1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
26 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
27 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, OptionalField, ErrorAction};
30 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
31 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
32 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
33 use util::errors::APIError;
34 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
35 use util::config::UserConfig;
37 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
38 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
39 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
42 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
44 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
51 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
52 use core::default::Default;
53 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
55 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
56 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
59 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
60 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
61 use ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
62 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
63 cfg.peer_channel_config_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
64 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
65 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
66 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
67 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
69 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
71 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
72 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
73 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
75 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
76 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
78 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
79 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
81 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
82 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
83 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
84 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
85 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
86 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
87 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
88 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
90 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
91 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
93 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
95 } else { assert!(false); }
98 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
100 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
101 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
102 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
104 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
106 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
108 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
110 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
112 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
116 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
120 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
121 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
123 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
124 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
125 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
126 node_cfgs[1].features = InitFeatures::known().clear_wumbo();
127 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
128 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
130 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
131 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
132 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
138 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
139 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
140 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
141 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
142 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
143 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
144 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
145 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
146 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
148 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
149 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
150 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
151 let opt_anchors = false;
152 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
153 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
155 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
156 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
157 if !send_from_initiator {
158 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
159 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
161 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
163 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
164 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
165 if send_from_initiator {
166 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
167 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
169 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
172 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
173 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
174 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
177 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
178 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
179 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
181 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
182 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
183 if send_from_initiator {
184 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
185 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
186 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
187 // well as an additional HTLC.
188 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
190 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
195 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
196 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
197 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
201 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
202 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
203 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
204 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
205 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
206 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
209 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
213 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
214 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
215 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
216 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
217 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
218 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
219 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
220 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
221 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
222 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
224 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
226 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
228 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
230 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
233 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
236 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
237 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
238 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
239 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
240 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
242 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
245 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
247 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
248 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
249 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
252 let payment_event = {
253 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
254 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
255 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
257 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
258 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
260 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
261 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
262 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
263 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
264 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
267 // deliver(1), generate (3):
268 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
269 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
270 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
273 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
274 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
275 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
276 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
277 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
278 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
279 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
282 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
283 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
284 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
285 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
286 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
287 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
288 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
291 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
292 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
293 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
296 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
297 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
300 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
303 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
304 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
306 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
307 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
310 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
315 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
316 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
317 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
318 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
319 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
320 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
321 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
322 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
325 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
327 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
329 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
332 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
335 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
336 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
337 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
338 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
341 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
344 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
346 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
347 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
348 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
351 let payment_event = {
352 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
353 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
354 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
356 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
357 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
359 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
360 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
361 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
362 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
363 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
364 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
366 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
369 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
373 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
374 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
375 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
376 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
377 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
378 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
381 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
382 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
383 // update_fee (never committed) ->
385 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
386 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
387 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
388 // <- (1) RAA delivered
389 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
390 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
391 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
392 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
394 // B should send no response here
395 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
396 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
399 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
402 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
403 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
404 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
406 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
409 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
410 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
411 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
412 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
413 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
415 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
418 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
419 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
420 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
421 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
424 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
427 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
428 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
430 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
431 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
432 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
434 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
435 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
436 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
437 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
440 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
442 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
444 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
446 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
447 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
448 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
450 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
451 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
452 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
453 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
454 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
455 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
456 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
458 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
459 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
460 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
462 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
464 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
465 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
469 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
470 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
473 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
474 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
477 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
478 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
479 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
482 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
483 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
487 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
488 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
489 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
490 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
493 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
494 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
495 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
496 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
498 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
500 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
503 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
504 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
507 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
508 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
509 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
511 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
512 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
513 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
515 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
516 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
518 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
520 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
521 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
523 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
525 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
526 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
528 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
529 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
530 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
531 added_monitors.clear();
533 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
535 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
536 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
538 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
539 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
540 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
541 added_monitors.clear();
544 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
545 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
547 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
548 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
550 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
551 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
552 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
553 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
557 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
558 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
559 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
560 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
561 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
562 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
563 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
564 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
565 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
566 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
567 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
568 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
569 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
570 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
571 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
572 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
573 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
579 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
580 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
581 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
582 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
583 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
584 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
587 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
590 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
593 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
594 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
595 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
596 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
597 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
599 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
601 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
603 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
604 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
607 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
608 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
611 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
612 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
613 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
616 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
617 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
622 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
623 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
624 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
625 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
626 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
627 let channel_value = 5000;
629 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
630 let channel_id = chan.2;
631 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
632 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
634 let opt_anchors = false;
636 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
637 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
638 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
640 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
641 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
643 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
644 *feerate_lock = feerate;
646 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
648 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
650 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
652 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
654 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
656 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
658 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
659 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
660 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
661 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
662 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
663 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
667 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
668 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
671 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
672 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
675 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
677 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
678 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
679 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
680 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
681 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
682 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
683 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
684 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
685 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
687 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
688 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
689 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
690 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
691 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
692 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
693 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
694 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
697 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
698 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
699 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
702 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
703 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
704 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
705 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
706 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
707 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
709 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
710 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
711 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
712 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
714 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
716 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
719 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
722 htlc_signatures: res.1
725 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
727 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
730 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
732 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
733 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
734 //Should produce and error.
735 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
736 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
738 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
739 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
743 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
744 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
745 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
746 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
747 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
748 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
751 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
754 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
757 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
760 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
761 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
762 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
763 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
764 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
766 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
768 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
769 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
770 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
773 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
775 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
776 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
778 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
779 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
780 added_monitors.clear();
782 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
783 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
784 // node[1] has nothing to do
786 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
787 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
790 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
791 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
792 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
794 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
796 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
798 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
799 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
800 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
801 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
802 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
803 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
805 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
806 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
808 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
810 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
812 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
814 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
816 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
817 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
819 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
821 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
823 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
825 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
826 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
828 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
829 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
832 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
834 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
835 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
836 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
837 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
838 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
842 fn test_update_fee() {
843 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
844 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
845 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
846 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
847 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
848 let channel_id = chan.2;
851 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
852 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
853 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
854 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
855 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
856 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
857 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
858 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
859 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
860 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
861 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
864 // Create and deliver (1)...
867 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
868 feerate = *feerate_lock;
869 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
871 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
874 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
875 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
876 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
877 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
878 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
880 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
882 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
884 // Generate (2) and (3):
885 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
886 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
890 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
891 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
894 // Create and deliver (4)...
896 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
897 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
899 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
901 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
902 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
903 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
904 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
905 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
907 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
910 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
911 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
914 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
915 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
917 // Handle (3), creating (6):
918 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
920 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
921 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
924 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
925 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
928 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
929 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
930 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
931 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
932 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
933 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
934 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
935 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
939 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
941 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
942 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
944 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
946 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
948 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
949 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
950 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
951 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
952 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
956 fn fake_network_test() {
957 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
958 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
959 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
960 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
961 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
962 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
964 // Create some initial channels
965 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
966 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
967 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
969 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
970 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
971 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
972 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
973 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
975 // Send some more payments
976 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
977 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
978 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
980 // Test failure packets
981 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
982 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
984 // Add a new channel that skips 3
985 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
987 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
988 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
989 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
990 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
991 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
992 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
993 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
995 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
996 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
998 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
999 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1000 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1001 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1003 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1005 hops.push(RouteHop {
1006 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1007 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1008 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1009 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1011 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1013 hops.push(RouteHop {
1014 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1015 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1016 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1017 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1019 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1021 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1022 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1023 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1025 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1026 hops.push(RouteHop {
1027 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1028 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1029 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1030 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1032 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1034 hops.push(RouteHop {
1035 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1036 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1037 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1038 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1040 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1042 hops.push(RouteHop {
1043 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1044 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1045 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1046 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1048 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1050 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1051 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1052 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1054 // Claim the rebalances...
1055 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1056 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1058 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1059 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1061 // Send some payments across both channels
1062 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1063 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1064 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1067 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1068 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1069 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1070 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1072 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1074 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1075 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1076 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1078 // Close down the channels...
1079 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1080 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1081 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1082 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1083 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1084 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1086 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1087 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1088 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1089 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1090 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1091 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1092 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1093 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1097 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1098 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1099 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1100 // commitment dance rounds.
