1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use chain::channelmonitor;
18 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
21 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
22 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
23 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
26 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
27 use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
28 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
29 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
31 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, OptionalField, ErrorAction};
32 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
33 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
34 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
35 use util::errors::APIError;
36 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use core::iter::repeat;
58 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
60 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
61 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
64 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
65 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
66 use ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
67 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
68 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
69 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
70 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
71 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
72 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
74 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
76 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
77 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
78 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
80 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
81 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
83 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
84 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
86 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
87 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
88 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
89 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
90 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
91 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
92 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
93 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
95 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
96 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
98 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
100 } else { assert!(false); }
103 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
105 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
106 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
107 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
109 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
111 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
113 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
115 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
117 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
119 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
121 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
125 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
126 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
128 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
129 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
130 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
131 node_cfgs[1].features = InitFeatures::known().clear_wumbo();
132 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
133 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
135 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
136 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
137 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
143 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
144 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
145 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
146 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
147 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
148 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
149 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
150 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
151 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
153 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
154 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
155 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
156 let opt_anchors = false;
157 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
158 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
160 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
161 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
162 if !send_from_initiator {
163 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
164 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
166 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
168 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
169 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
170 if send_from_initiator {
171 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
172 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
174 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
177 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
178 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
179 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
182 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
183 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
184 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
186 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
187 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
188 if send_from_initiator {
189 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
190 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
191 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
192 // well as an additional HTLC.
193 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
195 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
200 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
201 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
202 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
206 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
207 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
208 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
209 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
210 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
211 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
214 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
218 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
219 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
220 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
221 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
222 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
223 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
224 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
225 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
226 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
227 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
229 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
231 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
233 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
235 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
238 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
241 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
242 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
243 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
244 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
245 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
247 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
250 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
252 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
253 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
254 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
257 let payment_event = {
258 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
259 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
260 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
262 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
263 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
265 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
266 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
267 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
268 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
269 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
272 // deliver(1), generate (3):
273 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
274 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
275 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
278 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
279 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
280 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
281 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
282 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
283 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
284 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
285 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
287 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
288 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
289 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
290 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
291 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
292 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
293 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
296 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
297 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
298 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
301 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
302 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
305 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
308 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
309 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
311 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
312 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
315 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
316 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
320 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
321 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
322 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
323 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
324 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
325 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
326 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
327 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
330 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
332 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
334 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
337 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
340 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
341 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
342 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
343 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
346 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
349 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
351 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
352 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
353 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
354 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
356 let payment_event = {
357 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
358 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
359 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
361 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
362 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
364 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
365 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
366 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
367 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
368 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
371 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
374 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
378 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
379 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
380 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
381 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
382 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
383 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
386 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
387 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
388 // update_fee (never committed) ->
390 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
391 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
392 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
393 // <- (1) RAA delivered
394 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
395 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
396 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
397 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
399 // B should send no response here
400 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
401 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
404 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
407 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
408 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
409 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
411 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
414 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
415 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
416 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
417 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
418 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
420 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
423 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
424 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
425 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
426 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
429 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
432 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
433 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
435 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
436 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
437 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
439 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
440 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
441 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
442 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
445 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
447 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
449 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
451 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
452 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
453 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
455 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
456 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
457 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
458 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
459 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
460 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
461 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
463 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
464 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
465 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
467 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
469 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
470 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
474 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
475 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
478 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
479 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
482 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
483 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
484 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
487 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
488 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
489 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
492 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
493 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
494 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
495 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
498 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
499 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
500 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
501 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
503 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
505 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
508 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
509 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
512 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
513 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
514 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
516 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
517 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
518 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
520 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
521 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
523 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
525 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
526 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
528 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
530 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
531 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
533 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
534 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
535 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
536 added_monitors.clear();
538 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
540 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
541 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
543 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
544 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
545 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
546 added_monitors.clear();
549 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
550 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
552 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
553 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
555 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
556 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
557 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
558 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
562 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
563 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
564 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
565 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
566 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
567 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
568 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
569 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
570 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
571 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
572 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
573 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
576 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
584 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
585 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
586 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
587 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
588 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
589 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
592 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
595 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
596 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
598 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
599 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
600 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
601 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
602 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
604 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
606 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
608 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
609 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
612 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
613 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
616 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
617 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
618 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
619 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
621 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
622 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
623 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
627 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
628 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
629 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
630 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
631 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
632 let channel_value = 5000;
634 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
635 let channel_id = chan.2;
636 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
637 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
639 let opt_anchors = false;
641 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
642 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
643 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
645 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
646 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
648 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
649 *feerate_lock = feerate;
651 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
653 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
655 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
657 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
659 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
661 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
663 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
664 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
665 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
666 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
667 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
668 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
672 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
673 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
676 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
677 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
680 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
682 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
683 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
684 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
685 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
686 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
687 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
688 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
689 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
690 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
692 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
693 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
694 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
695 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
696 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
697 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
698 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
699 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
702 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
703 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
704 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
707 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
708 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
709 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
710 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
711 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
712 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
714 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
715 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
716 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
717 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
719 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
721 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
724 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
727 htlc_signatures: res.1
730 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
732 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
735 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
737 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
738 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
739 //Should produce and error.
740 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
741 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
742 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
743 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
744 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
748 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
749 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
750 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
751 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
752 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
753 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
756 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
759 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
762 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
763 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
765 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
766 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
767 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
768 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
769 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
771 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
773 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
774 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
775 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
776 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
778 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
780 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
781 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
783 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
784 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
785 added_monitors.clear();
787 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
788 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
789 // node[1] has nothing to do
791 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
792 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
795 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
796 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
797 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
799 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
800 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
801 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
803 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
804 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
805 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
806 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
807 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
808 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
810 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
811 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
813 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
815 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
817 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
819 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
821 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
822 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
824 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
826 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
828 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
830 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
831 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
833 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
834 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
837 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
839 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
840 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
841 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
842 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
843 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
847 fn test_update_fee() {
848 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
849 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
850 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
851 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
852 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
853 let channel_id = chan.2;
856 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
857 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
858 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
859 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
860 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
861 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
862 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
863 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
864 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
865 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
866 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
869 // Create and deliver (1)...
872 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
873 feerate = *feerate_lock;
874 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
876 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
877 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
879 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
880 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
881 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
882 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
883 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
885 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
887 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
889 // Generate (2) and (3):
890 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
891 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
895 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
896 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
897 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
899 // Create and deliver (4)...
901 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
902 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
904 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
906 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
907 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
908 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
909 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
910 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
912 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
915 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
916 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
919 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
920 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
922 // Handle (3), creating (6):
923 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
925 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
926 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
929 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
930 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
933 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
934 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
935 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
936 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
937 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
938 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
939 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
940 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
944 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
946 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
947 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
949 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
951 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
953 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
954 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
955 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
956 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
957 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
961 fn fake_network_test() {
962 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
963 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
964 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
965 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
966 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
967 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
969 // Create some initial channels
970 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
971 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
972 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
974 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
975 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
976 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
977 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
978 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
980 // Send some more payments
981 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
982 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
983 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
985 // Test failure packets
986 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
987 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
989 // Add a new channel that skips 3
990 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
992 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
993 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
994 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
995 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
996 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
997 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
998 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1000 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1001 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1002 hops.push(RouteHop {
1003 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1004 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1005 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1006 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1008 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1010 hops.push(RouteHop {
1011 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1012 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1013 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1014 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1016 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1018 hops.push(RouteHop {
1019 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1020 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1021 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1022 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1024 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1026 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1027 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1028 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1030 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1031 hops.push(RouteHop {
1032 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1033 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1034 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1035 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1037 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1039 hops.push(RouteHop {
1040 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1041 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1042 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1043 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1045 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1047 hops.push(RouteHop {
1048 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1049 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1050 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1051 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1053 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1055 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1056 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1057 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1059 // Claim the rebalances...
1060 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1061 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1063 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1064 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1066 // Send some payments across both channels
1067 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1068 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1069 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1072 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1073 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1074 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1075 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1077 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1079 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1080 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1081 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1083 // Close down the channels...
1084 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1085 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1086 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1087 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1088 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1089 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1090 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1091 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1092 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1093 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1094 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1095 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1096 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1097 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1098 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1102 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1103 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1104 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1105 // commitment dance rounds.
1106 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1107 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1108 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1109 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1110 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1111 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1113 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1114 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1115 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1116 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1117 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1119 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1121 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1122 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1123 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1124 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1126 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1127 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1129 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1131 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1132 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1133 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1134 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1137 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1138 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1140 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1144 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1145 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1146 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1147 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1149 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1150 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1151 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1152 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1153 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1154 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1157 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1158 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1159 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1161 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1163 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1164 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1165 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1168 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1169 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1171 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1173 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1175 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1177 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1178 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1180 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1182 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1184 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1186 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1188 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1190 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1192 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1195 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1197 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1198 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1199 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1201 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1202 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1204 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1208 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1209 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1212 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1216 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1217 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1218 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1219 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1220 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1221 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1222 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1224 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1225 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1226 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1227 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1228 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1229 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1231 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1233 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1234 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1236 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1237 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1239 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1240 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1241 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1245 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1246 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1247 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1248 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1249 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1250 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1251 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1252 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1254 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1257 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1259 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1261 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1262 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1263 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1265 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1266 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1267 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1270 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1271 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1273 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1274 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1275 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1276 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1277 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1278 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1279 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1282 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1284 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1285 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1286 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1287 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1289 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1290 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1292 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1294 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
1295 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
1297 let bump_tx = if claim_txn[1] == claim_txn[4] {
1298 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1299 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1301 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC timeout on alternative commitment tx
1303 check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]); // HTLC timeout on broadcasted commitment tx
1306 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[3]);
1307 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[4]);
1309 check_spends!(claim_txn[5], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC timeout on alternative commitment tx
1311 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], remote_txn[0]); // HTLC timeout on broadcasted commitment tx
1316 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1317 assert_eq!(bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1318 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, bump_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1320 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1321 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1322 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1324 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1325 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1326 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1327 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1329 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1330 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1333 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1334 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1335 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1336 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1338 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1339 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1340 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1341 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1342 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1343 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1345 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1351 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1352 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1353 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1354 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1355 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1356 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1358 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1359 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1361 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1362 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1363 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1364 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1365 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1367 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1369 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1370 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1371 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1374 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1376 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1377 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1379 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1383 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1384 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1385 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1386 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1387 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1388 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1390 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1391 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1392 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1393 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1395 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1397 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1398 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1399 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1400 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1403 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1404 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1405 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1406 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1409 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1411 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1412 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1413 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1415 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1417 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1419 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1420 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1421 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1422 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1423 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1424 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1425 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1426 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1428 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1429 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1430 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1431 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1432 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1434 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1435 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1436 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1437 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1438 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1439 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1440 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1441 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1444 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1445 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1446 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1448 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1449 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1450 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1452 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1454 amount_msat: 3460001,
1455 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1457 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1460 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1463 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1464 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1465 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1466 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1470 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1471 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1473 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1474 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1476 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1479 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1482 htlc_signatures: res.1
1485 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1486 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1487 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1489 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1490 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1492 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1493 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1495 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1497 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1498 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1499 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1501 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1502 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1503 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1505 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1507 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1508 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1510 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1514 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1515 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1516 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1517 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1518 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1520 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1521 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1522 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1523 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1525 let opt_anchors = false;
1527 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1528 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1529 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1531 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1533 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1534 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1535 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1538 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1539 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1540 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1541 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1542 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1543 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1547 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1548 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1549 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1550 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1551 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1552 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1554 let opt_anchors = false;
1556 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1557 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1558 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1559 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1560 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1561 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1562 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1564 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1565 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1566 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1569 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1570 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1571 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1572 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1573 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1574 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1575 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1576 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1577 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1579 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1580 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1581 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1582 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1583 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1586 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1587 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1588 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1589 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1590 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1591 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1592 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1593 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1597 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1598 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1599 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1600 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1601 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1603 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1604 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1605 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1607 let opt_anchors = false;
1609 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1610 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1611 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1612 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1613 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1614 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1615 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1617 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1618 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1619 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1620 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1621 // commitment transaction fee.
