6877         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6878         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6879         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6880         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6881         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6882
6883         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6884         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6885         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6886         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6887
6888         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6889         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6890
6891         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6892         match events[0] {
6893                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6894                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6895                 },
6896                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6897         }
6898         match events[1] {
6899                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6900                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6901                 },
6902                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6903         }
6904
6905         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6906         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6907         if announce_latest {
6908                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6909         } else {
6910                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6911         }
6912
6913         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6914         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6915         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6916
6917         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6918         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6919         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6920         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6921         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6922         let mut first_failed = false;
6923         for event in events {
6924                 match event {
6925                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6926                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6927                                         assert!(!first_failed);
6928                                         first_failed = true;
6929                                 } else {
6930                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6931                                 }
6932                         }
6933                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6934                 }
6935         }
6936 }
6937
6938 #[test]
6939 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6940         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6941         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6942 }
6943
6944 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6945         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6946         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6947         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6948         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6949         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6950         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6951
6952         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6953         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6954         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6955         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6956         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6957
6958         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6959
6960         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6961         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6962
6963         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6964         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6965
6966         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6967         if revoked {
6968                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6969                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6970         }
6971
6972         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6973         if local {
6974                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6975                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6976                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6977                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6978                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
6979
6980                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6981                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6982                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6983                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6984                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
6985                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6986                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6987                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6988                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6989                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6990                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
6991         } else {
6992                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6993                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6994                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6995                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6996                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6997                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6998                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6999                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7000                 if !revoked {
7001                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7002                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7003                         // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7004                         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7005                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7006                         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7007                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7008                 } else {
7009                         // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7010                         // commitment tx
7011                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7012                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7013                         let first;
7014                         match events[0] {
7015                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7016                                         if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7017                                         else { first = false; }
7018                                 },
7019                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7020                         }
7021                         match events[1] {
7022                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7023                                         if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7024                                         else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7025                                 },
7026                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7027                         }
7028                 }
7029         }
7030 }
7031
7032 #[test]
7033 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7034         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7035         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7036         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7037 }
7038
7039 #[test]
7040 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7041         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7042
7043         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7044         low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7045         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7046         high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7047         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7048         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7049         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7050         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7051         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7052
7053         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7054         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7055                 match error {
7056                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7057                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7058                 }
7059         } else { assert!(false) }
7060
7061         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7062         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7063         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7064         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7065         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7066                 match error {
7067                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7068                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7069                 }
7070         } else { assert!(false); }
7071
7072         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7073         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7074         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7075         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7076         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7077         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7078         let reason_msg;
7079         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7080                 match action {
7081                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7082                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7083                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7084                         },
7085                         _ => { panic!(); }
7086                 }
7087         } else { panic!(); }
7088         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7089
7090         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7091         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7092         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7093         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7094         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0) {
7095                 match error {
7096                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7097                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7098                 }
7099         } else { assert!(false); }
7100 }
7101
7102 #[test]
7103 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7104         // We want to be sure that :
7105         // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7106         //   (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7107         // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7108         // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7109         // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7110         let persister;
7111         let logger;
7112         let fee_estimator;
7113         let tx_broadcaster;
7114         let chain_source;
7115         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7116         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7117         // during signing due to revoked tx
7118         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7119         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7120         let monitor;
7121         let node_state_0;
7122         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7123         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7124         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7125
7126         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7127
7128         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7129         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7130         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7131         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7132
7133         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7134         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7135
7136         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7137         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7138
7139         // Restore node A from previous state
7140         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7141         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7142         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7143         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7144         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7145         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7146         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7147         node_state_0 = {
7148                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7149                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7150                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7151                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7152                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7153                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7154                         logger: &logger,
7155                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7156                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7157                         channel_monitors,
7158                 }).unwrap().1
7159         };
7160         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7161         assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7162         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7163         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7164
7165         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7166
7167         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7168         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7169
7170         let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7171
7172         // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7173         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7175
7176         {
7177                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7178                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7179         }
7180
7181         let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7182         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7183                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7184                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7185                         reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7186                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7187                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7188                         match action {
7189                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7190                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7191                                 },
7192                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7193                         }
7194                 } else {
7195                         panic!("Unexpected event")
7196                 }
7197         }
7198
7199         // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7200         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7201         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7202         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7203         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7204
7205         // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7206         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7207         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7208         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7209         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7210         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7211         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7212         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7213         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7214         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7215         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7216 }
7217
7218 #[test]
7219 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7220         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7221         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7222         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7223
7224         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7225         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7226         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7227         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7228
