1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
26 use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
27 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, OptionalField, ErrorAction};
31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
34 use util::errors::APIError;
35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
36 use util::config::UserConfig;
38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
44 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
45 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
47 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
54 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
55 use core::default::Default;
56 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
58 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
59 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
62 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
63 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
64 use ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
65 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
66 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
67 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
68 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
69 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
70 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
72 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
74 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
75 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
76 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
78 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
79 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
81 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
82 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
84 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
85 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
86 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
87 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
88 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
89 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
90 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
91 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
93 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
94 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
96 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
98 } else { assert!(false); }
101 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
103 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
104 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
105 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
107 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
109 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
111 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
113 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
115 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
117 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
119 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
123 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
124 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
126 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
127 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
128 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
129 node_cfgs[1].features = InitFeatures::known().clear_wumbo();
130 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
131 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
133 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
134 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
135 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
141 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
142 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
143 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
144 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
145 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
146 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
147 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
148 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
149 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
151 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
152 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
153 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
154 let opt_anchors = false;
155 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
156 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
158 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
159 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
160 if !send_from_initiator {
161 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
162 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
164 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
166 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
167 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
168 if send_from_initiator {
169 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
170 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
172 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
175 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
176 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
177 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
180 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
181 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
182 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
184 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
185 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
186 if send_from_initiator {
187 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
188 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
189 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
190 // well as an additional HTLC.
191 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
193 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
198 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
199 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
200 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
204 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
205 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
206 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
207 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
208 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
209 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
212 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
216 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
217 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
218 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
219 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
220 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
221 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
222 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
223 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
224 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
225 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
227 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
229 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
231 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
233 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
236 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
239 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
240 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
241 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
242 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
243 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
245 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
248 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
250 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
251 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
252 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
255 let payment_event = {
256 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
257 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
258 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
260 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
261 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
263 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
264 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
265 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
266 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
267 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
270 // deliver(1), generate (3):
271 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
272 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
273 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
276 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
277 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
278 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
279 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
280 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
281 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
282 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
285 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
286 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
287 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
288 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
289 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
290 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
291 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
294 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
295 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
296 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
299 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
300 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
303 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
306 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
307 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
309 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
310 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
313 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
318 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
319 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
320 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
321 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
322 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
323 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
324 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
325 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
328 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
330 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
332 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
335 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
336 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
338 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
339 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
340 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
341 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
344 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
347 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
349 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
350 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
351 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
354 let payment_event = {
355 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
356 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
357 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
359 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
360 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
362 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
363 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
364 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
365 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
366 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
369 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
372 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
376 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
377 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
378 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
379 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
380 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
381 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
384 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
385 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
386 // update_fee (never committed) ->
388 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
389 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
390 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
391 // <- (1) RAA delivered
392 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
393 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
394 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
395 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
397 // B should send no response here
398 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
399 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
402 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
405 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
406 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
407 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
409 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
412 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
413 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
414 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
415 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
416 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
418 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
421 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
422 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
423 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
424 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
427 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
430 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
431 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
433 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
434 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
435 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
437 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
438 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
439 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
440 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
443 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
445 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
447 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
449 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
450 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
451 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
453 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
454 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
455 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
456 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
457 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
458 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
459 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
461 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
462 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
463 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
465 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
467 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
468 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
472 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
473 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
476 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
477 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
480 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
481 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
482 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
485 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
486 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
490 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
491 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
492 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
493 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
496 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
497 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
498 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
499 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
501 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
503 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
506 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
507 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
510 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
511 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
512 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
514 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
515 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
516 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
518 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
519 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
521 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
523 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
524 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
526 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
528 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
529 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
531 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
532 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
533 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
534 added_monitors.clear();
536 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
538 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
539 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
541 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
542 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
543 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
544 added_monitors.clear();
547 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
548 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
550 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
551 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
553 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
554 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
555 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
556 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
560 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
561 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
562 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
563 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
564 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
565 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
566 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
567 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
568 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
569 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
570 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
571 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
572 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
573 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
576 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
582 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
583 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
586 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
587 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
590 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
593 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
596 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
597 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
598 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
599 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
600 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
602 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
604 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
606 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
607 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
608 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
610 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
611 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
614 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
615 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
616 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
619 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
620 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
625 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
626 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
627 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
628 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
629 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
630 let channel_value = 5000;
632 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
633 let channel_id = chan.2;
634 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
635 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
637 let opt_anchors = false;
639 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
640 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
641 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
643 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
644 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
646 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
647 *feerate_lock = feerate;
649 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
650 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
651 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
653 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
655 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
657 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
659 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
661 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
662 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
663 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
664 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
665 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
666 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
670 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
671 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
674 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
675 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
676 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
678 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
680 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
681 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
682 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
683 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
684 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
685 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
686 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
687 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
688 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
690 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
691 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
692 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
693 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
694 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
695 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
696 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
697 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
700 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
701 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
702 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
705 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
706 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
707 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
708 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
709 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
710 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
712 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
713 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
714 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
715 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
717 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
719 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
722 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
725 htlc_signatures: res.1
728 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
730 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
733 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
735 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
736 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
737 //Should produce and error.
738 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
739 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
741 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
742 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
746 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
747 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
748 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
749 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
750 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
751 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
754 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
757 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
760 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
763 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
764 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
765 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
766 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
767 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
769 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
771 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
772 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
773 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
776 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
778 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
779 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
781 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
782 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
783 added_monitors.clear();
785 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
786 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
787 // node[1] has nothing to do
789 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
790 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
793 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
794 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
795 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
796 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
797 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
799 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
801 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
802 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
803 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
804 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
805 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
806 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
808 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
809 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
811 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
813 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
815 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
817 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
819 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
820 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
822 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
824 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
826 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
828 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
829 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
831 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
832 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
835 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
837 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
838 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
839 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
840 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
841 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
845 fn test_update_fee() {
846 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
847 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
848 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
849 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
850 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
851 let channel_id = chan.2;
854 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
855 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
856 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
857 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
858 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
859 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
860 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
861 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
862 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
863 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
864 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
867 // Create and deliver (1)...
870 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
871 feerate = *feerate_lock;
872 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
874 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
875 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
877 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
878 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
879 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
880 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
881 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
883 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
885 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
887 // Generate (2) and (3):
888 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
889 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
893 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
894 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
897 // Create and deliver (4)...
899 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
900 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
902 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
903 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
904 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
905 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
906 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
907 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
908 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
910 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
913 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
914 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
917 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
918 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
920 // Handle (3), creating (6):
921 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
923 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
924 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
927 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
928 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
931 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
932 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
933 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
934 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
935 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
936 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
937 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
938 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
942 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
944 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
945 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
947 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
949 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
951 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
952 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
953 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
954 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
955 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
959 fn fake_network_test() {
960 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
961 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
962 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
963 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
964 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
965 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
967 // Create some initial channels
968 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
969 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
970 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
972 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
973 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
974 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
975 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
976 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
978 // Send some more payments
979 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
980 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
981 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
983 // Test failure packets
984 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
985 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
987 // Add a new channel that skips 3
988 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
990 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
991 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
992 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
993 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
994 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
995 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
996 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
998 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
999 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1000 hops.push(RouteHop {
1001 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1002 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1003 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1004 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1006 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1008 hops.push(RouteHop {
1009 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1010 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1011 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1012 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1014 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1016 hops.push(RouteHop {
1017 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1018 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1019 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1020 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1022 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1024 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1025 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1026 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1028 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1029 hops.push(RouteHop {
1030 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1031 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1032 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1033 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1035 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1037 hops.push(RouteHop {
1038 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1039 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1040 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1041 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1043 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1045 hops.push(RouteHop {
1046 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1047 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1048 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1049 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1051 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1053 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1054 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1055 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1057 // Claim the rebalances...
1058 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1059 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1061 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1062 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1064 // Send some payments across both channels
1065 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1066 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1067 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1070 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1071 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1072 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1073 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1075 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1077 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1078 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1079 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1081 // Close down the channels...
1082 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1083 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1084 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1086 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1087 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1088 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1089 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1090 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1091 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1092 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1093 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1094 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1095 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1096 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1100 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1101 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1102 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1103 // commitment dance rounds.
1104 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1105 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1106 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1107 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1108 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1109 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1111 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1112 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1113 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1114 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1115 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1119 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1120 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1121 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1122 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1124 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1125 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1127 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1129 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1130 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1131 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1132 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1135 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1136 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1138 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1142 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1143 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1144 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1145 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1147 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1148 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1149 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1150 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1151 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1152 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1155 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1156 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1157 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1159 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1161 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1162 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1163 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1166 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1167 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1169 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1171 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1173 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1175 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1176 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1178 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1180 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1182 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1184 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1185 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1186 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1188 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1190 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1193 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1195 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1196 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1197 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1199 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1200 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1202 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1206 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1207 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1210 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1214 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1215 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1216 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1217 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1218 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1219 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1220 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1222 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1223 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1224 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1225 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1226 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1227 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1229 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1231 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1232 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1234 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1235 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1237 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1238 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1239 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1243 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1244 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1245 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1246 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1247 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1248 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1249 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1250 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1252 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1255 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1257 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1259 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1260 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1261 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1263 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1264 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1265 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1268 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1269 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1271 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1272 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1273 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1274 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1275 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1276 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1277 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1280 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1282 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1284 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1285 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1287 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1288 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1290 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1292 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
1293 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
1295 let bump_tx = if claim_txn[1] == claim_txn[4] {
1296 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1297 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1299 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC timeout on alternative commitment tx
1301 check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]); // HTLC timeout on broadcasted commitment tx
1304 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[3]);
1305 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[4]);
1307 check_spends!(claim_txn[5], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC timeout on alternative commitment tx
1309 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], remote_txn[0]); // HTLC timeout on broadcasted commitment tx
1314 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1315 assert_eq!(bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1316 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, bump_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1318 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1319 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1320 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1322 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1323 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1324 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1325 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1327 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1328 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1331 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1332 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1333 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1334 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1336 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1337 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1338 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1339 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1340 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1341 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1343 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1349 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1350 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1351 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1352 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1353 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1354 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1356 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1357 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1359 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1360 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1361 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1362 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1363 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1365 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1367 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1368 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1369 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1372 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1374 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1375 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1377 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1381 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1382 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1383 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1384 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1385 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1386 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1388 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1389 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1390 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1391 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1393 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1395 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1396 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1397 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1398 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1401 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1402 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1403 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1404 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1407 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1409 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1410 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1411 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1413 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1415 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1417 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1418 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1419 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1420 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1421 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1422 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1423 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1424 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1426 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1427 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1428 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1429 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1430 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1432 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1433 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1434 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1435 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1436 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1437 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1438 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1439 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1442 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1443 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1444 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1446 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1447 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1448 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1450 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1452 amount_msat: 3460001,
1453 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1455 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1458 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1461 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1462 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1463 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1464 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1468 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1469 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1471 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1472 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1474 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1477 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1480 htlc_signatures: res.1
1483 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1484 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1485 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1487 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1488 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1490 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1491 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1493 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1495 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1496 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1497 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1499 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1500 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1501 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1503 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1505 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1506 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1508 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1512 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1513 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1514 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1515 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1516 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1518 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1519 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1520 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1521 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1523 let opt_anchors = false;
1525 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1526 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1527 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1529 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1531 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1532 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1533 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1536 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1537 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1538 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1539 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1540 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1541 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1545 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1546 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1547 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1548 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1549 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1550 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1552 let opt_anchors = false;
1554 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1555 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1556 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1557 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1558 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1559 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1560 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1562 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1563 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1564 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1567 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1568 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1569 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1570 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1571 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1572 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1573 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1574 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1575 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1577 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1578 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1579 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1580 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1581 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1584 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1585 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1586 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1587 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1588 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1589 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1591 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1595 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1596 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1597 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1598 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1599 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1601 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1602 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1603 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1605 let opt_anchors = false;
1607 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1608 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1609 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1610 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1611 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1612 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1613 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1615 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1616 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1617 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1618 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1619 // commitment transaction fee.