1101 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1102 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1103 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1104 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1105 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1106 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1108 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1109 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1110 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1111 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1112 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1116 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1117 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1118 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1119 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1121 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1122 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1124 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1126 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1127 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1128 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1129 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1132 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1133 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1135 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1139 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1140 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1141 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1142 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1144 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1145 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1146 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1147 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1148 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1149 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1152 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1153 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1154 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1156 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1158 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1159 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1160 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1163 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1164 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1166 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1168 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1170 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1172 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1173 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1175 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1177 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1179 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1181 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1183 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1185 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1187 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1190 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1192 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1193 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1194 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1196 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1197 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1199 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1203 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1204 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1207 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1211 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1212 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1213 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1214 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1215 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1216 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1217 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1219 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1220 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1221 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1222 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1223 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1224 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1226 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1228 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1229 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1231 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1232 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1234 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1235 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1236 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1240 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1241 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1242 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1243 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1244 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1245 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1246 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1247 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1249 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1252 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1254 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1256 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1257 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1258 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1260 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1261 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1262 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1264 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1265 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1267 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1268 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1269 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1270 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1271 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1272 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1273 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1276 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1278 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1280 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1281 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1283 // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1284 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1285 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1286 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1287 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1288 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1289 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1290 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1292 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1293 assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1294 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1296 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1297 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1298 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1299 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1300 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1301 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1302 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1303 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1305 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1306 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1309 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1310 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1311 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1312 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1314 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1315 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1316 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1317 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1318 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1319 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1321 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1327 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1328 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1329 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1330 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1331 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1332 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1334 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1335 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1337 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1338 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1339 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1340 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1341 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1343 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1345 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1346 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1347 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1350 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1352 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1353 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1355 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1359 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1360 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1361 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1362 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1363 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1364 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1366 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1367 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1368 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1369 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1371 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1373 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1374 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1375 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1376 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1379 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1380 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1381 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1382 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1385 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1387 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1388 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1389 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1391 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1393 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1395 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1396 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1397 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1398 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1399 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1400 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1401 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1402 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1404 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1405 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1406 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1407 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1408 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1410 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1411 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1412 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1413 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1414 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1415 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1416 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1417 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1420 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1421 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1422 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1424 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1425 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1426 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1428 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1430 amount_msat: 3460001,
1431 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1433 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1436 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1439 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1440 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1441 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1442 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1446 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1447 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1449 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1450 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1452 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1455 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1458 htlc_signatures: res.1
1461 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1462 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1463 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1465 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1466 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1468 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1469 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1471 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1473 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1474 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1475 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1477 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1478 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1479 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1481 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1483 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1484 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1490 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1491 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1492 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1493 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1494 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1496 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1497 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1498 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1499 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1501 let opt_anchors = false;
1503 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1504 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1505 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1507 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1509 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1510 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1511 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1514 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1515 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1516 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1517 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1518 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1519 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1523 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1524 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1525 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1526 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1527 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1528 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1530 let opt_anchors = false;
1532 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1533 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1534 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1535 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1536 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1537 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1538 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1540 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1541 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1542 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1545 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1546 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1547 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1548 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1549 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1550 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1551 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1552 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1553 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1555 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1556 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1557 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1558 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1559 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1562 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1563 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1564 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1565 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1566 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1567 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1569 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1573 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1574 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1575 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1576 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1577 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1579 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1580 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1581 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1583 let opt_anchors = false;
1585 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1586 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1587 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1588 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1589 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1590 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1591 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1593 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1594 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1595 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1596 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1597 // commitment transaction fee.
1598 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1600 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1601 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1602 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1605 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1606 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1607 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1608 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1612 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1613 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1614 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1615 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1616 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1617 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1618 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1619 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1621 let opt_anchors = false;
1623 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1625 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1626 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1627 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1628 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1630 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1631 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1632 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1633 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1634 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1635 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1636 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1638 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1639 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1640 match msg_events[0] {
1641 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1642 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1644 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1649 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1650 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1651 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1652 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1653 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1654 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1655 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1656 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1658 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1659 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1660 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1665 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1666 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1667 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1668 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1669 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1672 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1673 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1674 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1675 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1679 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1680 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1681 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1682 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1683 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1684 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1685 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1688 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1689 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1690 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1691 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1693 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1694 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1695 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1696 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1698 // Add a pending HTLC.
1699 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1700 let payment_event_1 = {
1701 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1704 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1705 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1706 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1708 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1710 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1711 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1712 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1713 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1714 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1716 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1717 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1718 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1719 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1720 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1721 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1722 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1723 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1726 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1727 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1728 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1729 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1732 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1733 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1734 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1735 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1736 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1737 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1739 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1743 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1744 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1745 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1746 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1747 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1748 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1749 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1750 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1751 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1752 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1754 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1755 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1756 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1758 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1759 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1762 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1763 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1767 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1768 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1769 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1770 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1771 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1772 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1773 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1774 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1775 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1776 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1777 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1779 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1780 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1782 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1783 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1785 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1787 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1788 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1789 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1790 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1795 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1796 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1797 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1798 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1800 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1802 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1804 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1805 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1806 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1807 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1808 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1809 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1810 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1813 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1814 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1816 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1817 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1818 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1819 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1820 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1821 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1822 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1825 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1827 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1828 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1829 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1830 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1831 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1834 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1835 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1836 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1837 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1838 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1841 // adding pending output.
1842 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1843 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1844 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1845 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1846 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1847 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1848 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1849 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1850 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1852 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1853 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1854 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1856 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1857 let payment_event_1 = {
1858 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1859 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1861 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1862 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1863 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1865 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1867 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1868 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1870 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1871 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1872 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1873 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1876 // split the rest to test holding cell
1877 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1878 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1879 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1880 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1882 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1883 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1886 // now see if they go through on both sides
1887 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1888 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1889 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1891 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1892 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1894 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1896 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1897 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1898 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1899 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1900 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1903 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1904 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1905 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1907 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1908 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1910 // flush the pending htlc
1911 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1912 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1915 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1916 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1918 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1920 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1921 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1922 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1923 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1925 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1926 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1929 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1931 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1932 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1933 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1935 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1936 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1938 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1939 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1940 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1941 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1942 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1943 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1945 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1946 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1947 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1948 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1950 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1951 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1953 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1954 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1956 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1957 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1958 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1960 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1961 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1962 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1964 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1967 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1970 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1971 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1972 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1974 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1975 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1976 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1978 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1981 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1984 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1985 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1986 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1988 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1989 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1990 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1992 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
1993 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1994 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1995 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1996 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1998 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1999 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2003 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2004 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2005 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2006 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2007 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2008 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2009 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2010 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2012 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2013 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2014 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2015 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2016 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2017 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2018 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2019 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2021 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2022 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2023 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2024 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2025 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2026 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2027 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2028 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2029 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2030 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2032 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2033 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2034 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
2035 let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
2037 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2038 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2040 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2042 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2043 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2044 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2047 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2048 // initial fulfill/CS.
2049 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
2050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2051 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2053 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2054 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2055 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2057 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2059 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2060 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2061 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2062 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2063 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2065 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2066 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2068 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2069 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2071 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2073 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2075 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2077 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2079 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2081 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2083 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2084 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2085 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2086 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2087 // on-chain as necessary).
2088 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2089 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2091 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2092 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2094 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2096 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2098 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2099 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2101 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2102 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2103 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2105 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2106 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2108 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2109 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2110 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2112 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2114 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2115 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2116 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2119 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2120 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2122 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2124 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2126 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2127 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2128 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2130 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2133 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2135 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2136 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2138 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2140 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2142 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2145 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2146 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2148 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2149 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2153 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2154 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2155 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2156 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2157 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2158 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2159 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2161 // Create some initial channels
2162 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2163 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2164 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2165 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2167 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2168 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2169 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2170 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2171 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2172 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2174 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2175 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2176 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2177 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2178 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2180 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2181 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
2182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2183 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2185 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2186 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2187 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2189 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2191 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2192 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2193 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2194 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2195 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2197 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2198 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2200 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2201 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2202 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_2.2).unwrap();
2203 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2206 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2207 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2208 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2209 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2211 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2213 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2214 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2215 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2216 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2217 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2219 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2220 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2222 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2223 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2225 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2226 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2228 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2229 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2230 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2231 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2233 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2239 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2240 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2241 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&chan_3.2).unwrap();
2242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2243 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2244 let node2_commitment_txid;
2246 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2247 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2248 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2249 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2251 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2252 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2253 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2254 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2255 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2257 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2258 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2259 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2260 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2261 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2263 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2264 // confusing us in the following tests.
2265 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2267 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2268 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2269 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2272 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2273 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2274 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2275 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2276 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2277 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2280 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2283 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2284 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2286 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2290 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2292 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2293 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2294 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2300 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2302 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2303 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2305 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2306 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2307 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2308 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2309 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2312 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2315 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2316 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2318 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2321 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2323 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2324 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2325 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2327 nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2328 nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2329 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2330 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2332 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2333 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2334 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2338 fn test_justice_tx() {
2339 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2340 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2341 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2342 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2343 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2344 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2345 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2346 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2347 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2348 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2349 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2350 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2351 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2352 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2353 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2354 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2355 // Create some new channels:
2356 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2358 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2359 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2360 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2361 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2362 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2363 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2364 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2365 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2366 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2367 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2368 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2369 // Revoke the old state
2370 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2373 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2375 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2376 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2377 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2379 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2380 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2381 node_txn.truncate(1);
2383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2384 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2385 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2387 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2388 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2389 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2390 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2391 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2392 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2393 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2394 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2395 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2397 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2399 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2400 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2402 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2403 // Create some new channels:
2404 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2406 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2410 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2411 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2412 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2413 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2414 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2415 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2416 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2417 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2418 // Revoke the old state
2419 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2421 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2423 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2424 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2425 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2427 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2428 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2431 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2433 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2434 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2435 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2436 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2437 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2438 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2439 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2441 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2442 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2443 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2447 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2448 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2449 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2450 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2451 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2452 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2453 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2454 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2455 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2456 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2457 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2458 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2459 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2460 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2461 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2463 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2464 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2465 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2466 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2467 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2468 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2470 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2471 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2473 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2474 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2475 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2477 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2481 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2482 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2483 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2484 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2485 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2486 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2487 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2489 // Create some new channel:
2490 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2492 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2493 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2494 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2495 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2496 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2498 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2499 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2500 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2501 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2502 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2503 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2504 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2505 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2506 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2508 //Revoke the old state
2509 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2512 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2513 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2514 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2515 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2516 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2517 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2518 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2519 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2521 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2522 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2524 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2525 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2527 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2528 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2529 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2530 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2531 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2532 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2533 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2534 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2536 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2537 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2538 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2540 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2541 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2542 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2546 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2547 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2548 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2549 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2550 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2551 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2552 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2554 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2556 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2557 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2558 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2559 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2560 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2561 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2563 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2564 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2566 //Revoke the old state
2567 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2570 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2572 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2574 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2575 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2576 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2578 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2579 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2582 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2583 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2585 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2586 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2587 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2588 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2589 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2590 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2592 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2593 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2594 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2595 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2596 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2597 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2598 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2600 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2601 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2602 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2603 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2605 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2606 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2607 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2609 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2610 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2611 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2612 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2613 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2614 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2615 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2616 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2618 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2619 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2620 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2624 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2625 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2626 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2627 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2628 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2629 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2630 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2631 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2632 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2634 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2635 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2636 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2637 // PaymentSent event).
