_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use chain;
  15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use chain::channelmonitor;
  17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  19 use chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
  20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  21 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
  23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  25 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  26 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  27 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  28 use ln::msgs;
  29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  30 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  31 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  32 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
  33 use util::errors::APIError;
  34 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  35 use util::config::UserConfig;
  36
  37 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  38 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  39 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  42 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  43
  44 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  46
  47 use regex;
  48
  49 use io;
  50 use prelude::*;
  51 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  52 use core::default::Default;
  53 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  54
  55 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  56 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  57
  58 #[test]
  59 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  60         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  61         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  62         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  63         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  64         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  65
  66         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  67         // funding satoshis
  68         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  69         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
  70         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  71
  72         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  73         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  74
  75         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  76         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  77
  78         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  79         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  80         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  81                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  82                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  83                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  84                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  85                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  86                         match action {
  87                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  88                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  89                                 },
  90                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
  91                         }
  92                 } else { assert!(false); }
  93         };
  94
  95         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
  96         use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
  97
  98         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
  99         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
 100
 101         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 102
 103         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 104
 105         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 106
 107         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 108
 109         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 110
 111         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 112
 113         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 114 }
 115
 116 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 117         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 118         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 119         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 120         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 121         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 122         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 123         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 124         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 125
 126         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 127         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 128         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 129         let opt_anchors = false;
 130         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 131         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
 132
 133         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 134         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 135         if !send_from_initiator {
 136                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 137                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 138         }
 139         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
 140
 141         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 142         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 143         if send_from_initiator {
 144                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 145                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 146         }
 147         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
 148         {
 149                 let mut lock;
 150                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
 151                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 152                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 153         }
 154
 155         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 156         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 157         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 158
 159         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 160         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 161         if send_from_initiator {
 162                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 163                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 164                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 165                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 166                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 167         } else {
 168                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 169         }
 170 }
 171
 172 #[test]
 173 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 174         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 175         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 176 }
 177
 178 #[test]
 179 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 180         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 181         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 182         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 183         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 184         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 185
 186         // balancing
 187         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 188
 189         // A                                        B
 190         // update_fee                            ->
 191         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 192         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 193         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 194         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 195         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 196         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 197         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 198         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 199         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 200         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 201         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 202         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 203         //                                       <- RAA
 204         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 205
 206         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 207         {
 208                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 209                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 210         }
 211         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 213
 214         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 215         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 216         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 217                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 218                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 219                 },
 220                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 221         };
 222
 223         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 224
 225         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 226         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 227         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 228         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 229
 230         let payment_event = {
 231                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 232                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 233                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 234         };
 235         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 236         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 237
 238         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 239         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 240         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 241         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 242         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 243         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 244
 245         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 246         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 247         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 248         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 250
 251         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 252         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 253         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 254         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 255         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 256         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 257         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 258         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 259
 260         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 261         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 262         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 263         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 264         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 265         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 266         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 267         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 268
 269         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 270         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 271         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 272         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 273
 274         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 275         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 277
 278         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 279         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 280
 281         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 282         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 283         match events_2[0] {
 284                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 285                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 286         }
 287
 288         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 290 }
 291
 292 #[test]
 293 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 294         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 295         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 296         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 297         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 298         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 299         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 300         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 301
 302         // balancing
 303         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 304
 305         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 306         {
 307                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 308                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 309         }
 310         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 311         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 312
 313         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 314         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 315         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 316                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 317                         update_fee.as_ref()
 318                 },
 319                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 320         };
 321
 322         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 323
 324         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 325         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 326         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 327         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 328
 329         let payment_event = {
 330                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 331                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 332                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 333         };
 334         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 335         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 336
 337         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 338         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 339         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 340         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 341         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 342         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 343
 344         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 345         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 346
 347         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 348 }
 349
 350 #[test]
 351 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 352         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 353         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 354         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 355         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 356         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 357
 358         // A                                        B
 359         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 360         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 361         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 362         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 363         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 364         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 365         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 366         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 367         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 368         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 369         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 370         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 371         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 372         //                                          B should send no response here
 373         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 374         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 375         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 376
 377         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 378         let initial_feerate;
 379         {
 380                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 381                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 382                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 383         }
 384         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 385         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 386
 387         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 388         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 389         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 390                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 391                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 392                 },
 393                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 394         };
 395
 396         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 397         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 398         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 399         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 400         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 401
 402         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 403         // transaction:
 404         {
 405                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 406                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 407         }
 408         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 409         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 410         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 411
 412         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 413         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 414                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 415                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 416         };
 417
 418         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 419
 420         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 421         // Deliver (3)
 422         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 423
 424         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 425         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 426         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 427         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 428         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 429         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 430         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 431         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 432         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 433         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 434         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 435
 436         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 437         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 438         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 439         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 440         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 441
 442         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 443         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 445
 446         // Delever (4)
 447         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 448         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 449         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 450
 451         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 452         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 453         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 454
 455         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 456         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 457         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 458         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 459
 460         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 461         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 462         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 463 }
 464
 465 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 466         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 467         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 468         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 469         // Node objects.
 470
 471         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 472         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 473         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 474         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 475
 476         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 477                 let block = Block {
 478                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 479                         txdata: vec![],
 480                 };
 481                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 482                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 483         }
 484
 485         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 486         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 487         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 488
 489         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 490         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
 491         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 492
 493         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 494         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
 495
 496         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
 497
 498         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 499         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
 500         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 501         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 502
 503         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 504         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 505         {
 506                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 507                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 508                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 509                 added_monitors.clear();
 510         }
 511         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 512
 513         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 514         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 515         {
 516                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 517                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 518                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 519                 added_monitors.clear();
 520         }
 521
 522         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 523         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 524
 525         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 526         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 527
 528         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 529         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 530         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 531         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 532 }
 533
 534 #[test]
 535 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 536         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 537         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 538         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 539         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 540         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 541         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 542         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 543         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 544         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 545         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 546         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 547         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 548         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 549         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 550         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 551         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 552         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 553         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 554 }
 555
 556 #[test]
 557 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 558         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 559         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 560         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 561         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 562         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 563
 564         {
 565                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 566                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 567         }
 568         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 569         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 570
 571         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 572         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 573         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 574                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 575                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 576                 },
 577                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 578         };
 579         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 580
 581         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 582         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 583         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 584
 585         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 586         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 587         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 588
 589         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 590         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 591         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 592         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 593
 594         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 595         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 596         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 597 }
 598
 599 #[test]
 600 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 601         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 602         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 603         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 604         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 605         let channel_value = 5000;
 606         let push_sats = 700;
 607         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 608         let channel_id = chan.2;
 609         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 610         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
 611
 612         let opt_anchors = false;
 613
 614         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 615         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 616         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 617         // remote limit.
 618         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 619         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 620         {
 621                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 622                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 623         }
 624         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 625         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 626         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 627
 628         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 629
 630         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 631
 632         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 633         {
 634                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 635
 636                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 637                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 638                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 639                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 640                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 641                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 642         }
 643
 644         {
 645                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 646                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 647                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 648         }
 649         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 650         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 651         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 652
 653         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 654
 655         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 656         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 657         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 658                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 659                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 660                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 661                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 662                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 663                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 664         };
 665         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 666                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 667                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 668                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 669                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 670                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 671                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 672                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 673         };
 674
 675         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 676         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 677                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 678
 679         let res = {
 680                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 681                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 682                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 683                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 684                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 685                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 686                         push_sats,
 687                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 688                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 689                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 690                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 691                         &mut htlcs,
 692                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 693                 );
 694                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 695         };
 696
 697         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 698                 channel_id: chan.2,
 699                 signature: res.0,
 700                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 701         };
 702
 703         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 704                 channel_id: chan.2,
 705                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 706         };
 707
 708         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 709
 710         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 711         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 712         //Should produce and error.
 713         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 714         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 715         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 716         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 717         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 718 }
 719
 720 #[test]
 721 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 722         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 723         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 724         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 725         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 726         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 727
 728         // balancing
 729         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 730
 731         {
 732                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 733                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 734         }
 735         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 736         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 737
 738         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 739         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 740         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 741                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 742                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 743                 },
 744                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 745         };
 746         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 747         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 748         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 749         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 750
 751         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 752
 753         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 754         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 755         {
 756                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 757                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 758                 added_monitors.clear();
 759         }
 760         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 761         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 762         // node[1] has nothing to do
 763
 764         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 765         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 766         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 767
 768         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 769         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 770         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 771         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 772         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 773         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 774         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 775
 776         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 777         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 778         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 779         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 780         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 781         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 782
 783         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 784         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 785         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 786         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 787
 788         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 789         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 790         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 791
 792         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 793         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 794         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 795         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 796
 797         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 798         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 799         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 800
 801         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 802
 803         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 804         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 805         match events[0] {
 806                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 807                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 808         };
 809
 810         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 811
 812         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 813         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 814         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 815         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 816         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 817 }
 818
 819 #[test]
 820 fn test_update_fee() {
 821         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 822         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 823         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 824         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 825         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 826         let channel_id = chan.2;
 827
 828         // A                                        B
 829         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 830         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 831         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 832         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 833         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 834         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 835         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 836         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 837         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 838         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 839         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 840         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 841
 842         // Create and deliver (1)...
 843         let feerate;
 844         {
 845                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 846                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 847                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 848         }
 849         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 850         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 851
 852         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 853         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 854         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 855                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 856                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 857                 },
 858                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 859         };
 860         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 861
 862         // Generate (2) and (3):
 863         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 864         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 865         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 866
 867         // Deliver (2):
 868         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 869         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 870         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 871
 872         // Create and deliver (4)...
 873         {
 874                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 875                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 876         }
 877         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 878         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 879         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 880         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 881         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 882                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 883                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 884                 },
 885                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 886         };
 887
 888         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 889         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 890         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 891         // ... creating (5)
 892         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 893         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 894
 895         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 896         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 897         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 898         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 899         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 900
 901         // Deliver (5):
 902         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 903         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 904         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 905
 906         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 907         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 908         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 909         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 910         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 911         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 912         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 913         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 914         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 915
 916         // Deliver (7)
 917         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 918         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 919         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 920         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 921
 922         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 923         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 924         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 925
 926         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 927         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 928         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 929         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 930         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 931 }
 932
 933 #[test]
 934 fn fake_network_test() {
 935         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 936         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 937         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 938         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 939         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 940         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 941
 942         // Create some initial channels
 943         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 944         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 945         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 946
 947         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 948         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 949         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 950         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 951         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 952
 953         // Send some more payments
 954         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 955         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 956         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 957
 958         // Test failure packets
 959         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 960         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 961
 962         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 963         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 964
 965         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 966         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 967         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 968         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 969         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 970         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 971         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 972
 973         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
 974         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
 975         hops.push(RouteHop {
 976                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
 977                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 978                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 979                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 980                 fee_msat: 0,
 981                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 982         });
 983         hops.push(RouteHop {
 984                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
 985                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 986                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 987                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 988                 fee_msat: 0,
 989                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 990         });
 991         hops.push(RouteHop {
 992                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
 993                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
 994                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 995                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
 996                 fee_msat: 1000000,
 997                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
 998         });
 999         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1000         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1001         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1002
1003         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1004         hops.push(RouteHop {
1005                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1006                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1007                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1008                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1009                 fee_msat: 0,
1010                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1011         });
1012         hops.push(RouteHop {
1013                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1014                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1015                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1016                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1017                 fee_msat: 0,
1018                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1019         });
1020         hops.push(RouteHop {
1021                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1022                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1023                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1024                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1025                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1026                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1027         });
1028         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1029         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1030         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1031
1032         // Claim the rebalances...
1033         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1034         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1035
1036         // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1037         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1038
1039         // Send some payments across both channels
1040         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1041         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1042         let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1043
1044
1045         route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1046         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1047         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1048         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1049
1050         //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1051
1052         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1053         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1054         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1055
1056         // Close down the channels...
1057         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1058         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1059         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1060         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1061         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1062         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1063         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1064         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1065         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1066         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1067         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1068         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1069         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1070         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1071         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1072 }
1073
1074 #[test]
1075 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1076         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1077         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1078         // commitment dance rounds.
1079         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1080         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1081         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1082         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1083         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1084         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1085
1086         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1087         for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1088                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1089                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1090                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1091         }
1092         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1093
1094         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1095         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1096         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1097         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1098
1099         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1100         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1101         // another HTLC.
