_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, EntropySource, KeysInterface};
  21 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  22 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  23 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  24 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  25 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  26 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  27 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  28 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  30 use crate::ln::msgs;
  31 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  32 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  33 use crate::util::test_utils;
  34 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  38
  39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
  46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  47
  48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  50
  51 use regex;
  52
  53 use crate::io;
  54 use crate::prelude::*;
  55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  56 use core::default::Default;
  57 use core::iter::repeat;
  58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  59 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  60
  61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  63
  64 #[test]
  65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  66         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  67         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  68         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  69         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  70         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  71         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  72         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  73         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  74
  75         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  76         // funding satoshis
  77         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  78         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
  79         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  80
  81         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  82         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  83
  84         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  85         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  86
  87         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  88         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  89         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  90                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  91                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  92                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  93                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  94                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  95                         match action {
  96                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  97                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  98                                 },
  99                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 100                         }
 101                 } else { assert!(false); }
 102         };
 103
 104         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 105
 106         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 107         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 108         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 109
 110         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 111
 112         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 113
 114         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 115
 116         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 117
 118         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 119
 120         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 121
 122         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 123 }
 124
 125 #[test]
 126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 127         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 128         // them.
 129         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 130         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 131         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 132         node_cfgs[1].features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_wumbo();
 133         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 134         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 135
 136         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
 137                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 138                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 139                 },
 140                 _ => panic!()
 141         }
 142 }
 143
 144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 145         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 146         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 147         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 148         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 149         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 150         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 151         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 152         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 153         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 154
 155         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 156         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 157         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 158         let opt_anchors = false;
 159         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 160         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 161
 162         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 163         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 164         if !send_from_initiator {
 165                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 166                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 167         }
 168         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
 169
 170         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 171         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 172         if send_from_initiator {
 173                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 174                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 175         }
 176         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
 177         {
 178                 let mut lock;
 179                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
 180                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 181                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 182         }
 183
 184         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 185         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 186         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 187
 188         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 189         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 190         if send_from_initiator {
 191                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 192                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 193                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 194                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 195                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 196         } else {
 197                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 198         }
 199 }
 200
 201 #[test]
 202 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 203         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 204         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 205 }
 206
 207 #[test]
 208 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 209         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 210         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 211         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 212         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 213         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 214
 215         // balancing
 216         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 217
 218         // A                                        B
 219         // update_fee                            ->
 220         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 221         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 222         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 223         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 224         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 225         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 226         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 227         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 228         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 229         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 230         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 231         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 232         //                                       <- RAA
 233         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 234
 235         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 236         {
 237                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 238                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 239         }
 240         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 241         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 242
 243         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 244         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 245         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 246                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 247                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 248                 },
 249                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 250         };
 251
 252         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 253
 254         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 255         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 256         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 257         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 258
 259         let payment_event = {
 260                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 261                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 262                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 263         };
 264         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 265         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 266
 267         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 268         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 269         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 270         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 271         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 272         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 273
 274         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 275         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 276         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 277         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 278         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 279
 280         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 281         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 282         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 283         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 284         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 285         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 286         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 287         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 288
 289         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 290         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 291         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 292         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 293         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 294         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 295         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 296         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 297
 298         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 299         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 300         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 302
 303         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 304         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 306
 307         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 309
 310         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 311         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 312         match events_2[0] {
 313                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 314                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 315         }
 316
 317         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 318         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 319 }
 320
 321 #[test]
 322 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 323         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 324         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 325         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 326         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 327         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 328         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 329         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 330
 331         // balancing
 332         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 333
 334         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 335         {
 336                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 337                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 338         }
 339         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 341
 342         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 343         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 344         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 345                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 346                         update_fee.as_ref()
 347                 },
 348                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 349         };
 350
 351         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 352
 353         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 354         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 355         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 356         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 357
 358         let payment_event = {
 359                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 360                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 361                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 362         };
 363         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 364         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 365
 366         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 367         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 368         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 369         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 370         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 372
 373         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 374         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 375
 376         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 377 }
 378
 379 #[test]
 380 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 381         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 382         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 383         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 384         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 385         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 386
 387         // A                                        B
 388         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 389         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 390         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 391         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 392         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 393         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 394         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 395         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 396         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 397         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 398         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 399         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 400         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 401         //                                          B should send no response here
 402         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 403         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 404         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 405
 406         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 407         let initial_feerate;
 408         {
 409                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 410                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 411                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 412         }
 413         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 414         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 415
 416         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 417         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 418         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 419                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 420                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 421                 },
 422                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 423         };
 424
 425         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 426         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 427         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 428         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 429         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 430
 431         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 432         // transaction:
 433         {
 434                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 435                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 436         }
 437         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 438         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 439         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 440
 441         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 442         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 443                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 444                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 445         };
 446
 447         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 448
 449         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 450         // Deliver (3)
 451         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 452
 453         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 454         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 455         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 456         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 457         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 458         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 459         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 460         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 461         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 462         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 463         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 464
 465         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 466         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 467         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 468         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 469         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 470
 471         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 472         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 474
 475         // Delever (4)
 476         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 477         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 478         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 479
 480         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 481         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 483
 484         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 485         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 486         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 488
 489         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 490         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 491         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 492 }
 493
 494 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 495         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 496         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 497         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 498         // Node objects.
 499
 500         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 501         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 502         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 503         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 504
 505         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 506                 let block = Block {
 507                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 508                         txdata: vec![],
 509                 };
 510                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 511                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 512         }
 513
 514         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 515         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 516         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 517
 518         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 519         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
 520         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 521
 522         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 523         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
 524
 525         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 526
 527         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 528         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 529         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 530         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 531
 532         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 533         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 534         {
 535                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 536                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 537                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 538                 added_monitors.clear();
 539         }
 540         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 541
 542         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 543         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 544         {
 545                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 546                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 547                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 548                 added_monitors.clear();
 549         }
 550
 551         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 552         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 553
 554         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 555         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 556
 557         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 558         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 559         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 560         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 561         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 562 }
 563
 564 #[test]
 565 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 566         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 567         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 568         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 569         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 570         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 571         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 572         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 573         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 574         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 576         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 577         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 578         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 584 }
 585
 586 #[test]
 587 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 588         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 589         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 590         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 591         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 592         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 593
 594         {
 595                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 596                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 597         }
 598         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 599         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 600
 601         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 602         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 603         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 604                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 605                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 606                 },
 607                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 608         };
 609         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 610
 611         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 612         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 613         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 614
 615         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 616         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 617         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 618
 619         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 620         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 621         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 623
 624         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 625         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 626         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 627 }
 628
 629 #[test]
 630 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 631         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 632         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 633         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 634         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 635         let channel_value = 5000;
 636         let push_sats = 700;
 637         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 638         let channel_id = chan.2;
 639         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 640         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 641         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 642
 643         let opt_anchors = false;
 644
 645         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 646         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 647         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 648         // remote limit.
 649         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 650         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 651         {
 652                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 653                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 654         }
 655         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 656         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 657         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 658
 659         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 660
 661         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 662
 663         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 664         {
 665                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 666
 667                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 668                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 669                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 670                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 671                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 672                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 673         }
 674
 675         {
 676                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 677                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 678                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 679         }
 680         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 681         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 682         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 683
 684         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 685
 686         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 687         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 688         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 689                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 690                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 691                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 692                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 693                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 694                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 695         };
 696         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 697                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 698                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 699                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 700                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 701                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 702                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 703                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 704         };
 705
 706         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 707         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 708                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
 709
 710         let res = {
 711                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 712                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 713                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 714                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 715                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 716                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 717                         push_sats,
 718                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 719                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 720                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 721                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 722                         &mut htlcs,
 723                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 724                 );
 725                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 726         };
 727
 728         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 729                 channel_id: chan.2,
 730                 signature: res.0,
 731                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 732         };
 733
 734         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 735                 channel_id: chan.2,
 736                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 737         };
 738
 739         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 740
 741         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 742         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 743         //Should produce and error.
 744         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 745         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 746         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 747         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 748         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 749 }
 750
 751 #[test]
 752 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 753         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 754         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 755         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 756         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 757         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 758
 759         // balancing
 760         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 761
 762         {
 763                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 764                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 765         }
 766         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 767         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 768
 769         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 770         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 771         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 772                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 773                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 774                 },
 775                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 776         };
 777         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 778         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 779         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 780         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 781
 782         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 783
 784         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 785         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 786         {
 787                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 788                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 789                 added_monitors.clear();
 790         }
 791         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 792         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 793         // node[1] has nothing to do
 794
 795         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 796         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 797         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 798
 799         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 800         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 801         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 803         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 804         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 805         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 806
 807         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 808         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 809         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 810         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 811         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 812         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 813
 814         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 815         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 816         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 817         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 818
 819         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 820         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 821         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 822
 823         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 824         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 825         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 826         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 827
 828         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 829         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 830         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 831
 832         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 833
 834         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 835         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 836         match events[0] {
 837                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
 838                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 839         };
 840
 841         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 842
 843         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 844         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 845         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 846         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 847         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 848 }
 849
 850 #[test]
 851 fn test_update_fee() {
 852         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 853         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 854         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 855         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 856         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 857         let channel_id = chan.2;
 858
 859         // A                                        B
 860         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 861         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 862         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 863         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 864         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 865         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 866         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 867         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 868         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 869         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 870         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 871         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 872
 873         // Create and deliver (1)...
 874         let feerate;
 875         {
 876                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 877                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 878                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 879         }
 880         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 881         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 882
 883         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 884         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 885         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 886                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 887                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 888                 },
 889                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 890         };
 891         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 892
 893         // Generate (2) and (3):
 894         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 895         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 897
 898         // Deliver (2):
 899         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 900         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 901         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 902
 903         // Create and deliver (4)...
 904         {
 905                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 906                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 907         }
 908         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 910         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 911         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 912         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 913                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 914                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 915                 },
 916                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 917         };
 918
 919         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 920         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 922         // ... creating (5)
 923         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 924         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 925
 926         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 927         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 928         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 929         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 930         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 931
 932         // Deliver (5):
 933         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 934         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 935         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 936
 937         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 938         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 939         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 940         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 941         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 942         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 943         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 944         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 946
 947         // Deliver (7)
 948         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 949         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 950         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 951         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 952
 953         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 955         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 956
 957         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 958         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 959         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 960         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 961         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 962 }
 963
 964 #[test]
 965 fn fake_network_test() {
 966         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 967         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 968         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 969         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 970         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 971         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 972
 973         // Create some initial channels
 974         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 975         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 976         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 977
 978         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 979         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 980         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 981         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 982         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 983
 984         // Send some more payments
 985         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 986         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 987         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 988
 989         // Test failure packets
 990         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 991         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 992
 993         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 994         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 995
 996         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 997         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 998         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 999         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1000         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1001         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1002         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1003
1004         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1005         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1006         hops.push(RouteHop {
1007                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1008                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1009                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1010                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1011                 fee_msat: 0,
1012                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1013         });
1014         hops.push(RouteHop {
1015                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1016                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1017                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1018                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1019                 fee_msat: 0,
1020                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1021         });
1022         hops.push(RouteHop {
1023                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1024                 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1025                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1026                 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1027                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1028                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1029         });
1030         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1031         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1032         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1033
1034         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1035         hops.push(RouteHop {
1036                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1037                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1038                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1039                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1040                 fee_msat: 0,
1041                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1042         });
1043         hops.push(RouteHop {
1044                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1045                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1046                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1047                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1048                 fee_msat: 0,
1049                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1050         });
1051         hops.push(RouteHop {
1052                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1053                 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1054                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1055                 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1056                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1057                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1058         });
1059         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1060         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1061         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1062
1063         // Claim the rebalances...
1064         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1065         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1066
1067         // Close down the channels...
1068         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1069         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1070         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1071         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1072         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1073         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1074         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1075         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1076         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1077         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1078         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1079         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1080 }
1081
1082 #[test]
1083 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1084         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1085         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1086         // commitment dance rounds.
1087         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1088         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1089         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1090         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1091         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1092         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1093
1094         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1095         for _ in 0..crate::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1096                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1097                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1098                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1099         }
1100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1101
1102         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1103         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1104         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1105         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1106
1107         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1108         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1109         // another HTLC.