2639 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2640 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2641 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2642 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2644 // Create some initial channels
2645 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2646 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2648 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2649 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2650 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2651 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2652 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2654 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2655 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2656 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2658 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2659 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2661 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2662 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2663 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2664 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2665 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2666 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2667 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2669 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2670 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2671 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2672 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2673 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2675 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2676 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2677 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2678 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2679 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2680 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2681 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2682 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2683 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2684 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2685 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2686 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2687 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2688 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2689 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2690 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2691 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2693 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2694 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2695 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2696 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2698 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2699 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2700 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2701 added_monitors.clear();
2703 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2704 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2705 match forwarded_events[0] {
2706 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2707 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2709 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2710 match forwarded_events[1] {
2711 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2712 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2713 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2714 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2715 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2719 match forwarded_events[2] {
2720 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2721 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2722 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2723 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2724 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2728 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2730 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2731 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2732 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2733 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2734 added_monitors.clear();
2736 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2738 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2739 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2742 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2743 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2747 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2748 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2749 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2750 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2751 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2752 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2754 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2756 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2757 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2758 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2759 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2760 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2761 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2762 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2763 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2764 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2765 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2767 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2768 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2769 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2770 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2772 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2773 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2774 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2775 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2777 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2778 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2782 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2783 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2784 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2785 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2787 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2788 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2789 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2790 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2791 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2792 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2794 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2795 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2796 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2797 let commitment_spend =
2798 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2799 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2800 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2801 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2804 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2805 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2806 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2810 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2811 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2812 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2813 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2814 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2815 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2816 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2817 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2818 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2819 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2820 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2821 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2823 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2824 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2825 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2826 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2827 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2829 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2830 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2831 let mut first_claimed = false;
2832 for event in events {
2834 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2835 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2836 assert!(!first_claimed);
2837 first_claimed = true;
2839 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2840 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2843 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2844 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2845 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2848 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2851 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2852 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2853 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2854 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2855 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2856 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2858 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2860 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2861 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2862 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2863 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2864 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2865 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2866 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2868 // Create some intial channels
2869 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2870 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2872 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2873 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2874 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2876 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2878 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2879 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2880 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2881 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2883 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2886 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2887 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2889 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2890 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2891 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2892 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2893 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2894 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2896 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2898 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2899 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2901 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2902 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2903 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2904 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2905 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2907 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2908 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2909 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2910 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2911 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2914 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2915 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2916 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2917 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2919 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2920 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2922 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2923 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2924 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2925 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2927 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2931 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2933 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2935 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2936 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2937 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2938 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2941 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2943 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2944 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2945 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2946 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2947 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2948 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2949 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2951 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2955 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2957 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2958 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2960 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2961 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2962 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2963 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2964 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2965 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2967 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2970 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2971 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2972 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2974 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2975 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2977 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2979 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2980 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2981 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2982 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2983 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2984 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2985 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2989 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2990 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2991 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2992 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2996 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2997 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2998 // and fail backward accordingly.
3000 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3001 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3002 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3003 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3005 // Create some initial channels
3006 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3007 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3009 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3010 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3011 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3012 // Revoke the old state
3013 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3015 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3017 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3018 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3019 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3020 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3021 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3023 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3025 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3026 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3028 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3029 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3030 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3031 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3032 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3033 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3035 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3036 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3037 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3039 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3043 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3044 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3045 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3046 // commitment transaction anymore.
3047 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3048 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3049 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3050 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3051 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3052 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3054 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3055 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3056 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3057 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3058 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3059 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3060 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3061 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3062 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3064 // Create some initial channels
3065 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3066 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3068 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3069 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3070 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3071 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3072 // Revoke the old state
3073 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3075 let value = if use_dust {
3076 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3077 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3078 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3081 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3082 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3083 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3085 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3086 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3088 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3089 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3090 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3091 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3092 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3093 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3094 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3095 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3096 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3098 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3099 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3101 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3102 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3103 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3104 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3105 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3106 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3107 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3108 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3110 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3111 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3112 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3115 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3116 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3118 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3119 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3120 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3121 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3122 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3123 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3124 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3125 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3126 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3127 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3129 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3130 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3131 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3134 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3135 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3136 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3137 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3138 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3139 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3143 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3144 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3145 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3147 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3148 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3150 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3151 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3153 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3154 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3157 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3158 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3160 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3162 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3163 assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3165 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3166 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3168 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3169 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3172 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3173 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3175 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3177 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3179 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3180 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3182 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3185 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3186 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3189 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3192 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3193 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3194 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3195 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3198 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3199 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3200 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3201 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3203 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3207 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3208 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3209 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3210 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3211 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3212 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3214 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3217 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3218 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3219 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3220 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3221 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3222 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3223 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3225 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3226 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3227 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3229 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3231 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3232 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3234 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3235 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3236 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3237 // that we should update our routing table for.
3238 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3239 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3242 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3245 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3246 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3247 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3249 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3252 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3253 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3254 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3256 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3259 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3262 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3263 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3264 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3268 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3269 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3270 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3271 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3272 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3276 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3277 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3278 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3279 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3280 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3284 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3285 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3286 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3287 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3288 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3289 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3291 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3293 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3294 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3297 let payment_event = {
3298 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3299 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3300 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3302 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3303 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3306 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3307 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3309 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3312 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3315 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3317 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3319 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3320 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3321 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3322 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3323 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3324 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3326 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3327 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3333 onion_routing_packet,
3335 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3337 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3338 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3339 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3341 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3342 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3344 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3347 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3348 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3350 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3352 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3357 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3358 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3359 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3360 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3361 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3362 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3363 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3364 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3366 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3367 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3368 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3369 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3371 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3373 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3374 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3375 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3377 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3378 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3379 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3380 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3381 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3383 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3384 // registering new transactions
3385 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3386 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3390 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3391 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3392 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3393 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3394 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3395 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3396 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3397 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3399 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3401 let mut payment_event = {
3402 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3405 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3406 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3407 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3410 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3411 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3413 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3415 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3416 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3417 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3418 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3421 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3422 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3424 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3426 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3427 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3428 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3430 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3431 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3433 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3435 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3436 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3437 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3438 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3439 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3443 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3445 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3446 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3448 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3450 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3452 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3453 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3455 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3456 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3457 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3458 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3459 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3460 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3461 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3463 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3467 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3468 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3469 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3470 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3471 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3473 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3474 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3475 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3476 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3477 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3479 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3481 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3483 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3484 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3485 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3487 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3488 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3490 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3491 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3495 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3496 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3497 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3498 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3499 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3500 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3501 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3503 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3504 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3505 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3506 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3507 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
3508 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3509 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
3511 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3512 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3514 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3516 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3517 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3519 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3520 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3523 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3526 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3527 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3528 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3529 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3531 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3532 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3536 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3537 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3538 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3539 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3540 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3541 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3542 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3543 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3545 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3546 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3547 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3549 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3550 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3551 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3552 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3554 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3555 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3556 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3558 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3559 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3560 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3561 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3563 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3564 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3566 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3567 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3569 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3571 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3572 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3574 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3575 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3576 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3578 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3581 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3582 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3583 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3585 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3588 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3589 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3593 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3594 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3597 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3598 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3599 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3600 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3601 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3602 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3604 let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3605 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3606 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3607 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3608 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3609 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3610 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3612 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3615 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3617 let payment_event = {
3618 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3619 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3621 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3622 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3623 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3625 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3627 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3628 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3630 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3631 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3632 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3633 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3634 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3636 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3637 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3638 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3641 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3642 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3643 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3644 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3645 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3647 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3648 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3649 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3650 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3657 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3658 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3659 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3660 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3661 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3662 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3664 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3665 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3666 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3668 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3669 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3671 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3672 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3673 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3674 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3675 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3676 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3677 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3678 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3679 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3680 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3681 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3682 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3683 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3684 // Everything was delivered...
3685 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3688 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3689 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3691 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3692 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3695 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3696 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3697 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3699 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3701 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3702 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3704 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3705 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3706 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3708 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3709 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3710 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3712 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3715 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3718 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3721 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3722 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3723 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3724 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3725 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3726 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3727 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3728 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3729 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3730 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3731 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3733 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3736 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3737 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3739 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3740 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3742 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3743 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3744 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3746 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3749 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3750 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3752 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3754 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3755 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3756 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3757 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3759 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3760 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3761 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3762 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3763 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3765 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3766 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3767 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3775 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3776 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3777 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3778 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3779 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3780 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3782 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3784 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3785 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3786 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3787 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3788 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3789 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3790 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3791 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3792 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3793 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3794 // Everything was delivered...
3795 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3798 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3799 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3802 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3803 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3804 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3806 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3807 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3810 // Channel should still work fine...