7229         // Create some initial channels
7230         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7231
7232         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7233         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7234         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[0].network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7235         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7236         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7237         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7238         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7239
7240         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7241         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7242         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7243         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7244         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7245
7246         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7247         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7248         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7249         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7250
7251         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7252         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7253         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7254
7255         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7256         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7257         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7258                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7259                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7260                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7261                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7262                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7263                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7264                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7265                 },
7266                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7267         };
7268         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7269
7270         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7271         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7272
7273         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7274         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7275         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7276         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7277 }
7278
7279 #[test]
7280 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7281         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7282         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7283
7284         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7285         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7286         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7287         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7288
7289         let short_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7290         let short_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7291         let short_id_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7292
7293         // Disconnect peers
7294         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7295         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7296
7297         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7298         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7299         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7300         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7301         let mut chans_disabled: HashSet<u64> = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7302         for e in msg_events {
7303                 match e {
7304                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7305                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7306                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7307                                 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7308                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7309                                 }
7310                         },
7311                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7312                 }
7313         }
7314         // Reconnect peers
7315         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7316         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7317         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7318         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7319         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7320         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7321
7322         // Reestablish chan_1
7323         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7324         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7325         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7326         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7327         // Reestablish chan_2
7328         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7329         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7330         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7331         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7332         // Reestablish chan_3
7333         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7334         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7335         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7336         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7337
7338         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7339         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7340         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7341         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7342         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7343         chans_disabled = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7344         for e in msg_events {
7345                 match e {
7346                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7347                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7348                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7349                                 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7350                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7351                                 }
7352                         },
7353                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7354                 }
7355         }
7356 }
7357
7358 #[test]
7359 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7360         // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7361         // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7362         // to forward through that channel.
7363         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7364         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7365         let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7366         no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7367         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7368         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7369         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7370         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7371         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7372         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7373
7374         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7375
7376         // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7377         // not send for private channels.
7378         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7379         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7380         nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7381         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7382         nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7383
7384         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7385         nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7386         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7387         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7388
7389         let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7390         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7391         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7392
7393         let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7394         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7395         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7396         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7397         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7398         let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7399         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7400         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7401         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7402         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7403
7404         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7405         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7406         assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7407
7408         // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7409         // channel:
7410         send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7411
7412         // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7413         // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7414         let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7415                 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7416                 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7417                 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7418                 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7419                 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7420                 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7421         }]);
7422         let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7423         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7424
7425         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7426         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7427         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7428         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7429         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7430
7431         let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7432         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7433         assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7434         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7435         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7436
7437         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7438         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7439         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7440
7441         // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7442         // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7443
7444         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7445         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7446
7447         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7448         let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7449         let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7450         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7451         get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7452
7453         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7454         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7455         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7456         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7457
7458         let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7459         let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7460         let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7461         let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7462         assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7463         assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7464
7465         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7466
7467         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7468         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7469                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7470                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7471                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7472                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7473                         default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7474                         keys_manager,
7475                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7476                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7477                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7478                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
7479                         channel_monitors,
7480                 }).unwrap()
7481         };
7482         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7483         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7484
7485         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7486         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7488         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7489
7490         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7491         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7492         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7493         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7494         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7495         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7496         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7497         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7498
7499         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7500         nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7501         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7502         let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7503         nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7504         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7505         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7506         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7507
7508         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7509         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7510         pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7511         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7512 }
7513
7514 #[test]
7515 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7516         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7517         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7518
7519         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7520         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7521         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7522         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7523
7524         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7525
7526         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7527         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7528         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7529
7530         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7531         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7532         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7533         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7534         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7535         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7536
7537         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7538         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7539                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7540                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7541                 }
7542         }
7543
7544         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7545         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7546
7547         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7548         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7549         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7550         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7551         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7552
7553         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7554         let penalty_1;
7555         let feerate_1;
7556         {
7557                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7558                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7559                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7560                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7561                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7562                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7563                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7564                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7565                 node_txn.clear();