1110         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1111         {
1112                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1113                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1114                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1115                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1116         }
1117
1118         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1119         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1120         {
1121                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1122                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1123         }
1124
1125         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1126         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1127         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1128         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1129
1130         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1131         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1132         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1133         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1134         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1135         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1136         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1137
1138         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1139         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1140         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1141
1142         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1143
1144         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1145         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1146         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1148
1149         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1150         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1152         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1153
1154         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1156         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1157
1158         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1159                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1160         }
1161         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1163         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1165         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1166
1167         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1169         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1170         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1171         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1172
1173         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1175
1176         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1177
1178         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1179         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1180         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1181                 match event {
1182                         &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1183                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1184                         },
1185                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1186                 };
1187         }
1188
1189         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1190                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1191         }
1192
1193         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1194 }
1195
1196 #[test]
1197 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1198         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1199         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1200         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1201         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1202         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1203         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1204
1205         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1206         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1207         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1208         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1209         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1210         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1211
1212         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1213
1214         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1215         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1216
1217         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1218         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1219
1220         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1221         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1222         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1223 }
1224
1225 #[test]
1226 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1227         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1228         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1229         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1230         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1231         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1232         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1233         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1234
1235         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1236
1237         // balancing
1238         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1239
1240         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1241
1242         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1243         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1244         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1245
1246         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1247         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1248         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1250
1251         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1252         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1253
1254         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1255         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1256         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1257                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1258                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1259                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1260                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1261                 }
1262         }
1263         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1264
1265         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1266         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1267         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1268         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1269
1270         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1271         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1272
1273         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1274         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1275         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1276         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1277         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1278                 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1279         } else {
1280                 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1281         };
1282
1283         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1284         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1285
1286         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1287         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1288         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1289
1290         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1291         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1292         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1293         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1294
1295         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1296         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1297         for e in events {
1298                 match e {
1299                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1300                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1301                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1302                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1303                         },
1304                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1305                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1306                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1307                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1308                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1309                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1310                         },
1311                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1312                 }
1313         }
1314 }
1315
1316 #[test]
1317 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1318         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1319         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1320         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1321         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1322         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1323
1324         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1325         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1326
1327         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1328         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1329         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1330         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1331         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1332         match err {
1333                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1334                         match &fails[0] {
1335                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1336                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1337                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1338                         }
1339                 },
1340                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1341         }
1342         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1343         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1344
1345         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1346 }
1347
1348 #[test]
1349 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1350         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1351         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1352         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1353         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1354         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1355
1356         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1357         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1358         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1359         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1360
1361         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1362
1363         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1364         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1365         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1366         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1367                 channel_id: chan.2,
1368                 htlc_id: 0,
1369                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1370                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1371                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1372                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1373         };
1374
1375         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1376
1377         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1378         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1379         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1380
1381         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1382
1383         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1384
1385         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1386         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1387         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1388                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1389                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1390                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1391                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1392                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1393
1394                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1395                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1396                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1397                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1398                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1399         };
1400         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1401                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1402                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1403                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1404                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1405                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1406                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1407                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1408         };
1409
1410         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1411         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1412                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1413
1414         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1415         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1416         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1417
1418         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1419                 offered: false,
1420                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1421                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1422                 payment_hash,
1423                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1424         };
1425
1426         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1427
1428         let res = {
1429                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1430                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1431                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1432                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1433                         commitment_number,
1434                         95000,
1435                         local_chan_balance,
1436                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1437                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1438                         feerate_per_kw,
1439                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1440                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1441                 );
1442                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1443         };
1444
1445         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1446                 channel_id: chan.2,
1447                 signature: res.0,
1448                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1449         };
1450
1451         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1452         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1453         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1454
1455         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1456         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1457                 channel_id: chan.2,
1458                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1459                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1460         };
1461         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1462
1463         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1464         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1465         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1466         match events[0] {
1467                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1468                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1469                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1470                 },
1471                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1472         };
1473         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1474                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1475
1476         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1477 }
1478
1479 #[test]
1480 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1481         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1482         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1483         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1484         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1485         // this situation.
1486         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1487         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1488         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1489         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1490         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1491         let opt_anchors = false;
1492
1493         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1494         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1495
1496         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1497
1498         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1499
1500         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1501         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1502                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1503         }
1504
1505         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1506         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1507         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1508                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1509         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1510         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1511 }
1512
1513 #[test]
1514 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1515         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1516         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1517         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1518         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1519         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1520         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1521         let opt_anchors = false;
1522
1523         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1524         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1525         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1526         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1527         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1528         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1529         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1530
1531         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1532         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1533                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1534         }
1535
1536         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1537         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1538         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1539         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1540         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1541         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1542         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1543         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1544         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1545                 channel_id: chan.2,
1546                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1547                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1548                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1549                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1550                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1551         };
1552
1553         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1554         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1555         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1556         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1557         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1558         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1559         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1560         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1561 }
1562
1563 #[test]
1564 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1565         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1566         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1567         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1568         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1569
1570         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1571         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1572         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1573         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1574         let opt_anchors = false;
1575
1576         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1577         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1578         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1579         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1580         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1581         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1582         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1583
1584         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1585                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1586         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1587         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1588         // commitment transaction fee.
1589         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1590
1591         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1592         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1593                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1594         }
1595
1596         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1597         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1598         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1599                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1600 }
1601
1602 #[test]
1603 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1604         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1605         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1606         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1607         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1608         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1609         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1610         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1611         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1612         let opt_anchors = false;
1613
1614         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1615         // HTLC.
1616         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1617         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1618         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1619                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1620
1621         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1622         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1623         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1624         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1625         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1626         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1627         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg);
1628
1629         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1630         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1631         match msg_events[0] {
1632                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1633                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1634                 },
1635                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1636         }
1637 }
1638
1639 #[test]
1640 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1641         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1642         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1643         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1644         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1645         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1646         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1647         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1648
1649         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1650         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1651         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1652         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1653         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1654         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1655
1656         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1657         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1658         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1659         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1660         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662
1663         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1664         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1665         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1666         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1667 }
1668
1669 #[test]
1670 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1671         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1672         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1673         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1674         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1675         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1676         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1677
1678         let feemsat = 239;
1679         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1680         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1681         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1682         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1683
1684         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1685         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1686         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1687         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1688
1689         // Add a pending HTLC.
1690         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1691         let payment_event_1 = {
1692                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1693                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1694
1695                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1696                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1697                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1698         };
1699         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1700
1701         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1702         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1703         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1704         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1705         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1706
1707         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1708         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1709         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1710         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1711         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1712         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1713         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1714         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1715                 channel_id: chan.2,
1716                 htlc_id: 1,
1717                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1718                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1719                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1720                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1721         };
1722
1723         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1724         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1725         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1726         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1727         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1728         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1729         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1730         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1731 }
1732
1733 #[test]
1734 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1735         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1736         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1737         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1738         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1739         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1740         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1741         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1742         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1743         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1744         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1745
1746         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1747         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1748         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1749
1750         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1751         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1752 }
1753
1754 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1755         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1756 }
1757
1758 #[test]
1759 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1760         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1761         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1762         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1763         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1764         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1765         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1766         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1767         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1768         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1769         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1770
1771         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1772         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1773
1774         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1775         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1776
1777         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1778                 ($node: expr) => {{
1779                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1780                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1781                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1782                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1783                         payment_event
1784                 }}
1785         }
1786
1787         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1788         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1789         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1790         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1791
1792         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1793
1794         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1795         {
1796                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1797                         .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1798                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1799                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1800                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1801
1802                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1803                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1804                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1805                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1806         }
1807
1808         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1809         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1810         loop {
1811                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1812                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1813                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1814                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1815                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1816                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1817                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1818                         break;
1819                 }
1820
1821                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1822                         .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1823                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1824                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1825                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1826
1827                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1828                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1829                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1830                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1831                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1832                 );
1833
1834                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1835                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1836                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1837                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1838                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1839         }
1840
1841         // adding pending output.
1842         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1843         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1844         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1845         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1846         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1847         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1848         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1849         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1850         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1851         // policy.
1852         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1853         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1854         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1855
1856         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1857         let payment_event_1 = {
1858                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1859                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1860
1861                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1862                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1863                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1864         };
1865         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1866
1867         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1868         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1869         {
1870                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1871                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1872                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1873                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1874         }
1875
1876         // split the rest to test holding cell
1877         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1878         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1879         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1880         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1881         {
1882                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1883                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1884         }
1885
1886         // now see if they go through on both sides
1887         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1888         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1889         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1890         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1891         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1892         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1893
1894         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1895         {
1896                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1897                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1898                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1899                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1900                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1901         }
1902
1903         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1904         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1905         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1906         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1907         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1908         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1909
1910         // flush the pending htlc
1911         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1912         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1913         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1914
1915         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1916         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1918         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1919
1920         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1921         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1922         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1923         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1924
1925         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1926         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1927         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1928
1929         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1930
1931         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1932         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1933         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1934
1935         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1936         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1937
1938         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1939         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1940         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1941         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1942         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1943         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1944
1945         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1946         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1947         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1948         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1949
1950         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1951         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1952
1953         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1954         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1955         match events[0] {
1956                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1957                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1958                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1959                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1960                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1961                         match &purpose {
1962                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1963                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1964                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1965                                 },
1966                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1967                         }
1968                 },
1969                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1970         }
1971         match events[1] {
1972                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1973                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1974                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1975                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1976                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1977                         match &purpose {
1978                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1979                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1980                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1981                                 },
1982                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1983                         }
1984                 },
1985                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1986         }
1987
1988         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1989         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1990         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1991
1992         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1993         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1994         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1995
1996         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
1997         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1998         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1999         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2000         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2001
2002         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2003         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2004 }
2005
2006 #[test]
2007 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2008         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2009         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2010         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2011         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2012         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2013         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2014         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2015         // To test this we:
2016         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2017         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2018         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2019         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2020         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2021         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2022         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2023         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2024         //    claim,
2025         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2026         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2027         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2028         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2029         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2030         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2031         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2032         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2033         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2034         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2035
2036         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2037         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2038         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2039         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2040         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2041
2042         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2043         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2044         let send_1 = {
2045                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2046                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2047                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2048                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2049                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2050         };
2051
2052         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2053         // initial fulfill/CS.
2054         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2055         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2056         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2057         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2058
2059         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2060         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2061         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2062         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2063         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2064         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2065
2066         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2067         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2068         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2069         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2070         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2071
2072         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2073         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2074         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2075         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2076         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2077
2078         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2079         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2080         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2081
2082         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2083         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2084         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2085
2086         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2087         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2088         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2089
2090         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2091         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2092         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2093         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2094         // on-chain as necessary).
2095         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2096         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2097         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2098         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2099         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2100
2101         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2102         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2103         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2104
2105         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2106         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2107
2108         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2109         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2110         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2111         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2112         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2113         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2114
2115         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2116         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2117         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2118         let send_2 = {
2119                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2120                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2121                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2122                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2123                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2124         };
2125
2126         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2127         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2128         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2129         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2130
2131         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2132
2133         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2134         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2135         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2136
2137         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2139
2140         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2141         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2142         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2143         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2144
2145         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2146         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2147         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2148
2149         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2151
2152         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2153         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2154
2155         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2156         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2157 }
2158
2159 #[test]
2160 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2161         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2162         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2163         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2164         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2165         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2166         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2167
2168         // Create some initial channels
2169         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2170         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2171         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2172         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2173
2174         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2175         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2176         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2177         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2178         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2179         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2180
2181         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2182         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2183         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2184         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2185         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2186
2187         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2188         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2189         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2190         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2191         {
2192                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2193                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2194                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2195                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2196                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2197         }
2198         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2199         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2200         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2201         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2202         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2203
2204         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2205         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2206
2207         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2208         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2209         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2210         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2211         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2212         {
2213                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2214                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2215                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2216                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2217                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2218                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2219         }
2220         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2221         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2222         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2223         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2224         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2225
2226         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2227                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2228                         {
2229                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2230                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2231                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2232
2233                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2234                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2235                                 match events[0] {
2236                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2237                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2238                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2239                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2240                                         },
2241                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2242                                 };
2243                         }
2244                 }
2245         }
2246
2247         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2248         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2249         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2250         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2251         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2252         let node2_commitment_txid;
2253         {
2254                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2255                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2256                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2257                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2258
2259                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2260                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2261                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2262                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2263                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2264         }
2265         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2266         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2267         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2268         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2269         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2270
2271         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2272         // confusing us in the following tests.
2273         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2274
2275         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2276         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2277         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2278         // buffer space).
2279
2280         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2281                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2282                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2283                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2284                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2285                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2286                                 msg.clone()
2287                         },
2288                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2289                 };
2290                 match events[1] {
2291                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2292                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2293                         },
2294                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2295                 }
2296                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2297
2298                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2299                 {
2300                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2301                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2302                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2303                                         false
2304                                 } else { true }
2305                         });
2306                 }
2307
2308                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2309
2310                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2311                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2312
2313                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2314                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2315                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2316                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2317                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2318                                 msg.clone()
2319                         },
2320                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2321                 };
2322                 match events[1] {
2323                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2324                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2325                         },
2326                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2327                 }
2328                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2329                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2330
2331                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2332                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2333                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2334         };
2335         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2336         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2337         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2338         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2339
2340         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2341                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2342         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2343         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2344 }
2345
2346 #[test]
2347 fn test_justice_tx() {
2348         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2349         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2350         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2351         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2352         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2353         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2354         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2355         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2356         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2357         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2358         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2359         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2360         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2361         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2362         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2363         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2364         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2365         // Create some new channels:
2366         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2367
2368         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2369         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2370         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2371         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2372         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2373         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2374         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2375         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2376         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2377         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2378         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2379         // Revoke the old state
2380         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2381
2382         {
2383                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2384                 {
2385                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2386                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2387                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2388
2389                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2390                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2391                 }
2392                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2393                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2394                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2395
2396                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2397                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2398                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2399                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2400                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2401                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2402                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2403                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2404                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2405         }
2406         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2407
2408         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2409         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2410
2411         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2412         // Create some new channels:
2413         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2414         {
2415                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2416                 node_txn.clear();
2417         }
2418
2419         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2420         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2421         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2422         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2423         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2424         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2425         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2426         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2427         // Revoke the old state
2428         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2429         {
2430                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2431                 {
2432                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2433                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2434                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2435
2436                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2437                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2438                 }
2439                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2440                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2441
2442                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2443                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2444                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2445                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2446                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2447                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2448                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2449         }
2450         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2451         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2452         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2453 }
2454
2455 #[test]
2456 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2457         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2458         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2459         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2460         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2461         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2462         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2463         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2464         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2465         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2466         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2467         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2468         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2469         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2470         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2471
2472         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2473         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2474         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2475         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2476         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2477         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2478
2479         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2480
2481         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2482         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2483         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2484         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2485         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2486 }
2487
2488 #[test]
2489 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2490         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2491         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2492         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2493         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2494         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2495         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2496
2497         // Create some new channel:
2498         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2499
2500         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2501         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2502         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2503         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2504         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2505
2506         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2507         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2508         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2509         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2510         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2511         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2512         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2513         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2514         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2515
2516         //Revoke the old state
2517         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2518
2519         {
2520                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2521                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2522                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2523                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2524                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2525                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2526                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2527                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2528
2529                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2530                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2531
2532                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2533                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2534
2535                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2536                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2537                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2538                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2539                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2540                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2541                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2542                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2543
2544                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2545                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2546                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2547                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2548                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2549         }
2550         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2551         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2552         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2553 }
2554
2555 #[test]
2556 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2557         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2558         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2559         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2560         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2561         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2562         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2563
2564         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2565
2566         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2567         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2568         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2569         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2570         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2571         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2572
2573         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2574         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2575
2576         //Revoke the old state
2577         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2578
2579         {
2580                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2581                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2582                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2583                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2584                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2585                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2586                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2587                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2588                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2589                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2590                 }
2591
2592                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2593                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2594
2595                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2596                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
2597
2598                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2599                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2600                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2601                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2602                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2603                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2604                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2605
2606                 // Justice transactions are indices 2-3-4
2607                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2608                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2609                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2610
2611                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2612                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2613                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2614
2615                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2616                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2617                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2618                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2619                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2620                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2621                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2622                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2623
2624                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2625                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2626                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2627                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2628                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2629                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2630                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2631         }
2632         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2633         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2634         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2635 }
2636
2637 #[test]
2638 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2639         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2640         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2641         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2642         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2643         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2644         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2645         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2646         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2647         // towards B.