3811 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3812 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3813 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3817 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3818 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3819 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3820 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3821 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3825 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3826 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3827 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3828 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3829 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3833 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3834 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3835 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3836 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3837 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3838 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3839 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3840 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3841 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3842 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3844 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3845 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3847 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3848 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3849 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3851 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3853 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3854 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3856 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3857 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3858 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3860 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3861 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3862 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3863 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3865 // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a funding_locked, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3866 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3867 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3868 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3869 let as_funding_locked = match events_3[0] {
3870 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3871 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3874 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3877 // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s funding_locked on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3878 // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3879 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3880 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3881 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3883 let bs_funding_locked = match events_4[0] {
3884 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3885 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3886 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3889 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3891 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3892 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3893 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3896 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3899 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3900 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3902 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3905 // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s funding_locked, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3906 // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3907 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
3908 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3909 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3911 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3912 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3914 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3917 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s funding_locked, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3918 // announcement_signatures.
3919 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_locked);
3920 let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3921 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3922 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3923 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3924 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3927 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3930 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3931 // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3933 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3934 let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3935 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3936 let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3937 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3938 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3940 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3943 // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3944 // same channel_announcement.
3945 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3946 let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3947 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3948 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3949 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3950 assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3953 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3956 // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3957 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3958 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3959 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3961 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3962 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3963 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3965 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3966 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3967 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3969 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3970 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3971 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3973 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3974 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3975 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3976 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3977 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3978 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3979 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3980 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3982 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3983 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3984 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3985 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3986 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3987 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3989 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3990 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3991 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3992 logger: nodes[0].logger,
3996 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3997 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3999 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4000 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4003 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4005 // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
4006 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
4007 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4008 let mut found_announcement = false;
4009 for event in msgs.iter() {
4011 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
4012 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
4014 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
4015 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4018 assert!(found_announcement);
4022 fn test_funding_locked_without_best_block_updated() {
4023 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4024 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4025 // generate a funding_locked until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4026 // funding_locked immediately instead.
4027 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4028 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4029 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4030 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4031 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4033 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4035 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4036 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4037 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4038 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4039 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4040 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4042 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a funding_locked after the transactions_confirmed
4043 let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4044 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
4048 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4049 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4050 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4051 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4052 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4053 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4054 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4055 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4057 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4059 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4060 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4061 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4064 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4065 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4067 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4068 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4071 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
4072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4074 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4075 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4077 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4078 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4079 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4080 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4081 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4082 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4083 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4085 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4086 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4087 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4089 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4090 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4091 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4093 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4096 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4097 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4098 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4101 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4104 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4105 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4107 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4108 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4109 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4110 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4111 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4112 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4114 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4115 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4116 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4117 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4119 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4120 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4122 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4123 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4125 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4127 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4128 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4129 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4130 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4131 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4132 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4133 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4134 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4135 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4138 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4139 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4140 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4141 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4142 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4143 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4144 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4147 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4148 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4149 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4150 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4151 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4152 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4153 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4156 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4157 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4158 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4161 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4162 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4163 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4166 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4167 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4170 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4172 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4173 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4175 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4176 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4178 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4179 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4180 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4182 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4185 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4188 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4189 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4192 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4193 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4196 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4197 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4198 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4199 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4200 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4201 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4202 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4204 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4206 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4207 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4208 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4209 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4210 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4211 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4212 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4214 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4215 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4216 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4217 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4218 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4221 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4224 let mut block = Block {
4225 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4228 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4229 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4230 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4231 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4232 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4233 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4234 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4237 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4240 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4241 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4242 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4243 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4244 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4246 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4247 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4248 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4249 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4250 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4251 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4255 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4256 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4257 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4260 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4261 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4262 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4263 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4264 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4265 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4266 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4267 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4269 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4270 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4271 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4272 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4274 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4275 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4277 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4279 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4282 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4283 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4284 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4285 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4288 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4289 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4290 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4291 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4295 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4296 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4297 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4298 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4301 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4303 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4304 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4305 match fail_commit[0] {
4306 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4307 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4308 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4310 _ => unreachable!(),
4312 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4314 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4315 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4316 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4317 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4318 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4319 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4320 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4321 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4326 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4327 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4328 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4332 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4333 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4334 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4335 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4336 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4337 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4338 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4339 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4340 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4341 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4343 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4345 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4347 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4348 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4349 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4350 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4352 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4353 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4354 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4355 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4356 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4357 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4358 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4359 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4360 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4361 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4363 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4364 let config = UserConfig::default();
4365 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4366 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4367 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4368 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4369 default_config: config,
4371 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4372 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4373 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4378 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4379 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4381 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4382 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4383 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4386 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4387 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4388 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4389 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4391 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4392 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4393 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4394 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4396 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4397 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4398 for node in nodes.iter() {
4399 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4400 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4401 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4404 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4408 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4409 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4410 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4411 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4412 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4413 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4414 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4415 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4416 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4417 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4418 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4420 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4421 let channel_value = 100000;
4422 let push_msat = 10001;
4423 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4424 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4425 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4426 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4427 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4428 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4429 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4431 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
4433 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
4434 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4436 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4438 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4439 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4440 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4441 added_monitors.clear();
4444 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4445 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4447 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4448 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4449 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4450 added_monitors.clear();
4452 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4457 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4458 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4459 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4460 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4462 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4463 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4464 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4465 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4466 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4467 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4468 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4469 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4470 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4471 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4473 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4474 let config = UserConfig::default();
4475 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4476 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4477 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4478 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4479 default_config: config,
4481 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4482 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4483 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4488 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4489 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4491 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4493 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4494 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4496 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4497 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4498 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4499 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4500 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4502 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4503 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4506 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4507 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4508 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4509 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4511 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4512 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4513 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4514 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4516 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4517 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4518 for node in nodes.iter() {
4519 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4520 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4521 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4524 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4528 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4529 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4530 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4531 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4532 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4533 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4534 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4535 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4536 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4537 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4538 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4540 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4541 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4543 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4545 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4546 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4547 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4549 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4550 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4551 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4552 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4553 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4554 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4555 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4556 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4557 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4558 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4560 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4561 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4562 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4563 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4564 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4565 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4567 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4568 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4569 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4574 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4575 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4577 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4578 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4581 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4583 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4584 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4588 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4589 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4590 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4591 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4592 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4593 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4594 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4595 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4596 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4597 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4598 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4599 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4600 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4601 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4603 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4604 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4605 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4606 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4607 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4610 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4612 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4613 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4615 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4616 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4617 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4618 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4620 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4622 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4623 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4624 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4625 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4626 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4629 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4630 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4631 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4632 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4633 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4634 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4637 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4638 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4639 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4640 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4641 assert!(read.is_empty());
4642 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4645 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4646 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4647 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4648 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4649 assert!(read.is_empty());
4650 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4653 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4654 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4655 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4656 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4658 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4659 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4660 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4662 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4664 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4667 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4668 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4669 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4670 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4672 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4673 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4674 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4676 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4678 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4679 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4681 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4682 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4683 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4684 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4685 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4688 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4689 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4690 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4692 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4693 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4695 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4696 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4697 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4698 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4699 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4701 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4702 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4703 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4704 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4705 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4706 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4707 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4709 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4710 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4712 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4717 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4718 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4720 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4721 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4722 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4723 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4724 for event in events.drain(..) {
4726 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4727 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4728 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4729 all_outputs.push(outp);
4732 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4735 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4736 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4746 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4747 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4748 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4749 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4750 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4751 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4753 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4754 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4755 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4756 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4757 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4758 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4759 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4760 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4761 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4763 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4764 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4766 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4767 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4768 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4769 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4770 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4774 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4775 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4776 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4777 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4778 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4779 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4780 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4782 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4783 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4784 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4786 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4788 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4789 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4790 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4791 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4793 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4794 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4796 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4797 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4799 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4800 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4801 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4805 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4806 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4807 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4809 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4810 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4811 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4812 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4814 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4815 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4816 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4817 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4818 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4820 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4821 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4822 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4824 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4826 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4827 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4828 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4830 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4831 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4832 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4833 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4834 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4838 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4839 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4840 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4841 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4842 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4844 // Create some initial channels
4845 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4847 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4849 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4850 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4851 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4853 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4854 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4856 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4857 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4858 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4860 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4861 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4864 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4865 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4868 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4869 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4870 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4871 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4872 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4873 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4874 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4876 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4877 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4878 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4880 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4881 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4882 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4886 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4887 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4888 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4889 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4890 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4892 // Create some initial channels
4893 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4895 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4896 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4898 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4900 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4901 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4902 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4904 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4905 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4907 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4909 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4910 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4912 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4914 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4915 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4916 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4917 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4918 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4919 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4921 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4922 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4923 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4924 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4926 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4927 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4928 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4929 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4930 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4934 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4935 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4936 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4937 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4938 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4940 // Create some initial channels
4941 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4943 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4944 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4945 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4946 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4948 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4950 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4951 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4953 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4955 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4956 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4957 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4958 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4960 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4961 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4963 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4964 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4965 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4969 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4970 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4971 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4972 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4973 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4974 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4976 // Create some initial channels
4977 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4979 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4980 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4981 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4982 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4984 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4986 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4987 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4988 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4990 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4991 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4993 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4994 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4995 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4996 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4997 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4998 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4999 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
5001 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5002 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5003 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
5004 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5006 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5008 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5009 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5010 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5011 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5012 // transactions next...
5013 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
5014 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5016 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
5017 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5018 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
5019 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5021 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5022 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5025 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5026 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5028 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5029 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5031 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5032 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5033 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5034 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5035 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5039 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5040 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5041 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5042 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5043 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5044 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5046 // Create some initial channels
5047 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5049 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5050 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5051 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5052 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5054 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5055 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5057 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5059 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5060 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5061 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5063 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5064 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5066 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5067 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5068 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5069 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5071 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5072 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5073 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5075 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5076 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5077 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5078 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5080 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5082 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5083 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5085 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5086 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5087 // transactions next...
