_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource};
  21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
  22 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  25 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  29 use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  31 use crate::ln::msgs;
  32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  33 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  34 use crate::util::test_utils;
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
  38 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  39
  40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
  46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  47
  48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  50
  51 use regex;
  52
  53 use crate::io;
  54 use crate::prelude::*;
  55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  56 use core::default::Default;
  57 use core::iter::repeat;
  58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  59 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  60
  61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  63
  64 #[test]
  65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  66         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  67         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  68         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  69         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  70         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  71         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  72         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  73         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  74
  75         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  76         // funding satoshis
  77         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  78         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
  79         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  80
  81         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  82         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  83
  84         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  85         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  86
  87         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  88         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  89         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  90                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  91                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  92                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  93                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  94                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  95                         match action {
  96                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  97                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
  98                                 },
  99                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 100                         }
 101                 } else { assert!(false); }
 102         };
 103
 104         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 105
 106         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 107         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 108         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 109
 110         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 111
 112         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 113
 114         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 115
 116         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 117
 118         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 119
 120         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 121
 122         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 123 }
 124
 125 #[test]
 126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 127         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 128         // them.
 129         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 130         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 131         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 132         *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
 133         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 134         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 135
 136         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
 137                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 138                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 139                 },
 140                 _ => panic!()
 141         }
 142 }
 143
 144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 145         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 146         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 147         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 148         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 149         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 150         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 151         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 152         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 153         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 154
 155         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 156         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 157         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 158         let opt_anchors = false;
 159         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 160         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 161
 162         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 163         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 164         if !send_from_initiator {
 165                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 166                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 167         }
 168         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
 169
 170         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 171         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 172         if send_from_initiator {
 173                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 174                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 175         }
 176         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
 177         {
 178                 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
 179                 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
 180                 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
 181                 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
 182                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
 183                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 184                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 185         }
 186
 187         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 188         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 189         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 190
 191         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 192         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 193         if send_from_initiator {
 194                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 195                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 196                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 197                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 198                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 199         } else {
 200                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 201         }
 202 }
 203
 204 #[test]
 205 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 206         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 207         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 208 }
 209
 210 #[test]
 211 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 212         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 213         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 214         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 215         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 216         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 217
 218         // balancing
 219         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 220
 221         // A                                        B
 222         // update_fee                            ->
 223         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 224         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 225         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 226         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 227         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 228         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 229         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 230         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 231         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 232         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 233         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 234         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 235         //                                       <- RAA
 236         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 237
 238         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 239         {
 240                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 241                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 242         }
 243         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 244         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 245
 246         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 247         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 248         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 249                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 250                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 251                 },
 252                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 253         };
 254
 255         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 256
 257         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 258         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 259         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 260                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 261         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 262
 263         let payment_event = {
 264                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 265                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 266                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 267         };
 268         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 269         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 270
 271         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 272         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 273         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 274         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 275         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 277
 278         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 279         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 280         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 281         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 282         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 283
 284         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 285         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 286         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 287         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 288         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 289         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 290         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 291         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 292
 293         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 294         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 295         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 296         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 297         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 298         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 299         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 300         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 301
 302         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 303         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 304         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 306
 307         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 308         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 309         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 310
 311         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 312         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 313
 314         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 315         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 316         match events_2[0] {
 317                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 318                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 319         }
 320
 321         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 322         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 323 }
 324
 325 #[test]
 326 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 327         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 328         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 329         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 330         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 331         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 332         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 333         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 334
 335         // balancing
 336         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 337
 338         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 339         {
 340                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 341                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 342         }
 343         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 344         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 345
 346         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 347         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 348         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 349                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 350                         update_fee.as_ref()
 351                 },
 352                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 353         };
 354
 355         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 356
 357         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 358         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 359         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 360                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 361         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 362
 363         let payment_event = {
 364                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 365                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 366                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 367         };
 368         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 369         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 370
 371         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 372         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 373         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 374         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 375         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 376         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 377
 378         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 379         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 380
 381         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 382 }
 383
 384 #[test]
 385 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 386         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 387         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 388         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 389         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 390         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 391
 392         // A                                        B
 393         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 394         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 395         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 396         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 397         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 398         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 399         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 400         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 401         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 402         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 403         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 404         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 405         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 406         //                                          B should send no response here
 407         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 408         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 409         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 410
 411         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 412         let initial_feerate;
 413         {
 414                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 415                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 416                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 417         }
 418         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 419         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 420
 421         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 422         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 423         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 424                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 425                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 426                 },
 427                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 428         };
 429
 430         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 431         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 432         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 433         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 434         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 435
 436         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 437         // transaction:
 438         {
 439                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 440                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 441         }
 442         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 443         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 444         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 445
 446         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 447         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 448                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 449                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 450         };
 451
 452         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 453
 454         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 455         // Deliver (3)
 456         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 457
 458         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 459         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 460         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 461         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 462         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 463         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 464         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 465         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 466         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 467         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 468         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 469
 470         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 471         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 472         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 474         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 475
 476         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 477         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 478         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 479
 480         // Delever (4)
 481         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 482         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 483         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 484
 485         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 486         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 488
 489         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 490         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 491         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 492         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 493
 494         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 495         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 496         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 497 }
 498
 499 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 500         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 501         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 502         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 503         // Node objects.
 504
 505         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 506         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 507         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 508         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 509
 510         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 511                 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
 512                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 513                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 514         }
 515
 516         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 517         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 518         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 519
 520         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 521         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
 522         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 523
 524         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 525         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
 526
 527         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 528
 529         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 530         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 531         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 532         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 533
 534         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 535         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 536         {
 537                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 538                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 539                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 540                 added_monitors.clear();
 541         }
 542         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 543
 544         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 545
 546         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 547         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 548         {
 549                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 550                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 551                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 552                 added_monitors.clear();
 553         }
 554
 555         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 556         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 557         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 558
 559         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 560         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 561
 562         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 563         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 564         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 565         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 566         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 567 }
 568
 569 #[test]
 570 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 571         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 572         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 573         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 574         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 576         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 577         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 578         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 584         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 585         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 586         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 587         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 588         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 589 }
 590
 591 #[test]
 592 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 593         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 594         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 595         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 596         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 597         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 598
 599         {
 600                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 601                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 602         }
 603         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 604         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 605
 606         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 607         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 608         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 609                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 610                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 611                 },
 612                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 613         };
 614         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 615
 616         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 617         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 618         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 619
 620         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 621         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 623
 624         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 625         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 626         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 627         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 628
 629         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 630         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 631         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 632 }
 633
 634 #[test]
 635 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 636         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 637         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 638         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 639         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 640         let channel_value = 5000;
 641         let push_sats = 700;
 642         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
 643         let channel_id = chan.2;
 644         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 645         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 646         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 647
 648         let opt_anchors = false;
 649
 650         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 651         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 652         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 653         // remote limit.
 654         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 655         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 656         {
 657                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 658                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 659         }
 660         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 661         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 662         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 663
 664         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 665
 666         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 667
 668         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 669         {
 670                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 671
 672                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 673                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 674                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 675                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 676                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 677                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 678         }
 679
 680         {
 681                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 682                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 683                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 684         }
 685         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 686         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 687         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 688
 689         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 690
 691         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 692         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 693         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 694                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 695                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 696                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 697                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 698                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 699                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 700                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 701         };
 702         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 703                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 704                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 705                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 706                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 707                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 708                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 709                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 710                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 711         };
 712
 713         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 714         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 715                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
 716
 717         let res = {
 718                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 719                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 720                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 721                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 722                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 723                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 724                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 725                         push_sats,
 726                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 727                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 728                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 729                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 730                         &mut htlcs,
 731                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 732                 );
 733                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 734         };
 735
 736         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 737                 channel_id: chan.2,
 738                 signature: res.0,
 739                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
 740                 #[cfg(taproot)]
 741                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
 742         };
 743
 744         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 745                 channel_id: chan.2,
 746                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 747         };
 748
 749         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 750
 751         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 752         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 753         //Should produce and error.
 754         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 755         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 756         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 757         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 758         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 759 }
 760
 761 #[test]
 762 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 763         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 764         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 765         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 766         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 767         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 768
 769         // balancing
 770         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 771
 772         {
 773                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 774                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 775         }
 776         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 777         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 778
 779         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 780         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 781         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 782                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 783                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 784                 },
 785                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 786         };
 787         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 788         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 789         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 790         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 791
 792         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 793
 794         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 795         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 796                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 797         {
 798                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 799                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 800                 added_monitors.clear();
 801         }
 802         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 803         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 804         // node[1] has nothing to do
 805
 806         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 807         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 808         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 809
 810         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 811         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 812         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 813         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 814         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 815         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 816         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 817
 818         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 819         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 820         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 821         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 822         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 823         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 824
 825         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 826         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 827         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 828         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 829
 830         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 831         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 832         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 833
 834         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 835         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 836         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 837         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 838
 839         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 840         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 841         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 842
 843         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 844
 845         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 846         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 847         match events[0] {
 848                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
 849                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 850         };
 851
 852         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 853
 854         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 855         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 856         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 857         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 858         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 859 }
 860
 861 #[test]
 862 fn test_update_fee() {
 863         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 864         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 865         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 866         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 867         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 868         let channel_id = chan.2;
 869
 870         // A                                        B
 871         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 872         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 873         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 874         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 875         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 876         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 877         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 878         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 879         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 880         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 881         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 882         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 883
 884         // Create and deliver (1)...
 885         let feerate;
 886         {
 887                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 888                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 889                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 890         }
 891         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 892         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 893
 894         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 895         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 896         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 897                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 898                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 899                 },
 900                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 901         };
 902         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 903
 904         // Generate (2) and (3):
 905         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 906         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 907         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 908
 909         // Deliver (2):
 910         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 911         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 912         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 913
 914         // Create and deliver (4)...
 915         {
 916                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 917                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 918         }
 919         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 921         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 922         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 923         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 924                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 925                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 926                 },
 927                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 928         };
 929
 930         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 931         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 932         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 933         // ... creating (5)
 934         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 935         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 936
 937         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 938         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 939         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 940         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 941         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 942
 943         // Deliver (5):
 944         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 945         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 946         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 947
 948         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 949         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 950         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 951         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 952         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 953         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 954         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 955         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 956         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 957
 958         // Deliver (7)
 959         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 960         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 961         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 962         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 963
 964         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 965         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 966         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 967
 968         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 969         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 970         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 971         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 972         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 973 }
 974
 975 #[test]
 976 fn fake_network_test() {
 977         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 978         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 979         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 980         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 981         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 982         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 983
 984         // Create some initial channels
 985         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 986         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
 987         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
 988
 989         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 990         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 991         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 992         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 993         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 994
 995         // Send some more payments
 996         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 997         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 998         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 999
1000         // Test failure packets
1001         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1002         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1003
1004         // Add a new channel that skips 3
1005         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1006
1007         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1008         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1009         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1010         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1011         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1012         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1013         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1014
1015         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1016         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1017         hops.push(RouteHop {
1018                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1019                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1020                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1021                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1022                 fee_msat: 0,
1023                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1024         });
1025         hops.push(RouteHop {
1026                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1027                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1028                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1029                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1030                 fee_msat: 0,
1031                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1032         });
1033         hops.push(RouteHop {
1034                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1035                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1036                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1037                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1038                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1039                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1040         });
1041         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1042         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1043         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1044
1045         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1046         hops.push(RouteHop {
1047                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1048                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1049                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1050                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1051                 fee_msat: 0,
1052                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1053         });
1054         hops.push(RouteHop {
1055                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1056                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1057                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1058                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1059                 fee_msat: 0,
1060                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1061         });
1062         hops.push(RouteHop {
1063                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1064                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1065                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1066                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1067                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1068                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1069         });
1070         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1071         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1072         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1073
1074         // Claim the rebalances...
1075         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1076         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1077
1078         // Close down the channels...
1079         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1080         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1081         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1082         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1083         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1084         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1086         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1087         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1088         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1089         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1090         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1091 }
1092
1093 #[test]
1094 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1095         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1096         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1097         // commitment dance rounds.
1098         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1099         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1100         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1101         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1102         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1103         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1104
1105         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1106         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1107
1108         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1109         for _ in 0..50 {
1110                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1111                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
1112                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1113                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1114         }
1115         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1116
1117         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1118         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1119         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1120         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1121
1122         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1123         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1124         // another HTLC.