2648         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2649         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2650         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2651         // PaymentSent event).
2652
2653         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2654         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2655         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2656         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2657
2658         // Create some initial channels
2659         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2660         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2661
2662         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2663         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2664         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2665         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2666         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2667
2668         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2669         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2670         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2671
2672         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2673         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2674
2675         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2676         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2677         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2678         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2679         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2680         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2681         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2682         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2683         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2684         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2685         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2686         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2687         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2688         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2689         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2690
2691         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2692         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2693         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2694         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2695         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2696         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2697         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2698         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2699         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2700         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2701         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2702         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2703         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2704         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2705
2706         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2707         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2708         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
2709         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2710         {
2711                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2712                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2713                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2714                 added_monitors.clear();
2715         }
2716         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2717         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2718         match forwarded_events[0] {
2719                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2720                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2721         }
2722         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2723         match forwarded_events[1] {
2724                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2725                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2726                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2727                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2728                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2729                 },
2730                 _ => panic!()
2731         }
2732         match forwarded_events[2] {
2733                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2734                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2735                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2736                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2737                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2738                 },
2739                 _ => panic!()
2740         }
2741         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2742         {
2743                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2744                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2745                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2746                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2747                 added_monitors.clear();
2748         }
2749         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2750         match events[0] {
2751                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2752                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2753         }
2754         match events[1] {
2755                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2756                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2757         }
2758
2759         match events[2] {
2760                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2761                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2762                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2763                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2764                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2765                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2766                 },
2767                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2768         };
2769         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2770                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2771                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2772                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2773                         // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2774                         // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2775                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2776                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2777                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2778                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2779                         if $htlc_offered {
2780                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2781                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2782                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2783                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2784                         } else {
2785                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2786                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2787                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2788                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2789                         }
2790                         node_txn.clear();
2791                 } }
2792         }
2793         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2794         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2795
2796         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2797         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2798         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2799         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2800         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2801         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2803         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2804         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2805         assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2806         let commitment_spend =
2807                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2808                         &node_txn[0]
2809                 } else {
2810                         // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2811                         // FullBlockViaListen
2812                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2813                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2814                                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2815                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2816                                 &node_txn[0]
2817                         } else {
2818                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2819                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2820                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2821                                 &node_txn[2]
2822                         }
2823                 };
2824
2825         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2826         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2827         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2828         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2829         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, 0);
2830         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2831         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2832         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2833
2834         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2835         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2836         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2837         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2838         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2839         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2840         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2841         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2842         let mut first_claimed = false;
2843         for event in events {
2844                 match event {
2845                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2846                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2847                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2848                                         first_claimed = true;
2849                                 } else {
2850                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2851                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2852                                 }
2853                         },
2854                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2855                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2856                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2857                 }
2858         }
2859         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2860 }
2861
2862 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2863         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2864         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2865         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2866         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2867         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2868         //            \                                  \
2869         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2870
2871         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2872         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2873         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2874         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2875         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2876         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2877         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2878
2879         // Create some intial channels
2880         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2881         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2882
2883         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2884         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2885         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2886
2887         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2888
2889         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2890         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2891         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2892         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2893         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2894         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2895         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2896
2897         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2898         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2899         match events[0] {
2900                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2901                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2902                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2903                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2904                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2905                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2906                 },
2907                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2908         };
2909         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2910         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2911         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2912         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2913         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2914         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2915
2916         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2917         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2918         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2919         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2920         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2921         let timeout_tx;
2922         {
2923                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2924                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2925
2926                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2927                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2928
2929                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2930                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2931                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2932                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2933
2934                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2935                 node_txn.clear();
2936         }
2937
2938         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2939         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2940         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2941
2942         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2943
2944         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2946         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2947         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2948         match events[0] {
2949                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2950                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2951                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2952                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2953                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2954                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2955                 },
2956                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2957         };
2958
2959         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2960         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2961         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2962
2963         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2964         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2965
2966         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2968         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2969         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
2970         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2971         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2972         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2973 }
2974
2975 #[test]
2976 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2977         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2978         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2979         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2980 }
2981
2982 #[test]
2983 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2984         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2985         // and fail backward accordingly.
2986
2987         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2988         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2989         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2990         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2991
2992         // Create some initial channels
2993         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2994         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2995
2996         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2997         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2998         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2999         // Revoke the old state
3000         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3001
3002         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3003
3004         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3005         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3006         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3007         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3008         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3009
3010         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3011         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3012         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3013         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3014         match events[0] {
3015                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3016                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3017                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3018                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3019                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3020                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3021
3022                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3023                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3024                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3025                 },
3026                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3027         }
3028 }
3029
3030 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3031         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3032         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3033         // commitment transaction anymore.
3034         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3035         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3036         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3037         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3038         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3039         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3040         // transactions:
3041         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3042         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3043         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3044         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3045         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3046         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3047         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3048         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3049         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3050
3051         // Create some initial channels
3052         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3053         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3054
3055         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3056         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3057         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3058         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3059         // Revoke the old state
3060         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3061
3062         let value = if use_dust {
3063                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3064                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3065                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3066         } else { 3000000 };
3067
3068         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3069         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3070         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3071
3072         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3073         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3074         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3075         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3076         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3077         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3078         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3079         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3080         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3081         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3082         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3083         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3084
3085         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3086         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3087         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3088         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3089         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3090         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3091         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3092         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3093         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3094         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3095         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3096         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3097         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3098         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3099         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3101
3102         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3103         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3104         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3105         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3106         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3107         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3108         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3109         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3110         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3111         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3112         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3113         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3114         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3115         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3116         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3117         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3118         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3119         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3120
3121         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3122         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3123         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3124         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3125         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3126         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3127         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3128
3129         if deliver_bs_raa {
3130                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3131                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3132                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3133                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3134                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3135                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3136                 match events[0] {
3137                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3138                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3139                 };
3140                 match events[1] {
3141                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3142                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3143                 }
3144                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3145                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3146         }
3147
3148         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3149         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3150
3151         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3152         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3153         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3154
3155         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3156         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 3 + nodes.len() });
3157         match events[0] {
3158                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3159                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3160         }
3161         match events[1] {
3162                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3163                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3164                 },
3165                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3166         }
3167         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3168                 match events[2] {
3169                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3170                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3171                 };
3172                 nodes[1].node.abandon_payment(PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0));
3173                 let payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3174                 assert_eq!(payment_failed_events.len(), 1);
3175                 match payment_failed_events[0] {
3176                         Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3177                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3178                         },
3179                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3180                 }
3181         }
3182         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3184
3185         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3186         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3187         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3188                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3189                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3190         }
3191         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3192                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3193                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3194                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3195                 },
3196                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3197         }
3198         if deliver_bs_raa {
3199                 match events[0] {
3200                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3201                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3202                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3203                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3204                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3205                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3206                         },
3207                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3208                 }
3209         }
3210         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3211                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3212                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3213                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3214                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3215                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3216                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3217
3218                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3219                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3220                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3221
3222                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3223
3224                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3225                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3226                         match events[0] {
3227                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3228                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3229                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3230                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3231                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3232                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3233                                         }
3234                                 },
3235                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3236                         }
3237                         match events[1] {
3238                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3239                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3240                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3241                                 },
3242                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3243                         }
3244                         match events[2] {
3245                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3246                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3247                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3248                                 },
3249                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3250                         }
3251                 },
3252                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3253         }
3254
3255         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3256         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3257         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3258 }
3259
3260 #[test]
3261 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3262         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3263         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3264         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3265         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3266 }
3267
3268 #[test]
3269 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3270         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3271         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3272         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3273         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3274 }
3275
3276 #[test]
3277 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3278         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3279         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3280         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3281         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3282         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3283
3284         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3285         {
3286                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3287                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3288                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3289
3290                 let payment_event = {
3291                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3292                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3293                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3294                 };
3295                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3296                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3297         }
3298
3299         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3300         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3301         {
3302                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3303                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3304
3305                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3306         }
3307
3308         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3309         {
3310                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3311
3312                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3313                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3314                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3315                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3316                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3317                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3318
3319                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3320                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3321                         channel_id: chan.2,
3322                         htlc_id: 0,
3323                         amount_msat: 0,
3324                         payment_hash,
3325                         cltv_expiry,
3326                         onion_routing_packet,
3327                 };
3328                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3329         }
3330         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3331         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3332         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3333         match events[0] {
3334                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3335                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3336                 },
3337                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3338         }
3339         match events[1] {
3340                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3341                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3342                 },
3343                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3344         }
3345         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3346         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3347 }
3348
3349 #[test]
3350 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3351         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3352         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3353         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3354         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3355         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3356         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3357         if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3358                 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3359                 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3360                 // connect_style.
3361                 return;
3362         }
3363         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3364
3365         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3366         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3367         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3368         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3369         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3370         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3371
3372         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3373         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3374         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3375
3376         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3377         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3378         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3379         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3380         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3381
3382         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3383         // registering new transactions
3384         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3385 }
3386
3387 #[test]
3388 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3389         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3390         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3391         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3392         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3393         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3394         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3395         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3396
3397         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3398
3399         let mut payment_event = {
3400                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3401                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3402
3403                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3404                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3405                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3406         };
3407
3408         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3409         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3410
3411         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3412
3413         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3414         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3415         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3416         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3417
3418         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3419         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3420         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3421         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3422         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3423
3424         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3425         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3426         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3427
3428         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3429         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3430         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3431         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3432         let tx = {
3433                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3434                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3435                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3436                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3437                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3438                 node_txn.remove(0)
3439         };
3440
3441         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3442
3443         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3444         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3445         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3446         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3447
3448         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3449         {
3450                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3451                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3452         }
3453         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3454         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3455         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3456         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3457         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3458         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3459         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3460
3461         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3462 }
3463
3464 #[test]
3465 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3466         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3467         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3468         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3469         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3470
3471         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3472         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3473         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3474         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3475         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3476
3477         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3478
3479         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3480         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3481         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3482         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3483         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3484         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3485
3486         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3487         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3488
3489         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3490         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3491 }
3492
3493 #[test]
3494 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3495         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3496         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3497         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3498         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3499         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3500         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3501
3502         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3503         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3504         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3505         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3506         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
3507         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3508         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
3509
3510         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3511         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3512
3513         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3514
3515         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3516         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3517
3518         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3519         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3520         // broadcasted.
3521         {
3522                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3523         }
3524
3525         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3526         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3527         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3528         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3529
3530         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3531         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3532 }
3533
3534 #[test]
3535 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3536         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3537         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3538         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3539         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3540         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3541         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3542         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3543
3544         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3545         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3546         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3547
3548         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3549         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3550         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3551         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3552
3553         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3554         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3555         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3556
3557         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3558         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3559         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3560         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3561
3562         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3563         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3564
3565         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3566         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3567
3568         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3569         {
3570                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3571                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3572                 match events[0] {
3573                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3574                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3575                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3576                         },
3577                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3578                 }
3579                 match events[1] {
3580                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3581                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3582                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3583                         },
3584                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3585                 }
3586                 match events[2] {
3587                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3588                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3589                 }
3590         }
3591
3592         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3593         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3594 }
3595
3596 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3597         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3598         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3599         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3600         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3601         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3602
3603         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3604         let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3605                 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3606                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3607                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3608                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3609                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3610                 chan_id
3611         } else {
3612                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2
3613         };
3614
3615         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3616
3617         let payment_event = {
3618                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3619                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3620
3621                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3622                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3623                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3624         };
3625         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3626
3627         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3628                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3629         } else {
3630                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3631                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3632                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3633                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3634                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3635
3636                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3637                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3638                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3639                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3640
3641                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3642                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3643                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3644                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3645                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3646
3647                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3648                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3649                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3650                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3651                                         }
3652                                 }
3653                         }
3654                 }
3655         }
3656
3657         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3658         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3659         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3660                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3661                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3662                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3663                         //
3664                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3665                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3666                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3667                         //
3668                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3669                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3670                 }
3671                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3672                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3673                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3674         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3675                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3676                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3677         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3678                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3679                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3680         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3681                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3682                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3683         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3684                 // Everything was delivered...