5088 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5089 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5090 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5091 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5093 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5094 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5097 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5098 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5100 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5102 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5103 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5105 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5106 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5108 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5109 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5110 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5111 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5112 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5113 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5114 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5115 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5119 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5120 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5121 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5122 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5123 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5125 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5128 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5129 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5130 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5131 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5133 // Create some initial channels
5134 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5135 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5137 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5138 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5139 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5140 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5141 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5143 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5144 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5145 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5147 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
5148 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5149 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5150 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5152 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5153 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5154 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5155 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5156 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5158 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5159 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5161 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5163 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5164 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5165 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5166 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5167 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5168 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5169 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5170 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5171 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5172 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5174 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5175 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5176 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5178 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5179 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5181 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5182 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5185 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
5186 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5187 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
5188 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5189 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
5191 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5194 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5195 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5196 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5197 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5201 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5202 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5203 match msg_events[0] {
5204 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5205 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5207 match msg_events[1] {
5208 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5209 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5211 match msg_events[2] {
5212 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5213 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5214 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5215 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5216 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5217 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5219 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5221 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5222 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5223 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5224 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5225 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5226 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5227 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5228 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5229 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5230 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5231 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5232 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5233 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5235 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5240 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5241 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5242 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5243 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5244 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5245 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5246 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5247 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5248 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5249 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5250 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5251 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5252 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5253 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5255 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5256 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5257 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5259 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5260 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5261 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5262 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5263 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5265 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5267 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5268 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5269 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5270 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5271 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5272 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
5273 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5274 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5276 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5277 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5278 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5280 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5281 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5282 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5283 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5284 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5286 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5287 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5288 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5289 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5290 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5291 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5293 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5294 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5295 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5296 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5297 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5298 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5299 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5301 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5302 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5303 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5304 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5307 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5308 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5310 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5311 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5313 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5317 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5318 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5320 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5321 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5322 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5323 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5324 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5325 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5326 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5327 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5328 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5329 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5330 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5331 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5332 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5334 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5335 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5336 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5337 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5338 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5339 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5340 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5341 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5342 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5345 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5346 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5348 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5350 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5352 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5353 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5354 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5355 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5356 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
5357 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5358 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5359 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5360 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5361 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5362 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5363 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5365 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5366 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5368 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5370 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5371 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5372 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5374 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5379 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5380 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5381 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5382 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5383 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5385 // Create some initial channels
5386 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5388 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5389 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5390 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5391 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5392 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5394 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5395 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5397 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5399 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5400 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5402 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5403 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5406 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5407 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5410 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5411 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5412 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5413 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5414 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5415 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5416 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5420 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5421 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5423 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5424 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5425 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5426 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5427 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5428 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5431 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5432 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5433 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5434 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5435 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5436 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5437 // use the same payment hashes.
5438 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5443 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5444 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5445 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5446 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5447 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5448 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5449 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5450 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5451 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5452 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5454 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5455 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5456 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5457 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5458 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5460 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5461 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5462 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5463 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5465 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5467 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5469 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5470 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5472 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5474 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5476 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5478 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5479 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5481 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5483 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5486 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5488 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5489 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5492 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5494 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5495 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5497 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5498 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5499 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5500 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5501 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5503 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5504 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5505 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5506 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5507 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5508 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5509 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5510 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5513 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5514 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5515 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5516 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5517 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5518 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5520 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5521 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5522 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5523 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5524 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5527 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5528 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5529 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5530 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5532 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5534 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5536 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5537 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5538 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5539 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5540 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5541 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5542 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5543 if deliver_last_raa {
5544 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5546 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5549 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5550 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5551 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5552 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5554 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5555 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5556 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5558 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5559 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5560 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5562 if announce_latest {
5563 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5565 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5567 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5568 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5569 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5572 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5576 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5577 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5580 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5581 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5582 if deliver_last_raa {
5583 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5585 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5589 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5590 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5591 let mut a_done = false;
5592 for msg in cs_msgs {
5594 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5595 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5596 // should be failed-backwards here.
5597 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5598 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5599 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5600 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5602 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5607 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5608 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5609 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5611 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5612 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5615 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5616 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5617 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5618 if announce_latest {
5619 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5620 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5621 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5624 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5626 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5630 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5631 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5632 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5633 let mut as_updates = 0;
5634 for event in as_events.iter() {
5635 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5636 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5637 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5638 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5640 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5642 if network_update.is_some() {
5645 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5647 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5648 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5649 if announce_latest {
5650 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5651 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5653 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5655 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5656 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5657 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5658 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5659 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5660 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5661 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5662 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5663 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5665 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5667 if network_update.is_some() {
5670 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5672 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5673 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5674 if announce_latest {
5675 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5677 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5679 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5680 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5681 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5682 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5683 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5684 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5688 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5689 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5693 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5694 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5698 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5699 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5700 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5701 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5705 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5706 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5707 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5708 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5709 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5711 // Create some initial channels
5712 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5714 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5715 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5716 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5717 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5719 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5720 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5721 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5722 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5723 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5724 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5726 let htlc_timeout = {
5727 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5728 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5729 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5730 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5731 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5732 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5736 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5737 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5738 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5740 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5741 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5742 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5743 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5744 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5745 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5746 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5747 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5748 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5749 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5750 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5754 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5755 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5756 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5757 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5759 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5761 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5762 let seed = [42; 32];
5763 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5764 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5765 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5766 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5767 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5768 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5770 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5771 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5773 // Create some initial channels
5774 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5776 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5777 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5778 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5780 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5781 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5782 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5783 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5784 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5786 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5787 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5788 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5789 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5790 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5792 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5793 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5794 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5795 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5796 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5797 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5798 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5799 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5802 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5803 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5804 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5805 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5806 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5807 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5809 let htlc_timeout = {
5810 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5811 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5812 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5813 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5817 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5818 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5819 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5821 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5822 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5823 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5824 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5825 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5826 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5827 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5828 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5829 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5830 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5831 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5832 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5836 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5837 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5838 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5839 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5840 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5842 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5844 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5845 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5847 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5848 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5849 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5851 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5852 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5853 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5855 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5856 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5857 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5859 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5860 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5861 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5864 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5865 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5866 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5867 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5868 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5869 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5871 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5873 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5874 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5875 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5878 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5879 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5880 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5882 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5883 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5884 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5885 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5888 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5889 let mut block = Block {
5890 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5893 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5894 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5895 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5897 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5898 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5900 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5903 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5904 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5905 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5906 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5907 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5908 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5910 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5911 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5914 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5916 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5917 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5918 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5920 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5921 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5923 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5924 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5925 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5927 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5928 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5930 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5933 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5934 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5935 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5936 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5937 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5938 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5940 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5941 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5942 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5943 // actually revoked.
5944 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5945 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5946 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5947 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5950 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5951 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5952 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5954 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5955 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5957 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5959 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5961 if check_revoke_no_close {
5962 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5966 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5967 let mut block = Block {
5968 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5971 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5972 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5973 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5975 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5976 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5977 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5979 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5981 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5982 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5983 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
5984 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5985 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5986 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
5987 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5988 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5992 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5993 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5994 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5995 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5996 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5997 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5998 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
6000 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
6001 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
6002 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
6004 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
6005 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
6006 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
6008 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
6009 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
6013 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
6014 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
6015 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
6016 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
6017 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
6022 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
6023 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6024 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6025 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6026 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6027 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
6028 for node in nodes.iter() {
6029 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6032 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6033 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6034 let push_msat=10001;
6035 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6036 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6037 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6038 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6040 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
6041 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
6042 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6046 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6047 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6048 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6049 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6050 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6052 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6053 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6054 let push_msat=10001;
6055 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6057 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6058 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6059 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6060 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6061 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6063 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6064 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6065 let push_msat=10001;
6066 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6067 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6068 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6070 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6071 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6072 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6074 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6075 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6076 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6078 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6079 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6080 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6082 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6083 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6084 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6085 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6086 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6087 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6091 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6092 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6093 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6094 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6095 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6097 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6098 let push_msat=10001;
6099 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6100 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6101 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6102 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6104 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6105 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6106 let err_msg = match events[0] {
6107 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6110 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6112 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6115 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6116 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6117 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6118 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6120 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6121 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6122 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6123 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6124 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6125 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6127 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6128 // pending_update_fee.
6130 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6131 *feerate_lock += 20;
6133 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6136 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6137 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6138 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6139 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6140 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6142 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6145 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6147 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6148 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6149 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6150 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6152 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6153 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6154 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6156 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6157 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6158 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6159 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6161 // Flush the pending fee update.
6162 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6163 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6165 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6168 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6169 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6170 // us to surface its failure to the user.
6171 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6172 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6173 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6174 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6175 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6176 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6178 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6179 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6180 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6182 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6183 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6184 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6185 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6186 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6187 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6188 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6189 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6190 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6192 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6196 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6197 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6198 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6200 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6201 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6202 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6203 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6204 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6205 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6207 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6208 // pending_update_fee.
6210 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6211 *feerate_lock += 200;
6213 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6216 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6217 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6218 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6219 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6220 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6222 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6225 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6227 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6228 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6229 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6230 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6232 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6234 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6235 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6236 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6238 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6239 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6240 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6241 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6242 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6243 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6244 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6246 // Flush the pending fee update.
6247 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6248 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6250 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6251 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6254 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6255 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6256 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6257 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6258 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6259 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6260 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6261 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6262 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6264 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6265 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6266 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6268 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6269 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6270 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6271 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6272 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6273 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6274 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6275 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6276 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6278 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6281 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6282 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6283 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6284 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6285 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6287 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6288 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6289 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6291 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6293 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6294 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6295 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6296 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6298 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6299 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6301 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6302 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6303 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6305 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6306 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6308 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6310 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6311 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6312 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6313 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6316 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6317 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6318 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6321 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6322 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6323 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6324 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6325 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6326 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6327 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6328 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6329 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6330 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6331 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6333 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6334 // pending_update_fee.