1622 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1624 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1625 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1626 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1629 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1630 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1631 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1632 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1636 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1637 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1638 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1639 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1640 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1641 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1642 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1643 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1645 let opt_anchors = false;
1647 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1649 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1650 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1651 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1652 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1654 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1655 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1656 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1657 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1658 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1659 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1660 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1662 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1663 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1664 match msg_events[0] {
1665 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1666 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1668 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1673 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1674 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1675 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1676 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1677 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1678 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1679 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1680 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1682 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1683 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1684 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1685 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1686 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1687 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1689 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1690 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1691 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1692 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1693 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1694 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1696 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1697 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1698 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1699 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1703 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1704 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1705 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1706 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1707 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1708 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1709 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1712 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1713 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1714 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1715 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1717 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1718 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1719 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1720 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1722 // Add a pending HTLC.
1723 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1724 let payment_event_1 = {
1725 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1728 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1729 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1730 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1732 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1734 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1735 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1736 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1737 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1738 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1740 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1741 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1742 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1743 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1744 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1745 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1746 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1747 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1750 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1751 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1752 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1753 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1756 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1757 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1758 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1759 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1760 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1761 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1763 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1767 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1768 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1769 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1770 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1771 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1772 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1773 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1774 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1775 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1776 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1778 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1779 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1780 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1782 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1783 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1786 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1787 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1791 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1792 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1793 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1794 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1795 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1796 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1797 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1798 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1799 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1800 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1801 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1803 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1804 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1806 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1807 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1809 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1811 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1812 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1813 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1814 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1819 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1820 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1821 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1822 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1824 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1826 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1828 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1829 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1830 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1831 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1832 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1834 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1835 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1836 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1837 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1840 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1841 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1843 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1844 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1845 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1846 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1847 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1848 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1849 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1853 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1854 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1855 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1856 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1857 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1859 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1860 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1861 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1862 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1863 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1866 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1867 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1868 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1869 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1870 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1873 // adding pending output.
1874 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1875 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1876 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1877 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1878 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1879 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1880 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1881 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1882 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1884 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1885 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1886 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1888 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1889 let payment_event_1 = {
1890 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1891 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1893 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1894 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1895 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1897 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1899 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1900 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1902 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1903 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1904 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1905 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1908 // split the rest to test holding cell
1909 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1910 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1911 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1912 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1914 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1915 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1918 // now see if they go through on both sides
1919 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1920 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1921 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1923 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1924 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1926 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1928 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1929 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1930 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1931 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1932 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1935 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1936 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1937 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1939 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1940 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1942 // flush the pending htlc
1943 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1944 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1947 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1948 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1950 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1952 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1953 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1954 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1957 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1958 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1961 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1963 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1964 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1965 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1967 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1968 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1970 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1971 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1972 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1973 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1974 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1975 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1977 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1978 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1979 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1980 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1982 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1983 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1985 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1986 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1988 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1989 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1990 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1992 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1993 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1994 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1996 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1999 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2002 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
2003 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2004 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2006 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2007 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2008 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2010 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2013 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2016 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2017 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2018 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2020 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2021 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2022 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2024 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2025 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2026 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2027 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2028 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2030 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2031 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2035 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2036 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2037 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2038 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2039 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2040 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2041 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2042 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2044 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2045 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2046 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2047 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2048 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2049 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2050 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2051 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2053 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2054 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2055 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2056 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2057 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2058 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2059 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2060 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2061 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2062 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2064 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2065 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2066 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2067 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2068 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2070 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2071 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2073 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2075 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2076 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2077 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2080 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2081 // initial fulfill/CS.
2082 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2083 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2085 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2087 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2088 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2089 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2090 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2092 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2094 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2095 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2097 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2098 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2100 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2101 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2103 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2104 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2106 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2108 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2110 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2112 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2114 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2116 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2118 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2119 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2120 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2121 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2122 // on-chain as necessary).
2123 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2124 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2125 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2126 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2127 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2129 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2131 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2133 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2134 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2136 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2137 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2138 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2140 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2141 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2143 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2144 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2145 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2147 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2149 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2150 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2151 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2154 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2155 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2157 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2159 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2161 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2163 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2165 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2168 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2170 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2171 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2173 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2175 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2177 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2180 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2181 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2183 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2184 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2188 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2189 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2190 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2191 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2192 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2193 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2194 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2196 // Create some initial channels
2197 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2198 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2199 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2200 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2202 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2203 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2204 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2205 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2206 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2207 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2209 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2210 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2211 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2212 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2213 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2215 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2216 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2218 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2220 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2221 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2222 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2224 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2226 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2227 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2228 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2229 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2230 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2232 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2233 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2235 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2236 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2237 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2238 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2241 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2242 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2243 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2244 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2246 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2248 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2249 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2250 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2251 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2252 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2254 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2255 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2257 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2258 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2259 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2261 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2262 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2264 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2265 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2266 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2267 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2269 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2275 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2276 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2277 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2279 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2280 let node2_commitment_txid;
2282 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2283 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2284 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2285 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2287 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2288 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2289 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2291 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2293 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2294 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2295 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2296 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2297 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2299 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2300 // confusing us in the following tests.
2301 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2303 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2304 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2305 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2308 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2309 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2310 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2311 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2312 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2313 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2316 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2319 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2320 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2322 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2324 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2326 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2328 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2329 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2330 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2336 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2338 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2339 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2341 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2342 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2343 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2344 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2345 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2348 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2351 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2352 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2354 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2357 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2359 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2360 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2361 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2363 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2364 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2365 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2366 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2368 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2369 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2370 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2374 fn test_justice_tx() {
2375 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2376 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2377 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2378 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2379 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2380 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2381 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2382 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2383 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2384 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2385 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2386 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2387 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2388 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2389 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2390 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2391 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2392 // Create some new channels:
2393 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2395 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2396 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2397 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2398 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2399 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2400 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2401 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2402 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2403 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2404 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2405 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2406 // Revoke the old state
2407 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2410 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2412 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2413 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2414 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2416 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2417 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2418 node_txn.truncate(1);
2420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2421 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2422 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2424 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2425 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2426 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2427 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2429 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2430 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2431 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2432 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2434 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2436 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2437 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2439 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2440 // Create some new channels:
2441 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2443 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2447 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2448 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2449 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2450 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2451 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2452 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2453 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2454 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2455 // Revoke the old state
2456 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2458 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2460 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2461 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2462 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2464 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2465 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2468 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2470 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2471 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2472 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2474 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2475 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2476 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2478 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2479 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2480 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2484 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2485 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2486 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2487 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2488 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2489 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2490 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2491 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2492 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2493 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2494 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2495 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2496 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2497 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2498 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2500 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2501 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2502 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2503 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2504 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2505 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2507 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2508 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2510 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2511 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2512 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2513 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2514 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2518 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2519 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2520 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2521 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2522 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2523 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2524 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2526 // Create some new channel:
2527 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2529 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2530 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2531 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2532 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2533 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2535 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2536 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2537 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2538 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2539 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2540 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2541 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2542 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2543 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2545 //Revoke the old state
2546 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2549 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2551 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2552 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2554 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2555 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2556 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2558 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2559 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2561 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2562 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2564 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2565 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2566 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2567 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2568 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2569 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2570 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2571 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2573 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2574 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2575 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2577 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2578 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2579 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2580 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2581 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2583 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2584 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2585 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2589 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2590 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2591 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2592 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2593 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2594 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2595 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2597 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2599 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2600 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2601 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2602 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2603 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2604 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2606 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2607 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2609 //Revoke the old state
2610 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2613 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2615 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2617 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2618 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2619 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2620 match events.last().unwrap() {
2621 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2622 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2625 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2626 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2628 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2629 assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
2631 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2632 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2633 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2634 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2635 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2636 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2637 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2639 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2640 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2641 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2642 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2644 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2645 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2646 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2648 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2649 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2650 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2651 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2652 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2653 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2654 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2655 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2657 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2658 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2659 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2660 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2661 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2662 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2663 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2665 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2666 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2667 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2671 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2672 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2673 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2674 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2675 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2676 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2677 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2678 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2679 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2681 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2682 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2683 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2684 // PaymentSent event).