1620 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1622 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1623 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1624 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1627 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1628 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1629 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1630 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1634 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1635 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1636 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1637 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1638 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1639 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1640 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1641 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1643 let opt_anchors = false;
1645 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1647 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1648 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1649 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1650 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1652 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1653 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1654 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1655 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1656 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1657 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1658 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1660 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1661 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1662 match msg_events[0] {
1663 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1664 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1666 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1671 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1672 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1673 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1674 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1675 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1676 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1677 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1678 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1680 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1681 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1682 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1683 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1684 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1685 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1687 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1688 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1689 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1690 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1691 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1692 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1694 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1695 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1696 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1697 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1701 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1702 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1703 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1704 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1705 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1706 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1707 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1710 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1711 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1712 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1713 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1715 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1716 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1717 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1718 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1720 // Add a pending HTLC.
1721 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1722 let payment_event_1 = {
1723 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1726 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1727 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1728 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1730 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1732 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1733 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1734 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1735 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1736 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1738 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1739 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1740 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1741 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1742 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1743 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1744 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1745 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1748 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1749 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1750 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1751 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1754 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1755 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1756 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1757 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1758 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1759 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1760 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1761 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1765 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1766 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1767 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1768 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1769 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1770 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1771 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1772 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1773 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1774 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1776 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1777 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1778 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1780 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1781 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1784 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1785 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1789 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1790 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1791 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1792 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1793 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1794 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1795 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1796 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1797 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1798 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1799 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1801 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1802 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1804 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1805 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1807 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1809 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1810 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1811 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1812 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1817 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1818 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1819 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1820 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1822 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1824 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1826 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1827 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1828 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1829 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1830 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1832 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1833 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1834 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1835 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1838 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1839 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1841 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1842 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1843 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1844 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1845 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1846 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1847 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1851 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1852 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1853 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1854 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1855 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1857 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1858 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1859 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1860 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1861 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1864 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1865 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1866 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1867 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1868 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1871 // adding pending output.
1872 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1873 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1874 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1875 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1876 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1877 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1878 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1879 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1880 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1882 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1883 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1884 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1886 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1887 let payment_event_1 = {
1888 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1891 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1892 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1893 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1895 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1897 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1898 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1900 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1901 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1902 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1903 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1906 // split the rest to test holding cell
1907 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1908 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1909 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1910 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1912 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1913 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1916 // now see if they go through on both sides
1917 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1918 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1919 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1921 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1922 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1924 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1926 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1927 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1928 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1929 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1930 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1933 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1934 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1935 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1937 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1938 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1940 // flush the pending htlc
1941 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1942 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1945 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1946 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1948 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1950 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1951 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1952 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1955 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1956 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1957 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1959 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1961 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1962 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1963 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1965 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1966 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1968 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1969 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1970 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1971 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1972 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1973 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1975 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1976 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1977 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1978 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1980 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1981 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1983 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1984 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1986 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1987 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1988 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1990 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1991 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1992 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1994 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1997 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2000 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
2001 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2002 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2004 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2005 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2006 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2008 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2011 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2014 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2015 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2016 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2018 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2019 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2020 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2022 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2023 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2024 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2025 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2026 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2028 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2029 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2033 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2034 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2035 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2036 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2037 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2038 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2039 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2040 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2042 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2043 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2044 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2045 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2046 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2047 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2048 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2049 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2051 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2052 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2053 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2054 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2055 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2056 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2057 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2058 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2059 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2060 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2062 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2063 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2064 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2065 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2066 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2068 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2069 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2071 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2073 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2074 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2075 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2078 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2079 // initial fulfill/CS.
2080 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2081 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2083 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2085 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2086 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2087 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2088 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2090 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2092 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2093 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2095 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2096 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2098 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2099 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2101 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2102 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2104 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2106 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2108 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2110 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2112 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2114 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2116 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2117 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2118 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2119 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2120 // on-chain as necessary).
2121 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2122 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2124 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2125 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2127 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2129 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2131 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2132 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2134 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2135 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2136 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2138 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2139 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2141 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2142 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2143 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2145 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2147 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2148 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2149 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2152 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2153 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2155 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2157 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2159 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2161 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2163 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2166 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2168 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2169 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2171 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2173 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2175 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2178 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2179 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2181 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2182 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2186 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2187 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2188 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2189 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2190 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2191 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2192 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2194 // Create some initial channels
2195 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2196 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2197 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2198 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2200 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2201 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2202 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2203 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2204 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2205 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2207 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2208 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2209 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2210 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2211 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2213 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2214 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2216 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2218 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2219 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2220 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2221 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2222 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2224 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2225 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2226 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2227 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2228 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2230 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2231 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2233 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2234 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2235 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2236 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2239 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2240 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2241 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2242 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2244 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2246 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2247 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2248 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2249 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2250 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2252 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2253 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2255 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2256 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2257 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2259 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2260 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2262 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2263 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2264 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2265 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2267 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2273 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2274 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2275 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2277 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2278 let node2_commitment_txid;
2280 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2281 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2282 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2283 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2285 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2286 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2287 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2289 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2291 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2292 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2293 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2294 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2295 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2297 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2298 // confusing us in the following tests.
2299 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2301 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2302 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2303 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2306 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2307 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2308 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2309 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2310 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2311 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2317 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2318 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2320 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2324 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2326 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2327 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2328 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2334 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2336 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2337 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2339 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2340 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2341 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2342 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2343 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2346 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2349 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2350 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2352 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2354 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2355 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2357 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2358 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2359 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2361 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2362 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2363 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2364 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2366 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2367 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2368 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2372 fn test_justice_tx() {
2373 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2374 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2375 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2376 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2377 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2378 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2379 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2380 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2381 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2382 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2383 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2384 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2385 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2386 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2387 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2388 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2389 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2390 // Create some new channels:
2391 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2393 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2394 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2395 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2396 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2397 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2398 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2399 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2400 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2401 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2402 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2403 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2404 // Revoke the old state
2405 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2408 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2410 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2411 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2412 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2414 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2415 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2416 node_txn.truncate(1);
2418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2419 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2420 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2422 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2423 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2424 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2425 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2427 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2428 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2429 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2430 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2432 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2434 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2435 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2437 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2438 // Create some new channels:
2439 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2441 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2445 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2446 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2447 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2448 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2449 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2450 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2451 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2452 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2453 // Revoke the old state
2454 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2456 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2458 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2459 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2460 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2462 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2463 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2465 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2466 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2468 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2469 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2470 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2472 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2473 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2474 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2476 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2477 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2478 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2482 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2483 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2484 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2485 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2486 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2487 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2488 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2489 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2490 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2491 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2492 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2493 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2494 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2495 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2496 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2498 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2499 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2501 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2502 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2503 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2505 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2506 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2508 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2509 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2510 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2512 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2516 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2517 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2518 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2519 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2520 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2521 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2522 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2524 // Create some new channel:
2525 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2527 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2528 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2529 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2530 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2531 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2533 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2534 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2535 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2536 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2537 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2538 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2539 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2540 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2541 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2543 //Revoke the old state
2544 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2547 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2549 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2550 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2552 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2553 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2554 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2556 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2557 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2559 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2560 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2562 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2563 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2564 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2565 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2566 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2567 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2568 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2569 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2571 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2572 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2573 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2575 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2576 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2577 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2578 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2579 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2581 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2582 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2583 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2587 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2588 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2589 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2590 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2591 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2592 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2593 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2595 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2597 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2598 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2599 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2600 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2601 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2602 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2604 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2605 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2607 //Revoke the old state
2608 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2611 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2613 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2615 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2616 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2617 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2619 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2620 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2623 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2624 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2626 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2627 assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
2629 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2630 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2631 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2632 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2633 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2634 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2635 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2637 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2638 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2639 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2640 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2642 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2643 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2644 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2646 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2647 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2648 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2649 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2650 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2651 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2652 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2653 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2655 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2656 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2657 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2658 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2659 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2660 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2661 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2663 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2664 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2665 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2669 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2670 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2671 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2672 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2673 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2674 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2675 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2676 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2677 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2679 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2680 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2681 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2682 // PaymentSent event).