6336 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6337 *feerate_lock += 20;
6339 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6342 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6343 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6344 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6345 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6346 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6348 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6351 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6353 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6354 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6355 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6356 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6358 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6360 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6361 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6362 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6363 let payment_event = {
6364 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6367 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6368 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6370 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6372 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6374 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6375 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6377 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6378 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6380 // Flush the pending fee update.
6381 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6382 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6384 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6385 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6388 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6389 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6390 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6392 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6393 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6396 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6399 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6401 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6403 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6404 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6405 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6406 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6407 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6408 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6411 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6412 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6415 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6416 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6417 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6418 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6419 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6420 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6421 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6422 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6423 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6424 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6426 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6429 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6430 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6431 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6433 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6434 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6436 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6437 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6438 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6439 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6440 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6441 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6442 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6443 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6445 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6446 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6450 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6451 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6452 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6455 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6456 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6457 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6458 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6459 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6460 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6461 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6463 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6464 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6466 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6467 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6468 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6469 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6473 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6474 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6475 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6476 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6477 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6478 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6479 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6481 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6482 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6483 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6484 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6486 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6487 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6491 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6492 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6493 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6494 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6495 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6496 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6497 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6499 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6500 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6501 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6502 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6503 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6505 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6506 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6507 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6508 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6509 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6513 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6514 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6515 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6516 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6517 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6518 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6519 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6520 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6522 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6523 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6524 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6525 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6526 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6527 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6531 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6532 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6533 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6534 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6535 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6536 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6537 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6538 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6539 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6540 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6542 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6543 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6544 let payment_event = {
6545 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6548 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6549 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6550 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6551 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6555 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6557 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6558 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6559 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6561 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6562 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6564 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6565 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6566 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6568 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6569 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6573 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6574 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6575 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6576 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6577 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6578 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6579 let channel_value = 100000;
6580 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6581 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6583 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6585 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6586 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6588 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6589 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6590 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6592 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6593 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6595 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6598 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6600 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6601 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6602 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6603 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6604 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6605 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6606 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6607 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6609 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6610 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6611 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6614 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6615 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6617 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6618 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6619 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6620 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6621 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6622 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6623 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6624 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6628 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6629 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6630 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6631 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6632 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6633 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6634 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6636 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6637 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6638 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6639 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6640 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6641 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6643 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6644 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6645 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6646 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6647 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6649 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6650 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6651 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6652 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6653 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6655 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6656 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6657 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6658 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6659 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6663 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6664 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6665 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6666 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6667 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6668 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6669 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6670 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6672 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6673 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6674 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6675 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6676 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6677 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6679 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6683 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6684 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6685 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6688 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6689 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6690 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6692 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6693 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6695 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6696 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6697 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6699 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6703 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6704 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6705 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6706 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6707 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6708 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6709 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6711 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6712 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6714 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6715 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6716 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6718 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6719 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6720 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6722 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6726 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6727 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6728 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6729 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6730 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6731 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6733 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6734 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6735 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6737 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6738 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6739 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6741 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6742 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6743 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6745 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6749 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6750 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6751 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6752 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6753 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6754 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6755 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6756 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6758 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6759 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6760 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6762 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6763 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6765 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6766 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6767 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6768 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6769 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6770 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6771 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6772 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6773 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6774 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6775 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6776 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6777 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6780 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6781 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6782 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6784 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6786 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6788 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6789 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6790 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6792 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6796 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6797 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6799 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6800 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6801 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6802 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6803 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6804 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6805 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6808 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6809 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6811 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6814 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6817 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6819 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6820 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6821 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6823 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6827 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6828 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6830 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6831 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6832 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6833 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6834 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6836 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6837 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6839 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6840 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6842 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6845 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6848 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6850 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6851 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6852 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6853 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6854 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6858 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6859 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6861 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6862 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6863 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6864 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6865 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6867 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6868 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6869 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6870 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6871 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6872 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6875 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6876 failure_code: 0x8000,
6879 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6881 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6882 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6883 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6885 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6889 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6890 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6892 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6893 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6894 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6895 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6896 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6898 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6900 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6903 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6904 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6905 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6907 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6908 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6909 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6910 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6911 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6912 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6913 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6915 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6919 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6921 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6923 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6924 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6925 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6927 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6931 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6932 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6934 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6935 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6936 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6937 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6938 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6940 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6942 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6945 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6946 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6947 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6949 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6950 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6951 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6952 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6953 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6954 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6955 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6957 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6961 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6963 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6965 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6966 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6967 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6969 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6973 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6974 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6976 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6977 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6978 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6979 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6980 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6982 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6983 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6986 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6987 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6989 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6991 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6993 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6995 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6997 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6998 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6999 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7000 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7001 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7002 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7003 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
7005 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7008 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
7009 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7011 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7012 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7013 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
7014 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7015 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7019 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
7020 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
7021 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
7023 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7024 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7025 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7026 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7027 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7028 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7030 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7033 let mut payment_event = {
7034 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7036 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7037 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7038 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7040 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7042 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7043 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7044 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7045 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7047 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7048 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7051 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7052 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7053 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7054 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7056 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7057 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7058 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7060 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7061 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7062 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7063 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7064 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7065 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7066 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7068 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7072 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7075 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7076 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7077 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7078 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7080 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7082 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7083 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7084 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7085 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7086 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7087 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7089 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7092 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7095 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7096 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7097 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7098 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7100 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7101 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7102 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7103 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7104 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7105 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7107 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7109 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7110 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7111 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7112 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7114 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7115 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7117 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7118 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
7119 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7120 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7123 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7124 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7125 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7126 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7128 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7129 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7131 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7133 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7134 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7136 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7139 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7140 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7142 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7145 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7146 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7147 if announce_latest {
7148 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7150 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7153 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7155 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7157 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7158 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7159 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7160 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7161 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7162 let mut first_failed = false;
7163 for event in events {
7165 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7166 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7167 assert!(!first_failed);
7168 first_failed = true;
7170 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7173 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7179 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7180 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7181 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7184 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7185 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7186 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7187 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7188 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7189 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7190 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7192 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7193 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7194 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7195 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7196 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7198 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7200 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7201 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7203 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7204 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7206 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7208 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7209 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7212 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7214 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7215 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7216 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7217 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7218 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7220 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7221 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7223 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7224 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7225 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7226 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7227 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7228 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7229 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7230 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7232 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7233 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7234 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7236 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7237 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7238 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7239 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7241 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7242 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7243 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7244 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7245 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7246 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7247 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7249 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7251 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7252 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7255 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7256 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7257 else { first = false; }
7259 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7262 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7263 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7264 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7266 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7273 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7274 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7275 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7276 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7280 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7281 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7283 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7284 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7285 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7286 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7287 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7288 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7289 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7290 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7291 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7293 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7294 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7295 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7296 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7299 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7300 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7302 } else { assert!(false) }
7304 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7305 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7306 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7307 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7308 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7309 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7310 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7313 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7316 } else { assert!(false); }
7318 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7319 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7320 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7321 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7322 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7323 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7325 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7327 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7328 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7329 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7333 } else { panic!(); }
7334 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7336 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7337 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7338 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7339 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7340 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7341 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7342 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7345 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7346 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7348 } else { assert!(false); }
7352 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7353 // We want to be sure that :
7354 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7355 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7356 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7357 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7358 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7364 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7365 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7366 // during signing due to revoked tx
7367 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7368 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7371 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7372 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7373 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7375 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7377 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7378 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7379 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7380 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7382 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7383 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7385 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7386 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7388 // Restore node A from previous state
7389 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7390 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7391 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7392 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
7393 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7394 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7395 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7397 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7398 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7399 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7400 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7401 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7402 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7404 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7405 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7409 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7410 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7411 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7412 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7416 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7417 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7419 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7421 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7422 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7426 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7427 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7430 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7431 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7432 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7433 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7434 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7435 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7436 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7438 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7439 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7441 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7444 panic!("Unexpected event")
7448 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7449 // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
7450 // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
7451 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7452 let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
7453 assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
7455 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7456 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7457 // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
7458 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
7459 // B should now detect that there is something wrong and should force close the channel.