2686 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2687 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2688 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2689 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2691 // Create some initial channels
2692 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2693 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2695 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2696 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2697 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2698 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2699 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2701 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2702 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2703 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2705 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2706 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2708 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2709 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2710 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2711 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2712 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2713 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2714 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2715 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2716 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2718 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2719 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2720 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2721 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2722 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2724 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2725 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2727 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2728 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2729 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2730 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2731 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2732 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2733 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2734 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2735 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2736 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2737 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2738 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2739 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2740 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2742 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2743 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2744 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2745 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2747 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2748 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2749 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2750 added_monitors.clear();
2752 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2753 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2754 match forwarded_events[0] {
2755 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2756 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2758 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2759 match forwarded_events[1] {
2760 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2761 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2762 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2763 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2764 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2768 match forwarded_events[2] {
2769 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2770 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2771 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2772 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2773 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2777 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2779 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2780 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2781 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2782 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2783 added_monitors.clear();
2785 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2787 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2788 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2791 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2792 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2796 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2797 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2798 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2799 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2800 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2801 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2803 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2805 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2806 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2807 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2808 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2809 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2810 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2811 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2812 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2813 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2814 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2816 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2817 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2818 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2819 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2821 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2822 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2823 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2824 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2826 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2827 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2831 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2832 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2833 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2834 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2836 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2837 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2838 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2839 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2840 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2841 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2843 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2844 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2845 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2846 let commitment_spend =
2847 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2848 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2849 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2850 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2853 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2854 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2855 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2859 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2860 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2861 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2862 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2863 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2864 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2865 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2866 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2867 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2868 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2869 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2870 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2872 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2873 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2874 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2875 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2876 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2877 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2878 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2879 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2880 let mut first_claimed = false;
2881 for event in events {
2883 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2884 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2885 assert!(!first_claimed);
2886 first_claimed = true;
2888 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2889 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2892 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2893 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2894 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2897 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2900 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2901 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2902 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2903 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2904 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2905 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2907 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2909 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2910 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2911 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2912 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2913 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2914 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2915 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2917 // Create some intial channels
2918 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2919 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2921 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2922 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2923 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2925 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2927 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2928 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2929 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2930 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2932 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2935 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2936 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2938 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2939 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2940 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2941 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2942 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2943 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2945 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2947 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2948 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2950 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2951 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2952 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2953 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2954 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2956 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2957 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2958 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2959 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2960 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2963 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2964 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2965 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2966 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2968 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2969 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2971 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2972 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2973 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2974 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2976 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2980 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2982 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2984 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2985 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2986 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2987 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2990 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2992 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2993 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2994 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2995 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2996 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2997 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2998 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
3000 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
3004 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3006 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3007 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3009 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3010 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3011 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3012 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3013 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3014 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3016 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3019 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3020 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3021 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3023 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3024 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3026 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3028 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3029 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
3030 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3031 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
3032 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
3033 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3034 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3038 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3039 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3040 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3041 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3045 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3046 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3047 // and fail backward accordingly.
3049 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3050 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3051 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3052 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3054 // Create some initial channels
3055 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3056 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3058 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3059 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3060 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3061 // Revoke the old state
3062 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3064 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3066 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3067 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3068 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3069 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3070 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3072 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3074 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3075 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3077 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3078 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3079 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3080 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3081 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3082 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3084 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3085 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3086 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3088 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3092 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3093 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3094 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3095 // commitment transaction anymore.
3096 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3097 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3098 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3099 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3100 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3101 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3103 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3104 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3105 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3106 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3107 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3108 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3109 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3110 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3111 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3113 // Create some initial channels
3114 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3115 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3117 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3118 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3119 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3120 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3121 // Revoke the old state
3122 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3124 let value = if use_dust {
3125 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3126 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3127 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3130 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3131 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3132 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3134 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3135 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3137 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3138 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3139 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3140 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3141 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3142 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3143 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3144 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3145 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3147 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3148 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3150 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3151 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3152 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3153 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3154 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3155 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3156 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3157 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3159 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3160 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3161 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3164 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3165 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3167 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3168 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3169 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3170 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3171 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3172 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3173 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3174 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3175 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3176 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3178 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3179 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3180 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3183 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3184 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3185 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3186 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3187 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3188 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3192 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3193 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3194 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3196 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3197 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3199 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3200 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3203 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3204 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3206 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3207 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3210 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3211 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3213 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3215 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3216 assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3218 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3219 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 + (nodes.len() - 1) } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3221 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3222 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3225 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3226 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3228 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3230 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3232 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3233 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3235 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3238 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3239 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3242 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3245 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3246 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3247 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3248 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3249 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3251 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3252 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3253 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3254 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3256 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3260 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3261 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3262 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3263 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3264 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3265 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3267 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3270 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3271 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3272 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3273 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3274 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3275 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3276 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3278 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3279 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3280 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3282 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3284 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3285 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3287 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3288 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3289 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3290 // that we should update our routing table for.
3291 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3292 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3295 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3298 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3299 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3300 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3302 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3305 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3306 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3307 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3309 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3312 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3315 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3316 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3317 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3321 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3322 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3323 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3324 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3325 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3329 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3330 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3331 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3332 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3333 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3337 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3338 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3339 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3340 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3341 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3342 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3344 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3346 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3347 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3350 let payment_event = {
3351 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3352 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3353 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3355 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3356 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3359 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3360 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3362 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3363 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3365 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3368 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3370 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3372 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3373 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3374 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3375 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3376 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3377 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3379 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3380 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3386 onion_routing_packet,
3388 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3390 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3391 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3392 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3394 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3395 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3397 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3400 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3401 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3403 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3405 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3410 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3411 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3412 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3413 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3414 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3415 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3416 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3417 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3419 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3420 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3421 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3422 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3424 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3426 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3427 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3428 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3430 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3431 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3432 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3434 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3436 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3437 // registering new transactions
3438 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3439 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3443 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3444 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3445 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3446 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3447 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3448 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3449 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3450 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3452 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3454 let mut payment_event = {
3455 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3458 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3459 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3460 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3463 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3464 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3466 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3468 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3469 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3470 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3471 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3474 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3475 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3477 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3479 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3480 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3481 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3483 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3484 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3486 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3488 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3489 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3490 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3491 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3492 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3496 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3498 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3499 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3501 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3503 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3505 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3506 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3508 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3509 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3510 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3511 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3512 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3513 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3514 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3516 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3520 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3521 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3522 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3523 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3524 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3526 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3527 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3528 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3529 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3530 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3532 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3534 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3535 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3536 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3537 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3538 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3539 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3541 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3542 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3544 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3545 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3549 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3550 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3551 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3552 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3553 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3554 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3555 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3557 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3558 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3559 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3560 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3561 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
3562 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3563 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
3565 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3566 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3568 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3570 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3571 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3573 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3574 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3577 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3580 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3581 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3582 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3583 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3585 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3586 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3590 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3591 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3592 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3593 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3594 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3595 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3596 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3597 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3599 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3600 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3601 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3603 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3604 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3605 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3606 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3608 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3609 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3610 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3612 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3613 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3614 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3615 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3617 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3618 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3620 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3621 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3623 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3625 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3626 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3628 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3629 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3630 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3632 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3635 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3636 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3637 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3639 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3642 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3643 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3647 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3648 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3651 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3652 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3653 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3654 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3655 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3656 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3658 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3659 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3660 let (channel_ready, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3661 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3662 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3663 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3664 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3666 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3669 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3671 let payment_event = {
3672 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3675 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3676 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3677 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3679 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3681 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3682 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3684 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3685 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3686 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3688 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3690 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3691 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3692 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3695 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3696 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3697 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3698 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3701 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3702 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3703 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3704 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3711 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3712 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3713 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3714 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3715 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3716 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3718 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3719 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3720 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3722 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3723 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3725 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3726 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3727 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3728 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3729 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3730 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3731 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3732 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3733 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3734 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3735 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3736 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3737 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3738 // Everything was delivered...
3739 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3742 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3743 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3745 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3746 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3749 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3750 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3751 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3753 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3755 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3756 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3758 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
3759 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3760 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3762 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3763 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3764 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3766 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3769 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3772 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3774 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3776 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3777 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3778 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3779 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3780 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3781 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3782 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3783 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3784 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3785 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3786 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3788 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3791 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3792 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3794 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3795 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3797 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3798 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3799 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3801 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3804 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3805 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3806 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3807 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3809 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3810 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3811 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3814 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3815 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3816 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3817 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3820 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3821 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3822 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3830 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3831 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3832 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3833 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3834 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3835 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3837 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3839 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3840 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3841 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3842 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3843 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3844 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3845 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3846 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3847 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3848 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3849 // Everything was delivered...
3850 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3853 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3854 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3857 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3858 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3859 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3861 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3862 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3865 // Channel should still work fine...
3866 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3867 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3868 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3872 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3873 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3874 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3875 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3876 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3880 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3881 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3882 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3883 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3884 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3888 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3889 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3890 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3891 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3892 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3893 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3894 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3895 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3896 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3897 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3899 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3900 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3902 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3903 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3904 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3906 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3908 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3909 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3911 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3912 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3913 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3915 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3916 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3917 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3918 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3920 // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a channel_ready, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3921 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3922 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3923 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3924 let as_channel_ready = match events_3[0] {
3925 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3926 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3929 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3932 // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s channel_ready on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3933 // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3934 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3935 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3936 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3938 let bs_channel_ready = match events_4[0] {
3939 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3940 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3941 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3944 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3946 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3947 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3948 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3951 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3954 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3955 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3957 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3960 // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s channel_ready, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3961 // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3962 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3963 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3964 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3966 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3967 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3969 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3972 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s channel_ready, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3973 // announcement_signatures.
3974 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_channel_ready);
3975 let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3976 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3977 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3978 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3979 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3982 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3985 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3986 // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3988 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3989 let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3990 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3991 let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3992 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3993 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3995 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3998 // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3999 // same channel_announcement.
4000 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
4001 let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4002 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
4003 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
4004 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
4005 assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
4008 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
4011 // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
4012 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
4013 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4014 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4016 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4017 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
4018 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
4020 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
4021 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
4022 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4024 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4025 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4026 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4028 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4029 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4030 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4031 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4032 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4033 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4034 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4035 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4037 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4038 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4039 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4040 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4041 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4042 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4044 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
4045 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4046 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4047 logger: nodes[0].logger,
4051 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4052 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4054 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4055 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4058 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4060 // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
4061 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
4062 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4063 let mut found_announcement = false;
4064 for event in msgs.iter() {
4066 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
4067 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
4069 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
4070 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4073 assert!(found_announcement);
4077 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4078 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4079 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4080 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4081 // channel_ready immediately instead.