1125         {
1126                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
1127                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
1128                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1129                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1130                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1131                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", 1);
1132         }
1133
1134         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1135         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1136         {
1137                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
1138                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1139                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1140         }
1141
1142         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1143         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1144         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1145         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1146
1147         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1148         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1149         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1150         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1151         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1152         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1153         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1154
1155         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1156         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1157         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1158
1159         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1160
1161         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1162         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1163         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1165
1166         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1167         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1169         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1170
1171         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1173         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1174
1175         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1176                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1177         }
1178         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1180         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1181         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1182         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1183
1184         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1185         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1186         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1188         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1189
1190         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1191         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1192
1193         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1194
1195         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1196         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1197         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1198                 match event {
1199                         &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1200                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1201                         },
1202                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1203                 };
1204         }
1205
1206         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1207                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1208         }
1209
1210         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1211 }
1212
1213 #[test]
1214 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1215         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1216         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1217         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1218         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1219         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1220         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1221
1222         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1223         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1224         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1225         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1226         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1227         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1228
1229         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1230
1231         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1232         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1233
1234         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1235         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1236
1237         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1238         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1239         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1240 }
1241
1242 #[test]
1243 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1244         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1245         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1246         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1247         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1248         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1249         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1250         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1251
1252         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1253
1254         // balancing
1255         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1256
1257         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1258
1259         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1260         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1261         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1262
1263         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1264         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1265         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1266         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1267
1268         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1269         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1270
1271         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1272         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1273         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1274                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1275                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1276                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1277                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1278                 }
1279         }
1280         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1281
1282         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1283         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1284         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1285         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1286
1287         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1288         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1289
1290         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1291         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1292         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1293         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1294         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1295                 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1296         } else {
1297                 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1298         };
1299
1300         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1301         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1302
1303         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1304         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1305         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1306
1307         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1308         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1309         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1310         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1311
1312         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1313         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1314         for e in events {
1315                 match e {
1316                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1317                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1318                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1319                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1320                         },
1321                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1322                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1323                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1324                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1325                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1326                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1327                         },
1328                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1329                 }
1330         }
1331 }
1332
1333 #[test]
1334 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1335         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1336         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1337         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1338         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1339         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1340
1341         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1342         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1343
1344         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1345         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1346         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1347         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1348                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
1349         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1350         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1351                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1352         match err {
1353                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1354                         match &fails[0] {
1355                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1356                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1357                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1358                         }
1359                 },
1360                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1361         }
1362         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1363         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 1);
1364
1365         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1366 }
1367
1368 #[test]
1369 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1370         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1371         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1372         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1373         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1374         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1375
1376         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1377                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460000);
1378         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1379         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1380         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1381         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1382
1383         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1384
1385         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1386         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1387                 3460001, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1388         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1389         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1390                 channel_id: chan.2,
1391                 htlc_id: 0,
1392                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1393                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1394                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1395                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1396         };
1397
1398         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1399
1400         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1401         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1402         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1403
1404         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1405
1406         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1407
1408         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1409         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1410         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1411                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1412                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1413                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1414                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1415                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1416                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1417
1418                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1419                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1420                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1421                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1422                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1423         };
1424         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1425                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1426                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1427                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1428                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1429                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1430                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1431                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1432                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1433         };
1434
1435         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1436         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1437                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1438
1439         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1440         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1441         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1442
1443         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1444                 offered: false,
1445                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1446                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1447                 payment_hash,
1448                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1449         };
1450
1451         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1452
1453         let res = {
1454                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1455                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1456                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1457                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1458                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1459                         commitment_number,
1460                         95000,
1461                         local_chan_balance,
1462                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1463                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1464                         feerate_per_kw,
1465                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1466                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1467                 );
1468                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1469         };
1470
1471         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1472                 channel_id: chan.2,
1473                 signature: res.0,
1474                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1475                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1476                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1477         };
1478
1479         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1480         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1481         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1482
1483         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1484         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1485                 channel_id: chan.2,
1486                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1487                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
1488                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1489                 next_local_nonce: None,
1490         };
1491         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1492
1493         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1494         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1495         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1496         match events[0] {
1497                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1498                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1499                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1500                 },
1501                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1502         };
1503         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1504                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1505
1506         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1507 }
1508
1509 #[test]
1510 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1511         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1512         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1513         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1514         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1515         // this situation.
1516         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1517         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1518         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1519         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1520         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1521         let opt_anchors = false;
1522
1523         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1524         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1525
1526         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1527
1528         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1529
1530         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1531         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1532                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1533         }
1534
1535         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1536         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1537         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1538                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1539                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1540                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1541         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1542         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1543 }
1544
1545 #[test]
1546 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1547         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1548         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1549         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1550         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1551         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1552         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1553         let opt_anchors = false;
1554
1555         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1556         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1557         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1558         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1559         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1560         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1561         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1562
1563         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1564         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1565                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1566         }
1567
1568         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1569         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1570         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1571         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1572         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1573         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1574         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1575                 700_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1576         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1577         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1578                 channel_id: chan.2,
1579                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1580                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1581                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1582                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1583                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1584         };
1585
1586         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1587         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1588         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1589         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1590         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1591         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1592         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1593         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1594 }
1595
1596 #[test]
1597 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1598         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1599         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1600         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1601         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1602
1603         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1604         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1605         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1606         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1607         let opt_anchors = false;
1608
1609         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1610         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1611         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1612         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1613         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1614         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1615         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1616
1617         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1618                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1619         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1620         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1621         // commitment transaction fee.
1622         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1623
1624         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1625         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1626                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1627         }
1628
1629         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1630         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1631         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1632                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1633                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1634                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1635 }
1636
1637 #[test]
1638 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1639         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1640         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1641         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1642         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1643         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1644         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1645         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1646         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1647         let opt_anchors = false;
1648
1649         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1650         // HTLC.
1651         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1652         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1653         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1654                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1655
1656         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1657         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1658         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1659         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1660         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1661         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1662         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1663
1664         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1665         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1666         match msg_events[0] {
1667                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1668                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1669                 },
1670                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1671         }
1672 }
1673
1674 #[test]
1675 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1676         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1677         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1678         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1679         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1680         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1681         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1682         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1683
1684         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1685         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1686         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1687         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1688         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1689         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1690
1691         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1692         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1693         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1694         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1695         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1696         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1697
1698         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1699         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1700         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1701         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1702 }
1703
1704 #[test]
1705 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1706         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1707         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1708         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1709         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1710         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1711         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1712
1713         let feemsat = 239;
1714         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1715         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1716         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1717         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1718
1719         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1720         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1721         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1722         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1723
1724         // Add a pending HTLC.
1725         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1726         let payment_event_1 = {
1727                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1728                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1729                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1730
1731                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1732                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1733                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1734         };
1735         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1736
1737         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1738         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1739         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1740         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1741         let mut route_2 = route_1.clone();
1742         route_2.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = amt_msat_2;
1743
1744         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1745         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1746         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1747         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1748         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1749         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
1750                 &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1751         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
1752         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1753                 channel_id: chan.2,
1754                 htlc_id: 1,
1755                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1756                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1757                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1758                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1759         };
1760
1761         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1762         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1763         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1764         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1765         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1766         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1767         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1768         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1769 }
1770
1771 #[test]
1772 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1773         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1774         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1775         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1776         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1777         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1778         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1779         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1780         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1781         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1782         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1783
1784         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1785         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1786         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1787
1788         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1789         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1790 }
1791
1792 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1793         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1794 }
1795
1796 #[test]
1797 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1798         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1799         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1800         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1801         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1802         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1803         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1804         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1805         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1806         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1807         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1808
1809         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1810         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1811
1812         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1813         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1814
1815         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1816                 ($node: expr) => {{
1817                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1818                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1819                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1820                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1821                         payment_event
1822                 }}
1823         }
1824
1825         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1826         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1827         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1828         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1829
1830         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1831
1832         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1833         {
1834                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1835                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1836                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
1837                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1838                 assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1839
1840                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1841                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1842                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1843                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1844                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1845                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept", 1);
1846         }
1847
1848         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1849         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1850         loop {
1851                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1852                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1853                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1854                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1855                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1856                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1857                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1858                         break;
1859                 }
1860
1861                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1862                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1863                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
1864                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1865                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1866
1867                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1868                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1869                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1870                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1871                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1872                 );
1873
1874                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1875                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1876                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1877                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1878                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1879         }
1880
1881         // adding pending output.
1882         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1883         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1884         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1885         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1886         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1887         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1888         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1889         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1890         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1891         // policy.
1892         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1893         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1894         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1895
1896         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1897         let payment_event_1 = {
1898                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1899                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1900                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1901
1902                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1903                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1904                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1905         };
1906         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1907
1908         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1909         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1910         {
1911                 let mut route = route_1.clone();
1912                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = recv_value_2 + 1;
1913                 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1914                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1915                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1916                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1917                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1918                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1919         }
1920
1921         // split the rest to test holding cell
1922         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1923         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1924         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1925         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1926         {
1927                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1928                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1929         }
1930
1931         // now see if they go through on both sides
1932         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1933         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1934         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21,
1935                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1936         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1937         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1938         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1939
1940         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1941         {
1942                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1943                         get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1944                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1945                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1946                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1947                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1948                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1949                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1950                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 2);
1951         }
1952
1953         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1954         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1955         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22,
1956                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1957         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1958         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1959         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1960
1961         // flush the pending htlc
1962         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1963         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1964         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1965
1966         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1967         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1968         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1969         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1970
1971         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1972         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1973         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1974         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1975
1976         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1977         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1978         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1979
1980         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1981
1982         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1983         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1984         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1985
1986         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1987         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1988
1989         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1990         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1991         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1992         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1993         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1994         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1995
1996         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1997         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1998         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1999         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
2000
2001         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
2002         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2003
2004         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2005         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2006         match events[0] {
2007                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2008                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2009                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
2010                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2011                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2012                         match &purpose {
2013                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2014                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2015                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2016                                 },
2017                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2018                         }
2019                 },
2020                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2021         }
2022         match events[1] {
2023                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2024                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2025                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2026                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2027                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2028                         match &purpose {
2029                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2030                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2031                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2032                                 },
2033                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2034                         }
2035                 },
2036                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2037         }
2038
2039         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2040         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2041         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2042
2043         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2044         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2045         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2046
2047         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2048         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2049         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2050         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2051         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2052
2053         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2054         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2055 }
2056
2057 #[test]
2058 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2059         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2060         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2061         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2062         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2063         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2064         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2065         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2066         // To test this we:
2067         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2068         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2069         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2070         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2071         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2072         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2073         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2074         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2075         //    claim,
2076         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2077         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2078         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2079         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2080         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2081         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2082         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2083         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2084         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2085         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2086
2087         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2088         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2089         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2090         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2091         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2092
2093         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2094         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2095         let send_1 = {
2096                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
2097                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2098                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2099                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2100                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2101                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2102         };
2103
2104         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2105         // initial fulfill/CS.
2106         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2107         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2108         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2109         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2110
2111         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2112         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2113         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2114         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2115         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2116         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2117
2118         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2119         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2120         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2121         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2122         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2123
2124         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2125         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2126         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2127         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2128         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2129
2130         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2132         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2133
2134         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2135         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2136         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2137
2138         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2140         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2141
2142         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2143         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2144         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2145         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2146         // on-chain as necessary).
2147         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2148         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2149         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2150         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2151         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2152
2153         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2154         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2155         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2156
2157         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2158         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2159
2160         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2161         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2162         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2163         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2164         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2165         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2166
2167         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2168         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2169         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2170         let send_2 = {
2171                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_4,
2172                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2173                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2174                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2175                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2176                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2177         };
2178
2179         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2180         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2181         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2182         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2183
2184         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2185
2186         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2188         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2189
2190         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2191         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2192
2193         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2194         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2195         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2196         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2197
2198         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2199         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2200         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2201
2202         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2203         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2204
2205         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2206         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2207
2208         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2209         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2210 }
2211
2212 #[test]
2213 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2214         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2215         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2216         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2217         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2218         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2219         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2220
2221         // Create some initial channels
2222         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2223         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2224         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2225         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2226
2227         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2228         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2229         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2230         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2231         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2232         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2233
2234         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2235         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2236         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2237         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2238         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2239
2240         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2241         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2242         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2243         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2244         {
2245                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2246                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2247                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2248                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2249                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2250         }
2251         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2252         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2253         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2254         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2255         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2256
2257         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2258         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2259
2260         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2261         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2262         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2263         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2264         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2265         {
2266                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2267                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2268                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2269                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2270                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2271                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2272         }
2273         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2274         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2275         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2276         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2277         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2278
2279         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2280                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2281                         {
2282                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2283                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2284                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2285
2286                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2287                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2288                                 match events[0] {
2289                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2290                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2291                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2292                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2293                                         },
2294                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2295                                 };
2296                         }
2297                 }
2298         }
2299
2300         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2301         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2302         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2303         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2304         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2305         let node2_commitment_txid;
2306         {
2307                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2308                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2309                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2310                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2311
2312                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2313                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2314                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2315                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2316                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2317         }
2318         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2319         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2320         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2321         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2322         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2323
2324         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2325         // confusing us in the following tests.
2326         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2327
2328         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2329         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2330         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2331         // buffer space).
2332
2333         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2334                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2335                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2336                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2337                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2338                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2339                                 msg.clone()
2340                         },
2341                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2342                 };
2343                 match events[1] {
2344                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2345                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2346                         },
2347                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2348                 }
2349                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2350
2351                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2352                 {
2353                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2354                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2355                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2356                                         false
2357                                 } else { true }
2358                         });
2359                 }
2360
2361                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2362
2363                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2364                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2365
2366                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2367                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2368                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2369                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2370                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2371                                 msg.clone()
2372                         },
2373                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2374                 };
2375                 match events[1] {
2376                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2377                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2378                         },
2379                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2380                 }
2381                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2382                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2383
2384                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2385                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2386                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2387         };
2388         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2389         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2390         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2391         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2392
2393         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2394                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2395         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2396         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2397 }
2398
2399 #[test]
2400 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
2401         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides
2402         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2403         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2404         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2405         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2406         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2407         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2408         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2409         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2410         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2411         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2412         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2413         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2414         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2415         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2416         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2417         // Create some new channels:
2418         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2419
2420         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2421         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2422         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2423         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2424         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2425         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2426         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2427         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2428         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2429         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2430         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2431         // Revoke the old state
2432         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2433
2434         {
2435                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2436                 {
2437                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2438                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2439                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2440                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2441                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2442                 }
2443                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2444                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2445                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2446
2447                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2448                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2449                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2450                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2451                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2452                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2453                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2454                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2455                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2456         }
2457         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2458         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2459         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2460 }
2461
2462 #[test]
2463 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() {
2464         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2465         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2466         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2467         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2468         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2469         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2470         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2471         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2472         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2473         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2474         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2475         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2476         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2477         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2478         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2479         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2480         // Create some new channels:
2481         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2482
2483         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2484         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2485         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2486         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2487         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2488         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2489         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2490         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2491         // Revoke the old state
2492         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2493         {
2494                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2495                 {
2496                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2497                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2498                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2499
2500                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2501                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2502                 }
2503                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2504                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2505
2506                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2507                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2508                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2509                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2510                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2511                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2512                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2513         }
2514         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2515         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2516         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2517 }
2518
2519 #[test]
2520 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2521         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2522         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2523         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2524         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2525         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2526         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2527         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2528         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2529         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2530         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2531         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2532         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2533         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2534         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2535
2536         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2537         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2538         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2539         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2540         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2541         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2542
2543         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2544
2545         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2546         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2547         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2548         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2549         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2550 }
2551
2552 #[test]
2553 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2554         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2555         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2556         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2557         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2558         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2559         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2560
2561         // Create some new channel:
2562         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2563
2564         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2565         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2566         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2567         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2568         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2569
2570         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2571         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2572         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2573         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2574         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2575         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2576         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2577         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2578         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2579
2580         //Revoke the old state
2581         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2582
2583         {
2584                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2585                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2586                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2587                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2588                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2589                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2590                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2591                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2592
2593                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2594                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2595
2596                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2597                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2598
2599                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2600                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2601                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2602                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2603                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2604                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2605                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2606                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2607
2608                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2609                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2610                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2611                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2612                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2613         }
2614         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2615         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2616         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2617 }
2618
2619 #[test]
2620 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2621         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2622         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2623         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2624         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2625         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2626         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2627
2628         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2629
2630         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2631         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2632         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2633         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2634         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2635         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2636
2637         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2638         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2639
2640         //Revoke the old state
2641         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2642
2643         {
2644                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2645                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2646                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2647                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2648                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2649                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2650                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2651                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2652                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2653                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2654                 }
2655
2656                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2657                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2658
2659                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2660
2661                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2662                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2663                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2664                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2665                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2666                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2667                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2668
2669                 // Filter out any non justice transactions.
