_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use chain;
  15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use chain::channelmonitor;
  17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
  20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  25 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  26 use routing::network_graph::{NetworkUpdate, RoutingFees};
  27 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  29 use ln::msgs;
  30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
  34 use util::errors::APIError;
  35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  36 use util::config::UserConfig;
  37
  38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  44
  45 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  46 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  47
  48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  50
  51 use regex;
  52
  53 use io;
  54 use prelude::*;
  55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  56 use core::default::Default;
  57 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  58
  59 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  60 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  61
  62 #[test]
  63 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  64         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  65         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  66         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  67         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  68         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  69
  70         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  71         // funding satoshis
  72         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  73         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
  74         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  75
  76         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  77         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  78
  79         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  80         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  81
  82         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  83         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  84         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  85                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  86                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  87                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  88                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  89                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  90                         match action {
  91                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  92                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  93                                 },
  94                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
  95                         }
  96                 } else { assert!(false); }
  97         };
  98
  99         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
 100         use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 101
 102         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 103         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
 104
 105         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 106
 107         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 108
 109         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 110
 111         insane_open_helper(r"Bogus; channel reserve \(\d+\) is less than dust limit \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis + 1; msg });
 112
 113         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 114
 115         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 116
 117         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 118
 119         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 120 }
 121
 122 #[test]
 123 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 124         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 125         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 126         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 127         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 128         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 129
 130         // balancing
 131         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 132
 133         // A                                        B
 134         // update_fee                            ->
 135         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 136         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 137         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 138         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 139         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 140         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 141         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 142         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 143         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 144         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 145         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 146         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 147         //                                       <- RAA
 148         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 149
 150         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 151         {
 152                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 153                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 154         }
 155         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 157
 158         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 159         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 160         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 161                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 162                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 163                 },
 164                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 165         };
 166
 167         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 168
 169         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 170         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 171         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 173
 174         let payment_event = {
 175                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 176                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 177                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 178         };
 179         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 180         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 181
 182         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 183         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 184         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 185         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 186         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 188
 189         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 190         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 191         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 192         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 193         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 194
 195         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 196         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 197         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 198         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 199         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 200         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 201         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 202         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 203
 204         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 205         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 206         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 207         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 208         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 209         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 210         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 211         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 212
 213         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 214         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 215         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 217
 218         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 219         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 221
 222         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 223         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 224
 225         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 226         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 227         match events_2[0] {
 228                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 229                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 230         }
 231
 232         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 233         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 234 }
 235
 236 #[test]
 237 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 238         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 239         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 240         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 241         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 242         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 243         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 244         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 245
 246         // balancing
 247         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 248
 249         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 250         {
 251                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 252                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 253         }
 254         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 255         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 256
 257         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 258         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 259         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 260                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 261                         update_fee.as_ref()
 262                 },
 263                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 264         };
 265
 266         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 267
 268         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 269         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 270         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 271         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 272
 273         let payment_event = {
 274                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 275                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 276                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 277         };
 278         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 279         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 280
 281         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 282         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 283         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 284         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 285         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 286         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 287
 288         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 290
 291         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 292 }
 293
 294 #[test]
 295 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 296         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 297         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 298         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 299         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 300         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 301
 302         // A                                        B
 303         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 304         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 305         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 306         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 307         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 308         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 309         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 310         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 311         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 312         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 313         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 314         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 315         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 316         //                                          B should send no response here
 317         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 318         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 319         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 320
 321         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 322         let initial_feerate;
 323         {
 324                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 325                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 326                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 327         }
 328         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 329         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 330
 331         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 332         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 333         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 334                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 335                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 336                 },
 337                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 338         };
 339
 340         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 341         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 342         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 343         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 344         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 345
 346         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 347         // transaction:
 348         {
 349                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 350                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 351         }
 352         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 353         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 354         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 355
 356         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 357         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 358                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 359                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 360         };
 361
 362         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 363
 364         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 365         // Deliver (3)
 366         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 367
 368         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 369         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 370         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 372         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 373         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 374         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 375         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 376         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 377         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 378         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 379
 380         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 381         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 382         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 383         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 384         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 385
 386         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 387         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 388         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 389
 390         // Delever (4)
 391         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 392         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 393         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 394
 395         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 396         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 397         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 398
 399         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 400         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 401         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 402         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 403
 404         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 405         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 406         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 407 }
 408
 409 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
 410         // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
 411         // tests that we properly send one in that case.
 412         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
 413         alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 414         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 415         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 416         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
 417         bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 418         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 419         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 420         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 421         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 422         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
 423         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 424         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
 425
 426         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 427         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
 428         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
 429
 430         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
 431         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 432         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
 433
 434         for node in nodes {
 435                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
 436                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
 437                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
 438         }
 439 }
 440 #[test]
 441 fn test_1_conf_open() {
 442         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
 443         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
 444         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
 445 }
 446
 447 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 448         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 449         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 450         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 451         // Node objects.