4082 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4083 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4084 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4085 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4086 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4088 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4090 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4091 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4092 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4093 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4094 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4095 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4097 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4098 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4099 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4103 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4104 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4105 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4106 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4107 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4108 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4109 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4110 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4112 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4114 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4115 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4116 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4119 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4120 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4122 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4123 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4126 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4127 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4130 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4131 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4133 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4134 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4135 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4136 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4137 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4138 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4139 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4141 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4142 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4143 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4145 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4146 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4147 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4149 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4152 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4153 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4154 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4157 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4160 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4161 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4163 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4164 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4165 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4166 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4167 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4168 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4170 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4171 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4172 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4173 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4175 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4176 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4178 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4179 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4181 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4183 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4184 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4185 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4186 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4187 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4188 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4189 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4190 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4191 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4194 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4195 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4196 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4197 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4198 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4199 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4200 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4203 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4204 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4205 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4206 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4207 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4208 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4209 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4212 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4213 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4214 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4217 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4218 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4219 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4222 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4223 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4226 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4228 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4229 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4231 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4232 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4234 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4235 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4236 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4238 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4241 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4244 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4245 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4248 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4249 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4252 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4253 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4254 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4255 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4256 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4257 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4258 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4260 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4262 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4263 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4264 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4265 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4266 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4267 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4268 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4270 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4271 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4272 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4273 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4274 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4277 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4280 let mut block = Block {
4281 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4284 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4285 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4286 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4287 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4288 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4289 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4290 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4293 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4296 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4297 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4298 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4299 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4300 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4302 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4303 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4304 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4305 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4306 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4307 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4311 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4312 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4313 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4316 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4317 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4318 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4319 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4320 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4321 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4322 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4323 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4325 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4326 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4327 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4328 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4330 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4331 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4333 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4335 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4336 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4338 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4339 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4340 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4341 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4344 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4345 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4346 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4347 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4351 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4352 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4353 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4354 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4357 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4359 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4360 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4361 match fail_commit[0] {
4362 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4363 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4364 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4366 _ => unreachable!(),
4368 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4370 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4371 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4372 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4373 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4374 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4375 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4376 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4377 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4382 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4383 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4384 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4388 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4389 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4390 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4391 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4392 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4393 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4394 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4395 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4396 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4397 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4399 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4401 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4403 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4404 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4405 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4406 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4408 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4409 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4410 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4411 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4412 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4413 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4414 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4415 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4416 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4417 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4419 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4420 let config = UserConfig::default();
4421 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4422 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4423 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4424 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4425 default_config: config,
4427 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4428 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4429 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4434 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4435 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4437 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4438 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4439 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4442 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4443 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4444 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4445 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4447 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4448 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4449 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4450 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4452 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4453 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4454 for node in nodes.iter() {
4455 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4456 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4457 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4460 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4464 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4465 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4466 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4467 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4468 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4469 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4470 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4471 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4472 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4473 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4474 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4476 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4477 let channel_value = 100000;
4478 let push_msat = 10001;
4479 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4480 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4481 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4482 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4483 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4484 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4485 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4487 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
4489 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
4490 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4492 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4494 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4495 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4496 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4497 added_monitors.clear();
4500 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4501 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4503 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4504 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4505 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4506 added_monitors.clear();
4508 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4513 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4514 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4515 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4516 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4518 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4519 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4520 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4521 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4522 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4523 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4524 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4525 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4526 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4527 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4529 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4530 let config = UserConfig::default();
4531 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4532 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4533 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4534 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4535 default_config: config,
4537 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4538 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4539 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4544 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4545 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4547 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4549 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4550 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4552 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4553 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4554 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4555 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4556 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4558 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4559 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4562 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4563 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4564 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4565 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4567 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4568 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4569 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4570 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4572 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4573 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4574 for node in nodes.iter() {
4575 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4576 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4577 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4580 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4584 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4585 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4586 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4587 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4588 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4589 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4590 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4591 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4592 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4593 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4594 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4596 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4597 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4599 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4601 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4602 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4603 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4605 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4606 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4607 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4608 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4609 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4610 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4611 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4612 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4613 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4614 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4616 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4617 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4618 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4619 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4620 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4621 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4623 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4624 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4625 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4630 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4631 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4633 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4634 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4635 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4637 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4639 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4640 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4644 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4645 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4646 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4647 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4648 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4649 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4650 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4651 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4652 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4653 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4654 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4655 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4656 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4657 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4659 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4660 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4661 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4662 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4663 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4666 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4668 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4669 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4671 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4672 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4673 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4674 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4676 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4678 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4679 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4680 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4681 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4682 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4685 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4686 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4687 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4688 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4689 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4690 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4693 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4694 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4695 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4696 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4697 assert!(read.is_empty());
4698 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4701 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4702 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4703 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4704 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4705 assert!(read.is_empty());
4706 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4709 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4710 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4711 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4712 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4714 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4715 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4716 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4718 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4720 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4723 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4724 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4725 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4726 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4728 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4729 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4730 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4732 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4734 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4735 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4737 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4738 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4739 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4740 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4741 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4744 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4745 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4746 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4748 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4749 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4751 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4752 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4753 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4754 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4755 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4757 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4758 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4759 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4760 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4761 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4762 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4763 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4765 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4766 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4768 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4773 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4774 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4776 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4777 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4778 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4779 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4780 for event in events.drain(..) {
4782 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4783 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4784 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4785 all_outputs.push(outp);
4788 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4791 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4792 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4802 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4803 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4804 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4805 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4806 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4807 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4809 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4810 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4811 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4813 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4814 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4815 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4816 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4817 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4819 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4820 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4822 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4823 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4824 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4825 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4826 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4830 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4831 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4832 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4833 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4834 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4835 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4836 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4838 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4839 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4840 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4841 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4842 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4844 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4845 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4846 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4847 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4849 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4850 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4852 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4853 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4855 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4856 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4857 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4861 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4862 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4863 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4865 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4866 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4867 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4868 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4870 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4871 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4872 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4873 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4874 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4876 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4877 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4878 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4879 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4880 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4882 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4883 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4884 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4886 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4887 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4888 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4889 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4890 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4894 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4895 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4896 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4897 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4898 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4900 // Create some initial channels
4901 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4903 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4905 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4906 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4907 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4909 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4910 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4911 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4913 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4915 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4917 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4918 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4921 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4922 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4925 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4926 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4927 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4928 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4929 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4930 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4931 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4933 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4934 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4935 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4937 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4938 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4939 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4943 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4944 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4945 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4946 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4947 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4949 // Create some initial channels
4950 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4952 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4953 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4955 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4957 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4958 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4959 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4961 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4962 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4964 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4966 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4967 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4969 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4971 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4972 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4973 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4974 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4975 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4976 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4978 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4979 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4980 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4981 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4983 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4984 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4985 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4986 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4987 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4991 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4992 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4993 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4994 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4995 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4997 // Create some initial channels
4998 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5000 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5001 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5002 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5003 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5005 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5007 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5008 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5010 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5012 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5013 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5014 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5015 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5017 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
5018 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5020 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5021 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5022 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
5026 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5027 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5028 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5029 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5030 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5031 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5033 // Create some initial channels
5034 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5036 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5037 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5038 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5039 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5041 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5043 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
5044 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5045 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5047 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5048 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5050 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5051 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5052 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5053 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5054 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5055 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5056 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
5058 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5059 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5060 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
5061 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5063 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5065 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5066 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5067 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5068 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5069 // transactions next...
5070 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
5071 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5073 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
5074 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5075 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
5076 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5078 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5079 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5082 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5083 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5085 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5086 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5088 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5089 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5090 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5091 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5092 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5096 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5097 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5098 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5099 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5100 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5101 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5103 // Create some initial channels
5104 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5106 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5107 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5108 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5109 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5111 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5112 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5114 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5116 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5117 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5118 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5119 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5120 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5121 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5123 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5124 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5125 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5126 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5128 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5129 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5130 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5132 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5133 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5134 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5135 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5137 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5139 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5140 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5142 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5143 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5144 // transactions next...
5145 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5146 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5147 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5148 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5150 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5151 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5154 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5155 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5157 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5159 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5160 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5162 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5163 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5165 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5166 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5167 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5168 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5169 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5170 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5171 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5172 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5176 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5177 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5178 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5179 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5180 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5182 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5185 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5186 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5187 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5188 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5190 // Create some initial channels
5191 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5192 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5194 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5195 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5196 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5197 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5198 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5200 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5201 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5202 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5204 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
5205 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5206 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5207 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5208 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
5209 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5210 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5211 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5212 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5213 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5214 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5216 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5217 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5219 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5221 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5222 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5223 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5224 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5225 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5226 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5227 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5228 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5229 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5230 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5232 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5233 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5234 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5236 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5237 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5239 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5240 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5243 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
5244 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5245 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
5246 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5247 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
5249 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5252 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5253 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5254 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5255 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5259 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5260 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5261 match msg_events[0] {
5262 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5263 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5265 match msg_events[1] {
5266 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5267 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5269 match msg_events[2] {
5270 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5271 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5272 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5273 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5274 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5275 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5277 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5279 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5280 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5281 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5282 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5283 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5284 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5285 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5286 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5287 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5288 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5289 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5290 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5291 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5293 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5298 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5299 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5300 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5301 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5302 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5303 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5304 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5305 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5306 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5307 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5308 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5309 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5310 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5311 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5313 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5314 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5315 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5317 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5318 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5319 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5320 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5321 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5323 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5325 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5326 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5327 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5328 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5329 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5330 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
5331 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5332 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5334 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5335 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5336 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5338 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5339 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5341 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5342 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5344 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5345 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5346 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5347 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5348 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5349 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5351 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5352 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5354 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5355 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5356 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5357 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5359 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5360 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5362 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5363 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5366 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5367 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5368 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5369 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5371 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5374 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5375 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5377 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5379 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5380 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5382 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5383 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5386 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5387 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5389 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5390 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5391 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5392 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5393 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5394 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5395 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5396 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5397 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5398 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5399 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5400 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5401 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5403 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5404 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5405 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5406 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5407 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5408 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5409 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5410 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5411 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5414 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5415 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5417 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5419 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5421 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5422 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5423 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5424 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5425 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
5426 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5427 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5428 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5429 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5430 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5431 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5434 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5435 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5437 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5439 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5440 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5441 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5443 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5448 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5449 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5450 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5451 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5452 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5454 // Create some initial channels
5455 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5457 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5458 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5459 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5460 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5461 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5463 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5464 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5465 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5468 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5470 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5471 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5473 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5474 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5477 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5478 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5481 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5482 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5483 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5484 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5485 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5486 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5487 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5491 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5492 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5494 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5495 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5496 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5497 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5498 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5499 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5502 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5503 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5504 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5505 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5506 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5507 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5508 // use the same payment hashes.
5509 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5514 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5515 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5516 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5517 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5518 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5519 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5520 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5521 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5522 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5523 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5525 let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5526 let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5527 let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5528 let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5529 let chan_3_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5531 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5532 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5533 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5534 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5536 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5538 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5540 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5541 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5543 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5545 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5547 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5549 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5550 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5552 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5554 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5557 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5559 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5560 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5563 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5565 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5566 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5568 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5569 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5570 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5571 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5572 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5574 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5575 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5576 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5577 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5578 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5579 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5582 let failed_destinations = vec![
5583 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5584 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5585 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5586 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5588 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5591 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5592 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5593 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5594 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5595 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5596 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5598 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5599 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5600 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5601 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5603 let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5604 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5605 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5607 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5608 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5610 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5611 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5612 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5613 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5615 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5617 // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5618 let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5619 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5620 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5621 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5622 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5623 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5624 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5626 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5628 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5629 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5630 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5631 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5632 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5633 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5634 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5635 if deliver_last_raa {
5636 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5638 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5641 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5642 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5643 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5644 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5646 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5647 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5648 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5650 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5651 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5652 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5654 if announce_latest {
5655 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5657 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5659 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5660 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5661 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5662 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5664 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5665 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5668 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5669 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5672 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5673 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5674 if deliver_last_raa {
5675 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5677 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5678 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5680 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5681 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5683 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5686 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5688 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5690 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5691 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5692 let mut a_done = false;
5693 for msg in cs_msgs {
5695 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5696 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5697 // should be failed-backwards here.