2670                 node_txn.retain(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2671                 assert!(node_txn.len() > 3);
2672
2673                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2674                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2675                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2676
2677                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2678                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2679                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2680
2681                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2682                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2683                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2684                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2685                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2686                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2687                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2688                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2689
2690                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2691                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2692                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2693                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2694                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2695                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2696                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2697         }
2698         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2699         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2700         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2701 }
2702
2703 #[test]
2704 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2705         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2706         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2707         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2708         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2709         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2710         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2711         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2712         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2713         // towards B.
2714         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2715         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2716         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2717         // PaymentSent event).
2718
2719         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2720         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2721         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2722         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2723
2724         // Create some initial channels
2725         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2726         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2727
2728         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2729         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2730         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2731         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2732         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2733
2734         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2735         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2736         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2737
2738         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2739         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2740
2741         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2742         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2743         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2744         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2745         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2746         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2747         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2748         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2749         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2750         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2751         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2752         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2753         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2754         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2755         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2756
2757         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2758         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2759         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2760         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2761         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2762         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2763         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2764         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2765         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2766         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2767         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2768         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2769         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2770         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2771
2772         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2773         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
2774         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2775         {
2776                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2777                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2778                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2779                 added_monitors.clear();
2780         }
2781         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2782         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2783         match forwarded_events[0] {
2784                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2785                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2786         }
2787         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2788         match forwarded_events[1] {
2789                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2790                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2791                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2792                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2793                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2794                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2795                 },
2796                 _ => panic!()
2797         }
2798         match forwarded_events[2] {
2799                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2800                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2801                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2802                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2803                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2804                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2805                 },
2806                 _ => panic!()
2807         }
2808         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2809         {
2810                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2811                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2812                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2813                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2814                 added_monitors.clear();
2815         }
2816         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2817
2818         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2819         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2820
2821         match nodes_2_event {
2822                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2823                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2824         }
2825
2826         match nodes_0_event {
2827                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2828                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2829                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2830                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2831                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2832                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2833                 },
2834                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2835         };
2836
2837         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2838         match events[0] {
2839                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2840                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2841         }
2842
2843         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2844                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2845                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2846                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2847                         // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2848                         // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2849                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2850                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2851                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2852                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2853                         if $htlc_offered {
2854                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2855                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2856                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2857                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2858                         } else {
2859                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2860                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2861                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2862                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2863                         }
2864                         node_txn.clear();
2865                 } }
2866         }
2867         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2868         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2869
2870         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2871         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2872         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2873         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2874         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2875         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2876         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2877         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2878         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2879         assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2880         let commitment_spend =
2881                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2882                         &node_txn[0]
2883                 } else {
2884                         // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2885                         // FullBlockViaListen
2886                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2887                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2888                                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2889                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2890                                 &node_txn[0]
2891                         } else {
2892                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2893                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2894                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2895                                 &node_txn[2]
2896                         }
2897                 };
2898
2899         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2900         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2901         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2902         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2903         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2904         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2905         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2906         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2907
2908         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2909         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()]));
2910         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2911         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2912         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2913         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2914         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2915         let mut first_claimed = false;
2916         for event in events {
2917                 match event {
2918                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2919                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2920                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2921                                         first_claimed = true;
2922                                 } else {
2923                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2924                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2925                                 }
2926                         },
2927                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2928                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2929                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2930                 }
2931         }
2932         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2933 }
2934
2935 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2936         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2937         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2938         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2939         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2940         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2941         //            \                                  \
2942         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2943
2944         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2945         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2946         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2947         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2948         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2949         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2950         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2951
2952         // Create some intial channels
2953         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2954         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2955
2956         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2957         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2958         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2959
2960         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2961
2962         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2963         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2964         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2965         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2966         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2967         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2968         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2969
2970         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2971         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2972         match events[0] {
2973                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2974                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2975                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2976                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2977                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2978                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2979                 },
2980                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2981         };
2982         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2983         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2984         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2985         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2986         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2987         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2988
2989         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2990         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2991         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2992         check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false);
2993         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2994         let timeout_tx = {
2995                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2996                 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
2997                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2998                 } else {
2999                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 3); // Two extra fee bumps for timeout transaction
3000                 }
3001                 txn.iter().for_each(|tx| check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx[0]));
3002                 assert_eq!(txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3003                 txn.remove(0)
3004         };
3005
3006         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
3007         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3008         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3009
3010         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3011
3012         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3013         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3014         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3015         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3016         match events[0] {
3017                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3018                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3019                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3020                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3021                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3022                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3023                 },
3024                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3025         };
3026
3027         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3028         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3029         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3030
3031         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3032         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3033
3034         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3035         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3036         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3037         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
3038         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3039         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3040         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3041 }
3042
3043 #[test]
3044 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3045         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3046         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3047         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3048 }
3049
3050 #[test]
3051 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3052         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3053         // and fail backward accordingly.
3054
3055         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3056         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3057         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3058         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3059
3060         // Create some initial channels
3061         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3062         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3063
3064         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3065         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3066         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3067         // Revoke the old state
3068         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3069
3070         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3071
3072         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3073         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3074         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3075         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3076         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3077
3078         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3079         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3080         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3081         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3082         match events[0] {
3083                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3084                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3085                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3086                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3087                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3088                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3089
3090                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3091                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3092                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3093                 },
3094                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3095         }
3096 }
3097
3098 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3099         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3100         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3101         // commitment transaction anymore.
3102         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3103         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3104         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3105         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3106         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3107         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3108         // transactions:
3109         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3110         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3111         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3112         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3113         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3114         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3115         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3116         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3117         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3118
3119         // Create some initial channels
3120         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3121         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3122
3123         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3124         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3125         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3126         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3127         // Revoke the old state
3128         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3129
3130         let value = if use_dust {
3131                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3132                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3133                 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3134                         .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3135         } else { 3000000 };
3136
3137         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3138         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3139         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3140
3141         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3142         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3144         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3145         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3146         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3147         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3148         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3149         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3150         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3151         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3152         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3153
3154         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3155         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3157         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3158         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3159         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3160         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3161         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3162         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3163         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3164         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3165         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3166         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3167         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3168         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3169         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3170
3171         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3172         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3173         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3174         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3175         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3176         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3177         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3178         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3179         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3180         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3181         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3182         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3183         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3184         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3185         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3186         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3187         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3189
3190         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3191         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3192         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3193         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, fourth_payment_hash,
3194                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3195         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3196         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3197         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3198
3199         if deliver_bs_raa {
3200                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3201                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3202                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3203                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3204                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3205                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3206                 match events[0] {
3207                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3208                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3209                 };
3210                 match events[1] {
3211                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3212                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3213                 }
3214                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3215                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3216         }
3217
3218         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3219         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3220
3221         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3222         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3223         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3224
3225         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3226         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3227         match events[0] {
3228                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3229                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3230         }
3231         match events[1] {
3232                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3233                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3234                 },
3235                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3236         }
3237         match events[2] {
3238                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3239                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3240                 },
3241                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3242         }
3243
3244         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3245         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3246
3247         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3248         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3249
3250         if deliver_bs_raa {
3251                 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3252                 match nodes_2_event {
3253                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3254                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3255                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3256                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3257                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3258                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3259                         },
3260                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3261                 }
3262         }
3263
3264         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3265         match nodes_2_event {
3266                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3267                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3268                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3269                 },
3270                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3271         }
3272
3273         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3274         match nodes_0_event {
3275                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3276                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3277                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3278                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3279                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3280                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3281
3282                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3283                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3284                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3285
3286                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3287
3288                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3289                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3290                         match events[0] {
3291                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3292                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3293                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3294                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3295                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3296                                                 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3297                                         }
3298                                 },
3299                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3300                         }
3301                         match events[1] {
3302                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3303                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3304                                 },
3305                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3306                         }
3307                         match events[2] {
3308                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3309                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3310                                 },
3311                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3312                         }
3313                         match events[3] {
3314                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3315                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3316                                 },
3317                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3318                         }
3319                         match events[4] {
3320                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3321                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3322                                 },
3323                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3324                         }
3325                         match events[5] {
3326                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3327                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3328                                 },
3329                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3330                         }
3331                 },
3332                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3333         }
3334
3335         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3336         match events[0] {
3337                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3338                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3339         }
3340
3341         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3342         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3343         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3344 }
3345
3346 #[test]
3347 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3348         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3349         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3350         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3351         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3352 }
3353
3354 #[test]
3355 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3356         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3357         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3358         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3359         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3360 }
3361
3362 #[test]
3363 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3364         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3365         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3366         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3367         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3368         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3369
3370         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3371         {
3372                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3373                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
3374                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3375                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3376
3377                 let payment_event = {
3378                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3379                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3380                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3381                 };
3382                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3383                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3384         }
3385
3386         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3387         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3388         {
3389                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, failed_payment_hash,
3390                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3391                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3392
3393                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3394         }
3395
3396         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3397         {
3398                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3399
3400                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3401                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3402                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3403                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
3404                         &route.paths[0], 50_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3405                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3406                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
3407
3408                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3409                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3410                         channel_id: chan.2,
3411                         htlc_id: 0,
3412                         amount_msat: 0,
3413                         payment_hash,
3414                         cltv_expiry,
3415                         onion_routing_packet,
3416                 };
3417                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3418         }
3419         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3420         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3421         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3422         match events[0] {
3423                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3424                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3425                 },
3426                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3427         }
3428         match events[1] {
3429                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3430                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3431                 },
3432                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3433         }
3434         match events[2] {
3435                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3436                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3437                 },
3438                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3439         }
3440         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3441         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3442 }
3443
3444 #[test]
3445 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3446         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3447         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3448         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3449         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3450         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3451         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3452         if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3453                 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3454                 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3455                 // connect_style.
3456                 return;
3457         }
3458         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3459
3460         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3461         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3462         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3463         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3464         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3465         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3466
3467         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3468         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3469         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[1].txid());
3470
3471         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]);
3472         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3473         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3474         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3475         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3476
3477         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3478         // registering new transactions
3479         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3480 }
3481
3482 #[test]
3483 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3484         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3485         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3486         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3487         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3488         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3489         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3490         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3491
3492         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3493
3494         let mut payment_event = {
3495                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
3496                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3497                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3498
3499                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3500                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3501                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3502         };
3503
3504         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3505         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3506
3507         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3508
3509         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3510         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3511         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3512         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3513
3514         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3515         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3516         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3517         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3518         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3519
3520         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3521         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3522         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3523
3524         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3525         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3526         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3527         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3528         let tx = {
3529                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3530                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3531                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3532                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3533                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3534                 node_txn.remove(0)
3535         };
3536
3537         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3538
3539         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3540         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3541         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3542         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3543
3544         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3545         {
3546                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3547                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3548         }
3549         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3550         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3551         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3552         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3553         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3554         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3555         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3556
3557         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3558 }
3559
3560 #[test]
3561 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3562         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3563         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3564         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3565         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3566
3567         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3568         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3569         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3570         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3571         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3572
3573         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3574
3575         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3576         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3577         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3578         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3579         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3580         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3581
3582         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3583         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3584
3585         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3586         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3587 }
3588
3589 #[test]
3590 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3591         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3592         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3593         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3594         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3595         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3596         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3597
3598         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3599         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3600         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3601         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3602         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3603         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3604         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3605
3606         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3607         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3608
3609         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3610
3611         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3612         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3613
3614         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3615         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3616         // broadcasted.
3617         {
3618                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3619         }
3620
3621         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3622         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3623         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3624         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3625
3626         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3627         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3628 }
3629
3630 #[test]
3631 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3632         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3633         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3634         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3635         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3636         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3637         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3638         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3639
3640         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3641         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3642         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3643
3644         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3645         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3646         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3647         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3648
3649         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3650         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3651         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3652
3653         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3654         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3655         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3656         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3657
3658         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3659         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3660
3661         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3662         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3663
3664         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3665         {
3666                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3667                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3668                 match events[0] {
3669                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3670                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3671                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3672                         },
3673                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3674                 }
3675                 match events[1] {
3676                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3677                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3678                 }
3679                 match events[2] {
3680                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3681                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3682                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3683                         },
3684                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3685                 }
3686                 match events[3] {
3687                         Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3688                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3689                         },
3690                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3691                 }
3692         }
3693
3694         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3695         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3696 }
3697
3698 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3699         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3700         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3701         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3702         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3703         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3704
3705         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3706         let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3707                 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3708                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3709                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3710                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3711                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3712                 chan_id
3713         } else {
3714                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3715         };
3716
3717         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3718
3719         let payment_event = {
3720                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
3721                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3722                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3723
3724                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3725                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3726                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3727         };
3728         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3729
3730         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3731                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3732         } else {
3733                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3734                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3735                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3736                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3737                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3738
3739                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3740                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3741                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3742                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3743
3744                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3745                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3746                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3747                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3748                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3749
3750                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3751                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3752                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3753                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3754                                         }
3755                                 }
3756                         }
3757                 }
3758         }
3759
3760         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3761         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3762         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3763                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3764                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3765                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3766                         //
3767                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3768                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3769                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3770                         //
3771                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3772                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3773                 }
3774                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3775                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3776                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3777         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3778                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3779                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3780         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3781                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3782                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3783         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3784                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3785                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3786         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3787                 // Everything was delivered...