1102         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1103         {
1104                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1105                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1106                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1107                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1108         }
1109
1110         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1111         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1112         {
1113                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1114                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1115         }
1116
1117         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1118         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1119         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1120         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1121
1122         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1123         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1124         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1125         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1126         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1127         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1128         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1129
1130         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1131         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1132         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1133
1134         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1135
1136         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1137         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1138         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1140
1141         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1142         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1144         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1145
1146         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1148         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1149
1150         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1151                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1152         }
1153         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1154         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1155         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1157         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1158
1159         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1160         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1161         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1163         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1164
1165         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1166         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1167
1168         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1169
1170         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1171         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1172         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1173                 match event {
1174                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1175                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1176                         },
1177                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1178                 };
1179         }
1180
1181         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1182                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1183         }
1184
1185         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1186 }
1187
1188 #[test]
1189 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1190         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1191         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1192         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1193         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1194         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1195         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1196
1197         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1198         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1199         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1200         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1201         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1202         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1203
1204         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1205
1206         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1207         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1208
1209         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1210         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1211
1212         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1213         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1214         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1215 }
1216
1217 #[test]
1218 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1219         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1220         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1221         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1222         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1223         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1224         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1225         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1226
1227         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1228
1229         // balancing
1230         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1231
1232         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1233
1234         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1235         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1236         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1237
1238         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1239         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1240         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1241
1242         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1243         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1244
1245         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1246         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1247         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1248                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1249                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1250                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1251                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1252                 }
1253         }
1254         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1255
1256         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1257         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1258         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1259         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1260
1261         // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1262         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1263         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1264         assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1265         assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1266         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1267         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1268         check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1269
1270         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1271         assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1272         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1273
1274         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1275         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1276         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1277         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1278         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1279         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1280         check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1281         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1282
1283         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1284         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1285         for e in events {
1286                 match e {
1287                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1288                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1289                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1290                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1291                         },
1292                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1293                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1294                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1295                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1296                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1297                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1298                         },
1299                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1300                 }
1301         }
1302 }
1303
1304 #[test]
1305 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1306         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1307         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1308         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1309         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1310         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1311
1312         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1313         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1314
1315         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1316         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1317         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1318         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1319         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1320         match err {
1321                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1322                         match &fails[0] {
1323                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1324                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1325                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1326                         }
1327                 },
1328                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1329         }
1330         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1331         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1332
1333         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1334 }
1335
1336 #[test]
1337 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1338         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1339         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1340         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1341         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1342         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1343
1344         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1345         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1346         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1347         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1348
1349         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1350
1351         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1352         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1353         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1354         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1355                 channel_id: chan.2,
1356                 htlc_id: 0,
1357                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1358                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1359                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1360                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1361         };
1362
1363         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1364
1365         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1366         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1367         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1368
1369         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1370
1371         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1372
1373         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1374         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1375         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1376                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1377                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1378                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1379                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1380                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1381
1382                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1383                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1384                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1385                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1386                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1387         };
1388         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1389                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1390                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1391                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1392                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1393                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1394                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1395                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1396         };
1397
1398         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1399         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1400                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1401
1402         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1403         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1404         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1405
1406         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1407                 offered: false,
1408                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1409                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1410                 payment_hash,
1411                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1412         };
1413
1414         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1415
1416         let res = {
1417                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1418                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1419                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1420                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1421                         commitment_number,
1422                         95000,
1423                         local_chan_balance,
1424                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1425                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1426                         feerate_per_kw,
1427                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1428                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1429                 );
1430                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1431         };
1432
1433         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1434                 channel_id: chan.2,
1435                 signature: res.0,
1436                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1437         };
1438
1439         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1440         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1441         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1442
1443         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1444         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1445                 channel_id: chan.2,
1446                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1447                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1448         };
1449         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1450
1451         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1452         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1453         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1454         match events[0] {
1455                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1456                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1457                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1458                 },
1459                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1460         };
1461         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1462                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1463
1464         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1465 }
1466
1467 #[test]
1468 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1469         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1470         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1471         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1472         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1473         // this situation.
1474         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1475         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1476         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1477         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1478
1479         let opt_anchors = false;
1480
1481         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1482         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1483         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1484
1485         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1486
1487         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1488         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1489                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1490         }
1491
1492         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1493         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1494         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1495                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1496         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1497         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1498 }
1499
1500 #[test]
1501 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1502         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1503         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1504         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1505         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1506         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1507
1508         let opt_anchors = false;
1509
1510         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1511         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1512         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1513         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1514         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1515         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1516         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1517
1518         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1519         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1520                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1521         }
1522
1523         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1524         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1525         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1526         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1527         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1528         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1529         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1530         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1531         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1532                 channel_id: chan.2,
1533                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1534                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1535                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1536                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1537                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1538         };
1539
1540         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1541         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1542         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1543         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1544         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1545         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1546         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1547         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1548 }
1549
1550 #[test]
1551 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1552         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1553         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1554         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1555         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1556
1557         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1558         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1559         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1560
1561         let opt_anchors = false;
1562
1563         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1564         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1565         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1566         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1567         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1568         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1569         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1570
1571         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1572                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1573         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1574         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1575         // commitment transaction fee.
1576         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1577
1578         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1579         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1580                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1581         }
1582
1583         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1584         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1585         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1586                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1587 }
1588
1589 #[test]
1590 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1591         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1592         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1593         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1594         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1595         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1596         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1597         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1598
1599         let opt_anchors = false;
1600
1601         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1602         // HTLC.
1603         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1604         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1605         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1606                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1607
1608         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1609         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1610         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1611         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1612         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1613         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1614         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1615
1616         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1617         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1618         match msg_events[0] {
1619                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1620                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1621                 },
1622                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1623         }
1624 }
1625
1626 #[test]
1627 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1628         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1629         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1630         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1631         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1632         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1633         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1634         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1635
1636         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1637         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1638         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1639         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1640         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1641         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1642
1643         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1644         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1645         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1646         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1647         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1648         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1649
1650         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1651         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1652         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1653         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1654 }
1655
1656 #[test]
1657 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1658         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1659         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1660         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1661         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1662         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1663         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1664
1665         let feemsat = 239;
1666         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1667         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1668         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1669         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1670
1671         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1672         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1673         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1674         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1675
1676         // Add a pending HTLC.
1677         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1678         let payment_event_1 = {
1679                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1680                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1681
1682                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1683                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1684                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1685         };
1686         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1687
1688         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1689         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1690         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1691         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1692         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1693
1694         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1695         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1696         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1697         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1698         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1699         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1700         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1701         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1702                 channel_id: chan.2,
1703                 htlc_id: 1,
1704                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1705                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1706                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1707                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1708         };
1709
1710         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1711         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1712         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1713         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1714         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1715         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1716         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1717         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1718 }
1719
1720 #[test]
1721 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1722         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1723         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1724         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1725         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1726         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1727         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1728         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1729         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1730         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1731
1732         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1733         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1734         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1735
1736         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1737         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1738 }
1739
1740 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1741         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1742 }
1743
1744 #[test]
1745 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1746         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1747         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1748         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1749         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1750         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1751         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1752         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1753         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1754         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1755         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1756
1757         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1758         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1759
1760         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1761         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1762
1763         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1764                 ($node: expr) => {{
1765                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1766                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1767                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1768                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1769                         payment_event
1770                 }}
1771         }
1772
1773         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1774         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1775         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1776         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1777
1778         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1779
1780         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1781         {
1782                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1783                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1784                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1785                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1786                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1787                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1788                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1789         }
1790
1791         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1792         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1793         loop {
1794                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1795                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1796                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1797                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1798                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1799                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1800                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1801                         break;
1802                 }
1803                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1804
1805                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1806                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1807                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1808                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1809                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1810                 );
1811
1812                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1813                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1814                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1815                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1816                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1817         }
1818
1819         // adding pending output.
1820         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1821         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1822         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1823         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1824         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1825         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1826         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1827         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1828         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1829         // policy.
1830         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1831         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1832         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1833
1834         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1835         let payment_event_1 = {
1836                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1837                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1838
1839                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1840                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1841                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1842         };
1843         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1844
1845         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1846         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1847         {
1848                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1849                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1850                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1851                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1852         }
1853
1854         // split the rest to test holding cell
1855         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1856         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1857         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1858         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1859         {
1860                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1861                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1862         }
1863
1864         // now see if they go through on both sides
1865         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1866         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1867         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1868         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1869         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1870         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1871
1872         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1873         {
1874                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1875                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1876                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1877                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1878                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1879         }
1880
1881         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1882         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1883         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1884         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1885         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1886         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1887
1888         // flush the pending htlc
1889         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1890         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1891         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1892
1893         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1894         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1895         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1896         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1897
1898         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1899         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1900         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1901         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1902
1903         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1904         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1905         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1906
1907         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1908
1909         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1910         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1911         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1912
1913         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1914         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1915
1916         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1917         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1918         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1919         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1920         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1921         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1922
1923         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1924         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1925         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1926         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1927
1928         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1929         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1930
1931         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1932         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1933         match events[0] {
1934                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1935                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1936                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1937                         match &purpose {
1938                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1939                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1940                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1941                                 },
1942                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1943                         }
1944                 },
1945                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1946         }
1947         match events[1] {
1948                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1949                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1950                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1951                         match &purpose {
1952                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1953                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1954                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1955                                 },
1956                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1957                         }
1958                 },
1959                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1960         }
1961
1962         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1963         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1964         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1965
1966         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1967         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1968         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1969
1970         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
1971         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1972         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1973         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1974         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1975
1976         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1977         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
1978 }
1979
1980 #[test]
1981 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
1982         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
1983         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
1984         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
1985         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
1986         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
1987         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
1988         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
1989         // To test this we:
1990         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
1991         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
1992         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
1993         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
1994         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
1995         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
1996         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
1997         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
1998         //    claim,
1999         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2000         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2001         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2002         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2003         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2004         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2005         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2006         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2007         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2008         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2009
2010         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2011         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2012         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
2013         let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
2014
2015         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2016         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2017         let send_1 = {
2018                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2019                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2020                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2021                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2022                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2023         };
2024
2025         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2026         // initial fulfill/CS.
2027         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
2028         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2029         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2030
2031         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2032         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2033         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2034         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2035         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2036
2037         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2038         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2039         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2040         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2041         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2042
2043         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2044         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2045         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2046         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2047         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2048
2049         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2050         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2051         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2052
2053         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2054         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2055         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2056
2057         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2058         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2059         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2060
2061         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2062         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2063         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2064         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2065         // on-chain as necessary).
2066         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2067         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2068         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2069         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2070         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2071
2072         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2074         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2075
2076         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2077         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2078
2079         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2080         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2081         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2083         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2084         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2085
2086         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2087         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2088         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2089         let send_2 = {
2090                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2091                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2092                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2093                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2094                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2095         };
2096
2097         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2098         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2099         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2100         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2101
2102         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2103
2104         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2105         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2106         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2107
2108         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2109         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2110
2111         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2112         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2113         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2114         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2115
2116         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2117         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2118         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2119
2120         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2122
2123         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2124         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2125
2126         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2127         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2128 }
2129
2130 #[test]
2131 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2132         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2133         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2134         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2135         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2136         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2137         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2138
2139         // Create some initial channels
2140         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2141         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2142         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2143         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2144
2145         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2146         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2147         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2148         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2149         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2150         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2151
2152         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2153         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2154         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2155         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2156         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2157
2158         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2159         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2160         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2161         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2162         {
2163                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2164                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2165                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2166                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2167                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2168         }
2169         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2170         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2171         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2172         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2173         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2174
2175         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2176         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2177
2178         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2179         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2180         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2181         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2182         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2183         {
2184                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2185                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2186                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2187                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2188                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2189                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2190         }
2191         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2192         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2193         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2194         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2195         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2196
2197         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2198                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2199                         {
2200                                 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2201                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2202
2203                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2204                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2205                                 match events[0] {
2206                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2207                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2208                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2209                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2210                                         },
2211                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2212                                 };
2213                         }
2214                 }
2215         }
2216
2217         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2218         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2219         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2221         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2222         let node2_commitment_txid;
2223         {
2224                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2225                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2226                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2227                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2228
2229                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2230                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2231                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2232                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2233                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2234         }
2235         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2236         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2237         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2238         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2239         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2240
2241         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2242         // confusing us in the following tests.
2243         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2244
2245         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2246         let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2247         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2248         // buffer space).
2249
2250         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2251                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2252                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2253                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2254                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2255                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2256                                 msg.clone()
2257                         },
2258                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2259                 };
2260                 match events[1] {
2261                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2262                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2263                         },
2264                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2265                 }
2266                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2267
2268                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2269                 {
2270                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2271                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2272                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2273                                         false
2274                                 } else { true }
2275                         });
2276                 }
2277
2278                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2279
2280                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2281                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2282
2283                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2284                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2285                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2286                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2287                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2288                                 msg.clone()
2289                         },
2290                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2291                 };
2292                 match events[1] {
2293                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2294                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2295                         },
2296                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2297                 }
2298                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2299                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2300
2301                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2302                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2303                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2304         };
2305         nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2306         nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2307         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2308         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2309
2310         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2311         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2312         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2313 }
2314
2315 #[test]
2316 fn test_justice_tx() {
2317         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2318         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2319         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2320         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2321         alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2322         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2323         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2324         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2325         bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2326         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2327         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2328         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2329         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2330         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2331         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2332         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2333         // Create some new channels:
2334         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2335
2336         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2337         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2338         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2339         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2340         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2341         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2342         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2343         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2344         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2345         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2346         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2347         // Revoke the old state
2348         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2349
2350         {
2351                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2352                 {
2353                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2354                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2355                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2356
2357                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2358                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2359                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2360                 }
2361                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2362                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2363                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2364
2365                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2366                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2367                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2368                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2369                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2370                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2371                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2372                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2373                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2374         }
2375         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2376
2377         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2378         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2379
2380         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2381         // Create some new channels:
2382         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2383         {
2384                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2385                 node_txn.clear();
2386         }
2387
2388         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2389         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2390         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2391         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2392         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2393         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2394         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2395         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2396         // Revoke the old state
2397         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2398         {
2399                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2400                 {
2401                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2402                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2403                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2404
2405                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2406                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2407                 }
2408                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2409                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2410
2411                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2412                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2413                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2414                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2415                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2416                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2417                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2418         }
2419         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2420         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2421         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2422 }
2423
2424 #[test]
2425 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2426         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2427         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2428         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2429         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2430         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2431         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2432         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2433         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2434         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2435         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2436         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2437         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2438         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2439         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2440
2441         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2442         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2443         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2444         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2445         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2446         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2447
2448         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2449         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2450
2451         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2452         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2453         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2454         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2455         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2456 }
2457
2458 #[test]
2459 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2460         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2461         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2462         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2463         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2464         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2465         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2466
2467         // Create some new channel:
2468         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2469
2470         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2471         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2472         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2473         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2474         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2475
2476         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2477         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2478         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2479         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2480         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2481         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2482         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2483         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2484         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2485
2486         //Revoke the old state
2487         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2488
2489         {
2490                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2491                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2492                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2493                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2494                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2495                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2496                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2497                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2498
2499                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2500                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2501
2502                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2503                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2504
2505                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2506                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2507                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2508                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2509                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2510                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2511                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2512                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2513
2514                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2515                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2516                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2517         }
2518         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2519         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2520         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2521 }
2522
2523 #[test]
2524 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2525         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2526         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2527         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2528         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2529         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2530         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2531
2532         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2533
2534         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2535         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2536         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2537         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2538         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2539         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2540
2541         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2542         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2543
2544         //Revoke the old state
2545         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2546
2547         {
2548                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2549                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2550                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2551                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2552                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2553                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2554                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2555                 match events[1] {
2556                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2557                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2558                 }
2559
2560                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2561                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2562
2563                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2564                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2565                 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2566                 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2567                 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2568                 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2569
2570                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2571                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2572                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2573                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2574                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2575                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2576                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2577
2578                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2579                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2580                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2581                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2582
2583                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2584                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2585                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2586
2587                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2588                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2589                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2590                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2591                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2592                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2593                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2594                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2595         }
2596         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2597         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2598         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2599 }
2600
2601 #[test]
2602 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2603         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2604         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2605         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2606         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2607         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2608         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2609         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2610         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2611         // towards B.