5698 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5699 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5700 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5701 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5703 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5708 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5709 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5710 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5712 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5713 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5716 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5717 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5718 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5719 if announce_latest {
5720 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5721 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5722 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5725 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5727 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5731 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5732 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5733 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5734 let mut as_updates = 0;
5735 for event in as_events.iter() {
5736 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5737 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5738 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5739 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5741 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5743 if network_update.is_some() {
5746 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5748 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5749 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5750 if announce_latest {
5751 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5752 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5754 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5756 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5757 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5758 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5759 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5760 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5761 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5762 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5763 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5764 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5766 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5768 if network_update.is_some() {
5771 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5773 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5774 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5775 if announce_latest {
5776 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5778 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5780 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5781 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5782 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5783 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5784 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5785 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5789 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5790 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5794 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5795 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5799 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5800 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5801 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5802 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5806 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5807 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5808 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5809 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5810 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5812 // Create some initial channels
5813 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5815 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5816 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5817 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5818 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5820 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5821 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5822 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5824 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5825 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5827 let htlc_timeout = {
5828 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5829 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5830 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5831 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5832 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5833 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5837 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5838 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5839 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5841 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5842 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5843 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5844 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5845 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5846 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5847 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5848 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5849 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5850 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5851 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5855 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5856 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5857 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5858 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5860 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5862 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5863 let seed = [42; 32];
5864 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5865 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5866 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger);
5867 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5868 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5869 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5870 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5872 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5873 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5875 // Create some initial channels
5876 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5878 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5879 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5880 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5882 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5883 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5884 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5885 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5886 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5888 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5889 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5890 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5891 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5892 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5894 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5895 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5896 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5897 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5898 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5899 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5900 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5901 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5904 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5905 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5906 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5907 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5909 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5911 let htlc_timeout = {
5912 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5913 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5914 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5915 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5919 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5920 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5921 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5923 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5924 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5925 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5926 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5927 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5928 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5929 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5930 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5931 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5932 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5933 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5934 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5938 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5939 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5940 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5941 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5942 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5944 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5946 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5947 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5949 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5950 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5951 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5953 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5954 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5955 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5957 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5958 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5959 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5961 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5962 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5963 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5966 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5967 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5968 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5969 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5970 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5971 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5973 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5975 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5976 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5977 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5979 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5981 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5982 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5983 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5985 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5987 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5988 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5991 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5992 let mut block = Block {
5993 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5996 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5997 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5998 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
6000 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
6001 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
6002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6003 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6006 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
6007 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6008 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6009 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6010 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6011 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6013 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
6014 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6017 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6019 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
6020 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
6021 // to "time out" the HTLC.
6023 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
6024 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6026 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
6027 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
6028 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
6030 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
6031 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6033 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6036 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
6037 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6038 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6039 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6040 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6041 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6043 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
6044 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
6045 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
6046 // actually revoked.
6047 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
6048 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
6049 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
6050 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6053 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6054 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6055 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
6056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6057 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6058 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
6059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6060 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
6061 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6062 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6064 if check_revoke_no_close {
6065 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
6066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6069 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
6070 let mut block = Block {
6071 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6074 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
6075 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
6076 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
6078 if !check_revoke_no_close {
6079 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
6080 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6082 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6084 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6085 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6086 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
6087 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6088 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6089 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
6090 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6091 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6095 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
6096 // There are only a few cases to test here:
6097 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
6098 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
6099 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
6100 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
6101 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
6103 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
6104 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
6105 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
6107 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
6108 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
6109 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
6111 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
6112 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
6116 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
6117 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
6118 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
6119 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
6120 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
6125 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
6126 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6127 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6128 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6129 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6130 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
6131 for node in nodes.iter() {
6132 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6135 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6136 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6137 let push_msat=10001;
6138 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6139 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6140 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6141 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6143 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
6144 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
6145 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6149 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6150 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6151 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6152 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6153 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6155 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6156 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6157 let push_msat=10001;
6158 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6160 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6161 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6162 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6163 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6164 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6166 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6167 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6168 let push_msat=10001;
6169 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6170 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6171 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6173 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6174 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6175 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6177 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6178 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6179 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6181 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6182 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6183 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6185 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6186 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6187 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6188 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6189 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6190 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6194 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6195 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6196 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6197 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6198 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6200 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6201 let push_msat=10001;
6202 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6203 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6204 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6205 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6207 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6208 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6209 let err_msg = match events[0] {
6210 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6213 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6215 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6218 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6219 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6220 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6221 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6223 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6224 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6225 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6226 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6227 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6228 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6230 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6231 // pending_update_fee.
6233 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6234 *feerate_lock += 20;
6236 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6239 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6240 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6241 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6242 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6243 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6245 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6248 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6250 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6251 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6252 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6253 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6255 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6256 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6257 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6259 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6260 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6261 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6262 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6264 // Flush the pending fee update.
6265 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6266 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6268 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6271 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6272 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6273 // us to surface its failure to the user.
6274 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6275 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6276 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6277 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6278 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6279 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6281 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6282 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6283 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6285 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6286 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6287 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6288 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6289 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6290 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6291 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6292 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6293 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6295 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6299 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6300 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6301 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6303 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6304 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6305 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6306 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6307 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6308 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6310 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6311 // pending_update_fee.
6313 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6314 *feerate_lock += 200;
6316 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6319 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6320 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6321 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6322 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6323 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6325 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6328 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6330 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6331 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6332 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6333 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6335 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6337 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6338 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6339 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6341 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6342 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6343 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6344 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6345 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6346 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6347 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6349 // Flush the pending fee update.
6350 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6351 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6353 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6354 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6357 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6358 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6359 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6360 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6361 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6362 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6363 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6364 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6365 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6367 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6368 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6369 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6371 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6372 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6373 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6374 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6375 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6376 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6377 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6378 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6379 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6381 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6384 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6385 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6386 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6387 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6388 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6390 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6391 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6392 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6394 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6396 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6397 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6398 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6399 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6401 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6402 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6404 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6405 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6406 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6408 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6409 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6411 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6413 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6415 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6416 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6417 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6418 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6421 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6422 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6423 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6426 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6427 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6428 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6429 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6430 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6431 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6432 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6433 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6434 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6435 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6436 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6438 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6439 // pending_update_fee.
6441 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6442 *feerate_lock += 20;
6444 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6447 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6448 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6449 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6450 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6451 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6453 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6456 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6458 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6459 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6460 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6461 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6463 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6465 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6466 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6467 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6468 let payment_event = {
6469 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6472 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6473 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6475 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6477 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6479 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6480 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6482 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6483 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6485 // Flush the pending fee update.
6486 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6487 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6489 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6490 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6493 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6494 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6495 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6497 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6498 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6501 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6504 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6506 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6508 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6509 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6510 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6511 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6512 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6513 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6516 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6517 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6520 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6521 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6522 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6523 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6524 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6525 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6526 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6527 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6528 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6529 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6531 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6534 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6535 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6536 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6538 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6539 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6541 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6542 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6544 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6545 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6546 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6547 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6548 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6550 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6551 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6555 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6556 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6557 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6560 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6561 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6562 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6563 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6564 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6565 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6566 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6568 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6569 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6571 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6572 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6573 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6574 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6578 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6579 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6580 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6581 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6582 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6583 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6584 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6586 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6587 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6588 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6589 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6591 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6592 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6596 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6597 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6598 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6599 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6600 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6601 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6602 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6604 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6605 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6607 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6608 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6610 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6611 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6612 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6614 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6618 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6619 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6620 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6621 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6622 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6623 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6624 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6625 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6627 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6628 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6629 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6630 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6631 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6632 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6636 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6637 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6638 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6639 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6640 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6641 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6642 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6643 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6644 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6645 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6647 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6648 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6649 let payment_event = {
6650 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6653 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6654 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6655 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6656 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6660 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6662 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6664 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6666 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6667 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6669 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6670 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6671 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6673 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6674 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6678 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6679 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6680 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6681 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6682 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6683 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6684 let channel_value = 100000;
6685 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6686 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6688 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6690 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6691 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6693 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6694 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6695 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6697 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6698 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6700 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6703 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6705 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6706 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6707 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6708 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6709 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6710 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6711 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6712 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6714 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6715 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6716 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6719 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6720 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6722 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6723 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6724 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6725 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6726 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6727 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6728 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6729 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6733 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6734 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6735 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6736 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6737 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6738 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6739 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6741 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6742 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6743 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6744 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6745 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6746 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6748 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6749 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6750 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6752 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6754 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6755 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6756 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6757 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6758 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6760 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6761 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6762 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6763 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6764 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6768 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6769 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6770 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6771 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6772 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6773 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6774 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6775 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6777 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6778 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6779 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6780 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6781 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6782 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6784 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6788 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6789 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6790 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6793 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6794 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6795 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6797 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6798 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6800 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6801 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6802 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6804 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6808 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6809 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6810 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6811 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6812 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6813 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6814 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6816 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6817 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6819 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6820 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6821 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6823 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6824 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6825 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6827 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6831 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6832 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6833 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6834 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6835 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6836 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6838 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6839 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6840 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6841 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6842 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6843 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6844 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6846 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6847 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6848 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6850 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6854 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6855 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6856 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6857 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6858 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6859 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6860 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6861 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6863 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6864 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6865 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6867 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6868 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6870 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6871 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6872 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6873 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6874 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6875 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6876 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6877 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6878 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6879 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6880 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6881 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6882 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6885 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6886 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6887 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6888 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6889 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6891 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6893 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6894 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6895 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6897 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6901 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6902 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6904 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6905 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6906 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6907 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6908 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6909 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6910 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6913 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6914 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6916 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6919 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6922 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6924 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6925 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6926 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6928 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6932 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6933 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6935 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6936 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6937 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6938 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6939 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6941 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6942 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6944 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6945 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6947 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6950 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6953 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6955 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6956 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6957 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6959 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6963 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6964 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6966 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6967 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6968 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6969 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6970 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6972 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6973 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6975 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6976 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6977 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6980 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6981 failure_code: 0x8000,