7566         };
7567
7568         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7569         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7570         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7571         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7572         {
7573                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7574                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7575                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7576                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7577                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7578                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7579                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7580                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7581                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7582                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7583                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7584                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7585                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7586                         node_txn.clear();
7587                 }
7588         }
7589         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7590
7591         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7592         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7593         let penalty_3;
7594         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7595         {
7596                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7597                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7598                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7599                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7600                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7601                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7602                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7603                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7604                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7605                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7606                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7607                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7608                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7609                         node_txn.clear();
7610                 }
7611         }
7612         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7613
7614         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7615         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7616 }
7617
7618 #[test]
7619 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7620         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7621         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7622
7623         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7624         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7625         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7626         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7627         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7628
7629         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7630         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7631         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7632         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7633         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7634                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7635         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7636         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7637         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[1].network_graph, None,
7638                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7639         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7640
7641         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7642         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7643         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7644
7645         // Revoke local commitment tx
7646         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7647
7648         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7649         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7650         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7651         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7652         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7653         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7654         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7655
7656         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7657         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7658         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7659
7660         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7661         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7662         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7663
7664         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7665         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7666         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7667         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7668
7669         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7670         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7671         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7672         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7673         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7674         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7675         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7676         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7677         match events[1] {
7678                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7679                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7680         }
7681         let first;
7682         let feerate_1;
7683         let penalty_txn;
7684         {
7685                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7686                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7687                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7688
7689                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7690                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7691                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7692                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7693                 // future).
7694                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7695                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7696                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7697                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7698                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7699                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7700
7701                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7702                 // available, which we check here:
7703                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7704                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7705                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7706
7707                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7708                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7709
7710                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7711                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7712                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7713                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7714
7715                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7716                 // output, checked above).
7717                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7718                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7719                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7720
7721                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7722                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7723                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7724                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7725                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7726                 node_txn.clear();
7727         }
7728
7729         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7730         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7731         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7732         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7733         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7734         {
7735                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7736                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7737
7738                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7739                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7740                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7741                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
7742                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7743                 } else {
7744                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7745                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7746                 }
7747
7748                 node_txn.clear();
7749         };
7750
7751         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7752         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7753         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7754         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7755         let node_txn = {
7756                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7757                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7758
7759                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7760                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7761                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7762                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7763                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7764                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7765                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7766                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7767                 node_txn.clear();
7768                 txn
7769         };
7770         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7771         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7772         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7773         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7774         {
7775                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7776                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7777                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7778                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7779                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7780                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7781                 // up bumped justice generation.
7782                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7783                 node_txn.clear();
7784         }
7785         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7786         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7787 }
7788
7789 #[test]
7790 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7791         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7792         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7793
7794         // Create 2 HTLCs
7795         // Provide preimage for one
7796         // Check aggregation
7797
7798         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7799         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7800         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7801         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7802
7803         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7804         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7805         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7806
7807         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7808         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7809         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7810         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7811         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7812
7813         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7814         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7815         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7816         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7817         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7818
7819         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7820         let timeout;
7821         let preimage;
7822         let preimage_bump;
7823         let feerate_timeout;
7824         let feerate_preimage;
7825         {
7826                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7827                 // 9 transactions including:
7828                 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7829                 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7830                 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7831                 // 1 * HTLC-Timeout
7832                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7833                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7834                 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7835                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7836                 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7837                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7838                 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7839
7840                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7841                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7842                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7843                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7844
7845                 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7846                 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7847                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7848                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7849
7850                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7851                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7852                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7853                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7854
7855                 node_txn.clear();
7856         };
7857         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7858         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7859
7860         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7861         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7862         {
7863                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7864                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7865                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7866                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7867                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7868                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7869
7870                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7871                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7872                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7873                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7874                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7875
7876                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7877                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7878                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7879                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7880                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7881
7882                 node_txn.clear();
7883         }
7884
7885         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7886         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7887 }
7888
7889 #[test]
7890 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7891         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7892         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7893         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7894         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7895         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7896         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7897         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7898         // implement that).