3685                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3686         }
3687
3688         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3689         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3690                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3691                 match events_1[0] {
3692                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3693                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3694                 };
3695                 match events_1[1] {
3696                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3697                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3698                 };
3699         } else {
3700                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3701                 match events_1[0] {
3702                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3703                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3704                 };
3705         }
3706
3707         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3708         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3709         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3710
3711         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3712
3713         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3714         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3715         match events_2[0] {
3716                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
3717                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3718                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3719                         assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3720                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3721                         match &purpose {
3722                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3723                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3724                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3725                                 },
3726                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3727                         }
3728                 },
3729                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3730         }
3731
3732         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3733         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3734         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3735
3736         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3737         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3738         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3739                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3740                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3741                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3742                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3743                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3744                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3745                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3746                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3747                 },
3748                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3749         };
3750
3751         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3752                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3753
3754                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3755                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3756                 match events_4[0] {
3757                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3758                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3759                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3760                         },
3761                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3762                 }
3763
3764                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3765                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3766                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3767                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3768
3769                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3770                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3771                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3772                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3773
3774                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3775                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3776                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3777                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3778                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3779
3780                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3781                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3782                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3783                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3784                                         }
3785                                 }
3786                         }
3787                 }
3788         }
3789
3790         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3791         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3792         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3793                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3794                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3795                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3796                 } else {
3797                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3798                 }
3799         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3800                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3801                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3802         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3803                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3804                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3805         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3806                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3807                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3808         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3809                 // Everything was delivered...
3810                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3811         }
3812
3813         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3814                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3815         }
3816
3817         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3818         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3819         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3820
3821         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3822                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3823         }
3824
3825         // Channel should still work fine...
3826         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3827         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3828         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3829 }
3830
3831 #[test]
3832 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3833         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3834         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3835         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3836         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3837 }
3838
3839 #[test]
3840 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3841         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3842         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3843         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3844         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3845 }
3846
3847 #[test]
3848 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3849         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3850         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3851         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3852         // channel_ready immediately instead.
3853         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3854         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3855         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3856         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3857         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3858
3859         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3860
3861         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3862         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3863         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3864         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3865         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3866         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3867
3868         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3869         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3870         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3871 }
3872
3873 #[test]
3874 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3875         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3876         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3877         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3878         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3879         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3880         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3881         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3882
3883         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3884
3885         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3886         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3887         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3888         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3889
3890         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3891         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3892         match events_1[0] {
3893                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3894                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3895         }
3896
3897         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3898         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3899         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3900
3901         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3902         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3903         match events_2[0] {
3904                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3905                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3906                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3907                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3908                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3909                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3910                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3911
3912                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3913                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3914                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3915                         match events_3[0] {
3916                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3917                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3918                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3919                                 },
3920                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3921                         }
3922
3923                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3924                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3925                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3926                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3927                 },
3928                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3929         }
3930
3931         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3932         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3933
3934         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3935         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3936         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3937         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3938         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3939         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3940
3941         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3942         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3943         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3944         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3945
3946         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3947         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3948
3949         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3950         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3951
3952         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3953
3954         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3955         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3956         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3957         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3958         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3959         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3960         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3961         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3962         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3963         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3964
3965         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3966         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3967         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3968         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3969         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3970         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3971         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3972         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3973
3974         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3975         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3976         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3977         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3978         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3979         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3980         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3981         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3982
3983         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3984         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3985         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3986         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3987
3988         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3989         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3990         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3991         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3992
3993         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3994         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3995         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3996
3997         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3998
3999         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4000         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4001         match events_5[0] {
4002                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4003                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4004                         match &purpose {
4005                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4006                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4007                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4008                                 },
4009                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4010                         }
4011                 },
4012                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4013         }
4014
4015         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4016         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4017         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4018
4019         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4020         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4021 }
4022
4023 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4024         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4025         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4026         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4027         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4028         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4029         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4030
4031         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4032
4033         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4034                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4035                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4036                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4037                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4038                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4039                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4040                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4041                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4042                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4043                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4044                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4045                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4046                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4047                 our_payment_hash
4048         } else {
4049                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4050         };
4051
4052         let mut block = Block {
4053                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4054                 txdata: vec![],
4055         };
4056         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4057         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4058         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4059         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4060                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4061                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4062                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4063         }
4064
4065         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4066
4067         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4068         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4069         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4070         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4071         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4072         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4073
4074         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4075         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4076         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4077         let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4078         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4079         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4080 }
4081
4082 #[test]
4083 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4084         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4085         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4086 }
4087
4088 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4089         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4090         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4091         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4092         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4093         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4094         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4095         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4096
4097         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4098         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4099         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4100         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4101
4102         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4103         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4104         {
4105                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4106         }
4107         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4108         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4109
4110         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4111         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4112         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4113         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4114         if forwarded_htlc {
4115                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4116                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4117                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4118                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4119                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4120         }
4121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4122
4123         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4124         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4125         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4126         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4127
4128         if forwarded_htlc {
4129                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4130                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4131                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4132                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4133                 match fail_commit[0] {
4134                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4135                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4136                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4137                         },
4138                         _ => unreachable!(),
4139                 }
4140                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4141         } else {
4142                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4143         }
4144 }
4145
4146 #[test]
4147 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4148         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4149         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4150 }
4151
4152 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4153         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4154                 {
4155                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4156                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4157                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4158                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4159                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4160                                 match event {
4161                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4162                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4163                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4164                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4165                                                 }
4166                                         },
4167                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4168                                 };
4169                         }
4170                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4171                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4172                                         txn.push(tx);
4173                                 }
4174                         }
4175                         txn
4176                 }
4177         }
4178 }
4179
4180 #[test]
4181 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4182         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4183         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4184         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4185         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4186         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4187
4188         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4189         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4190         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4191         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4192         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4193         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4194         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4195         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4196         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4197
4198         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4199         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4200
4201         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4202         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4203         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4204         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4205         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4206 }
4207
4208 #[test]
4209 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4210         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4211         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4212         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4213         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4214         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4215         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4216
4217         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4218         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4219         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4221         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4222
4223         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4224         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4225         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4226         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4227
4228         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4229         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4230         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4231         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4232         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4233
4234         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4235         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4236         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4237 }
4238
4239 #[test]
4240 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4241         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4242         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4243
4244         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4245         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4246         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4247         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4248
4249         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4250         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4251         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4252         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4253         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4254
4255         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4256         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4257         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4258         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4259         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4260
4261         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4262         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4263         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4264
4265         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4266         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4267         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4268         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4269         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4270 }
4271
4272 #[test]
4273 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4274         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4275         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4276         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4277         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4278
4279         // Create some initial channels
4280         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4281
4282         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4283
4284         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4285         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4286         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4287
4288         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4289         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4290         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4291         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4292         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4293         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4294         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4295         match events[0] {
4296                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4297                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4298         }
4299         match events[1] {
4300                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4301                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4302         }
4303
4304         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4305         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4306         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4307         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4308         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4309
4310         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4311         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4312         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4313
4314         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4315         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4316         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4317 }
4318
4319 #[test]
4320 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4321         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4322         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4323         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4324         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4325
4326         // Create some initial channels
4327         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4328
4329         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4330         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4331
4332         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4333
4334         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4335         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4336         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4337
4338         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4339         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4341         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4342         match events[0] {
4343                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4344                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4345         }
4346         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4347
4348         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4349         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4350         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4351         check_spends!(node_txn[0],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4352         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4353
4354         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4355         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4356         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4357         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4358
4359         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4360         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4361         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4362         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4363         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4364 }
4365
4366 #[test]
4367 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4368         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4369         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4370         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4371         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4372
4373         // Create some initial channels
4374         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4375
4376         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4377         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4378         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4379         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4380
4381         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4382
4383         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4384         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4385         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4386         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4387
4388         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4389         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4390         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4391         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4392
4393         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4394         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4395
4396         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4397         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4398         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4399 }
4400
4401 #[test]
4402 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4403         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4404         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4405         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4406         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4407         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4408
4409         // Create some initial channels
4410         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4411
4412         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4413         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4414         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4415         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4416
4417         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4418
4419         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4420         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4421         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4422         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4423         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4424         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4425
4426         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4427         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4428         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4429         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4430         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4431         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4432
4433         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4434         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4435         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4436         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4437         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4438         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4439
4440         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4441         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4442         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4443         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4444         // transactions next...
4445         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4446         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4447
4448         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4449         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4450         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4451                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4452         } else {
4453                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4454                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4455         }
4456
4457         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4458         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4459
4460         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4461         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4462         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4463         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4464         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4465 }
4466
4467 #[test]
4468 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4469         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4470         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4471         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4472         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4473         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4474
4475         // Create some initial channels
4476         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4477
4478         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4479         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4480         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4481         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4482
4483         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4484         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4485
4486         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4487
4488         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4489         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4490         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4491         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4492         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4493         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4494
4495         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4496         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4497         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4498         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4499
4500         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4501         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4502         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4503
4504         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4505         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4506         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4507         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4508         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4509         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4510
4511         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4512         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4513
4514         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4515         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4516         // transactions next...
4517         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4518         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4519         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4520                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4521         } else {
4522                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4523                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4524         }
4525
4526         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4527         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4528
4529         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4530         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4531
4532         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4533         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4534
4535         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4536         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4537         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4538         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4539         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4540         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4541         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4542         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4543 }
4544
4545 #[test]
4546 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4547         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4548         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4549         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4550         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4551         // channel.
4552         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4553         // gets broadcast.
4554
4555         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4556         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4557         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4558         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4559
4560         // Create some initial channels
4561         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4562         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4563
4564         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4565         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4566         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4567         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4568         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4569
4570         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4571         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4572         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4573
4574         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4575         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4576         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4577         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4578         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4579         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4580         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4581         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4582         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4583         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4584         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4585
4586         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4587         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4588         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4589         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4590
4591         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4592         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4593         check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4594         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4595         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4596         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4597
4598         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4599         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4600         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]});
4601         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4602         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4603         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4604         match events[0] {
4605                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4606                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4607         }
4608         match events[1] {
4609                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
4610                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4611                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4612                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4613                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4614                 },
4615                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4616         }
4617         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4618         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4619         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4620         match msg_events[0] {
4621                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4622                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4623         }
4624         match msg_events[1] {
4625                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4626                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4627         }
4628         match msg_events[2] {
4629                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4630                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4631                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4632                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4633                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4634                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4635                 },
4636                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4637         };
4638         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4639         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4640         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4641         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4642         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4643         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4644         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4645         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4646         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4647         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4648         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4649
4650         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4651         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4652 }
4653
4654 #[test]
4655 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4656         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4657         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4658         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4659         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4660         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4661         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4662         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4663         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4664         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4665         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4666         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4667                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4668         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4669
4670         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4671         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4672         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4673
4674         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4675         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4676         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4677         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4678         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4679
4680         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4681
4682         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
4683         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4684         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4685         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4686         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
4687                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
4688         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
4689         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4690
4691         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4692         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4693         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4694
4695         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4696         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4697         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4698         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4699         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4700
4701         let htlc_timeout_tx;
4702         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4703                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4704                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
4705                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4706
4707                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4708                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4709
4710                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4711                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4712                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4713                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4714
4715                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4716                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4717                 } else {
4718                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4719                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4720                 }
4721
4722                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4723                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4724                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4725                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4726                 }
4727                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[0].clone();
4728         }
4729
4730         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4731         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4732
4733         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4734         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4735         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4736         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4737         match events[0] {
4738                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4739                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4740         }
4741         match events[1] {
4742                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4743                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4744         }
4745         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4746         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4747         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4748         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4749         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4750         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4751         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4752         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4753         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4754         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4755
4756         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4757         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4758         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4759         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4760         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4761         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4762         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4763         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4764         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4765         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4766
4767         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4768         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4769         {
4770                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4771         }
4772         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4773
4774         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4775         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
4776         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
4777         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
4778         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
4779         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4780         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4781         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4782         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4783         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4784         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4785         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4786
4787         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4788         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4789
4790         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4791         match events[0] {
4792                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4793                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4794                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
4795                 }
4796                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4797         }
4798 }
4799
4800 #[test]
4801 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4802         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4803         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4804         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4805         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4806
4807         // Create some initial channels
4808         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4809
4810         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4811         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4812         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4813         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4814         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4815
4816         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4817         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4818         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4819         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4820
4821         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4822         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4823         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4824         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4825         match events[0] {
4826                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4827                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4828         }
4829         match events[1] {
4830                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4831                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4832         }
4833         let node_tx = {
4834                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4835                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4836                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4837                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4838                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4839                 node_txn[0].clone()
4840         };
4841
4842         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4843         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4844
4845         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4846         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4847         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4848         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4849         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4850         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4851 }
4852
4853 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4854         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4855         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4856         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4857         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4858         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4859         // use the same payment hashes.