3788                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3789         }
3790
3791         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3792         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3793                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3794                 match events_1[0] {
3795                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3796                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3797                 };
3798                 match events_1[1] {
3799                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3800                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3801                 };
3802         } else {
3803                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3804                 match events_1[0] {
3805                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3806                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3807                 };
3808         }
3809
3810         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3811         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3812         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3813
3814         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3815
3816         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3817         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3818         match events_2[0] {
3819                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
3820                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3821                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3822                         assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3823                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3824                         match &purpose {
3825                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3826                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3827                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3828                                 },
3829                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3830                         }
3831                 },
3832                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3833         }
3834
3835         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3836         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3837         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3838
3839         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3840         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3841         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3842                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3843                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3844                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3845                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3846                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3847                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3848                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3849                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3850                 },
3851                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3852         };
3853
3854         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3855                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3856
3857                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3858                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3859                 match events_4[0] {
3860                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3861                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3862                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3863                         },
3864                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3865                 }
3866
3867                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3868                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3869                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3870                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3871
3872                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3873                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3874                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3875                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3876
3877                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3878                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3879                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3880                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3881                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3882
3883                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3884                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3885                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3886                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3887                                         }
3888                                 }
3889                         }
3890                 }
3891         }
3892
3893         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3894         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3895         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3896                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3897                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3898                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3899                 } else {
3900                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3901                 }
3902         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3903                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3904                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3905         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3906                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3907                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3908         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3909                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3910                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3911         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3912                 // Everything was delivered...
3913                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3914         }
3915
3916         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3917                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3918         }
3919         if messages_delivered <= 5 {
3920                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3921                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3922         }
3923         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3924
3925         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3926                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3927         }
3928
3929         // Channel should still work fine...
3930         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3931         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3932         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3933 }
3934
3935 #[test]
3936 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3937         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3938         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3939         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3940         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3941 }
3942
3943 #[test]
3944 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3945         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3946         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3947         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3948         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3949 }
3950
3951 #[test]
3952 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3953         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3954         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3955         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3956         // channel_ready immediately instead.
3957         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3958         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3959         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3960         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3961         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3962
3963         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
3964
3965         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3966         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3967         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3968         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3969         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3970         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3971
3972         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3973         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3974         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3975 }
3976
3977 #[test]
3978 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3979         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3980         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3981         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3982         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3983         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3984         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3985         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3986
3987         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3988
3989         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3990         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3991         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
3992                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3993         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3994
3995         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3996         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3997         match events_1[0] {
3998                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3999                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4000         }
4001
4002         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4003         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4004         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4005
4006         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4007         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4008         match events_2[0] {
4009                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4010                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4011                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4012                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4013                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4014                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4015                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4016
4017                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4018                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4019                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4020                         match events_3[0] {
4021                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4022                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4023                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4024                                 },
4025                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4026                         }
4027
4028                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4029                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4030                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4031                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4032                 },
4033                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4034         }
4035
4036         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4037         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4038
4039         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
4040         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4041         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4042         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
4043         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4044         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4045
4046         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4047         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4048         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4049         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4050
4051         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4052         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4053
4054         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4055         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4056
4057         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4058
4059         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4060         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4061         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4062         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4063         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4064         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4065         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4066         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4067         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4068         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4069
4070         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4071         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4072         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4073         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4074         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4075         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4076         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4077         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4078
4079         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4080         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4081         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4082         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4083         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4084         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4085         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4086         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4087
4088         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4089         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4090         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4091         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4092
4093         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4094         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4095         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4096         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4097
4098         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4099         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4101
4102         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4103
4104         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4105         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4106         match events_5[0] {
4107                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4108                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4109                         match &purpose {
4110                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4111                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4112                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4113                                 },
4114                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4115                         }
4116                 },
4117                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4118         }
4119
4120         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4121         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4122         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4123
4124         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4125         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4126 }
4127
4128 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4129         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4130         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4131         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4132         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4133         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4134         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4135
4136         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4137
4138         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4139                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4140                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4141                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4142                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4143                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4144                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
4145                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4146                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
4147                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id,
4148                         &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4149                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4150                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4151                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4152                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4153                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4154                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4155                 our_payment_hash
4156         } else {
4157                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4158         };
4159
4160         let mut block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
4161         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4162         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4163         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4164         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4165                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4166                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4167                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4168         }
4169
4170         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4171
4172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4173         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4174         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4175         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4176         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4177         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4178
4179         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4180         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4181         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4182         let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4183         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4184         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4185 }
4186
4187 #[test]
4188 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4189         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4190         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4191 }
4192
4193 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4194         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4195         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4196         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4197         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4198         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4199         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4200         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4201
4202         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4203         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4204         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4205         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4206
4207         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4208         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4209         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, first_payment_hash,
4210                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4211         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4213
4214         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4215         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4216         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4217         sending_node.node.send_payment_with_route(&route, second_payment_hash,
4218                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4219         if forwarded_htlc {
4220                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4221                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4222                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4223                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4224                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4225         }
4226         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4227
4228         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4229         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4230         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4231         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4232
4233         if forwarded_htlc {
4234                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4235                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4236                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4237                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4238                 match fail_commit[0] {
4239                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4240                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4241                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4242                         },
4243                         _ => unreachable!(),
4244                 }
4245                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4246         } else {
4247                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4248         }
4249 }
4250
4251 #[test]
4252 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4253         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4254         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4255 }
4256
4257 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4258         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4259                 {
4260                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4261                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4262                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4263                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4264                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4265                                 match event {
4266                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4267                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4268                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4269                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4270                                                 }
4271                                         },
4272                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4273                                 };
4274                         }
4275                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4276                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx) {
4277                                         txn.push(tx);
4278                                 }
4279                         }
4280                         txn
4281                 }
4282         }
4283 }
4284
4285 #[test]
4286 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4287         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4288         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4289         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4290         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4291         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4292
4293         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4294         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4295         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4296         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4297         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4298         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4299         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4300         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4301         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4302
4303         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4304         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4305
4306         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4307         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4308         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4309         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4310         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4311 }
4312
4313 #[test]
4314 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4315         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4316         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4317         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4318         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4319         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4320         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4321
4322         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4323         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4324         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4325         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4326         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4327
4328         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4329         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4330         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4331         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4332
4333         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4334         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4335         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4336         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4337         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4338
4339         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4340         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4341         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4342 }
4343
4344 #[test]
4345 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4346         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4347         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4348
4349         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4350         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4351         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4352         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4353
4354         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4355         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4356         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4357         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4358         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4359
4360         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4361         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4362         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4363         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4364         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4365
4366         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4367         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4368         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4369
4370         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4371         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4372         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4373         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4374         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4375 }
4376
4377 #[test]
4378 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4379         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4380         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4381         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4382         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4383
4384         // Create some initial channels
4385         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4386
4387         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4388
4389         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4390         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4391         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4392
4393         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4394         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4395         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4396         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4397         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4398         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4399         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4400         match events[0] {
4401                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4402                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4403         }
4404         match events[1] {
4405                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4406                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4407         }
4408
4409         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4410         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4411         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4412         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4413         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4414
4415         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4416         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4417         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4418
4419         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4420         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4421         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4422 }
4423
4424 #[test]
4425 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4426         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4427         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4428         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4429         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4430
4431         // Create some initial channels
4432         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4433
4434         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4435         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4436
4437         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4438
4439         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4440         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4441         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4442
4443         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4444         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4445         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4446         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4447         match events[0] {
4448                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4449                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4450         }
4451         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4452
4453         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4454         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4455         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4456         check_spends!(node_txn[0],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4457         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4458
4459         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4460         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4461         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4462         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4463
4464         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4465         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4466         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4467         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4468         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4469 }
4470
4471 #[test]
4472 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4473         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4474         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4475         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4476         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4477
4478         // Create some initial channels
4479         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4480
4481         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4482         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4483         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4484         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4485
4486         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4487
4488         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4489         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4490         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4491         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4492
4493         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4494         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4495         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4496         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4497
4498         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4499         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4500
4501         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4502         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4503         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4504 }
4505
4506 #[test]
4507 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4508         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4509         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4510         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4511         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4512         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4513
4514         // Create some initial channels
4515         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4516
4517         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4518         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4519         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4520         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4521
4522         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4523
4524         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4525         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4526         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4527         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4528         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4529         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4530
4531         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4532         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4533         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4534         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4535         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4536         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4537
4538         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4539         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4540         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4541         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4542         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4543
4544         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4545         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4546         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4547         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4548         // transactions next...
4549         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4550         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4551
4552         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4553         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4554         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4555                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4556         } else {
4557                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4558                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4559         }
4560
4561         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4562         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4563
4564         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4565         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4566         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4567         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4568         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4569 }
4570
4571 #[test]
4572 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4573         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4574         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4575         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4576         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4577         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4578
4579         // Create some initial channels
4580         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4581
4582         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4583         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4584         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4585         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4586
4587         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4588         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4589
4590         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4591
4592         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4593         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4594         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4595         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4596         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4597         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4598
4599         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4600         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4601         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4602         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4603
4604         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4605         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4606         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4607
4608         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4609         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4610         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4611         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4612         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4613
4614         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4615         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4616
4617         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4618         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4619         // transactions next...
4620         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4621         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4622         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4623                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4624         } else {
4625                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4626                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4627         }
4628
4629         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4630         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4631
4632         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4633         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4634
4635         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4636         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4637
4638         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4639         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4640         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4641         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4642         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4643         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4644         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4645         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4646 }
4647
4648 #[test]
4649 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4650         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4651         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4652         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4653         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4654         // channel.
4655         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4656         // gets broadcast.
4657
4658         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4659         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4660         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4661         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4662
4663         // Create some initial channels
4664         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4665         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4666
4667         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4668         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4669         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4670         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4671         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4672
4673         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4674         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4675         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4676
4677         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4678         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4679         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4680         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4681         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4682         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4683         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4684         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4685         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4686         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4687         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4688
4689         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4690         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4691         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4692         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4693
4694         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4695         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4696         check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4697         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4698         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4699         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4700
4701         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4702         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
4703         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4704         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4705         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4706         match events[0] {
4707                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4708                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4709         }
4710         match events[1] {
4711                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
4712                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4713                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4714                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4715                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4716                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4717                 },
4718                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4719         }
4720         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4721         let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4722         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4723         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4724         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4725
4726         match nodes_2_event {
4727                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4728                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4729         }
4730
4731         match nodes_0_event {
4732                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4733                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4734                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4735                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4736                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4737                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4738                 },
4739                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4740         };
4741
4742         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4743         match msg_events[0] {
4744                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4745                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4746         }
4747
4748         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4749         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4750         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4751         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4752         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4753         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4754         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4755         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4756         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4757         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4758         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
4759
4760         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4761         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4762 }
4763
4764 #[test]
4765 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4766         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4767         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4768         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4769         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4770         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4771         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4772         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4773         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4774         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4775         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4776         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4777                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4778         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4779
4780         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4781         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4782         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4783
4784         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4785         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4786         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4787         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4788         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4789
4790         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4791
4792         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
4793         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4794         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4795         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4796         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
4797                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
4798         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
4799         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4800
4801         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4802         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4803         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4804
4805         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4806         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4807         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4808         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4809         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4810
4811         let htlc_timeout_tx;
4812         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4813                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4814                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
4815                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4816
4817                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4818                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4819                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4820
4821                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4822                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4823                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4824                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4825                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4826
4827                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4828                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4829                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
4830                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4831                 } else {
4832                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4833                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4834                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4835                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4836                 }
4837
4838                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4839                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4840                 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
4841                 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
4842                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4843                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4844                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4845                 } else {
4846                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4847                 }
4848         }
4849
4850         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4851         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4852
4853         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4854         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4855         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4856         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4857         match events[0] {
4858                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4859                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4860         }
4861         match events[1] {
4862                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4863                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4864         }
4865         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4866         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4867         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4868         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4869         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4870         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4871         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4872         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4873         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4874         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4875
4876         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4877         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4878         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4879         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4880         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4881         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4882         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4883         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4884         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4885         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4886
4887         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4888         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4889         {
4890                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4891         }
4892         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4893
4894         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4895         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
4896         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
4897         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4898         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4899         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4900         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4901         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4902         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4903         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4904
4905         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4906         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4907         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, None, true);
4908 }
4909
4910 #[test]
4911 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4912         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4913         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4914         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4915         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4916
4917         // Create some initial channels
4918         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4919
4920         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4921         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4922         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4923         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4924         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4925
4926         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4927         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4928         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4929         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4930
4931         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4932         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4933         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4934         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4935         match events[0] {
4936                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4937                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4938         }
4939         match events[1] {
4940                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4941                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4942         }
4943         let node_tx = {
4944                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4945                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4946                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4947                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4948                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4949                 node_txn[0].clone()
4950         };
4951
4952         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4953         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4954
4955         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4956         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4957         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4958         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4959         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4960         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4961 }
4962
4963 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4964         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4965         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4966         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4967         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4968         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4969         // use the same payment hashes.
