_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
  21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
  22 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, COINBASE_MATURITY, ChannelPhase};
  24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  25 use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, ChannelError};
  26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  29 use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, get_route, RouteParameters};
  30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  31 use crate::ln::msgs;
  32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  33 use crate::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
  34 use crate::util::test_utils::{self, WatchtowerPersister};
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
  38 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
  39
  40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  44 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
  45 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  46 use bitcoin::{Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
  47 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  48
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  50 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  51
  52 use crate::io;
  53 use crate::prelude::*;
  54 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  55 use core::iter::repeat;
  56 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  57 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
  58
  59 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  60 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  61
  62 use super::channel::UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS;
  63
  64 #[test]
  65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  66         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  67         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  68         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  69         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  70         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  71         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  72         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  73         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  74
  75         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  76         // funding satoshis
  77         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  78         let channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
  79         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  80
  81         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  82         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
  83
  84         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  85         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  86
  87         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  88         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  89         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  90                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  91                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  92                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  93                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  94                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  95                         match action {
  96                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  97                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
  98                                 },
  99                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 100                         }
 101                 } else { assert!(false); }
 102         };
 103
 104         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 105
 106         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 107         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 108         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 109
 110         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 111
 112         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 113
 114         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 115
 116         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 117
 118         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 119
 120         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 121
 122         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 123 }
 124
 125 #[test]
 126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 127         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 128         // them.
 129         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 130         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 131         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 132         *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
 133         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 134         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 135
 136         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None, None) {
 137                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 138                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 139                 },
 140                 _ => panic!()
 141         }
 142 }
 143
 144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 145         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 146         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 147         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 148         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 149         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 150         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 151         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 152         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 153         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 154
 155         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 156         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 157         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 158         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
 159         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 160         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 161
 162         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None, None).unwrap();
 163         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 164         if !send_from_initiator {
 165                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 166                 open_channel_message.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 167         }
 168         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
 169
 170         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 171         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 172         if send_from_initiator {
 173                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 174                 accept_channel_message.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 175         }
 176         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
 177         {
 178                 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
 179                 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
 180                 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
 181                 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
 182
 183                 let channel_phase = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
 184                 match channel_phase {
 185                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
 186                                 let chan_context = channel_phase.context_mut();
 187                                 chan_context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 188                                 chan_context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 189                         },
 190                         _ => assert!(false),
 191                 }
 192         }
 193
 194         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 195         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 196         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 197
 198         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 199         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 200         if send_from_initiator {
 201                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 202                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 203                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 204                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 205                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, &channel_type_features));
 206         } else {
 207                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 208         }
 209 }
 210
 211 #[test]
 212 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 213         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 214         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 215 }
 216
 217 #[test]
 218 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 219         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 220         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 221         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 222         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 223         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 224
 225         // balancing
 226         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 227
 228         // A                                        B
 229         // update_fee                            ->
 230         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 231         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 232         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 233         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 234         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 235         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 236         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 237         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 238         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 239         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 240         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 241         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 242         //                                       <- RAA
 243         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 244
 245         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 246         {
 247                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 248                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 249         }
 250         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 251         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 252
 253         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 254         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 255         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 256                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 257                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 258                 },
 259                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 260         };
 261
 262         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 263
 264         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 265         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 266         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 267                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 268         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 269
 270         let payment_event = {
 271                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 272                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 273                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 274         };
 275         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 276         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 277
 278         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 279         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 280         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 281         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 282         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 283         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 284
 285         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 286         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 287         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 288         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 290
 291         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 292         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 293         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 294         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 295         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 296         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 297         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 298         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 299
 300         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 301         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 302         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 303         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 304         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 305         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 306         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 307         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 308
 309         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 310         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 311         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 312         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 313
 314         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 315         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 316         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 317
 318         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 319         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 320
 321         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 322         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 323         match events_2[0] {
 324                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 325                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 326         }
 327
 328         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 329         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 330 }
 331
 332 #[test]
 333 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 334         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 335         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 336         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 337         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 338         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 339         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 340         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 341
 342         // balancing
 343         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 344
 345         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 346         {
 347                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 348                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 349         }
 350         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 351         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 352
 353         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 354         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 355         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 356                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 357                         update_fee.as_ref()
 358                 },
 359                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 360         };
 361
 362         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 363
 364         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 365         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 366         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 367                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 368         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 369
 370         let payment_event = {
 371                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 372                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 373                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 374         };
 375         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 376         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 377
 378         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 379         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 380         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 381         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 382         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 383         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 384
 385         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 386         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 387
 388         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 389 }
 390
 391 #[test]
 392 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 393         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 394         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 395         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 396         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 397         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 398
 399         // A                                        B
 400         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 401         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 402         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 403         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 404         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 405         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 406         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 407         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 408         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 409         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 410         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 411         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 412         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 413         //                                          B should send no response here
 414         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 415         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 416         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 417
 418         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 419         let initial_feerate;
 420         {
 421                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 422                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 423                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 424         }
 425         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 426         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 427
 428         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 429         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 430         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 431                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 432                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 433                 },
 434                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 435         };
 436
 437         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 438         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 439         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 440         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 441         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 442
 443         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 444         // transaction:
 445         {
 446                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 447                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 448         }
 449         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 450         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 451         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 452
 453         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 454         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 455                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 456                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 457         };
 458
 459         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 460
 461         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 462         // Deliver (3)
 463         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 464
 465         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 466         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 467         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 468         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 469         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 470         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 471         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 472         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 473         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 474         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 475         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 476
 477         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 478         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 479         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 480         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 481         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 482
 483         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 484         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 485         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 486
 487         // Delever (4)
 488         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 489         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 490         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 491
 492         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 493         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 494         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 495
 496         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 497         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 498         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 499         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 500
 501         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 502         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 503         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 504 }
 505
 506 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 507         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 508         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 509         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 510         // Node objects.
 511
 512         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 513         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 514         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 515         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 516
 517         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 518                 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
 519                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 520                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 521         }
 522
 523         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 524         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
 525         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 526
 527         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 528         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
 529         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 530
 531         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 532         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
 533
 534         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 535
 536         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 537         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 538         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 539         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 540
 541         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 542         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 543         {
 544                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 545                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 546                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 547                 added_monitors.clear();
 548         }
 549         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 550
 551         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 552
 553         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 554         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 555         {
 556                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 557                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 558                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 559                 added_monitors.clear();
 560         }
 561
 562         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 563         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 564         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 565
 566         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 567         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 568
 569         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 570         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 571         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 572         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 573         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 574 }
 575
 576 #[test]
 577 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 578         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 584         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 585         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 586         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 587         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 588         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 589         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 590         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 591         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 592         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 593         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 594         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 595         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 596 }
 597
 598 #[test]
 599 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 600         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 601         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 602         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 603         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 604         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 605
 606         {
 607                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 608                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 609         }
 610         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 611         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 612
 613         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 614         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 615         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 616                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 617                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 618                 },
 619                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 620         };
 621         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 622
 623         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 624         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 625         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 626
 627         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 628         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 629         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 630
 631         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 632         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 633         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 634         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 635
 636         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 637         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 638         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 639 }
 640
 641 #[test]
 642 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 643         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 644         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 645         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 646         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 647         let channel_value = 5000;
 648         let push_sats = 700;
 649         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
 650         let channel_id = chan.2;
 651         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 652         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 653         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 654
 655         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
 656
 657         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 658         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 659         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 660         // remote limit.
 661         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 662         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features)) as u32;
 663         {
 664                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 665                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 666         }
 667         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 668         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 669         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 670
 671         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 672
 673         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 674
 675         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 676         {
 677                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 678
 679                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 680                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 681                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000;
 682                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 683                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 684                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 685         }
 686
 687         {
 688                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 689                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 690                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 691         }
 692         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 693         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 694         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 695
 696         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 697
 698         // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 699         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 700         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 701                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 702                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 703                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 704                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 705                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 706                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 707                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
 708                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 709                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 710         };
 711         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 712                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 713                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 714                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 715                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 716                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 717                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 718                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
 719                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 720                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 721                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 722         };
 723
 724         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 725         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 726                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
 727
 728         let res = {
 729                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 730                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 731                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 732                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 733                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 734                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 735                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 736                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 737                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 738                         push_sats,
 739                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000,
 740                         local_funding, remote_funding,
 741                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 742                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 743                         &mut htlcs,
 744                         &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 745                 );
 746                 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 747         };
 748
 749         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 750                 channel_id: chan.2,
 751                 signature: res.0,
 752                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
 753                 #[cfg(taproot)]
 754                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
 755         };
 756
 757         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 758                 channel_id: chan.2,
 759                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 760         };
 761
 762         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 763
 764         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 765         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 766         //Should produce and error.
 767         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 768         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee", 3);
 769         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 770         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 771         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") },
 772                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], channel_value);
 773 }
 774
 775 #[test]
 776 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 777         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 778         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 779         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 780         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 781         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 782
 783         // balancing
 784         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 785
 786         {
 787                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 788                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 789         }
 790         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 791         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 792
 793         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 794         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 795         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 796                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 797                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 798                 },
 799                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 800         };
 801         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 802         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 803         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 804         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 805
 806         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 807
 808         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 809         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 810                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 811         {
 812                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 813                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 814                 added_monitors.clear();
 815         }
 816         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 817         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 818         // node[1] has nothing to do
 819
 820         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 821         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 822         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 823
 824         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 825         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 826         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 827         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 828         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 829         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 830         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 831
 832         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 833         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 834         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 835         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 836         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 837         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 838
 839         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 840         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 841         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 842         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 843
 844         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 845         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 846         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 847
 848         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 849         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 850         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 851         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 852
 853         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 854         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 855         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 856
 857         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 858
 859         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 860         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 861         match events[0] {
 862                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
 863                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 864         };
 865
 866         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 867
 868         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 869         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 870         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 871         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 872         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 873 }
 874
 875 #[test]
 876 fn test_update_fee() {
 877         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 878         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 879         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 880         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 881         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 882         let channel_id = chan.2;
 883
 884         // A                                        B
 885         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 886         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 887         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 888         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 889         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 890         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 891         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 892         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 893         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 894         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 895         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 896         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 897
 898         // Create and deliver (1)...
 899         let feerate;
 900         {
 901                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 902                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 903                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 904         }
 905         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 906         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 907
 908         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 909         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 910         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 911                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 912                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 913                 },
 914                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 915         };
 916         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 917
 918         // Generate (2) and (3):
 919         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 920         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 922
 923         // Deliver (2):
 924         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 925         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 926         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 927
 928         // Create and deliver (4)...
 929         {
 930                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 931                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 932         }
 933         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 934         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 935         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 936         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 937         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 938                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 939                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 940                 },
 941                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 942         };
 943
 944         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 945         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 946         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 947         // ... creating (5)
 948         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 949         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 950
 951         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 952         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 953         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 954         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 955         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 956
 957         // Deliver (5):
 958         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 959         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 960         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 961
 962         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 963         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 964         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 965         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 966         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 967         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 968         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 969         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 970         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 971
 972         // Deliver (7)
 973         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 974         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 975         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 976         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 977
 978         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 979         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 980         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 981
 982         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 983         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 984         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 985         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 986         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 987 }
 988
 989 #[test]
 990 fn fake_network_test() {
 991         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 992         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 993         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 994         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 995         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 996         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 997
 998         // Create some initial channels
 999         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1000         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1001         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1002
1003         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
1004         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1005         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1006         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1007         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1008
1009         // Send some more payments
1010         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1011         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
1012         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1013
1014         // Test failure packets
1015         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1016         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1017
1018         // Add a new channel that skips 3
1019         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1020
1021         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1022         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1023         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1024         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1025         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1026         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1027         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1028
1029         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1030         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1031         hops.push(RouteHop {
1032                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1033                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1034                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1035                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1036                 fee_msat: 0,
1037                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1038                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1039         });
1040         hops.push(RouteHop {
1041                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1042                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1043                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1044                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1045                 fee_msat: 0,
1046                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1047                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1048         });
1049         hops.push(RouteHop {
1050                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1051                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1052                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1053                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1054                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1055                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1056                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1057         });
1058         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1059         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1060         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1061                 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1062                         &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1063
1064         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1065         hops.push(RouteHop {
1066                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1067                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1068                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1069                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1070                 fee_msat: 0,
1071                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1072                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1073         });
1074         hops.push(RouteHop {
1075                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1076                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1077                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1078                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1079                 fee_msat: 0,
1080                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1081                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1082         });
1083         hops.push(RouteHop {
1084                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1085                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1086                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1087                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1088                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1089                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1090                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1091         });
1092         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1093         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1094         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1095                 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1096                         &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1097
1098         // Claim the rebalances...
1099         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1100         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1101
1102         // Close down the channels...
1103         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1104         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1105         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1106         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1107         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1108         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1109         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1110         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1111         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1112         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1113         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1114         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1115 }
1116
1117 #[test]
1118 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1119         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1120         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1121         // commitment dance rounds.
1122         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1123         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1124         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1125         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1126         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1127         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1128
1129         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1130         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1131
1132         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1133         for _ in 0..50 {
1134                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1135                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
1136                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1137                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1138         }
1139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1140
1141         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1142         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1143         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1144         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1145
1146         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1147         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1148         // another HTLC.
1149         {
1150                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
1151                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
1152                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1153                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1154         }
1155
1156         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1157         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1158         {
1159                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
1160                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1161                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1162         }
1163
1164         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1165         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1166         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1167         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1168
1169         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1170         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1171         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1172         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1173         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1174         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1175         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1176
1177         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1178         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1179         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1180
1181         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1182
1183         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1184         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1185         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1186         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1187
1188         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1189         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1190         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1191         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1192
1193         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1194         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1195         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1196
1197         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1198                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1199         }
1200         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1201         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1202         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1203         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1204         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1205
1206         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1207         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1208         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1209         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1210         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1211
1212         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1213         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1214
1215         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1216
1217         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1218         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1219         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1220                 match event {
1221                         &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1222                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1223                         },
1224                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1225                 };
1226         }
1227
1228         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1229                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1230         }
1231
1232         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1233 }
1234
1235 #[test]
1236 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1237         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1238         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1239         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1240         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1241         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1242         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1243
1244         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1245         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1246         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1247         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1248         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1249         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1250
1251         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1252
1253         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1254         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1255
1256         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1257         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1258
1259         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1260         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1261         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1262 }
1263
1264 #[test]
1265 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1266         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1267         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1268         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1269         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1270         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1271         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1272         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1273
1274         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1275
1276         // balancing
1277         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1278
1279         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1280
1281         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1282         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1283         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1284
1285         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1286         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1287         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1288         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1289
1290         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1291         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1292
1293         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1294         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1295         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1296                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1297                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1298                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1299                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1300                 }
1301         }
1302         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1303
1304         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1306         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1307         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1308
1309         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1310         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1311
1312         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1313         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1314         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1315         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1316         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1317                 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1318         } else {
1319                 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1320         };
1321
1322         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1323         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1324
1325         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1326         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1327         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1328
1329         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1330         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1331         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1332         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1333
1334         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1335         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1336         for e in events {
1337                 match e {
1338                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1339                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg } } => {
1340                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1341                                 assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1342                         },
1343                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1344                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1345                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1346                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1347                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1348                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1349                         },
1350                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1351                 }
1352         }
1353 }
1354
1355 #[test]
1356 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1357         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1358         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1359         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1360         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1361         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1362
1363         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1364         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1365
1366         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1367         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, &get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1368         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1369         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1370                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
1371         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1372         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1373                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1374         match err {
1375                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1376                         if let &APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. } = &fails[0] {}
1377                         else { panic!("Unexpected error variant"); }
1378                 },
1379                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1380         }
1381         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1382
1383         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1384 }
1385
1386 #[test]
1387 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1388         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1389         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1390         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1391         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1392         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1393
1394         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1395                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460000);
1396         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1397         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1398         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1399         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1400
1401         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
1402
1403         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1404         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1405                 3460001, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1406         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1407         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1408                 channel_id: chan.2,
1409                 htlc_id: 0,
1410                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1411                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1412                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1413                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1414                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1415                 blinding_point: None,
1416         };
1417
1418         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1419
1420         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1421         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1422         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1423
1424         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1425
1426         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1427
1428         // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1429         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1430         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1431                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1432                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1433                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1434                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1435                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1436                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1437                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1438                 chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1439
1440                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1441                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1442                  chan_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1443                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1444                  chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1445         };
1446         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1447                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1448                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1449                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1450                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1451                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1452                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1453                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1454                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1455                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1456                  chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1457         };
1458
1459         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1460         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1461                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1462
1463         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1464         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1465         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1466
1467         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1468                 offered: false,
1469                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1470                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1471                 payment_hash,
1472                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1473         };
1474
1475         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1476
1477         let res = {
1478                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1479                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1480                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1481                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1482                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1483                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1484                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1485                         commitment_number,
1486                         95000,
1487                         local_chan_balance,
1488                         local_funding, remote_funding,
1489                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1490                         feerate_per_kw,
1491                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1492                         &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1493                 );
1494                 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1495         };
1496
1497         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1498                 channel_id: chan.2,
1499                 signature: res.0,
1500                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1501                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1502                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1503         };
1504
1505         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1506         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1507         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1508
1509         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1510         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1511                 channel_id: chan.2,
1512                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1513                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
1514                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1515                 next_local_nonce: None,
1516         };
1517         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1518
1519         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1520         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1521         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1522         match events[0] {
1523                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1524                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1525                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1526                 },
1527                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1528         };
1529         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
1530                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", raa_msg.channel_id), 1);
1531
1532         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1533 }
1534
1535 #[test]
1536 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1537         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1538         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1539         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1540         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1541         // this situation.