2612         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2613         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2614         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2615         // PaymentSent event).
2616
2617         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2618         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2619         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2620         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2621
2622         // Create some initial channels
2623         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2624         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2625
2626         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2627         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2628         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2629         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2630         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2631
2632         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2633         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2634         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2635
2636         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2637         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2638
2639         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2640         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2641         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2642         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2643         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2644         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2645         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2646         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2647         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2648         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2649         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2650         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2651         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2652
2653         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2654         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2655         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2656         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2657         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2658         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2659         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2660         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2661         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2662         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2663         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2664         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2665         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2666         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2667         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2668         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2669         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2670
2671         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2672         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2673         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2674         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2675         {
2676                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2677                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2678                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2679                 added_monitors.clear();
2680         }
2681         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2682         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2683         match forwarded_events[0] {
2684                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2685                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2686         }
2687         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2688                 } else { panic!(); }
2689         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2690                 } else { panic!(); }
2691         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2692         {
2693                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2694                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2695                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2696                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2697                 added_monitors.clear();
2698         }
2699         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2700         match events[0] {
2701                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2702                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2703         }
2704         match events[1] {
2705                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2706                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2707         }
2708
2709         match events[2] {
2710                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2711                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2712                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2713                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2714                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2715                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2716                 },
2717                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2718         };
2719         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2720                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2721                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2722                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2723                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2724                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2725                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2726                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2727                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2728                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2729                         if $htlc_offered {
2730                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2731                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2732                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2733                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2734                         } else {
2735                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2736                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2737                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2738                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2739                         }
2740                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2741                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2742                         node_txn.clear();
2743                 } }
2744         }
2745         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2746         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2747         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2748         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2749
2750         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2751         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2752         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2753         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2754         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2755         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2756         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2757         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2758         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2759         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2760         let commitment_spend =
2761                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2762                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2763                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2764                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2765                         &node_txn[0]
2766                 } else {
2767                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2768                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2769                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2770                         &node_txn[2]
2771                 };
2772
2773         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2774         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2775         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2776         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2777         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2778         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2779         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2780         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2781         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2782         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2783         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2784         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2785
2786         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2787         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2788         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2789         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2790         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2791         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2792         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2793         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2794         let mut first_claimed = false;
2795         for event in events {
2796                 match event {
2797                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2798                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2799                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2800                                         first_claimed = true;
2801                                 } else {
2802                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2803                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2804                                 }
2805                         },
2806                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2807                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2808                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2809                 }
2810         }
2811         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2812 }
2813
2814 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2815         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2816         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2817         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2818         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2819         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2820         //            \                                  \
2821         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2822
2823         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2824         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2825         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2826         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2827         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2828         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2829         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2830
2831         // Create some intial channels
2832         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2833         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2834
2835         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2836         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2837         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2838
2839         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2840
2841         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2842         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2843         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2844         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2845         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2846         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2847         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2848
2849         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2850         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2851         match events[0] {
2852                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2853                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2854                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2855                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2856                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2857                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2858                 },
2859                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2860         };
2861         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2862         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2863         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2864         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2865         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2866         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2867         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2868         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2869
2870         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2871         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2872         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2873         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2874         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2875         let timeout_tx;
2876         {
2877                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2878                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2879                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2880                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2881
2882                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2883                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2884
2885                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2886                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2887                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2888                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2889
2890                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2891                 node_txn.clear();
2892         }
2893
2894         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2895         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2896         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2897         {
2898                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2899                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2900                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2901                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2902         }
2903
2904         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2905         {
2906                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2907                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2908                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2909                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2910                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2911                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2912                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2913                 } else {
2914                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2915                 }
2916         }
2917
2918         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2919         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2920         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2921         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2922         match events[0] {
2923                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2924                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2925                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2926                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2927                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2928                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2929                 },
2930                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2931         };
2932
2933         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2934         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2935         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2936
2937         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2938         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2939
2940         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2941         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2942         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2943         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2944         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2945         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2946         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2947         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2948         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2949 }
2950
2951 #[test]
2952 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2953         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2954         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2955         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2956 }
2957
2958 #[test]
2959 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2960         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2961         // and fail backward accordingly.
2962
2963         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2964         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2965         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2966         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2967
2968         // Create some initial channels
2969         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2970         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2971
2972         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2973         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2974         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2975         // Revoke the old state
2976         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2977
2978         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2979
2980         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2981         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2982         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2983         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2984         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2985
2986         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2987         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2988         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2989         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2990         match events[0] {
2991                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
2992                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2993                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2994                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2995                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2996                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2997
2998                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2999                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3000                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3001                 },
3002                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3003         }
3004 }
3005
3006 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3007         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3008         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3009         // commitment transaction anymore.
3010         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3011         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3012         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3013         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3014         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3015         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3016         // transactions:
3017         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3018         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3019         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3020         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3021         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3022         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3023         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3024         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3025         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3026
3027         // Create some initial channels
3028         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3029         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3030
3031         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3032         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3033         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3034         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3035         // Revoke the old state
3036         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3037
3038         let value = if use_dust {
3039                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3040                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3041                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3042         } else { 3000000 };
3043
3044         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3045         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3046         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3047
3048         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3049         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3050         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3051         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3052         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3053         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3054         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3055         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3056         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3057         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3058         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3059         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3060
3061         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3062         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3063         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3064         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3065         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3066         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3067         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3068         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3069         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3070         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3071         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3073         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3074         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3075         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3076         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3077
3078         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3079         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3080         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3081         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3082         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3083         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3084         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3085         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3086         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3087         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3088         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3089         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3090         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3091         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3092         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3093         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3094         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3095         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3096
3097         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3098         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3099         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3100         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3101         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3102         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3104
3105         if deliver_bs_raa {
3106                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3107                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3108                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3109                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3110                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3111                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3112                 match events[0] {
3113                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3114                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3115                 };
3116                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3117                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3118         }
3119
3120         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3121         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3122
3123         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3124         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3125         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3126         assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3127
3128         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3129         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3130         match events[0] {
3131                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3132                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3133         }
3134         match events[1] {
3135                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3136                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3137                 },
3138                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3139         }
3140         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3141                 match events[2] {
3142                         Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3143                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3144                         },
3145                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3146                 }
3147                 match events[3] {
3148                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3149                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3150                 };
3151         }
3152         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3153         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3154
3155         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3156         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3157         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3158                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3159                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3160         }
3161         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3162                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3163                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3164                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3165                 },
3166                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3167         }
3168         if deliver_bs_raa {
3169                 match events[0] {
3170                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3171                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3172                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3173                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3174                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3175                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3176                         },
3177                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3178                 }
3179         }
3180         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3181                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3182                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3183                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3184                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3185                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3186                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3187
3188                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3189                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3190                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3191
3192                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3193
3194                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3195                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3196                         match events[0] {
3197                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3198                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3199                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3200                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3201                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3202                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3203                                         }
3204                                 },
3205                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3206                         }
3207                         match events[1] {
3208                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3209                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3210                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3211                                 },
3212                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3213                         }
3214                         match events[2] {
3215                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3216                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3217                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3218                                 },
3219                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3220                         }
3221                 },
3222                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3223         }
3224
3225         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3226         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3227         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3228 }
3229
3230 #[test]
3231 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3232         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3233         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3234         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3235         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3236 }
3237
3238 #[test]
3239 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3240         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3241         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3242         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3243         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3244 }
3245
3246 #[test]
3247 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3248         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3249         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3250         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3251         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3252         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3253
3254         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3255         {
3256                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3257                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3258                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3259
3260                 let payment_event = {
3261                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3262                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3263                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3264                 };
3265                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3266                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3267         }
3268
3269         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3270         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3271         {
3272                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3273                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3274
3275                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3276         }
3277
3278         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3279         {
3280                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3281
3282                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3283                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3284                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3285                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3286                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3287                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3288
3289                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3290                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3291                         channel_id: chan.2,
3292                         htlc_id: 0,
3293                         amount_msat: 0,
3294                         payment_hash,
3295                         cltv_expiry,
3296                         onion_routing_packet,
3297                 };
3298                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3299         }
3300         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3301         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3302         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3303         match events[0] {
3304                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3305                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3306                 },
3307                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3308         }
3309         match events[1] {
3310                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3311                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3312                 },
3313                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3314         }
3315         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3316         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3317 }
3318
3319 #[test]
3320 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3321         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3322         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3323         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3324         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3325         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3326         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3327         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3328
3329         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3330         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3331         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3332         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3333         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3334         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3335
3336         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3337         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3338         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3339
3340         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3341         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3342         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3343         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3344         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3345
3346         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3347         // registering new transactions
3348         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3349         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3350 }
3351
3352 #[test]
3353 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3354         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3355         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3356         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3357         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3358         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3359         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3360         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3361
3362         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3363
3364         let mut payment_event = {
3365                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3366                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3367
3368                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3369                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3370                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3371         };
3372
3373         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3374         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3375
3376         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3377
3378         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3379         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3380         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3381         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3382
3383         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3384         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3385         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3386         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3387         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3388
3389         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3390         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3391         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3392
3393         nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3394         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3395         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3396         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3397         let tx = {
3398                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3399                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3400                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3401                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3402                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3403                 node_txn.remove(0)
3404         };
3405
3406         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3407
3408         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3409         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3410         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3411         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3412
3413         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3414         {
3415                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3416                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3417         }
3418         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3419         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3420         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3421         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3422         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3423         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3424         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3425
3426         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3427 }
3428
3429 #[test]
3430 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3431         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3432         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3433         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3434         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3435
3436         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3437         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3438         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3439         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3440         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3441
3442         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3443
3444         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3445         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3446         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3447         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3448         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3449
3450         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3451         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3452
3453         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3454         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3455 }
3456
3457 #[test]
3458 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3459         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3460         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3461         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3462         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3463         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3464         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3465         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3466
3467         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3468         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3469         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3470
3471         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3472         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3473         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3474         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3475
3476         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3477         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3478         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3479
3480         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3481         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3482         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3483         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3484
3485         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3486         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3487
3488         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3489         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3490
3491         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3492         {
3493                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3494                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3495                 match events[0] {
3496                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3497                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3498                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3499                         },
3500                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3501                 }
3502                 match events[1] {
3503                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3504                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3505                                 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3506                         },
3507                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3508                 }
3509                 match events[2] {
3510                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3511                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3512                 }
3513         }
3514
3515         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3516         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3517 }
3518
3519 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3520         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3521         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3522         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3523         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3524         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3525
3526         let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3527         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3528                 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3529                 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3530                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3531                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3532                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3533         } else {
3534                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3535         }
3536
3537         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3538
3539         let payment_event = {
3540                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3541                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3542
3543                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3544                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3545                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3546         };
3547         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3548
3549         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3550                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3551         } else {
3552                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3553                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3554                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3555                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3556                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3557
3558                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3559                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3560                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3561                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3562
3563                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3564                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3565                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3566                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3567                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3568
3569                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3570                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3571                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3572                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3573                                         }
3574                                 }
3575                         }
3576                 }
3577         }
3578
3579         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3580         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3581         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3582                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3583                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3584                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3585                         //
3586                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3587                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3588                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3589                         //
3590                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3591                         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3592                 }
3593                 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3594                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3595                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3596         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3597                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3598                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3599         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3600                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3601                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3602         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3603                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3604                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3605         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3606                 // Everything was delivered...
3607                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3608         }
3609
3610         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3611         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3612         match events_1[0] {
3613                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3614                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3615         };
3616
3617         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3618         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3619         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3620
3621         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3622
3623         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3624         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3625         match events_2[0] {
3626                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3627                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3628                         assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3629                         match &purpose {
3630                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3631                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3632                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3633                                 },
3634                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3635                         }
3636                 },
3637                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3638         }
3639
3640         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3641         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3642
3643         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3644         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3645         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3646                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3647                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3648                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3649                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3650                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3651                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3652                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3653                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3654                 },
3655                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3656         };
3657
3658         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3659                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3660
3661                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3662                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3663                 match events_4[0] {
3664                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3665                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3666                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3667                         },
3668                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3669                 }
3670
3671                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3672                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3673                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3674                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3675
3676                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3677                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3678                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3679                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3680
3681                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3682                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3683                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3684                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3685                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3686
3687                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3688                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3689                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3690                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3691                                         }
3692                                 }
3693                         }
3694                 }
3695         }
3696
3697         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3698         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3699         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3700                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3701                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3702                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3703                 } else {
3704                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3705                 }
3706         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3707                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3708                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3709         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3710                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3711                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3712         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3713                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3714                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3715         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3716                 // Everything was delivered...