4970         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4971         //
4972         // A \         / E
4973         //    - C - D -
4974         // B /         \ F
4975         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4976         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4977         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4978         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4979         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4980         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4981         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4982         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4983                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4984         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4985
4986         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
4987         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4988         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4989         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4990         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4991
4992         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4993         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4994         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
4995         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
4996
4997         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
4998                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4999         // 0th HTLC:
5000         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5001         // 1st HTLC:
5002         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5003         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5004         // 2nd HTLC:
5005         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5006         // 3rd HTLC:
5007         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5008         // 4th HTLC:
5009         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5010         // 5th HTLC:
5011         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5012         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5013         // 6th HTLC:
5014         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5015         // 7th HTLC:
5016         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5017
5018         // 8th HTLC:
5019         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5020         // 9th HTLC:
5021         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5022         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5023
5024         // 10th HTLC:
5025         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5026         // 11th HTLC:
5027         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5028         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5029
5030         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5031         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5032         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5033         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5034         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5035
5036         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5037         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5038         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5039         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5040         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5041         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5042         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5043
5044         let failed_destinations = vec![
5045                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5046                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5047                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5048                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5049         ];
5050         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5051         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5052
5053         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5054         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5055         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5056         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5057         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5058         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5059
5060         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5061         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5062         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5063         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5064
5065         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5066                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5067                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5068         ];
5069         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5070         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5071
5072         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5073         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5074         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5075         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5076
5077         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5078
5079         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5080         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5081                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5082                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5083                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5084                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5085                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5086                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5087         ];
5088         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5089         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5090         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5091         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5092         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5093         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5094         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5095         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5096         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5097         if deliver_last_raa {
5098                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5099         } else {
5100                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5101         }
5102
5103         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5104         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5105         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5106         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5107         //
5108         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5109         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5110         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5111         //
5112         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5113         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5114         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5115
5116         if announce_latest {
5117                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5118         } else {
5119                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5120         }
5121         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5122         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5123                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5124                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5125         } else {
5126                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5127                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5128         };
5129         match close_event {
5130                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5131                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5132         }
5133
5134         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5135         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5136         if deliver_last_raa {
5137                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5138
5139                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5140                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5141         } else {
5142                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5143                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5144                 } else {
5145                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5146                 };
5147
5148                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5149         }
5150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5151
5152         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5153         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5154         let mut a_done = false;
5155         for msg in cs_msgs {
5156                 match msg {
5157                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5158                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5159                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5160                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5161                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5162                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5163                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5164                                         }
5165                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5166                                         assert!(!a_done);
5167                                         a_done = true;
5168                                         &nodes[0]
5169                                 } else {
5170                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5171                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5172                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5173                                         }
5174                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5175                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5176                                         &nodes[1]
5177                                 };
5178                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5179                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5180                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5181                                 if announce_latest {
5182                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5183                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5184                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5185                                         }
5186                                 }
5187                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5188                         },
5189                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5190                 }
5191         }
5192
5193         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5194         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5195         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5196         let mut as_updates = 0;
5197         for event in as_events.iter() {
5198                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5199                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5200                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5201                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5202                         } else {
5203                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5204                         }
5205                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5206                                 as_updates += 1;
5207                         }
5208                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5209                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5210         }
5211         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5212         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5213         if announce_latest {
5214                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5215                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5216         }
5217         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5218
5219         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5220         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5221         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5222         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5223         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5224                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5225                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5226                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5227                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5228                         } else {
5229                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5230                         }
5231                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5232                                 bs_updates += 1;
5233                         }
5234                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5235                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5236         }
5237         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5238         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5239         if announce_latest {
5240                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5241         }
5242         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5243
5244         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5245         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5246         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5247         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5248         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5249         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5250 }
5251
5252 #[test]
5253 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5254         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5255 }
5256
5257 #[test]
5258 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5259         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5260 }
5261
5262 #[test]
5263 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5264         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5265         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5266         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5267 }
5268
5269 #[test]
5270 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5271         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5272         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5273         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5274         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5275
5276         // Create some initial channels
5277         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5278
5279         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5280         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5281         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5282         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5283
5284         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5285         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5286         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5287         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5288         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5289         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5290
5291         let htlc_timeout = {
5292                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5293                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5294                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5295                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5296                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5297                 node_txn[0].clone()
5298         };
5299
5300         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5301         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5302         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5303
5304         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5305         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5306         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5307         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5308         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5309         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5310         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5311         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5312         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5313         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5314                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5315 }
5316
5317 #[test]
5318 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5319         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5320         // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5321         // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5322         // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5323
5324         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5325
5326         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5327         let seed = [42; 32];
5328         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5329         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5330         let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5331         let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5332         let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &scorer);
5333         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5334         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5335         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5336         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5337
5338         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5339         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5340
5341         // Create some initial channels
5342         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5343         // for node 0
5344         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5345         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5346         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5347
5348         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5349         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5350         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5351         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5352         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5353
5354         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5355         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5356         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5357         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5358         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5359
5360         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5361         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5362         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5363         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5364             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5365             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5366             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5367                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5368         }
5369
5370         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5371         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5372         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5373         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5374         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5375         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5376
5377         let htlc_timeout = {
5378                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5379                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5380                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5381                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5382                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5383                 node_txn[0].clone()
5384         };
5385
5386         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5387         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5388         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5389
5390         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5391         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5392         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5393         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5394         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5395         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5396         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5397         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5398         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5399         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5400         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5401                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5402 }
5403
5404 #[test]
5405 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5406         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5407         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5408         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5409         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5410
5411         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5412
5413         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5414         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5415
5416         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5417         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5418         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5419
5420         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5421         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5422         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5423
5424         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5425         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5426         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5427
5428         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5429         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5430         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5431 }
5432
5433 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5434         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5435         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5436         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5437         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5438         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5439
5440         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5441
5442         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5443         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5444         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5445         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5446         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5447
5448         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5449         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5450         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5451
5452         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5453         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5454         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5455         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5456         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5457
5458         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5459         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5460         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5461                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5462                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5463         }
5464         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5465         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5466         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5467         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5468 }
5469
5470 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5471         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5472         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5473         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5474         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5475         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5476
5477         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5478         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
5479                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5480         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5481
5482         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5483
5484         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5485         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5486         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5487
5488         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5489         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5490
5491         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5492                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5493                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5494         }
5495         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5496         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5497         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5498         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5499 }
5500
5501 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5502         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5503         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5504         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5505         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5506         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5507
5508         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5509         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5510         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5511         // actually revoked.
5512         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5513         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5514         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5515         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5516         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5517
5518         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5519         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5520         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5521         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5522         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5523         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5524         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5525         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5526         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5527         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5528
5529         if check_revoke_no_close {
5530                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5531                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5532         }
5533
5534         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5535         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5536         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5537                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5538                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5539         }
5540         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5541                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5542                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5543                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5544                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5545         } else {
5546                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5547         }
5548 }
5549
5550 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5551 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5552 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5553 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5554 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5555 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5556 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5557 // non-dust HTLCs.
5558 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5559 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5560 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5561 #[test]
5562 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5563         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5564         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5565
5566         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5567         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5568 }
5569
5570 #[test]
5571 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5572         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5573         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5574         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5575         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5576 }
5577
5578 #[test]
5579 #[should_panic]
5580 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5581         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5582         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5583         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5584         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5585         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5586         for node in nodes.iter() {
5587                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5588         }
5589
5590         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5591         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5592         let push_msat=10001;
5593         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5594         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5595         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5596         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5597
5598         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5599         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5600         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5601 }
5602
5603 #[test]
5604 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5605         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5606         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5607         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5608         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5609
5610         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5611         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5612         let push_msat=10001;
5613         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5614
5615         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5616         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5617         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5618         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5619         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5620
5621         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5622         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5623         let push_msat=10001;
5624         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5625         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5626         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5627
5628         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5629         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5630         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5631
5632         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5633         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5634         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5635
5636         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5637         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5638         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5639
5640         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5641         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5642         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5643         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5644         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5645         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5646 }
5647
5648 #[test]
5649 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5650         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5651         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5652         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5653         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5654
5655         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5656         let push_msat=10001;
5657         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5658         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5659         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5660         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5661
5662         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5663         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5664         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5665                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5666                         msg.clone()
5667                 },
5668                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5669         };
5670         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5671 }
5672
5673 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5674 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5675 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5676 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5677 #[test]
5678 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5679         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5680         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5681         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5682         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5683         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5684
5685         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5686         // pending_update_fee.
5687         {
5688                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5689                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5690         }
5691         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5692         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5693
5694         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5695         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5696         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5697                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5698                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5699                 },
5700                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5701         };
5702
5703         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5704
5705         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5706         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5707         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5708         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5709
5710         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5711         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5712         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5713
5714         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5715         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5716                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5717         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5718         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5719
5720         // Flush the pending fee update.
5721         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5722         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5723         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5724         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5725         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5726
5727         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5728         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5729         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5730         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5731         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5732         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5733         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5734                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5735         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5736
5737         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5738         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5739         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5740         match &events[0] {
5741                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5742                         assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5743                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5744                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5745                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5746                 },
5747                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5748         }
5749         match &events[1] {
5750                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5751                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5752                 },
5753                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5754         }
5755 }
5756
5757 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5758 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5759 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5760 #[test]
5761 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5762         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5763         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5764         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5765         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5766         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5767
5768         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5769         // pending_update_fee.
5770         {
5771                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5772                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5773         }
5774         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5775         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5776
5777         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5778         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5779         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5780                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5781                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5782                 },
5783                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5784         };
5785
5786         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5787
5788         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5789         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5790         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5791         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5792
5793         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5794         let amt_1 = 20000;
5795         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5796         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5797         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5798
5799         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5800         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, payment_hash_1,
5801                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5802         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5803         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5804         let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5805         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
5806                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5807         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5808         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5809
5810         // Flush the pending fee update.
5811         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5812         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5813         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5814         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5815         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5816         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5817
5818         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5819         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5820         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5821         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5822         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5823         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5824         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5825                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5826         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5827
5828         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5829         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5830         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5831         match &events[0] {
5832                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5833                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5834                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5835                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5836                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5837                 },
5838                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5839         }
5840         match &events[1] {
5841                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5842                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5843                 },
5844                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5845         }
5846
5847         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5848         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5849                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5850                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5851                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5852         };
5853         let raa = match send_raa_event {
5854                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5855                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5856         };
5857         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5858         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5859         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5860         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5861         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5862         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5863         match events[0] {
5864                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5865                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5866         }
5867         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5868         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5869         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5870         match events[0] {
5871                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
5872                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5873         }
5874         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5875         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5876         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5877
5878         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5879         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5880         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5881         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5882 }
5883
5884 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5885 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5886 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5887 // once it's freed.
5888 #[test]
5889 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5890         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5891         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5892         // Avoid having to include routing fees in calculations
5893         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5894         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
5895         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
5896         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5897         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5898         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5899         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
5900
5901         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5902         // pending_update_fee.
5903         {
5904                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5905                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5906         }
5907         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5908         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5909
5910         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5911         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5912         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5913                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5914                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5915                 },
5916                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5917         };
5918
5919         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5920
5921         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5922         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5923         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5924         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5925
5926         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5927         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5928         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5929         let payment_event = {
5930                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5931                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5932                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5933
5934                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5935                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5936
5937                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5938         };
5939         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5940         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5941         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5942         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5943
5944         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
5945         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5946
5947         // Flush the pending fee update.
5948         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5949         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5950         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5951         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5952         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5953         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5954
5955         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5956         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5957         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5958
5959         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5960                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5961                         msg.clone()
5962                 },
5963                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5964         };
5965
5966         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5968         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5969
5970         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5971         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5972         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5973         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5974                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5975                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5976         }
5977
5978         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5979         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5980         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5981
5982         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5983         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5984         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5985         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5986                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5987                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5988                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5989                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5990                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5991                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5992                 },
5993                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5994         };
5995
5996         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
5997         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
5998         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5999
6000         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6001         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6002         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6003         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6004         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6005         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6006         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6007         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6008         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6009                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6010                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6011         };
6012         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6013         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6014         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6015 }
6016
6017 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6018 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6019 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6020
6021 #[test]
6022 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6023         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6024         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6025         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6026         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6027         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6028         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6029
6030         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6031         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 100;
6032
6033         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6034                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6035                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6036                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6037         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6038         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value", 1);
6039 }
6040
6041 #[test]
6042 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6043         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6044         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6045         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6046         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6047         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6048         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6049
6050         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6051         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
6052         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6053                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)),
6054                 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6055                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6056
6057         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6058         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6059 }
6060
6061 #[test]
6062 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6063         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6064         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6065         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6066         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6067         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6068         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6069
6070         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6071         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6072                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6074         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6075         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6076
6077         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6078         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6079         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6080         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6081         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6082 }
6083
6084 #[test]
6085 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6086         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6087         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6088         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6089         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6090         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6091         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6092         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6093
6094         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6095                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
6096         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6097         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6098         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6099                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6100                 ), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6101                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6102 }
6103
6104 #[test]
6105 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6106         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6107         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6108         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6109         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6110         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6111         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6112         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6113         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6114         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6115                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6116
6117         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
6118         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6119         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6120                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6121                 let payment_event = {
6122                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6123                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6124                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6125
6126                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6127                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6128                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6129                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6130                         } else {
6131                                 assert!(false);
6132                         }
6133                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6134                 };
6135                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6136                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6137                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6138
6139                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6140                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6141         }
6142         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6143                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6144                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6145                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6146
6147         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6148         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", 1);
6149 }
6150
6151 #[test]
6152 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6153         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6154         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6155         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6156         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6157         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6158         let channel_value = 100000;
6159         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6160         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6161
6162         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6163
6164         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6165         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6166         // limits us to.