1542         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1543         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1544         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1545         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1546         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1547         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1548
1549         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1550         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1551
1552         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1553
1554         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1555
1556         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1557         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1558         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1559         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1560                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1561         }
1562
1563         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1564         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1565                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1566                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1567         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1568 }
1569
1570 #[test]
1571 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1572         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1573         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1574         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1575         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1576         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1577         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1578         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1579
1580         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1581         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1582         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1583         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1584         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1585         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1586         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1587
1588         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1589         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1590                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1591         }
1592
1593         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1594                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1595         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 700_000;
1596         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1597         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1598         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1599         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
1600         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1601         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1602                 700_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1603         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1604         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1605                 channel_id: chan.2,
1606                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1607                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1608                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1609                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1610                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1611                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1612                 blinding_point: None,
1613         };
1614
1615         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1616         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1617         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 3);
1618         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1619         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1620         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1621         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1622         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() },
1623                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1624 }
1625
1626 #[test]
1627 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1628         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1629         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1630         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1631         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1632
1633         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1634         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1635         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1636         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1637         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1638
1639         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1640         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1641         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1642         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1643         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1644         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1645         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1646
1647         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1648                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1649         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1650         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1651         // commitment transaction fee.
1652         route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1653
1654         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1655         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1656                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1657         }
1658
1659         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1660         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1661                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt);
1662         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1663         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1664                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1665                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1666 }
1667
1668 #[test]
1669 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1670         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1671         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1672         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1673         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1674         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1675         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1676         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1677         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1678         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1679
1680         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1681         // HTLC.
1682         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1683         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1684         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None, None).unwrap_err(),
1685                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1686
1687         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1688         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1689         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1690         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None, None).unwrap();
1691         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1692         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1693         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1694
1695         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1696         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1697         match msg_events[0] {
1698                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1699                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1700                 },
1701                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1702         }
1703 }
1704
1705 #[test]
1706 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1707         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1708         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1709         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1710         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1711         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1712         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1713         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1714
1715         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1716         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1717         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1718         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1719         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1720         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1721
1722         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1723         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1724         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1725         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1726         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1727         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1728
1729         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1730         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1731         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1732         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1733 }
1734
1735 #[test]
1736 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1737         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1738         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1739         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1740         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1741         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1742         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1743
1744         let feemsat = 239;
1745         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1746         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1747         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1748         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1749
1750         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1751         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1752         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1753         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1754
1755         // Add a pending HTLC.
1756         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1757         let payment_event_1 = {
1758                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1759                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1760                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1761
1762                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1763                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1764                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1765         };
1766         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1767
1768         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1769         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, &channel_type_features);
1770         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1771         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1772         let mut route_2 = route_1.clone();
1773         route_2.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = amt_msat_2;
1774
1775         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1776         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1777         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1778         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
1779         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1780         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
1781                 &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1782         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
1783         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1784                 channel_id: chan.2,
1785                 htlc_id: 1,
1786                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1787                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1788                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1789                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1790                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1791                 blinding_point: None,
1792         };
1793
1794         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1795         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1796         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value", 3);
1797         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1798         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1799         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1800         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1801         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() },
1802                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1803 }
1804
1805 #[test]
1806 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1807         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1808         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1809         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1810         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1811         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1812         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1813         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1814         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1815         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1816         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1817
1818         let reserve = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1819         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1820         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1821
1822         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1823         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1824 }
1825
1826 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1827         (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1828 }
1829
1830 #[test]
1831 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1832         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1833         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1834         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1835         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1836         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1837         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1838         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1839         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1840         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1841         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1842
1843         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1844         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1845
1846         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1847         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1848
1849         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1850                 ($node: expr) => {{
1851                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1852                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1853                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1854                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1855                         payment_event
1856                 }}
1857         }
1858
1859         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1860         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1861         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1862         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1863
1864         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1865
1866         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1867         {
1868                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1869                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1870                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
1871                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1872                 assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1873
1874                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1875                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1876                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1877                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1878         }
1879
1880         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1881         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1882         loop {
1883                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1884                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1885                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1886                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1887                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1888                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1889                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1890                         break;
1891                 }
1892
1893                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1894                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1895                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
1896                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1897                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1898
1899                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1900                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1901                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1902                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1903                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1904                 );
1905
1906                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1907                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1908                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1909                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1910                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1911         }
1912
1913         // adding pending output.
1914         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1915         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1916         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1917         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1918         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1919         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1920         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1921         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1922         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1923         // policy.
1924         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1925         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1926         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1927
1928         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1929         let payment_event_1 = {
1930                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1931                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1932                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1933
1934                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1935                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1936                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1937         };
1938         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1939
1940         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1941         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1942         {
1943                 let mut route = route_1.clone();
1944                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = recv_value_2 + 1;
1945                 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1946                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1947                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1948                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1949                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1950         }
1951
1952         // split the rest to test holding cell
1953         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1954         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1955         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1956         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1957         {
1958                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1959                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1960         }
1961
1962         // now see if they go through on both sides
1963         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1964         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1965         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21,
1966                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1968         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1969         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1970
1971         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1972         {
1973                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1974                         get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1975                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1976                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1977                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1978                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1979                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1980         }
1981
1982         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1983         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1984         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22,
1985                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1986         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1987         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1988         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1989
1990         // flush the pending htlc
1991         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1992         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1993         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1994
1995         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1996         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1997         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1998         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1999
2000         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
2001         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2002         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
2003         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2004
2005         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
2006         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2007         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2008
2009         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2010
2011         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2012         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
2013         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
2014
2015         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2016         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
2017
2018         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
2019         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
2020         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
2021         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
2022         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
2023         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2024
2025         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2026         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
2027         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
2028         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
2029
2030         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
2031         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2032
2033         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2034         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2035         match events[0] {
2036                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2037                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2038                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
2039                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2040                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2041                         match &purpose {
2042                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2043                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2044                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2045                                 },
2046                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2047                         }
2048                 },
2049                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2050         }
2051         match events[1] {
2052                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2053                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2054                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2055                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2056                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2057                         match &purpose {
2058                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2059                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2060                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2061                                 },
2062                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2063                         }
2064                 },
2065                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2066         }
2067
2068         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2069         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2070         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2071
2072         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, &channel_type_features);
2073         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2074         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2075
2076         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
2077         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2078         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2079         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2080         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2081
2082         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2083         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2084 }
2085
2086 #[test]
2087 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2088         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2089         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2090         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2091         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2092         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2093         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2094         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2095         // To test this we:
2096         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2097         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2098         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2099         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2100         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2101         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2102         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2103         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2104         //    claim,
2105         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2106         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2107         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2108         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2109         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2110         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2111         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2112         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2113         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2114         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2115
2116         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2117         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2118         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2119         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2120         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2121
2122         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2123         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2124         let send_1 = {
2125                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
2126                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2127                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2128                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2129                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2130                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2131         };
2132
2133         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2134         // initial fulfill/CS.
2135         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2136         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2137         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2138         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2139
2140         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2141         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2142         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2143         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2144         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2145         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2146
2147         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2148         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2149         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2150         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2151         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_1, None, false, false);
2152
2153         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2154         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2156         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2157         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2158
2159         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2160         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2161         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2162
2163         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2165         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2166
2167         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2169         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2170
2171         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2172         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2173         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2174         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2175         // on-chain as necessary).
2176         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2177         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2179         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2180         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, false, false);
2181
2182         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2184         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2185
2186         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2187         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2188
2189         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2190         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2191         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2192         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2193         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2194         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2195
2196         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2197         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2198         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2199         let send_2 = {
2200                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_4,
2201                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2202                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2203                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2204                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2205                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2206         };
2207
2208         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2209         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2210         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2211         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2212
2213         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2214
2215         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2217         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2218
2219         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2221
2222         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2223         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2224         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2225         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2226
2227         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2228         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2229         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2230
2231         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2232         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2233
2234         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2235         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2236
2237         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2238         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2239 }
2240
2241 #[test]
2242 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2243         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2244         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2245         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2246         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2247         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2248         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2249
2250         // Create some initial channels
2251         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2252         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2253         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2254         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2255
2256         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2257         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2258         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2259         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2260         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2261         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2262
2263         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2264         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2265         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2266         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2267         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2268
2269         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2270         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
2271         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
2272         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2273         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2274         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2275         {
2276                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2277                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2278                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2279                 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2280                         let _ = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2281                 }
2282
2283                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2284                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2285                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2286         }
2287         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2288         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2289         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2290         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2291
2292         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2293         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2294
2295         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2296         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2297         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
2298         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
2299         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2300         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2301         {
2302                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2303                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2304                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2305                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2306                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2307                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2308         }
2309         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2310         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2311         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2312         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2313         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2314
2315         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2316                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2317                         {
2318                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2319                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2320                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2321
2322                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2323                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2324                                 match events[0] {
2325                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2326                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2327                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2328                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2329                                         },
2330                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2331                                 };
2332                         }
2333                 }
2334         }
2335
2336         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2337         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2338         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
2339         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
2340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2341         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2342         let node2_commitment_txid;
2343         {
2344                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2345                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2346                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2347                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2348
2349                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2350                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2351                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2352                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2353                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2354         }
2355         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2356         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2357         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2358         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2359         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2360
2361         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2362         // confusing us in the following tests.
2363         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2364
2365         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2366         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2367         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2368         // buffer space).
2369
2370         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2371                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2372                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2373                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2374                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[1] {
2375                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2376                                 msg.clone()
2377                         },
2378                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2379                 };
2380                 match events[0] {
2381                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
2382                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2383                         },
2384                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2385                 }
2386                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2387
2388                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2389                 {
2390                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2391                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2392                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2393                                         false
2394                                 } else { true }
2395                         });
2396                 }
2397
2398                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2399
2400                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2401                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2402
2403                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2404                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2405                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2406                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[1] {
2407                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2408                                 msg.clone()
2409                         },
2410                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2411                 };
2412                 match events[0] {
2413                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
2414                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2415                         },
2416                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2417                 }
2418                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2419                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2420                 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2421
2422                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2423                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2424                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2425         };
2426         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2427         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2428         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2429         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2430
2431         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2432                 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
2433         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2434 }
2435
2436 #[test]
2437 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
2438         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides
2439         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2440         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2441         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2442         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2443         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2444         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2445         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2446         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2447         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2448         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2449         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2450         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2451         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2452         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2453         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2454         // Create some new channels:
2455         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2456
2457         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2458         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2459         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2460         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2461         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2462         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2463         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2464         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2465         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2466         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2467         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2468         // Revoke the old state
2469         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2470
2471         {
2472                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2473                 {
2474                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2475                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2476                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2477                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2478                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2479                 }
2480                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2481                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2482                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2483
2484                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2485                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2486                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2487                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2488                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2489                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2490                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2491                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2492                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2493         }
2494         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2495         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2496         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2497 }
2498
2499 #[test]
2500 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() {
2501         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2502         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2503         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2504         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2505         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2506         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2507         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2508         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2509         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2510         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2511         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2512         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2513         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2514         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2515         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2516         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2517         // Create some new channels:
2518         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2519
2520         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2521         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2522         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2523         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2524         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2525         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2526         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2527         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2528         // Revoke the old state
2529         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2530         {
2531                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2532                 {
2533                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2534                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2535                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2536
2537                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2538                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2539                 }
2540                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2541                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2542
2543                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2544                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2545                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2546                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2547                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2548                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2549                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2550         }
2551         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2552         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2553         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2554 }
2555
2556 #[test]
2557 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2558         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2559         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2560         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2561         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2562         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2563         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2564         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2565         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2566         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2567         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2568         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2569         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2570         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2571         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2572
2573         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2574         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2575         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2576         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2577         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2578         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2579
2580         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2581
2582         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2583         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2584         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2585         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2586         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2587 }
2588
2589 #[test]
2590 fn test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates() {
2591         do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(true);
2592         do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(false);
2593 }
2594
2595 fn do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(broadcast_initial_commitment: bool) {
2596         // Simple test to make sure that the justice tx formed in WatchtowerPersister
2597         // is properly formed and can be broadcasted/confirmed successfully in the event
2598         // that a revoked commitment transaction is broadcasted
2599         // (Similar to `revoked_output_claim` test but we get the justice tx + broadcast manually)
2600         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2601         let destination_script0 = chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
2602         let destination_script1 = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
2603         let persisters = vec![WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script0),
2604                 WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script1)];
2605         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs_with_persisters(2, &chanmon_cfgs, persisters.iter().collect());
2606         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2607         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2608         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2609         let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
2610
2611         if !broadcast_initial_commitment {
2612                 // Send a payment to move the channel forward
2613                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2614         }
2615
2616         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output.
2617         // We'll keep this commitment transaction to broadcast once it's revoked.
2618         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel_id);
2619         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2620         let revoked_commitment_tx = &revoked_local_txn[0];
2621
2622         // Send another payment, now revoking the previous commitment tx
2623         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2624
2625         let justice_tx = persisters[1].justice_tx(funding_txo, &revoked_commitment_tx.txid()).unwrap();
2626         check_spends!(justice_tx, revoked_commitment_tx);
2627
2628         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2629         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2630
2631         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2632         check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2633                 &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2634         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 0);
2635
2636         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2637         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2638                 &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2639
2640         // Check that the justice tx has sent the revoked output value to nodes[1]
2641         let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel_id);
2642         let total_claimable_balance = monitor.get_claimable_balances().iter().fold(0, |sum, balance| {
2643                 match balance {
2644                         channelmonitor::Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. } => sum + amount_satoshis,
2645                         _ => panic!("Unexpected balance type"),
2646                 }
2647         });
2648         // On the first commitment, node[1]'s balance was below dust so it didn't have an output
2649         let node1_channel_balance = if broadcast_initial_commitment { 0 } else { revoked_commitment_tx.output[0].value };
2650         let expected_claimable_balance = node1_channel_balance + justice_tx.output[0].value;
2651         assert_eq!(total_claimable_balance, expected_claimable_balance);
2652 }
2653
2654
2655 #[test]
2656 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2657         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2658         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2659         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2660         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2661         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2662         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2663
2664         // Create some new channel:
2665         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2666
2667         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2668         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2669         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2670         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2671         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2672
2673         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2674         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2675         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2676         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2677         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2678         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2679         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2680         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2681         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2682
2683         //Revoke the old state
2684         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2685
2686         {
2687                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2688                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2689                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2690                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2691                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2692                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2693                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2694                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2695
2696                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2697                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2698
2699                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2700                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2701
2702                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2703                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2704                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2705                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2706                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2707                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2708                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2709                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2710
2711                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2712                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2713                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2714                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2715                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2716         }
2717         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2718         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2719         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2720 }
2721
2722 #[test]
2723 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2724         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2725         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2726         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2727         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2728         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2729         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2730
2731         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2732
2733         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2734         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2735         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2736         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2737         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2738         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2739
2740         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2741         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2742
2743         //Revoke the old state
2744         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2745
2746         {
2747                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2748                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2749                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2750                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2751                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2752                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2753                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions(events[0..2].to_vec(), &[HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
2754                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2755                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2756                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2757                 }
2758
2759                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2760                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2761
2762                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2763
2764                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2765                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2766                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2767                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2768                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2769                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2770                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2771
2772                 // Filter out any non justice transactions.
2773                 node_txn.retain(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2774                 assert!(node_txn.len() > 3);
2775
2776                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2777                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2778                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2779
2780                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2781                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2782                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2783
2784                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2785                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2786                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2787                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2788                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2789                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2790                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2791                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2792
2793                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2794                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2795                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2796                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2797                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2798                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2799                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2800         }
2801         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2802         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2803         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2804 }
2805
2806 #[test]
2807 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2808         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2809         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2810         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2811         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2812         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2813         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2814         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2815         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2816         // towards B.
2817         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2818         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2819         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2820         // PaymentSent event).
2821
2822         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2823         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2824         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2825         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2826
2827         // Create some initial channels
2828         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2829         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2830
2831         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2832         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2833         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2834         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2835         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2836
2837         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2838         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2839         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2840
2841         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2842         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2843
2844         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2845         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2846         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2847         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2848         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2849         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2850         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2851         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2852         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2853         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2854         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2855         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2856         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2857         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2858         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2859
2860         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2861         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2862         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2863         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2864         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2865         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2866         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2867         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2868         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2869         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2870         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2871         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2872         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2873         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2874
2875         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2876         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
2877         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2878         {
2879                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2880                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2881                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2882                 added_monitors.clear();
2883         }
2884         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2885         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2886         match forwarded_events[0] {
2887                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2888                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2889         }
2890         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2891         match forwarded_events[1] {
2892                 Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
2893                         next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
2894                 } => {
2895                         assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2896                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2897                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2898                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2899                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2900                 },
2901                 _ => panic!()
2902         }
2903         match forwarded_events[2] {
2904                 Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
2905                         next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
2906                 } => {
2907                         assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2908                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2909                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2910                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2911                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2912                 },
2913                 _ => panic!()
2914         }
2915         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2916         {
2917                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2918                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2919                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2920                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2921                 added_monitors.clear();
2922         }
2923         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2924
2925         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2926         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2927
2928         match nodes_2_event {
2929                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2930                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2931         }
2932
2933         match nodes_0_event {
2934                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2935                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2936                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2937                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2938                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2939                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2940                 },
2941                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2942         };
2943
2944         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2945         match events[0] {
2946                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2947                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2948         }
2949
2950         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2951                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2952                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2953                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2954                         // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2955                         // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2956                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2957                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2958                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2959                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2960                         if $htlc_offered {
2961                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2962                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2963                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2964                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2965                         } else {
2966                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2967                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2968                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2969                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2970                         }
2971                         node_txn.clear();
2972                 } }
2973         }
2974         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2975         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2976
2977         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2978         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2979         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2980         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2981         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2982         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2983         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2984         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2985         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2986         assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2987         let commitment_spend =
2988                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2989                         &node_txn[0]
2990                 } else {
2991                         // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2992                         // FullBlockViaListen
2993                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2994                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2995                                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2996                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2997                                 &node_txn[0]
2998                         } else {
2999                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3000                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3001                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
3002                                 &node_txn[2]
3003                         }
3004                 };
3005
3006         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3007         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
3008         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3009         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3010         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
3011         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
3012         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
3013         // we already checked the same situation with A.