7899         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7900         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7901         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7902         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7903         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7904
7905         let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7906         let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7907
7908         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7909
7910         // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7911         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7912         let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7913
7914         // Must revoke without gaps
7915         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7916         keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7917
7918         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7919         let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7920                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7921
7922         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7923                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7924         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7925         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7926         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7927 }
7928
7929 #[test]
7930 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7931         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7932         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7933
7934         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7935         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7936         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7937         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7938
7939         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7940         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7941         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7942         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7943
7944         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7945         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7946         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7947
7948         // Revoke local commitment tx
7949         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7950
7951         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7952         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7953         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7954         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7955
7956         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7957         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7958         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7959         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7960         let penalty_txn = {
7961                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7962                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7963                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7964                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7965                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7966                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7967                 node_txn.clear();
7968                 penalty_txn
7969         };
7970         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7971         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7972         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7973         {
7974                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7975                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7976                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7977         }
7978 }
7979
7980 #[test]
7981 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7982         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7983         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7984         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7985         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7986         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7987         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7988
7989         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7990
7991         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7992         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7993         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7994         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7995         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7996
7997         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7998         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7999         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8000         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8001
8002         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8003         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8004         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8005         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8006         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8007         match close_ev[0] {
8008                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8009                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8010                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8011                 },
8012                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8013         }
8014 }
8015
8016 #[test]
8017 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8018         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8019         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8020         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8021         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8022
8023         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8024         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8025         override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8026
8027         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8028
8029         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8030         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8031         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8032         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8033 }
8034
8035 #[test]
8036 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8037         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8038         zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8039         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8040         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8041         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8042         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8043
8044         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8045         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8046         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8047
8048         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8049         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8050         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8051 }
8052
8053 #[test]
8054 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8055         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8056         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8057         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8058         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8059         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8060
8061         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8062         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8063         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8064         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8065
8066         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8067         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8068         route.paths.push(path);
8069         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8070         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8071         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8072         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8073         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8074         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8075         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8076         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8077 }
8078
8079 #[test]
8080 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8081         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8082         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8083         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8084         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8085         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8086
8087         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8088
8089         {
8090                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200);
8091                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8092                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8093                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8094                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8095                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8096                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8097                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8098         }
8099         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8100         // values from previous calls.
8101         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8102         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8103         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8104         match events[0] {
8105                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8106                         match &purpose {
8107                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8108                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8109                                 },
8110                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8111                         }
8112                 },
8113                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8114         }
8115 }
8116
8117 #[test]
8118 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8119         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs
8120         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8121         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8122         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8123         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8124
8125         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8126
8127         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8128
8129         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8130         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8131         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8132                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8133         } else { panic!(); }
8134         let mut block = {
8135                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8136                 Block {
8137                         header: BlockHeader {
8138                                 version: 0x2000000,
8139                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8140                                 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8141                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8142                         txdata: vec![],
8143                 }
8144         };
8145         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8146         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8147                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8148         } else { panic!(); }
8149
8150         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8151         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8152         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8153         block.header.time += 1;
8154         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8155         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8156         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8157
8158         {
8159                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8160                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8161                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8162                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8163                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8164                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8165                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8166         }
8167         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8168         // values from previous calls.
8169         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8170         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8171         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8172         match events[0] {
8173                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8174                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8175                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8176                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8177                 },
8178                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8179         }
8180 }
8181
8182 #[test]
8183 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8184         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8185         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8186         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8187         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8188         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8189
8190         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8191
8192         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8193         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8194         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8195         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8196
8197         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8198         // resulting events.
8199         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8200                 () => {
8201                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8202                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8203                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8204                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8205                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8206
8207                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8208                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8209                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8210                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8211                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8212
8213                         // We should fail the payment back
8214                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8215                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8216                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8217                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8218                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8219                                 },
8220                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8221                         }
8222                 }
8223         }
8224
8225         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8226         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8227         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8228
8229         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8230         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8231         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8232         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8233
8234         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8235         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8236         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8237         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8238
8239         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8240         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8241         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8242         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8243 }
8244
8245 #[test]
8246 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8247         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8248         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8249         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8250         //
8251         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8252         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8253         // commitment at same time.