4860         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4861         //
4862         // A \         / E
4863         //    - C - D -
4864         // B /         \ F
4865         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4866         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4867         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4868         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4869         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4870         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4871         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4872         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4873                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4874         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4875
4876         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4877         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4878         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4879         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4880         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4881
4882         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4883         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4884         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
4885         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
4886
4887         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4888         // 0th HTLC:
4889         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4890         // 1st HTLC:
4891         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4892         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4893         // 2nd HTLC:
4894         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4895         // 3rd HTLC:
4896         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4897         // 4th HTLC:
4898         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4899         // 5th HTLC:
4900         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4901         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4902         // 6th HTLC:
4903         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
4904         // 7th HTLC:
4905         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
4906
4907         // 8th HTLC:
4908         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4909         // 9th HTLC:
4910         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4911         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4912
4913         // 10th HTLC:
4914         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4915         // 11th HTLC:
4916         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4917         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
4918
4919         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
4920         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
4921         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
4922         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
4923         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
4924
4925         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
4926         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
4927         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
4928         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
4929         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
4930         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
4931         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
4932
4933         let failed_destinations = vec![
4934                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
4935                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
4936                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
4937                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
4938         ];
4939         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
4940         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
4941
4942         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
4943         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4944         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
4945         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
4946         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
4947         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
4948
4949         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
4950         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
4951         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
4952         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
4953
4954         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
4955                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
4956                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
4957         ];
4958         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
4959         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
4960
4961         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
4962         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4963         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
4964         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
4965
4966         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
4967
4968         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
4969         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
4970                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
4971                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
4972                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
4973                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
4974                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
4975                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
4976         ];
4977         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
4978         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
4979         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
4980         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4981         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
4982         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
4983         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
4984         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
4985         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
4986         if deliver_last_raa {
4987                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
4988         } else {
4989                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
4990         }
4991
4992         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
4993         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
4994         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
4995         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
4996         //
4997         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
4998         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
4999         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5000         //
5001         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5002         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5003         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5004
5005         if announce_latest {
5006                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5007         } else {
5008                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5009         }
5010         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5011         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5012                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5013                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5014         } else {
5015                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5016                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5017         };
5018         match close_event {
5019                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5020                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5021         }
5022
5023         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5024         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5025         if deliver_last_raa {
5026                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5027
5028                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5029                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5030         } else {
5031                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5032                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5033                 } else {
5034                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5035                 };
5036
5037                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5038         }
5039         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5040
5041         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5042         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5043         let mut a_done = false;
5044         for msg in cs_msgs {
5045                 match msg {
5046                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5047                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5048                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5049                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5050                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5051                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5052                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5053                                         }
5054                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5055                                         assert!(!a_done);
5056                                         a_done = true;
5057                                         &nodes[0]
5058                                 } else {
5059                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5060                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5061                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5062                                         }
5063                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5064                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5065                                         &nodes[1]
5066                                 };
5067                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5068                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5069                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5070                                 if announce_latest {
5071                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5072                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5073                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5074                                         }
5075                                 }
5076                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5077                         },
5078                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5079                 }
5080         }
5081
5082         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5083         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5084         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5085         let mut as_updates = 0;
5086         for event in as_events.iter() {
5087                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5088                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5089                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5090                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5091                         } else {
5092                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5093                         }
5094                         if network_update.is_some() {
5095                                 as_updates += 1;
5096                         }
5097                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5098         }
5099         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5100         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5101         if announce_latest {
5102                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5103                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5104         }
5105         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5106
5107         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5108         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5109         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5110         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5111         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5112                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5113                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5114                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5115                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5116                         } else {
5117                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5118                         }
5119                         if network_update.is_some() {
5120                                 bs_updates += 1;
5121                         }
5122                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5123         }
5124         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5125         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5126         if announce_latest {
5127                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5128         }
5129         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5130
5131         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5132         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5133         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5134         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5135         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5136         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5137 }
5138
5139 #[test]
5140 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5141         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5142 }
5143
5144 #[test]
5145 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5146         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5147 }
5148
5149 #[test]
5150 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5151         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5152         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5153         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5154 }
5155
5156 #[test]
5157 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5158         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5159         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5160         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5161         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5162
5163         // Create some initial channels
5164         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5165
5166         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5167         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5168         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5169         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5170
5171         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5172         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5173         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5175         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5176         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5177
5178         let htlc_timeout = {
5179                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5180                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5181                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5182                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5183                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5184                 node_txn[0].clone()
5185         };
5186
5187         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5188         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5189         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5190
5191         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5192         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5193         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5194         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5195         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5196         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5197         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5198         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5199         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5200         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5201                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5202 }
5203
5204 #[test]
5205 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5206         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5207         // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5208         // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5209         // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5210
5211         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5212
5213         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5214         let seed = [42; 32];
5215         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5216         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5217         let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5218         let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone());
5219         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: channelmanager::provided_init_features() };
5220         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5221         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5222         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5223
5224         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5225         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5226
5227         // Create some initial channels
5228         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5229         // for node 0
5230         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5231         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5232         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5233
5234         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5235         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5236         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5237         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5238         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5239
5240         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5241         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5242         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5243         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5244         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5245
5246         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5247         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5248         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5249         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5250             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5251             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5252             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5253                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5254         }
5255
5256         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5257         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5258         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5259         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5260         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5261         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5262
5263         let htlc_timeout = {
5264                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5265                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5266                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5267                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5268                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5269                 node_txn[0].clone()
5270         };
5271
5272         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5273         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5274         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5275
5276         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5277         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5278         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5279         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5280         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5281         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5282         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5283         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5284         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5285         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5286         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5287                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5288 }
5289
5290 #[test]
5291 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5292         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5293         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5294         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5295         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5296
5297         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5298
5299         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5300         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5301
5302         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5303         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5304         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5305
5306         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5307         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5308         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5309
5310         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5311         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5312         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5313
5314         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5315         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5316         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5317 }
5318
5319 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5320         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5321         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5322         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5323         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5324         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5325
5326         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5327
5328         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5329         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5330         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5331         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5332         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5333
5334         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5335         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5336         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5337
5338         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5339         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5340         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5341         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5342         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5343
5344         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5345         let mut block = Block {
5346                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5347                 txdata: vec![],
5348         };
5349         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5350                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5351                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5352         }
5353         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5354         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5355         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5356         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5357 }
5358
5359 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5360         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5361         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5362         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5363         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5364         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5365
5366         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5367         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5368         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5369
5370         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5371
5372         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5373         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5374         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5375
5376         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5377         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5378
5379         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5380                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5381                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5382         }
5383         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5384         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5385         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5386         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5387 }
5388
5389 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5390         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5391         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5392         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5393         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5394         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5395
5396         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5397         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5398         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5399         // actually revoked.
5400         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5401         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5402         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5403         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5404         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5405
5406         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5407         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5408         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5409         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5410         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5411         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5412         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5413         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5414         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5415         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5416
5417         if check_revoke_no_close {
5418                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5419                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5420         }
5421
5422         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5423         let mut block = Block {
5424                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5425                 txdata: vec![],
5426         };
5427         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5428                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5429                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5430         }
5431         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5432                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5433                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5434                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5435                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5436         } else {
5437                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5438         }
5439 }
5440
5441 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5442 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5443 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5444 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5445 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5446 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5447 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5448 // non-dust HTLCs.
5449 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5450 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5451 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5452 #[test]
5453 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5454         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5455         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5456
5457         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5458         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5459 }
5460
5461 #[test]
5462 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5463         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5464         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5465         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5466         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5467 }
5468
5469 #[test]
5470 #[should_panic]
5471 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5472         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5473         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5474         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5475         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5476         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5477         for node in nodes.iter() {
5478                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5479         }
5480
5481         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5482         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5483         let push_msat=10001;
5484         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5485         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5486         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5487         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5488
5489         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5490         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5491         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5492 }
5493
5494 #[test]
5495 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5496         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5497         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5498         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5499         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5500
5501         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5502         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5503         let push_msat=10001;
5504         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5505
5506         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5507         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5508         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5509         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5510         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5511
5512         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5513         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5514         let push_msat=10001;
5515         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5516         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5517         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5518
5519         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5520         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5521         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5522
5523         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5524         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5525         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5526
5527         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5528         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5529         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5530
5531         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5532         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5533         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5534         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5535         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5536         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5537 }
5538
5539 #[test]
5540 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5541         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5542         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5543         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5544         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5545
5546         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5547         let push_msat=10001;
5548         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5549         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5550         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5551         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5552
5553         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5554         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5555         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5556                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5557                         msg.clone()
5558                 },
5559                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5560         };
5561         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5562 }
5563
5564 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5565 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5566 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5567 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5568 #[test]
5569 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5570         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5571         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5572         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5573         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5574         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5575
5576         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5577         // pending_update_fee.
5578         {
5579                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5580                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5581         }
5582         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5583         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5584
5585         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5586         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5587         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5588                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5589                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5590                 },
5591                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5592         };
5593
5594         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5595
5596         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5597         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5598         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5599         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5600
5601         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5602         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5603         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5604
5605         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5606         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5607         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5608         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5609
5610         // Flush the pending fee update.
5611         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5612         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5613         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5614         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5615         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5616
5617         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5618         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5619         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5620         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5621         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5622         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5623         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5624                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5625         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5626
5627         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5628         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5629         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5630         match &events[0] {
5631                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5632                         assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5633                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5634                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5635                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5636                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5637                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5638                 },
5639                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5640         }
5641 }
5642
5643 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5644 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5645 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5646 #[test]
5647 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5648         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5649         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5650         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5651         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5652         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5653
5654         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5655         // pending_update_fee.
5656         {
5657                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5658                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5659         }
5660         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5661         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5662
5663         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5664         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5665         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5666                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5667                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5668                 },
5669                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5670         };
5671
5672         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5673
5674         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5675         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5676         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5677         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5678
5679         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5680         let amt_1 = 20000;
5681         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5682         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5683         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5684
5685         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5686         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5687         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5688         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5689         let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5690         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5691         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5692         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5693
5694         // Flush the pending fee update.
5695         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5696         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5697         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5698         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5699         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5700         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5701
5702         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5703         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5704         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5705         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5706         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5707         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5708         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5709                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5710         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5711
5712         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5713         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5714         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5715         match &events[0] {
5716                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5717                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5718                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5719                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5720                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5721                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5722                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5723                 },
5724                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5725         }
5726
5727         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5728         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5729                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5730                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5731                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5732         };
5733         let raa = match send_raa_event {
5734                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5735                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5736         };
5737         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5738         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5739         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5740         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5741         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5742         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5743         match events[0] {
5744                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5745                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5746         }
5747         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5748         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5749         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5750         match events[0] {
5751                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
5752                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5753         }
5754         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5755         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5756         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5757
5758         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5759         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5760         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5761         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5762 }
5763
5764 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5765 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5766 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5767 // once it's freed.
5768 #[test]
5769 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5770         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5771         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5772         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5773         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5774         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5775         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5776         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5777         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5778         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5779         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5780
5781         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5782         // pending_update_fee.
5783         {
5784                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5785                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5786         }
5787         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5788         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5789
5790         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5791         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5792         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5793                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5794                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5795                 },
5796                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5797         };
5798
5799         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5800
5801         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5802         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5803         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5804         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5805
5806         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5807         let feemsat = 239;
5808         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
5809         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
5810         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5811         let payment_event = {
5812                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5813                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5814
5815                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5816                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5817
5818                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5819         };
5820         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5821         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5822         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5823         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5824
5825         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
5826         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5827
5828         // Flush the pending fee update.
5829         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5830         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5831         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5832         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5833         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5834         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5835
5836         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5837         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5838         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5839
5840         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5841                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5842                         msg.clone()
5843                 },
5844                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5845         };
5846
5847         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5848         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5849         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5850
5851         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5852         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5853         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5854         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5855                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5856                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5857         }
5858
5859         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5860         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5861         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5862
5863         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5864         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5865         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5866         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5867                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5868                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5869                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5870                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5871                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5872                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5873                 },
5874                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5875         };
5876
5877         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
5878         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
5879         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5880
5881         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
5882         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5883         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5884         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5885         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5886         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5887         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5888         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
5889         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
5890                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
5891                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5892         };
5893         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5894         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
5895         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5896 }
5897
5898 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
5899 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
5900 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
5901
5902 #[test]
5903 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
5904         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
5905         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5906         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5907         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5908         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5909         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5910
5911         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5912         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
5913
5914         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5915                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
5916         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5917         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
5918 }
5919
5920 #[test]
5921 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
5922         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
5923         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5924         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5925         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5926         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5927         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5928
5929         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5930         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
5931         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5932                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
5933
5934         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5935         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
5936 }
5937
5938 #[test]
5939 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
5940         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
5941         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5942         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5943         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5944         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5945         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5946
5947         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5948         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5949         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5950         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5951         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
5952
5953         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5954         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
5955         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
5956         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5957         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
5958 }
5959
5960 #[test]
5961 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
5962         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
5963         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
5964         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5965         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5966         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5967         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5968         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5969
5970         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
5971                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
5972         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
5973         route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
5974         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
5975                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
5976 }
5977
5978 #[test]
5979 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
5980         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
5981         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
5982         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
5983         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5984         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5985         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5986         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5987         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5988         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
5989
5990         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
5991                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5992                 let payment_event = {
5993                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5994                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5995
5996                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5997                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5998                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
5999                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6000                         } else {
6001                                 assert!(false);
6002                         }
6003                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6004                 };
6005                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6006                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6007                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6008
6009                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6010                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6011         }
6012         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6013         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6014                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6015
6016         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6017         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6018 }
6019
6020 #[test]
6021 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6022         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6023         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6024         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6025         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6026         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6027         let channel_value = 100000;
6028         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6029         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6030
6031         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6032
6033         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6034         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6035         // limits us to.