3014
3015         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
3016         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()]));
3017         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3018         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3019         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3020         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3021         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
3022         let mut first_claimed = false;
3023         for event in events {
3024                 match event {
3025                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3026                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
3027                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
3028                                         first_claimed = true;
3029                                 } else {
3030                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
3031                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
3032                                 }
3033                         },
3034                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3035                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
3036                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3037                 }
3038         }
3039         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3040 }
3041
3042 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
3043         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
3044         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
3045         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
3046         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
3047         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
3048         //            \                                  \
3049         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
3050
3051         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3052         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3053         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3054         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3055         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3056         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3057         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3058
3059         // Create some intial channels
3060         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3061         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3062
3063         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
3064         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3065         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3066
3067         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
3068
3069         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
3070         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3071         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
3072         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
3073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
3074         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
3075         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3076
3077         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3078         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3079         match events[0] {
3080                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3081                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3082                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3083                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3084                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3085                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3086                 },
3087                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3088         };
3089         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
3090         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3091         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3092         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3093         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
3094         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
3095
3096         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
3097         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
3098         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
3099         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false
3100                 , [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3101         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
3102         let timeout_tx = {
3103                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3104                 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
3105                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
3106                 } else {
3107                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 3); // Two extra fee bumps for timeout transaction
3108                 }
3109                 txn.iter().for_each(|tx| check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx[0]));
3110                 assert_eq!(txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3111                 txn.remove(0)
3112         };
3113
3114         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
3115         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3116         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3117
3118         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3119
3120         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3122         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3123         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3124         match events[0] {
3125                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3126                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3127                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3128                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3129                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3130                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3131                 },
3132                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3133         };
3134
3135         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3136         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3137         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3138
3139         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3140         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3141
3142         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3144         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3145         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
3146         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3147         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3148         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3149 }
3150
3151 #[test]
3152 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3153         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3154         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3155         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3156 }
3157
3158 #[test]
3159 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3160         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3161         // and fail backward accordingly.
3162
3163         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3164         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3165         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3166         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3167
3168         // Create some initial channels
3169         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3170         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3171
3172         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3173         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3174         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3175         // Revoke the old state
3176         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3177
3178         let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3179
3180         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3181         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3182         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3184         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3185
3186         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3188         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3189         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3190         match events[0] {
3191                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3192                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3193                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3194                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3195                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3196                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3197
3198                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3199                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3200                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3201                 },
3202                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3203         }
3204 }
3205
3206 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3207         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3208         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3209         // commitment transaction anymore.
3210         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3211         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3212         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3213         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3214         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3215         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3216         // transactions:
3217         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3218         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3219         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3220         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3221         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3222         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3223         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3224         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3225         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3226
3227         // Create some initial channels
3228         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3229         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3230
3231         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3232         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3233         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3234         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3235         // Revoke the old state
3236         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3237
3238         let value = if use_dust {
3239                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3240                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3241                 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3242                         .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3243         } else { 3000000 };
3244
3245         let (_, first_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3246         let (_, second_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3247         let (_, third_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3248
3249         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3250         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3251         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3252         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3253         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3254         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3255         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3256         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3257         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3258         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3259         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3260         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3261
3262         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3263         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3264         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3265         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3266         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3267         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3268         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3269         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3270         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3271         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3272         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3273         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3274         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3275         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3276         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3277         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3278
3279         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3280         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3281         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3282         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3283         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3284         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3285         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3286         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3287         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3288         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3289         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3290         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3291         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3293         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3294         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3295         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3296         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3297
3298         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3299         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3300         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3301         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, fourth_payment_hash,
3302                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3303         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3304         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3306
3307         if deliver_bs_raa {
3308                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3309                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3310                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3311                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3312                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3313                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3314                 match events[0] {
3315                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3316                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3317                 }
3318                 match events[1] {
3319                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3320                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3321                 };
3322                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3323                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3324         }
3325
3326         let mut failed_htlcs = new_hash_set();
3327         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3328
3329         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3330         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3331         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3332
3333         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3334         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3335         assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3336                 ev,
3337                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. }
3338         )));
3339         assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3340                 ev,
3341                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
3342         )));
3343         assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3344                 ev,
3345                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
3346         )));
3347
3348         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3349         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3350
3351         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3352         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3353
3354         if deliver_bs_raa {
3355                 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3356                 match nodes_2_event {
3357                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3358                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3359                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3360                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3361                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3362                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3363                         },
3364                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3365                 }
3366         }
3367
3368         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3369         match nodes_2_event {
3370                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data }) }, node_id: _ } => {
3371                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3372                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3373                 },
3374                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3375         }
3376
3377         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3378         match nodes_0_event {
3379                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3380                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3381                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3382                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3383                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3384                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3385
3386                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3387                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3388                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3389
3390                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3391
3392                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3393                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3394                         match events[0] {
3395                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3396                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3397                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3398                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3399                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3400                                                 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3401                                         }
3402                                 },
3403                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3404                         }
3405                         match events[1] {
3406                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3407                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3408                                 },
3409                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3410                         }
3411                         match events[2] {
3412                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3413                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3414                                 },
3415                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3416                         }
3417                         match events[3] {
3418                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3419                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3420                                 },
3421                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3422                         }
3423                         match events[4] {
3424                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3425                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3426                                 },
3427                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3428                         }
3429                         match events[5] {
3430                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3431                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3432                                 },
3433                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3434                         }
3435                 },
3436                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3437         }
3438
3439         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3440         match events[0] {
3441                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3442                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3443         }
3444
3445         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3446         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3447         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3448 }
3449
3450 #[test]
3451 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3452         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3453         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3454         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3455         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3456 }
3457
3458 #[test]
3459 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3460         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3461         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3462         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3463         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3464 }
3465
3466 #[test]
3467 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3468         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3469         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3470         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3471         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3472         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3473
3474         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3475         {
3476                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3477                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
3478                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3479                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3480
3481                 let payment_event = {
3482                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3483                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3484                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3485                 };
3486                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3487                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3488         }
3489
3490         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3491         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3492         {
3493                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, failed_payment_hash,
3494                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3495                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3496
3497                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3498         }
3499
3500         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3501         {
3502                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3503
3504                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3505                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3506                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3507                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
3508                         &route.paths[0], 50_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3509                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3510                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
3511
3512                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3513                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3514                         channel_id: chan.2,
3515                         htlc_id: 0,
3516                         amount_msat: 0,
3517                         payment_hash,
3518                         cltv_expiry,
3519                         onion_routing_packet,
3520                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
3521                         blinding_point: None,
3522                 };
3523                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3524         }
3525         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3526         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3527         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3528         match events[0] {
3529                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3530                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3531                 },
3532                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3533         }
3534         match events[1] {
3535                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3536                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3537                 },
3538                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3539         }
3540         match events[2] {
3541                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3542                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3543                 },
3544                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3545         }
3546         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3547         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3548 }
3549
3550 #[test]
3551 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3552         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3553         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3554         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3555         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3556         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3557         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3558         if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3559                 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3560                 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3561                 // connect_style.
3562                 return;
3563         }
3564         let funding_tx = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).3;
3565         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
3566         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3567         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
3568         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3569         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3570         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3571         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3572
3573         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
3574         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3575         check_spends!(node_txn[0], funding_tx);
3576         check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
3577
3578         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone()]);
3579         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3580         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3581         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3582         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3583
3584         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3585         // registering new transactions
3586         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3587 }
3588
3589 #[test]
3590 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3591         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3592         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3593         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3594         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3595         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3596         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3597         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3598
3599         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3600
3601         let mut payment_event = {
3602                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
3603                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3604                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3605
3606                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3607                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3608                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3609         };
3610
3611         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3612         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3613
3614         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3615
3616         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3617         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3618         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3619         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3620
3621         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3622         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3623         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3624         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3625         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3626
3627         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3628         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3629         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3630         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
3631         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
3632         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3633         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3634         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3635         let commitment_tx = {
3636                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3637                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3638                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3639                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3640                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3641                 node_txn.remove(0)
3642         };
3643
3644         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
3645
3646         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3647         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3648         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3649         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3650
3651         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3652         {
3653                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3654                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3655         }
3656         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx);
3657         let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3658         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), if nodes[2].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 2 } else { 1 });
3659         let htlc_tx = node_txn.pop().unwrap();
3660         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input.len(), 1);
3661         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, commitment_tx.txid());
3662         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3663         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3664
3665         check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx);
3666 }
3667
3668 #[test]
3669 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3670         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3671         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3672         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3673         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3674
3675         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3676         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3677         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3678         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3679         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3680
3681         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3682
3683         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3684         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3685         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3686         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3687         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3688         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
3689
3690         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3691         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3692
3693         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3694         reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3695         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3696         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3697 }
3698
3699 #[test]
3700 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3701         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3702         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted, and doesn't reconnect back within time.
3703         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3704         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3705         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3706         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3707
3708         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3709         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3710         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
3711         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3712         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3713         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3714         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3715
3716         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3717         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3718
3719         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3720
3721         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3722         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3723
3724         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3725         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3726         // broadcasted.
3727         {
3728                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3729         }
3730
3731         // The peers disconnect before the funding is broadcasted.
3732         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3733         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3734
3735         // The time for peers to reconnect expires.
3736         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS {
3737                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
3738         }
3739
3740         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed`
3741         // when the peers are disconnected and do not reconnect before the funding
3742         // transaction is broadcasted.
3743         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, true
3744                 , [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3745         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false
3746                 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3747 }
3748
3749 #[test]
3750 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3751         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3752         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3753         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3754         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3755         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3756         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3757         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3758
3759         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3760         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3761         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3762         reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3763         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3764
3765         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3766         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3767         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3768         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3769
3770         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3771         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3772         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3773
3774         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3775         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3776         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3777         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3778
3779         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3780         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3781
3782         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3783         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3784
3785         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3786         reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 = 1;
3787         reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3788         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3789         {
3790                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3791                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3792                 match events[0] {
3793                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3794                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3795                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3796                         },
3797                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3798                 }
3799                 match events[1] {
3800                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3801                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3802                 }
3803                 match events[2] {
3804                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3805                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3806                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3807                         },
3808                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3809                 }
3810                 match events[3] {
3811                         Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3812                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3813                         },
3814                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3815                 }
3816         }
3817         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
3818
3819         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3820         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3821 }
3822
3823 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3824         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3825         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3826         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3827         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3828         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3829
3830         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3831         let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3832                 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3833                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3834                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3835                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3836                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3837                 chan_id
3838         } else {
3839                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3840         };
3841
3842         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3843
3844         let payment_event = {
3845                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
3846                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3847                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3848
3849                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3850                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3851                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3852         };
3853         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3854
3855         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3856                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3857         } else {
3858                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3859                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3860                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3861                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3862                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3863
3864                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3865                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3866                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3867                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3868
3869                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3870                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3871                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3872                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3873                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3874
3875                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3876                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3877                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3878                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3879                                         }
3880                                 }
3881                         }
3882                 }
3883         }
3884
3885         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3886         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3887         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3888                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3889                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3890                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3891                         //
3892                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3893                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3894                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3895                         //
3896                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3897                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3898                 }
3899                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3900                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3901                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3902                 reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3903                 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = 1;
3904                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3905         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3906                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3907                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3908                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
3909                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
3910                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3911         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3912                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3913                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3914                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
3915                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3916         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3917                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3918                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3919                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
3920                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3921         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3922                 // Everything was delivered...
3923                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3924         }
3925
3926         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3927         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3928                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3929                 match events_1[0] {
3930                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3931                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3932                 };
3933                 match events_1[1] {
3934                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3935                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3936                 };
3937         } else {
3938                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3939                 match events_1[0] {
3940                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3941                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3942                 };
3943         }
3944
3945         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3946         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3947         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3948
3949         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3950
3951         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3952         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3953         match events_2[0] {
3954                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
3955                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3956                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3957                         assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3958                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3959                         match &purpose {
3960                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3961                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3962                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3963                                 },
3964                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3965                         }
3966                 },
3967                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3968         }
3969
3970         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3971         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3972         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3973
3974         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3975         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3976         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3977                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3978                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3979                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3980                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3981                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3982                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3983                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3984                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3985                 },
3986                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3987         };
3988
3989         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3990                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3991
3992                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3993                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3994                 match events_4[0] {
3995                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3996                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3997                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3998                         },
3999                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4000                 }
4001
4002                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
4003                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
4004                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4005                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4006
4007                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
4008                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4009                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4010                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4011
4012                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
4013                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
4014                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4015                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4016                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4017
4018                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
4019                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4020                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4021                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4022                                         }
4023                                 }
4024                         }
4025                 }
4026         }
4027
4028         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4029         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4030         if messages_delivered < 2 {
4031                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4032                 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
4033                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4034                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
4035                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
4036                 } else {
4037                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4038                 }
4039         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
4040                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
4041                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4042                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
4043                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
4044                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4045         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
4046                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
4047                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4048                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
4049                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4050         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
4051                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
4052                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4053                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
4054                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4055         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
4056                 // Everything was delivered...
4057                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4058         }
4059
4060         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
4061                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4062         }
4063         if messages_delivered <= 5 {
4064                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4065                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4066         }
4067         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4068
4069         if messages_delivered > 2 {
4070                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4071         }
4072
4073         // Channel should still work fine...
4074         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4075         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
4076         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4077 }
4078
4079 #[test]
4080 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
4081         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
4082         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
4083         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
4084         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
4085 }
4086
4087 #[test]
4088 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
4089         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
4090         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
4091         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
4092         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
4093 }
4094
4095 #[test]
4096 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4097         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4098         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4099         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4100         // channel_ready immediately instead.
4101         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4102         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4103         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4104         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4105         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4106
4107         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4108
4109         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4110         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4111         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4112         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4113         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4114         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4115
4116         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4117         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4118         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4119 }
4120
4121 #[test]
4122 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_leading() {
4123         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4124         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4125         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4126         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4127
4128         // Let channel_manager get ahead of chain_monitor by 1 block.
4129         // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4130         // in case where client calls block_connect on channel_manager first and then on chain_monitor.
4131         let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4132         let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4133
4134         nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4135         nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4136
4137         // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4138         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4139
4140         // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1,
4141         // but it's best_block is block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager
4142         // was running ahead of chain_monitor at the time of funding_created.
4143         // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4144         // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4145         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4146         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4147
4148         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4149         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4150         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4151 }
4152
4153 #[test]
4154 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_lagging() {
4155         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4156         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4157         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4158         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4159
4160         // Let chain_monitor get ahead of channel_manager by 1 block.
4161         // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4162         // in case where client calls block_connect on chain_monitor first and then on channel_manager.
4163         let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4164         let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4165
4166         nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4167         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4168
4169         // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4170         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4171
4172         // channel_manager can't really skip block_1, it should get it eventually.
4173         nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4174
4175         // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1, it's best_block is
4176         // the block before block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager was
4177         // running behind at the time of funding_created.
4178         // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4179         // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4180         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4181         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4182
4183         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4184         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4185         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4186 }
4187
4188 #[test]
4189 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4190         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4191         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4192         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4193         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4194         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4195         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4196         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4197
4198         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4199
4200         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4201         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4202         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
4203                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
4204         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4205
4206         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4207         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4208         match events_1[0] {
4209                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4210                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4211         }
4212
4213         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4214         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4215         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4216
4217         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4218         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4219         match events_2[0] {
4220                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4221                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4222                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4223                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4224                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4225                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4226                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4227
4228                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4229                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4230                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4231                         match events_3[0] {
4232                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4233                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4234                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4235                                 },
4236                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4237                         }
4238
4239                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4240                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4241                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4242                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4243                 },
4244                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4245         }
4246
4247         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4248         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4249
4250         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4251                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4252         }, true).unwrap();
4253         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4254         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4255         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4256                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4257         }, false).unwrap();
4258         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4259         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4260
4261         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4262         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4263         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4264         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4265
4266         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4267         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4268
4269         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4270         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4271
4272         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4273
4274         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4275         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4276         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4277         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4278         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4279         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4280         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4281         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4282         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4283         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4284
4285         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4286         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4287         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4288         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4289         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4290         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4291         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4293
4294         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4295         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4296         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4297         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4298         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4299         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4300         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4302
4303         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4304         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4305         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4306         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4307
4308         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4309         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4310         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4311         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4312
4313         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4314         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4315         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4316
4317         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4318
4319         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4320         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4321         match events_5[0] {
4322                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4323                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4324                         match &purpose {
4325                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4326                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4327                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4328                                 },
4329                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4330                         }
4331                 },
4332                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4333         }
4334
4335         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4336         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4337         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4338
4339         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4340         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4341 }
4342
4343 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4344         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4345         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4346         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4347         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4348         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4349         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4350
4351         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4352
4353         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4354                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4355                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4356                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4357                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4358                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4359                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
4360                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4361                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
4362                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id,
4363                         &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4364                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4365                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4366                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4367                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4368                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4369                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4370                 our_payment_hash
4371         } else {
4372                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4373         };
4374
4375         let mut block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
4376         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4377         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4378         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4379         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4380                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4381                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4382                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4383         }
4384
4385         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4386
4387         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4388         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4389         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4390         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4391         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4392         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4393
4394         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4395         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4396         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4397         let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4398         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4399         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4400 }
4401
4402 #[test]
4403 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4404         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4405         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4406 }
4407
4408 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4409         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4410         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4411         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4412         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4413         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4414         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4415         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4416
4417         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4418         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4419         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4420         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4421
4422         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4423         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4424         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, first_payment_hash,
4425                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4426         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4427         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4428
4429         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4430         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4431         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4432         sending_node.node.send_payment_with_route(&route, second_payment_hash,
4433                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4434         if forwarded_htlc {
4435                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4436                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4437                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4438                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4439                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4440         }
4441         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4442
4443         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4444         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4445         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4446         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4447
4448         if forwarded_htlc {
4449                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4450                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4451                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4452                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4453                 match fail_commit[0] {
4454                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4455                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4456                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4457                         },
4458                         _ => unreachable!(),
4459                 }
4460                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4461         } else {
4462                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4463         }
4464 }
4465
4466 #[test]
4467 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4468         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4469         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4470 }
4471
4472 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4473         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4474                 {
4475                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4476                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4477                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4478                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4479                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4480                                 match event {
4481                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs, channel_id: _ } => {
4482                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4483                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4484                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4485                                                 }
4486                                         },
4487                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4488                                 };
4489                         }
4490                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4491                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx) {
4492                                         txn.push(tx);
4493                                 }
4494                         }
4495                         txn
4496                 }
4497         }
4498 }
4499
4500 #[test]
4501 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4502         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4503         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4504         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4505         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4506         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4507
4508         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4509         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
4510         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
4511         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4512         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4513         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4514         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4515         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4516         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4517         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4518
4519         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4520         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4521
4522         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4523         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4524         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4525         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4526         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4527 }
4528
4529 #[test]
4530 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4531         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4532         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4533         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4534         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4535         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4536         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4537         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
4538
4539         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4540         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
4541         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4542         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4543         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4544
4545         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4546         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4547         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4548         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4549
4550         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4551         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4552         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4553         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4554         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4555
4556         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4557         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4558         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4559 }
4560
4561 #[test]
4562 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4563         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4564         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4565
4566         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4567         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4568         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4569         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4570
4571         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4572         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4573         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4574         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4575         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4576
4577         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4578         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4579         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4580         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4581         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4582
4583         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4584         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4585         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4586
4587         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4588         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4589         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4590         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4591         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4592 }
4593
4594 #[test]
4595 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4596         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4597         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4598         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4599         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4600
4601         // Create some initial channels
4602         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4603
4604         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4605
4606         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4607         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4608         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4609
4610         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4611         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4612         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4613         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4614         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4615         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4616         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4617         match events[0] {
4618                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4619                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4620         }
4621         match events[2] {
4622                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4623                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4624         }
4625
4626         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4627         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4628         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4629         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4630         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4631
4632         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4633         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4634         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4635
4636         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4637         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4638         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4639 }
4640
4641 #[test]
4642 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4643         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4644         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4645         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4646         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4647
4648         // Create some initial channels
4649         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4650
4651         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4652         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4653
4654         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4655
4656         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4657         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4658         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4659
4660         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4661         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4662         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4663         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4664         match events[1] {
4665                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4666                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4667         }
4668         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4669
4670         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4671         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4672         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4673         check_spends!(node_txn[0],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4674         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4675
4676         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4677         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4678         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4679         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4680
4681         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4682         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4683         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4684         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4685         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4686 }
4687
4688 #[test]
4689 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4690         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4691         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4692         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4693         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4694
4695         // Create some initial channels
4696         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4697
4698         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4699         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4700         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4701         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4702
4703         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4704
4705         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4706         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4707         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4708         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4709
4710         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4711         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4712         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4713         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4714
4715         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4716         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4717
4718         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4719         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4720         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4721 }
4722
4723 #[test]
4724 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4725         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4726         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4727         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4728         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4729         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4730
4731         // Create some initial channels
4732         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4733
4734         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4735         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4736         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4737         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4738
4739         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4740
4741         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4742         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4743         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4744         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4745         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4746         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4747
4748         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4749         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4750         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4751         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4752         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4753         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // HTLC-Timeout
4754
4755         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4756         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4757         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4758         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4759         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4760
4761         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4762         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4763         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4764         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4765         // transactions next...