2684 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2685 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2686 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2687 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2689 // Create some initial channels
2690 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2691 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2693 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2694 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2695 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2696 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2697 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2699 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2700 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2701 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2703 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2704 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2706 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2707 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2708 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2709 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2710 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2711 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2712 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2713 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2714 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2715 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2716 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2717 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2718 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2719 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2720 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2722 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2723 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2725 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2726 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2727 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2728 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2729 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2730 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2731 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2732 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2733 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2734 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2735 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2736 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2737 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2738 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2740 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2741 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2742 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2743 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2745 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2746 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2747 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2748 added_monitors.clear();
2750 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2751 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2752 match forwarded_events[0] {
2753 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2754 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2756 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2757 match forwarded_events[1] {
2758 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2759 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2760 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2761 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2762 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2766 match forwarded_events[2] {
2767 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2768 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2769 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2770 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2771 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2775 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2777 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2778 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2779 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2780 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2781 added_monitors.clear();
2783 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2785 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2786 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2789 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2790 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2794 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2795 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2796 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2797 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2798 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2799 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2801 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2803 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2804 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2805 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2806 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2807 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2808 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2809 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2810 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2811 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2812 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2814 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2815 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2816 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2817 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2819 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2820 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2821 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2822 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2824 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2825 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2829 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2830 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2831 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2832 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2834 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2835 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2836 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2837 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2838 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2839 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2841 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2842 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2843 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2844 let commitment_spend =
2845 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2846 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2847 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2848 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2851 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2852 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2853 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2857 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2858 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2859 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2860 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2861 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2862 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2863 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2864 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2865 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2866 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2867 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2868 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2870 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2871 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2872 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2873 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2874 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2875 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2876 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2877 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2878 let mut first_claimed = false;
2879 for event in events {
2881 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2882 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2883 assert!(!first_claimed);
2884 first_claimed = true;
2886 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2887 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2890 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2891 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2892 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2895 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2898 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2899 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2900 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2901 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2902 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2903 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2905 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2907 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2908 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2909 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2910 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2911 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2912 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2913 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2915 // Create some intial channels
2916 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2917 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2919 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2920 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2921 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2923 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2925 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2926 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2927 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2928 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2930 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2933 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2934 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2936 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2937 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2938 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2939 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2940 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2941 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2943 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2945 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2946 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2948 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2949 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2950 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2951 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2952 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2954 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2955 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2956 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2957 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2958 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2961 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2962 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2963 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2964 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2966 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2967 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2969 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2970 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2971 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2972 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2974 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2978 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2979 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2980 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2982 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2983 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2984 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2985 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2988 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2990 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2991 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2992 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2993 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2994 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2995 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2996 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2998 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
3002 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3004 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3005 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3007 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3008 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3009 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3010 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3011 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3012 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3014 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3017 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3018 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3019 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3021 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3022 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3024 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3026 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3027 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
3028 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3029 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
3030 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
3031 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3032 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3036 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3037 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3038 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3039 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3043 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3044 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3045 // and fail backward accordingly.
3047 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3048 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3049 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3050 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3052 // Create some initial channels
3053 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3054 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3056 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3057 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3058 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3059 // Revoke the old state
3060 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3062 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3064 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3065 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3066 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3068 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3070 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3072 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3073 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3075 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3076 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3077 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3078 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3079 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3080 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3082 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3083 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3084 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3086 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3090 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3091 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3092 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3093 // commitment transaction anymore.
3094 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3095 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3096 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3097 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3098 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3099 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3101 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3102 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3103 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3104 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3105 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3106 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3107 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3108 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3109 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3111 // Create some initial channels
3112 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3113 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3115 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3116 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3117 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3118 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3119 // Revoke the old state
3120 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3122 let value = if use_dust {
3123 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3124 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3125 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3128 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3129 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3130 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3132 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3133 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3135 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3136 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3137 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3138 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3139 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3140 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3141 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3142 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3143 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3145 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3146 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3148 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3149 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3150 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3151 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3152 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3153 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3154 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3155 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3157 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3158 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3159 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3162 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3163 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3165 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3166 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3167 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3168 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3169 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3170 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3171 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3172 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3173 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3174 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3176 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3177 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3178 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3181 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3182 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3183 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3184 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3185 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3186 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3190 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3191 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3192 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3194 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3195 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3197 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3198 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3200 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3201 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3204 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3205 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3207 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3209 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3210 assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3212 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3213 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3215 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3216 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3219 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3220 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3222 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3224 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3226 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3227 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3229 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3232 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3233 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3236 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3239 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3240 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3241 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3242 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3243 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3245 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3246 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3247 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3248 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3250 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3254 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3255 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3256 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3257 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3258 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3259 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3261 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3264 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3265 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3266 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3267 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3268 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3269 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3270 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3272 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3273 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3274 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3276 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3278 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3279 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3281 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3282 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3283 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3284 // that we should update our routing table for.
3285 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3286 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3289 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3292 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3293 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3294 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3296 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3299 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3300 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3301 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3303 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3306 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3309 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3310 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3311 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3315 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3316 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3317 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3318 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3319 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3323 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3324 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3325 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3326 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3327 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3331 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3332 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3333 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3334 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3335 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3336 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3338 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3340 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3341 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3344 let payment_event = {
3345 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3346 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3347 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3349 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3350 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3353 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3354 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3356 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3357 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3359 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3362 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3364 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3366 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3367 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3368 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3369 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3370 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3371 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3373 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3374 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3380 onion_routing_packet,
3382 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3384 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3385 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3386 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3388 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3389 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3391 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3394 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3395 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3397 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3399 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3404 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3405 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3406 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3407 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3408 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3409 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3410 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3411 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3413 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3414 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3415 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3416 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3418 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3420 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3421 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3422 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3424 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3425 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3426 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3428 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3430 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3431 // registering new transactions
3432 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3433 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3437 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3438 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3439 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3440 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3441 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3442 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3443 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3444 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3446 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3448 let mut payment_event = {
3449 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3450 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3452 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3453 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3454 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3457 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3458 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3460 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3462 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3463 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3464 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3465 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3468 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3469 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3471 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3473 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3474 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3475 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3477 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3478 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3480 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3482 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3483 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3484 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3485 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3486 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3490 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3492 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3493 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3495 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3497 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3499 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3500 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3502 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3503 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3504 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3505 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3506 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3507 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3508 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3510 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3514 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3515 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3516 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3517 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3518 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3520 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3521 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3522 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3523 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3524 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3526 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3528 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3529 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3531 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3532 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3533 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3535 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3536 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3538 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3539 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3543 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3544 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3545 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3546 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3547 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3548 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3549 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3551 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3552 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3553 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3554 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3555 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
3556 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3557 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
3559 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3560 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3562 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3564 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3565 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3567 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3568 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3571 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3574 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3575 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3576 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3577 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3579 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3580 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3584 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3585 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3586 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3587 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3588 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3589 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3590 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3591 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3593 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3594 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3595 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3597 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3598 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3599 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3600 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3602 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3603 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3604 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3606 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3607 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3608 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3609 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3611 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3612 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3614 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3615 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3617 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3619 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3620 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3622 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3623 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3624 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3626 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3629 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3630 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3631 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3633 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3636 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3637 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3641 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3642 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3645 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3646 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3647 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3648 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3649 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3650 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3652 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3653 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3654 let (channel_ready, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3655 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3656 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3657 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3658 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3660 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3663 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3665 let payment_event = {
3666 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3667 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3669 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3670 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3671 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3673 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3675 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3676 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3678 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3679 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3680 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3682 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3684 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3685 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3686 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3689 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3690 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3691 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3692 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3695 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3696 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3697 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3705 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3706 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3707 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3708 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3709 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3710 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3712 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3713 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3714 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3716 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3717 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3719 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3720 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3721 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3722 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3723 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3724 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3725 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3726 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3727 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3728 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3729 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3730 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3731 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3732 // Everything was delivered...
3733 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3736 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3737 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3739 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3740 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3743 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3744 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3745 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3747 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3749 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3750 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3752 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
3753 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3754 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3756 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3757 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3758 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3760 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3763 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3766 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3768 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3770 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3771 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3772 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3773 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3774 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3775 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3776 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3777 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3778 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3779 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3780 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3782 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3785 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3786 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3788 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3789 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3791 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3792 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3793 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3795 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3798 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3799 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3800 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3801 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3803 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3804 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3805 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3806 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3808 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3809 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3810 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3811 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3814 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3815 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3816 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3824 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3825 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3826 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3827 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3828 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3829 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3831 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3833 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3834 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3835 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3836 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3837 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3838 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3839 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3840 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3841 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3842 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3843 // Everything was delivered...
3844 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3847 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3848 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3851 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3852 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3853 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3855 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3856 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3859 // Channel should still work fine...
3860 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3861 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3862 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3866 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3867 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3868 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3869 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3870 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3874 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3875 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3876 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3877 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3878 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3882 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3883 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3884 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3885 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3886 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3887 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3888 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3889 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3890 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3891 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3893 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3894 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3896 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3897 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3898 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3900 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3902 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3903 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3905 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3906 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3907 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3909 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3910 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3911 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3912 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3914 // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a channel_ready, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3915 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3916 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3917 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3918 let as_channel_ready = match events_3[0] {
3919 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3920 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3923 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3926 // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s channel_ready on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3927 // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3928 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3929 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3930 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3932 let bs_channel_ready = match events_4[0] {
3933 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3934 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3935 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3938 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3940 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3941 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3942 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3945 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3948 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3949 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3951 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3954 // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s channel_ready, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3955 // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3956 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3957 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3958 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3960 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3961 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3963 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3966 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s channel_ready, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3967 // announcement_signatures.
3968 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_channel_ready);
3969 let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3970 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3971 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3972 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3973 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3976 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3979 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3980 // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3982 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3983 let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3984 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3985 let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3986 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3987 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3989 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3992 // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3993 // same channel_announcement.
3994 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3995 let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3996 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3997 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3998 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3999 assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
4002 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
4005 // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
4006 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
4007 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4008 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4010 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4011 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
4012 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
4014 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
4015 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
4016 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4018 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4019 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4020 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4022 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4023 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4024 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4025 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4026 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4027 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4028 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4029 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4031 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4032 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4033 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4034 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4035 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4036 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4038 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
4039 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4040 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4041 logger: nodes[0].logger,
4045 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4046 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4048 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4049 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4052 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4054 // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
4055 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
4056 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4057 let mut found_announcement = false;
4058 for event in msgs.iter() {
4060 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
4061 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
4063 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
4064 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4067 assert!(found_announcement);
4071 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4072 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4073 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4074 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4075 // channel_ready immediately instead.