6036         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6037         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6038                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6039
6040         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6041         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6042
6043         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6044 }
6045
6046 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6047 #[test]
6048 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6049         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6050         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6051         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6052         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6053         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6054         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6055         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6056         {
6057                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6058                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6059                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6060         }
6061
6062         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6063         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6064         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6065         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6066         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6067         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6068         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6069         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6070         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6071         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6072         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6073 }
6074
6075 #[test]
6076 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6077         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6078         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6079         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6080         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6081         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6082         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6083
6084         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6085         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6086         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6087         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6088         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6089         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6090
6091         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6092         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6093         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6094         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6095         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6096
6097         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6098         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6099         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6100         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6101         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6102
6103         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6104         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6105         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6106         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6107         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6108 }
6109
6110 #[test]
6111 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6112         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6113         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6114         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6115         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6116         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6117         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6118         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6119
6120         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6121         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6122         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6123         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6124         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6125         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6126
6127         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6128                 channel_id: chan.2,
6129                 htlc_id: 0,
6130                 amount_msat: 1000,
6131                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6132                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6133                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6134         };
6135
6136         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6137                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6138                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6139         }
6140         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6141         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6142
6143         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6144         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6145         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6146         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6147         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6148 }
6149
6150 #[test]
6151 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6152         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6153         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6154         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6155         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6156         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6157         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6158
6159         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6160         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6161         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6162         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6163         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6164         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6165
6166         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6167         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6168         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6169         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6170         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6171 }
6172
6173 #[test]
6174 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6175         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6176         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6177         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6178         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6179         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6180
6181         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6182         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6183         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6184         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6185         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6186         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6187         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6188
6189         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6190         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6191         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6192         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6193         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6194 }
6195
6196 #[test]
6197 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6198         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6199         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6200         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6201         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6202         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6203         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6204         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6205
6206         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6207         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6208         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6209         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6210         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6211         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6212
6213         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6214         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6215         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6216         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6217         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6218         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6219         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6220         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6221         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6222         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6223         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6224         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6225         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6226
6227         //Resend HTLC
6228         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6229         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6230         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6231         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6232         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6233
6234         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6235
6236         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6237         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6238         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6239         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6240         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6241 }
6242
6243 #[test]
6244 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6245         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6246
6247         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6248         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6249         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6250         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6251         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6252         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6253         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6254
6255         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6256         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6257         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6258
6259         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6260                 channel_id: chan.2,
6261                 htlc_id: 0,
6262                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6263         };
6264
6265         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6266
6267         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6268         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6269         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6270         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6271         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6272 }
6273
6274 #[test]
6275 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6276         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6277
6278         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6279         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6280         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6281         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6282         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6283
6284         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6285         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6286         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6287         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6288         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6289
6290         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6291                 channel_id: chan.2,
6292                 htlc_id: 0,
6293                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6294         };
6295
6296         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6297
6298         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6299         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6300         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6302         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6303 }
6304
6305 #[test]
6306 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6307         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6308
6309         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6310         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6311         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6312         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6313         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6314
6315         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6316         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6317         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6318         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6319         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6320         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6321                 channel_id: chan.2,
6322                 htlc_id: 0,
6323                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6324                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6325         };
6326
6327         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6328
6329         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6330         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6331         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6332         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6333         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6334 }
6335
6336 #[test]
6337 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6338         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6339
6340         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6341         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6342         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6343         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6344         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6345
6346         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6347
6348         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6349         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6350         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6351
6352         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6353         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6354         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6355                 match events[0] {
6356                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6357                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6358                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6359                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6360                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6361                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6362                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6363                         },
6364                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6365                 }
6366         };
6367
6368         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6369
6370         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6371
6372         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6373         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6374         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6375         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6376         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6377 }
6378
6379 #[test]
6380 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6381         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6382
6383         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6384         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6385         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6386         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6387         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6388
6389         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6390
6391         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6392         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6393         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6394
6395         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6396         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6397         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6398                 match events[0] {
6399                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6400                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6401                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6402                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6403                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6404                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6405                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6406                         },
6407                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6408                 }
6409         };
6410
6411         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6412
6413         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6414
6415         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6416         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6417         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6418         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6419         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6420 }
6421
6422 #[test]
6423 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6424         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6425
6426         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6427         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6428         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6429         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6430         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6431
6432         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6433         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6434         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6435
6436         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6437         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6438
6439         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6440         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6441         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6442
6443         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6444
6445         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6446                 match events[0] {
6447                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6448                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6449                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6450                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6451                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6452                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6453                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6454                         },
6455                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6456                 }
6457         };
6458         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6459         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6460
6461         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6462         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6463         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6464         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6465         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6466 }
6467
6468 #[test]
6469 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6470         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6471         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6472
6473         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6474         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6475         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6476         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6477         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6478         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6479
6480         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6481
6482         //First hop
6483         let mut payment_event = {
6484                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6485                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6486                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6487                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6488                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6489         };
6490         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6491         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6492         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6493         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6494         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6495         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6496         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6497         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6498         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6499
6500         //Second Hop
6501         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6502         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6503         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6504         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6505
6506         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6507         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6508         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6509                 match events_3[0] {
6510                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6511                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6512                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6513                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6514                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6515                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6516                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6517                         },
6518                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6519                 }
6520         };
6521
6522         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6523
6524         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6525         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6526         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6527         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6528         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6529
6530         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6531         match events_4[0] {
6532                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6533                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6534                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6535                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6536                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6537                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6538                 },
6539                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6540         };
6541
6542         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6543 }
6544
6545 #[test]
6546 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6547         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6548         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6549         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6550         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6551         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6552         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6553
6554         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6555
6556         // First hop
6557         let mut payment_event = {
6558                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6559                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6560                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6561         };
6562
6563         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6564         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6565         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6566         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6567         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6568         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6569
6570         // Second Hop
6571         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6572         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6573         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6574         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6575
6576         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6577         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6578         match events_3[0] {
6579                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6580                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6581                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6582                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6583
6584                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6585                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6586                 },
6587                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6588         }
6589
6590         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6591                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6592                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6593         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6594         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6595         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6596
6597         match events_4[0] {
6598                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6599                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6600                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6601                 },
6602                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6603         }
6604
6605         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6606         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6607
6608         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6609         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6610         match events_5[0] {
6611                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update:
6612                         Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }), error_code, ..
6613                 } => {
6614                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6615                         assert!(is_permanent);
6616                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6617                 },
6618                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6619         }
6620
6621         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6622 }
6623
6624 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6625         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6626         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6627         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6628
6629         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6630         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6631         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6632         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6633         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6634         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6635
6636         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6637
6638         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6639         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6640         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6641         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6642
6643         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6644         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6645
6646         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6647         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6648         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6649         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6650         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6651
6652         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6653         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6654         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6655         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6656
6657         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6658         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6659
6660         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6661         match events[0] {
6662                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6663                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6664                 },
6665                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6666         }
6667         match events[1] {
6668                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6669                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6670                 },
6671                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6672         }
6673
6674         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6675         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6676         if announce_latest {
6677                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6678         } else {
6679                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6680         }
6681
6682         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6683         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6684         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6685
6686         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6687         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6688         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6689         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6690         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6691         let mut first_failed = false;
6692         for event in events {
6693                 match event {
6694                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6695                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6696                                         assert!(!first_failed);
6697                                         first_failed = true;
6698                                 } else {
6699                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6700                                 }
6701                         }
6702                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6703                 }
6704         }
6705 }
6706
6707 #[test]
6708 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6709         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6710         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6711 }
6712
6713 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6714         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6715         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6716         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6717         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6718         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6719         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6720
6721         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6722         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6723         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6724         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6725         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6726
6727         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6728
6729         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6730         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6731
6732         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6733         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6734
6735         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6736         if revoked {
6737                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6738                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6739         }
6740
6741         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6742         if local {
6743                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6744                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6745                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6746                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6747                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6748
6749                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6750                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6751                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6752                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6753                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
6754                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6755                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6756                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6757                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6758                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6759                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6760         } else {
6761                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6762                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6763                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6764                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6765                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6766                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6767
6768                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6769                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6770                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6771                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6772                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6773                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6774                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6775
6776                 if !revoked {
6777                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6778                 } else {
6779                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 0);
6780                 }
6781                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6782                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6783                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6784                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6785                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6786         }
6787 }
6788
6789 #[test]
6790 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6791         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6792         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6793         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6794 }
6795
6796 #[test]
6797 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6798         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6799
6800         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6801         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6802         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6803         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6804         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6805         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6806         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6807         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6808         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6809
6810         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6811         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6812                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6813                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6814         {
6815                 match error {
6816                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6817                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6818                 }
6819         } else { assert!(false) }
6820
6821         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6822         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6823         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6824         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6825         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6826                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6827                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6828         {
6829                 match error {
6830                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
6831                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6832                 }
6833         } else { assert!(false); }
6834
6835         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6836         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6837         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6838         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6839         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6840         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
6841         let reason_msg;
6842         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
6843                 match action {
6844                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
6845                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
6846                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
6847                         },
6848                         _ => { panic!(); }
6849                 }
6850         } else { panic!(); }
6851         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
6852
6853         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6854         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6855         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6856         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6857         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6858                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6859                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6860         {
6861                 match error {
6862                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6863                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6864                 }
6865         } else { assert!(false); }
6866 }
6867
6868 #[test]
6869 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
6870         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
6871         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
6872         // to B, B should refuse payment.
6873
6874         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6875         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6876         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6877         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6878
6879         // Create some initial channels
6880         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6881
6882         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
6883         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
6884         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
6885         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
6886         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6887         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
6888         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6889         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6890
6891         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6892         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6893         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
6894         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6895         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6896
6897         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
6898         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
6899         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6900         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6901
6902         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
6903         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
6904         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6905
6906         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6907         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6908         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6909                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6910                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6911                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6912                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6913                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6914                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6915                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
6916                 },
6917                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6918         };
6919         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6920
6921         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
6922         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
6923
6924         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
6925         let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6926         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
6927         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
6928 }
6929
6930 #[test]
6931 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
6932         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
6933         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
6934
6935         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6936         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6937         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6938         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6939
6940         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6941         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6942         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6943
6944         // Disconnect peers
6945         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6946         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6947
6948         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
6949         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
6950         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6951         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
6952         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
6953         for e in msg_events {
6954                 match e {
6955                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
6956                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
6957                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
6958                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
6959                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
6960                                 }
6961                         },
6962                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6963                 }
6964         }
6965         // Reconnect peers
6966         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6967         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6968         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
6969         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6970         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6971         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
6972
6973         // Reestablish chan_1
6974         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6975         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6976         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6977         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6978         // Reestablish chan_2
6979         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
6980         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6981         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
6982         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6983         // Reestablish chan_3
6984         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
6985         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6986         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
6987         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6988
6989         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6990         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6991         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6992         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6993         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
6994         for e in msg_events {
6995                 match e {
6996                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
6997                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
6998                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6999                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7000                                         // the old one.
7001                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7002                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7003                                 }
7004                         },
7005                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7006                 }
7007         }
7008         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7009         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7010 }
7011
7012 #[test]
7013 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7014         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7015         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7016
7017         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7018         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7019         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7020         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7021
7022         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7023
7024         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7025         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7026                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7027         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7028         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7029
7030         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7031         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7032         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7033         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7034         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7035         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7036
7037         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7038         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7039                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7040                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7041                 }
7042         }
7043
7044         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7045         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7046
7047         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7048         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7049         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7050         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7051         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7052
7053         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7054         let penalty_1;
7055         let feerate_1;
7056         {
7057                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7058                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7059                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7060                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7061                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7062                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7063                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7064                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7065                 node_txn.clear();
7066         };
7067
7068         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7069         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7070         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7071         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7072         {
7073                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7074                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7075                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7076                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7077                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7078                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7079                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7080                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7081                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7082                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7083                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7084                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7085                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7086                         node_txn.clear();
7087                 }
7088         }
7089         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7090
7091         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7092         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7093         let penalty_3;
7094         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7095         {
7096                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7097                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7098                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7099                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7100                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7101                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7102                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7103                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7104                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7105                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7106                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7107                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7108                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7109                         node_txn.clear();
7110                 }
7111         }
7112         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7113
7114         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7115         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7116 }
7117
7118 #[test]
7119 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7120         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7121         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7122
7123         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7124         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7125         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7126         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7127         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7128
7129         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7130         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7131         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7132         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7133         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7134         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7135                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7136         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7137         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7138         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7139                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7140         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7141
7142         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7143         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7144         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7145
7146         // Revoke local commitment tx
7147         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7148
7149         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7150         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7151         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7152         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7153         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7154         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7155         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7156
7157         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7158         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7159
7160         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7161         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7162         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7163
7164         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7165         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7166         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7167         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7168
7169         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7170         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7171         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7172         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7173         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7174         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
7175         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7176         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7177         match events.last().unwrap() {
7178                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7179                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7180         }
7181         let first;
7182         let feerate_1;
7183         let penalty_txn;
7184         {
7185                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7186                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7187                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7188
7189                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7190                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7191                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7192                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7193                 // future).