4766         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4767         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4768
4769         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4770         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4771         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4772                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4773         } else {
4774                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4775                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4776         }
4777
4778         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4779         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4780
4781         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4782         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4783         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4784         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4785         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4786 }
4787
4788 #[test]
4789 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4790         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4791         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4792         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4793         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4794         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4795
4796         // Create some initial channels
4797         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4798
4799         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4800         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4801         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4802         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4803
4804         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4805         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4806
4807         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4808
4809         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4810         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4811         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4812         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4813         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4814         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4815
4816         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4817         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4818         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4819         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4820
4821         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4822         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4823         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4824
4825         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4826         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4827         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4828         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4829         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4830
4831         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4832         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4833
4834         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4835         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4836         // transactions next...
4837         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4838         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4839         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4840                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4841         } else {
4842                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4843                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4844         }
4845
4846         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4847         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4848
4849         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4850         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4851
4852         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4853         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4854
4855         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4856         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4857         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4858         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4859         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4860         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4861         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4862         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4863 }
4864
4865 #[test]
4866 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4867         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4868         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4869         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4870         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4871         // channel.
4872         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4873         // gets broadcast.
4874
4875         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4876         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4877         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4878         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4879
4880         // Create some initial channels
4881         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4882         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4883
4884         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4885         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4886         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4887         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4888         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4889
4890         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4891         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4892         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4893
4894         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4895         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4896         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4897         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4898         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4899         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4900         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4901         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4902         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4903         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4904         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4905
4906         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4907         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4908         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4909         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4910
4911         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4912         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4913         check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4914         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4915         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4916         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Success tx
4917
4918         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4919         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
4920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4921         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4922         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4923         match events[0] {
4924                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4925                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4926         }
4927         match events[1] {
4928                 Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
4929                         next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
4930                 } => {
4931                         assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4932                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4933                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4934                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4935                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4936                 },
4937                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4938         }
4939         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4940         let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4941         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4942         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4943         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4944
4945         match nodes_2_event {
4946                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4947                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4948         }
4949
4950         match nodes_0_event {
4951                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4952                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4953                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4954                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4955                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4956                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4957                 },
4958                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4959         };
4960
4961         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4962         match msg_events[0] {
4963                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4964                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4965         }
4966
4967         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4968         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4969         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4970         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4971         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4972         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4973         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4974         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4975         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4976         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4977         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
4978
4979         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4980         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4981 }
4982
4983 #[test]
4984 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4985         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4986         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4987         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4988         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4989         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4990         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4991         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4992         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4993         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4994         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4995         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4996                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4997         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4998
4999         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5000         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5001         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5002
5003         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5004         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5005         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5006         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5007         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5008
5009         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5010
5011         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
5012         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5013         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5014         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5015         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
5016                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
5017         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
5018         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5019
5020         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5021         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5022         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5023
5024         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5025         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5026         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5027         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5028         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5029
5030         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5031         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5032                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5033                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
5034                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5035
5036                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5037                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5038                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5039
5040                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
5041                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5042                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5043                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5044                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5045
5046                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5047                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5048                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
5049                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5050                 } else {
5051                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5052                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5053                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5054                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5055                 }
5056
5057                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5058                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5059                 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
5060                 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
5061                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
5062                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5063                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5064                 } else {
5065                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5066                 }
5067         }
5068
5069         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5070         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5071
5072         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5074         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5075         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5076         match events[0] {
5077                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5078                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5079         }
5080         match events[2] {
5081                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5082                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5083         }
5084         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5085         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5086         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5087         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5088         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5089         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5090         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5091         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5092         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5093         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5094
5095         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5096         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5097         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5098         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5099         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5100         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5101         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5102         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5103         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5104         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5105
5106         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5107         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5108         {
5109                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5110         }
5111         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5112
5113         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5114         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
5115         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
5116         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5117         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5118         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5119         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5120         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5121         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5122         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5123
5124         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5125         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5126         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, None, true, true);
5127 }
5128
5129 #[test]
5130 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5131         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5132         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5133         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5134         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5135
5136         // Create some initial channels
5137         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5138
5139         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5140         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5141         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5142         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5143         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5144
5145         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5146         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5147         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5148         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5149
5150         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5152         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5153         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5154         match events[0] {
5155                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5156                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5157         }
5158         match events[2] {
5159                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5160                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5161         }
5162         let node_tx = {
5163                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5164                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5165                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5166                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5167                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5168                 node_txn[0].clone()
5169         };
5170
5171         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5172         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5173
5174         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5175         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5176         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5177         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5178         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5179         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5180 }
5181
5182 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5183         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5184         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5185         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5186         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5187         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5188         // use the same payment hashes.
5189         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5190         //
5191         // A \         / E
5192         //    - C - D -
5193         // B /         \ F
5194         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5195         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5196         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5197         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5198         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5199         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5200         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5201         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5202                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5203         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5204
5205         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5206         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5207         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5208         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5209         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5210
5211         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5212         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5213         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5214         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5215
5216         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
5217                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5218         // 0th HTLC:
5219         let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5220         // 1st HTLC:
5221         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5222         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5223         // 2nd HTLC:
5224         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5225         // 3rd HTLC:
5226         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5227         // 4th HTLC:
5228         let (_, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5229         // 5th HTLC:
5230         let (_, payment_hash_4, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5231         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5232         // 6th HTLC:
5233         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5234         // 7th HTLC:
5235         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5236
5237         // 8th HTLC:
5238         let (_, payment_hash_5, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5239         // 9th HTLC:
5240         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5241         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5242
5243         // 10th HTLC:
5244         let (_, payment_hash_6, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5245         // 11th HTLC:
5246         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5247         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5248
5249         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5250         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5251         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5252         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5253         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5254
5255         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5256         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5257         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5258         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5259         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5260         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5261         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5262
5263         let failed_destinations = vec![
5264                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5265                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5266                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5267                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5268         ];
5269         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5270         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5271
5272         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5273         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5274         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5275         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5276         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5277         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5278
5279         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5280         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5281         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5282         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5283
5284         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5285                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5286                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5287         ];
5288         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5290
5291         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5292         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5293         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5294         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5295
5296         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5297
5298         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5299         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5300                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5301                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5302                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5303                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5304                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5305                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5306         ];
5307         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5309         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5310         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5311         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5312         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5313         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5314         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5315         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5316         if deliver_last_raa {
5317                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5318         } else {
5319                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5320         }
5321
5322         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5323         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5324         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5325         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5326         //
5327         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5328         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5329         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5330         //
5331         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5332         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5333         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5334
5335         if announce_latest {
5336                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5337         } else {
5338                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5339         }
5340         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5341         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5342                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5343                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5344         } else {
5345                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5346                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5347         };
5348         match close_event {
5349                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5350                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5351         }
5352
5353         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5354         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5355         if deliver_last_raa {
5356                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[1..2], true);
5357
5358                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5359                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5360         } else {
5361                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5362                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5363                 } else {
5364                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5365                 };
5366
5367                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5368         }
5369         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5370
5371         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5372         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5373         let mut a_done = false;
5374         for msg in cs_msgs {
5375                 match msg {
5376                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5377                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5378                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5379                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5380                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5381                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5382                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5383                                         }
5384                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5385                                         assert!(!a_done);
5386                                         a_done = true;
5387                                         &nodes[0]
5388                                 } else {
5389                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5390                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5391                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5392                                         }
5393                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5394                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5395                                         &nodes[1]
5396                                 };
5397                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5398                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5399                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5400                                 if announce_latest {
5401                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5402                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5403                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5404                                         }
5405                                 }
5406                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5407                         },
5408                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5409                 }
5410         }
5411
5412         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5413         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5414         let mut as_faileds = new_hash_set();
5415         let mut as_updates = 0;
5416         for event in as_events.iter() {
5417                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5418                         assert!(as_faileds.insert(*payment_hash));
5419                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5420                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5421                         } else {
5422                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5423                         }
5424                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5425                                 as_updates += 1;
5426                         }
5427                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5428                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5429         }
5430         assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5431         assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5432         if announce_latest {
5433                 assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5434                 assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5435         }
5436         assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5437
5438         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5439         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5440         let mut bs_faileds = new_hash_set();
5441         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5442         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5443                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5444                         assert!(bs_faileds.insert(*payment_hash));
5445                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5446                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5447                         } else {
5448                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5449                         }
5450                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5451                                 bs_updates += 1;
5452                         }
5453                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5454                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5455         }
5456         assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5457         assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5458         if announce_latest {
5459                 assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5460         }
5461         assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5462
5463         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5464         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5465         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5466         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5467         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5468         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5469 }
5470
5471 #[test]
5472 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5473         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5474 }
5475
5476 #[test]
5477 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5478         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5479 }
5480
5481 #[test]
5482 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5483         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5484         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5485         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5486 }
5487
5488 #[test]
5489 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5490         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5491         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5492         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5493         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5494
5495         // Create some initial channels
5496         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5497
5498         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5499         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5500         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5501         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5502
5503         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5504         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5505         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5506         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5507         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5508         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5509
5510         let htlc_timeout = {
5511                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5512                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5513                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5514                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5515                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5516                 node_txn[0].clone()
5517         };
5518
5519         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5520         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5521         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5522
5523         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5524         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5525         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5526         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5527         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5528         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5529         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5530         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5531         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5532         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5533                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5534 }
5535
5536 #[test]
5537 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5538         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5539         // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5540         // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5541         // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5542
5543         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5544
5545         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5546         let seed = [42; 32];
5547         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5548         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5549         let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5550         let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5551         let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &scorer);
5552         let message_router = test_utils::TestMessageRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &keys_manager);
5553         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, message_router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5554         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5555         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5556         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5557
5558         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5559         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5560
5561         // Create some initial channels
5562         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5563         // for node 0
5564         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5565         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5566         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5567
5568         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5569         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5570         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5571         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5572         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5573
5574         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5575         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5576         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5577         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5578         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5579
5580         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5581         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5582         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5583         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5584             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5585             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5586             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5587                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5588         }
5589
5590         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5591         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5592         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5593         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5594         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5595         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5596
5597         let htlc_timeout = {
5598                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5599                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5600                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5601                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5602                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5603                 node_txn[0].clone()
5604         };
5605
5606         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5607         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5608         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5609
5610         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5611         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5612         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5613         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5614         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5615         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5616         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5617         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5618         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5619         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5620         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5621                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5622 }
5623
5624 #[test]
5625 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5626         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5627         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5628         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5629         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5630
5631         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5632
5633         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5634         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5635
5636         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5637         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5638         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5639
5640         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5641         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5642         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5643
5644         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5645         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5646         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5647
5648         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5649         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5650         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5651 }
5652
5653 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5654         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5655         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5656         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5657         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5658         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5659
5660         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5661
5662         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5663         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5664         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5665         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5666         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5667
5668         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5669         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5670         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
5671
5672         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5673         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5674         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5675         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5676         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5677
5678         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5679         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5680         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5681                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5682                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5683         }
5684         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5685         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5686         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5687         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5688 }
5689
5690 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5691         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5692         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5693         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5694         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5695         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5696
5697         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5698         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
5699                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5700         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5701
5702         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5703
5704         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5705         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5706         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5707
5708         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5709         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5710
5711         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5712                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5713                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5714         }
5715         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5716         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5717         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5718         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5719 }
5720
5721 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5722         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5723         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5724         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5725         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5726         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5727
5728         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5729         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5730         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5731         // actually revoked.
5732         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5733         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5734         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5735         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5736         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5737
5738         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5739         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5740         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5741         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5742         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5743         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5744         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5745         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5746         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5747         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5748
5749         if check_revoke_no_close {
5750                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5751                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5752         }
5753
5754         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5755         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5756         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5757                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5758                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5759         }
5760         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5761                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5762                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5763                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5764                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5765         } else {
5766                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5767         }
5768 }
5769
5770 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5771 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5772 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5773 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5774 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5775 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5776 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5777 // non-dust HTLCs.
5778 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5779 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5780 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5781 #[test]
5782 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5783         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5784         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5785
5786         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5787         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5788 }
5789
5790 #[test]
5791 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5792         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5793         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5794         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5795         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5796 }
5797
5798 #[test]
5799 #[should_panic]
5800 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5801         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5802         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5803         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5804         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5805         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5806         for node in nodes.iter() {
5807                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5808         }
5809
5810         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5811         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5812         let push_msat=10001;
5813         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
5814         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5815         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5816         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5817
5818         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5819         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5820         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5821 }
5822
5823 #[test]
5824 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5825         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5826         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5827         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5828         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5829
5830         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5831         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5832         let push_msat=10001;
5833         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5834
5835         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5836         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5837         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5838         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5839         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5840
5841         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5842         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5843         let push_msat=10001;
5844         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5845         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5846         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
5847
5848         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5849         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5850         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.channel_flags<=1);
5851
5852         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5853         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5854         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5855
5856         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5857         let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
5858         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.chain_hash, chain_hash);
5859
5860         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5861         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5862         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5863         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5864         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5865         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5866 }
5867
5868 #[test]
5869 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5870         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5871         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5872         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5873         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5874
5875         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5876         let push_msat=10001;
5877         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
5878         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5879         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5880         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5881
5882         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5883         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5884         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5885                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5886                         msg.clone()
5887                 },
5888                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5889         };
5890         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5891 }
5892
5893 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5894 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5895 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5896 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5897 #[test]
5898 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5899         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5900         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5901         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5902         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5903         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5904
5905         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5906         // pending_update_fee.
5907         {
5908                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5909                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5910         }
5911         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5912         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5913
5914         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5915         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5916         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5917                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5918                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5919                 },
5920                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5921         };
5922
5923         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5924
5925         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5926         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5927         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5928         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5929
5930         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5931         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
5932         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5933
5934         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5935         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5936                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5937         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5938         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5939
5940         // Flush the pending fee update.
5941         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5942         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5943         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5944         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5946
5947         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5948         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5949         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5950         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5951         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5952         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
5953
5954         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5955         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5956         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5957         match &events[0] {
5958                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5959                         assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5960                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5961                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5962                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5963                 },
5964                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5965         }
5966         match &events[1] {
5967                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5968                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5969                 },
5970                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5971         }
5972 }
5973
5974 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5975 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5976 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5977 #[test]
5978 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5979         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5980         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5981         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5982         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5983         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5984
5985         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5986         // pending_update_fee.
5987         {
5988                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5989                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5990         }
5991         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5992         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5993
5994         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5995         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5996         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5997                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5998                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5999                 },
6000                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6001         };
6002
6003         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6004
6005         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6006         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6007         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6008         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6009
6010         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6011         let amt_1 = 20000;
6012         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features) - amt_1;
6013         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6014         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6015
6016         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6017         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, payment_hash_1,
6018                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
6019         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6020         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6021         let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6022         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
6023                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
6024         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6025         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6026
6027         // Flush the pending fee update.
6028         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6029         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6030         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6031         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6032         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6033         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6034
6035         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6036         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6037         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6038         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6039         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6040         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
6041
6042         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6043         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6044         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6045         match &events[0] {
6046                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6047                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6048                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6049                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6050                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
6051                 },
6052                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6053         }
6054         match &events[1] {
6055                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6056                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6057                 },
6058                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6059         }
6060
6061         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6062         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6063                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6064                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6065                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6066         };
6067         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6068                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6069                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6070         };
6071         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6073         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6074         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6075         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6076         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6077         match events[0] {
6078                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6079                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6080         }
6081         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6082         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6083         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6084         match events[0] {
6085                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
6086                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6087         }
6088         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6089         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6090         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6091
6092         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6093         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6094         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6095         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6096 }
6097
6098 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6099 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6100 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6101 // once it's freed.