4076 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4077 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4078 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4079 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4080 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4082 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4084 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4085 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4086 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4087 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4088 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4089 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4091 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4092 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4093 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4097 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4098 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4099 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4100 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4101 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4102 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4103 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4104 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4106 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4108 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4109 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4110 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4113 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4114 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4116 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4117 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4120 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4121 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4124 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4125 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4127 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4128 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4129 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4130 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4131 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4132 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4133 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4135 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4136 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4137 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4139 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4140 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4141 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4143 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4146 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4147 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4148 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4151 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4154 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4155 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4157 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4158 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4159 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4160 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4161 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4162 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4164 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4165 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4166 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4167 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4169 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4170 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4172 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4173 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4175 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4177 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4178 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4179 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4180 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4181 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4182 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4183 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4184 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4185 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4188 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4189 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4190 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4191 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4192 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4193 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4194 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4197 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4198 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4199 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4200 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4201 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4202 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4203 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4206 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4207 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4208 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4209 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4211 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4212 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4213 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4216 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4217 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4220 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4222 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4223 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4225 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4226 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4228 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4229 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4230 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4232 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4235 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4238 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4239 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4242 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4243 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4246 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4247 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4248 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4249 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4250 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4251 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4252 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4254 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4256 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4257 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4258 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4259 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4260 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4261 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4262 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4264 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4265 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4266 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4267 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4268 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4271 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4274 let mut block = Block {
4275 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4278 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4279 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4280 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4281 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4282 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4283 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4284 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4287 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4290 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4291 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4292 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4293 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4294 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4296 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4297 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4298 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4299 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4300 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4301 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4305 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4306 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4307 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4310 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4311 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4312 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4313 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4314 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4315 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4316 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4317 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4319 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4320 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4321 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4322 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4324 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4325 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4327 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4329 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4332 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4333 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4334 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4335 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4338 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4339 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4340 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4341 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4345 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4346 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4347 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4348 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4351 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4353 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4354 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4355 match fail_commit[0] {
4356 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4357 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4358 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4360 _ => unreachable!(),
4362 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4364 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4365 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4366 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4367 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4368 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4369 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4370 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4371 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4376 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4377 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4378 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4382 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4383 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4384 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4385 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4386 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4387 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4388 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4389 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4390 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4391 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4393 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4395 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4397 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4398 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4399 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4400 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4402 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4403 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4404 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4405 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4406 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4407 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4408 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4409 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4410 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4411 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4413 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4414 let config = UserConfig::default();
4415 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4416 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4417 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4418 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4419 default_config: config,
4421 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4422 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4423 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4428 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4429 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4431 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4432 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4433 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4434 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4436 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4437 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4438 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4439 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4441 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4442 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4443 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4444 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4446 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4447 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4448 for node in nodes.iter() {
4449 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4450 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4451 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4454 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4458 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4459 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4460 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4461 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4462 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4463 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4464 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4465 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4466 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4467 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4468 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4470 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4471 let channel_value = 100000;
4472 let push_msat = 10001;
4473 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4474 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4475 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4476 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4477 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4478 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4479 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4481 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
4483 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
4484 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4486 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4488 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4489 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4490 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4491 added_monitors.clear();
4494 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4495 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4497 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4498 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4499 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4500 added_monitors.clear();
4502 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4507 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4508 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4509 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4510 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4512 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4513 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4514 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4515 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4516 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4517 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4518 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4519 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4520 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4521 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4523 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4524 let config = UserConfig::default();
4525 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4526 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4527 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4528 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4529 default_config: config,
4531 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4532 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4533 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4538 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4539 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4541 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4543 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4544 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4546 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4547 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4548 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4549 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4550 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4552 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4553 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4554 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4556 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4557 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4558 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4559 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4561 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4562 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4563 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4564 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4566 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4567 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4568 for node in nodes.iter() {
4569 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4570 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4571 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4574 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4578 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4579 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4580 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4581 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4582 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4583 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4584 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4585 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4586 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4587 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4588 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4590 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4591 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4593 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4595 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4596 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4597 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4599 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4600 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4601 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4602 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4603 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4604 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4605 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4606 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4607 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4608 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4610 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4611 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4612 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4613 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4614 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4615 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4617 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4618 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4619 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4624 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4625 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4627 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4628 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4631 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4633 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4634 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4638 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4639 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4640 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4641 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4642 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4643 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4644 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4645 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4646 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4647 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4648 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4649 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4650 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4651 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4653 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4654 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4655 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4656 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4657 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4660 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4662 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4663 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4665 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4666 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4667 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4668 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4670 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4672 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4673 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4674 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4675 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4676 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4679 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4680 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4681 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4682 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4683 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4684 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4687 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4688 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4689 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4690 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4691 assert!(read.is_empty());
4692 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4695 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4696 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4697 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4698 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4699 assert!(read.is_empty());
4700 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4703 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4704 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4705 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4706 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4708 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4709 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4710 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4712 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4714 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4717 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4718 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4719 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4720 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4722 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4723 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4724 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4726 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4728 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4729 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4731 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4732 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4733 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4734 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4735 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4738 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4739 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4742 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4743 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4745 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4746 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4747 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4748 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4749 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4751 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4752 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4753 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4754 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4755 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4756 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4757 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4759 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4760 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4762 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4767 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4768 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4770 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4771 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4772 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4773 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4774 for event in events.drain(..) {
4776 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4777 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4778 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4779 all_outputs.push(outp);
4782 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4785 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4786 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4796 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4797 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4798 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4799 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4800 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4801 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4803 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4804 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4805 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4806 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4807 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4808 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4809 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4810 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4811 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4813 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4814 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4816 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4817 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4818 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4819 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4820 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4824 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4825 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4826 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4827 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4828 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4829 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4830 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4832 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4833 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4834 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4836 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4838 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4839 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4840 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4841 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4843 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4844 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4845 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4846 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4847 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4849 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4850 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4851 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4855 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4856 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4857 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4859 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4860 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4861 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4862 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4864 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4865 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4866 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4867 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4868 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4870 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4871 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4872 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4874 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4876 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4877 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4878 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4880 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4881 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4882 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4883 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4884 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4888 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4889 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4890 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4891 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4892 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4894 // Create some initial channels
4895 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4897 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4899 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4900 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4901 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4903 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4904 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4905 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4907 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4909 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4911 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4912 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4915 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4916 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4919 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4920 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4921 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4922 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4923 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4924 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4925 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4927 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4928 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4929 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4931 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4932 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4933 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4937 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4938 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4939 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4940 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4941 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4943 // Create some initial channels
4944 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4946 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4947 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4949 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4951 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4952 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4953 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4955 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4956 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4957 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4958 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4960 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4961 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4963 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4965 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4966 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4967 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4968 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4969 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4970 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4972 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4973 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4974 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4975 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4977 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4978 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4979 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4980 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4981 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4985 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4986 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4987 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4988 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4989 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4991 // Create some initial channels
4992 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4994 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4995 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4996 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4997 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4999 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5001 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5002 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5004 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5006 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5007 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5008 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5009 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5011 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
5012 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5014 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5015 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5016 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
5020 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5021 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5022 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5023 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5024 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5025 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5027 // Create some initial channels
5028 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5030 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5031 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5032 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5033 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5035 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5037 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
5038 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5039 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5041 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5042 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5044 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5045 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5046 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5047 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5048 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5049 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5050 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
5052 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5053 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5054 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
5055 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5057 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5059 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5060 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5061 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5062 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5063 // transactions next...
5064 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
5065 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5067 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
5068 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5069 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
5070 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5072 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5073 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5076 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5077 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5079 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5080 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5082 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5083 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5084 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5085 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5086 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5090 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5091 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5092 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5093 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5094 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5095 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5097 // Create some initial channels
5098 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5100 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5101 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5102 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5103 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5105 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5106 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5108 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5110 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5111 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5112 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5114 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5115 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5117 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5118 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5119 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5120 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5122 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5123 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5124 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5126 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5127 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5128 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5129 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5131 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5133 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5134 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5136 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5137 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5138 // transactions next...
5139 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5140 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5141 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5142 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5144 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5145 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5148 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5149 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5151 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5153 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5154 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5156 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5157 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5159 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5160 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5161 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5162 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5163 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5164 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5165 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5166 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5170 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5171 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5172 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5173 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5174 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5176 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5179 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5180 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5181 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5182 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5184 // Create some initial channels
5185 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5186 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5188 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5189 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5190 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5191 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5192 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5194 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5195 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5196 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5198 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
5199 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5200 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5201 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5202 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
5203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5204 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5205 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5206 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5207 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5208 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5210 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5211 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5213 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5215 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5216 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5217 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5218 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5219 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5220 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5221 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5222 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5223 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5224 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5226 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5227 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5228 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5230 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5231 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5233 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5234 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5237 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
5238 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5239 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
5240 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5241 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
5243 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5246 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5247 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5248 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5249 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5253 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5254 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5255 match msg_events[0] {
5256 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5257 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5259 match msg_events[1] {
5260 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5261 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5263 match msg_events[2] {
5264 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5265 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5266 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5267 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5268 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5269 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5271 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5273 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5274 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5275 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5276 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5277 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5278 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5279 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5280 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5281 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5282 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5283 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5284 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5285 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5287 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5292 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5293 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5294 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5295 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5296 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5297 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5298 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5299 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5300 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5301 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5302 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5303 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5304 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5305 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5307 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5308 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5309 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5311 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5312 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5313 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5314 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5315 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5317 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5319 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5320 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5321 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5322 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5323 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5324 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
5325 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5326 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5328 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5329 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5330 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5332 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5333 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5334 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5335 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5336 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5338 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5339 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5340 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5341 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5342 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5343 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5345 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5346 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5348 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5349 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5350 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5351 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5353 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5354 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5356 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5357 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5360 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5361 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5362 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5363 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5365 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5368 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5369 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5371 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5373 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5374 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5376 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5377 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5380 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5381 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5383 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5384 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5385 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5386 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5387 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5388 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5389 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5390 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5391 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5392 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5393 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5394 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5395 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5397 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5398 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5399 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5400 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5401 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5402 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5403 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5404 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5405 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5408 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5409 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5411 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5413 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5415 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5416 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5417 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5418 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5419 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
5420 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5421 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5422 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5423 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5424 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5425 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5428 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5429 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5431 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5433 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5434 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5435 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5437 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5442 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5443 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5444 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5445 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5446 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5448 // Create some initial channels
5449 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5451 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5452 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5453 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5454 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5455 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5457 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5458 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5459 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5462 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5464 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5465 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5467 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5468 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5471 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5472 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5475 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5476 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5477 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5478 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5479 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5480 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5481 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5485 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5486 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5488 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5489 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5490 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5491 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5492 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5493 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5496 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5497 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5498 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5499 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5500 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5501 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5502 // use the same payment hashes.
5503 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5508 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5509 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5510 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5511 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5512 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5513 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5514 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5515 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5516 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5517 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5519 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5520 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5521 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5522 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5523 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5525 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5526 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5527 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5528 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5530 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5532 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5534 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5535 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5537 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5539 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5541 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5543 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5544 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5546 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5548 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5551 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5553 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5554 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5557 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5559 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5560 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5562 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5563 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5564 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5565 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5566 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5568 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5569 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5570 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5571 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5572 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5573 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5575 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5578 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5579 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5580 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5581 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5582 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5583 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5585 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5586 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5587 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5588 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5589 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5592 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5593 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5594 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5595 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5597 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5599 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5601 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5602 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5603 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5604 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5605 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5606 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5607 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5608 if deliver_last_raa {
5609 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5611 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5614 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5615 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5616 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5617 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5619 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5620 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5621 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5623 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5624 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5625 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5627 if announce_latest {
5628 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5630 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5632 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5633 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5634 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5637 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5641 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5642 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5645 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5646 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5647 if deliver_last_raa {
5648 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5650 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5654 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5655 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5656 let mut a_done = false;
5657 for msg in cs_msgs {
5659 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5660 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5661 // should be failed-backwards here.