3717                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3718         }
3719
3720         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3721                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3722         }
3723
3724         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3725         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3726         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3727
3728         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3729                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3730         }
3731
3732         // Channel should still work fine...
3733         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3734         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3735         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3736 }
3737
3738 #[test]
3739 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3740         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3741         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3742         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3743         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3744 }
3745
3746 #[test]
3747 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3748         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3749         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3750         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3751         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3752 }
3753
3754 #[test]
3755 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3756         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3757         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3758         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3759         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3760         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3761         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3762         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3763         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3764         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3765
3766         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3767         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3768
3769         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3770         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3771         assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3772
3773         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3774
3775         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3776         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3777
3778         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3779         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3780         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3781
3782         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3783         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3784         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3785         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3786
3787         // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a funding_locked, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3788         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3789         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3790         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3791         let as_funding_locked = match events_3[0] {
3792                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3793                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3794                         msg.clone()
3795                 },
3796                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3797         };
3798
3799         // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s funding_locked on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3800         // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3801         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3802         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3803         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3804         let chan_id;
3805         let bs_funding_locked = match events_4[0] {
3806                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3807                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3808                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3809                         msg.clone()
3810                 },
3811                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3812         };
3813         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3814                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3815                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3816                         msg.clone()
3817                 },
3818                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3819         };
3820         match events_4[2] {
3821                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3822                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3823                 },
3824                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3825         }
3826
3827         // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s funding_locked, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3828         // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3829         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
3830         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3831         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3832         match events_5[0] {
3833                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3834                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3835                 },
3836                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3837         };
3838
3839         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s funding_locked, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3840         // announcement_signatures.
3841         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_locked);
3842         let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3843         assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3844         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3845                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3846                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3847                         msg.clone()
3848                 },
3849                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3850         };
3851
3852         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3853         // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3854         // channel_update.
3855         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3856         let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3857         assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3858         let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3859                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3860                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3861                 },
3862                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3863         };
3864
3865         // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3866         // same channel_announcement.
3867         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3868         let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3869         assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3870         let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3871                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3872                         assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3873                         update_msg.clone()
3874                 },
3875                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3876         };
3877
3878         // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3879         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3880         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3881         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3882
3883         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3884         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3885         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3886
3887         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3888         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3889         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3890
3891         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3892         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3893         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3894
3895         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3896         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3897         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3898         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3899         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3900         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3901                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3902         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3903
3904         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3905         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3906                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3907                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3908                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3909                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3910                         keys_manager,
3911                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3912                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3913                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3914                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
3915                         channel_monitors,
3916                 }).unwrap()
3917         };
3918         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3919         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3920
3921         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3922         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3923         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3924
3925         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3926
3927         // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3928         nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3929         let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3930         let mut found_announcement = false;
3931         for event in msgs.iter() {
3932                 match event {
3933                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3934                                 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3935                         },
3936                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3937                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3938                 }
3939         }
3940         assert!(found_announcement);
3941 }
3942
3943 #[test]
3944 fn test_funding_locked_without_best_block_updated() {
3945         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3946         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3947         // generate a funding_locked until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3948         // funding_locked immediately instead.
3949         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3950         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3951         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3952         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3953         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3954
3955         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3956
3957         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3958         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3959         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3960         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3961         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3962         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3963
3964         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a funding_locked after the transactions_confirmed
3965         let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3966         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
3967 }
3968
3969 #[test]
3970 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3971         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3972         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3973         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3974         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3975         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3976         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3977         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3978
3979         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3980
3981         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3982         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3983         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3984         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3985
3986         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3987         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3988         match events_1[0] {
3989                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3990                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3991         }
3992
3993         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3994         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3995
3996         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3997         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3998         match events_2[0] {
3999                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4000                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4001                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4002                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4003                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4004                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4005                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4006
4007                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4008                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4009                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4010                         match events_3[0] {
4011                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4012                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4013                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4014                                 },
4015                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4016                         }
4017
4018                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4019                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4020                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4021                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4022                 },
4023                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4024         }
4025
4026         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4027         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4028
4029         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4030         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4031         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4032         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4033         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4034         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4035
4036         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4037         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4038         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4039         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4040
4041         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4042         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4043
4044         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4045         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4046
4047         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4048
4049         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4050         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4051         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4052         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4053         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4054         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4055         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4056         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4057         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4058         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4059
4060         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4061         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4062         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4063         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4064         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4065         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4066         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4067         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4068
4069         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4070         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4071         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4072         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4073         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4074         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4075         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4076         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4077
4078         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4079         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4080         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4081         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4082
4083         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4084         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4085         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4086         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4087
4088         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4089         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4090         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4091
4092         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4093
4094         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4095         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4096         match events_5[0] {
4097                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4098                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4099                         match &purpose {
4100                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4101                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4102                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4103                                 },
4104                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4105                         }
4106                 },
4107                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4108         }
4109
4110         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4111         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4112         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4113
4114         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4115         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4116 }
4117
4118 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4119         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4120         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4121         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4122         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4123         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4124         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4125
4126         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4127
4128         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4129                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4130                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4131                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4132                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4133                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4134                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4135                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4136                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4137                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4138                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4139                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4140                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4141                 our_payment_hash
4142         } else {
4143                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4144         };
4145
4146         let mut block = Block {
4147                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4148                 txdata: vec![],
4149         };
4150         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4151         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4152         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4153         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4154                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4155                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4156                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4157         }
4158
4159         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4160
4161         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4162         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4163         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4164         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4165         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4166         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4167
4168         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4169         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4170         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4171         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4172         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4173         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4174 }
4175
4176 #[test]
4177 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4178         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4179         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4180 }
4181
4182 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4183         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4184         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4185         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4186         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4187         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4188         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4189         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4190
4191         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4192         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4193         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4194         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4195
4196         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4197         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4198         {
4199                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4200         }
4201         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4202         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4203
4204         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4205         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4206         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4207         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4208         if forwarded_htlc {
4209                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4210                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4211                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4212                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4213                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4214         }
4215         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4216
4217         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4218         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4219         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4220         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4221
4222         if forwarded_htlc {
4223                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4224                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4225                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4226                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4227                 match fail_commit[0] {
4228                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4229                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4230                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4231                         },
4232                         _ => unreachable!(),
4233                 }
4234                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4235         } else {
4236                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4237                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4238                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4239                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4240                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4241                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4242                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4243                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4244         }
4245 }
4246
4247 #[test]
4248 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4249         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4250         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4251 }
4252
4253 #[test]
4254 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4255         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4256         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4257         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4258         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4259         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4260         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4261         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4262         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4263         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4264
4265         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4266
4267         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4268
4269         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4270         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4271         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4272                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4273
4274         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4275         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4276         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4277         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4278         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4279         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4280         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4281         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4282                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4283         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4284
4285         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4286         let config = UserConfig::default();
4287         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4288                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4289                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4290                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4291                         default_config: config,
4292                         keys_manager,
4293                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4294                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4295                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4296                         logger: &logger,
4297                         channel_monitors,
4298                 }).unwrap()
4299         };
4300         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4301         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4302
4303         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4304         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4305         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4306         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4307
4308         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4309         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4310         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4311         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4312
4313         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4314         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4315         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4316         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4317
4318         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4319         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4320         for node in nodes.iter() {
4321                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4322                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4323                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4324         }
4325
4326         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4327 }
4328
4329 #[test]
4330 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4331         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4332         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4333         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4334         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4335         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4336         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4337         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4338         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4339         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4340         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4341
4342         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4343         let channel_value = 100000;
4344         let push_msat = 10001;
4345         let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4346         let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4347         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4348         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4349         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4350         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4351         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4352
4353         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4354
4355         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4356         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4357
4358         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4359         {
4360                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4361                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4362                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4363                 added_monitors.clear();
4364         }
4365
4366         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4367         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4368         {
4369                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4370                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4371                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4372                 added_monitors.clear();
4373         }
4374         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4375
4376         nodes.push(node_a);
4377         nodes.push(node_b);
4378
4379         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4380         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4381         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4382         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4383
4384         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4385         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4386         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4387         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4388         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4389         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4390         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4391         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4392                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4393         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4394
4395         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4396         let config = UserConfig::default();
4397         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4398                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4399                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4400                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4401                         default_config: config,
4402                         keys_manager,
4403                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4404                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4405                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4406                         logger: &logger,
4407                         channel_monitors,
4408                 }).unwrap()
4409         };
4410         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4411         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4412
4413         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4414
4415         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4416         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4417
4418         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4419         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4420         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4421         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4422         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4423
4424         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4425         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4426         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4427
4428         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4429         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4430         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4431         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4432
4433         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4434         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4435         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4436         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4437
4438         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4439         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4440         for node in nodes.iter() {
4441                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4442                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4443                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4444         }
4445
4446         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4447 }
4448
4449 #[test]
4450 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4451         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4452         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4453         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4454         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4455         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4456         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4457         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4458         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4459         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4460         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4461
4462         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4463         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4464
4465         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4466
4467         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4468         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4469         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4470
4471         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4472         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4473         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4474         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4475         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4476         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4477         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4478         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4479                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4480         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4481
4482         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4483         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4484                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4485                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4486                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4487                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4488                         keys_manager,
4489                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4490                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4491                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4492                         logger: &logger,
4493                         channel_monitors,
4494                 }).unwrap()
4495         };
4496         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4497         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4498
4499         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4500         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4501         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4502
4503         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4504
4505         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4506         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4507 }
4508
4509 #[test]
4510 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4511         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4512         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4513         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4514         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4515         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4516         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4517         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4518         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4519         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4520         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4521         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4522         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4523         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4524
4525         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4526         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4527                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4528                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4529                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4530         }
4531
4532         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4533
4534         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4535         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4536
4537         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4538         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4539         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4540         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4541
4542         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4543         // nodes[3])
4544         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4545         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4546                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4547                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4548                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4549         }
4550
4551         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4552         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4553         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4554         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4555         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4556         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4557
4558
4559         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4560         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4561                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4562                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4563                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4564                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4565         }
4566
4567         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4568         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4569                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4570                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4571                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4572                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4573         }
4574
4575         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4576         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4577                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4578                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4579                 keys_manager,
4580                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4581                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4582                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4583                 logger: &logger,
4584                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4585         }) { } else {
4586                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4587         };
4588
4589         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4590         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4591                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4592                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4593                 keys_manager,
4594                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4595                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4596                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4597                 logger: &logger,
4598                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4599         }).unwrap();
4600         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4601         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4602
4603         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4604                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4605                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4606                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4607                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4608         }
4609
4610         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4611                 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4612                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4613         }
4614         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4615         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4616
4617         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4618         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4619         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4620         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4621         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4622
4623         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4624         let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4625         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4626         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4627         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4628         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4629         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4630                 match action {
4631                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4632                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4633                         },
4634                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4635                 }
4636         }
4637 }
4638
4639 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4640         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4641                 {
4642                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4643                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4644                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4645                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4646                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4647                                 match event {
4648                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4649                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4650                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4651                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4652                                                 }
4653                                         },
4654                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4655                                 };
4656                         }
4657                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4658                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4659                                         txn.push(tx);
4660                                 }
4661                         }
4662                         txn
4663                 }
4664         }
4665 }
4666
4667 #[test]
4668 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4669         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4670         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4671         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4672         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4673         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4674
4675         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4676         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4677         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4678         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4679         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4680         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4681         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4682         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4683         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4684
4685         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4686         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4687
4688         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4689         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4690         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4691         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4692         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4693 }
4694
4695 #[test]
4696 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4697         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4698         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4699         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4700         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4701         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4702         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4703
4704         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4705         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4706         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4707         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4708         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4709
4710         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4711         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4712         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4713         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4714
4715         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4716         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4717         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4718         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4719         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4720
4721         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4722         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4723         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4724 }
4725
4726 #[test]
4727 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4728         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4729         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4730
4731         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4732         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4733         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4734         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4735
4736         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4737         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4738         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4739         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4740         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4741
4742         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4743         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4744         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4745         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4746         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4747
4748         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4749         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4750         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4751
4752         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4753         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4754         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4755         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4756         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4757 }
4758
4759 #[test]
4760 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4761         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4762         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4763         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4764         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4765
4766         // Create some initial channels
4767         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4768
4769         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4770
4771         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4772         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4773         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4774
4775         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4776         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4777         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4778         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4779         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4780         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4781         match events[0] {
4782                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4783                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4784         }
4785         match events[1] {
4786                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4787                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4788         }
4789
4790         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4791         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4792         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4793         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4794         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4795         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4796         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4797
4798         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4799         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4800         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4801
4802         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4803         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4804         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4805 }
4806
4807 #[test]
4808 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4809         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4810         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4811         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4812         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4813
4814         // Create some initial channels
4815         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4816
4817         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4818         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4819
4820         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4821
4822         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4823         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4824         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4825
4826         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4827         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4828         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4829         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4830         match events[0] {
4831                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4832                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4833         }
4834         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4835
4836         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4837         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4838         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4839         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4840         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4841         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4842
4843         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4844         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4845         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4846         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4847
4848         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4849         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4850         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4851         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4852         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4853 }
4854
4855 #[test]
4856 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4857         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4858         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4859         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4860         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4861
4862         // Create some initial channels
4863         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4864
4865         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4866         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4867         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4868         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4869
4870         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4871
4872         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4873         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4874         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4875         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4876
4877         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4878         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4879         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4880         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4881
4882         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4883         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4884
4885         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4886         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4887         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4888 }
4889
4890 #[test]
4891 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4892         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4893         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4894         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4895         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4896         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4897
4898         // Create some initial channels
4899         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4900
4901         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4902         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4903         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4904         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4905
4906         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4907
4908         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4909         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4910         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4911         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4912         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4913         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4914
4915         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4916         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4917         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4918         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4919         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4920         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4921         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4922
4923         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4924         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4925         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4926         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4927         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4928         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4929
4930         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4931         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4932         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4933         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4934         // transactions next...