 452
 453         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 454         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 455         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 456         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 457
 458         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 459                 let block = Block {
 460                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 461                         txdata: vec![],
 462                 };
 463                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 464                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 465         }
 466
 467         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 468         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 469         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 470
 471         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 472         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
 473         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 474
 475         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 476         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
 477
 478         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
 479
 480         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 481         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
 482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 483         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 484
 485         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 486         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 487         {
 488                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 489                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 490                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 491                 added_monitors.clear();
 492         }
 493         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 494
 495         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 496         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 497         {
 498                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 499                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 500                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 501                 added_monitors.clear();
 502         }
 503
 504         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 505         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 506
 507         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 508         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 509
 510         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 511         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 512         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 513         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 514 }
 515
 516 #[test]
 517 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 518         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 519         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 520         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 521         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 522         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 523         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 524         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 525         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 526         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 527         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 528         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 529         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 530         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 531         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 532         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 533         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 534         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 535         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 536 }
 537
 538 #[test]
 539 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 540         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 541         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 542         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 543         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 544         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 545
 546         {
 547                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 548                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 549         }
 550         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 551         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 552
 553         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 554         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 555         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 556                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 557                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 558                 },
 559                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 560         };
 561         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 562
 563         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 564         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 565         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 566
 567         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 568         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 569         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 570
 571         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 572         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 573         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 574         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 575
 576         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 577         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 578         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 579 }
 580
 581 #[test]
 582 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 583         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 584         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 585         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 586         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 587         let channel_value = 5000;
 588         let push_sats = 700;
 589         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 590         let channel_id = chan.2;
 591         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 592         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
 593
 594         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 595         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 596         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 597         // remote limit.
 598         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 599         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) as u32;
 600         {
 601                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 602                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 603         }
 604         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 605         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 606         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 607
 608         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 609
 610         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 611
 612         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 613         {
 614                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 615
 616                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 617                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 618                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0) / 1000;
 619                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 620                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 621                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 622         }
 623
 624         {
 625                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 626                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 627                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 628         }
 629         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 630         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 631         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 632
 633         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 634
 635         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 636         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 637         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 638                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 639                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 640                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 641                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 642                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 643                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 644         };
 645         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 646                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 647                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 648                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 649                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 650                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 651                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 652                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 653         };
 654
 655         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 656         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 657                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 658
 659         let res = {
 660                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 661                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 662                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 663                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 664                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 665                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 666                         push_sats,
 667                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0) / 1000,
 668                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
 669                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 670                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 671                         &mut htlcs,
 672                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 673                 );
 674                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 675         };
 676
 677         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 678                 channel_id: chan.2,
 679                 signature: res.0,
 680                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 681         };
 682
 683         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 684                 channel_id: chan.2,
 685                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 686         };
 687
 688         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 689
 690         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 691         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 692         //Should produce and error.
 693         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 694         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 695         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 696         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 697         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 698 }
 699
 700 #[test]
 701 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 702         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 703         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 704         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 705         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 706         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 707
 708         // balancing
 709         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 710
 711         {
 712                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 713                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 714         }
 715         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 716         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 717
 718         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 719         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 720         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 721                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 722                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 723                 },
 724                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 725         };
 726         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 727         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 728         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 729         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 730
 731         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 732
 733         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 734         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 735         {
 736                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 737                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 738                 added_monitors.clear();
 739         }
 740         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 741         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 742         // node[1] has nothing to do
 743
 744         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 745         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 746         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 747
 748         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 749         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 750         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 751         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 752         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 753         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 754         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 755
 756         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 757         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 758         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 759         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 760         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 761         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 762
 763         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 764         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 765         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 766         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 767
 768         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 769         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 770         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 771
 772         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 773         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 774         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 775         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 776
 777         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 778         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 779         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 780
 781         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 782
 783         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 784         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 785         match events[0] {
 786                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 787                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 788         };
 789
 790         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 791
 792         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 793         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 794         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 795         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 796         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 797 }
 798
 799 #[test]
 800 fn test_update_fee() {
 801         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 802         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 803         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 804         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 805         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 806         let channel_id = chan.2;
 807
 808         // A                                        B
 809         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 810         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 811         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 812         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 813         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 814         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 815         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 816         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 817         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 818         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 819         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 820         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 821
 822         // Create and deliver (1)...
 823         let feerate;
 824         {
 825                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 826                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 827                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 828         }
 829         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 830         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 831
 832         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 833         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 834         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 835                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 836                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 837                 },
 838                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 839         };
 840         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 841
 842         // Generate (2) and (3):
 843         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 844         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 845         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 846
 847         // Deliver (2):
 848         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 849         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 850         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 851
 852         // Create and deliver (4)...