6102 #[test]
6103 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6104         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6105         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6106         // Avoid having to include routing fees in calculations
6107         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6108         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
6109         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
6110         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6111         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6112         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6113         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
6114
6115         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6116         // pending_update_fee.
6117         {
6118                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6119                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6120         }
6121         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6122         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6123
6124         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6125         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6126         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6127                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6128                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6129                 },
6130                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6131         };
6132
6133         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6134
6135         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6136         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6137         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6138         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6139
6140         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6141         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6142         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6143         let payment_event = {
6144                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6145                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6146                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6147
6148                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6149                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6150
6151                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6152         };
6153         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6154         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6155         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6156         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6157
6158         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
6159         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6160
6161         // Flush the pending fee update.
6162         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6163         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6165         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6166         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6167         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6168
6169         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6170         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6171         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6172
6173         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6174                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6175                         msg.clone()
6176                 },
6177                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6178         };
6179
6180         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6181         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6182         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6183
6184         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6185         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6186         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6187         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[1] {
6188                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6189                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6190         }
6191
6192         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6193         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6194         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6195
6196         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6197         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6198         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6199         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6200                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6201                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6202                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6203                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6204                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6205                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6206                 },
6207                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6208         };
6209
6210         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6211         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6212         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6213
6214         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6215         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6217         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6218         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6219         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6220         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6221         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6222         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6223                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6224                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6225         };
6226         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6227         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6228         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6229 }
6230
6231 #[test]
6232 fn test_payment_route_reaching_same_channel_twice() {
6233         //A route should not go through the same channel twice
6234         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6235         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6236         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6237         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6238         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6239         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6240
6241         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6242                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
6243         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6244
6245         // Extend the path by itself, essentially simulating route going through same channel twice
6246         let cloned_hops = route.paths[0].hops.clone();
6247         route.paths[0].hops.extend_from_slice(&cloned_hops);
6248
6249         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6250                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6251         ), false, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6252         assert_eq!(err, &"Path went through the same channel twice"));
6253 }
6254
6255 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6256 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6257 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6258
6259 #[test]
6260 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6261         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6262         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6263         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6264         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6265         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6266         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6267
6268         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6269         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 100;
6270
6271         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6272                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6273                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6274         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6275 }
6276
6277 #[test]
6278 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6279         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6280         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6281         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6282         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6283         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6284         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6285
6286         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6287         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
6288         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6289                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)),
6290                 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6291                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6292
6293         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6294         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6295 }
6296
6297 #[test]
6298 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6299         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6300         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6301         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6302         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6303         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6304         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6305
6306         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6307         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6308                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6309         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6310         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6311         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6312
6313         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6314         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC", 3);
6315         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6316         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6317         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() },
6318                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6319 }
6320
6321 #[test]
6322 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6323         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6324         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6325         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6326         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6327         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6328         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6329         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6330
6331         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6332                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
6333         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6334         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6335         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6336                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6337                 ), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6338                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6339 }
6340
6341 #[test]
6342 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6343         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6344         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6345         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6346         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6347         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6348         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6349         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6350         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6351         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6352                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6353
6354         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
6355         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6356         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6357                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6358                 let payment_event = {
6359                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6360                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6361                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6362
6363                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6364                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6365                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6366                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6367                         } else {
6368                                 assert!(false);
6369                         }
6370                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6371                 };
6372                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6373                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6374                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6375
6376                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6377                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6378         }
6379         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6380                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6381                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6382
6383         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6384 }
6385
6386 #[test]
6387 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6388         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6389         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6390         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6391         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6392         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6393         let channel_value = 100000;
6394         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6395         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6396
6397         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6398
6399         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6400         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6401         // limits us to.
6402         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6403         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6404                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6405                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6406         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6407
6408         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6409 }
6410
6411 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6412 #[test]
6413 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6414         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6415         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6416         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6417         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6418         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6419         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6420         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6421         {
6422                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6423                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6424                 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6425                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.context().get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6426         }
6427
6428         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6429         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6430                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6431         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6432         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6433         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6434         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6435         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6436         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6437         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6438         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6439         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6440 }
6441
6442 #[test]
6443 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6444         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6445         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6446         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6447         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6448         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6449         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6450
6451         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6452         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6453         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6454         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6455         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6456         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6457
6458         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6459         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6460         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6461                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6462         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6463         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6464
6465         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6466         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6467         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6468         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6469         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6470
6471         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6472         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6473         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6474         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6475         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6476 }
6477
6478 #[test]
6479 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6480         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6481         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6482         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6483         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6484         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6485         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6486         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6487
6488         let send_amt = 3999999;
6489         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
6490                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
6491         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = send_amt;
6492         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6493         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
6494         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6495         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
6496                 &route.paths[0], send_amt, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6497         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6498
6499         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6500                 channel_id: chan.2,
6501                 htlc_id: 0,
6502                 amount_msat: 1000,
6503                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6504                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6505                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6506                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6507                 blinding_point: None,
6508         };
6509
6510         for i in 0..50 {
6511                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6512                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6513         }
6514         msg.htlc_id = (50) as u64;
6515         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6516
6517         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6518         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6519         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6520         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6521         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6522 }
6523
6524 #[test]
6525 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6526         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6527         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6528         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6529         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6530         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6531         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6532
6533         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6534         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6535                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6536         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6537         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6538         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6539         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6540
6541         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6542         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6543         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6544         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6545         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6546 }
6547
6548 #[test]
6549 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6550         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6551         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6552         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6553         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6554         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6555
6556         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6557         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6558         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6559                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6560         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6561         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6562         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6563         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6564
6565         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6566         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6567         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6568         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6569         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6570 }
6571
6572 #[test]
6573 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6574         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6575         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6576         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6577         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6578         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6579         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6580         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6581
6582         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6583         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6584         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6585                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6586         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6587         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6588         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6589
6590         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6591         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6592         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6593         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6594                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6595         }, true).unwrap();
6596         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6597         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6598         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6599                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6600         }, false).unwrap();
6601         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6602         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6603         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6604         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6605         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6606         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6607
6608         //Resend HTLC
6609         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6610         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6611         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6612         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6613         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6614
6615         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6616
6617         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6618         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6619         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6620         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6621         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6622 }
6623
6624 #[test]
6625 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6626         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6627
6628         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6629         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6630         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6631         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6632         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6633         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6634         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6635                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6636
6637         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6638         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6639         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6640
6641         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6642                 channel_id: chan.2,
6643                 htlc_id: 0,
6644                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6645         };
6646
6647         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6648
6649         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6650         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6651         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6652         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6653         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6654 }
6655
6656 #[test]
6657 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6658         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6659
6660         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6661         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6662         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6663         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6664         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6665
6666         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6667         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6668                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6669         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6670         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6671         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6672
6673         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6674                 channel_id: chan.2,
6675                 htlc_id: 0,
6676                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6677         };
6678
6679         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6680
6681         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6682         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6683         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6684         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6685         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6686 }
6687
6688 #[test]
6689 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6690         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6691
6692         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6693         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6694         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6695         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6696         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6697
6698         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6699         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6700                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6701         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6702         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6703         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6704         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6705                 channel_id: chan.2,
6706                 htlc_id: 0,
6707                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6708                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6709         };
6710
6711         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6712
6713         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6714         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6715         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6716         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6717         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6718 }
6719
6720 #[test]
6721 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6722         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6723
6724         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6725         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6726         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6727         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6728         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6729
6730         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6731
6732         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6733         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6734         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6735
6736         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6737         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6738         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6739                 match events[0] {
6740                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6741                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6742                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6743                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6744                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6745                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6746                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6747                         },
6748                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6749                 }
6750         };
6751
6752         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6753
6754         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6755
6756         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6757         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6758         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6759         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6760         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6761 }
6762
6763 #[test]
6764 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6765         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6766
6767         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6768         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6769         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6770         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6771         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6772
6773         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6774
6775         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6776         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6777         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6778
6779         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6780         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6781         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6782                 match events[0] {
6783                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6784                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6785                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6786                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6787                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6788                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6789                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6790                         },
6791                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6792                 }
6793         };
6794
6795         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6796
6797         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6798
6799         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6800         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6801         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6803         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6804 }
6805
6806 #[test]
6807 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6808         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6809
6810         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6811         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6812         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6813         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6814         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6815
6816         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6817         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6818                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6819         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6820
6821         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6822         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6823
6824         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6825         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6826         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6827
6828         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6829
6830         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6831                 match events[0] {
6832                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6833                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6834                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6835                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6836                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6837                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6838                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6839                         },
6840                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6841                 }
6842         };
6843         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6844         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6845
6846         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6847         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6848         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6849         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6850         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6851 }
6852
6853 #[test]
6854 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6855         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6856         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6857
6858         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6859         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6860         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6861         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6862         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6863         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6864
6865         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6866
6867         //First hop
6868         let mut payment_event = {
6869                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6870                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6871                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6872                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6873                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6874                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6875         };
6876         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6877         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6878         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6879         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6880         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6881         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6882         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6883         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6884         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6885
6886         //Second Hop
6887         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6888         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6889         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6890         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6891
6892         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6893         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6894         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6895                 match events_3[0] {
6896                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6897                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6898                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6899                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6900                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6901                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6902                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6903                         },
6904                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6905                 }
6906         };
6907
6908         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6909
6910         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6911         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6912         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6913         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6914         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6915
6916         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6917         match events_4[0] {
6918                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6919                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6920                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6921                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6922                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6923                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6924                 },
6925                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6926         };
6927
6928         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6929 }
6930
6931 #[test]
6932 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6933         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6934         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6935         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6936         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6937         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6938         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6939
6940         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6941
6942         // First hop
6943         let mut payment_event = {
6944                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6945                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6946                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6947                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6948         };
6949
6950         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6951         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6952         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6953         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6954         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6955         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6956
6957         // Second Hop
6958         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6959         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6960         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6961         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6962
6963         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6964         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6965         match events_3[0] {
6966                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6967                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6968                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6969                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6970
6971                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6972                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6973                 },
6974                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6975         }
6976
6977         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6978                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6979                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6980         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6981         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6982         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6983
6984         match events_4[0] {
6985                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6986                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6987                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6988                 },
6989                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6990         }
6991
6992         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6993         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6994
6995         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6996         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6997         match events_5[0] {
6998                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
6999                 } => {
7000                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
7001                         assert!(is_permanent);
7002                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
7003                 },
7004                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7005         }
7006         match events_5[1] {
7007                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7008                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
7009                 },
7010                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7011         }
7012
7013         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
7014 }
7015
7016 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7017         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7018         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7019         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7020
7021         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7022         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7023         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7024         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7025         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7026         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7027
7028         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7029                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7030
7031         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7032         let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7033         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7034         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7035
7036         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7037         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7038
7039         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7040         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7041         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7042         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7043         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7044
7045         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7046         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7047         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7048         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7049
7050         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7051         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7052
7053         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7054         match events[0] {
7055                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7056                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7057                 },
7058                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7059         }
7060         match events[1] {
7061                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7062                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7063                 },
7064                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7065         }
7066
7067         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7068         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7069         if announce_latest {
7070                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7071         } else {
7072                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7073         }
7074
7075         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7076         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7077         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7078
7079         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7080         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7081         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7082         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7083         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
7084         let mut first_failed = false;
7085         for event in events {
7086                 match event {
7087                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7088                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7089                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7090                                         first_failed = true;
7091                                 } else {
7092                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7093                                 }
7094                         },
7095                         Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
7096                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7097                 }
7098         }
7099 }
7100
7101 #[test]
7102 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7103         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7104         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7105 }
7106
7107 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7108         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7109         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7110         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7111         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7112         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7113         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7114
7115         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7116         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7117         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7118         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7119         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7120
7121         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7122                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7123
7124         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7125         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7126
7127         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7128         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7129
7130         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7131         if revoked {
7132                 let (payment_preimage_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7133                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7134         }
7135
7136         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7137         if local {
7138                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7139                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7140                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7141                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7142                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7143
7144                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7145                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7146                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7147                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7148                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
7149                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7150                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7151                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7152                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7153                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7154                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7155         } else {
7156                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7157                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7158                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7159                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7160                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7161                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7162
7163                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7164                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7165                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7166                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7167                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7168                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7169                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7170
7171                 if !revoked {
7172                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7173                 } else {
7174                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), 11);
7175                 }
7176                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7177                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7178                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7179                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7180                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7181         }
7182 }
7183
7184 #[test]
7185 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7186         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7187         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7188         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7189 }
7190
7191 #[test]
7192 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7193         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7194
7195         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7196         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7197         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7198         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7199         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7200         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7201         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7202         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7203         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7204
7205         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in OutboundV1Channel::new()
7206         if let Err(error) = OutboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7207                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7208                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42, None)
7209         {
7210                 match error {
7211                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7212                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7213                 }
7214         } else { assert!(false) }
7215
7216         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7217         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7218         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7219         open_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay = 200;
7220         if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7221                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7222                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7223         {
7224                 match error {
7225                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7226                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7227                 }
7228         } else { assert!(false); }
7229
7230         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7231         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7232         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7233         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7234         accept_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay = 200;
7235         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
7236         let reason_msg;
7237         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7238                 match action {
7239                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7240                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7241                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7242                         },
7243                         _ => { panic!(); }
7244                 }
7245         } else { panic!(); }
7246         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7247
7248         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7249         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7250         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7251         open_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay = 200;
7252         if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7253                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7254                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7255         {
7256                 match error {
7257                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7258                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7259                 }
7260         } else { assert!(false); }
7261 }
7262
7263 #[test]
7264 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7265         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7266         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7267         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7268
7269         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7270         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7271         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7272         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7273
7274         // Create some initial channels
7275         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7276
7277         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7278         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7279         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
7280                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7281         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000);
7282         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
7283                 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7284         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7285         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7286         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
7287                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7288         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7289
7290         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7291         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7292         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7293         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7294         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7295
7296         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7297         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7298         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7299         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7300
7301         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7302         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7303         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7304
7305         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7306         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7307         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7308                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7309                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7310                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7311                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7312                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7313                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7314                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7315                 },
7316                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7317         };
7318         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7319
7320         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7321         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7322
7323         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7324         let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7325         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7326         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7327 }
7328
7329 #[test]
7330 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7331         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7332         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7333
7334         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7335         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7336         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7337         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7338
7339         // Connect a dummy node for proper future events broadcasting
7340         connect_dummy_node(&nodes[0]);
7341
7342         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7343         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7344         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7345
7346         // Disconnect peers
7347         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7348         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7349
7350         for _ in 0..DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS + 1 {
7351                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7352         }
7353         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7354         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7355         let mut chans_disabled = new_hash_map();
7356         for e in msg_events {
7357                 match e {
7358                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7359                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7360                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7361                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7362                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7363                                 }
7364                         },
7365                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7366                 }
7367         }
7368         // Reconnect peers
7369         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7370                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7371         }, true).unwrap();
7372         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7373         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7374         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7375                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7376         }, false).unwrap();
7377         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7378         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7379
7380         // Reestablish chan_1
7381         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7382         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7383         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7384         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7385         // Reestablish chan_2
7386         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7387         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7388         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7389         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7390         // Reestablish chan_3
7391         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7392         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7393         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7394         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7395
7396         for _ in 0..ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
7397                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7398         }
7399         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7400         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7401         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7402         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7403         for e in msg_events {
7404                 match e {
7405                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7406                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7407                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7408                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7409                                         // the old one.
7410                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7411                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7412                                 }
7413                         },
7414                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7415                 }
7416         }
7417         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7418         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7419 }
7420
7421 #[test]
7422 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7423         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7424         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7425
7426         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7427         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7428         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7429         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7430
7431         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7432
7433         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7434         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7435                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7436         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
7437         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7438
7439         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7440         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7441         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7442         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7443         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7444         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7445
7446         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7447         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7448                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7449                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7450                 }
7451         }
7452
7453         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7454         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7455
7456         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7457         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7458         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(header_114, 42, vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()]));
7459         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7460
7461         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7462         let penalty_1;
7463         let feerate_1;
7464         {
7465                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7466                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7467                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7468                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7469                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7470                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7471                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7472                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7473                 node_txn.clear();
7474         };
7475
7476         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7477         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7478         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7479         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7480         {
7481                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7482                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7483                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7484                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7485                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7486                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7487                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7488                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7489                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7490                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7491                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7492                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7493                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7494                         node_txn.clear();
7495                 }
7496         }
7497         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7498
7499         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7500         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7501         let penalty_3;
7502         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7503         {
7504                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7505                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7506                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7507                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7508                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7509                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7510                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7511                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7512                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7513                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7514                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7515                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7516                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7517                         node_txn.clear();
7518                 }
7519         }
7520         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7521
7522         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7523         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7524 }
7525
7526 #[test]
7527 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7528         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7529         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7530
7531         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7532         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7533         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7534         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7535         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7536
7537         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7538         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7539         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7540         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7541         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7542         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7543         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7544                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7545         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7546         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50)
7547                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7548         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7549         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7550                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7551         let failed_payment_hash = send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000).1;
7552
7553         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7554         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7555         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7556
7557         // Revoke local commitment tx
7558         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7559
7560         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7561         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]));
7562         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7563         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7564         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7565         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 50); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7566
7567         let revoked_htlc_txn = {
7568                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
7569                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7570
7571                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7572                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7573                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7574
7575                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7576                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7577                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7578                 check_spends!(txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7579
7580                 txn
7581         };
7582
7583         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7584         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7585         let block_11 = create_dummy_block(hash_128, 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]);
7586         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_11);
7587         let block_129 = create_dummy_block(block_11.block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()]);
7588         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_129);
7589         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7590         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions(events[0..2].to_vec(), &[HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
7591         match events.last().unwrap() {
7592                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7593                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7594         }
7595         let first;
7596         let feerate_1;
7597         let penalty_txn;
7598         {
7599                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7600                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7601                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7602
7603                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7604                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7605                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7606                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7607                 // future).
7608                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7609                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7610                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7611                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7612                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7613                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7614
7615                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7616                 // available, which we check here:
7617                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7618                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7619                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7620
7621                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7622                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7623
7624                 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7625                 // output, checked above).