4935         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4936         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4937
4938         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4939         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4940         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4941                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4942         } else {
4943                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4944                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4945         }
4946
4947         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4948         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4949
4950         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4951         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4952
4953         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4954         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4955         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4956         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4957         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4958 }
4959
4960 #[test]
4961 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4962         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4963         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4964         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4965         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4966         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4967
4968         // Create some initial channels
4969         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4970
4971         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4972         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4973         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4974         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4975
4976         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4977         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4978
4979         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4980
4981         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4982         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4983         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4984         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4985         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4986         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4987
4988         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4989         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4990         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4991         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4992
4993         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4994         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4995         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4996
4997         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4998         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4999         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5000         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5001         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5002         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5003
5004         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5005         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5006
5007         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5008         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5009         // transactions next...
5010         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5011         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5012         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5013                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5014         } else {
5015                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5016                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5017         }
5018
5019         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5020         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5021
5022         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5023
5024         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5025         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5026
5027         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5028         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5029
5030         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5031         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5032         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5033         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5034         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5035         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5036         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5037         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5038 }
5039
5040 #[test]
5041 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5042         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5043         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5044         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5045         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5046         // channel.
5047         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5048         // gets broadcast.
5049
5050         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5051         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5052         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5053         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5054
5055         // Create some initial channels
5056         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5057         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5058
5059         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5060         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5061         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5062         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5063         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5064
5065         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5066         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5067         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5068
5069         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
5070         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5071         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5072         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5074         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5075         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5076         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5077         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5078         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5079
5080         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5081         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5083         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5084
5085         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5086         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5087         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5088         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5089         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5090         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5091         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5092         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5093         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5094         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5095
5096         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5097         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5098         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5099         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5100         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5101         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5102         match events[0] {
5103                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5104                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5105         }
5106         match events[1] {
5107                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
5108                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5109                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5110                 },
5111                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5112         }
5113         {
5114                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5115                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5116                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5117                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5118                 b_txn.clear();
5119         }
5120         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5121         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5122         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5123         match msg_events[0] {
5124                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5125                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5126         }
5127         match msg_events[1] {
5128                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5129                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5130         }
5131         match msg_events[2] {
5132                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5133                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5134                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5135                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5136                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5137                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5138                 },
5139                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5140         };
5141         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5142         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5143         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5144         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5145         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5146         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5147         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5148         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5149         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5150         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5151         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5152         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5153         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5154
5155         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5157 }
5158
5159 #[test]
5160 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5161         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5162         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5163         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5164         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5165         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5166         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5167         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5168         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5169         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5170         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5171         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5172                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5173         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5174
5175         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5176         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5177         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5178
5179         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5180         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5181         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5182         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5183         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5184
5185         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5186
5187         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5188         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5189         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5190         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5191         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5192                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
5193         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5194         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5195
5196         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5197         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5198         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5199
5200         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5201         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5202         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5203         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5204         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5205
5206         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5207         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5208                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5209                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5210                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5211                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5212
5213                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5214                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5215                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5216                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5217                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5218                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5219                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5220
5221                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5222                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5223                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5224                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5225         }
5226
5227         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5228         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5229         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5230         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5231         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5232         match events[0] {
5233                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5234                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5235         }
5236         match events[1] {
5237                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5238                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5239         }
5240         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5241         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5242         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5243         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5244         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5245         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5246         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5247         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5248         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5249         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5250         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5251         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5252         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5253
5254         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5255         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5256         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5257         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5258         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5259         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5260         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5261         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5262         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5263         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5264
5265         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5266         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5267         {
5268                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5269         }
5270         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5271
5272         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5273         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5274         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5275         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5276         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5277         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5278         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5279         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5280         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5281         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5282         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5283         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5284
5285         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5286         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5287
5288         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5289         match events[0] {
5290                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5291                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5292                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5293                 }
5294                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5295         }
5296 }
5297
5298 #[test]
5299 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5300         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5301         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5302         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5303         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5304
5305         // Create some initial channels
5306         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5307
5308         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5309         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5310         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5311         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5312         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5313
5314         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5315         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5316         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5317         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5318         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5319         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5320         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5321         match events[0] {
5322                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5323                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5324         }
5325         match events[1] {
5326                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5327                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5328         }
5329         let node_tx = {
5330                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5331                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5332                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5333                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5334                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5335                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5336                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5337                 node_txn[0].clone()
5338         };
5339
5340         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5341         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5342
5343         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5344         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5345         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5346         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5347         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5348         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5349 }
5350
5351 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5352         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5353         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5354         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5355         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5356         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5357         // use the same payment hashes.
5358         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5359         //
5360         // A \         / E
5361         //    - C - D -
5362         // B /         \ F
5363         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5364         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5365         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5366         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5367         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5368         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5369         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5370         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5371                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5372         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5373
5374         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5375         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5376         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5377         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5378         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5379
5380         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5381         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5382         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5383         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5384
5385         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5386         // 0th HTLC:
5387         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5388         // 1st HTLC:
5389         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5390         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5391         // 2nd HTLC:
5392         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5393         // 3rd HTLC:
5394         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5395         // 4th HTLC:
5396         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5397         // 5th HTLC:
5398         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5399         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5400         // 6th HTLC:
5401         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5402         // 7th HTLC:
5403         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5404
5405         // 8th HTLC:
5406         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5407         // 9th HTLC:
5408         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5409         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5410
5411         // 10th HTLC:
5412         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5413         // 11th HTLC:
5414         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5415         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5416
5417         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5418         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5419         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5420         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5421         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5422
5423         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5424         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5425         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5426         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5427         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5428         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5429         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5430         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5431         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5432
5433         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5434         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5435         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5436         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5437         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5438         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5439
5440         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5441         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5442         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5443         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5444         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5445         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5446
5447         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5448         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5449         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5450         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5451
5452         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5453
5454         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5455         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5456         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5457         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5458         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5459         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5460         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5461         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5462         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5463         if deliver_last_raa {
5464                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5465         } else {
5466                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5467         }
5468
5469         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5470         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5471         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5472         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5473         //
5474         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5475         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5476         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5477         //
5478         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5479         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5480         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5481
5482         if announce_latest {
5483                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5484         } else {
5485                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5486         }
5487         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5488         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5489                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5490                 events[1].clone()
5491         } else {
5492                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5493                 events[0].clone()
5494         };
5495         match close_event {
5496                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5497                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5498         }
5499
5500         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5501         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5502         if deliver_last_raa {
5503                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5504         } else {
5505                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5506         }
5507         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5508
5509         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5510         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5511         let mut a_done = false;
5512         for msg in cs_msgs {
5513                 match msg {
5514                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5515                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5516                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5517                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5518                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5519                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5520                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5521                                         }
5522                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5523                                         assert!(!a_done);
5524                                         a_done = true;
5525                                         &nodes[0]
5526                                 } else {
5527                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5528                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5529                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5530                                         }
5531                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5532                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5533                                         &nodes[1]
5534                                 };
5535                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5536                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5537                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5538                                 if announce_latest {
5539                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5540                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5541                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5542                                         }
5543                                 }
5544                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5545                         },
5546                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5547                 }
5548         }
5549
5550         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5551         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5552         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5553         let mut as_updates = 0;
5554         for event in as_events.iter() {
5555                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5556                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5557                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5558                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5559                         } else {
5560                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5561                         }
5562                         if network_update.is_some() {
5563                                 as_updates += 1;
5564                         }
5565                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5566         }
5567         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5568         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5569         if announce_latest {
5570                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5571                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5572         }
5573         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5574
5575         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5576         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5577         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5578         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5579         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5580                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5581                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5582                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5583                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5584                         } else {
5585                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5586                         }
5587                         if network_update.is_some() {
5588                                 bs_updates += 1;
5589                         }
5590                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5591         }
5592         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5593         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5594         if announce_latest {
5595                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5596         }
5597         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5598
5599         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5600         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5601         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5602         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5603         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5604         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5605 }
5606
5607 #[test]
5608 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5609         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5610 }
5611
5612 #[test]
5613 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5614         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5615 }
5616
5617 #[test]
5618 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5619         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5620         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5621         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5622 }
5623
5624 #[test]
5625 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5626         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5627         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5628         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5629         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5630
5631         // Create some initial channels
5632         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5633
5634         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5635         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5636         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5637         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5638
5639         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5640         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5641         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5642         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5643         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5644         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5645
5646         let htlc_timeout = {
5647                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5648                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5649                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5650                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5651                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5652                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5653                 node_txn[1].clone()
5654         };
5655
5656         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5657         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5658         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5659
5660         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5661         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5662         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5663         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5664         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5665         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5666         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5667         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5668         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5669         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5670                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5671 }
5672
5673 #[test]
5674 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5675         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5676         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5677         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5678
5679         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5680
5681         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5682         let seed = [42; 32];
5683         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5684         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5685         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5686         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5687         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5688         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5689
5690         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5691         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5692
5693         // Create some initial channels
5694         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5695         // for node 0
5696         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5697         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5698         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5699
5700         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5701         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5702         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5703         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5704         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5705
5706         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5707         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5708         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5709         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5710         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5711
5712         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5713         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5714         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5715         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5716             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5717             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5718             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5719                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5720         }
5721
5722         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5723         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5724         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5725         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5726         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5727         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5728
5729         let htlc_timeout = {
5730                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5731                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5732                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5733                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5734                 node_txn[1].clone()
5735         };
5736
5737         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5738         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5739         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5740
5741         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5742         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5743         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5744         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5745         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5746         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5747         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5748         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5749         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5750         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5751         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5752                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5753 }
5754
5755 #[test]
5756 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5757         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5758         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5759         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5760         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5761
5762         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5763
5764         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5765         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5766
5767         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5768         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5769         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5770
5771         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5772         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5773         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5774
5775         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5776         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5777         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5778
5779         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5780         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5781         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5782 }
5783
5784 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5785         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5786         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5787         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5788         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5789         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5790
5791         let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5792
5793         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5794         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5795         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5796         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5797
5798         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5799         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5800         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5801
5802         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5803         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5804         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5805         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5806         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5807
5808         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5809         let mut block = Block {
5810                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5811                 txdata: vec![],
5812         };
5813         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5814                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5815                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5816         }
5817         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5818         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5819         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5820         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5821 }
5822
5823 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5824         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5825         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5826         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5827         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5828         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5829
5830         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5831         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5832         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5833
5834         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5835
5836         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5837         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5838         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5839
5840         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5841         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5842
5843         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5844                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5845                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5846         }
5847         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5848         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5849         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5850         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5851 }
5852
5853 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5854         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5855         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5856         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5857         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5858         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5859
5860         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5861         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5862         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5863         // actually revoked.
5864         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5865         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5866         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5867         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5868         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5869
5870         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5871         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5872         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5873         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5874         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5875         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5876         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5877         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5878         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5879         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5880
5881         if check_revoke_no_close {
5882                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5883                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5884         }
5885
5886         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5887         let mut block = Block {
5888                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5889                 txdata: vec![],
5890         };
5891         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5892                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5893                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5894         }
5895         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5896                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5897                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5898                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5899                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5900         } else {
5901                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5902                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5903                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
5904                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5905                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5906                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
5907                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5908                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5909         }
5910 }
5911
5912 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5913 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5914 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5915 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5916 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5917 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5918 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5919 // non-dust HTLCs.
5920 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5921 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5922 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5923 #[test]
5924 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5925         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5926         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5927
5928         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5929         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5930 }
5931
5932 #[test]
5933 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5934         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5935         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5936         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5937         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5938 }
5939
5940 #[test]
5941 #[should_panic]
5942 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5943         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5944         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5945         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5946         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5947         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5948         for node in nodes.iter() {
5949                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5950         }
5951
5952         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5953         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5954         let push_msat=10001;
5955         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5956         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5957         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5958         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5959
5960         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5961         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5962         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5963 }
5964
5965 #[test]
5966 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5967         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5968         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5969         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5970         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5971
5972         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5973         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5974         let push_msat=10001;
5975         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5976
5977         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5978         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5979         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5980         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5981         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5982
5983         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5984         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5985         let push_msat=10001;
5986         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5987         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5988         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5989
5990         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5991         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5992         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5993
5994         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5995         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5996         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5997
5998         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5999         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6000         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6001
6002         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6003         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6004         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6005         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6006         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6007         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6008 }
6009
6010 #[test]
6011 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6012         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6013         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6014         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6015         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6016
6017         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6018         let push_msat=10001;
6019         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6020         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6021         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6022         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6023
6024         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6025         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6026         let err_msg = match events[0] {
6027                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6028                         msg.clone()
6029                 },
6030                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6031         };
6032         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6033 }
6034
6035 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6036 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6037 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6038 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6039 #[test]
6040 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6041         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6042         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6043         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6044         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6045         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6046
6047         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6048         // pending_update_fee.
6049         {
6050                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6051                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6052         }
6053         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6054         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6055
6056         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6057         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6058         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6059                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6060                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6061                 },
6062                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6063         };
6064
6065         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6066
6067         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6068         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6069         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6070         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6071
6072         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6073         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6074         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6075
6076         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6077         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6078         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6079         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6080
6081         // Flush the pending fee update.
6082         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6083         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6084         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6085         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6086         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6087
6088         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6089         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6090         // us to surface its failure to the user.
6091         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6092         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6093         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6094         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6095                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6096         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6097
6098         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6099         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6100         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6101         match &events[0] {
6102                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6103                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6104                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6105                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6106                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6107                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6108                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6109                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6110                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6111                 },
6112                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6113         }
6114 }
6115
6116 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6117 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6118 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6119 #[test]
6120 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6121         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6122         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6123         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6124         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6125         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6126
6127         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6128         // pending_update_fee.