 853         {
 854                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 855                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 856         }
 857         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 858         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 859         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 860         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 861         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 862                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 863                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 864                 },
 865                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 866         };
 867
 868         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 869         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 870         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 871         // ... creating (5)
 872         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 873         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 874
 875         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 876         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 877         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 878         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 879         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 880
 881         // Deliver (5):
 882         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 883         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 884         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 885
 886         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 887         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 888         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 889         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 890         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 891         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 892         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 893         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 894         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 895
 896         // Deliver (7)
 897         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 898         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 899         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 900         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 901
 902         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 903         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 904         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 905
 906         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 907         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 908         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 909         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 910         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 911 }
 912
 913 #[test]
 914 fn fake_network_test() {
 915         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 916         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 917         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 918         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 919         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 920         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 921
 922         // Create some initial channels
 923         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 924         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 925         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 926
 927         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 928         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 929         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 930         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 931         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 932
 933         // Send some more payments
 934         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 935         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 936         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 937
 938         // Test failure packets
 939         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 940         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 941
 942         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 943         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 944
 945         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 946         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 947         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 948         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 949         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 950         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 951         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 952
 953         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
 954         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
 955         hops.push(RouteHop {
 956                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
 957                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 958                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 959                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 960                 fee_msat: 0,
 961                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 962         });
 963         hops.push(RouteHop {
 964                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
 965                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 966                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 967                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 968                 fee_msat: 0,
 969                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 970         });
 971         hops.push(RouteHop {
 972                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
 973                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
 974                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 975                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
 976                 fee_msat: 1000000,
 977                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
 978         });
 979         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
 980         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
 981         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
 982
 983         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
 984         hops.push(RouteHop {
 985                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
 986                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 987                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 988                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 989                 fee_msat: 0,
 990                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 991         });
 992         hops.push(RouteHop {
 993                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
 994                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 995                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 996                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 997                 fee_msat: 0,
 998                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 999         });
1000         hops.push(RouteHop {
1001                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1002                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1003                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1004                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1005                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1006                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1007         });
1008         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1009         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1010         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1011
1012         // Claim the rebalances...
1013         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1014         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1015
1016         // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1017         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1018
1019         // Send some payments across both channels
1020         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1021         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1022         let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1023
1024
1025         route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1026         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1027         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1028         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1029
1030         //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1031
1032         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1033         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1034         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1035
1036         // Close down the channels...
1037         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1038         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1039         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1040         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1041         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1042         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1043         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1044         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1045         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1046         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1047         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1048         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1049         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1050         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1051         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1052 }
1053
1054 #[test]
1055 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1056         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1057         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1058         // commitment dance rounds.
1059         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1060         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1061         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1062         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1063         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1064         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1065
1066         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1067         for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1068                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1069                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1070                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1071         }
1072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1073
1074         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1075         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1076         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1077         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1078
1079         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1080         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1081         // another HTLC.
1082         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1083         {
1084                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1085                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1086                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1087                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1088         }
1089
1090         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1091         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1092         {
1093                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1094                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1095         }
1096
1097         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1098         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1099         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1100         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1101
1102         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1103         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1104         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1105         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1106         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1107         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1108         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1109
1110         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1111         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1112         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1113
1114         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1115
1116         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1117         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1118         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1119         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1120
1121         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1122         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1123         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1124         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1125
1126         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1127         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1128         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1129
1130         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1131                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1132         }
1133         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1134         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1135         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1136         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1137         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1138
1139         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1141         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1142         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1143         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1144
1145         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1146         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1147
1148         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1149
1150         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1151         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1152         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1153                 match event {
1154                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1155                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1156                         },
1157                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1158                 };
1159         }
1160
1161         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1162                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1163         }
1164
1165         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1166 }
1167
1168 #[test]
1169 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1170         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1171         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1172         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1173         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1174         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1175         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1176
1177         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1178         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1179         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1180         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1181         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1182         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1183
1184         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1185
1186         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1187         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1188
1189         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1190         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1191
1192         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1193         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1194         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1195 }
1196
1197 #[test]
1198 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1199         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1200         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1201         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1202         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1203         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1204         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1205         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1206
1207         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1208
1209         // balancing
1210         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1211
1212         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1213
1214         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1215         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1216         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1217
1218         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1219         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1221
1222         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1223         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1224
1225         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1226         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1227         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1228                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1229                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1230                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1231                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1232                 }
1233         }
1234         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1235
1236         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1237         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1238         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1239         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1240
1241         // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1242         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1243         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1244         assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1245         assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1246         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1247         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1248         check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1249
1250         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1251         assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1252         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1253
1254         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1255         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1256         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1257         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1258         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1259         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1260         check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1261         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1262
1263         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1264         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1265         for e in events {
1266                 match e {
1267                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1268                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1269                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1270                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1271                         },
1272                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1273                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1274                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1275                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1276                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1277                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1278                         },
1279                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1280                 }
1281         }
1282 }
1283
1284 #[test]
1285 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1286         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1287         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1288         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1289         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1290         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1291
1292         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1293         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1294
1295         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1296         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1297         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1298         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1299         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1300         match err {
1301                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1302                         match &fails[0] {
1303                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1304                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1305                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1306                         }
1307                 },
1308                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1309         }
1310         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1311         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1312
1313         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1314 }
1315
1316 #[test]
1317 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1318         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1319         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1320         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1321         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1322         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1323