8254
8255         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8256         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8257         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8258         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8259
8260         // Create some initial channel
8261         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8262         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8263
8264         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8265         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8266
8267         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8268         let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8269
8270         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8271         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8272         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8273         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8274         let watchtower = {
8275                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8276                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8277                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8278                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8279                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8280                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8281                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8282                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8283                 watchtower
8284         };
8285         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8286         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8287         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8288         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8289         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8290
8291         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8292         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8293         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8294         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8295         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8296         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8297         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8298                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8299                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8300                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8301                 } else { assert!(false); }
8302         } else { assert!(false); };
8303         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8304         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8305         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8306         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8307 }
8308
8309 #[test]
8310 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8311         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8312         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8313         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8314         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8315
8316         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8317         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8318         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8319         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8320
8321         // Create some initial channel
8322         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8323         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8324
8325         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8326         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8327
8328         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8329         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8330
8331         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8332         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8333         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8334         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8335         let watchtower_alice = {
8336                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8337                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8338                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8339                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8340                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8341                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8342                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8343                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8344                 watchtower
8345         };
8346         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8347         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8348         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8349         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8350         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8351
8352         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8353         {
8354                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8355                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8356                 txn.clear();
8357         }
8358
8359         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8360         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8361         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8362         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8363         let watchtower_bob = {
8364                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8365                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8366                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8367                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8368                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8369                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8370                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8371                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8372                 watchtower
8373         };
8374         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8375         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8376
8377         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8378         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8379         {
8380                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8381         }
8382         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8383
8384         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8385         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8386         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8387         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8388                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8389                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8390                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8391                         if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8392                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8393                 } else { assert!(false); }
8394         } else { assert!(false); };
8395         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8396         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8397
8398         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8399         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8400         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8401
8402         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8403         let bob_state_y;
8404         {
8405                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8406                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8407                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8408                 txn.clear();
8409         };
8410
8411         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8412         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8413         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8414         {
8415                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8416                 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8417                 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8418                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8419                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8420                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8421         }
8422 }
8423
8424 #[test]
8425 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8426         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8427         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8428         // message).
8429         //
8430         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8431         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8432         //
8433         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8434         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8435         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8436         // before receiving funding_signed.
8437         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8438         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8439         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8440         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8441
8442         // Create an initial channel
8443         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8444         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8445         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8446         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8447         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8448
8449         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8450         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8451
8452         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8453         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8454
8455         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8456         let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8457         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8458         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8459         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8460 }
8461
8462 #[test]
8463 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8464         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8465         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8466         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8467         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8468         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8469         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8470
8471         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8472         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8473         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8474         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8475
8476         // Create some initial channels
8477         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8478
8479         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8480         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8481         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8482         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8483         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8484         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8485
8486         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8487         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8488         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8489         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8490         // this test before #653 fix.
8491         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8492         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8493         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8494         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8495         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8496
8497         let htlc_timeout = {
8498                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8499                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8500                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8501                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8502                 node_txn[1].clone()
8503         };
8504
8505         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8506         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8507         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8508         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8509 }
8510
8511 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8512         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8513         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8514         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8515         //
8516         // Steps of the test:
8517         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8518         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8519         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8520         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8521         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8522         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8523         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8524         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8525         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8526         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8527         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8528         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8529
8530         // Create some initial channels
8531         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8532         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8533
8534         // Steps (1) and (2):
8535         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8536         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8537
8538         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8539         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8540         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8541         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8542         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8543         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8544         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8545
8546         // Steps (3) and (4):
8547         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8548         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8549         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8550         if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8551         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8552         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8553         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8554         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8555         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8556                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8557                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8558                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8559                 };
8560                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8561                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8562                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8563                 if broadcast_alice {
8564                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8565                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8566                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8567                 }
8568                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8569                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8570         }
8571
8572         // Step (5):
8573         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8574         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8575         assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8576         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8577         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8578         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8579         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8580         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8581         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8582         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8583
8584         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8585         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8586         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8587         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8588                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8589                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8590                 match events[0] {
8591                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8592                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8593                         },
8594                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8595                 };
8596         }
8597         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8598         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8599         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8600         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8601
8602         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8603         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8604         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8605                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8606                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8607                         (*msg).clone()
8608                 },
8609                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8610         };
8611         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8612                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8613                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8614                         (*updates).clone()
8615                 },
8616                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8617         };
8618
8619         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8620         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8621         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8623
8624         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8625         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8626         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8627                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8628                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8629                         (*msg).clone()
8630                 },
8631                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8632         };
8633         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8634         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8635
8636         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8637         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8638         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8639         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8640         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8641                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8642                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8643                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8644                 if broadcast_alice {
8645                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8646                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8647                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8648                 }
8649                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8650                 if broadcast_alice {
8651                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8652                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8653                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8654                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8655                         // broadcasted.