6129         {
6130                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6131                 *feerate_lock += 200;
6132         }
6133         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6134         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6135
6136         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6137         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6138         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6139                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6140                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6141                 },
6142                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6143         };
6144
6145         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6146
6147         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6148         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6149         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6150         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6151
6152         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6153         let amt_1 = 20000;
6154         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6155         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6156         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6157
6158         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6159         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6160         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6161         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6162         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6163         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6164         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6165
6166         // Flush the pending fee update.
6167         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6168         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6169         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6170         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6171         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6173
6174         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6175         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6176         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6177         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6178         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6179         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6180         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6181                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6182         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6183
6184         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6185         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6186         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6187         match &events[0] {
6188                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6189                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6190                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6191                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6192                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6193                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6194                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6195                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6196                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6197                 },
6198                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6199         }
6200
6201         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6202         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6203                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6204                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6205                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6206         };
6207         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6208                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6209                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6210         };
6211         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6213         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6214         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6215         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6216         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6217         match events[0] {
6218                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6219                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6220         }
6221         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6222         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6223         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6224         match events[0] {
6225                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6226                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6227         }
6228         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6229         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6230         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6231         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6232         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6233         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6234 }
6235
6236 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6237 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6238 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6239 // once it's freed.
6240 #[test]
6241 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6242         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6243         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6244         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6245         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6246         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6247         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6248         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6249         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6250         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6251         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6252
6253         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6254         // pending_update_fee.
6255         {
6256                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6257                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6258         }
6259         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6260         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6261
6262         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6263         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6264         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6265                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6266                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6267                 },
6268                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6269         };
6270
6271         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6272
6273         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6274         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6275         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6276         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6277
6278         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6279         let feemsat = 239;
6280         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6281         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6282         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6283         let payment_event = {
6284                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6285                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6286
6287                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6288                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6289
6290                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6291         };
6292         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6293         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6294         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6295         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6296
6297         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6298         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6299
6300         // Flush the pending fee update.
6301         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6302         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6303         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6304         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6305         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6306         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6307
6308         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6309         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6310         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6311
6312         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6313                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6314                         msg.clone()
6315                 },
6316                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6317         };
6318
6319         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6320         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6321         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6322
6323         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6324         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6325         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6326         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6327                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6328                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6329         }
6330
6331         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6332         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6333         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6334
6335         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6336         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6337         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6338         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6339                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6340                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6341                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6342                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6343                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6344                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6345                 },
6346                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6347         };
6348
6349         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6350         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6351         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6352
6353         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6354         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6355         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6356         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6357         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6358         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6359         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6360         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6361         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6362                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6363                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6364         };
6365         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6366         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6367         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6368 }
6369
6370 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6371 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6372 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6373
6374 #[test]
6375 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6376         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6377         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6378         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6379         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6380         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6381         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6382
6383         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6384         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6385
6386         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6387                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6388         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6389         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6390 }
6391
6392 #[test]
6393 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6394         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6395         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6396         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6397         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6398         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6399         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6400
6401         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6402         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6403         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6404                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6405
6406         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6407         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6408 }
6409
6410 #[test]
6411 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6412         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6413         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6414         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6415         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6416         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6417         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6418
6419         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6420         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6421         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6422         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6423         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6424
6425         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6426         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6427         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6428         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6429         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6430 }
6431
6432 #[test]
6433 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6434         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6435         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6436         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6437         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6438         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6439         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6440         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6441
6442         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6443                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6444         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6445         route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6446         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6447                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6448 }
6449
6450 #[test]
6451 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6452         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6453         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6454         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6455         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6456         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6457         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6458         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6459         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6460         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6461
6462         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6463                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6464                 let payment_event = {
6465                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6466                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6467
6468                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6469                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6470                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6471                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6472                         } else {
6473                                 assert!(false);
6474                         }
6475                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6476                 };
6477                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6478                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6479                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6480
6481                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6482                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6483         }
6484         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6485         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6486                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6487
6488         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6489         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6490 }
6491
6492 #[test]
6493 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6494         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6495         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6496         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6497         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6498         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6499         let channel_value = 100000;
6500         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6501         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6502
6503         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6504
6505         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6506         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6507         // limits us to.
6508         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6509         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6510                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6511
6512         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6513         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6514
6515         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6516 }
6517
6518 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6519 #[test]
6520 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6521         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6522         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6523         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6524         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6525         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6526         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6527         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6528         {
6529                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6530                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6531                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6532         }
6533
6534         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6535         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6536         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6537         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6538         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6539         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6540         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6541         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6542         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6543         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6544         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6545 }
6546
6547 #[test]
6548 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6549         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6550         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6551         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6552         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6553         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6554         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6555
6556         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6557         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6558         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6559         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6560         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6561         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6562
6563         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6564         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6565         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6566         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6567         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6568
6569         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6570         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6571         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6572         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6573         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6574
6575         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6576         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6577         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6578         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6579         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6580 }
6581
6582 #[test]
6583 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6584         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6585         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6586         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6587         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6588         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6589         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6590         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6591
6592         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6593         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6594         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6595         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6596         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6597         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6598
6599         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6600                 channel_id: chan.2,
6601                 htlc_id: 0,
6602                 amount_msat: 1000,
6603                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6604                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6605                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6606         };
6607
6608         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6609                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6610                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6611         }
6612         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6613         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6614
6615         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6616         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6617         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6618         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6619         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6620 }
6621
6622 #[test]
6623 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6624         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6625         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6626         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6627         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6628         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6629         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6630
6631         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6632         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6633         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6634         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6635         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6636         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6637
6638         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6639         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6640         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6641         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6642         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6643 }
6644
6645 #[test]
6646 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6647         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6648         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6649         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6650         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6651         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6652
6653         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6654         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6655         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6656         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6657         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6658         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6659         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6660
6661         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6662         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6663         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6664         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6665         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6666 }
6667
6668 #[test]
6669 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6670         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6671         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6672         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6673         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6674         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6675         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6676         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6677
6678         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6679         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6680         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6681         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6682         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6683         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6684
6685         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6686         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6687         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6688         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6689         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6690         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6691         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6692         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6693         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6694         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6695         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6696         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6697         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6698
6699         //Resend HTLC
6700         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6701         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6702         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6703         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6704         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6705
6706         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6707
6708         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6709         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6710         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6711         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6712         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6713 }
6714
6715 #[test]
6716 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6717         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6718
6719         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6720         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6721         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6722         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6723         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6724         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6725         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6726
6727         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6728         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6729         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6730
6731         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6732                 channel_id: chan.2,
6733                 htlc_id: 0,
6734                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6735         };
6736
6737         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6738
6739         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6740         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6741         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6742         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6743         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6744 }
6745
6746 #[test]
6747 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6748         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6749
6750         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6751         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6752         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6753         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6754         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6755
6756         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6757         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6758         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6759         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6760         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6761
6762         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6763                 channel_id: chan.2,
6764                 htlc_id: 0,
6765                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6766         };
6767
6768         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6769
6770         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6771         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6772         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6773         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6774         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6775 }
6776
6777 #[test]
6778 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6779         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6780
6781         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6782         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6783         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6784         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6785         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6786
6787         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6788         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6789         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6790         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6791         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6792         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6793                 channel_id: chan.2,
6794                 htlc_id: 0,
6795                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6796                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6797         };
6798
6799         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6800
6801         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6802         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6803         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6804         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6805         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6806 }
6807
6808 #[test]
6809 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6810         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6811
6812         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6813         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6814         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6815         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6816         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6817
6818         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6819
6820         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6821         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6822
6823         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6824         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6825         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6826                 match events[0] {
6827                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6828                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6829                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6830                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6831                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6832                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6833                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6834                         },
6835                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6836                 }
6837         };
6838
6839         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6840
6841         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6842
6843         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6844         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6845         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6846         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6847         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6848 }
6849
6850 #[test]
6851 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6852         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6853
6854         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6855         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6856         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6857         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6858         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6859
6860         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6861
6862         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6863         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6864
6865         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6866         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6867         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6868                 match events[0] {
6869                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6870                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6871                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6872                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6873                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6874                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6875                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6876                         },
6877                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6878                 }
6879         };
6880
6881         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6882
6883         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6884
6885         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6886         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6887         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6888         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6889         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6890 }
6891
6892 #[test]
6893 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6894         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6895
6896         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6897         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6898         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6899         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6900         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6901
6902         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6903         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6904         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6905
6906         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6907         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6908
6909         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6910         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6911         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6912
6913         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6914
6915         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6916                 match events[0] {
6917                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6918                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6919                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6920                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6921                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6922                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6923                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6924                         },
6925                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6926                 }
6927         };
6928         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6929         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6930
6931         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6932         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6933         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6934         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6935         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6936 }
6937
6938 #[test]
6939 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6940         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6941         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6942
6943         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6944         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6945         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6946         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6947         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6948         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6949
6950         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6951
6952         //First hop
6953         let mut payment_event = {
6954                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6955                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6956                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6957                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6958                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6959         };
6960         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6961         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6962         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6963         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6964         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6965         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6966         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6967         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6968         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6969
6970         //Second Hop
6971         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6972         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6973         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6974         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6975
6976         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6977         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6978         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6979                 match events_3[0] {
6980                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6981                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6982                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6983                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6984                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6985                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6986                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6987                         },
6988                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6989                 }
6990         };
6991
6992         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6993
6994         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6995         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6996         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6997         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6998         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6999
7000         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7001         match events_4[0] {
7002                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7003                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7004                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7005                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7006                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7007                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7008                 },
7009                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7010         };
7011
7012         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7013 }
7014
7015 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7016         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7017         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7018         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7019
7020         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7021         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7022         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7023         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7024         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7025         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7026
7027         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7028
7029         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7030         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7031         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7032         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7033
7034         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7035         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7036
7037         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7038         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
7039         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7040         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7041         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7042
7043         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7044         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7045         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7046         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7047
7048         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7049         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7050
7051         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7052         match events[0] {
7053                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7054                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7055                 },
7056                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7057         }
7058         match events[1] {
7059                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7060                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7061                 },
7062                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7063         }
7064
7065         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7066         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7067         if announce_latest {
7068                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7069         } else {
7070                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7071         }
7072
7073         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7074         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7075         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7076
7077         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7078         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7079         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7080         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7081         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7082         let mut first_failed = false;
7083         for event in events {
7084                 match event {
7085                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7086                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7087                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7088                                         first_failed = true;
7089                                 } else {
7090                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7091                                 }
7092                         }
7093                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7094                 }
7095         }
7096 }
7097
7098 #[test]
7099 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7100         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7101         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7102 }
7103
7104 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7105         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7106         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7107         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7108         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7109         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7110         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7111
7112         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7113         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7114         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7115         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7116         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7117
7118         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7119
7120         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7121         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7122
7123         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7124         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7125
7126         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7127         if revoked {
7128                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7129                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7130         }
7131
7132         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7133         if local {
7134                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7135                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7136                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7137                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7138                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7139
7140                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7141                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7142                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7143                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7144                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7145                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7146                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7147                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7148                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7149                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7150                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7151         } else {
7152                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7153                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7154                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7155                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7156                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7157                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7158                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7159                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7160                 if !revoked {
7161                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7162                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7163                         // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7164                         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7165                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7166                         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7167                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7168                 } else {
7169                         // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7170                         // commitment tx
7171                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7172                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7173                         let first;
7174                         match events[0] {
7175                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7176                                         if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7177                                         else { first = false; }
7178                                 },
7179                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7180                         }
7181                         match events[1] {
7182                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7183                                         if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7184                                         else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7185                                 },
7186                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7187                         }
7188                 }
7189         }
7190 }
7191
7192 #[test]
7193 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7194         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7195         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7196         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7197 }
7198
7199 #[test]
7200 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7201         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7202
7203         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7204         low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7205         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7206         high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7207         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7208         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7209         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7210         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7211         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7212
7213         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7214         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7215                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7216                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7217         {
7218                 match error {
7219                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7220                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7221                 }
7222         } else { assert!(false) }
7223
7224         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7225         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7226         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7227         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7228         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7229                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7230                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7231         {
7232                 match error {
7233                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7234                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7235                 }
7236         } else { assert!(false); }
7237
7238         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7239         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7240         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7241         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7242         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7243         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7244         let reason_msg;
7245         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7246                 match action {
7247                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7248                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7249                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7250                         },
7251                         _ => { panic!(); }
7252                 }
7253         } else { panic!(); }
7254         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7255
7256         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7257         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7258         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7259         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7260         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7261                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7262                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7263         {
7264                 match error {
7265                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7266                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7267                 }
7268         } else { assert!(false); }
7269 }
7270
7271 #[test]
7272 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7273         // We want to be sure that :
7274         // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7275         //   (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7276         // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7277         // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7278         // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7279         let persister;
7280         let logger;
7281         let fee_estimator;
7282         let tx_broadcaster;
7283         let chain_source;
7284         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7285         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7286         // during signing due to revoked tx
7287         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7288         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7289         let monitor;
7290         let node_state_0;
7291         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7292         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7293         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7294
7295         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7296
7297         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7298         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7299         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7300         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7301
7302         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7303         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7304
7305         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7306         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7307
7308         // Restore node A from previous state
7309         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7310         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7311         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7312         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7313         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7314         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7315         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7316         node_state_0 = {
7317                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7318                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7319                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7320                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7321                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7322                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7323                         logger: &logger,
7324                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7325                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7326                         channel_monitors,
7327                 }).unwrap().1
7328         };
7329         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7330         assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7331         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7332         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7333
7334         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7335
7336         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7337         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7338
7339         let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7340
7341         // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7342         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7343         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7344
7345         {
7346                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7347                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7348         }
7349
7350         let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7351         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7352                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7353                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7354                         reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7355                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7356                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7357                         match action {
7358                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7359                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7360                                 },
7361                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7362                         }
7363                 } else {
7364                         panic!("Unexpected event")
7365                 }
7366         }
7367
7368         // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7369         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7370         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7371         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7372         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7373
7374         // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7375         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7376         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7377         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7378         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7379         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7380         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7381         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7382         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7383         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7384         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7385 }
7386
7387 #[test]
7388 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7389         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7390         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7391         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7392
7393         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7394         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7395         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7396         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7397
7398         // Create some initial channels
7399         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7400
7401         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7402         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7403         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7404         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7405         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7406         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7407         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7408         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7409
7410         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7411         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7412         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7413         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7414         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7415
7416         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7417         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7418         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7419         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7420
7421         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7422         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7423         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7424
7425         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7426         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7427         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7428                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7429                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7430                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7431                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7432                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7433                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7434                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7435                 },
7436                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7437         };
7438         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7439
7440         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7441         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7442
7443         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7444         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7445         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7446         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7447 }
7448
7449 #[test]
7450 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7451         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7452         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7453
7454         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7455         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7456         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7457         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7458
7459         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7460         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7461         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7462
7463         // Disconnect peers
7464         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7465         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7466
7467         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7468         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7469         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7470         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7471         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7472         for e in msg_events {
7473                 match e {
7474                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7475                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7476                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7477                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7478                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7479                                 }
7480                         },
7481                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7482                 }
7483         }
7484         // Reconnect peers
7485         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7486         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7487         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7488         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7489         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7490         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7491
7492         // Reestablish chan_1
7493         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7494         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7495         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7496         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7497         // Reestablish chan_2
7498         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7499         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7500         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7501         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7502         // Reestablish chan_3
7503         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7504         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7505         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7506         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7507
7508         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7509         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7510         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7511         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7512         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7513         for e in msg_events {
7514                 match e {
7515                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7516                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7517                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7518                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7519                                         // the old one.