7194                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7195                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7196                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7197                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7198                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7199                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7200
7201                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7202                 // available, which we check here:
7203                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7204                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7205                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7206
7207                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7208                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7209
7210                 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7211                 // output, checked above).
7212                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7213                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7214                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7215
7216                 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7217                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7218                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7219                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
7220                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7221                 node_txn.clear();
7222         }
7223
7224         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7225         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7226         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7227         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7228         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7229
7230         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7231         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7232         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7233         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7234         let node_txn = {
7235                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7236                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7237
7238                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7239                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7240                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7241                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7242                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7243                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7244                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7245                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7246                 node_txn.clear();
7247                 txn
7248         };
7249         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7250         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7251         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7252         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7253         {
7254                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7255                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7256                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7257                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7258                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7259                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7260                 // up bumped justice generation.
7261                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7262                 node_txn.clear();
7263         }
7264         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7265         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7266 }
7267
7268 #[test]
7269 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7270         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7271         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7272
7273         // Create 2 HTLCs
7274         // Provide preimage for one
7275         // Check aggregation
7276
7277         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7278         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7279         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7280         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7281
7282         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7283         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7284         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7285
7286         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7287         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7288         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7289         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7290         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7291
7292         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7293         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7294         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7295         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7296         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7297         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7298
7299         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7300         let timeout;
7301         let preimage;
7302         let preimage_bump;
7303         let feerate_timeout;
7304         let feerate_preimage;
7305         {
7306                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7307                 // 3 transactions including:
7308                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7309                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7310                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7311                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7312                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7313                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7314                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7315                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7316
7317                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7318                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7319                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7320                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7321
7322                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7323                         (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7324                 } else {
7325                         (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7326                 };
7327
7328                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7329                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7330                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7331
7332                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7333                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7334                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7335                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7336
7337                 node_txn.clear();
7338         };
7339         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7340         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7341
7342         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7343         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7344         {
7345                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7346                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7347                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7348                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7349                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7350                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7351
7352                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7353                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7354                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7355                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7356                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7357
7358                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7359                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7360                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7361                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7362                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7363
7364                 node_txn.clear();
7365         }
7366
7367         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7368         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7369 }
7370
7371 #[test]
7372 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7373         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7374         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7375         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7376         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7377         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7378         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7379         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7380         // implement that).
7381         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7382         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7383         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7384         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7385         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
7386
7387         let per_commitment_secret;
7388         let next_per_commitment_point;
7389         {
7390                 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7391                 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7392
7393                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7394
7395                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7396                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7397                 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7398
7399                 // Must revoke without gaps
7400                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7401                 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7402
7403                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7404                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7405                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7406         }
7407
7408         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7409                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7410         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7411         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7412         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7413 }
7414
7415 #[test]
7416 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7417         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7418         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7419
7420         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7421         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7422         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7423         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7424
7425         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7426         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7427         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7428         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7429
7430         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7431         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7432         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7433
7434         // Revoke local commitment tx
7435         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7436
7437         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7438         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7439         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7440         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7441
7442         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7443         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7445         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7446         let penalty_txn = {
7447                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7448                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7449                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7450                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7451                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7452                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7453                 node_txn.clear();
7454                 penalty_txn
7455         };
7456         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7457         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7458         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7459         {
7460                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7461                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7462                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7463         }
7464 }
7465
7466 #[test]
7467 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
7468         // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
7469         // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
7470         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7471         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7472         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7473         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7474         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7475
7476         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
7477         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7478         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
7479         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7480         let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7481
7482         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7483         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
7484         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
7485         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7486         let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7487
7488         // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
7489         // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
7490         // can get our balance.
7491
7492         // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
7493         // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
7494         // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
7495         let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
7496         route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
7497         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7498         let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7499         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
7500
7501         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
7502 }
7503
7504 #[test]
7505 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7506         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7507         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7508         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7509         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7510         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7511         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7512
7513         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7514
7515         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7516         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7517         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7518         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7519         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7520
7521         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7522         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7523         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7524         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7525
7526         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7527         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7528         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7529         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7530         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7531         match close_ev[0] {
7532                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7533                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7534                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7535                 },
7536                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7537         }
7538 }
7539
7540 #[test]
7541 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7542         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7543         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7544         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7545         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7546
7547         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7548         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7549         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7550
7551         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7552
7553         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7554         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7555         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7556         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7557 }
7558
7559 #[test]
7560 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7561         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7562         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7563         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7564         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7565         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7566         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7567
7568         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7569         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7570         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7571
7572         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7573         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7574         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7575 }
7576
7577 #[test]
7578 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7579         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7580         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7581         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7582         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7583         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7584
7585         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7586         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7587         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7588         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7589         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7590         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7591         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7592         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7593         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7594         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7595         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7596         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7597
7598         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7599         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7600         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7601         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7602
7603         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7604         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7605         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7606         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7607         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7608
7609         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7610         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7611
7612         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7613         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7614         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7615         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7616         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7617         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7618
7619         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7620         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7621         // `channel_value`.
7622         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7623         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7624         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7625         // `channel_value`.
7626         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7627 }
7628
7629 #[test]
7630 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7631         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7632         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7633         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7634         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7635         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7636         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7637
7638         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7639         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7640
7641         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7642
7643         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7644         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7645         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7646
7647         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7648         match events[0] {
7649                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7650                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7651                 }
7652                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7653         }
7654
7655         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7656         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7657
7658         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7659                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7660                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7661                 }
7662                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7663         }
7664
7665         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7666
7667         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7668         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7669
7670         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7671         match events[0] {
7672                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7673                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7674                 }
7675                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7676         }
7677 }
7678
7679 #[test]
7680 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7681         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7682         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7683         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7684         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7685         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7686         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7687
7688         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7689         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7690
7691         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7692
7693         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7694         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7695         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7696
7697         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7698         match events[0] {
7699                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7700                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7701                 }
7702                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7703         }
7704
7705         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7706         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7707
7708         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7709                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7710                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7711                 }
7712                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7713         }
7714         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7715 }
7716
7717 #[test]
7718 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7719         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7720         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7721         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7722         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7723         // and the channel should be closed.
7724         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7725         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7726         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7727         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7728         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7729         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7730
7731         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7732         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7733         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7734
7735         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7736
7737         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7738         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7739
7740         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7741         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7742
7743         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7744         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7745         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7746         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7747         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7748         let accept_chan_msg = {
7749                 let mut lock;
7750                 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
7751                 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7752         };
7753         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
7754
7755         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7756
7757         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7758         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7759
7760         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7761         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7762
7763         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7764         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7765
7766         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7767         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7768                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7769                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7770                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7771                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7772                 }
7773                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7774         }
7775
7776         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7777 }
7778
7779 #[test]
7780 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7781         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7782         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7783         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7784         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7785         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7786         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7787
7788         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7789         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7790
7791         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7792
7793         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7794         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7795         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7796
7797         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7798         match events[0] {
7799                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7800                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7801                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7802                         match api_res {
7803                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7804                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7805                                 },
7806                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7807                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7808                         }
7809                 }
7810                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7811         }
7812
7813         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7814         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7815         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7816
7817         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7818                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7819                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7820                 }
7821                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7822         }
7823 }
7824
7825 #[test]
7826 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7827         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7828         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7829         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7830         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7831
7832         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7833         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7834         match api_res {
7835                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
7836                         assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
7837                 },
7838                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7839                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7840         }
7841 }
7842
7843 #[test]
7844 fn test_simple_mpp() {
7845         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
7846         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7847         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7848         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7849         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7850
7851         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7852         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7853         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7854         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7855
7856         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7857         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7858         route.paths.push(path);
7859         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7860         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7861         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7862         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7863         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7864         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7865         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
7866         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
7867 }
7868
7869 #[test]
7870 fn test_preimage_storage() {
7871         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
7872         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7873         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7874         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7875         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7876
7877         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7878
7879         {
7880                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7881                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7882                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7883                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7884                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7885                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7886                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7887                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7888         }
7889         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
7890         // values from previous calls.
7891         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7892         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7893         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7894         match events[0] {
7895                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
7896                         match &purpose {
7897                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
7898                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
7899                                 },
7900                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
7901                         }
7902                 },
7903                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7904         }
7905 }
7906
7907 #[test]
7908 #[allow(deprecated)]
7909 fn test_secret_timeout() {
7910         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
7911         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
7912         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7913         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7914         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7915         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7916
7917         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7918
7919         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
7920
7921         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
7922         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
7923         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
7924                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
7925         } else { panic!(); }
7926         let mut block = {
7927                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
7928                 Block {
7929                         header: BlockHeader {
7930                                 version: 0x2000000,
7931                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
7932                                 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
7933                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7934                         txdata: vec![],
7935                 }
7936         };
7937         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
7938         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
7939                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
7940         } else { panic!(); }
7941
7942         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
7943         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
7944         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
7945         block.header.time += 1;
7946         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
7947         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
7948         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
7949
7950         {
7951                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7952                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7953                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7954                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7955                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7956                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7957                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7958         }
7959         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
7960         // values from previous calls.
7961         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7962         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7963         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7964         match events[0] {
7965                 Event::PaymentClaimable { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
7966                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
7967                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
7968                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
7969                 },
7970                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7971         }
7972 }
7973
7974 #[test]
7975 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
7976         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
7977         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7978         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7979         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7980         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7981
7982         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7983
7984         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
7985         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7986         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
7987         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7988
7989         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
7990         // resulting events.
7991         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
7992                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
7993                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7994                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7995                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7996                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7997                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7998
7999                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8000                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8001                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8002                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8003                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8004
8005                         // We should fail the payment back
8006                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8007                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8008                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8009                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8010                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8011                                 },
8012                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8013                         }
8014                 }
8015         }
8016
8017         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8018         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8019         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8020
8021         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8022         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8023         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8024         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8025
8026         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8027         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8028         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8029         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8030
8031         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8032         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8033         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8034         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8035 }
8036
8037 #[test]
8038 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8039         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8040         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8041         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8042         // error.
8043         //
8044         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8045         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8046         // commitment at same time.
8047
8048         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8049         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8050         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8051         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8052
8053         // Create some initial channel
8054         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8055         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8056
8057         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8058         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8059
8060         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8061         let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8062
8063         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8064         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8065         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8066         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8067         let watchtower = {
8068                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8069                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8070                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8071                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8072                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), nodes[0].keys_manager).unwrap().1;
8073                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8074                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8075                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8076                 watchtower
8077         };
8078         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8079         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8080         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8081         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8082         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8083         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8084
8085         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8086         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8087         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8088         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8089
8090         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8091         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8092         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8093         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8094                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8095                         assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8096                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8097                 } else { assert!(false); }
8098         } else { assert!(false); };
8099         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8101         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8102         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8103 }
8104
8105 #[test]
8106 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8107         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8108         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8109         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8110         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8111
8112         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8113         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8114         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8115         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8116
8117         // Create some initial channel
8118         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8119         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8120
8121         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8122         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8123
8124         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8125         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8126
8127         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8128         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8129         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8130         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8131         let watchtower_alice = {
8132                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8133                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8134                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8135                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8136                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), nodes[0].keys_manager).unwrap().1;
8137                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8138                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8139                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8140                 watchtower
8141         };
8142         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8143         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8144         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8145         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8146         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8147         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8148
8149         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8150         {
8151                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8152                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8153                 txn.clear();
8154         }
8155
8156         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8157         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8158         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8159         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8160         let watchtower_bob = {
8161                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8162                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8163                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8164                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8165                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), nodes[0].keys_manager).unwrap().1;
8166                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8167                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8168                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8169                 watchtower
8170         };
8171         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8172         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8173
8174         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8175         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8176         {
8177                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8178         }
8179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8180
8181         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8182         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8183         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8184         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8185                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8186                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8187                         assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8188                         assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8189                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8190                 } else { assert!(false); }
8191         } else { assert!(false); };
8192         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8193         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8194
8195         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8196         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8197         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8198
8199         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8200         let bob_state_y;
8201         {
8202                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8203                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8204                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8205                 txn.clear();
8206         };
8207
8208         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8209         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8210         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8211         {
8212                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8213                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8214                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8215         }
8216 }
8217
8218 #[test]
8219 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8220         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8221         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8222         // message).
8223         //
8224         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8225         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8226         //
8227         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8228         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8229         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8230         // before receiving funding_signed.
8231         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8232         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8233         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8234         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8235
8236         // Create an initial channel
8237         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8238         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8239         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8240         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8241         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
8242
8243         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8244         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8245
8246         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8247         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8248
8249         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8250         let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8251         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8252         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8253         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8254 }
8255
8256 #[test]
8257 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8258         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8259         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8260         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8261         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8262         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8263         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8264
8265         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8266         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8267         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8268         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8269
8270         // Create some initial channels
8271         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8272
8273         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8274         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8275         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8276         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8277         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8278         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8279
8280         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8281         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8282         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8283         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8284         // this test before #653 fix.