6167         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6168         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6169                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6170                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6171                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6172
6173         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6174         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept", 1);
6175
6176         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6177 }
6178
6179 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6180 #[test]
6181 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6182         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6183         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6184         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6185         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6186         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6187         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6188         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6189         {
6190                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6191                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6192                 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6193                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6194         }
6195
6196         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6197         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6198                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6199         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6200         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6201         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6202         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6203         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6204         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6205         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6206         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6207         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6208 }
6209
6210 #[test]
6211 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6212         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6213         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6214         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6215         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6216         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6217         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6218
6219         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6220         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6221         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6222         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6223         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6224         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6225
6226         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6227         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6228         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6229                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6230         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6231         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6232
6233         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6234         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6235         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6236         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6237         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6238
6239         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6240         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6241         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6242         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6243         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6244 }
6245
6246 #[test]
6247 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6248         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6249         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6250         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6251         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6252         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6253         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6254         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6255
6256         let send_amt = 3999999;
6257         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
6258                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
6259         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = send_amt;
6260         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6261         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6262         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6263         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
6264                 &route.paths[0], send_amt, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6265         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6266
6267         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6268                 channel_id: chan.2,
6269                 htlc_id: 0,
6270                 amount_msat: 1000,
6271                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6272                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6273                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6274         };
6275
6276         for i in 0..50 {
6277                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6278                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6279         }
6280         msg.htlc_id = (50) as u64;
6281         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6282
6283         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6284         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6285         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6286         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6287         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6288 }
6289
6290 #[test]
6291 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6292         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6293         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6294         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6295         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6296         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6297         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6298
6299         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6300         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6301                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6302         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6303         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6304         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6305         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6306
6307         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6308         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6309         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6310         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6311         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6312 }
6313
6314 #[test]
6315 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6316         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6317         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6318         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6319         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6320         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6321
6322         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6323         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6324         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6325                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6326         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6327         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6328         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6329         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6330
6331         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6332         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6333         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6334         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6335         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6336 }
6337
6338 #[test]
6339 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6340         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6341         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6342         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6343         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6344         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6345         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6346         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6347
6348         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6349         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6350         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6351                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6352         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6353         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6354         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6355
6356         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6357         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6358         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6359         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
6360         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6361         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6362         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
6363         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6364         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6365         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6366         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6367         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6368         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6369
6370         //Resend HTLC
6371         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6372         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6373         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6374         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6375         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6376
6377         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6378
6379         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6380         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6381         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6382         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6383         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6384 }
6385
6386 #[test]
6387 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6388         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6389
6390         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6391         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6392         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6393         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6394         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6395         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6396         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6397                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6398
6399         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6400         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6401         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6402
6403         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6404                 channel_id: chan.2,
6405                 htlc_id: 0,
6406                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6407         };
6408
6409         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6410
6411         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6412         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6413         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6414         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6415         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6416 }
6417
6418 #[test]
6419 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6420         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6421
6422         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6423         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6424         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6425         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6426         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6427
6428         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6429         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6430                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6431         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6432         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6433         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6434
6435         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6436                 channel_id: chan.2,
6437                 htlc_id: 0,
6438                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6439         };
6440
6441         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6442
6443         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6444         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6445         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6446         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6447         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6448 }
6449
6450 #[test]
6451 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6452         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6453
6454         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6455         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6456         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6457         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6458         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6459
6460         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6461         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6462                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6463         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6464         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6465         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6466         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6467                 channel_id: chan.2,
6468                 htlc_id: 0,
6469                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6470                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6471         };
6472
6473         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6474
6475         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6476         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6477         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6478         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6479         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6480 }
6481
6482 #[test]
6483 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6484         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6485
6486         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6487         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6488         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6489         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6490         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6491
6492         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6493
6494         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6495         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6496         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6497
6498         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6499         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6500         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6501                 match events[0] {
6502                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6503                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6504                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6505                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6506                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6507                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6508                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6509                         },
6510                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6511                 }
6512         };
6513
6514         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6515
6516         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6517
6518         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6519         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6520         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6521         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6522         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6523 }
6524
6525 #[test]
6526 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6527         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6528
6529         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6530         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6531         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6532         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6533         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6534
6535         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6536
6537         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6538         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6539         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6540
6541         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6542         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6543         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6544                 match events[0] {
6545                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6546                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6547                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6548                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6549                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6550                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6551                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6552                         },
6553                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6554                 }
6555         };
6556
6557         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6558
6559         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6560
6561         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6562         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6563         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6564         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6565         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6566 }
6567
6568 #[test]
6569 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6570         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6571
6572         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6573         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6574         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6575         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6576         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6577
6578         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6579         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6580                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6581         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6582
6583         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6584         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6585
6586         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6587         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6588         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6589
6590         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6591
6592         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6593                 match events[0] {
6594                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6595                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6596                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6597                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6598                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6599                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6600                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6601                         },
6602                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6603                 }
6604         };
6605         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6606         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6607
6608         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6609         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6610         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6611         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6612         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6613 }
6614
6615 #[test]
6616 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6617         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6618         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6619
6620         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6621         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6622         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6623         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6624         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6625         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6626
6627         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6628
6629         //First hop
6630         let mut payment_event = {
6631                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6632                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6633                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6634                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6635                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6636                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6637         };
6638         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6639         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6640         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6641         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6642         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6643         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6644         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6645         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6646         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6647
6648         //Second Hop
6649         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6650         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6651         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6652         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6653
6654         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6655         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6656         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6657                 match events_3[0] {
6658                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6659                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6660                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6661                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6662                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6663                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6664                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6665                         },
6666                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6667                 }
6668         };
6669
6670         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6671
6672         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6673         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6674         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6675         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6676         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6677
6678         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6679         match events_4[0] {
6680                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6681                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6682                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6683                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6684                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6685                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6686                 },
6687                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6688         };
6689
6690         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6691 }
6692
6693 #[test]
6694 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6695         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6696         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6697         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6698         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6699         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6700         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6701
6702         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6703
6704         // First hop
6705         let mut payment_event = {
6706                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6707                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6708                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6709                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6710         };
6711
6712         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6713         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6714         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6715         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6716         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6717         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6718
6719         // Second Hop
6720         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6721         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6722         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6723         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6724
6725         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6726         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6727         match events_3[0] {
6728                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6729                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6730                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6731                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6732
6733                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6734                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6735                 },
6736                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6737         }
6738
6739         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6740                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6741                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6742         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6743         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6744         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6745
6746         match events_4[0] {
6747                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6748                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6749                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6750                 },
6751                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6752         }
6753
6754         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6755         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6756
6757         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6758         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6759         match events_5[0] {
6760                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
6761                 } => {
6762                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6763                         assert!(is_permanent);
6764                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6765                 },
6766                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6767         }
6768         match events_5[1] {
6769                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6770                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6771                 },
6772                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6773         }
6774
6775         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6776 }
6777
6778 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6779         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6780         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6781         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6782
6783         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6784         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6785         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6786         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6787         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6788         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6789
6790         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6791                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6792
6793         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6794         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6795         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6796         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6797
6798         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6799         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6800
6801         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6802         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6803         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6804         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6805         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6806
6807         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6808         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6809         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6810         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6811
6812         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6813         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6814
6815         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6816         match events[0] {
6817                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6818                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6819                 },
6820                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6821         }
6822         match events[1] {
6823                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6824                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6825                 },
6826                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6827         }
6828
6829         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6830         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6831         if announce_latest {
6832                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6833         } else {
6834                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6835         }
6836
6837         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6838         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6839         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6840
6841         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6842         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6843         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6844         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6845         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
6846         let mut first_failed = false;
6847         for event in events {
6848                 match event {
6849                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6850                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6851                                         assert!(!first_failed);
6852                                         first_failed = true;
6853                                 } else {
6854                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6855                                 }
6856                         },
6857                         Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
6858                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6859                 }
6860         }
6861 }
6862
6863 #[test]
6864 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6865         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6866         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6867 }
6868
6869 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6870         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6871         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6872         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6873         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6874         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6875         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6876
6877         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6878         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6879         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6880         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6881         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6882
6883         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6884                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6885
6886         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6887         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6888
6889         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6890         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6891
6892         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6893         if revoked {
6894                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6895                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6896         }
6897
6898         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6899         if local {
6900                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6901                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6902                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6903                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6904                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6905
6906                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6907                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6908                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6909                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6910                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
6911                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6912                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6913                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6914                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6915                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6916                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6917         } else {
6918                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6919                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6920                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6921                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6922                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6923                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6924
6925                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6926                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6927                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6928                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6929                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6930                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6931                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6932
6933                 if !revoked {
6934                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6935                 } else {
6936                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 11);
6937                 }
6938                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6939                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6940                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6941                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6942                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6943         }
6944 }
6945
6946 #[test]
6947 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6948         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6949         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6950         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6951 }
6952
6953 #[test]
6954 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6955         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6956
6957         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6958         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6959         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6960         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6961         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6962         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6963         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6964         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6965         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6966
6967         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6968         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6969                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6970                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6971         {
6972                 match error {
6973                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6974                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6975                 }
6976         } else { assert!(false) }
6977
6978         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6979         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6980         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6981         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6982         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6983                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6984                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6985         {
6986                 match error {
6987                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
6988                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6989                 }
6990         } else { assert!(false); }
6991
6992         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6993         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6994         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6995         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6996         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6997         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
6998         let reason_msg;
6999         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7000                 match action {
7001                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7002                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7003                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7004                         },
7005                         _ => { panic!(); }
7006                 }
7007         } else { panic!(); }
7008         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7009
7010         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7011         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7012         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7013         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7014         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7015                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7016                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7017         {
7018                 match error {
7019                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7020                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7021                 }
7022         } else { assert!(false); }
7023 }
7024
7025 #[test]
7026 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7027         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7028         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7029         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7030
7031         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7032         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7033         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7034         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7035
7036         // Create some initial channels
7037         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7038
7039         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7040         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7041         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7042         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7043         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7044         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7045         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
7046                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7047         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7048
7049         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7050         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7051         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7052         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7053         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7054
7055         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7056         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7057         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7058         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7059
7060         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7061         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7062         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7063
7064         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7065         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7066         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7067                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7068                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7069                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7070                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7071                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7072                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7073                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7074                 },
7075                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7076         };
7077         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7078
7079         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7080         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7081
7082         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7083         let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7084         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7085         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7086 }
7087
7088 #[test]
7089 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7090         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7091         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7092
7093         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7094         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7095         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7096         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7097
7098         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7099         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7100         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7101
7102         // Disconnect peers
7103         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7104         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7105
7106         for _ in 0..DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS + 1 {
7107                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7108         }
7109         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7110         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7111         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7112         for e in msg_events {
7113                 match e {
7114                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7115                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7116                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7117                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7118                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7119                                 }
7120                         },
7121                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7122                 }
7123         }
7124         // Reconnect peers
7125         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
7126         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7127         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7128         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
7129         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7130         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7131
7132         // Reestablish chan_1
7133         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7134         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7135         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7136         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7137         // Reestablish chan_2
7138         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7139         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7140         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7141         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7142         // Reestablish chan_3
7143         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7144         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7145         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7146         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7147
7148         for _ in 0..ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
7149                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7150         }
7151         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7152         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7153         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7154         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7155         for e in msg_events {
7156                 match e {
7157                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7158                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7159                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7160                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7161                                         // the old one.
7162                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7163                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7164                                 }
7165                         },
7166                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7167                 }
7168         }
7169         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7170         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7171 }
7172
7173 #[test]
7174 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7175         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7176         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7177
7178         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7179         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7180         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7181         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7182
7183         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7184
7185         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7186         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7187                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7188         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
7189         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7190
7191         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7192         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7193         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7194         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7195         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7196         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7197
7198         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7199         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7200                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7201                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7202                 }
7203         }
7204
7205         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7206         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7207
7208         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7209         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7210         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(header_114, 42, vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()]));
7211         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7212
7213         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7214         let penalty_1;
7215         let feerate_1;
7216         {
7217                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7218                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7219                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7220                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7221                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7222                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7223                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7224                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7225                 node_txn.clear();
7226         };
7227
7228         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7229         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7230         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7231         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7232         {
7233                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7234                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7235                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7236                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7237                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7238                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7239                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7240                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7241                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7242                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7243                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7244                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7245                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7246                         node_txn.clear();
7247                 }
7248         }
7249         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7250
7251         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7252         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7253         let penalty_3;
7254         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7255         {
7256                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7257                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7258                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7259                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7260                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7261                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7262                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7263                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7264                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7265                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7266                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7267                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7268                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7269                         node_txn.clear();
7270                 }
7271         }
7272         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7273
7274         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7275         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7276 }
7277
7278 #[test]
7279 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7280         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7281         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7282
7283         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7284         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7285         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7286         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7287         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7288
7289         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7290         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7291         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7292         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7293         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7294         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7295                 3_000_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7296         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7297         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7298         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7299                 3_000_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7300         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7301
7302         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7303         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7304         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7305
7306         // Revoke local commitment tx
7307         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7308
7309         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7310         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]));
7311         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7312         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7313         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7314         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 50); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7315
7316         let revoked_htlc_txn = {
7317                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
7318                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7319
7320                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7321                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7322                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7323
7324                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7325                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7326                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7327                 check_spends!(txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7328
7329                 txn
7330         };
7331
7332         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7333         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7334         let block_11 = create_dummy_block(hash_128, 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]);
7335         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_11);
7336         let block_129 = create_dummy_block(block_11.block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()]);
7337         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_129);
7338         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7339         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7340         match events.last().unwrap() {
7341                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7342                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7343         }
7344         let first;
7345         let feerate_1;
7346         let penalty_txn;
7347         {
7348                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7349                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7350                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7351
7352                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7353                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7354                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7355                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7356                 // future).
7357                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7358                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7359                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7360                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7361                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7362                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7363
7364                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7365                 // available, which we check here:
7366                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7367                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7368                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7369
7370                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7371                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7372
7373                 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7374                 // output, checked above).
7375                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7376                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7377                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7378
7379                 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7380                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7381                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7382                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
7383                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7384                 node_txn.clear();
7385         }
7386
7387         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7388         let block_130 = create_dummy_block(block_129.block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn);
7389         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_130);
7390         let block_131 = create_dummy_block(block_130.block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
7391         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_131);
7392
7393         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7394         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7395         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7396         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7397         let node_txn = {
7398                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7399                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7400
7401                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7402                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7403                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7404                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7405                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7406                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7407                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7408                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7409                 node_txn.clear();
7410                 txn
7411         };
7412         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7413         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(header_144, 42, node_txn));
7414         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7415         {
7416                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7417                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7418                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7419                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7420                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7421                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7422                 // up bumped justice generation.
7423                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7424                 node_txn.clear();
7425         }
7426         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7427         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7428 }
7429
7430 #[test]
7431 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7432         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7433         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7434
7435         // Create 2 HTLCs
7436         // Provide preimage for one
7437         // Check aggregation
7438
7439         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7440         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7441         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7442         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7443
7444         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7445         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7446         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7447
7448         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7449         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7450         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7451         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7452         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7453
7454         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7455         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7456         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7457         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7458         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7459         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7460
7461         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7462         let timeout;
7463         let preimage;
7464         let preimage_bump;
7465         let feerate_timeout;
7466         let feerate_preimage;
7467         {
7468                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7469                 // 3 transactions including:
7470                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7471                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7472                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7473                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7474                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7475                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7476                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7477                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7478
7479                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7480                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7481                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7482                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7483
7484                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7485                         (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7486                 } else {
7487                         (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7488                 };
7489
7490                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7491                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7492                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7493
7494                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7495                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7496                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7497                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7498
7499                 node_txn.clear();
7500         };
7501         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7502         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7503
7504         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7505         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7506         {
7507                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7508                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7509                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7510                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7511                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7512                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7513
7514                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7515                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7516                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7517                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7518                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7519
7520                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7521                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7522                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7523                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7524                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7525
7526                 node_txn.clear();
7527         }
7528
7529         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7530         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7531 }
7532
7533 #[test]
7534 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7535         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7536         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7537         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7538         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7539         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7540         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7541         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7542         // implement that).