7626                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7627                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7628                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7629
7630                 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7631                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7632                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7633                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight().to_wu();
7634                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7635                 node_txn.clear();
7636         }
7637
7638         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7639         let block_130 = create_dummy_block(block_129.block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn);
7640         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_130);
7641         let block_131 = create_dummy_block(block_130.block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
7642         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_131);
7643
7644         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7645         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7646         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7647         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7648         let node_txn = {
7649                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7650                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7651
7652                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7653                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7654                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7655                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7656                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7657                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7658                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7659                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7660                 node_txn.clear();
7661                 txn
7662         };
7663         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7664         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(header_144, 42, node_txn));
7665         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7666         {
7667                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7668                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7669                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7670                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7671                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7672                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7673                 // up bumped justice generation.
7674                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7675                 node_txn.clear();
7676         }
7677         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7678         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7679 }
7680
7681 #[test]
7682 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7683         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7684         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7685
7686         // Create 2 HTLCs
7687         // Provide preimage for one
7688         // Check aggregation
7689
7690         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7691         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7692         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7693         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7694
7695         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7696         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7697         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7698
7699         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7700         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7701         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7702         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7703         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7704
7705         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7706         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7707         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7708         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7709         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7710         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7711
7712         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7713         let timeout;
7714         let preimage;
7715         let preimage_bump;
7716         let feerate_timeout;
7717         let feerate_preimage;
7718         {
7719                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7720                 // 3 transactions including:
7721                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7722                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7723                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7724                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7725                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7726                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7727                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7728                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7729
7730                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7731                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7732                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7733                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7734
7735                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7736                         (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7737                 } else {
7738                         (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7739                 };
7740
7741                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7742                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7743                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7744
7745                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7746                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7747                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7748                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight().to_wu();
7749
7750                 node_txn.clear();
7751         };
7752         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7753         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7754
7755         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7756         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7757         {
7758                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7759                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7760                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7761                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7762                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7763                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7764
7765                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7766                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7767                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight().to_wu();
7768                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7769                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7770
7771                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7772                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7773                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7774                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7775                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7776
7777                 node_txn.clear();
7778         }
7779
7780         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7781         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7782 }
7783
7784 #[test]
7785 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7786         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7787         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7788         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7789         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7790         // TestChannelSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7791         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7792         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7793         // implement that).
7794         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7795         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7796         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7797         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7798         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7799
7800         let per_commitment_secret;
7801         let next_per_commitment_point;
7802         {
7803                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7804                 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7805                 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).map(
7806                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7807                 ).flatten().unwrap().get_signer();
7808
7809                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7810
7811                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7812                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7813                 per_commitment_secret = keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7814
7815                 // Must revoke without gaps
7816                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7817                 keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7818
7819                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7820                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7821                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7822         }
7823
7824         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7825                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
7826                         channel_id,
7827                         per_commitment_secret,
7828                         next_per_commitment_point,
7829                         #[cfg(taproot)]
7830                         next_local_nonce: None,
7831                 });
7832         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7833         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7834         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() }
7835                 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7836 }
7837
7838 #[test]
7839 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7840         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7841         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7842
7843         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7844         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7845         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7846         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7847
7848         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7849         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7850         let (payment_preimage_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7851         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7852
7853         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7854         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7855         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7856
7857         // Revoke local commitment tx
7858         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7859
7860         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7861         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7862         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7863         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7864
7865         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7866         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7867         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7868         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7869         let penalty_txn = {
7870                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7871                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7872                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7873                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7874                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7875                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7876                 node_txn.clear();
7877                 penalty_txn
7878         };
7879         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn));
7880         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7881         {
7882                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7883                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7884                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7885         }
7886 }
7887
7888 #[test]
7889 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7890         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7891         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7892         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7893         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7894         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7895         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7896
7897         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7898
7899         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7900         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7901         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7902         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7903         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7904
7905         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7906         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7907         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7908         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7909
7910         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7911         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7912         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7913         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7914         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7915         match close_ev[0] {
7916                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7917                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7918                         assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7919                 },
7920                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7921         }
7922 }
7923
7924 #[test]
7925 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7926         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7927         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7928         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7929         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7930
7931         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7932         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7933         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7934
7935         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7936
7937         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7938         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7939         assert_eq!(res.common_fields.channel_flags, 0);
7940         assert_eq!(res.common_fields.to_self_delay, 200);
7941 }
7942
7943 #[test]
7944 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7945         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7946         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7947         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7948         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7949         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7950         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7951
7952         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7953         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7954         assert_eq!(res.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7955
7956         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7957         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7958         assert_eq!(res.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7959 }
7960
7961 #[test]
7962 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7963         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7964         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7965         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7966         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7967         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7968
7969         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7970         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7971         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7972         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7973         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7974         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7975         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7976         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7977         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7978         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7979         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7980         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7981
7982         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7983         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7984         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7985         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7986
7987         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7988         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7989         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7990         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7991         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7992
7993         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7994         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7995
7996         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7997         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7998         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7999         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8000         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8001         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
8002
8003         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8004         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8005         // `channel_value`.
8006         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8007         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8008         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8009         // `channel_value`.
8010         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8011 }
8012
8013 #[test]
8014 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8015         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8016         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8017         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8018         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8019         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8020         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8021
8022         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8023         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8024
8025         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8026
8027         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8028         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8029         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8030
8031         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8032         match events[0] {
8033                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8034                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8035                 }
8036                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8037         }
8038
8039         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8040         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8041
8042         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8043                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8044                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8045                 }
8046                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8047         }
8048         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
8049         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
8050
8051         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8052         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8053
8054         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8055         match events[0] {
8056                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8057                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8058                 }
8059                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8060         }
8061 }
8062
8063 #[test]
8064 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8065         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8066         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8067         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8068         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8069         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8070         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8071
8072         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8073         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8074
8075         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8076
8077         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8078         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8079         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8080         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
8081         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8082         match events[0] {
8083                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8084                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
8085                 }
8086                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8087         }
8088
8089         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8090         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8091
8092         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8093                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8094                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8095                 }
8096                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8097         }
8098
8099         // There should be no more events to process, as the channel was never opened.
8100         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8101 }
8102
8103 #[test]
8104 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8105         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8106         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8107         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8108         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8109         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8110         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8111
8112         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8113         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8114
8115         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8116
8117         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8118         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8119         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8120
8121         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8122         match events[0] {
8123                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8124                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8125                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8126                         match api_res {
8127                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8128                                         assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8129                                 },
8130                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8131                                 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error {:?}", e),
8132                         }
8133                 }
8134                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8135         }
8136
8137         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8138         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8139         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8140
8141         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8142                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8143                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8144                 }
8145                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8146         }
8147 }
8148
8149 #[test]
8150 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8151         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8152         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8153         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8154         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8155
8156         let unknown_channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
8157         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8158         match api_res {
8159                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8160                         assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8161                 },
8162                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8163                 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error: {:?}", e),
8164         }
8165 }
8166
8167 #[test]
8168 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
8169         // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
8170         // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
8171         // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
8172         // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
8173         // a PaymentClaimable event too early
8174         let node_count = 4;
8175         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8176         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8177         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8178         let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8179
8180         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8181         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8182         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8183         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8184
8185         let total_msat = 100_000;
8186         let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
8187         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
8188         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8189
8190         let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
8191         path_1.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8192         path_1.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8193         path_1.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8194         path_1.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8195         path_1.hops[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
8196         route.paths.push(path_1);
8197
8198         let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
8199         path_2.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8200         path_2.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8201         path_2.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8202         path_2.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8203         path_2.hops[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
8204         route.paths.push(path_2);
8205
8206         // Send payment
8207         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8208         let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8209                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8210         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8211                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
8213
8214         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8215         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8216
8217         // First path
8218         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8219         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8220         let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
8221
8222         for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
8223                 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
8224
8225                 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8226                         let session_priv = [3; 32];
8227                         let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8228                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8229                         let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8230                         let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000,
8231                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8232                         // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8233                         // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8234                         if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
8235                                 ref mut sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat, ..
8236                         } = onion_payloads[1] {
8237                                 *sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat = 99_000;
8238                         } else { panic!() }
8239                         let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8240                         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8241                 }
8242
8243                 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8244                 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8245                 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8246                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8247
8248                 if idx == 0 {
8249                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8250                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8251                         check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8252                         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8253                         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8254                 } else {
8255                         let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8256                         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8257                 }
8258
8259                 prev_node = node;
8260         }
8261
8262         // Second path
8263         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8264         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8265
8266         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8267 }
8268
8269 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8270
8271         let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8272         let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8273
8274         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8275         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8276         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8277         let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8278
8279         let src_idx = 0;
8280         let dst_idx = 1;
8281
8282         // Create channels for each amount
8283         let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8284         let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8285         let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8286         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8287                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8288                 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8289                 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8290                 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8291                 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8292                 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8293                 expected_paths.push(path);
8294         }
8295         let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8296
8297         // Create a route for each amount
8298         let example_amount = 100000;
8299         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8300         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8301         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8302                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8303                 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8304                 path.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8305                 path.hops[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8306                 path.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8307                 path.hops[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8308                 path.hops[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8309                 route.paths.push(path);
8310         }
8311
8312         // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8313         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8314         let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8315                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8316         nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8317                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8318         check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8319
8320         let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8321         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8322         let mut amount_received = 0;
8323         for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8324                 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8325
8326                 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8327                 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8328                 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8329                 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8330         }
8331
8332         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8333 }
8334
8335 #[test]
8336 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8337         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8338         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8339 }
8340
8341 #[test]
8342 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8343         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8344         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8345         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8346         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8347         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8348
8349         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8350         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8351         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8352         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8353
8354         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8355         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8356         route.paths.push(path);
8357         route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8358         route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8359         route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8360         route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8361         route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8362         route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8363         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8364         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8365 }
8366
8367 #[test]
8368 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8369         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8370         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8371         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8372         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8373         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8374
8375         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8376
8377         {
8378                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8379                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8380                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8381                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8382                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8383                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8384                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8385                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8386                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8387         }
8388         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8389         // values from previous calls.
8390         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8391         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8392         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8393         match events[0] {
8394                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8395                         match &purpose {
8396                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8397                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8398                                 },
8399                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8400                         }
8401                 },
8402                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8403         }
8404 }
8405
8406 #[test]
8407 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8408         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8409         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8410         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8411         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8412         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8413
8414         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8415
8416         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8417         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8418         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8419         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8420
8421         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8422         // resulting events.
8423         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8424                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8425                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8426                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8427                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8428                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8429                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8430
8431                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8432                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8433                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8434                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8435                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8436
8437                         // We should fail the payment back
8438                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8439                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8440                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8441                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8442                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8443                                 },
8444                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8445                         }
8446                 }
8447         }
8448
8449         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8450         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8451         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8452
8453         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8454         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
8455                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8456         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8457         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8458
8459         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8460         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8461                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8462         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8463         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8464
8465         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8466         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8467                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8468         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8469         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8470 }
8471
8472 #[test]
8473 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8474         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8475         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8476         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8477         // error.
8478         //
8479         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8480         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8481         // commitment at same time.
8482
8483         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8484         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8485         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8486         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8487
8488         // Create some initial channel
8489         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8490         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8491
8492         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8493         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8494
8495         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8496         let (preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8497
8498         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8499         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8500         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8501         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8502         let watchtower = {
8503                 let new_monitor = {
8504                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8505                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8506                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8507                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8508                         new_monitor
8509                 };
8510                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8511                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8512                 watchtower
8513         };
8514         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8515         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8516         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8517         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 200));
8518         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8519
8520         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8521         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8522         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8523         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8524
8525         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8526         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8527         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8528         {
8529                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8530                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8531                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8532                         if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8533                                 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
8534                                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8535                         } else { assert!(false); }
8536                 } else {
8537                         assert!(false);
8538                 }
8539         }
8540         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8541         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8542         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8543         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8544 }
8545
8546 #[test]
8547 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8548         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8549         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8550         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8551         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8552
8553         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8554         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8555         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8556         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8557
8558         // Create some initial channel
8559         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8560         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8561
8562         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8563         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8564
8565         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8566         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8567
8568         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8569         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8570         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8571         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8572         let alice_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(
8573                 Arc::new(Mutex::new(nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().clone())),
8574         );
8575         let watchtower_alice = {
8576                 let new_monitor = {
8577                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8578                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8579                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8580                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8581                         new_monitor
8582                 };
8583                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &alice_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8584                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8585                 watchtower
8586         };
8587         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8588         // Make Alice aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating transaction lock time
8589         // requirements here.
8590         const HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST: u32 = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8591         alice_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST) as usize, (block.clone(), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST));
8592         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8593
8594         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8595         {
8596                 let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8597                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8598                 check_spends!(txn[0], chan_1.3);
8599                 check_spends!(txn[1], txn[0]);
8600         };
8601
8602         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8603         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8604         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8605         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8606         let bob_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&alice_broadcaster.blocks));
8607         let watchtower_bob = {
8608                 let new_monitor = {
8609                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8610                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8611                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8612                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8613                         new_monitor
8614                 };
8615                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &bob_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8616                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8617                 watchtower
8618         };
8619         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST - 1);
8620
8621         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8622         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8623         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8624                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8625         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8626
8627         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8628         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8629         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8630         {
8631                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8632                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8633                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8634                         if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8635                                 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8636                                 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
8637                                 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8638                                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8639                         } else { assert!(false); }
8640                 } else {
8641                         assert!(false);
8642                 }
8643         }
8644         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8645         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8646
8647         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8648         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8649
8650         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8651         let bob_state_y;
8652         {
8653                 let mut txn = bob_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8654                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8655                 bob_state_y = txn.remove(0);
8656         };
8657
8658         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8659         let height = HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST + 1;
8660         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
8661         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
8662         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, false,
8663                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8664         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, vec![bob_state_y.clone()]), height);
8665         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
8666         {
8667                 let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8668                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8669                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8670         }
8671 }
8672
8673 #[test]
8674 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8675         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8676         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8677         // message).
8678         //
8679         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8680         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8681         //
8682         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8683         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8684         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8685         // before receiving funding_signed.
8686         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8687         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8688         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8689         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8690
8691         // Create an initial channel
8692         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
8693         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8694         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8695         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8696         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8697
8698         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8699         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8700
8701         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8702         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8703
8704         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8705         let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index });
8706         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8707         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8708         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true,
8709                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8710 }
8711
8712 #[test]
8713 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8714         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8715         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8716         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8717         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8718         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8719         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8720
8721         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8722         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8723         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8724         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8725
8726         // Create some initial channels
8727         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8728
8729         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8730         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8731         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8732         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8733         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8734         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8735
8736         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8737         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![local_txn[0].clone()]);
8738         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
8739         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8740         // this test before #653 fix.
8741         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &block, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8742         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8743         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8744         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8745         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
8746
8747         let htlc_timeout = {
8748                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8749                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8750                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8751                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8752                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8753                 node_txn[0].clone()
8754         };
8755
8756         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![htlc_timeout.clone()]));
8757         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8758         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8759 }
8760
8761 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8762         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8763         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8764         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8765         //
8766         // Steps of the test:
8767         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8768         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8769         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8770         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8771         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8772         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8773         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8774         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8775         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8776         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8777         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8778         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8779
8780         // Create some initial channels
8781         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8782         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8783
8784         // Steps (1) and (2):
8785         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8786         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8787
8788         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8789         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8790         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8791         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8792         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8793         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8794         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8795
8796         // Steps (3) and (4):
8797         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8798         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8799         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8800         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8801
8802         // Bob force-closes
8803         if !broadcast_alice {
8804                 force_closing_node = 1;
8805                 counterparty_node = 0;
8806         }
8807         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
8808         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
8809         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8810         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8811         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8812         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8813                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8814                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8815                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8816                 };
8817                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8818                 if broadcast_alice {
8819                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8820                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8821                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8822                 }
8823         }
8824
8825         // Step (5):
8826         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8827         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8828         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8829         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8830         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8831
8832         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8833         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8834         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8835         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8836         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8837         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8838
8839         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8840         let went_onchain = go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1;
8841         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if went_onchain { None } else { Some(1000) }, went_onchain, false);
8842         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8843         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8844                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8845                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8846                 match events[0] {
8847                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8848                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8849                         },
8850                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8851                 };
8852         }
8853         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8854         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8855         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8856         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8857
8858         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8859         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8860         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8861                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8862                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8863                         (*msg).clone()
8864                 },
8865                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8866         };
8867         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8868                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8869                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8870                         (*updates).clone()
8871                 },
8872                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8873         };
8874
8875         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8876         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8877         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8878         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8879
8880         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8881         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8882         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8883                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8884                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8885                         (*msg).clone()
8886                 },
8887                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8888         };
8889         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8890         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8891
8892         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8893         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8894         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8895         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8896         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8897                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8898                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8899                 if broadcast_alice {
8900                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8901                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8902                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8903                 }
8904                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8905                 if broadcast_alice {
8906                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8907                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8908                 } else {
8909                         if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
8910                                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8911                                 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].txid(), bob_txn[1].txid());
8912                         } else {
8913                                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8914                         }
8915                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8916                 }
8917         }
8918
8919         // Step (6):
8920         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8921         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8922         {
8923                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8924                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8925                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8926                 };
8927                 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8928                 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8929                 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8930                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8931                 if broadcast_alice {
8932                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8933                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8934                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8935                 } else {
8936                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
8937                         let htlc_tx = bob_txn.pop().unwrap();
8938                         check_spends!(htlc_tx, txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8939                         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8940                 }
8941         }
8942 }
8943
8944 #[test]
8945 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8946         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8947         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8948         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8949         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8950 }
8951
8952 #[test]
8953 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8954         // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8955         // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8956         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8957         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8958         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8959         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8960
8961         // Create an first channel channel
8962         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
8963         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8964
8965         // Create an second channel
8966         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None, None).unwrap();
8967         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8968
8969         // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8970         // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8971         open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
8972
8973         // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8974         // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8975         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8976         {
8977                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8978                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8979                 match &events[0] {
8980                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8981                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8982                                 assert_eq!(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
8983                         },
8984                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8985                 }
8986         }
8987
8988         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8989         {
8990                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8991                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8992                 match &events[0] {
8993                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8994                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8995                                 assert_eq!(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
8996                         },
8997                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8998                 }
8999         }
9000 }
9001
9002 #[test]
9003 fn test_peer_funding_sidechannel() {
9004         // Test that if a peer somehow learns which txid we'll use for our channel funding before we
9005         // receive `funding_transaction_generated` the peer cannot cause us to crash. We'd previously
9006         // assumed that LDK would receive `funding_transaction_generated` prior to our peer learning
9007         // the txid and panicked if the peer tried to open a redundant channel to us with the same
9008         // funding outpoint.