8285         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8286         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8287         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8288         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8289         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8290
8291         let htlc_timeout = {
8292                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8293                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8294                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8295                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8296                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8297                 node_txn[0].clone()
8298         };
8299
8300         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8301         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8302         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8303         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8304 }
8305
8306 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8307         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8308         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8309         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8310         //
8311         // Steps of the test:
8312         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8313         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8314         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8315         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8316         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8317         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8318         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8319         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8320         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8321         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8322         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8323         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8324
8325         // Create some initial channels
8326         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8327         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8328
8329         // Steps (1) and (2):
8330         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8331         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8332
8333         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8334         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8335         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8336         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8337         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8338         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8339         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8340
8341         // Steps (3) and (4):
8342         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8343         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8344         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8345         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8346
8347         // Bob force-closes
8348         if !broadcast_alice {
8349                 force_closing_node = 1;
8350                 counterparty_node = 0;
8351         }
8352         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8353         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8354         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8355         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8356         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8357                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8358                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8359                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8360                 };
8361                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8362                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8363                 if broadcast_alice {
8364                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8365                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8366                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8367                 }
8368         }
8369
8370         // Step (5):
8371         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8372         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8373         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8374         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8375         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8376
8377         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8378         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8379         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8380         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8381         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8382         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8383
8384         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8385         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8386         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8387         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8388                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8389                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8390                 match events[0] {
8391                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8392                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8393                         },
8394                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8395                 };
8396         }
8397         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8398         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8399         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8400         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8401
8402         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8403         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8404         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8405                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8406                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8407                         (*msg).clone()
8408                 },
8409                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8410         };
8411         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8412                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8413                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8414                         (*updates).clone()
8415                 },
8416                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8417         };
8418
8419         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8420         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8421         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8422         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8423
8424         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8425         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8426         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8427                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8428                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8429                         (*msg).clone()
8430                 },
8431                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8432         };
8433         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8434         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8435
8436         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8437         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8438         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8439         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8440         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8441                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8442                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8443                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8444                 if broadcast_alice {
8445                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8446                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8447                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8448                 }
8449                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8450                 if broadcast_alice {
8451                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8452                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8453                 } else {
8454                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8455                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8456                 }
8457         }
8458
8459         // Step (6):
8460         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8461         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8462         {
8463                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8464                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8465                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8466                 };
8467                 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8468                 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8469                 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8470                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8471                 if broadcast_alice {
8472                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8473                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8474                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8475                 } else {
8476                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8477                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8478                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8479                 }
8480         }
8481 }
8482
8483 #[test]
8484 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8485         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8486         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8487         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8488         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8489 }
8490
8491 #[test]
8492 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8493         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8494         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8495         //
8496         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8497         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8498         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8499         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8500         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8501         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8502         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8503         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8504
8505         // Create an initial channel
8506         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8507         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8508         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8509         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8510
8511         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8512         // that it is rejected.
8513         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8514         {
8515                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8516                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8517                 match events[0] {
8518                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8519                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8520                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8521                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8522                                 // move forward with it.
8523                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8524                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8525                         },
8526                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8527                 }
8528         }
8529
8530         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8531         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8532
8533         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8534         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8535
8536         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8537         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8538         {
8539                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8540                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8541                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8542                 added_monitors.clear();
8543         }
8544         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8545
8546         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8547         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8548
8549         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8550         // temporary one).
8551
8552         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8553         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8554         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8555         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8556         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8557         {
8558                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8559                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8560                 match events[0] {
8561                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8562                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8563                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8564                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8565                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8566                         },
8567                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8568                 }
8569         }
8570
8571         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8572         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8573         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8574         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8575         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8576         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8577
8578         let funding_created = {
8579                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8580                 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8581                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8582                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8583                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8584                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8585                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8586                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8587         };
8588         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8589         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8590         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8591         // still needs to be cleared here.
8592         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8593
8594         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8595         {
8596                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8597                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8598                 match events[0] {
8599                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8600                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8601                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8602                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8603                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8604                         },
8605                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8606                 }
8607         }
8608
8609         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8610         // everything is functional.
8611         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8612         {
8613                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8614                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8615                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8616                 added_monitors.clear();
8617         }
8618
8619         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8620         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8621         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8622         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8623
8624         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8625         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8626         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8627
8628         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8629 }
8630
8631 #[test]
8632 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8633         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8634         //
8635         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8636         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8637         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8638         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8639         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8640         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8641         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8642
8643         // Create some initial channels
8644         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8645         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8646         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8647
8648         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8649         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8650         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8651
8652         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8653         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8654         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8655
8656         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8657         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8658         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8659         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8660         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8661         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8662         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8663         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8664         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8665
8666         // A null channel ID should close all channels
8667         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8668         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8669         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8670         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8671         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8672         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8673         match events[0] {
8674                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8675                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8676                 },
8677                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8678         }
8679         match events[1] {
8680                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8681                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8682                 },
8683                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8684         }
8685         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8686         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8687         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8688         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8689         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8690         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8691
8692         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8693         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8694         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8695 }
8696
8697 #[test]
8698 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8699         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8700         //
8701         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8702         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8703         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8704         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8705         //
8706         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
8707         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
8708         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
8709         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8710         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8711         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8712         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8713
8714         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8715         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8716         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8717
8718         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8719
8720         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
8721         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
8722         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
8723         // its length.
8724         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
8725         let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
8726         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8727                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8728                 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
8729         }
8730
8731         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8732         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8733         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8734
8735         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8736         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8737
8738         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8739         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8740
8741         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8742         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8743         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8744
8745         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
8746         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8747         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8748         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8749         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8750         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8751         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8752                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8753                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8754                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
8755                 } else { panic!(); }
8756         } else { panic!(); }
8757         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8758
8759         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
8760         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
8761         // as its not 32 bytes long.
8762         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8763                 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
8764                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
8765                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
8766                                 txid: tx.txid(),
8767                                 vout: idx as u32,
8768                         },
8769                         script_sig: Script::new(),
8770                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
8771                         witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
8772                 }).collect(),
8773                 output: vec![TxOut {
8774                         value: 1000,
8775                         script_pubkey: Script::new(),
8776                 }]
8777         };
8778         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
8779         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
8780 }
8781
8782 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8783         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8784         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8785         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8786         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8787         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8788         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8789         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8790         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8791         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8792         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8793         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8794         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8795         // until we learned about an additional block.
8796         //
8797         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8798         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8799         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8800         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8801         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8802         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8803         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8804
8805         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8806         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8807         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8808         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8809         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8810
8811         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8812         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8813         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8814         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8815         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8816         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8817
8818         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8819         if !test_height_before_timelock {
8820                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8821         }
8822         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8823                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8824         if test_height_before_timelock {
8825                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8826                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8827                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8828                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8829         } else {
8830                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
8831                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8832                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
8833                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
8834                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
8835                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
8836                 // timelock is up).
8837                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
8838                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
8839
8840                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
8841                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
8842                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
8843                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8844                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
8845                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
8846                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8847
8848                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8849                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8850                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8851                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8852                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8853                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8854                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8855                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8856                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
8857         }
8858 }
8859
8860 #[test]
8861 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
8862         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
8863         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
8864 }
8865
8866 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
8867         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8868         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8869         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8870         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8871
8872         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8873
8874         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
8875                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8876         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8877
8878         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
8879
8880         {
8881                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8882                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8883                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8884                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8885                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8886                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8887                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8888         }
8889         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8890         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
8891
8892         {
8893                 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
8894                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
8895                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8896                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8897                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8898                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8899                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8900                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8901                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
8902                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
8903                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
8904                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
8905         }
8906
8907         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
8908         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8909
8910         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
8911                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
8912                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
8913
8914                 let expected_destinations = vec![
8915                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
8916                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
8917                 ];
8918                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
8919                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8920
8921                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8922                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8923                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
8924
8925                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8926                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
8927                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
8928
8929                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8930                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
8931                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
8932                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
8933         } else {
8934                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
8935                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8936                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8937
8938                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8939                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8940                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8941                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
8942
8943                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
8944
8945                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
8946         }
8947 }
8948
8949 #[test]
8950 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
8951         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
8952         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
8953         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
8954         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
8955         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
8956 }
8957
8958 #[test]
8959 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
8960         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
8961         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
8962         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
8963 }
8964
8965 #[test]
8966 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
8967         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
8968         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
8969         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8970         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8971         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8972         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8973
8974         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8975         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8976         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8977         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8978
8979         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
8980                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8981         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8982         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
8983         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
8984                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
8985                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
8986                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
8987         });
8988         let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
8989
8990         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
8991
8992         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8993         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8994
8995         let session_privs = {
8996                 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
8997                 // ultimately have, just not right away.
8998                 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
8999                 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9000                 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9001         };
9002         {
9003                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9004                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9005
9006                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9007                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9008                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9009         }
9010         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9011
9012         {
9013                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9014                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9015
9016                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9017                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9018                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9019
9020                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9021                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9022
9023                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9024                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9025
9026                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9027                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9028                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9029
9030                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9031                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9032                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9033
9034                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9035                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9036                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9037         }
9038         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9039         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9040         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9041         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9042
9043         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9044
9045         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9046         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9047         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9048
9049         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9050         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9051
9052         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9053         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9054         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9055
9056         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9057
9058         nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9059         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9060
9061         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9062         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9063         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9064
9065         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9066 }
9067
9068 #[test]
9069 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9070         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9071         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9072         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9073         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9074
9075         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9076         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9077         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9078         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9079         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9080                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9081                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9082                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9083         };
9084         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9085         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9086         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9087
9088         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9089         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9090         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9091         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9092         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9093         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9094         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9095         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9096         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9097 }
9098
9099 #[test]
9100 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9101         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9102         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9103         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9104         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9105
9106         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9107         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9108         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
9109         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
9110
9111         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9112         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9113                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9114                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9115                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9116         };
9117         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9118         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9119         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9120         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9121         let route = find_route(
9122                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9123                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9124         ).unwrap();
9125
9126         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9127         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9128         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9129         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9130         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9131         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9132         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9133         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9134         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9135 }
9136
9137 #[test]
9138 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9139         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9140         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9141         // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9142         // amount.
9143         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9144         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9145         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9146         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9147
9148         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9149         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9150         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9151         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9152
9153         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9154         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9155         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9156                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9157                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9158                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9159         });
9160
9161         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9162         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9163         // amount of time to respond to.
9164
9165         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9166         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9167         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9168
9169         let failed_destinations = vec![
9170                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9171                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9172         ];
9173         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9174
9175         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
9176
9177         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9178         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9180
9181         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9182         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9183         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9184
9185         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9186         // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9187         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9189         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9190 }
9191
9192 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9193 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9194 enum ExposureEvent {
9195         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9196         AtHTLCForward,
9197         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9198         AtHTLCReception,
9199         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9200         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9201 }
9202
9203 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9204         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9205         // policy.
9206         //
9207         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9208         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9209         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9210         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9211         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9212         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9213         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9214         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9215
9216         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9217         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9218         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9219         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9220         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9221         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9222
9223         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9224         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9225         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9226         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9227         if on_holder_tx {
9228                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9229         }
9230         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
9231         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9232         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
9233
9234         let opt_anchors = false;
9235
9236         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9237
9238         if on_holder_tx {
9239                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9240                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9241                 }
9242         }
9243
9244         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9245         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9246         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9247
9248         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9250
9251         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9252         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9253         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9254
9255         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9256                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9257                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9258                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9259         };
9260         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9261         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9262
9263         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9264         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9265
9266         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9267         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9268
9269         if on_holder_tx {
9270                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9271                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9272                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9273                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9274                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9275                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9276                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9277                         }
9278                 } else {
9279                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9280                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9281                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9282                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9283                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9284                         }
9285                 }
9286         } else {
9287                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9288                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9289                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9290                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9291                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9292                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9293                         }
9294                 } else {
9295                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9296                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9297                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9298                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9299                         }
9300                 }
9301         }
9302
9303         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9304         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9305                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9306                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9307                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9308                 if on_holder_tx {
9309                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9310                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9311                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9312                 } else {
9313                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9314                 }
9315         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9316                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9317                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9318                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9319                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9320                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9321                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9322                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9323                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9324                 if on_holder_tx {
9325                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9326                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9327                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9328                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9329                 } else {
9330                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9331                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9332                 }
9333         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9334                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9335                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9336                 {
9337                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9338                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9339                 }
9340                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9341                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9342                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9343         }
9344
9345         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9346         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9347         added_monitors.clear();
9348 }
9349
9350 #[test]
9351 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9352         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9353         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9354         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9355         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9356         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9357         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9358         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9359         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9360         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9361         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9362         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9363         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9364 }
9365
9366 #[test]
9367 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9368         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9369         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9370         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9371         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9372
9373         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9374         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9375         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
9376         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9377         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
9378
9379         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9380
9381         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9382         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9383         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9384         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9385         let mut tx = match events[0] {
9386                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9387                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
9388                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9389                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9390                         }]}
9391                 },
9392                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9393         };
9394         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9395         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9396                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9397                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9398                 },
9399                 _ => panic!()
9400         }
9401
9402         // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
9403         tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9404         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9405         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9406 }
9407
9408 #[test]
9409 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9410         // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9411         // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9412         // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9413         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9414         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9415         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9416         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9417
9418         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9419
9420         // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9421         {
9422                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9423                 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9424         }
9425
9426         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9427         {
9428                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9429                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9430         }
9431         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9432         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9433
9434         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9435         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9436         match events[0] {
9437                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9438                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9439                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9440                 },
9441                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9442         };
9443
9444         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9445         // it.
9446         {
9447                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9448                 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9449         }
9450         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9451         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9452
9453         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9454         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9455         match events[0] {
9456                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9457                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9458                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9459                 },
9460                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9461         };
9462
9463         // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9464         // channel.
9465         {
9466                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9467                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9468         }
9469         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9470         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9471
9472         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9473         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9474         match events[0] {
9475                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9476                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9477                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9478                                 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() });
9479                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9480                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9481                 },
9482                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9483         };
9484 }