5662 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5663 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5664 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5665 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5667 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5672 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5673 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5674 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5676 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5677 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5680 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5681 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5682 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5683 if announce_latest {
5684 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5685 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5686 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5689 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5691 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5695 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5696 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5697 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5698 let mut as_updates = 0;
5699 for event in as_events.iter() {
5700 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5701 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5702 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5703 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5705 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5707 if network_update.is_some() {
5710 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5712 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5713 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5714 if announce_latest {
5715 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5716 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5718 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5720 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5721 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5722 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5723 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5724 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5725 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5726 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5727 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5728 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5730 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5732 if network_update.is_some() {
5735 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5737 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5738 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5739 if announce_latest {
5740 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5742 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5744 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5745 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5746 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5747 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5748 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5749 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5753 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5754 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5758 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5759 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5763 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5764 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5765 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5766 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5770 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5771 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5772 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5773 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5774 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5776 // Create some initial channels
5777 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5779 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5780 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5781 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5782 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5784 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5785 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5786 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5787 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5788 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5789 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5791 let htlc_timeout = {
5792 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5793 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5794 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5795 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5796 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5797 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5801 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5802 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5803 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5805 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5806 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5807 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5808 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5809 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5810 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5811 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5812 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5813 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5814 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5815 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5819 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5820 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5821 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5822 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5824 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5826 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5827 let seed = [42; 32];
5828 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5829 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5830 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger);
5831 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5832 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5833 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5834 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5836 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5837 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5839 // Create some initial channels
5840 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5842 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5843 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5844 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5846 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5847 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5848 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5849 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5850 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5852 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5853 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5854 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5855 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5856 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5858 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5859 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5860 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5861 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5862 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5863 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5864 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5865 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5868 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5869 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5870 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5871 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5873 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5875 let htlc_timeout = {
5876 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5877 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5878 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5879 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5883 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5884 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5885 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5887 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5888 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5889 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5890 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5891 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5892 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5893 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5894 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5895 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5896 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5897 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5898 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5902 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5903 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5904 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5905 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5906 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5908 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5910 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5911 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5913 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5914 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5915 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5917 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5918 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5919 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5921 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5922 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5923 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5925 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5926 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5927 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5930 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5931 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5932 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5933 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5934 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5935 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5937 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5939 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5940 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5941 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5942 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5943 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5945 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5946 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5947 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5949 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5951 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5952 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5955 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5956 let mut block = Block {
5957 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5960 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5961 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5962 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5964 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5965 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5966 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5967 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5970 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5971 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5972 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5973 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5974 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5975 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5977 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5978 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5979 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5981 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5983 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5984 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5985 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5987 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5988 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5990 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5991 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5992 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5994 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5995 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5996 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5997 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6000 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
6001 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6002 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6003 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6004 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6005 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6007 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
6008 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
6009 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
6010 // actually revoked.
6011 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
6012 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
6013 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
6014 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6017 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6018 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6019 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
6020 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6021 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6022 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
6023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6024 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
6025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6026 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6028 if check_revoke_no_close {
6029 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
6030 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6033 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
6034 let mut block = Block {
6035 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6038 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
6039 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
6040 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
6042 if !check_revoke_no_close {
6043 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
6044 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6046 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6048 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6049 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6050 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
6051 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6052 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6053 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
6054 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6055 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6059 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
6060 // There are only a few cases to test here:
6061 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
6062 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
6063 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
6064 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
6065 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
6067 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
6068 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
6069 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
6071 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
6072 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
6073 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
6075 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
6076 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
6080 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
6081 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
6082 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
6083 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
6084 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
6089 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
6090 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6091 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6092 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6093 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6094 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
6095 for node in nodes.iter() {
6096 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6099 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6100 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6101 let push_msat=10001;
6102 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6103 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6104 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6105 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6107 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
6108 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
6109 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6113 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6114 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6115 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6116 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6117 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6119 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6120 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6121 let push_msat=10001;
6122 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6124 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6125 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6126 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6127 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6128 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6130 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6131 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6132 let push_msat=10001;
6133 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6134 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6135 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6137 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6138 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6139 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6141 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6142 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6143 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6145 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6146 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6147 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6149 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6150 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6151 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6152 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6153 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6154 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6158 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6159 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6160 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6161 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6162 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6164 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6165 let push_msat=10001;
6166 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6167 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6168 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6169 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6171 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6172 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6173 let err_msg = match events[0] {
6174 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6177 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6179 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6182 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6183 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6184 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6185 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6187 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6188 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6189 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6190 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6191 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6192 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6194 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6195 // pending_update_fee.
6197 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6198 *feerate_lock += 20;
6200 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6203 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6204 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6205 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6206 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6207 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6209 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6212 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6214 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6215 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6216 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6217 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6219 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6220 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6221 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6223 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6224 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6225 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6226 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6228 // Flush the pending fee update.
6229 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6230 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6231 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6232 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6235 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6236 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6237 // us to surface its failure to the user.
6238 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6239 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6240 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6241 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6242 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6243 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6245 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6246 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6247 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6249 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6250 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6251 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6252 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6253 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6254 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6255 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6256 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6257 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6259 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6263 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6264 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6265 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6267 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6268 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6269 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6270 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6271 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6272 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6274 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6275 // pending_update_fee.
6277 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6278 *feerate_lock += 200;
6280 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6283 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6284 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6285 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6286 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6287 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6289 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6292 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6294 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6295 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6296 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6297 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6299 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6301 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6302 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6303 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6305 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6306 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6307 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6308 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6309 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6310 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6311 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6313 // Flush the pending fee update.
6314 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6315 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6316 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6317 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6318 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6321 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6322 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6323 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6324 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6325 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6326 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6327 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6328 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6329 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6331 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6332 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6333 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6335 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6336 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6337 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6338 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6339 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6340 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6341 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6342 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6343 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6345 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6348 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6349 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6350 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6351 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6352 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6354 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6355 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6356 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6358 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6360 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6361 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6362 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6363 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6365 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6366 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6368 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6369 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6370 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6372 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6373 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6375 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6376 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6377 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6379 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6380 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6381 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6382 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6385 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6386 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6387 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6390 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6391 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6392 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6393 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6394 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6395 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6396 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6397 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6398 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6399 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6400 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6402 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6403 // pending_update_fee.
6405 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6406 *feerate_lock += 20;
6408 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6411 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6412 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6413 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6414 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6415 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6417 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6420 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6422 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6423 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6424 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6425 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6427 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6429 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6430 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6431 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6432 let payment_event = {
6433 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6434 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6436 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6437 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6439 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6441 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6442 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6443 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6444 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6446 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6447 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6449 // Flush the pending fee update.
6450 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6451 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6453 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6454 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6455 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6457 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6458 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6459 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6461 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6462 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6465 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6468 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6470 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6472 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6473 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6474 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6475 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6476 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6477 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6480 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6481 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6484 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6485 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6486 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6487 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6488 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6489 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6490 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6491 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6492 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6493 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6495 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6498 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6499 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6500 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6502 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6503 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6505 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6506 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6507 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6508 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6509 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6510 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6511 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6512 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6514 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6515 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6516 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6519 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6520 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6521 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6524 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6525 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6526 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6527 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6528 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6529 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6530 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6532 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6533 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6535 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6536 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6537 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6538 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6542 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6543 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6544 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6545 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6546 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6547 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6548 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6550 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6551 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6552 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6553 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6555 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6556 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6560 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6561 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6562 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6563 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6564 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6565 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6566 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6568 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6569 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6571 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6572 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6574 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6575 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6576 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6578 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6582 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6583 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6584 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6585 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6586 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6587 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6588 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6589 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6591 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6592 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6593 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6594 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6595 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6596 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6600 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6601 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6602 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6603 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6604 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6605 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6606 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6607 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6608 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6609 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6611 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6612 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6613 let payment_event = {
6614 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6617 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6618 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6619 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6620 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6624 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6626 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6628 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6630 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6631 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6633 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6634 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6635 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6637 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6638 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6642 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6643 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6644 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6645 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6646 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6647 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6648 let channel_value = 100000;
6649 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6650 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6652 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6654 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6655 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6657 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6658 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6659 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6661 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6662 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6664 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6667 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6669 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6670 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6671 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6672 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6673 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6674 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6675 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6676 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6678 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6679 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6680 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6683 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6684 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6686 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6687 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6688 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6689 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6690 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6691 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6693 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6697 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6698 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6699 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6700 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6701 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6702 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6703 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6705 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6706 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6707 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6708 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6709 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6710 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6712 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6713 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6714 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6715 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6716 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6718 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6719 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6720 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6721 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6722 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6724 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6725 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6726 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6727 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6728 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6732 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6733 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6734 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6735 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6736 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6737 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6738 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6739 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6741 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6742 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6743 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6744 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6745 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6746 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6748 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6752 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6753 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6754 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6757 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6758 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6759 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6761 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6762 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6764 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6765 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6766 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6768 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6772 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6773 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6774 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6775 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6776 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6777 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6778 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6780 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6781 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6783 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6784 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6785 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6787 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6788 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6789 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6790 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6791 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6795 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6796 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6797 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6798 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6799 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6800 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6802 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6803 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6804 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6806 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6807 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6808 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6810 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6811 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6812 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6814 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6818 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6819 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6820 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6821 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6822 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6823 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6824 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6825 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6827 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6828 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6829 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6831 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6832 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6834 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6835 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6836 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6837 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6838 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6839 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6840 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6841 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6842 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6843 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6844 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6845 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6846 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6849 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6850 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6851 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6853 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6855 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6857 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6858 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6859 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6860 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6861 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6865 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6866 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6868 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6869 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6870 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6871 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6872 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6873 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6874 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6877 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6878 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6880 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6883 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6886 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6888 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6889 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6890 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6891 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6892 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6896 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6897 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6899 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6900 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6901 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6902 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6903 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6905 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6906 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6908 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6909 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6911 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6914 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6917 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6919 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6920 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6921 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6923 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6927 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6928 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6930 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6931 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6932 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6933 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6934 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6936 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6937 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6939 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6940 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6941 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6944 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6945 failure_code: 0x8000,