7520                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7521                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7522                                 }
7523                         },
7524                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7525                 }
7526         }
7527         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7528         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7529 }
7530
7531 #[test]
7532 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7533         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7534         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7535
7536         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7537         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7538         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7539         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7540
7541         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7542
7543         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7544         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7545                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7546         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7547         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7548
7549         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7550         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7551         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7552         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7553         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7554         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7555
7556         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7557         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7558                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7559                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7560                 }
7561         }
7562
7563         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7564         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7565
7566         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7567         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7568         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7569         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7570         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7571
7572         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7573         let penalty_1;
7574         let feerate_1;
7575         {
7576                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7577                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7578                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7579                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7580                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7581                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7582                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7583                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7584                 node_txn.clear();
7585         };
7586
7587         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7588         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7589         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7590         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7591         {
7592                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7593                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7594                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7595                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7596                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7597                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7598                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7599                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7600                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7601                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7602                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7603                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7604                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7605                         node_txn.clear();
7606                 }
7607         }
7608         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7609
7610         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7611         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7612         let penalty_3;
7613         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7614         {
7615                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7616                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7617                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7618                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7619                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7620                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7621                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7622                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7623                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7624                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7625                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7626                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7627                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7628                         node_txn.clear();
7629                 }
7630         }
7631         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7632
7633         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7634         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7635 }
7636
7637 #[test]
7638 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7639         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7640         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7641
7642         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7643         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7644         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7645         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7646         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7647
7648         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7649         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7650         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7651         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7652         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7653         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7654                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7655         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7656         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7657         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7658                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7659         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7660
7661         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7662         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7663         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7664
7665         // Revoke local commitment tx
7666         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7667
7668         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7669         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7670         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7671         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7672         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7673         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7674         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7675
7676         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7677         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7678         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7679
7680         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7681         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7682         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7683
7684         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7685         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7686         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7687         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7688
7689         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7690         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7691         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7692         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7693         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7694         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7695         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7696         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7697         match events[1] {
7698                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7699                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7700         }
7701         let first;
7702         let feerate_1;
7703         let penalty_txn;
7704         {
7705                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7706                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7707                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7708
7709                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7710                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7711                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7712                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7713                 // future).
7714                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7715                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7716                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7717                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7718                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7719                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7720
7721                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7722                 // available, which we check here:
7723                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7724                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7725                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7726
7727                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7728                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7729
7730                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7731                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7732                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7733                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7734
7735                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7736                 // output, checked above).
7737                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7738                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7739                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7740
7741                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7742                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7743                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7744                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7745                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7746                 node_txn.clear();
7747         }
7748
7749         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7750         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7751         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7752         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7753         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7754         {
7755                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7756                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7757
7758                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7759                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7760                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7761                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
7762                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7763                 } else {
7764                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7765                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7766                 }
7767
7768                 node_txn.clear();
7769         };
7770
7771         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7772         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7773         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7774         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7775         let node_txn = {
7776                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7777                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7778
7779                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7780                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7781                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7782                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7783                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7784                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7785                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7786                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7787                 node_txn.clear();
7788                 txn
7789         };
7790         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7791         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7792         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7793         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7794         {
7795                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7796                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7797                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7798                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7799                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7800                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7801                 // up bumped justice generation.
7802                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7803                 node_txn.clear();
7804         }
7805         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7806         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7807 }
7808
7809 #[test]
7810 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7811         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7812         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7813
7814         // Create 2 HTLCs
7815         // Provide preimage for one
7816         // Check aggregation
7817
7818         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7819         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7820         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7821         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7822
7823         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7824         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7825         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7826
7827         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7828         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7829         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7830         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7831         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7832
7833         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7834         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7835         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7836         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7837         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7838
7839         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7840         let timeout;
7841         let preimage;
7842         let preimage_bump;
7843         let feerate_timeout;
7844         let feerate_preimage;
7845         {
7846                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7847                 // 9 transactions including:
7848                 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7849                 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7850                 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7851                 // 1 * HTLC-Timeout
7852                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7853                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7854                 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7855                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7856                 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7857                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7858                 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7859
7860                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7861                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7862                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7863                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7864
7865                 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7866                 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7867                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7868                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7869
7870                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7871                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7872                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7873                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7874
7875                 node_txn.clear();
7876         };
7877         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7878         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7879
7880         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7881         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7882         {
7883                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7884                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7885                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7886                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7887                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7888                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7889
7890                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7891                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7892                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7893                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7894                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7895
7896                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7897                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7898                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7899                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7900                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7901
7902                 node_txn.clear();
7903         }
7904
7905         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7906         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7907 }
7908
7909 #[test]
7910 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7911         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7912         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7913         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7914         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7915         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7916         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7917         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7918         // implement that).
7919         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7920         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7921         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7922         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7923         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7924
7925         let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7926         let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7927
7928         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7929
7930         // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7931         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7932         let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7933
7934         // Must revoke without gaps
7935         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7936         keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7937
7938         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7939         let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7940                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7941
7942         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7943                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7944         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7946         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7947 }
7948
7949 #[test]
7950 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7951         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7952         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7953
7954         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7955         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7956         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7957         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7958
7959         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7960         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7961         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7962         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7963
7964         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7965         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7966         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7967
7968         // Revoke local commitment tx
7969         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7970
7971         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7972         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7973         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7974         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7975
7976         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7977         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7978         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7979         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7980         let penalty_txn = {
7981                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7982                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7983                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7984                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7985                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7986                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7987                 node_txn.clear();
7988                 penalty_txn
7989         };
7990         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7991         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7992         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7993         {
7994                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7995                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7996                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7997         }
7998 }
7999
8000 #[test]
8001 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8002         // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8003         // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8004         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8005         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8006         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8007         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8008         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8009
8010         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000).0;
8011         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8012         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8013         let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8014
8015         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8016         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8017         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8018         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8019         let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8020
8021         // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8022         // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8023         // can get our balance.
8024
8025         // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8026         // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8027         // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8028         let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8029         route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8030         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8031         let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8032         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8033
8034         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8035 }
8036
8037 #[test]
8038 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8039         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8040         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8041         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8042         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8043         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8044         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8045
8046         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8047
8048         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8049         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8050         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8051         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8052         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8053
8054         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8055         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8056         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8057         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8058
8059         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8060         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8061         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8062         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8063         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8064         match close_ev[0] {
8065                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8066                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8067                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8068                 },
8069                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8070         }
8071 }
8072
8073 #[test]
8074 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8075         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8076         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8077         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8078         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8079
8080         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8081         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8082         override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8083
8084         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8085
8086         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8087         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8088         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8089         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8090 }
8091
8092 #[test]
8093 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8094         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8095         zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8096         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8097         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8098         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8099         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8100
8101         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8102         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8103         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8104
8105         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8106         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8107         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8108 }
8109
8110 #[test]
8111 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8112         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8113         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8114         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8115         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8116         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8117         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8118
8119         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8120         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8121
8122         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8123
8124         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8125         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8126         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8127
8128         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8129         match events[0] {
8130                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8131                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, 23).unwrap();
8132                 }
8133                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8134         }
8135
8136         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8137         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8138
8139         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8140                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8141                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8142                 }
8143                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8144         }
8145
8146         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temp_channel_id).unwrap();
8147
8148         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8149         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8150
8151         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8152         match events[0] {
8153                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8154                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8155                 }
8156                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8157         }
8158 }
8159
8160 #[test]
8161 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8162         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8163         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8164         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8165         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8166         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8167         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8168
8169         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8170         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8171
8172         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8173
8174         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8175         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8176         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8177
8178         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8179         match events[0] {
8180                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8181                         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8182                 }
8183                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8184         }
8185
8186         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8187         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8188
8189         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8190                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8191                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8192                 }
8193                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8194         }
8195         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8196 }
8197
8198 #[test]
8199 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8200         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8201         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8202         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8203         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8204         // and the channel should be closed.
8205         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8206         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8207         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8208         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8209         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8210         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8211
8212         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8213         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8214         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8215
8216         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8217
8218         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8219         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8220
8221         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8222         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8223
8224         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8225         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8226         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8227         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8228         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8229         {
8230                 let mut lock;
8231                 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8232                 let accept_chan_msg = channel.get_accept_channel_message();
8233                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8234         }
8235
8236         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8237
8238         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8239         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8240
8241         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8242         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8243
8244         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8245         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8246
8247         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8248         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8249                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8250                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8251                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8252                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8253                 }
8254                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8255         }
8256
8257         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8258 }
8259
8260 #[test]
8261 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8262         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8263         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8264         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8265         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8266         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8267         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8268
8269         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8270         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8271
8272         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8273
8274         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8275         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8276         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8277
8278         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8279         match events[0] {
8280                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8281                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, 0).unwrap();
8282                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, 0);
8283                         match api_res {
8284                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8285                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8286                                 },
8287                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8288                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8289                         }
8290                 }
8291                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8292         }
8293
8294         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8295         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8296         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8297
8298         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8299                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8300                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8301                 }
8302                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8303         }
8304 }
8305
8306 #[test]
8307 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8308         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
8309         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
8310         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
8311         let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr)[0].node;
8312
8313         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8314         let api_res = node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, 0);
8315         match api_res {
8316                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8317                         assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8318                 },
8319                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8320                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8321         }
8322 }
8323
8324 #[test]
8325 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8326         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8327         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8328         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8329         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8330         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8331
8332         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8333         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8334         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8335         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8336
8337         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8338         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8339         route.paths.push(path);
8340         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8341         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8342         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8343         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8344         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8345         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8346         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8347         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8348 }
8349
8350 #[test]
8351 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8352         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8353         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8354         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8355         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8356         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8357
8358         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8359
8360         {
8361                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8362                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8363                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8364                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8365                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8366                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8367                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8368                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8369         }
8370         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8371         // values from previous calls.
8372         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8373         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8374         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8375         match events[0] {
8376                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8377                         match &purpose {
8378                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8379                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8380                                 },
8381                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8382                         }
8383                 },
8384                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8385         }
8386 }
8387
8388 #[test]
8389 #[allow(deprecated)]
8390 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8391         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8392         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8393         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8394         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8395         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8396         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8397
8398         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8399
8400         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8401
8402         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8403         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8404         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8405                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8406         } else { panic!(); }
8407         let mut block = {
8408                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8409                 Block {
8410                         header: BlockHeader {
8411                                 version: 0x2000000,
8412                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8413                                 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8414                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8415                         txdata: vec![],
8416                 }
8417         };
8418         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8419         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8420                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8421         } else { panic!(); }
8422
8423         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8424         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8425         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8426         block.header.time += 1;
8427         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8428         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8429         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8430
8431         {
8432                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8433                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8434                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8435                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8436                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8437                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8438                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8439         }
8440         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8441         // values from previous calls.
8442         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8443         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8444         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8445         match events[0] {
8446                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8447                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8448                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8449                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8450                 },
8451                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8452         }
8453 }
8454
8455 #[test]
8456 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8457         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8458         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8459         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8460         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8461         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8462
8463         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8464
8465         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8466         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8467         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8468         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8469
8470         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8471         // resulting events.
8472         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8473                 () => {
8474                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8475                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8476                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8477                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8478                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8479
8480                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8481                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8482                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8483                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8484                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8485
8486                         // We should fail the payment back
8487                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8488                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8489                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8490                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8491                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8492                                 },
8493                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8494                         }
8495                 }
8496         }
8497
8498         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8499         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8500         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8501
8502         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8503         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8504         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8505         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8506
8507         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8508         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8509         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8510         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8511
8512         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8513         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8514         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8515         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8516 }
8517
8518 #[test]
8519 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8520         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8521         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8522         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8523         //
8524         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8525         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8526         // commitment at same time.