6984 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6986 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6987 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6988 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6990 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6994 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6995 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6997 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6998 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6999 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7000 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7001 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7003 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
7005 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
7006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7007 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
7009 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7010 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7011 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
7013 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7014 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7015 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7016 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7017 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7018 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7019 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
7021 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7025 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
7027 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
7029 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7030 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7031 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
7032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7033 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7037 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
7038 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
7040 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7041 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7042 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7043 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7044 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7046 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
7048 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
7049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7050 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
7052 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7053 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7054 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
7056 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7057 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7058 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7059 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7060 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7061 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7062 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
7064 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7068 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
7070 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
7072 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7073 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7074 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
7075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7076 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7080 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
7081 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
7083 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7084 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7085 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7086 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7087 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7089 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
7090 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7093 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7094 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7096 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7098 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7100 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7102 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
7104 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7105 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7106 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7107 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7108 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7109 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7110 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
7112 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7115 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
7116 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7118 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7119 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7120 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
7121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7122 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7126 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
7127 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
7128 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
7130 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7131 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7132 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7133 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7134 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7135 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7137 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7140 let mut payment_event = {
7141 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7143 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7144 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7145 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7147 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7149 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7150 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7151 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7152 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7154 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7155 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7158 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7159 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7161 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7163 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7164 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7165 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7167 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7168 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7169 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7170 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7171 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7172 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7173 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7175 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7179 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7182 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7183 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
7184 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7185 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7187 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7189 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7190 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7191 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7192 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7193 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7194 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7202 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7203 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7204 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7205 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7207 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7208 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7209 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7210 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7211 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7212 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7214 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7216 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7217 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7218 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7219 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7221 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7222 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7224 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7225 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7227 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7230 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7231 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7232 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7235 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7236 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7238 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7240 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7241 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7243 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7246 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7247 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7249 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7252 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7253 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7254 if announce_latest {
7255 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7257 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7260 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7261 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7262 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7264 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7265 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7266 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7267 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7268 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7269 let mut first_failed = false;
7270 for event in events {
7272 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7273 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7274 assert!(!first_failed);
7275 first_failed = true;
7277 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7280 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7286 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7287 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7288 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7291 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7292 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7293 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7294 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7295 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7296 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7297 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7299 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7300 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7301 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7302 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7303 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7305 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7307 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7308 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7310 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7311 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7313 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7315 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7316 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7319 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7321 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7322 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7323 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7324 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7325 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7327 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7328 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7330 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7331 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7332 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7333 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7334 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7335 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7336 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7337 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7339 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7340 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7341 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7343 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7344 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7346 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7347 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7348 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7349 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7350 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7351 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7352 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7355 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7357 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time, 0);
7359 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7360 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7361 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7362 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7363 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7368 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7369 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7370 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7371 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7375 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7376 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7378 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7379 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7380 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7381 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7382 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7383 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7384 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7385 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7386 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7388 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7389 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7390 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7391 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7394 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7395 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7397 } else { assert!(false) }
7399 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7400 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7401 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7402 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7403 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7404 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7405 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7408 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7409 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7411 } else { assert!(false); }
7413 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7414 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7415 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7416 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7417 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7418 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7420 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7422 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7423 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7424 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7428 } else { panic!(); }
7429 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7431 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7432 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7433 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7434 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7435 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7436 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7437 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7440 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7441 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7443 } else { assert!(false); }
7446 fn do_test_data_loss_protect(reconnect_panicing: bool) {
7447 // When we get a data_loss_protect proving we're behind, we immediately panic as the
7448 // chain::Watch API requirements have been violated (e.g. the user restored from a backup). The
7449 // panic message informs the user they should force-close without broadcasting, which is tested
7450 // if `reconnect_panicing` is not set.
7456 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7457 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7458 // during signing due to revoked tx
7459 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7460 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7463 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7464 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7465 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7467 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7469 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7470 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7471 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7472 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7474 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7475 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7477 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7478 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7480 // Restore node A from previous state
7481 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7482 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7483 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7484 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
7485 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7486 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7487 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7489 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7490 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7491 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7492 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7493 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7494 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7496 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7497 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7501 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7502 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7503 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7504 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7508 if reconnect_panicing {
7509 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7510 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7512 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7514 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7515 // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
7516 // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
7517 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7518 let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
7519 assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
7522 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7523 // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
7524 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
7527 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7528 // Check A panics upon seeing proof it has fallen behind.
7529 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7530 return; // By this point we should have panic'ed!
7533 nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7534 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7535 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7537 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7538 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7541 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7542 if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7543 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7545 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7546 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel force-closed");
7548 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7551 panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", msg)
7555 // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
7556 // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
7557 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7558 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7559 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7560 let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7562 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
7563 let mut err_msgs_0 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7564 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7565 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7567 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7568 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel");
7569 err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone());
7571 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7574 panic!("Unexpected event!");
7577 assert_eq!(err_msgs_0.len(), 1);
7578 nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]);
7579 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7581 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() });
7582 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
7587 fn test_data_loss_protect_showing_stale_state_panics() {
7588 do_test_data_loss_protect(true);
7592 fn test_force_close_without_broadcast() {
7593 do_test_data_loss_protect(false);
7597 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7598 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7599 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7600 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7602 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7603 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7604 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7605 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7607 // Create some initial channels
7608 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7610 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7611 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7612 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7613 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7614 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7615 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7616 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7619 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7620 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7621 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7622 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7623 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7625 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7626 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7627 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7628 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7630 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7631 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7632 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7634 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7635 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7636 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7637 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7638 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7639 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7640 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7641 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7642 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7643 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7645 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7649 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7650 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7652 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7653 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7654 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7655 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7659 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7660 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7661 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7663 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7664 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7665 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7666 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7668 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7669 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7670 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7673 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7674 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7676 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7677 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7678 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7679 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7680 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7681 for e in msg_events {
7683 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7684 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7685 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7686 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7687 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7690 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7694 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7695 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7696 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7697 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7698 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7699 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7701 // Reestablish chan_1
7702 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7703 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7704 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7705 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7706 // Reestablish chan_2
7707 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7708 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7709 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7710 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7711 // Reestablish chan_3
7712 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7713 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7714 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7715 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7717 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7718 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7719 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7720 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7721 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7722 for e in msg_events {
7724 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7725 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7726 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7727 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7729 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7730 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7733 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7736 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7737 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7741 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7742 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7743 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7745 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7746 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7747 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7748 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7750 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7752 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7753 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7754 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7755 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7756 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7758 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7759 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7760 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7761 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7762 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7763 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7765 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7766 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7767 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7768 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7772 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7773 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7775 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7776 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7777 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7778 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7781 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7785 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7786 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7787 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7788 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7789 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7790 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7791 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7792 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7796 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7797 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7798 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7799 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7801 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7802 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7803 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7804 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7805 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7806 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7807 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7808 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7809 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7810 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7811 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7812 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7813 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7817 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7819 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7820 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7822 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7824 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7825 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7826 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7827 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7828 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7829 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7830 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7831 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7832 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7833 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7834 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7835 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7836 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7840 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7842 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7843 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7847 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7848 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7849 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7851 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7852 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7853 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7854 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7855 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7857 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7858 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7859 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7860 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7861 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7862 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7863 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7864 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7865 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7866 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7867 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7868 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7870 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7871 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7872 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7874 // Revoke local commitment tx
7875 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7877 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7878 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7879 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7880 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7882 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7883 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7885 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7886 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7887 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7889 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7890 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7891 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7893 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7894 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7895 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7896 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7898 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7899 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7900 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7901 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7902 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7903 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7904 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7905 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7906 match events.last().unwrap() {
7907 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7908 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7914 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7915 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7916 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7918 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7919 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7920 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7921 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7923 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7924 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7925 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7926 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7927 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7928 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7930 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7931 // available, which we check here:
7932 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7933 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7934 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7936 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7937 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7939 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7940 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7941 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7942 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7944 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7945 // output, checked above).
7946 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7947 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7948 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7950 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7951 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7952 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7953 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7954 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7958 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7959 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7960 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7961 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7962 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7964 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7965 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7967 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7968 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7969 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7970 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7971 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7973 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7974 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7980 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7981 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7982 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7983 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7985 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7986 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7988 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7989 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7990 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7991 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7992 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7993 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7994 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7995 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7999 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
8000 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8001 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
8002 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
8004 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8005 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
8006 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
8007 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
8008 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
8009 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
8010 // up bumped justice generation.
8011 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
8014 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8019 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
8020 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
8021 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
8024 // Provide preimage for one
8025 // Check aggregation
8027 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8028 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8029 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8030 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8032 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8033 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
8034 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
8036 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
8037 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
8038 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
8039 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8040 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8042 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
8043 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8044 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8045 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
8046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8047 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
8049 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
8053 let feerate_timeout;
8054 let feerate_preimage;
8056 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8057 // 9 transactions including:
8058 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
8059 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
8060 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
8062 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
8063 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8064 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
8065 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8066 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
8068 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
8069 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
8071 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output {
8072 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
8073 check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
8075 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
8076 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
8078 preimage_bump = node_txn[7].clone();
8079 check_spends!(node_txn[7], remote_txn[0]);
8080 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[7].input[0].previous_output);
8082 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[3]);
8083 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[4]);
8086 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
8087 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8088 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
8089 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].weight() as u64;
8091 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8092 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8093 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8094 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8098 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8099 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8101 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8102 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8104 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8105 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8106 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8107 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8108 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8109 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8111 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8112 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8113 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
8114 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8115 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8117 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8118 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8119 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8120 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8121 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8126 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8127 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8131 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8132 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8133 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8134 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8135 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8136 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8137 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8138 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8140 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8141 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8142 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8143 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8144 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8146 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8147 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8149 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8151 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8152 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8153 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8155 // Must revoke without gaps
8156 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8157 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8159 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8160 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8161 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8163 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8164 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8165 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8167 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8171 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8172 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8173 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8175 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8176 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8177 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8178 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8180 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8181 // Lock HTLC in both directions
8182 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
8183 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
8185 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8186 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8187 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8189 // Revoke local commitment tx
8190 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
8192 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8193 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8194 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
8195 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8197 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8198 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8200 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8202 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8203 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8204 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8205 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8206 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8207 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8211 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8212 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8213 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8215 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8216 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8217 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8222 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8223 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8224 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8225 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8226 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8227 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8228 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8229 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8231 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
8232 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8233 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
8234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8235 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8237 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8238 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8239 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8241 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8243 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8244 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8245 // can get our balance.