7460 let exp_err = "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting";
7461 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: exp_err.to_string() });
7463 // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
7464 // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
7465 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7466 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7467 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7468 let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7470 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
7471 let mut err_msgs_0 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7472 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7473 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7475 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7476 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel");
7477 err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone());
7479 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7482 panic!("Unexpected event!");
7485 assert_eq!(err_msgs_0.len(), 1);
7486 nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]);
7487 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7489 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() });
7490 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
7494 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7495 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7496 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7497 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7499 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7500 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7501 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7502 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7504 // Create some initial channels
7505 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7507 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7508 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7509 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7510 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7511 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7512 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7513 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7514 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7516 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7517 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7518 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7519 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7520 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7522 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7523 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7524 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7525 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7527 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7528 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7529 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7531 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7532 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7533 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7534 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7535 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7536 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7537 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7538 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7539 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7540 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7542 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7546 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7547 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7549 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7550 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7551 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7552 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7556 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7557 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7558 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7560 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7561 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7562 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7563 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7565 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7566 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7567 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7570 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7571 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7573 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7574 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7575 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7576 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7577 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7578 for e in msg_events {
7580 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7581 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7582 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7583 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7584 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7587 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7591 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7592 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7593 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7594 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7595 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7596 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7598 // Reestablish chan_1
7599 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7600 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7601 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7602 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7603 // Reestablish chan_2
7604 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7605 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7606 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7607 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7608 // Reestablish chan_3
7609 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7610 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7611 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7612 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7614 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7615 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7616 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7617 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7618 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7619 for e in msg_events {
7621 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7622 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7623 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7624 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7626 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7627 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7630 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7633 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7634 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7638 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7639 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7640 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7642 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7643 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7644 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7645 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7647 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7649 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7650 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7651 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7652 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7653 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7655 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7656 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7657 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7658 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7659 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7660 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7662 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7663 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7664 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7665 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7669 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7670 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7672 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7673 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7674 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7675 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7676 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7678 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7682 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7683 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7684 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7685 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7686 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7687 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7688 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7689 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7693 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7694 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7695 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7696 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7698 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7699 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7700 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7701 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7702 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7703 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7704 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7705 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7706 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7707 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7708 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7709 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7710 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7714 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7716 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7717 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7719 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7721 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7722 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7723 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7724 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7725 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7726 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7727 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7728 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7729 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7730 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7731 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7732 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7733 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7737 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7739 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7740 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7744 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7745 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7746 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7748 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7749 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7750 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7751 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7752 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7754 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7755 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7756 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7757 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7758 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7759 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7760 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7761 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7762 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7763 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7764 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7765 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7767 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7768 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7769 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7771 // Revoke local commitment tx
7772 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7774 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7775 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7776 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7777 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7778 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7779 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7780 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7782 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7783 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7784 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7786 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7787 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7788 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7790 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7791 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7792 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7793 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7795 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7796 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7797 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7798 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7799 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7800 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7801 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7802 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7804 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7805 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7811 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7812 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7813 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7815 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7816 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7817 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7818 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7820 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7821 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7822 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7823 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7824 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7825 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7827 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7828 // available, which we check here:
7829 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7830 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7831 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7833 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7834 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7836 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7837 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7838 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7839 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7841 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7842 // output, checked above).
7843 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7844 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7845 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7847 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7848 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7849 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7850 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7851 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7855 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7856 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7857 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7858 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7859 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7861 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7862 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7864 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7865 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7866 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7867 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7868 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7870 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7871 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7877 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7878 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7879 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7880 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7882 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7883 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7885 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7886 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7887 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7888 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7889 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7890 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7891 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7892 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7896 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7897 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7898 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7899 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7901 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7902 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7903 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7904 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7905 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7906 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7907 // up bumped justice generation.
7908 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7911 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7916 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7917 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7918 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7921 // Provide preimage for one
7922 // Check aggregation
7924 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7925 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7926 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7927 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7929 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7930 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7931 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7933 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7934 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7935 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7936 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7937 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7939 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7940 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7941 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7942 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7943 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7945 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7949 let feerate_timeout;
7950 let feerate_preimage;
7952 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7953 // 9 transactions including:
7954 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7955 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7956 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7958 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7959 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7960 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7961 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7962 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7963 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7964 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7966 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7967 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7968 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7969 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7971 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7972 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7973 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7974 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].weight() as u64;
7976 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7977 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7978 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7979 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7983 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7984 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7986 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7987 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7989 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7990 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7991 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7992 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7993 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7994 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7996 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7997 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7998 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7999 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8000 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8002 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8003 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8004 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8005 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8006 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8011 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8012 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8016 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8017 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8018 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8019 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8020 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8021 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8022 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8023 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8025 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8026 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8027 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8028 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8029 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8031 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8032 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8034 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8036 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8037 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8038 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8040 // Must revoke without gaps
8041 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8042 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8044 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8045 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8046 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8048 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8049 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8050 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8052 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8056 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8057 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8058 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8060 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8061 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8062 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8063 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8065 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8066 // Lock HTLC in both directions
8067 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8068 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8070 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8071 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8072 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8074 // Revoke local commitment tx
8075 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8077 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8078 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8079 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8080 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8082 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8083 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8085 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8087 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8088 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8089 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8090 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8091 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8092 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8096 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8097 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8098 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8100 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8101 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8102 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8107 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8108 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8109 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8110 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8111 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8112 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8113 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8114 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8116 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000).0;
8117 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8119 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8121 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8122 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8123 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8125 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8127 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8128 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8129 // can get our balance.
8131 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8132 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8133 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8134 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8135 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8136 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8137 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8138 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8140 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8144 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8145 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8146 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8147 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8148 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8149 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8150 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8152 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8154 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8155 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8156 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8157 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8158 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8160 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8161 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8163 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8165 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8167 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8168 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8169 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8171 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8172 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8173 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8175 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8180 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8181 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8182 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8183 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8184 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8186 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8187 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8188 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8190 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8192 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8193 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8194 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8195 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8199 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8200 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8201 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8202 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8203 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8204 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8205 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8207 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8208 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8209 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8211 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8212 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8213 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8217 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
8218 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
8219 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
8220 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
8221 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
8222 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8224 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8225 config_30_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8226 config_30_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8227 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8228 config_50_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8229 config_50_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8230 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8231 config_95_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8232 config_95_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8233 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8234 config_100_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8235 config_100_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8237 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8238 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8239 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8240 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8242 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8243 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8244 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8245 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8246 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8248 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8249 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8251 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8252 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8253 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_50_percent_msat));
8254 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8255 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8256 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_30_percent_msat));
8258 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8259 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8261 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
8262 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8263 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8265 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
8269 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8270 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8271 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8272 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8273 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8274 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8275 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8277 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8278 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8280 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8282 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8283 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8284 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8286 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8288 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8289 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8291 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8294 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8295 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8297 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8298 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8299 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8301 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8304 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8306 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8307 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8309 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8311 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8312 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8319 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8320 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8321 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8322 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8323 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8324 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8325 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8327 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8328 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8330 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8332 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8333 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8334 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8336 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8338 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8339 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8341 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8344 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8345 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8347 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8348 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8349 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8351 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8353 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8357 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8358 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8359 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8360 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8361 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8362 // and the channel should be closed.
8363 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8364 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8365 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8366 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8367 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8368 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8370 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8371 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8372 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8374 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8376 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8377 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8379 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8380 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8382 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8383 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8384 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8385 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8386 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8389 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8390 let accept_chan_msg = channel.get_accept_channel_message();
8391 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8394 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8396 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8397 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8399 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8400 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8402 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8403 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8405 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8406 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8407 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8408 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8409 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8410 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8412 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8415 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8419 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8420 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8421 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8422 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8423 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8424 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8425 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8427 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8428 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8430 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8432 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8433 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8434 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8436 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8438 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8439 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8440 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8442 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8443 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8445 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8446 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8449 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8452 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8453 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8454 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8456 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8457 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8458 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8460 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8465 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8466 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8467 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8468 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8469 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8471 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8472 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8474 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8475 assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8477 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8478 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8483 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8484 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8485 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8486 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8487 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8488 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8490 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8491 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8492 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8493 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8495 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8496 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8497 route.paths.push(path);
8498 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8499 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8500 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8501 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8502 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8503 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8504 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8505 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8509 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8510 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8511 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8512 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8513 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8514 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8516 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8519 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8520 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8521 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8523 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8524 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8525 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8526 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8528 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8529 // values from previous calls.
8530 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8531 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8532 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8534 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8536 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8537 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8539 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8542 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8547 #[allow(deprecated)]
8548 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8549 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8550 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8551 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8552 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8553 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8554 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8556 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8558 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8560 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8561 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8562 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8563 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8564 } else { panic!(); }
8566 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8568 header: BlockHeader {
8570 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8571 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8572 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8576 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8577 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8578 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8579 } else { panic!(); }
8581 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8582 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8583 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8584 block.header.time += 1;
8585 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8586 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8587 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8590 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8591 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8592 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8593 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8594 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8595 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8596 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8598 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8599 // values from previous calls.
8600 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8601 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8602 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8604 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8605 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8606 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8607 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8609 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8614 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8615 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8616 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8617 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8618 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8619 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8621 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8623 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8624 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8625 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8626 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8628 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8629 // resulting events.
8630 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8632 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8633 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8634 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8635 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8636 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8638 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8639 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8640 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8641 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8644 // We should fail the payment back
8645 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8646 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8647 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8648 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8649 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8651 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8656 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8657 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8658 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8660 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8661 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8662 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8663 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8665 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8666 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8667 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8668 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8670 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8671 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8672 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8673 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8677 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8678 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8679 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8680 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8682 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8683 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8684 // commitment at same time.
8686 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8687 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8688 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8689 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8691 // Create some initial channel
8692 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8693 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8695 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8696 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8698 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8699 let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8701 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8702 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8703 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8704 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8706 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8707 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8708 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8709 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8710 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8711 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8712 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8713 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8716 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8717 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8718 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8719 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8720 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8722 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8723 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8725 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8726 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8727 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8728 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8729 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8730 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8731 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8732 } else { assert!(false); }
8733 } else { assert!(false); };
8734 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8736 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8737 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8741 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8742 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8743 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8744 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8745 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8747 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8748 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8749 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8750 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8752 // Create some initial channel
8753 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8754 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8756 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8757 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8759 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8760 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8762 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8763 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8764 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8765 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8766 let watchtower_alice = {
8767 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8768 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8769 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8770 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8771 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8772 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8773 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8774 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8777 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8778 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8779 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8780 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8781 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8783 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8785 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8786 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8790 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8791 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8792 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8793 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8794 let watchtower_bob = {
8795 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8796 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8797 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8798 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8799 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8800 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8801 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8802 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8805 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8806 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8808 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8809 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8811 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8815 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8816 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8817 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8818 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8819 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8820 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8821 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8822 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8823 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8824 } else { assert!(false); }
8825 } else { assert!(false); };
8826 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8827 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8829 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8830 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8831 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8833 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8836 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8837 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8838 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8842 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8843 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8844 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8846 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8847 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8848 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8849 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8850 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8851 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8856 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8857 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8858 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8861 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8862 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8864 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8865 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8866 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8867 // before receiving funding_signed.