8527
8528         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8529         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8530         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8531         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8532
8533         // Create some initial channel
8534         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8535         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8536
8537         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8538         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8539
8540         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8541         let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8542
8543         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8544         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8545         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8546         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8547         let watchtower = {
8548                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8549                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8550                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8551                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8552                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8553                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8554                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8555                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8556                 watchtower
8557         };
8558         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8559         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8560         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8561         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8562         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8563
8564         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8565         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8566         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8567         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8568         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8569         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8570         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8571                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8572                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8573                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8574                 } else { assert!(false); }
8575         } else { assert!(false); };
8576         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8577         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8578         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8579         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8580 }
8581
8582 #[test]
8583 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8584         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8585         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8586         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8587         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8588
8589         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8590         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8591         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8592         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8593
8594         // Create some initial channel
8595         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8596         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8597
8598         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8599         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8600
8601         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8602         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8603
8604         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8605         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8606         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8607         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8608         let watchtower_alice = {
8609                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8610                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8611                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8612                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8613                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8614                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8615                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8616                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8617                 watchtower
8618         };
8619         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8620         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8621         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8622         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8623         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8624
8625         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8626         {
8627                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8628                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8629                 txn.clear();
8630         }
8631
8632         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8633         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8634         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8635         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8636         let watchtower_bob = {
8637                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8638                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8639                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8640                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8641                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8642                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8643                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8644                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8645                 watchtower
8646         };
8647         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8648         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8649
8650         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8651         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8652         {
8653                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8654         }
8655         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8656
8657         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8658         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8659         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8660         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8661                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8662                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8663                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8664                         if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8665                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8666                 } else { assert!(false); }
8667         } else { assert!(false); };
8668         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8669         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8670
8671         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8672         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8673         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8674
8675         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8676         let bob_state_y;
8677         {
8678                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8679                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8680                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8681                 txn.clear();
8682         };
8683
8684         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8685         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8686         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8687         {
8688                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8689                 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8690                 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8691                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8692                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8693                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8694         }
8695 }
8696
8697 #[test]
8698 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8699         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8700         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8701         // message).
8702         //
8703         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8704         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8705         //
8706         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8707         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8708         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8709         // before receiving funding_signed.
8710         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8711         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8712         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8713         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8714
8715         // Create an initial channel
8716         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8717         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8718         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8719         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8720         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8721
8722         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8723         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8724
8725         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8726         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8727
8728         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8729         let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8730         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8731         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8732         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8733 }
8734
8735 #[test]
8736 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8737         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8738         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8739         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8740         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8741         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8742         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8743
8744         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8745         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8746         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8747         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8748
8749         // Create some initial channels
8750         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8751
8752         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8753         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8754         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8755         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8756         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8757         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8758
8759         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8760         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8761         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8762         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8763         // this test before #653 fix.
8764         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8765         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8766         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8767         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8768         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8769
8770         let htlc_timeout = {
8771                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8772                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8773                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8774                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8775                 node_txn[1].clone()
8776         };
8777
8778         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8779         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8780         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8781         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8782 }
8783
8784 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8785         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8786         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8787         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8788         //
8789         // Steps of the test:
8790         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8791         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8792         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8793         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8794         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8795         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8796         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8797         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8798         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8799         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8800         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8801         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8802
8803         // Create some initial channels
8804         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8805         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8806
8807         // Steps (1) and (2):
8808         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8809         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8810
8811         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8812         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8813         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8814         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8815         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8816         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8817         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8818
8819         // Steps (3) and (4):
8820         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8821         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8822         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8823         if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8824         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8825         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8826         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8827         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8828         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8829                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8830                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8831                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8832                 };
8833                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8834                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8835                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8836                 if broadcast_alice {
8837                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8838                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8839                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8840                 }
8841                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8842                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8843         }
8844
8845         // Step (5):
8846         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8847         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8848         assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8849         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8850         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8851         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8852         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8853         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8854         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8855         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8856
8857         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8858         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8859         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8860         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8861                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8862                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8863                 match events[0] {
8864                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8865                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8866                         },
8867                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8868                 };
8869         }
8870         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8871         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8872         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8873         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8874
8875         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8876         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8877         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8878                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8879                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8880                         (*msg).clone()
8881                 },
8882                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8883         };
8884         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8885                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8886                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8887                         (*updates).clone()
8888                 },
8889                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8890         };
8891
8892         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8893         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8894         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8895         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8896
8897         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8898         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8899         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8900                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8901                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8902                         (*msg).clone()
8903                 },
8904                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8905         };
8906         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8907         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8908
8909         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8910         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8911         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8912         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8913         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8914                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8915                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8916                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8917                 if broadcast_alice {
8918                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8919                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8920                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8921                 }
8922                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8923                 if broadcast_alice {
8924                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8925                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8926                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8927                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8928                         // broadcasted.
8929                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8930                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8931                 } else {
8932                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8933                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8934                 }
8935         }
8936
8937         // Step (6):
8938         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8939         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8940         {
8941                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8942                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8943                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8944                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8945                 }
8946                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8947                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8948                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8949                 };
8950                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8951                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8952                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8953                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8954                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8955                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8956                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8957                 } else {
8958                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8959                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8960                 }
8961         }
8962 }
8963
8964 #[test]
8965 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8966         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8967         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8968         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8969         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8970 }
8971
8972 #[test]
8973 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8974         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8975         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8976         //
8977         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8978         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8979         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8980         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8981         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8982         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8983         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8984         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8985
8986         // Create an initial channel
8987         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8988         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8989         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8990         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8991
8992         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8993         // that it is rejected.
8994         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8995         {
8996                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8997                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8998                 match events[0] {
8999                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9000                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9001                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9002                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9003                                 // move forward with it.
9004                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9005                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9006                         },
9007                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9008                 }
9009         }
9010
9011         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9012         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
9013
9014         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9015         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9016
9017         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9018         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9019         {
9020                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9021                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9022                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9023                 added_monitors.clear();
9024         }
9025         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9026
9027         let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9028         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9029
9030         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9031         // temporary one).
9032
9033         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9034         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9035         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9036         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9037         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9038         {
9039                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9040                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9041                 match events[0] {
9042                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9043                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9044                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9045                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9046                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9047                         },
9048                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9049                 }
9050         }
9051
9052         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9053         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9054         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9055         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9056         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9057         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9058
9059         let funding_created = {
9060                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9061                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9062                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9063                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9064         };
9065         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9066         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9067         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9068         // still needs to be cleared here.
9069         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9070
9071         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9072         {
9073                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9074                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9075                 match events[0] {
9076                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9077                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9078                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9079                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9080                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9081                         },
9082                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9083                 }
9084         }
9085
9086         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9087         // everything is functional.
9088         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9089         {
9090                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9091                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9092                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9093                 added_monitors.clear();
9094         }
9095
9096         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9097         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9098         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9099         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
9100
9101         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9102         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9103         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9104         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9105 }
9106
9107 #[test]
9108 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9109         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9110         //
9111         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9112         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9113         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9114         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9115         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9116         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9117         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9118
9119         // Create some initial channels
9120         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9121         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9122         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9123
9124         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9125         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9126         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9127
9128         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9129         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9130         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9131
9132         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9133         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9134         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9135         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9136         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9137         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9138         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9139         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9140         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9141
9142         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9143         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9144         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9145         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9146         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9147         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9148         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9149         match events[0] {
9150                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9151                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9152                 },
9153                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9154         }
9155         match events[1] {
9156                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9157                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9158                 },
9159                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9160         }
9161         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9162         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9163         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9164         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9165         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9166         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9167
9168         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9169         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9170         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9171 }
9172
9173 #[test]
9174 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9175         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9176         //
9177         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9178         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9179         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9180         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9181         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9182         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9183         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9184         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9185
9186         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9187         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9188         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9189
9190         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
9191         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9192                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9193                 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9194         }
9195
9196         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9197         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9198         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9199
9200         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9201         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9202
9203         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9204         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9205
9206         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9207         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9208         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9209
9210         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9211         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9212         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9213         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9214         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9215         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9216         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9217                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9218                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9219                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9220                 } else { panic!(); }
9221         } else { panic!(); }
9222         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9223 }
9224
9225 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9226         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9227         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9228         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9229         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9230         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9231         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9232         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9233         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9234         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9235         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9236         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9237         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9238         // until we learned about an additional block.
9239         //
9240         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9241         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9242         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9243         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9244         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9245         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9246         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9247
9248         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9249         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9250         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9251         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9252         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9253
9254         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9255         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9256         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9257         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9258         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9259         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9260
9261         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9262         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9263                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9264         }
9265         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9266                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9267         if test_height_before_timelock {
9268                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9269                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9270                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9271                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9272         } else {
9273                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9274                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9275                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9276                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9277                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9278                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9279                 // timelock is up).
9280                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9281                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9282
9283                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9284                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9285                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9286                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9287                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9288                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9289                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9290
9291                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9292                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9293                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9294                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9295                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9296                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9297                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9298                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9299                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9300         }
9301 }
9302
9303 #[test]
9304 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9305         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9306         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9307 }
9308
9309 #[test]
9310 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9311         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9312         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9313         // HTLCs.
9314         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9315
9316         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9317         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9318         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9319         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9320         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9321         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9322         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9323         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9324         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9325
9326         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9327         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9328         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9329         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9330
9331         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9332         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9333         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9334         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9335         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9336
9337         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9338
9339         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9340         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9341         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9342         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9343
9344         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9345         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9346         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9347         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9348         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9349
9350         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9351         // generated
9352         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9353
9354         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9355         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9356         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9357
9358         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9359         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9360         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9361         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9362         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9363
9364         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9365         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9366         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9367         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9368
9369         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9370         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9371                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9372         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9373         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9374         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9375                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9376         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9377
9378         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9379         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9380                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9381                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9382                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9383                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9384                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9385                         keys_manager,
9386                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9387                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9388                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9389                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9390                         channel_monitors,
9391                 }).unwrap()
9392         };
9393         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9394         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9395
9396         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9397         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9398         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9399         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9400
9401         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9402         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9403         // the commitment state.
9404         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9405
9406         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9407
9408         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9409         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9410         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9411
9412         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9413         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9414         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9415         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9416         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9417         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9418         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9419
9420         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9421         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9422 }
9423
9424 #[test]
9425 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9426         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9427         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9428         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9429         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9430         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9431         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9432         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9433         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9434
9435         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9436
9437         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9438                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9439         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9440         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9441         let route = get_route(
9442                 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
9443                 Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9444                 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9445
9446         let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9447
9448         {
9449                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9450                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9451                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9452                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9453                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9454                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9455                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9456         }
9457         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9458         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9459
9460         {
9461                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9462                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9463                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9464                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9465                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9466                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9467                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9468                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9469                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9470                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9471                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9472         }
9473
9474         // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9475         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9476         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9477         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9478
9479         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9480         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9481
9482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9483         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9484         assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9485
9486         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9487         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9488         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9489
9490         let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9491         assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9492         if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9493         if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9494 }
9495
9496 #[test]
9497 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9498         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9499         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9500         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9501         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9502
9503         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9504         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9505         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9506         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9507         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9508                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9509                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9510                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9511         };
9512         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9513         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9514         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9515
9516         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9517         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9518         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9519         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9520         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9521         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9522         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9523         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9524         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9525 }
9526
9527 #[test]
9528 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9529         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9530         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9531         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9532         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9533
9534         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9535         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9536         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9537         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9538
9539         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9540         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9541                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9542                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9543                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9544         };
9545         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9546         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9547         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9548         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9549         let route = find_route(
9550                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9551                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9552         ).unwrap();
9553
9554         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9555         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9556         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9557         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9558         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9559         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9560         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9561         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9562         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9563 }
9564
9565 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9566 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9567 enum ExposureEvent {
9568         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9569         AtHTLCForward,
9570         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9571         AtHTLCReception,
9572         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9573         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9574 }
9575
9576 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9577         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9578         // policy.
9579         //
9580         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9581         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9582         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9583         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9584         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9585         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9586         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9587         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9588
9589         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9590         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9591         config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9592         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9593         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9594         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9595
9596         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9597         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9598         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9599         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9600         if on_holder_tx {
9601                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9602         }
9603         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9604         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9605         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9606
9607         let opt_anchors = false;
9608
9609         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9610
9611         if on_holder_tx {
9612                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9613                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9614                 }
9615         }
9616
9617         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9618         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9619         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9620
9621         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9623
9624         let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9625         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9626         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9627
9628         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9629                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9630                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9631                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9632         };
9633         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9634         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9635
9636         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9637         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9638
9639         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9640         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9641
9642         if on_holder_tx {
9643                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9644                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9645                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9646                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9647                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9648                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9649                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9650                         }
9651                 } else {
9652                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9653                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9654                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9655                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9656                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9657                         }
9658                 }
9659         } else {
9660                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9661                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9662                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9663                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9664                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9665                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9666                         }
9667                 } else {
9668                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9669                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9670                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9671                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9672                         }
9673                 }
9674         }
9675
9676         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9677         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9678                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9679                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9680                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9681                 if on_holder_tx {
9682                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9683                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9684                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9685                 } else {
9686                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9687                 }
9688         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9689                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9690                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9691                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9692                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9693                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9694                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9695                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9696                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9697                 if on_holder_tx {
9698                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9699                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9700                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9701                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9702                 } else {
9703                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9704                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9705                 }
9706         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9707                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9708                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9709                 {
9710                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9711                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9712                 }
9713                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9714                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9715                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9716         }
9717
9718         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9719         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9720         added_monitors.clear();
9721 }
9722
9723 #[test]
9724 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9725         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9726         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9727         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9728         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9729         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9730         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9731         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9732         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9733         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9734         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9735         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9736         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9737 }