8247 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8248 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8249 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8250 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8251 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8252 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8253 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8254 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8256 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8260 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8261 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8262 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8263 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8264 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8265 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8266 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8268 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8270 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8271 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8272 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8273 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8274 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8276 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8277 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8279 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8281 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8282 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8283 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8284 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8285 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8287 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8288 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8289 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8291 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8296 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8297 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8298 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8299 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8300 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8302 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8303 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8304 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8306 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8308 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8309 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8310 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8311 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8315 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8316 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8317 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8318 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8319 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8320 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8321 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8323 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8324 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8325 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8327 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8328 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8329 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8333 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
8334 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
8335 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
8336 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
8337 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
8338 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8340 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8341 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8342 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8343 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8344 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8345 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8346 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8347 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8348 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8349 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8350 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8351 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8353 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8354 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8355 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8356 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8358 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8359 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8360 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8361 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8362 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8364 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8365 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8367 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8368 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8369 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_50_percent_msat));
8370 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8371 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8372 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_30_percent_msat));
8374 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8375 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8377 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
8378 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8379 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8381 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
8385 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8386 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8387 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8388 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8389 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8390 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8391 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8393 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8394 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8396 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8398 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8399 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8400 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8402 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8404 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8405 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8407 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8410 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8411 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8413 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8414 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8415 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8417 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8420 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8422 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8423 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8425 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8427 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8428 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8430 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8435 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8436 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8437 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8438 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8439 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8440 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8441 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8443 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8444 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8446 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8448 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8449 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8450 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8452 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8454 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8455 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8457 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8460 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8461 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8463 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8464 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8465 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8467 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8469 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8473 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8474 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8475 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8476 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8477 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8478 // and the channel should be closed.
8479 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8480 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8481 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8482 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8483 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8484 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8486 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8487 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8488 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8490 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8492 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8493 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8495 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8496 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8498 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8499 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8500 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8501 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8502 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8505 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8506 let accept_chan_msg = channel.get_accept_channel_message();
8507 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8510 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8512 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8513 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8515 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8516 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8518 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8519 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8521 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8522 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8523 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8524 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8525 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8526 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8528 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8531 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8535 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8536 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8537 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8538 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8539 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8540 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8541 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8543 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8544 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8546 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8548 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8549 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8550 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8552 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8554 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8555 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8556 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8558 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8559 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8561 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8562 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8565 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8568 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8569 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8570 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8572 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8573 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8574 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8576 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8581 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8582 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8583 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8584 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8585 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8587 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8588 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8590 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8591 assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8593 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8594 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8599 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8600 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8601 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8602 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8603 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8604 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8606 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8607 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8608 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8609 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8611 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8612 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8613 route.paths.push(path);
8614 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8615 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8616 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8617 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8618 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8619 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8620 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8621 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8625 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8626 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8627 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8628 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8629 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8630 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8632 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8635 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8636 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8637 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8639 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8640 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8641 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8642 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8644 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8645 // values from previous calls.
8646 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8647 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8648 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8650 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8652 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8653 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8655 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8658 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8663 #[allow(deprecated)]
8664 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8665 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8666 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8667 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8668 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8669 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8670 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8672 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8674 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8676 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8677 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8678 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8679 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8680 } else { panic!(); }
8682 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8684 header: BlockHeader {
8686 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8687 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8688 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8692 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8693 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8694 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8695 } else { panic!(); }
8697 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8698 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8699 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8700 block.header.time += 1;
8701 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8702 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8703 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8706 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8707 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8709 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8710 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8711 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8712 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8714 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8715 // values from previous calls.
8716 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8717 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8718 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8720 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8721 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8722 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8723 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8725 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8730 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8731 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8732 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8733 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8734 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8735 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8737 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8739 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8740 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8741 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8742 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8744 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8745 // resulting events.
8746 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8747 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8749 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8750 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8751 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8752 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8754 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8755 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8756 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8757 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8760 // We should fail the payment back
8761 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8762 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8763 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8764 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8765 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8767 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8772 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8773 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8774 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8776 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8777 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8778 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8779 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8781 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8782 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8783 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8784 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8786 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8787 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8788 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8789 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8793 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8794 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8795 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8796 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8798 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8799 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8800 // commitment at same time.
8802 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8803 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8804 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8805 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8807 // Create some initial channel
8808 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8809 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8811 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8812 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8814 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8815 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8817 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8818 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8819 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8820 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8822 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8823 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8824 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8825 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8826 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8827 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8828 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8829 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8832 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8833 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8834 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8835 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8836 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8837 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8839 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8840 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8841 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8842 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8844 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8845 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8846 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8847 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8848 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8849 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8850 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8851 } else { assert!(false); }
8852 } else { assert!(false); };
8853 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8854 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8855 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8856 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8860 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8861 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8862 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8863 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8864 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8866 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8867 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8868 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8869 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8871 // Create some initial channel
8872 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8873 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8875 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8876 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8878 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8879 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8881 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8882 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8883 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8884 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8885 let watchtower_alice = {
8886 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8887 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8888 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8889 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8890 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8891 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8892 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8893 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8896 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8897 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8898 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8899 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8900 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8901 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8903 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8905 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8906 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8910 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8911 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8912 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8913 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8914 let watchtower_bob = {
8915 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8916 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8917 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8918 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8919 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8920 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8921 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8922 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8925 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8926 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8928 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8929 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8931 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8935 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8936 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8937 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8938 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8939 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8940 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8941 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8942 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8943 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8944 } else { assert!(false); }
8945 } else { assert!(false); };
8946 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8949 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8950 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8951 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8953 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8956 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8957 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8958 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8962 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8963 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8964 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8966 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8967 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8968 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8969 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8970 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8971 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8976 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8977 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8978 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8981 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8982 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8984 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8985 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8986 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8987 // before receiving funding_signed.
8988 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8989 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8990 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8991 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8993 // Create an initial channel
8994 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8995 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8996 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8997 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8998 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
9000 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9001 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9003 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9006 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9007 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
9008 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
9009 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9010 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
9014 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
9015 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
9016 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
9017 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
9018 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
9019 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
9020 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
9022 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9023 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9024 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9025 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9027 // Create some initial channels
9028 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9030 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
9031 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
9032 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
9033 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9034 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
9035 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
9037 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
9038 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9039 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
9040 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
9041 // this test before #653 fix.
9042 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
9043 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9045 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9046 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
9048 let htlc_timeout = {
9049 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9050 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9051 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9052 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
9056 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9057 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
9058 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
9059 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9062 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
9063 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
9064 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
9065 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
9067 // Steps of the test:
9068 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
9069 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
9070 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
9071 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
9072 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
9073 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
9074 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
9075 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
9076 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9077 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9078 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9079 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9081 // Create some initial channels
9082 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9083 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9085 // Steps (1) and (2):
9086 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
9087 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
9089 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
9090 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
9091 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9092 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
9093 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
9094 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9095 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
9097 // Steps (3) and (4):
9098 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
9099 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
9100 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
9101 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
9104 if !broadcast_alice {
9105 force_closing_node = 1;
9106 counterparty_node = 0;
9108 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9109 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
9110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
9111 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9112 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9113 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
9114 true => alice_txn.clone(),
9115 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
9117 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9118 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9119 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9120 if broadcast_alice {
9121 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9123 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9125 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
9126 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9130 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
9131 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
9132 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9134 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
9136 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9137 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9138 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9139 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9140 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
9141 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9143 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9144 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
9145 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
9146 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
9147 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9148 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9150 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
9151 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9153 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9156 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
9157 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
9158 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
9159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9161 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9162 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9163 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
9164 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9165 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9168 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9170 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
9171 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
9172 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9175 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9178 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
9179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9180 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
9181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9183 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9184 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9185 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
9186 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9187 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9190 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9192 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
9193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9195 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
9196 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
9197 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
9198 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
9199 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9200 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9201 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9202 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
9203 if broadcast_alice {
9204 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9206 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9208 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9209 if broadcast_alice {
9210 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
9211 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
9212 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
9213 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
9215 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
9216 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
9218 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9219 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9224 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
9225 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
9227 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9228 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9229 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
9230 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9232 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
9233 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
9234 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
9236 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
9237 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
9238 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
9239 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
9240 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9241 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9242 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9244 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9245 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9251 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9252 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9253 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9254 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9255 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9259 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9260 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9261 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9263 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9264 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9265 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9266 // updating logic for the existing channel.
9267 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9268 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9269 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9270 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9272 // Create an initial channel
9273 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9274 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9275 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9276 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9278 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9279 // that it is rejected.
9280 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9282 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9283 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9285 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9286 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9287 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9288 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9289 // move forward with it.
9290 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9291 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9293 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9297 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9298 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9300 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9303 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9304 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9306 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9307 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9308 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9309 added_monitors.clear();
9311 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9313 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9314 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9316 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9319 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9320 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9321 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9322 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9323 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9325 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9326 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9328 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9329 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9330 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9331 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9332 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9334 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9338 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9339 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9340 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9341 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9342 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9343 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9345 let funding_created = {
9346 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9347 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9348 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9349 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9350 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9351 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9352 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9353 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9356 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9357 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9358 // still needs to be cleared here.
9359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9361 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9363 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9364 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9366 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9367 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9368 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9369 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9370 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9372 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9376 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9377 // everything is functional.
9378 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9380 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9381 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9382 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9383 added_monitors.clear();
9386 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9387 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9388 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9389 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9391 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9392 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9393 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9394 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9398 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9399 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9401 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9402 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9403 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9404 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9405 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9406 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9407 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9409 // Create some initial channels
9410 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9411 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9412 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9414 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9415 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9416 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9418 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9419 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9420 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9422 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9423 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9424 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9425 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9426 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9427 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9428 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9429 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9430 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9432 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9433 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9434 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9436 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9437 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9438 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9440 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9441 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9443 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9446 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9447 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9449 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9451 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9452 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9453 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9454 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9455 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9456 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9458 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9459 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9460 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9464 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9465 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9467 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9468 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9469 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9470 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9472 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9473 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9474 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9475 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9476 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9477 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9478 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9480 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9481 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9482 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9484 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9486 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9487 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9488 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9490 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9491 assert!(chan_utils::HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(wit_program.len()).unwrap() ==
9492 chan_utils::HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
9494 let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.clone().into();
9495 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9496 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9497 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9500 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9501 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9502 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9504 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9507 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9508 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9510 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9511 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9512 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9514 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9515 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9516 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9518 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9519 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9520 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9521 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9522 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9523 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9524 } else { panic!(); }
9525 } else { panic!(); }
9526 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9528 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9529 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9530 // as its not 32 bytes long.
9531 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9532 version: 2i32, lock_time: 0,
9533 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9534 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9538 script_sig: Script::new(),
9539 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
9540 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9542 output: vec![TxOut {
9544 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9547 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9548 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9551 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9552 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9553 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9554 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9555 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9556 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9557 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9558 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9559 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9560 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9561 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9562 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9563 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9564 // until we learned about an additional block.