1324         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1325         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1326         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1327         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1328
1329         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1330
1331         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1332         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1333         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1334         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1335                 channel_id: chan.2,
1336                 htlc_id: 0,
1337                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1338                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1339                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1340                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1341         };
1342
1343         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1344
1345         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1346         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1347         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1348
1349         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1350
1351         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1352
1353         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1354         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1355         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1356                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1357                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1358                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1359                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1360                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1361
1362                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1363                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1364                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1365                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1366                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1367         };
1368         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1369                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1370                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1371                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1372                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1373                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1374                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1375                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1376         };
1377
1378         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1379         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1380                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1381
1382         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1383         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1384         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1385
1386         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1387                 offered: false,
1388                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1389                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1390                 payment_hash,
1391                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1392         };
1393
1394         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1395
1396         let res = {
1397                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1398                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1399                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1400                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1401                         commitment_number,
1402                         95000,
1403                         local_chan_balance,
1404                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1405                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1406                         feerate_per_kw,
1407                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1408                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1409                 );
1410                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1411         };
1412
1413         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1414                 channel_id: chan.2,
1415                 signature: res.0,
1416                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1417         };
1418
1419         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1420         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1421         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1422
1423         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1424         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1425                 channel_id: chan.2,
1426                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1427                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1428         };
1429         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1430
1431         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1432         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1433         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1434         match events[0] {
1435                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1436                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1437                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1438                 },
1439                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1440         };
1441         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1442                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1443
1444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1445 }
1446
1447 #[test]
1448 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1449         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1450         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1451         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1452         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1453         // this situation.
1454         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1455         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1456         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1457         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1458
1459         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1460         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1461         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1462
1463         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1464
1465         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1466         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1467                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1468         }
1469
1470         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1471         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1472         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1473                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1474         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1475         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1476 }
1477
1478 #[test]
1479 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1480         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1481         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1482         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1483         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1484         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1485
1486         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1487         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1488         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1489         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1490         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1491         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1492         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1493
1494         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1495         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1496                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1497         }
1498
1499         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1500         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1501         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1502         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1503         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1504         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1505         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1506         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1507         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1508                 channel_id: chan.2,
1509                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1510                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1511                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1512                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1513                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1514         };
1515
1516         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1517         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1518         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1519         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1520         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1521         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1522         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1523         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1524 }
1525
1526 #[test]
1527 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1528         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1529         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1530         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1531         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1532
1533         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1534         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1535         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1536
1537         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1538         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1539         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1540         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1541         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1542         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1543         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1544
1545         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1546                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1547         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1548         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1549         // commitment transaction fee.
1550         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1551
1552         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1553         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1554                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1555         }
1556
1557         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1558         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1559         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1560                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1561 }
1562
1563 #[test]
1564 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1565         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1566         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1567         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1568         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1569         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1570         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1571         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1572
1573         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1574         // HTLC.
1575         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1576         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1577         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1578                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1579
1580         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1581         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1582         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1583         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1584         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1585         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1586         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1587
1588         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1589         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1590         match msg_events[0] {
1591                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1592                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1593                 },
1594                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1595         }
1596 }
1597
1598 #[test]
1599 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1600         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1601         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1602         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1603         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1604         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1605         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1606         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1607
1608         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1609         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1610         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1611         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1612         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1613         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1614
1615         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1616         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1617         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1618         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1619         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1620         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1621
1622         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1623         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1624         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1625         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1626 }
1627
1628 #[test]
1629 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1630         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1631         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1632         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1633         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1634         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1635         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1636
1637         let feemsat = 239;
1638         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1639         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1640         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1641
1642         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1643         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1644         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1645         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1646
1647         // Add a pending HTLC.
1648         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1649         let payment_event_1 = {
1650                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1651                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1652
1653                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1654                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1655                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1656         };
1657         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1658
1659         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1660         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1661         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1662         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1663         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1664
1665         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1666         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1667         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1668         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1669         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1670         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1671         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1672         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1673                 channel_id: chan.2,
1674                 htlc_id: 1,
1675                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1676                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1677                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1678                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1679         };
1680
1681         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1682         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1683         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1684         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1685         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1686         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1687         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1688         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1689 }
1690
1691 #[test]
1692 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1693         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1694         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1695         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1696         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1697         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1698         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1699         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1700         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1701         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1702
1703         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1704         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1705         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1706
1707         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1708         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1709 }
1710
1711 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1712         (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1713 }
1714
1715 #[test]
1716 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1717         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1718         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1719         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1720         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1721         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1722         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1723         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1724         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1725         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1726         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1727
1728         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1729         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1730
1731         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1732         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1733
1734         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1735                 ($node: expr) => {{
1736                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1737                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1738                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1739                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1740                         payment_event
1741                 }}
1742         }
1743
1744         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1745         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1746         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1747
1748         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1749
1750         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1751         {
1752                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1753                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1754                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1755                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1756                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1757                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1758                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1759         }
1760
1761         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1762         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1763         loop {
1764                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1765                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1766                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1767                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1768                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1769                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1770                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1771                         break;
1772                 }
1773                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1774
1775                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1776                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1777                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1778                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1779                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1780                 );
1781
1782                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1783                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1784                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1785                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1786                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1787         }
1788
1789         // adding pending output.