7543         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7544         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7545         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7546         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7547         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7548
7549         let per_commitment_secret;
7550         let next_per_commitment_point;
7551         {
7552                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7553                 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7554                 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7555
7556                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7557
7558                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7559                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7560                 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7561
7562                 // Must revoke without gaps
7563                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7564                 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7565
7566                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7567                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7568                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7569         }
7570
7571         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7572                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
7573                         channel_id,
7574                         per_commitment_secret,
7575                         next_per_commitment_point,
7576                         #[cfg(taproot)]
7577                         next_local_nonce: None,
7578                 });
7579         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7580         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7581         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7582 }
7583
7584 #[test]
7585 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7586         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7587         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7588
7589         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7590         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7591         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7592         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7593
7594         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7595         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7596         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7597         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7598
7599         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7600         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7601         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7602
7603         // Revoke local commitment tx
7604         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7605
7606         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7607         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7608         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7609         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7610
7611         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7612         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7613         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7614         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7615         let penalty_txn = {
7616                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7617                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7618                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7619                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7620                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7621                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7622                 node_txn.clear();
7623                 penalty_txn
7624         };
7625         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn));
7626         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7627         {
7628                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7629                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7630                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7631         }
7632 }
7633
7634 #[test]
7635 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7636         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7637         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7638         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7639         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7640         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7641         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7642
7643         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7644
7645         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7646         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7647         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7648         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7649         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7650
7651         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7652         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7653         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7654         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7655
7656         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7657         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7658         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7659         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7660         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7661         match close_ev[0] {
7662                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7663                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7664                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7665                 },
7666                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7667         }
7668 }
7669
7670 #[test]
7671 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7672         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7673         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7674         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7675         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7676
7677         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7678         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7679         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7680
7681         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7682
7683         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7684         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7685         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7686         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7687 }
7688
7689 #[test]
7690 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7691         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7692         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7693         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7694         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7695         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7696         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7697
7698         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7699         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7700         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7701
7702         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7703         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7704         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7705 }
7706
7707 #[test]
7708 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7709         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7710         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7711         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7712         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7713         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7714
7715         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7716         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7717         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7718         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7719         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7720         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7721         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7722         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7723         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7724         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7725         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7726         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7727
7728         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7729         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7730         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7731         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7732
7733         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7734         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7735         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7736         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7737         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7738
7739         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7740         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7741
7742         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7743         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7744         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7745         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7746         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7747         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7748
7749         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7750         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7751         // `channel_value`.
7752         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7753         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7754         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7755         // `channel_value`.
7756         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7757 }
7758
7759 #[test]
7760 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7761         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7762         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7763         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7764         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7765         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7766         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7767
7768         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7769         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7770
7771         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7772
7773         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7774         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7775         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7776
7777         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7778         match events[0] {
7779                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7780                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7781                 }
7782                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7783         }
7784
7785         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7786         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7787
7788         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7789                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7790                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7791                 }
7792                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7793         }
7794
7795         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7796
7797         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7798         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7799
7800         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7801         match events[0] {
7802                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7803                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7804                 }
7805                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7806         }
7807 }
7808
7809 #[test]
7810 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7811         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7812         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7813         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7814         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7815         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7816         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7817
7818         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7819         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7820
7821         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7822
7823         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7824         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7825         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7826
7827         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7828         match events[0] {
7829                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7830                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7831                 }
7832                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7833         }
7834
7835         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7836         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7837
7838         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7839                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7840                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7841                 }
7842                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7843         }
7844         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7845 }
7846
7847 #[test]
7848 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7849         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7850         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7851         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7852         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7853         // and the channel should be closed.
7854         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7855         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7856         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7857         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7858         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7859         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7860
7861         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7862         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7863         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7864
7865         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7866
7867         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7868         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7869
7870         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7871         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7872
7873         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7874         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7875         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7876         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7877         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7878         let accept_chan_msg = {
7879                 let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
7880                 let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
7881                 let channel =  get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
7882                 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7883         };
7884         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
7885
7886         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7887
7888         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7889         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7890
7891         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7892         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7893
7894         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7895         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7896
7897         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7898         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7899                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7900                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7901                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7902                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7903                 }
7904                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7905         }
7906
7907         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7908 }
7909
7910 #[test]
7911 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7912         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7913         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7914         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7915         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7916         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7917         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7918
7919         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7920         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7921
7922         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7923
7924         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7925         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7926         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7927
7928         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7929         match events[0] {
7930                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7931                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7932                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7933                         match api_res {
7934                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7935                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7936                                 },
7937                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7938                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7939                         }
7940                 }
7941                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7942         }
7943
7944         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7945         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7946         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7947
7948         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7949                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7950                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7951                 }
7952                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7953         }
7954 }
7955
7956 #[test]
7957 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7958         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7959         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7960         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7961         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7962
7963         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7964         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7965         match api_res {
7966                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
7967                         assert_eq!(err, format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(unknown_channel_id), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7968                 },
7969                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7970                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7971         }
7972 }
7973
7974 #[test]
7975 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
7976         // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
7977         // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
7978         // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
7979         // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
7980         // a PaymentClaimable event too early
7981         let node_count = 4;
7982         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
7983         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
7984         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
7985         let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7986
7987         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7988         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7989         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7990         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7991
7992         let total_msat = 100_000;
7993         let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
7994         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
7995         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
7996
7997         let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
7998         path_1.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7999         path_1.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8000         path_1.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8001         path_1.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8002         path_1.hops[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
8003         route.paths.push(path_1);
8004
8005         let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
8006         path_2.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8007         path_2.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8008         path_2.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8009         path_2.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8010         path_2.hops[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
8011         route.paths.push(path_2);
8012
8013         // Send payment
8014         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8015         let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8016                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8017         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8018                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8019         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
8020
8021         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8022         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8023
8024         // First path
8025         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8026         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8027         let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
8028
8029         for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
8030                 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
8031
8032                 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8033                         let session_priv = [3; 32];
8034                         let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8035                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8036                         let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8037                         let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000,
8038                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8039                         // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8040                         // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8041                         onion_payloads[1].amt_to_forward = 99_000;
8042                         let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8043                         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8044                 }
8045
8046                 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8047                 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8048                 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8049                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8050
8051                 if idx == 0 {
8052                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8053                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8054                         check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8055                         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8056                         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8057                 } else {
8058                         let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8059                         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8060                 }
8061
8062                 prev_node = node;
8063         }
8064
8065         // Second path
8066         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8067         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8068
8069         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8070 }
8071
8072 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8073
8074         let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8075         let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8076
8077         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8078         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8079         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8080         let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8081
8082         let src_idx = 0;
8083         let dst_idx = 1;
8084
8085         // Create channels for each amount
8086         let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8087         let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8088         let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8089         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8090                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8091                 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8092                 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8093                 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8094                 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8095                 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8096                 expected_paths.push(path);
8097         }
8098         let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8099
8100         // Create a route for each amount
8101         let example_amount = 100000;
8102         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8103         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8104         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8105                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8106                 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8107                 path.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8108                 path.hops[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8109                 path.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8110                 path.hops[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8111                 path.hops[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8112                 route.paths.push(path);
8113         }
8114
8115         // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8116         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8117         let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8118                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8119         nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8120                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8122
8123         let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8124         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8125         let mut amount_received = 0;
8126         for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8127                 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8128
8129                 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8130                 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8131                 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8132                 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8133         }
8134
8135         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8136 }
8137
8138 #[test]
8139 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8140         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8141         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8142 }
8143
8144 #[test]
8145 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8146         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8147         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8148         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8149         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8150         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8151
8152         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8153         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8154         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8155         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8156
8157         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8158         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8159         route.paths.push(path);
8160         route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8161         route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8162         route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8163         route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8164         route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8165         route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8166         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8167         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8168 }
8169
8170 #[test]
8171 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8172         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8173         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8174         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8175         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8176         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8177
8178         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8179
8180         {
8181                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8182                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8183                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8184                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8185                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8186                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8187                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8188                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8189                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8190         }
8191         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8192         // values from previous calls.
8193         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8194         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8195         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8196         match events[0] {
8197                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8198                         match &purpose {
8199                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8200                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8201                                 },
8202                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8203                         }
8204                 },
8205                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8206         }
8207 }
8208
8209 #[test]
8210 #[allow(deprecated)]
8211 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8212         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8213         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8214         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8215         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8216         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8217         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8218
8219         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8220
8221         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8222
8223         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8224         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8225         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8226                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8227         } else { panic!(); }
8228         let mut block = {
8229                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8230                 create_dummy_block(node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(), node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, Vec::new())
8231         };
8232         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8233         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8234                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8235         } else { panic!(); }
8236
8237         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8238         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8239         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8240         block.header.time += 1;
8241         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8242         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8243         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8244
8245         {
8246                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8247                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8248                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8249                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8250                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8251                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8252                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8253                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8254         }
8255         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8256         // values from previous calls.
8257         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8258         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8259         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8260         match events[0] {
8261                 Event::PaymentClaimable { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8262                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8263                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8264                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8265                 },
8266                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8267         }
8268 }
8269
8270 #[test]
8271 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8272         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8273         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8274         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8275         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8276         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8277
8278         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8279
8280         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8281         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8282         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8283         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8284
8285         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8286         // resulting events.
8287         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8288                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8289                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8290                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8291                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8292                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8293                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8294
8295                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8296                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8297                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8298                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8299                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8300
8301                         // We should fail the payment back
8302                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8303                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8304                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8305                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8306                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8307                                 },
8308                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8309                         }
8310                 }
8311         }
8312
8313         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8314         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8315         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8316
8317         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8318         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
8319                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8320         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8321         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8322
8323         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8324         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8325                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8326         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8327         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8328
8329         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8330         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8331                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8332         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8333         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8334 }
8335
8336 #[test]
8337 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8338         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8339         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8340         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8341         // error.
8342         //
8343         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8344         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8345         // commitment at same time.
8346
8347         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8348         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8349         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8350         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8351
8352         // Create some initial channel
8353         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8354         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8355
8356         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8357         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8358
8359         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8360         let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8361
8362         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8363         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8364         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8365         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8366         let watchtower = {
8367                 let new_monitor = {
8368                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8369                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8370                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8371                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8372                         new_monitor
8373                 };
8374                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8375                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8376                 watchtower
8377         };
8378         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8379         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8380         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8381         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 200));
8382         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8383
8384         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8385         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8386         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8387         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8388
8389         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8390         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8391         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8392         {
8393                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8394                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8395                 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8396                 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8397                         assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8398                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8399                 } else { assert!(false); }
8400         }
8401         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8402         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8403         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8404         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8405 }
8406
8407 #[test]
8408 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8409         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8410         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8411         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8412         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8413
8414         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8415         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8416         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8417         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8418
8419         // Create some initial channel
8420         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8421         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8422
8423         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8424         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8425
8426         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8427         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8428
8429         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8430         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8431         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8432         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8433         let alice_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(
8434                 Arc::new(Mutex::new(nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().clone())),
8435         );
8436         let watchtower_alice = {
8437                 let new_monitor = {
8438                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8439                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8440                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8441                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8442                         new_monitor
8443                 };
8444                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &alice_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8445                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8446                 watchtower
8447         };
8448         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8449         // Make Alice aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating transaction lock time
8450         // requirements here.
8451         const HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST: u32 = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8452         alice_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST) as usize, (block.clone(), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST));
8453         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8454
8455         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8456         let alice_state = {
8457                 let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8458                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8459                 txn.remove(0)
8460         };
8461
8462         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8463         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8464         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8465         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8466         let bob_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&alice_broadcaster.blocks));
8467         let watchtower_bob = {
8468                 let new_monitor = {
8469                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8470                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8471                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8472                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8473                         new_monitor
8474                 };
8475                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &bob_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8476                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8477                 watchtower
8478         };
8479         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST - 1);
8480
8481         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8482         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8483         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8484                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8485         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8486
8487         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8488         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8489         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8490         {
8491                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8492                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8493                 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8494                 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8495                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8496                         assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8497                         assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8498                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8499                 } else { assert!(false); }
8500         }
8501         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8502         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8503
8504         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8505         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8506
8507         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8508         let bob_state_y;
8509         {
8510                 let mut txn = bob_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8511                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8512                 bob_state_y = txn.remove(0);
8513         };
8514
8515         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8516         let height = HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST + 1;
8517         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
8518         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
8519         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false);
8520         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, vec![bob_state_y.clone()]), height);
8521         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
8522         {
8523                 let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8524                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8525                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8526                 // Alice doesn't clean up the old HTLC claim since it hasn't seen a conflicting spend for
8527                 // it. However, she should, because it now has an invalid parent.
8528                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], alice_state);
8529         }
8530 }
8531
8532 #[test]
8533 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8534         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8535         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8536         // message).
8537         //
8538         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8539         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8540         //
8541         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8542         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8543         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8544         // before receiving funding_signed.
8545         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8546         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8547         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8548         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8549
8550         // Create an initial channel
8551         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8552         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8553         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8554         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8555         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8556
8557         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8558         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8559
8560         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8561         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8562
8563         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8564         let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8565         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8566         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8567         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true);
8568 }
8569
8570 #[test]
8571 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8572         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8573         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8574         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8575         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8576         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8577         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8578
8579         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8580         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8581         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8582         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8583
8584         // Create some initial channels
8585         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8586
8587         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8588         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8589         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8590         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8591         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8592         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8593
8594         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8595         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![local_txn[0].clone()]);
8596         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
8597         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8598         // this test before #653 fix.