6948 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6950 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6951 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6952 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6954 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6958 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6959 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6961 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6962 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6963 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6964 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6965 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6967 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6969 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6971 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6973 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6974 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6975 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6977 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6978 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6979 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6980 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6981 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6982 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6983 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6985 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6989 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6991 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6993 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6994 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6995 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6996 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6997 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7001 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
7002 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
7004 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7005 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7006 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7007 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7008 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7010 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
7012 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
7013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7014 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
7016 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7017 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7018 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
7020 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7021 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7022 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7023 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7024 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7025 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7026 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
7028 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7032 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
7034 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
7036 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7037 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7038 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
7039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7040 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7044 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
7045 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
7047 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7048 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7049 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7050 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7051 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7053 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
7054 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7057 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7058 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7060 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7061 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7062 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7064 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7066 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
7068 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7069 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7070 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7071 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7072 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7073 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7074 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
7076 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7079 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
7080 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7082 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7083 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7084 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
7085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7086 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7090 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
7091 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
7092 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
7094 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7095 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7096 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7097 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7098 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7099 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7101 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7104 let mut payment_event = {
7105 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7107 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7108 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7109 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7111 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7113 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7114 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7115 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7116 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7118 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7119 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7122 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7123 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7125 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7127 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7128 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7129 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7131 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7132 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7133 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7134 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7135 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7136 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7137 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7139 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7143 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7146 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7147 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7148 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7149 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7151 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7153 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7154 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7155 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7156 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7157 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7158 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7160 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7166 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7167 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7168 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7169 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7171 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7172 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7173 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7174 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7175 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7176 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7178 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7180 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7181 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7182 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7183 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7185 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7186 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7188 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7189 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7191 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7194 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7195 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7196 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7199 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7200 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7202 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7204 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7205 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7207 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7210 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7211 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7213 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7216 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7217 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7218 if announce_latest {
7219 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7221 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7224 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7225 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7226 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7228 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7229 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7230 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7231 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7232 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7233 let mut first_failed = false;
7234 for event in events {
7236 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7237 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7238 assert!(!first_failed);
7239 first_failed = true;
7241 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7244 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7250 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7251 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7252 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7255 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7256 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7257 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7258 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7259 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7260 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7261 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7263 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7264 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7265 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7266 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7267 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7269 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7271 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7272 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7274 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7275 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7277 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7279 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7280 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7283 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7285 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7286 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7287 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7288 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7289 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7291 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7292 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7294 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7295 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7296 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7297 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7298 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7299 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7300 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7301 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7303 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7304 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7305 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7307 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7308 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7310 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7311 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7312 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7313 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7314 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7315 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7316 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7319 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7321 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time, 0);
7323 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7324 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7325 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7326 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7327 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7332 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7333 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7334 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7335 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7339 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7340 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7342 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7343 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7344 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7345 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7346 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7347 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7348 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7349 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7350 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7352 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7353 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7354 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7355 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7358 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7359 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7361 } else { assert!(false) }
7363 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7364 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7365 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7366 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7367 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7368 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7369 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7372 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7373 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7375 } else { assert!(false); }
7377 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7378 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7379 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7380 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7381 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7382 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7384 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7386 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7387 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7388 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7392 } else { panic!(); }
7393 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7395 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7396 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7397 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7398 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7399 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7400 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7401 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7404 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7405 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7407 } else { assert!(false); }
7410 fn do_test_data_loss_protect(reconnect_panicing: bool) {
7411 // When we get a data_loss_protect proving we're behind, we immediately panic as the
7412 // chain::Watch API requirements have been violated (e.g. the user restored from a backup). The
7413 // panic message informs the user they should force-close without broadcasting, which is tested
7414 // if `reconnect_panicing` is not set.
7420 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7421 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7422 // during signing due to revoked tx
7423 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7424 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7427 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7428 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7429 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7431 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7433 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7434 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7435 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7436 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7438 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7439 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7441 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7442 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7444 // Restore node A from previous state
7445 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7446 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7447 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7448 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
7449 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7450 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7451 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7453 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7454 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7455 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7456 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7457 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7458 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7460 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7461 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7465 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7466 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7467 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7468 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7472 if reconnect_panicing {
7473 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7474 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7476 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7478 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7479 // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
7480 // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
7481 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7482 let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
7483 assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
7486 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7487 // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
7488 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
7491 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7492 // Check A panics upon seeing proof it has fallen behind.
7493 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7494 return; // By this point we should have panic'ed!
7497 nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7499 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7501 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7502 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7505 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7506 if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7507 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7509 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7510 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel force-closed");
7512 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7515 panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", msg)
7519 // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
7520 // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
7521 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7522 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7523 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7524 let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7526 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
7527 let mut err_msgs_0 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7528 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7529 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7531 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7532 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel");
7533 err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone());
7535 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7538 panic!("Unexpected event!");
7541 assert_eq!(err_msgs_0.len(), 1);
7542 nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]);
7543 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7545 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() });
7546 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
7551 fn test_data_loss_protect_showing_stale_state_panics() {
7552 do_test_data_loss_protect(true);
7556 fn test_force_close_without_broadcast() {
7557 do_test_data_loss_protect(false);
7561 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7562 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7563 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7564 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7566 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7567 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7568 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7569 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7571 // Create some initial channels
7572 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7574 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7575 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7576 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7577 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7578 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7579 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7580 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7581 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7583 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7584 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7585 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7586 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7587 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7589 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7590 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7591 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7592 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7594 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7595 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7596 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7598 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7599 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7600 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7601 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7602 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7603 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7604 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7605 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7606 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7607 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7609 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7613 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7614 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7616 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7617 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7618 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7619 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7623 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7624 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7625 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7627 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7628 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7629 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7630 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7632 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7633 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7634 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7637 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7638 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7640 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7641 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7642 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7643 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7644 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7645 for e in msg_events {
7647 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7648 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7649 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7650 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7651 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7654 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7658 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7659 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7660 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7661 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7662 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7663 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7665 // Reestablish chan_1
7666 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7667 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7668 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7669 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7670 // Reestablish chan_2
7671 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7672 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7673 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7674 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7675 // Reestablish chan_3
7676 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7677 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7678 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7679 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7681 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7682 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7683 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7684 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7685 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7686 for e in msg_events {
7688 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7689 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7690 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7691 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7693 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7694 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7697 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7700 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7701 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7705 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7706 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7707 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7709 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7710 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7711 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7712 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7714 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7716 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7717 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7718 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7719 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7720 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7722 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7723 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7724 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7725 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7726 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7727 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7729 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7730 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7731 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7732 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7736 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7737 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7739 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7740 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7741 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7742 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7745 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7749 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7750 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7751 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7752 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7753 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7754 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7755 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7756 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7760 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7761 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7762 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7763 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7765 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7766 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7767 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7768 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7769 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7770 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7771 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7772 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7773 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7774 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7775 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7776 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7777 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7781 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7783 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7784 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7786 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7788 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7789 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7790 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7791 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7792 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7793 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7794 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7795 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7796 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7797 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7798 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7799 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7800 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7804 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7806 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7807 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7811 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7812 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7813 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7815 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7816 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7817 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7818 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7819 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7821 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7822 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7823 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7824 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7825 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7826 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7827 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7828 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7829 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7830 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7831 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7832 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7834 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7835 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7836 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7838 // Revoke local commitment tx
7839 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7841 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7842 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7843 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7844 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7845 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7846 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7847 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7849 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7850 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7851 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7853 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7854 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7855 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7857 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7858 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7859 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7860 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7862 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7863 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7864 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7865 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7866 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7867 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7868 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7869 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7871 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7872 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7878 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7879 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7880 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7882 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7883 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7884 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7885 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7887 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7888 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7889 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7890 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7891 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7892 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7894 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7895 // available, which we check here:
7896 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7897 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7898 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7900 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7901 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7903 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7904 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7905 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7906 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7908 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7909 // output, checked above).
7910 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7911 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7912 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7914 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7915 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7916 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7917 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7918 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7922 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7923 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7924 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7925 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7926 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7928 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7929 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7931 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7932 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7933 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7934 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7935 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7937 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7938 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7944 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7945 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7946 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7947 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7949 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7950 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7952 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7953 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7954 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7955 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7956 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7957 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7958 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7959 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7963 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7964 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7965 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7966 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7968 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7969 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7970 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7971 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7972 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7973 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7974 // up bumped justice generation.
7975 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7978 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7979 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7983 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7984 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7985 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7988 // Provide preimage for one
7989 // Check aggregation
7991 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7992 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7993 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7994 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7996 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7997 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7998 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
8000 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
8001 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
8002 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
8003 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8004 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8006 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
8007 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8008 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8009 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
8010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8011 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
8013 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
8017 let feerate_timeout;
8018 let feerate_preimage;
8020 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8021 // 9 transactions including:
8022 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
8023 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
8024 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
8026 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
8027 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8028 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
8029 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8030 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
8032 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
8033 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
8035 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output {
8036 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
8037 check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
8039 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
8040 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
8042 preimage_bump = node_txn[7].clone();
8043 check_spends!(node_txn[7], remote_txn[0]);
8044 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[7].input[0].previous_output);
8046 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[3]);
8047 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[4]);
8050 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
8051 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8052 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
8053 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].weight() as u64;
8055 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8056 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8057 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8058 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8062 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8063 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8065 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8066 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8068 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8069 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8070 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8071 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8072 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8073 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8075 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8076 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8077 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
8078 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8079 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8081 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8082 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8083 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8084 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8085 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8090 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8091 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8095 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8096 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8097 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8098 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8099 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8100 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8101 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8102 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8104 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8105 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8106 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8107 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8108 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8110 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8111 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8113 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8115 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8116 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8117 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8119 // Must revoke without gaps
8120 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8121 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8123 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8124 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8125 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8127 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8128 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8129 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8131 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8135 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8136 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8137 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8139 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8140 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8141 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8142 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8144 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8145 // Lock HTLC in both directions
8146 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8147 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8149 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8150 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8151 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8153 // Revoke local commitment tx
8154 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8156 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8157 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8158 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8159 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8161 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8162 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8164 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8166 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8167 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8168 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8169 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8170 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8171 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8175 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8176 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8177 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8179 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8180 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8181 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8186 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8187 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8188 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8189 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8190 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8191 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8192 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8193 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8195 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
8196 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8197 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
8198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8199 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8201 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8202 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8203 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8205 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8207 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8208 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8209 // can get our balance.