9009         //
9010         // While this assumption is generally safe, some users may have out-of-band protocols where
9011         // they notify their LSP about a funding outpoint first, or this may be violated in the future
9012         // with collaborative transaction construction protocols, i.e. dual-funding.
9013         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9014         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9015         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9016         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9017
9018         let temp_chan_id_ab = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
9019         let temp_chan_id_ca = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[2], &nodes[0], 1_000_000, 0);
9020
9021         let (_, tx, funding_output) =
9022                 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9023
9024         let cs_funding_events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9025         assert_eq!(cs_funding_events.len(), 1);
9026         match cs_funding_events[0] {
9027                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => {}
9028                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", cs_funding_events),
9029         }
9030
9031         nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temp_chan_id_ca, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), funding_output.index).unwrap();
9032         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9033         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9034         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9035         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9036         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9037
9038         let res = nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id_ab, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone());
9039         let err_msg = format!("{:?}", res.unwrap_err());
9040         assert!(err_msg.contains("An existing channel using outpoint "));
9041         assert!(err_msg.contains(" is open with peer"));
9042         // Even though the last funding_transaction_generated errored, it still generated a
9043         // SendFundingCreated. However, when the peer responds with a funding_signed it will send the
9044         // appropriate error message.
9045         let as_funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9046         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_created);
9047         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9048         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9049         let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: format!("An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}", funding_output, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), };
9050         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_output), true, reason)]);
9051
9052         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9053         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9054         get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9055 }
9056
9057 #[test]
9058 fn test_duplicate_conflicting_funding_from_second_peer() {
9059         // Test that if a user tries to fund a channel with a funding outpoint they'd previously used
9060         // we don't try to remove the previous ChannelMonitor. This is largely a test to ensure we
9061         // don't regress in the fuzzer, as such funding getting passed our outpoint-matches checks
9062         // implies the user (and our counterparty) has reused cryptographic keys across channels, which
9063         // we require the user not do.
9064         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9065         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9066         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9067         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9068
9069         let temp_chan_id = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
9070
9071         let (_, tx, funding_output) =
9072                 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9073
9074         // Now that we have a funding outpoint, create a dummy `ChannelMonitor` and insert it into
9075         // nodes[0]'s ChainMonitor so that the initial `ChannelMonitor` write fails.
9076         let dummy_chan_id = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[2], &nodes[3]).3;
9077         let dummy_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[2], dummy_chan_id).clone();
9078         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_output, dummy_monitor).unwrap();
9079
9080         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9081
9082         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9083         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9084         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9085         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9086         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9087
9088         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9089         // At this point, the channel should be closed, after having generated one monitor write (the
9090         // watch_channel call which failed), but zero monitor updates.
9091         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9092         get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9093         let err_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned() };
9094         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_signed_msg.channel_id, true, err_reason)]);
9095 }
9096
9097 #[test]
9098 fn test_duplicate_funding_err_in_funding() {
9099         // Test that if we have a live channel with one peer, then another peer comes along and tries
9100         // to create a second channel with the same txid we'll fail and not overwrite the
9101         // outpoint_to_peer map in `ChannelManager`.
9102         //
9103         // This was previously broken.
9104         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9105         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9106         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9107         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9108
9109         let (_, _, _, real_channel_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9110         let real_chan_funding_txo = chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9111         assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(real_chan_funding_txo), real_channel_id);
9112
9113         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9114         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9115         let node_c_temp_chan_id = open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
9116         open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
9117         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9118         let mut accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9119         accept_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = node_c_temp_chan_id;
9120         nodes[2].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
9121
9122         // Now that we have a second channel with the same funding txo, send a bogus funding message
9123         // and let nodes[1] remove the inbound channel.
9124         let (_, funding_tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[2], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9125
9126         nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated(&node_c_temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), funding_tx).unwrap();
9127
9128         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9129         funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
9130         // Make the signature invalid by changing the funding output
9131         funding_created_msg.funding_output_index += 10;
9132         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9133         get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9134         let err = "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned();
9135         let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err };
9136         let expected_closing = ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(real_channel_id, false, reason);
9137         check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[expected_closing]);
9138
9139         assert_eq!(
9140                 *nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().get(&real_chan_funding_txo).unwrap(),
9141                 nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
9142         );
9143 }
9144
9145 #[test]
9146 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9147         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9148         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9149         //
9150         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9151         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9152         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9153         // updating logic for the existing channel.
9154         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9155         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9156         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9157         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9158
9159         // Create an initial channel
9160         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9161         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9162         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9163         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9164
9165         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9166         // that it is rejected.
9167         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9168         {
9169                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9170                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9171                 match events[0] {
9172                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9173                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9174                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9175                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9176                                 // move forward with it.
9177                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
9178                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9179                         },
9180                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9181                 }
9182         }
9183
9184         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9185         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9186
9187         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9189
9190         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9191         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9192         {
9193                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9194                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9195                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9196                 added_monitors.clear();
9197         }
9198         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9199
9200         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9201
9202         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9203         let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
9204
9205         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9206         // temporary one).
9207
9208         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9209         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9210         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9211         open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9212         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9213         {
9214                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9215                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9216                 match events[0] {
9217                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9218                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9219                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9220                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
9221                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9222                         },
9223                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9224                 }
9225         }
9226
9227         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9228         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9229         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9230         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9231         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9232         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9233
9234         let funding_created = {
9235                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9236                 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9237                 // Once we call `get_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9238                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9239                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9240                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9241                 match a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id).unwrap() {
9242                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan) => {
9243                                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9244                                 chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
9245                         },
9246                         _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
9247                 }.unwrap()
9248         };
9249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9250         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9251         // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
9252         // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
9253         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9254
9255         check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[
9256                 ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_created.temporary_channel_id, false, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9257                         err: "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned()
9258                 })
9259         ]);
9260
9261         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9262         {
9263                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9264                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9265                 match events[0] {
9266                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9267                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9268                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9269                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9270                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9271                         },
9272                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9273                 }
9274         }
9275
9276         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9277         // everything is functional.
9278         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9279         {
9280                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9281                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9282                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9283                 added_monitors.clear();
9284         }
9285         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9286
9287         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9288         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9289         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9290         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9291
9292         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9293         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9294         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9295
9296         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9297 }
9298
9299 #[test]
9300 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9301         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9302         //
9303         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9304         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9305         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9306         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9307         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9308         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9309         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9310
9311         // Create some initial channels
9312         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9313         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9314         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
9315
9316         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9317         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9318         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9319
9320         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9321         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9322         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9323
9324         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9325         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9326         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9327         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9328         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9329                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9330         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9331         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9332         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9333         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9334
9335         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9336         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9337         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(), data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9338         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9339         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9340                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 100000);
9341         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9342         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9343         match events[0] {
9344                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9345                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9346                 },
9347                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9348         }
9349         match events[1] {
9350                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9351                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9352                 },
9353                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9354         }
9355         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9356         // peer_disconnected.
9357         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9358         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9359
9360         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9361         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9362         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9363 }
9364
9365 #[test]
9366 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9367         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9368         //
9369         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9370         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9371         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9372         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9373         //
9374         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9375         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9376         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9377         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9378         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9379         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9380         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9381
9382         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9383         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9384         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9385
9386         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9387
9388         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9389         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9390         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9391         // its length.
9392         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9393         let wit_program_script: ScriptBuf = wit_program.into();
9394         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9395                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9396                 output.script_pubkey = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9397         }
9398
9399         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9400         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9401         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9402         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9403
9404         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9405         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9406         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9407
9408         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9409         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9410
9411         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9412         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9413         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9414
9415         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9416         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9417         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() },
9418                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9419         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9420         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9421         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9422         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9423                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9424                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg } = action {
9425                         assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9426                 } else { panic!(); }
9427         } else { panic!(); }
9428         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9429
9430         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9431         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9432         // as its not 32 bytes long.
9433         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9434                 version: 2i32, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9435                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9436                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9437                                 txid: tx.txid(),
9438                                 vout: idx as u32,
9439                         },
9440                         script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
9441                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9442                         witness: Witness::from_slice(&channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9443                 }).collect(),
9444                 output: vec![TxOut {
9445                         value: 1000,
9446                         script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new(),
9447                 }]
9448         };
9449         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9450         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9451 }
9452
9453 #[test]
9454 fn test_coinbase_funding_tx() {
9455         // Miners are able to fund channels directly from coinbase transactions, however
9456         // by consensus rules, outputs of a coinbase transaction are encumbered by a 100
9457         // block maturity timelock. To ensure that a (non-0conf) channel like this is enforceable
9458         // on-chain, the minimum depth is updated to 100 blocks for coinbase funding transactions.
9459         //
9460         // Note that 0conf channels with coinbase funding transactions are unaffected and are
9461         // immediately operational after opening.
9462         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9463         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9464         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9465         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9466
9467         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9468         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9469
9470         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9471         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9472
9473         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9474
9475         // Create the coinbase funding transaction.
9476         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_coinbase_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9477
9478         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9479         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9480         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9481
9482         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9483         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9484         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9485
9486         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9487
9488         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9489         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9490
9491         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9492         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9493
9494         // Starting at height 0, we "confirm" the coinbase at height 1.
9495         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 1);
9496         // We connect 98 more blocks to have 99 confirmations for the coinbase transaction.
9497         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9498         // Check that we have no pending message events (we have not queued a `channel_ready` yet).
9499         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9500         // Now connect one more block which results in 100 confirmations of the coinbase transaction.
9501         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
9502         // There should now be a `channel_ready` which can be handled.
9503         let _ = &nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(&nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9504
9505         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9506         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9507         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9508         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
9509         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9510         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9511 }
9512
9513 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9514         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9515         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9516         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9517         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9518         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9519         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9520         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9521         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9522         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9523         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9524         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9525         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9526         // until we learned about an additional block.
9527         //
9528         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9529         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9530         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9531         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9532         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9533         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9534         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9535
9536         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9537         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9538         let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9539         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9540         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9541         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
9542         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
9543         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9544         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9545         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9546         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9547         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9548
9549         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9550         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9551                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9552         }
9553         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9554                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9555         if test_height_before_timelock {
9556                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9557                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9558                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9559                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9560         } else {
9561                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9562                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9563                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9564                 let htlc_tx = if spending_txn[0].txid() == node_txn[0].txid() {
9565                         &spending_txn[1]
9566                 } else {
9567                         &spending_txn[0]
9568                 };
9569                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, node_txn[0]);
9570                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9571                 // timelock is up).
9572                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9573                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9574
9575                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9576                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9577                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9578                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9579                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, htlc_tx)], conf_height + 1);
9580                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9581                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9582
9583                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9584                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9585                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9586                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9587                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9588                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9589                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9590                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9591                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9592         }
9593 }
9594
9595 #[test]
9596 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9597         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9598         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9599 }
9600
9601 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9602         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9603         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9604         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9605         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9606
9607         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9608
9609         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9610                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
9611         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();
9612
9613         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9614
9615         {
9616                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9617                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9618                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9619                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9620                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9621                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9622                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9623                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9624         }
9625         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9626         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9627
9628         {
9629                 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9630                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9631                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9632                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9633                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9634                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9635                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9636                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9637                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9638                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9639                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9640                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9641                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9642         }
9643
9644         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9645         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9646
9647         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9648                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9649                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9650
9651                 let expected_destinations = vec![
9652                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9653                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9654                 ];
9655                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
9656                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9657
9658                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9659                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9660                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9661
9662                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9663                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9664                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9665
9666                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9667                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9668                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9669                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9670                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9671                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9672         } else {
9673                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9674                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9675                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9676
9677                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9678                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9679                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9680                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9681
9682                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9683
9684                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9685         }
9686 }
9687
9688 #[test]
9689 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9690         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9691         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9692         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9693         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9694         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9695 }
9696
9697 #[test]
9698 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9699         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9700         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9701         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9702 }
9703
9704 #[test]
9705 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9706         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9707         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9708         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9709         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9710         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9711         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9712
9713         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9714         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9715         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9716         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9717
9718         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9719                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
9720         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
9721         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9722         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9723                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9724                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9725                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9726         });
9727
9728         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9729
9730         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9731         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9732
9733         let session_privs = {
9734                 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9735                 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9736                 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9737                 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9738                 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9739                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9740         };
9741         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9742                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9743                 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9744         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9745
9746         {
9747                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9748                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9749                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9750         }
9751         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9752
9753         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9754                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9755         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9756
9757         {
9758                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9759                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9760                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9761
9762                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9763                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9764
9765                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9766                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9767
9768                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9769                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9770                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9771
9772                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9773                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9774                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9775
9776                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9777                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9778                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9779         }
9780         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9781         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9782         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9783         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9784
9785         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9786
9787         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9788         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9789         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9790
9791         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9792         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9793
9794         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9795         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9796         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9797
9798         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9799
9800         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9801                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9802                 &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9803         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9804
9805         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9806         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9807         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9808
9809         do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9810         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, Some(None), true, true);
9811 }
9812
9813 #[test]
9814 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9815         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9816         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9817         // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9818         // amount.
9819         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9820         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9821         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9822         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9823
9824         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9825         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9826         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9827         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9828
9829         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9830         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9831         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9832                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9833                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9834                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9835         });
9836
9837         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9838         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9839         // amount of time to respond to.
9840
9841         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9842         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9843         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9844
9845         let failed_destinations = vec![
9846                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9847                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9848         ];
9849         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9850
9851         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash, PaymentFailureReason::RecipientRejected);
9852
9853         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9854         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9855                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9856         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9857
9858         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9859         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9860         let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9861         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9862
9863         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9864         // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9865         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9866         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9867         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9868 }
9869
9870 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9871 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9872 enum ExposureEvent {
9873         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9874         AtHTLCForward,
9875         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9876         AtHTLCReception,
9877         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9878         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9879 }
9880
9881 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool, multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
9882         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9883         // policy.
9884         //
9885         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9886         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9887         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9888         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9889         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9890         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9891         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9892         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9893
9894         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9895         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9896         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = if multiplier_dust_limit {
9897                 // Default test fee estimator rate is 253 sat/kw, so we set the multiplier to 5_000_000 / 253
9898                 // to get roughly the same initial value as the default setting when this test was
9899                 // originally written.
9900                 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253)
9901         } else { MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(5_000_000) }; // initial default setting value
9902         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9903         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9904         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9905
9906         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9907         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9908         open_channel.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9909         open_channel.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9910         if on_holder_tx {
9911                 open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9912         }
9913         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9914         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9915         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9916
9917         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9918
9919         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9920
9921         if on_holder_tx {
9922                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9923                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9924                 match get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id) {
9925                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9926                                 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9927                         },
9928                         _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
9929                 }
9930         }
9931
9932         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9933         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9934         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9935         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9936
9937         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9938         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9939         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9940
9941         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9942         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9943         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9944
9945         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
9946         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
9947                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
9948
9949         let (dust_buffer_feerate, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat) = {
9950                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9951                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9952                 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9953                 (chan.context().get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64,
9954                 chan.context().get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[0].fee_estimator)))
9955         };
9956         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9957         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9958
9959         // Substract 3 sats for multiplier and 2 sats for fixed limit to make sure we are 50% below the dust limit.
9960         // This is to make sure we fully use the dust limit. If we don't, we could end up with `dust_ibd_htlc_on_holder_tx` being 1
9961         // while `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat` is not equal to `dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat`.
9962         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis - if multiplier_dust_limit { 3 } else { 2 }) * 1000;
9963         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9964
9965         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 4;
9966         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9967
9968         if on_holder_tx {
9969                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9970                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9971                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9972                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9973                         for _ in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9974                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9975                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9976                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9977                         }
9978                 } else {
9979                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9980                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9981                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9982                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9983                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9984                         }
9985                 }
9986         } else {
9987                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9988                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9989                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9990                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9991                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9992                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9993                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9994                         }
9995                 } else {
9996                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9997                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9998                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9999                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10000                         }
10001                 }
10002         }
10003
10004         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
10005                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat =
10006                         if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 };
10007                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10008                 if on_holder_tx {
10009                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10010                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
10011                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
10012                 } else {
10013                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10014                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
10015                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
10016                 }
10017         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10018                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4 });
10019                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10020                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10021                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10022                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10023                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10024                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10025                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10026                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10027                 if on_holder_tx {
10028                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10029                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10030                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10031                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10032                 } else {
10033                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10034                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
10035                                 format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
10036                                         dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1) + dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4,
10037                                         max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10038                 }
10039         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10040                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = 2_500_000;
10041                 // For the multiplier dust exposure limit, since it scales with feerate,
10042                 // we need to add a lot of HTLCs that will become dust at the new feerate
10043                 // to cross the threshold.
10044                 for _ in 0..20 {
10045                         let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash(&nodes[1], Some(1_000), None);
10046                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10047                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10048                 }
10049                 {
10050                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10051                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10052                 }
10053                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10054                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10055                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
10056         }
10057
10058         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10059         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10060         added_monitors.clear();
10061 }
10062
10063 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
10064         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10065         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10066         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10067         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10068         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10069         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10070         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10071         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10072         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10073         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10074         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10075         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10076 }
10077
10078 #[test]
10079 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10080         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false);
10081         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true);
10082 }
10083
10084 #[test]
10085 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10086         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10087         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10088         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10089         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10090
10091         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10092         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10093         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10094         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10095         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10096
10097         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
10098
10099         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10100         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10101         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[&[1]]) };
10102         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10103         let mut tx = match events[0] {
10104                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10105                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
10106                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_height(best_height + 2).unwrap(), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10107                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10108                         }]}
10109                 },
10110                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10111         };
10112         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10113         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10114                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10115                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10116                 },
10117                 _ => panic!()
10118         }
10119         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10120         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10121         match events[0] {
10122                 Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, .. } => {
10123                         assert_eq!(channel_id, temp_channel_id);
10124                 },
10125                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10126         }
10127 }
10128
10129 #[test]
10130 fn test_non_final_funding_tx_within_headroom() {
10131         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10132         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10133         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10134         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10135
10136         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10137         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10138         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10139         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10140         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10141
10142         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
10143
10144         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10145         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10146         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[[1]]) };
10147         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10148         let mut tx = match events[0] {
10149                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10150                         // Timelock the transaction within a +1 headroom from the best block.