1790         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1791         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1792         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1793         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1794         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1795         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1796         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1797         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1798         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1799         // policy.
1800         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1801         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1802         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1803
1804         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1805         let payment_event_1 = {
1806                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1807                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1808
1809                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1810                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1811                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1812         };
1813         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1814
1815         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1816         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1817         {
1818                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1819                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1820                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1821                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1822         }
1823
1824         // split the rest to test holding cell
1825         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1826         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1827         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1828         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1829         {
1830                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1831                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1832         }
1833
1834         // now see if they go through on both sides
1835         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1836         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1837         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1838         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1839         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1840         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1841
1842         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1843         {
1844                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1845                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1846                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1847                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1848                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1849         }
1850
1851         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1852         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1853         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1854         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1855         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1856         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1857
1858         // flush the pending htlc
1859         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1860         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1861         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1862
1863         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1864         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1865         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1866         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1867
1868         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1869         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1870         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1871         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1872
1873         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1874         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1875         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1876
1877         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1878
1879         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1880         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1881         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1882
1883         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1884         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1885
1886         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1887         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1888         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1889         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1890         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1891         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1892
1893         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1894         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1895         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1896         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1897
1898         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1899         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1900
1901         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1902         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1903         match events[0] {
1904                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1905                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1906                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1907                         match &purpose {
1908                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1909                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1910                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1911                                 },
1912                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1913                         }
1914                 },
1915                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1916         }
1917         match events[1] {
1918                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1919                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1920                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1921                         match &purpose {
1922                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1923                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1924                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1925                                 },
1926                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1927                         }
1928                 },
1929                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1930         }
1931
1932         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1933         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1934         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1935
1936         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1937         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1938         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1939
1940         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
1941         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1942         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1943         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1944         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1945
1946         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1947         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
1948 }
1949
1950 #[test]
1951 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
1952         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
1953         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
1954         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
1955         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
1956         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
1957         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
1958         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
1959         // To test this we:
1960         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
1961         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
1962         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
1963         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
1964         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
1965         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
1966         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
1967         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
1968         //    claim,
1969         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
1970         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
1971         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
1972         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
1973         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
1974         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1975         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1976         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1977         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1978         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1979
1980         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1981         // Route the first two HTLCs.
1982         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
1983         let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
1984
1985         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
1986         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
1987         let send_1 = {
1988                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
1989                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1990                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1991                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1992                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1993         };
1994
1995         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
1996         // initial fulfill/CS.
1997         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
1998         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1999         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2000
2001         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2002         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2003         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2004         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2005         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2006
2007         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2008         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2009         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2010         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2011         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2012
2013         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2014         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2015         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2016         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2017         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2018
2019         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2020         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2021         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2022
2023         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2024         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2025         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2026
2027         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2028         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2029         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2030
2031         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2032         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2033         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2034         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2035         // on-chain as necessary).
2036         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2037         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2038         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2039         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2040         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2041
2042         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2043         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2044         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2045
2046         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2047         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2048
2049         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2050         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2051         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2052         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2053         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2054         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2055
2056         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2057         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2058         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2059         let send_2 = {
2060                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2061                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2062                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2063                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2064                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2065         };
2066
2067         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2068         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2069         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2070         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2071
2072         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2073
2074         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2075         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2076         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2077
2078         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2079         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2080
2081         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2083         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2084         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2085
2086         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2087         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2088         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2089
2090         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2091         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2092
2093         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2094         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2095
2096         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2097         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2098 }
2099
2100 #[test]
2101 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2102         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2103         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2104         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2105         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2106         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2107         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2108
2109         // Create some initial channels
2110         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2111         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2112         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2113         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2114
2115         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2116         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2117         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2118         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2119         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2120         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2121
2122         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2123         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2124         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2125         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2126         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2127
2128         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2129         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2130         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2131         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2132         {
2133                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2134                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2135                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2136                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2137                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2138         }
2139         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2140         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2141         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2142         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2143         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2144
2145         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2146         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2147
2148         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2149         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2150         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2151         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2152         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2153         {
2154                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2155                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2156                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2157                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2158                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2159                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2160         }
2161         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2162         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2163         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2164         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2165         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2166
2167         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2168                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2169                         {
2170                                 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2171                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2172
2173                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2174                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2175                                 match events[0] {
2176                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2177                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2178                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2179                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2180                                         },
2181                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2182                                 };
2183                         }
2184                 }
2185         }
2186
2187         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2188         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2189         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2190         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2191         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2192         let node2_commitment_txid;
2193         {
2194                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2195                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2196                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2197                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2198
2199                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2200                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2201                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2202                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2203                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2204         }
2205         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2206         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2207         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2208         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2209         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2210
2211         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2212         // confusing us in the following tests.