8868 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8869 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8870 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8871 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8873 // Create an initial channel
8874 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8875 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8876 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8877 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8878 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8880 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8881 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8883 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8886 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8887 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8888 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8889 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8890 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8894 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8895 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8896 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8897 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8898 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8899 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8900 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8902 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8903 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8904 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8905 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8907 // Create some initial channels
8908 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8910 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8911 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8912 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8913 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8914 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8915 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8917 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8918 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8919 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8920 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8921 // this test before #653 fix.
8922 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8923 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8925 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8926 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8928 let htlc_timeout = {
8929 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8930 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8931 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8932 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8936 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8937 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8938 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8939 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8942 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8943 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8944 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8945 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8947 // Steps of the test:
8948 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8949 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8950 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8951 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8952 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8953 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8954 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8955 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8956 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8957 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8958 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8959 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8961 // Create some initial channels
8962 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8963 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8965 // Steps (1) and (2):
8966 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8967 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8969 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8970 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8971 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8972 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8973 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8974 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8975 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8977 // Steps (3) and (4):
8978 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8979 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8980 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8981 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8984 if !broadcast_alice {
8985 force_closing_node = 1;
8986 counterparty_node = 0;
8988 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8989 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8991 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8992 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8993 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8994 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8995 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8997 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8998 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8999 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9000 if broadcast_alice {
9001 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9003 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9005 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
9006 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9010 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
9011 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
9012 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
9013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9014 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9015 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9016 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9017 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9018 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
9019 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9021 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9022 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
9023 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
9024 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
9025 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9026 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9028 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
9029 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9031 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9034 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
9035 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
9036 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
9037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9039 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9040 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9041 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
9042 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9043 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9046 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9048 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
9049 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
9050 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9053 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9056 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
9057 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9058 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
9059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9061 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9062 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9063 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
9064 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9065 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9068 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9070 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
9071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9073 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
9074 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
9075 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
9076 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
9077 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9078 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9079 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9080 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
9081 if broadcast_alice {
9082 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9084 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9086 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9087 if broadcast_alice {
9088 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
9089 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
9090 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
9091 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
9093 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
9094 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
9096 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9097 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9102 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
9103 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
9105 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9106 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9107 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
9108 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9110 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
9111 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
9112 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
9114 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
9115 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
9116 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
9117 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
9118 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9119 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9120 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9122 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9123 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9129 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9130 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9131 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9132 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9133 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9137 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9138 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9139 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9141 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9142 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9143 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9144 // updating logic for the existing channel.
9145 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9146 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9147 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9148 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9150 // Create an initial channel
9151 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9152 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9153 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9154 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9156 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9157 // that it is rejected.
9158 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9160 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9161 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9163 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9164 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9165 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9166 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9167 // move forward with it.
9168 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9169 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9171 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9175 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9176 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9178 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9181 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9182 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9184 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9185 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9186 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9187 added_monitors.clear();
9189 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9191 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9192 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9194 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9197 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9198 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9199 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9200 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9201 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9203 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9204 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9206 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9207 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9208 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9209 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9210 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9212 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9216 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9217 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9218 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9219 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9220 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9221 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9223 let funding_created = {
9224 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9225 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9226 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9227 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9230 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9231 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9232 // still needs to be cleared here.
9233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9235 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9237 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9238 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9240 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9241 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9242 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9243 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9244 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9246 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9250 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9251 // everything is functional.
9252 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9254 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9255 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9256 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9257 added_monitors.clear();
9260 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9261 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9262 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9263 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
9265 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9266 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9267 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9268 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9272 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9273 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9275 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9276 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9277 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9278 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9279 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9280 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9281 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9283 // Create some initial channels
9284 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9285 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9286 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9288 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9289 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9290 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9292 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9293 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9294 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9296 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9297 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9299 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9300 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9301 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9302 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9303 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9304 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9306 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9307 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9308 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9310 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9311 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9312 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9314 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9315 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9317 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9320 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9321 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9323 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9325 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9326 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9327 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9328 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9329 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9330 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9332 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9333 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9334 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9338 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9339 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9341 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9342 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9343 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9344 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9345 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9346 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9347 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9348 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9350 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9351 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9352 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9354 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9355 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9356 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9357 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9360 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9361 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9364 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9367 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9368 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9370 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9371 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9372 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9374 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9375 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9376 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9378 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9379 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9380 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9381 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9382 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9383 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9384 } else { panic!(); }
9385 } else { panic!(); }
9386 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9389 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9390 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9391 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9392 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9393 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9394 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9395 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9396 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9397 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9398 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9399 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9400 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9401 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9402 // until we learned about an additional block.
9404 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9405 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9406 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9407 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9408 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9409 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9410 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9412 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9413 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9414 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9415 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9416 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9418 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9419 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9420 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9421 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9422 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9423 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9425 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9426 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9427 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9429 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9430 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9431 if test_height_before_timelock {
9432 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9433 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9434 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9435 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9437 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9438 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9439 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9440 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9441 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9442 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9444 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9445 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9447 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9448 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9449 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9450 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9451 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9452 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9455 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9456 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9457 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9458 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9459 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9460 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9461 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9462 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9463 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9468 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9469 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9470 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9474 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9475 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9476 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9478 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9480 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9481 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9482 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9483 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9484 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9485 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9486 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9487 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9488 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9490 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9491 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9492 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9495 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9496 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9497 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9498 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9499 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9501 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9503 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9504 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9505 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9508 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9509 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9510 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9511 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9512 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9514 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9516 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9518 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9519 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9520 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9522 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9523 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9524 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9525 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9526 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9528 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9529 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9530 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9531 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9533 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9534 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9535 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9536 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9537 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9538 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9539 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9540 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9542 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9543 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9544 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9545 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9546 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9547 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9548 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9550 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9551 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9552 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9553 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9557 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9558 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9560 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9561 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9562 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9563 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9565 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9566 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9567 // the commitment state.
9568 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9570 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9572 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9573 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9576 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9577 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9578 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9579 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9580 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9581 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9582 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9584 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9585 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9588 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9589 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9590 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9591 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9592 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9594 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9596 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9597 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9598 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9600 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9603 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9604 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9605 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9606 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9607 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9608 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9609 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9611 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9612 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9615 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9617 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9618 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9619 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9620 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9621 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9622 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9623 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9624 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9625 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9628 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9629 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9631 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9632 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9633 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9635 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9636 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9639 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9640 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9642 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9643 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9644 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9646 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9647 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9648 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9649 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9651 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9652 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9653 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9656 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9657 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9658 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9660 expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9662 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9667 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9668 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9669 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9670 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9671 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9672 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9676 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9677 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9678 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9679 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9683 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9684 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9685 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9686 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9687 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9688 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9689 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9691 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9692 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9693 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9694 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9696 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9697 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9698 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9699 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9700 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9701 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9702 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9703 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9705 let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9707 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9709 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9710 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9712 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9715 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9716 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9717 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9719 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9722 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9723 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9725 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9726 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9727 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9729 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9730 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9732 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9733 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9735 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9736 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9737 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9739 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9741 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9743 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9744 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9745 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9747 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9748 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9749 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9750 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9754 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9755 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9756 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9758 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9761 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9762 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9763 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9765 expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9767 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9770 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9771 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9772 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9774 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9778 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9779 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9780 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9781 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9782 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9784 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9785 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9786 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9787 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9788 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9789 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9790 final_value_msat: 10000,
9791 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9793 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9794 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9795 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9797 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9798 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9800 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9801 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9802 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9803 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9804 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9805 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9809 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9810 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9811 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9812 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9813 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9815 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9816 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9817 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9818 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9820 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9821 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9822 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9823 final_value_msat: 10000,
9824 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9826 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9827 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9828 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9829 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9830 let route = find_route(
9831 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9832 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9835 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9836 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9837 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9838 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9839 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9840 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9841 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9842 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9843 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9846 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9847 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9848 enum ExposureEvent {
9849 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9851 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9853 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9854 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9857 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9858 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9861 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9862 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9863 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9864 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9865 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9866 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9867 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9868 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9870 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9871 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9872 config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9873 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9874 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9875 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9877 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9878 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9879 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9880 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9882 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9884 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9885 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9886 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9888 let opt_anchors = false;
9890 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9893 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9894 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9898 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9899 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9902 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9903 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9905 let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9906 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9907 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9909 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9910 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9911 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9912 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9914 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9915 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9917 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9918 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9920 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9921 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9924 if dust_outbound_balance {
9925 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9926 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9927 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9928 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9929 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9930 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9933 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9934 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9935 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9936 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9937 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9941 if dust_outbound_balance {
9942 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9943 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9944 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9945 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9946 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9949 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9950 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9951 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9952 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9957 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9958 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9959 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9960 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9961 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9963 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9964 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9965 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9967 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9969 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9970 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9971 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9973 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9974 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9975 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9976 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9977 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9979 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9980 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9981 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9982 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9984 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9985 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9987 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9988 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9989 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9991 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9992 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9994 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9996 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9999 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10000 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10001 added_monitors.clear();
10005 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10006 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10007 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10008 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10009 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10010 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10011 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10012 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10013 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10014 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10015 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10016 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10017 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);