10151                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(best_height + 1), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10152                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10153                         }]}
10154                 },
10155                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10156         };
10157
10158         // Transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
10159         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10160         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10161 }
10162
10163 #[test]
10164 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
10165         // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
10166         // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
10167         // later, but for now we only accept the update.
10168         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10169         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10170         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10171         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10172
10173         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10174
10175         // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
10176         {
10177                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10178                 *feerate_lock = 5000;
10179         }
10180
10181         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
10182         {
10183                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10184                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
10185         }
10186         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10188
10189         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10190         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10191         match events[0] {
10192                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
10193                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10194                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
10195                 },
10196                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10197         };
10198
10199         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
10200         // it.
10201         {
10202                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10203                 *feerate_lock = 2000;
10204         }
10205         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10206         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10207
10208         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10209         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10210         match events[0] {
10211                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
10212                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10213                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
10214                 },
10215                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10216         };
10217
10218         // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
10219         // channel.
10220         {
10221                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10222                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
10223         }
10224         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10225         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10226
10227         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10228         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10229         match events[0] {
10230                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
10231                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10232                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
10233                                 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000".to_owned() },
10234                                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10235                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
10236                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10237                 },
10238                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10239         };
10240 }
10241
10242 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
10243         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10244         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10245         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10246         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10247         let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
10248         let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
10249                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
10250         let recv_value = 100_000;
10251
10252         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10253
10254         let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
10255         let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
10256                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
10257                         Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
10258                 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
10259         } else {
10260                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
10261                 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
10262         };
10263         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value).unwrap();
10264         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10265                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10266         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10267         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10268         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10269         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
10270         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10271         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10272         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10273
10274         if valid_delta {
10275                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
10276                         None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10277
10278                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
10279         } else {
10280                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10281
10282                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10283
10284                 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10285                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10286                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10287
10288                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10289         }
10290 }
10291
10292 #[test]
10293 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
10294         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
10295         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
10296         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
10297         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
10298 }
10299
10300 #[test]
10301 fn test_disconnects_peer_awaiting_response_ticks() {
10302         // Tests that nodes which are awaiting on a response critical for channel responsiveness
10303         // disconnect their counterparty after `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10304         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10305         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10306         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10307         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10308
10309         // Asserts a disconnect event is queued to the user.
10310         let check_disconnect_event = |node: &Node, should_disconnect: bool| {
10311                 let disconnect_event = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10312                         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action, .. } = event {
10313                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { .. } = action {
10314                                         Some(())
10315                                 } else {
10316                                         None
10317                                 }
10318                         } else {
10319                                 None
10320                         }
10321                 );
10322                 assert_eq!(disconnect_event.is_some(), should_disconnect);
10323         };
10324
10325         // Fires timer ticks ensuring we only attempt to disconnect peers after reaching
10326         // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10327         let check_disconnect = |node: &Node| {
10328                 // No disconnect without any timer ticks.
10329                 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10330
10331                 // No disconnect with 1 timer tick less than required.
10332                 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS - 1 {
10333                         node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10334                         check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10335                 }
10336
10337                 // Disconnect after reaching the required ticks.
10338                 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10339                 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10340
10341                 // Disconnect again on the next tick if the peer hasn't been disconnected yet.
10342                 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10343                 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10344         };
10345
10346         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10347
10348         // We'll start by performing a fee update with Alice (nodes[0]) on the channel.
10349         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
10350         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10351         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10352         let alice_fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10353         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), alice_fee_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10354         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_fee_update.commitment_signed);
10355         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
10356
10357         // This will prompt Bob (nodes[1]) to respond with his `CommitmentSigned` and `RevokeAndACK`.
10358         let (bob_revoke_and_ack, bob_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10359         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revoke_and_ack);
10360         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10361         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_commitment_signed);
10362         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10363
10364         // Alice then needs to send her final `RevokeAndACK` to complete the commitment dance. We
10365         // pretend Bob hasn't received the message and check whether he'll disconnect Alice after
10366         // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10367         let alice_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10368         check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10369
10370         // Now, we'll reconnect them to test awaiting a `ChannelReestablish` message.
10371         //
10372         // Note that since the commitment dance didn't complete above, Alice is expected to resend her
10373         // final `RevokeAndACK` to Bob to complete it.
10374         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10375         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10376         let bob_init = msgs::Init {
10377                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10378         };
10379         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_init, true).unwrap();
10380         let alice_init = msgs::Init {
10381                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10382         };
10383         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_init, true).unwrap();
10384
10385         // Upon reconnection, Alice sends her `ChannelReestablish` to Bob. Alice, however, hasn't
10386         // received Bob's yet, so she should disconnect him after reaching
10387         // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10388         let alice_channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
10389                 nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()
10390         );
10391         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_channel_reestablish);
10392         check_disconnect(&nodes[0]);
10393
10394         // Bob now sends his `ChannelReestablish` to Alice to resume the channel and consider it "live".
10395         let bob_channel_reestablish = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10396                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = event {
10397                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10398                         Some(msg.clone())
10399                 } else {
10400                         None
10401                 }
10402         ).unwrap();
10403         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_channel_reestablish);
10404
10405         // Sanity check that Alice won't disconnect Bob since she's no longer waiting for any messages.
10406         for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10407                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10408                 check_disconnect_event(&nodes[0], false);
10409         }
10410
10411         // However, Bob is still waiting on Alice's `RevokeAndACK`, so he should disconnect her after
10412         // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10413         check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10414
10415         // Finally, have Bob process the last message.
10416         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_revoke_and_ack);
10417         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10418
10419         // At this point, neither node should attempt to disconnect each other, since they aren't
10420         // waiting on any messages.
10421         for node in &nodes {
10422                 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10423                         node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10424                         check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10425                 }
10426         }
10427 }
10428
10429 #[test]
10430 fn test_remove_expired_outbound_unfunded_channels() {
10431         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10432         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10433         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10434         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10435
10436         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10437         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10438         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10439         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10440         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10441
10442         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10443         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10444         match events[0] {
10445                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10446                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10447         };
10448
10449         // Asserts the outbound channel has been removed from a nodes[0]'s peer state map.
10450         let check_outbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10451                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10452                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10453                 assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10454         };
10455
10456         // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10457         check_outbound_channel_existence(true);
10458
10459         // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10460         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10461                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10462                 check_outbound_channel_existence(true)
10463         }
10464
10465         // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10466         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10467         check_outbound_channel_existence(false);
10468
10469         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10470         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10471         match msg_events[0] {
10472                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10473                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10474                 },
10475                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10476         }
10477         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10478 }
10479
10480 #[test]
10481 fn test_remove_expired_inbound_unfunded_channels() {
10482         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10483         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10484         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10485         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10486
10487         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10488         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10489         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10490         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10491         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10492
10493         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10494         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10495         match events[0] {
10496                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10497                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10498         };
10499
10500         // Asserts the inbound channel has been removed from a nodes[1]'s peer state map.
10501         let check_inbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10502                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10503                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10504                 assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10505         };
10506
10507         // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10508         check_inbound_channel_existence(true);
10509
10510         // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10511         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10512                 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10513                 check_inbound_channel_existence(true)
10514         }
10515
10516         // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10517         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10518         check_inbound_channel_existence(false);
10519
10520         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10521         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10522         match msg_events[0] {
10523                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10524                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10525                 },
10526                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10527         }
10528         check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10529 }
10530
10531 #[test]
10532 fn test_channel_close_when_not_timely_accepted() {
10533         // Create network of two nodes
10534         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10535         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10536         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10537         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10538
10539         // Simulate peer-disconnects mid-handshake
10540         // The channel is initiated from the node 0 side,
10541         // but the nodes disconnect before node 1 could send accept channel
10542         let create_chan_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10543         let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10544         assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, create_chan_id);
10545
10546         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10547         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10548
10549         // Make sure that we have not removed the OutboundV1Channel from node[0] immediately.
10550         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10551
10552         // Since channel was inbound from node[1] perspective, it should have been dropped immediately.
10553         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
10554
10555         // In the meantime, some time passes.
10556         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS {
10557                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10558         }
10559
10560         // Since we disconnected from peer and did not connect back within time,
10561         // we should have forced-closed the channel by now.
10562         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10563         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
10564
10565         {
10566                 // Since accept channel message was never received
10567                 // The channel should be forced close by now from node 0 side
10568                 // and the peer removed from per_peer_state
10569                 let node_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10570                 assert_eq!(node_0_per_peer_state.len(), 0);
10571         }
10572 }
10573
10574 #[test]
10575 fn test_rebroadcast_open_channel_when_reconnect_mid_handshake() {
10576         // Create network of two nodes
10577         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10578         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10579         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10580         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10581
10582         // Simulate peer-disconnects mid-handshake
10583         // The channel is initiated from the node 0 side,
10584         // but the nodes disconnect before node 1 could send accept channel
10585         let create_chan_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10586         let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10587         assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, create_chan_id);
10588
10589         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10590         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10591
10592         // Make sure that we have not removed the OutboundV1Channel from node[0] immediately.
10593         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10594
10595         // Since channel was inbound from node[1] perspective, it should have been immediately dropped.
10596         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
10597
10598         // The peers now reconnect
10599         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10600                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10601         }, true).unwrap();
10602         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10603                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10604         }, false).unwrap();
10605
10606         // Make sure the SendOpenChannel message is added to node_0 pending message events
10607         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10608         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10609         match &msg_events[0] {
10610                 MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { msg, .. } => assert_eq!(msg, &open_channel_msg),
10611                 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
10612         }
10613 }
10614
10615 fn do_test_multi_post_event_actions(do_reload: bool) {
10616         // Tests handling multiple post-Event actions at once.
10617         // There is specific code in ChannelManager to handle channels where multiple post-Event
10618         // `ChannelMonitorUpdates` are pending at once. This test exercises that code.
10619         //
10620         // Specifically, we test calling `get_and_clear_pending_events` while there are two
10621         // PaymentSents from different channels and one channel has two pending `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s
10622         // - one from an RAA and one from an inbound commitment_signed.
10623         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10624         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10625         let (persister, chain_monitor);
10626         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10627         let nodes_0_deserialized;
10628         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10629
10630         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
10631         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).2;
10632
10633         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10634         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10635
10636         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10637         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10638
10639         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
10640         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10641         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 1_000_000);
10642
10643         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
10644         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10645         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 1_000_000);
10646
10647         for dest in &[1, 2] {
10648                 let htlc_fulfill_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[*dest], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10649                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[*dest].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fulfill_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10650                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[*dest], htlc_fulfill_updates.commitment_signed, false);
10651                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 0);
10652         }
10653
10654         let (route, payment_hash_3, _, payment_secret_3) =
10655                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
10656         let payment_id = PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0);
10657         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
10658                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), payment_id).unwrap();
10659         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10660
10661         let send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
10662         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]);
10663         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg);
10664         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10665
10666         if do_reload {
10667                 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
10668                 let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
10669                 let chan_1_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_2).encode();
10670                 reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes_0_serialized, &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized, &chan_1_monitor_serialized], persister, chain_monitor, nodes_0_deserialized);
10671
10672                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10673                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10674
10675                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
10676                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[2]));
10677         }
10678
10679         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10680         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
10681         if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[0] {
10682                 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10683         } else { panic!(); }
10684         if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[1] {
10685                 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10686         } else { panic!(); }
10687         if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
10688         if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
10689
10690         // After the events are processed, the ChannelMonitorUpdates will be released and, upon their
10691         // completion, we'll respond to nodes[1] with an RAA + CS.
10692         get_revoke_commit_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10693         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 3);
10694 }
10695
10696 #[test]
10697 fn test_multi_post_event_actions() {
10698         do_test_multi_post_event_actions(true);
10699         do_test_multi_post_event_actions(false);
10700 }
10701
10702 #[test]
10703 fn test_batch_channel_open() {
10704         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10705         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10706         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10707         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10708
10709         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10710         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10711                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10712                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10713         ]);
10714
10715         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10716         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10717         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10718         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10719
10720         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10721         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10722         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10723
10724         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10725         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10726
10727         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
10728         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
10729         check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
10730         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10731
10732         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10733         chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
10734         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10735         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10736
10737         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before persisting all monitors has been
10738         // completed.
10739         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10740         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
10741
10742         // Complete the persistence of the monitor.
10743         nodes[0].chain_monitor.complete_sole_pending_chan_update(
10744                 &ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 })
10745         );
10746         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10747
10748         // The transaction should only have been broadcast now.
10749         let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10750         assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10751         assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0], tx);
10752
10753         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10754         assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
10755                 *e,
10756                 crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
10757                         ref counterparty_node_id,
10758                         ..
10759                 } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
10760         )));
10761         assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
10762                 *e,
10763                 crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
10764                         ref counterparty_node_id,
10765                         ..
10766                 } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
10767         )));
10768 }
10769
10770 #[test]
10771 fn test_close_in_funding_batch() {
10772         // This test ensures that if one of the channels
10773         // in the batch closes, the complete batch will close.
10774         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10775         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10776         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10777         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10778
10779         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10780         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10781                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10782                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10783         ]);
10784
10785         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10786         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10787         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10788         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10789
10790         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10791         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10792         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10793
10794         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10795         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10796
10797         // Force-close the channel for which we've completed the initial monitor.
10798         let funding_txo_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10799         let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 };
10800         let channel_id_1 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_1);
10801         let channel_id_2 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_2);
10802         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
10803         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
10804
10805         // The monitor should become closed.
10806         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10807         {
10808                 let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
10809                 let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
10810                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
10811                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10812         }
10813
10814         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10815         match msg_events[0] {
10816                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => (),
10817                 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
10818         }
10819
10820         // We broadcast the commitment transaction as part of the force-close.
10821         {
10822                 let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10823                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10824                 assert!(broadcasted_txs[0].txid() != tx.txid());
10825                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input.len(), 1);
10826                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
10827         }
10828
10829         // All channels in the batch should close immediately.
10830         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
10831                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10832                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
10833                         discard_funding: true,
10834                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_1),
10835                         user_channel_id: Some(42),
10836                         ..Default::default()
10837                 },
10838                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10839                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
10840                         discard_funding: true,
10841                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_2),
10842                         user_channel_id: Some(43),
10843                         ..Default::default()
10844                 },
10845         ]);
10846
10847         // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
10848         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10849 }
10850
10851 #[test]
10852 fn test_batch_funding_close_after_funding_signed() {
10853         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10854         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10855         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10856         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10857
10858         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10859         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10860                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10861                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10862         ]);
10863
10864         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10865         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10866         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10867         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10868
10869         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10870         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10871         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10872
10873         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
10874         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
10875         check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
10876         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10877
10878         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10879         chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
10880         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10881         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10882
10883         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10884         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10885
10886         // Force-close the channel for which we've completed the initial monitor.
10887         let funding_txo_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10888         let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 };
10889         let channel_id_1 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_1);
10890         let channel_id_2 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_2);
10891         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
10892         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
10893         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 2);
10894         {
10895                 let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
10896                 let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
10897                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
10898                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10899                 let monitor_updates_2 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_2).unwrap();
10900                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2.len(), 1);
10901                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10902         }
10903         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10904         match msg_events[0] {
10905                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => (),
10906                 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
10907         }
10908
10909         // We broadcast the commitment transaction as part of the force-close.
10910         {
10911                 let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10912                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10913                 assert!(broadcasted_txs[0].txid() != tx.txid());
10914                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input.len(), 1);
10915                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
10916         }
10917
10918         // All channels in the batch should close immediately.
10919         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
10920                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10921                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
10922                         discard_funding: true,
10923                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_1),
10924                         user_channel_id: Some(42),
10925                         ..Default::default()
10926                 },
10927                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10928                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
10929                         discard_funding: true,
10930                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_2),
10931                         user_channel_id: Some(43),
10932                         ..Default::default()
10933                 },
10934         ]);
10935
10936         // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
10937         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10938 }
10939
10940 fn do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(confirm_remote_commitment: bool) {
10941         // Tests that a node will forget the channel (when it only requires 1 confirmation) if the
10942         // funding and commitment transaction confirm in the same block.
10943         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10944         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10945         let mut min_depth_1_block_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10946         min_depth_1_block_cfg.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10947         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg), Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg)]);
10948         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10949
10950         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
10951         let chan_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 });
10952
10953         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10954         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10955
10956         let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_remote_commitment {
10957                 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
10958         } else {
10959                 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
10960         };
10961         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
10962         closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
10963         let mut msg_events = closing_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10964         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10965         match msg_events.pop().unwrap() {
10966                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, .. } => {},
10967                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10968         }
10969         check_added_monitors(closing_node, 1);
10970         check_closed_event(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
10971
10972         let commitment_tx = {
10973                 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10974                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
10975                 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
10976                 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
10977                 commitment_tx
10978         };
10979
10980         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
10981         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
10982
10983         check_closed_broadcast(other_node, 1, true);
10984         check_added_monitors(other_node, 1);
10985         check_closed_event(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, &[closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
10986
10987         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10988         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10989 }
10990
10991 #[test]
10992 fn test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block() {
10993         do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(false);
10994         do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(true);
10995 }
10996
10997 #[test]
10998 fn test_accept_inbound_channel_errors_queued() {
10999         // For manually accepted inbound channels, tests that a close error is correctly handled
11000         // and the channel fails for the initiator.
11001         let mut config0 = test_default_channel_config();
11002         let mut config1 = config0.clone();
11003         config1.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 1000;
11004         config1.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11005         config0.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 2000;
11006
11007         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11008         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11009         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config0), Some(config1)]);
11010         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11011
11012         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11013         let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11014
11015         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11016         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11017         match events[0] {
11018                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11019                         match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23) {
11020                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }) => (),
11021                                 _ => panic!(),
11022                         }
11023                 }
11024                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11025         }
11026         assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11027                 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
11028 }