2213         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2214
2215         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2216         let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2217         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2218         // buffer space).
2219
2220         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2221                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2222                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2223                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2224                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2225                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2226                                 msg.clone()
2227                         },
2228                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2229                 };
2230                 match events[1] {
2231                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2232                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2233                         },
2234                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2235                 }
2236                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2237
2238                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2239                 {
2240                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2241                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2242                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2243                                         false
2244                                 } else { true }
2245                         });
2246                 }
2247
2248                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2249
2250                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2251                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2252
2253                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2254                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2255                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2256                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2257                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2258                                 msg.clone()
2259                         },
2260                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2261                 };
2262                 match events[1] {
2263                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2264                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2265                         },
2266                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2267                 }
2268                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2269                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2270
2271                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2272                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2273                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2274         };
2275         nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2276         nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2277         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2278         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2279
2280         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2281         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2282         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2283 }
2284
2285 #[test]
2286 fn test_justice_tx() {
2287         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2288         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2289         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2290         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2291         alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2292         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2293         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2294         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2295         bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2296         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2297         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2298         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2299         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2300         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2301         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2302         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2303         // Create some new channels:
2304         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2305
2306         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2307         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2308         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2309         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2310         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2311         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2312         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2313         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2314         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2315         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2316         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2317         // Revoke the old state
2318         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2319
2320         {
2321                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2322                 {
2323                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2324                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2325                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2326
2327                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2328                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2329                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2330                 }
2331                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2332                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2333                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2334
2335                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2336                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2337                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2338                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2339                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2340                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2341                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2342                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2343                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2344         }
2345         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2346
2347         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2348         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2349
2350         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2351         // Create some new channels:
2352         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2353         {
2354                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2355                 node_txn.clear();
2356         }
2357
2358         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2359         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2360         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2361         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2362         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2363         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2364         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2365         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2366         // Revoke the old state
2367         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2368         {
2369                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2370                 {
2371                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2372                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2373                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2374
2375                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2376                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2377                 }
2378                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2379                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2380
2381                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2382                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2383                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2384                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2385                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2386                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2387                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2388         }
2389         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2390         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2391         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2392 }
2393
2394 #[test]
2395 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2396         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2397         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2398         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2399         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2400         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2401         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2402         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2403         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2404         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2405         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2406         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2407         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2408         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2409         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2410
2411         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2412         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2413         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2414         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2415         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2416         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2417
2418         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2419         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2420
2421         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2422         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2423         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2424         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2425         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2426 }
2427
2428 #[test]
2429 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2430         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2431         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2432         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2433         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2434         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2435         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2436
2437         // Create some new channel:
2438         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2439
2440         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2441         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2442         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2443         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2444         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2445
2446         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2447         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2448         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2449         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2450         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2451         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2452         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2453         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2454         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2455
2456         //Revoke the old state
2457         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2458
2459         {
2460                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2461                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2462                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2463                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2464                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2465                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2466                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2467                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2468
2469                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2470                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2471
2472                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2473                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2474
2475                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2476                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2477                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2478                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2479                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2480                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2481                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2482                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2483
2484                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2485                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2486                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2487         }
2488         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2489         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2490         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2491 }
2492
2493 #[test]
2494 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2495         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2496         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2497         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2498         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2499         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2500         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2501
2502         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2503
2504         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2505         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2506         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2507         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2508         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2509         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2510
2511         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2512         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2513
2514         //Revoke the old state
2515         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2516
2517         {
2518                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2519                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2520                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2521                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2522                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2523                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2524                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2525                 match events[1] {
2526                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2527                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2528                 }
2529
2530                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2531                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2532
2533                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2534                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2535                 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2536                 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2537                 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2538                 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2539
2540                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2541                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2542                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2543                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2544                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2545                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2546                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2547
2548                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2549                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2550                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2551                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2552
2553                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2554                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2555                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2556
2557                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2558                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2559                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2560                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2561                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2562                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2563                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2564                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2565         }
2566         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2567         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2568         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2569 }
2570
2571 #[test]
2572 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2573         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2574         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2575         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2576         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2577         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2578         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2579         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2580         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2581         // towards B.
2582         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2583         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2584         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2585         // PaymentSent event).