8211 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8212 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8213 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8214 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8215 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8216 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8217 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8218 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8220 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8224 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8225 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8226 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8227 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8228 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8229 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8230 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8232 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8234 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8235 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8236 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8237 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8238 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8240 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8241 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8243 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8245 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8247 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8248 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8249 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8251 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8252 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8253 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8255 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8260 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8261 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8262 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8263 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8264 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8266 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8267 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8268 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8270 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8272 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8273 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8274 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8275 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8279 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8280 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8281 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8282 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8283 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8284 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8285 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8287 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8288 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8289 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8291 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8292 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8293 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8297 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
8298 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
8299 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
8300 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
8301 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
8302 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8304 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8305 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8306 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8307 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8308 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8309 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8310 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8311 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8312 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8313 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8314 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8315 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8317 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8318 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8319 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8320 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8322 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8323 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8324 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8325 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8326 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8328 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8329 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8331 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8332 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8333 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_50_percent_msat));
8334 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8335 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8336 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_30_percent_msat));
8338 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8339 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8341 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
8342 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8343 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8345 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
8349 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8350 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8351 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8352 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8353 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8354 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8355 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8357 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8358 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8360 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8362 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8363 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8364 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8366 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8368 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8369 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8371 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8374 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8375 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8377 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8378 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8379 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8381 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8384 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8386 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8387 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8389 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8391 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8392 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8394 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8399 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8400 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8401 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8402 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8403 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8404 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8405 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8407 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8408 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8410 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8412 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8413 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8414 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8416 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8418 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8419 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8421 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8424 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8425 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8427 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8428 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8429 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8431 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8433 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8437 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8438 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8439 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8440 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8441 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8442 // and the channel should be closed.
8443 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8444 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8445 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8446 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8447 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8448 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8450 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8451 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8452 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8454 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8456 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8457 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8459 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8460 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8462 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8463 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8464 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8465 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8466 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8469 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8470 let accept_chan_msg = channel.get_accept_channel_message();
8471 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8474 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8476 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8477 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8479 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8480 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8482 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8483 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8485 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8486 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8487 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8488 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8489 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8490 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8492 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8495 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8499 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8500 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8501 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8502 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8503 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8504 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8505 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8507 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8508 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8510 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8512 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8513 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8514 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8516 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8518 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8519 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8520 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8522 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8523 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8525 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8526 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8529 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8532 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8533 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8534 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8536 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8537 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8538 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8540 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8545 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8546 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8547 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8548 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8549 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8551 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8552 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8554 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8555 assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8557 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8558 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8563 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8564 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8565 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8566 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8567 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8568 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8570 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8571 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8572 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8573 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8575 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8576 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8577 route.paths.push(path);
8578 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8579 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8580 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8581 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8582 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8583 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8584 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8585 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8589 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8590 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8591 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8592 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8593 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8594 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8596 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8599 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8600 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8601 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8603 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8604 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8605 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8606 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8608 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8609 // values from previous calls.
8610 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8611 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8612 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8614 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8616 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8617 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8619 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8622 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8627 #[allow(deprecated)]
8628 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8629 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8630 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8631 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8632 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8633 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8634 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8636 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8638 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8640 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8641 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8642 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8643 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8644 } else { panic!(); }
8646 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8648 header: BlockHeader {
8650 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8651 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8652 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8656 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8657 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8658 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8659 } else { panic!(); }
8661 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8662 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8663 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8664 block.header.time += 1;
8665 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8666 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8667 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8670 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8671 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8672 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8673 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8674 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8675 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8676 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8678 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8679 // values from previous calls.
8680 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8681 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8682 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8684 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8685 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8686 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8687 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8689 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8694 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8695 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8696 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8697 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8698 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8699 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8701 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8703 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8704 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8705 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8706 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8708 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8709 // resulting events.
8710 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8712 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8713 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8714 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8715 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8716 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8718 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8719 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8720 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8721 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8722 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8724 // We should fail the payment back
8725 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8726 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8727 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8728 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8729 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8731 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8736 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8737 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8738 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8740 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8741 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8742 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8743 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8745 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8746 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8747 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8748 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8750 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8751 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8752 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8753 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8757 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8758 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8759 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8760 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8762 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8763 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8764 // commitment at same time.
8766 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8767 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8768 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8769 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8771 // Create some initial channel
8772 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8773 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8775 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8776 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8778 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8779 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8781 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8782 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8783 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8784 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8786 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8787 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8788 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8789 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8790 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8791 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8792 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8793 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8796 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8797 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8798 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8799 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8800 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8801 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8803 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8804 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8806 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8808 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8809 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8810 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8811 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8812 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8813 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8814 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8815 } else { assert!(false); }
8816 } else { assert!(false); };
8817 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8819 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8820 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8824 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8825 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8826 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8827 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8828 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8830 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8831 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8832 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8833 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8835 // Create some initial channel
8836 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8837 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8839 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8840 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8842 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8843 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8845 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8846 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8847 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8848 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8849 let watchtower_alice = {
8850 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8851 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8852 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8853 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8854 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8855 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8856 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8857 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8860 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8861 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8862 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8863 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8864 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8865 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8867 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8869 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8870 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8874 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8875 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8876 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8877 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8878 let watchtower_bob = {
8879 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8880 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8881 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8882 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8883 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8884 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8885 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8886 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8889 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8890 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8892 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8893 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8895 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8897 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8899 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8900 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8901 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8902 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8903 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8904 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8905 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8906 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8907 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8908 } else { assert!(false); }
8909 } else { assert!(false); };
8910 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8913 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8914 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8915 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8917 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8920 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8921 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8922 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8926 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8927 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8928 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8930 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8931 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8932 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8933 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8934 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8935 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8940 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8941 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8942 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8945 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8946 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8948 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8949 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8950 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8951 // before receiving funding_signed.
8952 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8953 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8954 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8955 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8957 // Create an initial channel
8958 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8959 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8960 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8961 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8962 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8964 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8965 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8967 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8970 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8971 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8972 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8973 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8974 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8978 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8979 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8980 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8981 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8982 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8983 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8984 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8986 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8987 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8988 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8989 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8991 // Create some initial channels
8992 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8994 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8995 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8996 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8997 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8998 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8999 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
9001 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
9002 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9003 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
9004 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
9005 // this test before #653 fix.
9006 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
9007 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9008 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9009 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9010 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
9012 let htlc_timeout = {
9013 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9014 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9015 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9016 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
9020 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9021 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
9022 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
9023 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9026 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
9027 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
9028 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
9029 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
9031 // Steps of the test:
9032 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
9033 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
9034 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
9035 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
9036 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
9037 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
9038 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
9039 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
9040 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9041 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9042 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9043 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9045 // Create some initial channels
9046 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9047 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9049 // Steps (1) and (2):
9050 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
9051 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
9053 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
9054 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
9055 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9056 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
9057 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
9058 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9059 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
9061 // Steps (3) and (4):
9062 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
9063 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
9064 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
9065 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
9068 if !broadcast_alice {
9069 force_closing_node = 1;
9070 counterparty_node = 0;
9072 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9073 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
9074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
9075 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9076 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9077 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
9078 true => alice_txn.clone(),
9079 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
9081 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9082 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9083 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9084 if broadcast_alice {
9085 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9087 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9089 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
9090 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9094 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
9095 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
9096 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9098 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
9100 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9101 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9102 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9103 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9104 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
9105 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9107 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9108 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
9109 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
9110 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
9111 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9112 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9114 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
9115 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9117 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9120 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
9121 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
9122 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
9123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9125 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9126 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9127 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
9128 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9129 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9132 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9134 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
9135 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
9136 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9139 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9142 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
9143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9144 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
9145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9147 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9148 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9149 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
9150 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9151 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9154 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9156 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
9157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9159 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
9160 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
9161 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
9162 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
9163 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9164 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9165 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9166 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
9167 if broadcast_alice {
9168 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9170 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9172 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9173 if broadcast_alice {
9174 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
9175 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
9176 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
9177 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
9179 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
9180 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
9182 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9183 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9188 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
9189 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
9191 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9192 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9193 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
9194 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9196 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
9197 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
9198 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
9200 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
9201 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
9202 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
9203 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
9204 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9205 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9206 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9208 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9209 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9215 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9216 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9217 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9218 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9219 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9223 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9224 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9225 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9227 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9228 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9229 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9230 // updating logic for the existing channel.
9231 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9232 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9233 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9234 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9236 // Create an initial channel
9237 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9238 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9239 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9240 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9242 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9243 // that it is rejected.
9244 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9246 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9247 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9249 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9250 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9251 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9252 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9253 // move forward with it.
9254 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9255 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9257 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9261 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9262 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9264 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9267 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9268 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9270 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9271 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9272 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9273 added_monitors.clear();
9275 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9277 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9278 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9280 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9283 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9284 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9285 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9286 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9287 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9289 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9290 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9292 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9293 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9294 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9295 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9296 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9298 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9302 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9303 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9304 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9305 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9306 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9307 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9309 let funding_created = {
9310 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9311 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9312 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9313 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9314 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9315 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9316 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9317 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9320 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9321 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9322 // still needs to be cleared here.
9323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9325 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9327 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9328 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9330 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9331 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9332 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9333 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9334 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9336 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9340 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9341 // everything is functional.
9342 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9344 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9345 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9346 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9347 added_monitors.clear();
9350 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9351 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9352 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9353 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9355 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9356 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9357 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9358 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9362 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9363 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9365 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9366 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9367 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9368 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9369 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9370 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9371 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9373 // Create some initial channels
9374 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9375 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9376 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9378 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9379 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9380 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9382 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9383 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9384 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9386 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9387 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9389 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9390 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9391 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9392 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9393 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9394 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9396 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9397 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9398 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9400 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9401 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9402 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9404 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9405 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9407 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9410 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9411 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9413 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9415 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9416 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9417 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9418 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9419 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9420 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9422 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9423 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9424 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9428 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9429 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9431 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9432 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9433 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9434 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9436 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9437 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9438 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9439 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9440 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9441 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9442 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9444 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9445 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9446 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9448 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9450 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9451 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9452 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9454 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9455 assert!(chan_utils::HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(wit_program.len()).unwrap() ==
9456 chan_utils::HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
9458 let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.clone().into();
9459 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9460 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9461 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9464 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9465 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9468 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9471 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9472 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9474 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9475 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9476 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9478 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9479 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9480 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9482 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9483 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9484 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9485 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9486 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9487 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9488 } else { panic!(); }
9489 } else { panic!(); }
9490 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9492 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9493 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9494 // as its not 32 bytes long.
9495 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9496 version: 2i32, lock_time: 0,
9497 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9498 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9502 script_sig: Script::new(),
9503 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
9504 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9506 output: vec![TxOut {
9508 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9511 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9512 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9515 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9516 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9517 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9518 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9519 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9520 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9521 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9522 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9523 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9524 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9525 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9526 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9527 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9528 // until we learned about an additional block.