8656                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8657                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8658                 } else {
8659                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8660                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8661                 }
8662         }
8663
8664         // Step (6):
8665         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8666         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8667         {
8668                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8669                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8670                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8671                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8672                 }
8673                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8674                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8675                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8676                 };
8677                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8678                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8679                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8680                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8681                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8682                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8683                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8684                 } else {
8685                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8686                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8687                 }
8688         }
8689 }
8690
8691 #[test]
8692 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8693         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8694         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8695         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8696         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8697 }
8698
8699 #[test]
8700 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8701         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8702         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8703         //
8704         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8705         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8706         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8707         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8708         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8709         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8710         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8711         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8712
8713         // Create an initial channel
8714         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8715         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8716         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8717         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8718
8719         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8720         // that it is rejected.
8721         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8722         {
8723                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8724                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8725                 match events[0] {
8726                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8727                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8728                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8729                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8730                                 // move forward with it.
8731                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8732                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8733                         },
8734                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8735                 }
8736         }
8737
8738         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8739         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8740
8741         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8742         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8743
8744         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8745         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8746         {
8747                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8748                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8749                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8750                 added_monitors.clear();
8751         }
8752         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8753
8754         let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8755         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8756
8757         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8758         // temporary one).
8759
8760         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8761         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8762         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8763         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8764         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8765         {
8766                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8767                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8768                 match events[0] {
8769                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8770                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8771                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8772                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8773                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8774                         },
8775                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8776                 }
8777         }
8778
8779         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8780         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8781         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8782         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8783         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8784         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8785
8786         let funding_created = {
8787                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8788                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8789                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8790                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8791         };
8792         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8793         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8794         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8795         // still needs to be cleared here.
8796         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8797
8798         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8799         {
8800                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8801                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8802                 match events[0] {
8803                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8804                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8805                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8806                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8807                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8808                         },
8809                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8810                 }
8811         }
8812
8813         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8814         // everything is functional.
8815         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8816         {
8817                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8818                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8819                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8820                 added_monitors.clear();
8821         }
8822
8823         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8824         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8825         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8826         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8827
8828         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8829         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8830         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8831         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8832 }
8833
8834 #[test]
8835 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8836         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8837         //
8838         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8839         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8840         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8841         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8842         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8843         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8844         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8845
8846         // Create some initial channels
8847         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8848         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8849         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8850
8851         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8852         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8853         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8854
8855         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8856         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8857         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8858
8859         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8860         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8861         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8862         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8863         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8864         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8865         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8866         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8867         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8868
8869         // A null channel ID should close all channels
8870         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8871         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8872         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8873         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8874         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8875         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8876         match events[0] {
8877                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8878                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8879                 },
8880                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8881         }
8882         match events[1] {
8883                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8884                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8885                 },
8886                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8887         }
8888         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8889         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8890         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8891         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8892         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8893         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8894
8895         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8896         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8897         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8898 }
8899
8900 #[test]
8901 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8902         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8903         //
8904         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8905         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8906         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8907         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8908         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8909         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8910         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8911         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8912
8913         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8914         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8915         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8916
8917         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
8918         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8919                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8920                 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
8921         }
8922
8923         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8924         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8925         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8926
8927         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8928         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8929
8930         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8931         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8932
8933         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8934         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8935         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8936
8937         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
8938         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8939         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8940         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8941         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8942         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8943         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8944                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8945                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8946                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
8947                 } else { panic!(); }
8948         } else { panic!(); }
8949         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8950 }
8951
8952 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8953         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8954         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8955         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8956         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8957         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8958         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8959         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8960         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8961         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8962         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8963         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8964         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8965         // until we learned about an additional block.
8966         //
8967         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8968         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8969         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8970         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8971         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8972         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8973         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8974
8975         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8976         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8977         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8978         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8979         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8980
8981         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
8982         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8983         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8984         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8985         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8986         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8987
8988         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8989         if !test_height_before_timelock {
8990                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8991         }
8992         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8993                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8994         if test_height_before_timelock {
8995                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8996                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8997                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8998                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8999         } else {
9000                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9001                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9002                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9003                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9004                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9005                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9006                 // timelock is up).