2586
2587         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2588         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2589         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2590         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2591
2592         // Create some initial channels
2593         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2594         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2595
2596         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2597         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2598         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2599         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2600         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2601
2602         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2603         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2604         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2605
2606         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2607         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2608
2609         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2610         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2611         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2612         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2613         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2614         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2615         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2616         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2617         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2618         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2619         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2620         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2621         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2622
2623         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2624         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2625         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2626         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2627         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2628         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2629         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2630         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2631         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2632         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2633         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2634         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2635         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2636         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2637         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2638         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2639         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2640
2641         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2642         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2643         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2644         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2645         {
2646                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2647                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2648                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2649                 added_monitors.clear();
2650         }
2651         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2652         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2653         match forwarded_events[0] {
2654                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2655                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2656         }
2657         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2658                 } else { panic!(); }
2659         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2660                 } else { panic!(); }
2661         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2662         {
2663                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2664                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2665                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2666                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2667                 added_monitors.clear();
2668         }
2669         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2670         match events[0] {
2671                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2672                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2673         }
2674         match events[1] {
2675                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2676                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2677         }
2678
2679         match events[2] {
2680                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2681                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2682                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2683                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2684                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2685                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2686                 },
2687                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2688         };
2689         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2690                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2691                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2692                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2693                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2694                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2695                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2696                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2697                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2698                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2699                         if $htlc_offered {
2700                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2701                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2702                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2703                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2704                         } else {
2705                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2706                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2707                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2708                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2709                         }
2710                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2711                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2712                         node_txn.clear();
2713                 } }
2714         }
2715         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2716         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2717         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2718         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2719
2720         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2721         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2722         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2723         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2724         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2725         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2726         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2727         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2728         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2729         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2730         let commitment_spend =
2731                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2732                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2733                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2734                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2735                         &node_txn[0]
2736                 } else {
2737                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2738                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2739                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2740                         &node_txn[2]
2741                 };
2742
2743         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2744         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2745         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2746         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2747         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2748         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2749         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2750         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2751         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2752         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2753         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2754         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2755
2756         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2757         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2758         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2759         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2760         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2761         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2762         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2763         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2764         let mut first_claimed = false;
2765         for event in events {
2766                 match event {
2767                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2768                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2769                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2770                                         first_claimed = true;
2771                                 } else {
2772                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2773                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2774                                 }
2775                         },
2776                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2777                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2778                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2779                 }
2780         }
2781         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2782 }
2783
2784 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2785         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2786         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2787         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2788         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2789         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2790         //            \                                  \
2791         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2792
2793         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2794         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2795         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2796         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2797         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2798         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2799         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2800
2801         // Create some intial channels
2802         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2803         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2804
2805         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2806         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2807         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2808
2809         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2810
2811         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2812         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2813         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2814         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2815         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2816         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2817         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2818
2819         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2820         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2821         match events[0] {
2822                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2823                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2824                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2825                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2826                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2827                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2828                 },
2829                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2830         };
2831         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2832         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2833         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2834         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2835         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2836         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2837         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2838         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2839
2840         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2841         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2842         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2843         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2844         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2845         let timeout_tx;
2846         {
2847                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2848                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2849                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2850                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2851
2852                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2853                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2854
2855                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2856                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2857                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2858                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2859
2860                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2861                 node_txn.clear();
2862         }
2863
2864         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2865         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2866         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2867         {
2868                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2869                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2870                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2871                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2872         }
2873
2874         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2875         {
2876                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2877                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2878                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2879                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2880                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2881                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2882                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2883                 } else {
2884                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2885                 }
2886         }
2887
2888         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2889         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2890         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2891         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2892         match events[0] {
2893                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2894                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2895                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2896                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2897                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2898                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2899                 },
2900                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2901         };
2902
2903         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2904         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2905         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2906
2907         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2908         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2909
2910         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2911         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2912         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2913         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2914         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2915         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2916         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2917         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2918         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2919 }
2920
2921 #[test]
2922 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2923         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2924         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2925         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2926 }
2927
2928 #[test]
2929 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2930         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2931         // and fail backward accordingly.
2932
2933         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2934         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2935         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2936         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2937
2938         // Create some initial channels
2939         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2940         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2941
2942         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2943         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2944         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2945         // Revoke the old state
2946         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2947
2948         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2949
2950         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2951         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2952         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2953         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2954         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2955
2956         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2957         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2958         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2959         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2960         match events[0] {
2961                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
2962                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2963                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2964                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2965                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2966                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2967
2968                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2969                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
2970                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
2971                 },
2972                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2973         }
2974 }
2975
2976 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
2977         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
2978         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
2979         // commitment transaction anymore.