9530 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9531 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9532 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9533 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9534 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9535 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9536 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9538 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9539 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9540 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9541 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9542 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9544 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9545 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9546 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9548 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9549 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9551 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9552 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9553 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9555 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9556 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9557 if test_height_before_timelock {
9558 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9559 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9560 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9561 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9563 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9564 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9565 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9566 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9567 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9568 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9570 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9571 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9573 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9574 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9575 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9576 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9577 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9578 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9581 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9582 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9583 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9584 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9585 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9586 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9587 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9588 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9589 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9594 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9595 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9596 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9600 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9601 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9602 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9604 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9606 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9607 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9608 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9609 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9610 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9611 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9612 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9613 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9614 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9616 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9617 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9618 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9619 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9621 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9622 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9623 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9624 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9625 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9627 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9629 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9630 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9631 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9632 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9634 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9635 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9636 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9637 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9638 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9640 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9642 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9644 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9645 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9646 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9648 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9649 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9650 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9651 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9652 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9654 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9655 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9656 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9657 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9659 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9660 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9661 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9662 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9663 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9664 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9665 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9666 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9668 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9669 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9670 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9671 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9672 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9673 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9674 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9676 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9677 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9678 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9679 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9683 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9684 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9686 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9687 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9688 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9691 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9692 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their channel_ready here since they haven't updated
9693 // the commitment state.
9694 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9696 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9698 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9699 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9700 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9702 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9703 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9704 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9705 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9706 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9707 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9708 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9710 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9711 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9714 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9715 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9716 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9717 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9718 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9720 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9722 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9723 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9724 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9726 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9729 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9731 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9732 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9733 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9734 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9735 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9737 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9738 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9741 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9742 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9743 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9744 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9745 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9746 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9747 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9748 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9749 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9750 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9751 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9754 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9755 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9757 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9758 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9759 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9761 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9762 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9765 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9766 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9768 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9769 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9770 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9772 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9773 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9774 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9775 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9777 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9778 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9779 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9782 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9783 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9784 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9786 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9788 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9793 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9794 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9795 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9796 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9797 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9798 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9802 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9803 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9804 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9805 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9809 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9810 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9811 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9812 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9813 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9814 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9815 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9817 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9818 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9819 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9820 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9822 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9823 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9824 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9825 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9826 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9827 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9828 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9829 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9831 let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9833 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9835 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9836 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9838 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9841 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9842 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9843 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9845 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9848 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9851 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9852 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9853 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9855 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9856 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9858 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9859 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9861 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9862 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9863 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9865 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9867 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9869 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9870 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9871 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9873 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9874 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9875 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9876 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9880 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9881 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9882 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9884 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9887 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9888 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9889 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9891 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9893 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9896 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9897 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9898 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9900 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9904 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9905 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9906 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9907 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9908 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9910 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9911 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9912 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9913 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9914 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9915 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9916 final_value_msat: 10000,
9917 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9919 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9920 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9921 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9923 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9924 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9926 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9927 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9928 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9929 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9930 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9931 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9935 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9936 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9937 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9938 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9939 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9941 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9942 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9943 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9944 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9946 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9947 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9948 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9949 final_value_msat: 10000,
9950 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9952 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9953 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9954 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9955 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9956 let route = find_route(
9957 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9958 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9961 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9962 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9964 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9965 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9966 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9967 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9968 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9969 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9973 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9974 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentReceived event, the HTLCs
9975 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9976 // PaymentReceived event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9978 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9979 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9980 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9981 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9983 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9984 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9985 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9986 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9988 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9989 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9990 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9991 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9992 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9993 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9996 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9997 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentReceived event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9998 // amount of time to respond to.
10000 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
10001 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
10002 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
10004 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
10006 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
10008 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
10009 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10012 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10013 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10014 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10016 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
10017 // that PaymentReceived event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
10018 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10019 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
10020 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10023 fn do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(persist_both_monitors: bool) {
10024 // Test what happens if a node receives an MPP payment, claims it, but crashes before
10025 // persisting the ChannelManager. If `persist_both_monitors` is false, also crash after only
10026 // updating one of the two channels' ChannelMonitors. As a result, on startup, we'll (a) still
10027 // have the PaymentReceived event, (b) have one (or two) channel(s) that goes on chain with the
10028 // HTLC preimage in them, and (c) optionally have one channel that is live off-chain but does
10029 // not have the preimage tied to the still-pending HTLC.
10031 // To get to the correct state, on startup we should propagate the preimage to the
10032 // still-off-chain channel, claiming the HTLC as soon as the peer connects, with the monitor
10033 // receiving the preimage without a state update.
10035 // Further, we should generate a `PaymentClaimed` event to inform the user that the payment was
10036 // definitely claimed.
10037 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10038 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10039 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10041 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
10042 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
10043 let nodes_3_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
10045 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10047 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10048 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10049 let chan_id_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
10050 let chan_id_not_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
10052 // Create an MPP route for 15k sats, more than the default htlc-max of 10%
10053 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10054 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10055 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10056 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10057 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10058 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10061 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10064 // Send the payment through to nodes[3] *without* clearing the PaymentReceived event
10065 let mut send_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10066 assert_eq!(send_events.len(), 2);
10067 do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[0].clone(), true, false, None);
10068 do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[1].clone(), true, false, None);
10070 // Now that we have an MPP payment pending, get the latest encoded copies of nodes[3]'s
10071 // monitors and ChannelManager, for use later, if we don't want to persist both monitors.
10072 let mut original_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10073 if !persist_both_monitors {
10074 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10075 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10076 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10077 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10082 let mut original_manager = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10083 nodes[3].node.write(&mut original_manager).unwrap();
10085 expect_payment_received!(nodes[3], payment_hash, payment_secret, 15_000_000);
10087 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10089 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[3], payment_hash, 15_000_000);
10091 // Now fetch one of the two updated ChannelMonitors from nodes[3], and restart pretending we
10092 // crashed in between the two persistence calls - using one old ChannelMonitor and one new one,
10093 // with the old ChannelManager.
10094 let mut updated_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10095 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10096 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_persisted {
10097 assert!(updated_monitor.0.is_empty());
10098 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut updated_monitor).unwrap();
10101 // If `persist_both_monitors` is set, get the second monitor here as well
10102 if persist_both_monitors {
10103 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10104 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10105 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10106 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10111 // Now restart nodes[3].
10112 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
10113 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[3].keys_manager;
10114 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[3].chain_source), nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[3].logger, node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
10115 nodes[3].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
10116 let mut monitors = Vec::new();
10117 for mut monitor_data in [original_monitor, updated_monitor].iter() {
10118 let (_, mut deserialized_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut &monitor_data.0[..], keys_manager).unwrap();
10119 monitors.push(deserialized_monitor);
10122 let config = UserConfig::default();
10123 nodes_3_deserialized = {
10124 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
10125 for monitor in monitors.iter_mut() {
10126 channel_monitors.insert(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
10128 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut &original_manager.0[..], ChannelManagerReadArgs {
10129 default_config: config,
10131 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator,
10132 chain_monitor: nodes[3].chain_monitor,
10133 tx_broadcaster: nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
10134 logger: nodes[3].logger,
10138 nodes[3].node = &nodes_3_deserialized;
10140 for monitor in monitors {
10141 // On startup the preimage should have been copied into the non-persisted monitor:
10142 assert!(monitor.get_stored_preimages().contains_key(&payment_hash));
10143 nodes[3].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.clone(), monitor).unwrap();
10145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10147 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10148 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10150 // During deserialization, we should have closed one channel and broadcast its latest
10151 // commitment transaction. We should also still have the original PaymentReceived event we
10152 // never finished processing.
10153 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10154 assert_eq!(events.len(), if persist_both_monitors { 4 } else { 3 });
10155 if let Event::PaymentReceived { amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } = events[0] { } else { panic!(); }
10156 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[1] { } else { panic!(); }
10157 if persist_both_monitors {
10158 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[2] { } else { panic!(); }
10161 // On restart, we should also get a duplicate PaymentClaimed event as we persisted the
10162 // ChannelManager prior to handling the original one.
10163 if let Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: our_payment_hash, amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } =
10164 events[if persist_both_monitors { 3 } else { 2 }]
10166 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
10167 } else { panic!(); }
10169 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), if persist_both_monitors { 0 } else { 1 });
10170 if !persist_both_monitors {
10171 // If one of the two channels is still live, reveal the payment preimage over it.
10173 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
10174 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2]);
10175 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
10176 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[3]);
10178 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
10179 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
10180 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10182 nodes[3].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
10184 // Once we call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` the holding cell is cleared and the HTLC
10185 // claim should fly.
10186 let ds_msgs = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
10188 assert_eq!(ds_msgs.len(), 2);
10189 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } = ds_msgs[1] {} else { panic!(); }
10191 let cs_updates = match ds_msgs[0] {
10192 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
10193 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10195 let cs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10196 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[2], nodes[0], nodes[3], Some(1000), false, false);
10197 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10203 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10204 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], cs_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10205 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
10210 fn test_partial_claim_before_restart() {
10211 do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(false);
10212 do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(true);
10215 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
10216 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
10217 enum ExposureEvent {
10218 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
10220 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
10222 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
10223 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
10226 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
10227 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
10230 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
10231 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
10232 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
10233 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
10234 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
10235 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
10236 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
10237 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
10239 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10240 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
10241 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
10242 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10243 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
10244 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10246 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10247 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10248 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
10249 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
10251 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10253 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
10254 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10255 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
10257 let opt_anchors = false;
10259 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10262 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
10263 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10267 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10268 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10271 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10274 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10275 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10276 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
10278 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
10279 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
10280 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
10281 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
10283 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10284 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10286 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10287 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10289 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
10290 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
10293 if dust_outbound_balance {
10294 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10295 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10296 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
10297 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10298 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10299 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10302 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10303 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10304 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
10305 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10306 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10310 if dust_outbound_balance {
10311 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10312 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10313 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10314 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10315 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10318 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10319 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10320 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10321 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10326 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
10327 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
10328 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10329 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10330 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10332 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10333 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10334 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10336 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10338 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10339 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10340 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10342 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10343 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10344 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10345 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10346 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10348 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10349 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10350 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10351 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10353 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10354 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10356 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10357 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
10358 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
10360 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10361 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10363 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10364 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10365 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
10368 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10369 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10370 added_monitors.clear();
10374 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10375 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10376 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10377 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10378 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10379 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10380 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10381 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10382 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10383 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10384 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10385 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10386 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10390 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10391 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10392 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10393 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10394 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10396 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10397 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10398 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
10399 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10400 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
10402 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
10404 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10405 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10406 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: 0x1, witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
10407 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10408 let mut tx = match events[0] {
10409 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10410 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
10411 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: best_height + 3, input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10412 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10415 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10417 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10418 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10419 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10420 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10425 // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
10427 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10428 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());