9566 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9567 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9568 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9569 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9570 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9571 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9572 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9574 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9575 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9576 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9577 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9578 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9580 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9581 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9582 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9584 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9585 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9587 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9588 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9589 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9591 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9592 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9593 if test_height_before_timelock {
9594 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9595 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9596 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9597 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9599 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9600 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9601 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9602 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9603 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9604 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9606 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9607 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9609 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9610 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9611 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9612 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9613 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9614 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9617 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9618 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9619 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9620 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9621 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9622 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9623 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9624 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9625 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9630 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9631 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9632 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9636 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9637 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9638 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9640 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9642 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9643 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9644 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9645 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9646 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9647 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9648 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9649 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9650 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9652 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9653 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9654 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9657 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9658 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9659 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9660 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9661 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9663 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9665 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9666 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9667 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9670 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9671 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9672 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9673 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9674 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9676 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9678 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9680 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9681 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9682 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9684 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9685 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9686 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9687 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9688 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9690 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9691 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9692 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9693 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9695 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9696 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9697 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9698 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9699 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9700 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9701 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9702 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9704 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9705 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9706 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9707 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9708 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9709 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9710 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9712 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9713 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9714 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9715 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9719 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9720 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9722 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9723 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9724 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9725 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9727 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9728 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their channel_ready here since they haven't updated
9729 // the commitment state.
9730 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9732 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9734 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9735 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9738 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9739 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9740 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9741 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9742 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9743 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9744 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9746 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9747 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9750 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9751 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9752 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9753 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9754 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9756 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9758 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9759 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9760 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9762 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9765 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9767 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9768 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9769 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9770 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9771 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9773 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9774 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9777 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9778 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9779 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9780 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9781 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9782 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9783 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9784 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9785 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9786 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9787 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9790 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9791 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9793 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9794 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9795 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9797 let expected_destinations = vec![
9798 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9799 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9801 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], expected_destinations);
9802 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9805 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9806 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9808 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9809 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9810 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9812 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9813 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9814 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9815 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9817 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9818 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9819 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9822 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9823 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9824 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9826 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9828 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9833 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9834 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9835 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9836 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9837 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9838 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9842 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9843 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9844 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9845 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9849 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9850 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9851 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9852 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9853 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9854 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9855 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9857 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9858 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9859 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9860 let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9862 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9863 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9864 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9865 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9866 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9867 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9868 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9869 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9871 let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9873 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9875 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9876 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9878 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9879 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9881 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9882 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9883 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9885 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9888 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9891 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9892 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9893 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9895 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9896 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9898 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9901 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9902 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9903 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9905 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9907 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9909 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9910 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9911 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9913 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9914 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9915 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9916 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9920 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9921 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9922 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9924 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9927 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9928 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9929 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9931 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9933 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9936 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9937 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9938 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9940 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9944 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9945 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9946 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9947 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9948 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9950 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9951 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9952 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9953 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9954 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9955 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9956 final_value_msat: 10000,
9957 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9959 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9960 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9961 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9963 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9964 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9966 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9967 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9968 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9969 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9970 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9971 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9975 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9976 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9977 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9978 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9979 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9981 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9982 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9983 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9984 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9986 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9987 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9988 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9989 final_value_msat: 10000,
9990 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9992 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9993 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9994 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9995 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9996 let route = find_route(
9997 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9998 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
10001 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10002 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
10003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10004 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10005 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10006 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10007 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10008 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
10009 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
10013 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
10014 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentReceived event, the HTLCs
10015 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
10016 // PaymentReceived event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
10018 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10019 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10020 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10021 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10023 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10024 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10025 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10026 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10028 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10029 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10030 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10031 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10032 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10033 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10036 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
10037 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentReceived event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
10038 // amount of time to respond to.
10040 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
10041 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
10042 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
10044 let failed_destinations = vec![
10045 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
10046 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
10048 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
10050 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
10052 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
10053 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10056 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10057 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10058 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10060 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
10061 // that PaymentReceived event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
10062 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10063 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
10064 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10067 fn do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(persist_both_monitors: bool) {
10068 // Test what happens if a node receives an MPP payment, claims it, but crashes before
10069 // persisting the ChannelManager. If `persist_both_monitors` is false, also crash after only
10070 // updating one of the two channels' ChannelMonitors. As a result, on startup, we'll (a) still
10071 // have the PaymentReceived event, (b) have one (or two) channel(s) that goes on chain with the
10072 // HTLC preimage in them, and (c) optionally have one channel that is live off-chain but does
10073 // not have the preimage tied to the still-pending HTLC.
10075 // To get to the correct state, on startup we should propagate the preimage to the
10076 // still-off-chain channel, claiming the HTLC as soon as the peer connects, with the monitor
10077 // receiving the preimage without a state update.
10079 // Further, we should generate a `PaymentClaimed` event to inform the user that the payment was
10080 // definitely claimed.
10081 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10082 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10083 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10085 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
10086 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
10087 let nodes_3_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
10089 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10091 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10092 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10093 let chan_id_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
10094 let chan_id_not_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
10096 // Create an MPP route for 15k sats, more than the default htlc-max of 10%
10097 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10098 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10099 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10100 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10101 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10102 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10105 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10108 // Send the payment through to nodes[3] *without* clearing the PaymentReceived event
10109 let mut send_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10110 assert_eq!(send_events.len(), 2);
10111 do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[0].clone(), true, false, None);
10112 do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[1].clone(), true, false, None);
10114 // Now that we have an MPP payment pending, get the latest encoded copies of nodes[3]'s
10115 // monitors and ChannelManager, for use later, if we don't want to persist both monitors.
10116 let mut original_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10117 if !persist_both_monitors {
10118 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10119 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10120 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10121 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10126 let mut original_manager = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10127 nodes[3].node.write(&mut original_manager).unwrap();
10129 expect_payment_received!(nodes[3], payment_hash, payment_secret, 15_000_000);
10131 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10133 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[3], payment_hash, 15_000_000);
10135 // Now fetch one of the two updated ChannelMonitors from nodes[3], and restart pretending we
10136 // crashed in between the two persistence calls - using one old ChannelMonitor and one new one,
10137 // with the old ChannelManager.
10138 let mut updated_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10139 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10140 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_persisted {
10141 assert!(updated_monitor.0.is_empty());
10142 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut updated_monitor).unwrap();
10145 // If `persist_both_monitors` is set, get the second monitor here as well
10146 if persist_both_monitors {
10147 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10148 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10149 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10150 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10155 // Now restart nodes[3].
10156 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
10157 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[3].keys_manager;
10158 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[3].chain_source), nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[3].logger, node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
10159 nodes[3].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
10160 let mut monitors = Vec::new();
10161 for mut monitor_data in [original_monitor, updated_monitor].iter() {
10162 let (_, mut deserialized_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut &monitor_data.0[..], keys_manager).unwrap();
10163 monitors.push(deserialized_monitor);
10166 let config = UserConfig::default();
10167 nodes_3_deserialized = {
10168 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
10169 for monitor in monitors.iter_mut() {
10170 channel_monitors.insert(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
10172 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut &original_manager.0[..], ChannelManagerReadArgs {
10173 default_config: config,
10175 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator,
10176 chain_monitor: nodes[3].chain_monitor,
10177 tx_broadcaster: nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
10178 logger: nodes[3].logger,
10182 nodes[3].node = &nodes_3_deserialized;
10184 for monitor in monitors {
10185 // On startup the preimage should have been copied into the non-persisted monitor:
10186 assert!(monitor.get_stored_preimages().contains_key(&payment_hash));
10187 nodes[3].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.clone(), monitor).unwrap();
10189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10191 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10192 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10194 // During deserialization, we should have closed one channel and broadcast its latest
10195 // commitment transaction. We should also still have the original PaymentReceived event we
10196 // never finished processing.
10197 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10198 assert_eq!(events.len(), if persist_both_monitors { 4 } else { 3 });
10199 if let Event::PaymentReceived { amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } = events[0] { } else { panic!(); }
10200 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[1] { } else { panic!(); }
10201 if persist_both_monitors {
10202 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[2] { } else { panic!(); }
10205 // On restart, we should also get a duplicate PaymentClaimed event as we persisted the
10206 // ChannelManager prior to handling the original one.
10207 if let Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: our_payment_hash, amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } =
10208 events[if persist_both_monitors { 3 } else { 2 }]
10210 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
10211 } else { panic!(); }
10213 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), if persist_both_monitors { 0 } else { 1 });
10214 if !persist_both_monitors {
10215 // If one of the two channels is still live, reveal the payment preimage over it.
10217 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
10218 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2]);
10219 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
10220 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[3]);
10222 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
10223 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
10224 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10226 nodes[3].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
10228 // Once we call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` the holding cell is cleared and the HTLC
10229 // claim should fly.
10230 let ds_msgs = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10231 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
10232 assert_eq!(ds_msgs.len(), 2);
10233 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } = ds_msgs[1] {} else { panic!(); }
10235 let cs_updates = match ds_msgs[0] {
10236 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
10237 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10239 let cs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10240 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[2], nodes[0], nodes[3], Some(1000), false, false);
10241 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10247 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10248 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], cs_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10249 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
10254 fn test_partial_claim_before_restart() {
10255 do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(false);
10256 do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(true);
10259 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
10260 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
10261 enum ExposureEvent {
10262 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
10264 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
10266 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
10267 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
10270 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
10271 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
10274 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
10275 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
10276 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
10277 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
10278 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
10279 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
10280 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
10281 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
10283 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10284 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
10285 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
10286 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10287 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
10288 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10290 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10291 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10292 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
10293 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
10295 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10297 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
10298 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10299 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
10301 let opt_anchors = false;
10303 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10306 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
10307 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10311 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10312 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10313 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10315 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10316 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10318 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10319 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10320 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
10322 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
10323 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
10324 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
10325 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
10327 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10328 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10330 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10331 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10333 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
10334 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
10337 if dust_outbound_balance {
10338 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10339 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10340 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
10341 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10342 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10343 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10346 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10347 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10348 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
10349 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10350 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10354 if dust_outbound_balance {
10355 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10356 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10357 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10358 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10359 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10362 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10363 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10364 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10365 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10370 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
10371 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
10372 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10373 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10374 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10376 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10377 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10378 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10380 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10382 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10383 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10384 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10386 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10387 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10388 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10389 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10390 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10392 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10393 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10394 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10395 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10397 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10398 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10400 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10401 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
10402 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
10404 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10405 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10407 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10408 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10409 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
10412 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10413 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10414 added_monitors.clear();
10418 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10419 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10420 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10421 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10422 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10423 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10424 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10425 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10426 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10427 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10428 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10429 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10430 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10434 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10435 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10436 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10437 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10438 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10440 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10441 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10442 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
10443 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10444 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
10446 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
10448 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10449 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10450 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: 0x1, witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
10451 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10452 let mut tx = match events[0] {
10453 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10454 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
10455 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: best_height + 3, input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10456 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10459 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10461 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10462 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10463 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10464 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10469 // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
10471 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10472 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());