8599         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &block, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8600         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8601         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8602         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8603         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
8604
8605         let htlc_timeout = {
8606                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8607                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8608                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8609                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8610                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8611                 node_txn[0].clone()
8612         };
8613
8614         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![htlc_timeout.clone()]));
8615         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8616         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8617 }
8618
8619 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8620         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8621         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8622         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8623         //
8624         // Steps of the test:
8625         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8626         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8627         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8628         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8629         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8630         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8631         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8632         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8633         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8634         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8635         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8636         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8637
8638         // Create some initial channels
8639         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8640         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8641
8642         // Steps (1) and (2):
8643         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8644         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8645
8646         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8647         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8648         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8649         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8650         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8651         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8652         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8653
8654         // Steps (3) and (4):
8655         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8656         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8657         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8658         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8659
8660         // Bob force-closes
8661         if !broadcast_alice {
8662                 force_closing_node = 1;
8663                 counterparty_node = 0;
8664         }
8665         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8666         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8667         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8668         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8669         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8670                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8671                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8672                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8673                 };
8674                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8675                 if broadcast_alice {
8676                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8677                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8678                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8679                 }
8680         }
8681
8682         // Step (5):
8683         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8684         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8685         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8686         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8687         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8688
8689         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8690         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8691         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8692         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8693         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8694         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8695
8696         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8697         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8698         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8699         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8700                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8701                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8702                 match events[0] {
8703                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8704                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8705                         },
8706                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8707                 };
8708         }
8709         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8710         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8711         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8712         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8713
8714         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8715         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8716         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8717                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8718                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8719                         (*msg).clone()
8720                 },
8721                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8722         };
8723         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8724                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8725                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8726                         (*updates).clone()
8727                 },
8728                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8729         };
8730
8731         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8732         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8733         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8734         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8735
8736         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8737         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8738         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8739                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8740                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8741                         (*msg).clone()
8742                 },
8743                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8744         };
8745         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8746         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8747
8748         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8749         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8750         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8751         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8752         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8753                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8754                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8755                 if broadcast_alice {
8756                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8757                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8758                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8759                 }
8760                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8761                 if broadcast_alice {
8762                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8763                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8764                 } else {
8765                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8766                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8767                 }
8768         }
8769
8770         // Step (6):
8771         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8772         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8773         {
8774                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8775                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8776                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8777                 };
8778                 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8779                 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8780                 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8781                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8782                 if broadcast_alice {
8783                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8784                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8785                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8786                 } else {
8787                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8788                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8789                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8790                 }
8791         }
8792 }
8793
8794 #[test]
8795 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8796         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8797         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8798         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8799         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8800 }
8801
8802 #[test]
8803 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8804         // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8805         // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8806         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8807         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8808         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8809         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8810
8811         // Create an first channel channel
8812         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8813         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8814
8815         // Create an second channel
8816         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
8817         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8818
8819         // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8820         // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8821         open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8822
8823         // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8824         // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8825         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8826         {
8827                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8828                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8829                 match &events[0] {
8830                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8831                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8832                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8833                         },
8834                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8835                 }
8836         }
8837
8838         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8839         {
8840                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8841                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8842                 match &events[0] {
8843                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8844                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8845                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8846                         },
8847                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8848                 }
8849         }
8850 }
8851
8852 #[test]
8853 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8854         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8855         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8856         //
8857         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8858         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8859         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8860         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8861         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8862         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8863         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8864         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8865
8866         // Create an initial channel
8867         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8868         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8869         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8870         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8871
8872         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8873         // that it is rejected.
8874         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8875         {
8876                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8877                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8878                 match events[0] {
8879                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8880                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8881                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8882                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8883                                 // move forward with it.
8884                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8885                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8886                         },
8887                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8888                 }
8889         }
8890
8891         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8892         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8893
8894         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8895         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8896
8897         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8898         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8899         {
8900                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8901                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8902                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8903                 added_monitors.clear();
8904         }
8905         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8906
8907         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8908
8909         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8910         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8911
8912         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8913         // temporary one).
8914
8915         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8916         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8917         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8918         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8919         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8920         {
8921                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8922                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8923                 match events[0] {
8924                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8925                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8926                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8927                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8928                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8929                         },
8930                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8931                 }
8932         }
8933
8934         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8935         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8936         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8937         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8938         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8939         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8940
8941         let funding_created = {
8942                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8943                 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8944                 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8945                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8946                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8947                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8948                 let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8949                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8950                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8951         };
8952         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8953         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8954         // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
8955         // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
8956         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8957
8958         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8959         {
8960                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8961                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8962                 match events[0] {
8963                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8964                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8965                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8966                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8967                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8968                         },
8969                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8970                 }
8971         }
8972
8973         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8974         // everything is functional.
8975         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8976         {
8977                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8978                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8979                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8980                 added_monitors.clear();
8981         }
8982         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8983
8984         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8985         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8986         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8987         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8988
8989         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8990         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8991         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8992
8993         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8994 }
8995
8996 #[test]
8997 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8998         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8999         //
9000         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9001         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9002         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9003         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9004         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9005         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9006         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9007
9008         // Create some initial channels
9009         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9010         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9011         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
9012
9013         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9014         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9015         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9016
9017         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9018         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9019         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9020
9021         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9022         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9023         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9024         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9025         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
9026         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9027         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9028         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9029         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9030
9031         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9032         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9033         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9034         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9035         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
9036         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9037         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9038         match events[0] {
9039                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9040                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9041                 },
9042                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9043         }
9044         match events[1] {
9045                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9046                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9047                 },
9048                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9049         }
9050         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9051         // peer_disconnected.
9052         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9053         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9054
9055         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9056         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9057         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9058 }
9059
9060 #[test]
9061 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9062         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9063         //
9064         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9065         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9066         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9067         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9068         //
9069         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9070         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9071         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9072         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9073         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9074         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9075         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9076
9077         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9078         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9079         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9080
9081         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9082
9083         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9084         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9085         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9086         // its length.
9087         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9088         let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
9089         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9090                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9091                 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9092         }
9093
9094         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9095         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9096         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9097         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9098
9099         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9101         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9102
9103         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9104         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9105
9106         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9107         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9108         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9109
9110         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9111         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9112         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9113         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9114         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9115         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9116         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9117                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9118                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9119                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9120                 } else { panic!(); }
9121         } else { panic!(); }
9122         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9123
9124         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9125         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9126         // as its not 32 bytes long.
9127         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9128                 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9129                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9130                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9131                                 txid: tx.txid(),
9132                                 vout: idx as u32,
9133                         },
9134                         script_sig: Script::new(),
9135                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9136                         witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9137                 }).collect(),
9138                 output: vec![TxOut {
9139                         value: 1000,
9140                         script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9141                 }]
9142         };
9143         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9144         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9145 }
9146
9147 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9148         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9149         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9150         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9151         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9152         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9153         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9154         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9155         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9156         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9157         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9158         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9159         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9160         // until we learned about an additional block.
9161         //
9162         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9163         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9164         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9165         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9166         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9167         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9168         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9169
9170         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9171         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9172         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9173         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9174         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9175
9176         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9177         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9178         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9180         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9181         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9182
9183         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9184         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9185                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9186         }
9187         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9188                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9189         if test_height_before_timelock {
9190                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9191                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9192                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9193                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9194         } else {
9195                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9196                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9197                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9198                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[0].txid());
9199                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9200                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9201                 // timelock is up).
9202                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9203                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9204
9205                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9206                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9207                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9208                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9209                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9210                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9211                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9212
9213                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9214                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9215                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9216                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9217                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9218                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9219                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9220                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9221                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9222         }
9223 }
9224
9225 #[test]
9226 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9227         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9228         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9229 }
9230
9231 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9232         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9233         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9234         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9235         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9236
9237         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9238
9239         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9240                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9241         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();
9242
9243         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9244
9245         {
9246                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9247                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9248                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9249                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9250                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9251                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9252                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9253                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9254         }
9255         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9256         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9257
9258         {
9259                 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9260                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9261                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9262                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9263                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9264                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9265                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9266                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9267                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9268                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9269                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9270                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9271                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9272         }
9273
9274         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9275         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9276
9277         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9278                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9279                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9280
9281                 let expected_destinations = vec![
9282                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9283                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9284                 ];
9285                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
9286                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9287
9288                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9289                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9290                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9291
9292                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9293                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9294                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9295
9296                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9297                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9298                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9299                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9300                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9301                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9302         } else {
9303                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9304                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9305                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9306
9307                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9308                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9309                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9310                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9311
9312                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9313
9314                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9315         }
9316 }
9317
9318 #[test]
9319 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9320         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9321         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9322         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9323         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9324         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9325 }
9326
9327 #[test]
9328 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9329         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9330         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9331         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9332 }
9333
9334 #[test]
9335 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9336         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9337         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9338         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9339         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9340         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9341         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9342
9343         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9344         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9345         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9346         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9347
9348         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9349                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9350         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
9351         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9352         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9353                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9354                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9355                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9356         });
9357
9358         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9359
9360         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9361         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9362
9363         let session_privs = {
9364                 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9365                 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9366                 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9367                 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9368                 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9369                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9370         };
9371         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9372                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9373                 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9374         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9375
9376         {
9377                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9378                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9379                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9380         }
9381         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9382
9383         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9384                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9385         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9386
9387         {
9388                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9389                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9390                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9391
9392                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9393                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9394
9395                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9396                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9397
9398                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9399                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9400                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9401
9402                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9403                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9404                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9405
9406                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9407                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9408                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9409         }
9410         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9411         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9412         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9413         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9414
9415         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9416
9417         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9418         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9419         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9420
9421         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9422         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9423
9424         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9425         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9426         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9427
9428         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9429
9430         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9431                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9432                 &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9433         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9434
9435         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9436         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9437         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9438
9439         do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9440         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, Some(None), true);
9441 }
9442
9443 #[test]
9444 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9445         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9446         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9447         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9448         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9449
9450         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9451         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9452         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9453         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9454         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9455                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9456                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9457         };
9458         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9459         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9460         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9461
9462         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9463         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage),
9464                 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9465         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9466         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9467         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9468         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9469         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9470         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9471         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9472 }
9473
9474 #[test]
9475 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9476         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9477         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9478         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9479         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9480
9481         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9482         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9483
9484         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9485         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9486                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9487                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9488         };
9489         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9490         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9491         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9492         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9493         let route = find_route(
9494                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9495                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9496         ).unwrap();
9497
9498         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9499         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage),
9500                 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9501         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9502         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9503         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9504         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9505         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9506         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9507         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9508 }
9509
9510 #[test]
9511 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9512         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9513         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9514         // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9515         // amount.
9516         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9517         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9518         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9519         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9520
9521         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9522         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9523         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9524         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9525
9526         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9527         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9528         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9529                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9530                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9531                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9532         });
9533
9534         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9535         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9536         // amount of time to respond to.
9537
9538         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9539         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9540         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9541
9542         let failed_destinations = vec![
9543                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9544                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9545         ];
9546         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9547
9548         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash, PaymentFailureReason::RecipientRejected);
9549
9550         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9551         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9552                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9553         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9554
9555         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9556         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9557         let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9558         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9559
9560         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9561         // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9562         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9563         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9564         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9565 }
9566
9567 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9568 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9569 enum ExposureEvent {
9570         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9571         AtHTLCForward,
9572         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9573         AtHTLCReception,
9574         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9575         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9576 }
9577
9578 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9579         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9580         // policy.
9581         //
9582         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9583         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9584         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9585         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9586         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9587         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9588         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9589         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9590
9591         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9592         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9593         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9594         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9595         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9596         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9597
9598         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9599         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9600         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9601         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9602         if on_holder_tx {
9603                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9604         }
9605         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9606         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9607         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9608
9609         let opt_anchors = false;
9610
9611         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9612
9613         if on_holder_tx {
9614                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9615                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9616                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
9617                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9618         }
9619
9620         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9621         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9623         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9624
9625         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9626         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9627         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9628
9629         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9630         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9631         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9632
9633         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9634                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9635                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9636                 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9637                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9638         };
9639         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9640         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9641
9642         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9643         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9644
9645         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9646         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9647
9648         if on_holder_tx {
9649                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9650                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9651                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9652                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9653                         for _ in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9654                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9655                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9656                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9657                         }
9658                 } else {
9659                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9660                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9661                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9662                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9663                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9664                         }
9665                 }
9666         } else {
9667                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9668                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9669                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9670                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9671                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9672                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9673                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9674                         }
9675                 } else {
9676                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9677                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9678                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9679                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9680                         }
9681                 }
9682         }
9683
9684         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9685         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9686                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9687                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9688                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9689                 if on_holder_tx {
9690                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9691                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9692                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9693                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9694                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
9695                                 assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9696                 } else {
9697                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9698                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9699                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
9700                                 assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9701                 }
9702         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9703                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9704                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9705                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9706                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9707                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9708                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9709                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9710                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9711                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9712                 if on_holder_tx {
9713                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9714                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9715                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9716                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9717                 } else {
9718                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9719                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9720                 }
9721         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9722                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9723                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9724                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9725                 {
9726                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9727                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9728                 }
9729                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9730                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9731                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
9732         }
9733
9734         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9735         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9736         added_monitors.clear();
9737 }
9738
9739 #[test]
9740 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9741         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9742         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9743         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9744         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9745         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9746         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9747         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9748         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9749         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9750         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9751         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9752         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9753 }
9754
9755 #[test]
9756 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9757         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9758         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9759         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9760         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9761
9762         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9763         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9764         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
9765         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9766         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
9767
9768         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9769
9770         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9771         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9772         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9773         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9774         let mut tx = match events[0] {
9775                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9776                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
9777                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 2), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9778                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9779                         }]}
9780                 },
9781                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9782         };
9783         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9784         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9785                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9786                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9787                 },
9788                 _ => panic!()
9789         }
9790
9791         // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
9792         tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9793         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9794         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9795 }
9796
9797 #[test]
9798 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9799         // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9800         // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9801         // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9802         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9803         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9804         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9805         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9806
9807         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9808
9809         // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9810         {
9811                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9812                 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9813         }
9814
9815         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9816         {
9817                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9818                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9819         }
9820         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9821         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9822
9823         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9824         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9825         match events[0] {
9826                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9827                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9828                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9829                 },
9830                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9831         };
9832
9833         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9834         // it.
9835         {
9836                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9837                 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9838         }
9839         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9840         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9841
9842         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9843         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9844         match events[0] {
9845                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9846                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9847                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9848                 },
9849                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9850         };
9851
9852         // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9853         // channel.
9854         {
9855                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9856                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9857         }
9858         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9859         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9860
9861         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9862         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9863         match events[0] {
9864                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9865                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9866                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9867                                 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() });
9868                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9869                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9870                 },
9871                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9872         };
9873 }
9874
9875 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
9876         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9877         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9878         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9879         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9880         let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
9881         let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
9882                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
9883         let recv_value = 100_000;
9884
9885         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9886
9887         let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
9888         let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
9889                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
9890                         Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
9891                 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
9892         } else {
9893                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
9894                 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
9895         };
9896         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value).unwrap();
9897         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9898                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9899         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9900         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9901         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9902         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9903         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9904         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9905         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9906
9907         if valid_delta {
9908                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
9909                         None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9910
9911                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9912         } else {
9913                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9914
9915                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9916
9917                 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9918                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9919                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9920
9921                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9922         }
9923 }
9924
9925 #[test]
9926 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
9927         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
9928         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
9929         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
9930         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
9931 }