9007                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9008                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9009
9010                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9011                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9012                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9013                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9014                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9015                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9016                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9017
9018                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9019                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9020                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9021                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9022                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9023                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9024                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9025                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9026                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9027         }
9028 }
9029
9030 #[test]
9031 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9032         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9033         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9034 }
9035
9036 #[test]
9037 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9038         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9039         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9040         // HTLCs.
9041         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9042
9043         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9044         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9045         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9046         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9047         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9048         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9049         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9050         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9051         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9052
9053         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9054         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9055         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9056         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9057
9058         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9059         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9060         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9061         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9062         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9063
9064         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9065
9066         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9067         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9068         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9069         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9070
9071         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9072         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9073         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9074         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9075         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9076
9077         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9078         // generated
9079         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9080
9081         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9082         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9083         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9084
9085         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9086         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9087         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9088         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9089         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9090
9091         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9092         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9093         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9094         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9095
9096         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9097         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9098                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9099         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9100         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9101         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9102                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9103         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9104
9105         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9106         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9107                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9108                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9109                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9110                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9111                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9112                         keys_manager,
9113                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9114                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9115                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9116                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9117                         channel_monitors,
9118                 }).unwrap()
9119         };
9120         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9121         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9122
9123         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9124         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9125         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9126         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9127
9128         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9129         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9130         // the commitment state.
9131         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9132
9133         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9134
9135         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9136         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9137         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9138
9139         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9140         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9141         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9142         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9143         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9144         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9145         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9146
9147         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9148         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9149 }
9150
9151 #[test]
9152 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9153         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9154         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9155         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9156         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9157
9158         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9159         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9160         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9161         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9162         let params = RouteParameters {
9163                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9164                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9165                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9166         };
9167         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9168         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
9169
9170         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9171         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9173         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9174         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9175         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9176         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9177         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9178         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9179 }
9180
9181 #[test]
9182 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9183         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9184         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9185         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9186         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9187
9188         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9189         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9190         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9191         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9192
9193         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9194         let params = RouteParameters {
9195                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9196                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9197                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9198         };
9199         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9200         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9201         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9202         let route = find_route(
9203                 &payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9204                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9205         ).unwrap();
9206
9207         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9208         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9209         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9210         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9211         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9212         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9213         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9214         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9215         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9216 }
9217
9218 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9219 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9220 enum ExposureEvent {
9221         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9222         AtHTLCForward,
9223         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9224         AtHTLCReception,
9225         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9226         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9227 }
9228
9229 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9230         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9231         // policy.
9232         //
9233         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9234         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9235         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9236         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9237         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9238         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9239         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9240         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9241
9242         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9243         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9244         config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9245         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9246         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9247         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9248
9249         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9250         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9251         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9252         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9253         if on_holder_tx {
9254                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9255         }
9256         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9257         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9258         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9259
9260         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9261
9262         if on_holder_tx {
9263                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9264                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9265                 }
9266         }
9267
9268         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9269         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9270         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9271
9272         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9273         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9274
9275         let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9276         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9277         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9278
9279         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9280                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9281                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9282                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9283         };
9284         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9285         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9286
9287         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9288         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9289
9290         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9291         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9292
9293         if on_holder_tx {
9294                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9295                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9296                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9297                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9298                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9299                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9300                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9301                         }
9302                 } else {
9303                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9304                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9305                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9306                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9307                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9308                         }
9309                 }
9310         } else {
9311                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9312                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9313                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9314                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9315                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9316                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9317                         }
9318                 } else {
9319                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9320                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9321                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9322                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9323                         }
9324                 }
9325         }
9326
9327         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9328         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9329                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9330                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9331                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9332                 if on_holder_tx {
9333                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9334                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9335                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9336                 } else {
9337                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9338                 }
9339         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9340                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9341                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9342                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9343                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9344                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9345                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9346                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9347                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9348                 if on_holder_tx {
9349                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9350                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9351                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9352                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9353                 } else {
9354                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9355                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9356                 }
9357         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9358                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9359                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9360                 {
9361                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9362                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9363                 }
9364                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9365                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9366                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9367         }
9368
9369         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9370         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9371         added_monitors.clear();
9372 }
9373
9374 #[test]
9375 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9376         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9377         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9378         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9379         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9380         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9381         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9382         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9383         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9384         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9385         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9386         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9387         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9388 }