2980         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
2981         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
2982         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
2983         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
2984         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
2985         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
2986         // transactions:
2987         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
2988         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
2989         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
2990         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
2991         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
2992         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2993         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2994         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2995         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2996
2997         // Create some initial channels
2998         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2999         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3000
3001         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3002         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3003         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3004         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3005         // Revoke the old state
3006         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3007
3008         let value = if use_dust {
3009                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3010                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3011                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3012         } else { 3000000 };
3013
3014         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3015         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3016         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3017
3018         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3019         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3020         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3021         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3022         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3023         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3024         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3025         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3026         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3027         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3028         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3029         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3030
3031         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3032         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3033         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3034         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3035         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3036         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3037         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3038         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3039         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3040         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3041         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3042         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3043         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3044         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3045         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3046         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3047
3048         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3049         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3050         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3051         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3052         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3053         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3054         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3055         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3056         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3057         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3058         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3059         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3060         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3061         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3062         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3063         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3064         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3065         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3066
3067         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3068         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3069         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3070         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3071         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3072         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3074
3075         if deliver_bs_raa {
3076                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3077                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3078                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3079                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3080                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3081                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3082                 match events[0] {
3083                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3084                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3085                 };
3086                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3087                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3088         }
3089
3090         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3091         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3092
3093         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3094         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3095         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3096
3097         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3098         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
3099         match events[0] {
3100                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3101                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3102         }
3103         match events[1] {
3104                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3105                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3106                 },
3107                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3108         }
3109         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3110                 match events[2] {
3111                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3112                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3113                 };
3114         }
3115         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3116         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3117
3118         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3119         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3120         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3121                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3122                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3123         }
3124         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3125                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3126                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3127                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3128                 },
3129                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3130         }
3131         if deliver_bs_raa {
3132                 match events[0] {
3133                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3134                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3135                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3136                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3137                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3138                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3139                         },
3140                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3141                 }
3142         }
3143         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3144                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3145                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3146                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3147                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3148                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3149                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3150
3151                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3152                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3153                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3154
3155                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3156
3157                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3158                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3159                         match events[0] {
3160                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3161                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3162                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3163                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3164                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3165                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3166                                         }
3167                                 },
3168                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3169                         }
3170                         match events[1] {
3171                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3172                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3173                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3174                                 },
3175                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3176                         }
3177                         match events[2] {
3178                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3179                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3180                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3181                                 },
3182                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3183                         }
3184                 },
3185                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3186         }
3187
3188         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3189         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3190         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3191 }
3192
3193 #[test]
3194 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3195         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3196         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3197         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3198         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3199 }
3200
3201 #[test]
3202 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3203         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3204         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3205         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3206         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3207 }
3208
3209 #[test]
3210 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3211         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3212         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3213         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3214         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3215         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3216
3217         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3218         {
3219                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3220                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3221                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3222
3223                 let payment_event = {
3224                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3225                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3226                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3227                 };
3228                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3229                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3230         }
3231
3232         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3233         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3234         {
3235                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3236                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3237
3238                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3239         }
3240
3241         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3242         {
3243                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3244
3245                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3246                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3247                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3248                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3249                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3250                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3251
3252                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3253                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3254                         channel_id: chan.2,
3255                         htlc_id: 0,
3256                         amount_msat: 0,
3257                         payment_hash,
3258                         cltv_expiry,
3259                         onion_routing_packet,
3260                 };
3261                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3262         }
3263         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3264         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3265         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3266         match events[0] {
3267                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3268                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3269                 },
3270                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3271         }
3272         match events[1] {
3273                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3274                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3275                 },
3276                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3277         }
3278         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3279         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3280 }
3281
3282 #[test]
3283 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3284         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3285         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3286         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3287         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3288         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3289         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3290         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3291
3292         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3293         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3294         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3295         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3296         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3297         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3298
3299         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3300         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3301         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3302
3303         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3304         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3305         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3306         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3307         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3308
3309         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3310         // registering new transactions
3311         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3312         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3313 }
3314
3315 #[test]
3316 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3317         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3318         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3319         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3320         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3321         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3322         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3323         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3324
3325         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3326
3327         let mut payment_event = {
3328                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3329                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3330
3331                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3332                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3333                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3334         };
3335
3336         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3337         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3338
3339         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3340
3341         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3342         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3343         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3344         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3345
3346         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3347         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3348         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3349         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3350         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3351
3352         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3353         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3354         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3355
3356         nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3357         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3358         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3359         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3360         let tx = {
3361                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3362                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3363                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3364                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3365                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3366                 node_txn.remove(0)
3367         };
3368
3369         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3370
3371         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3372         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3373         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3374         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3375
3376         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3377         {
3378                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3379                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3380         }
3381         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3382         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3383         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3384         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3385         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3386         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3387         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3388
3389         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3390 }
3391
3392 #[test]
3393 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3394         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3395         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3396         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3397         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3398
3399         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3400         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3401         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3402         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3403         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3404
3405         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3406
3407         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3408         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3409         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3410         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3411         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3412
3413         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3414         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3415
3416         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3417         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3418 }
3419
3420 #[test]
3421 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3422         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3423         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3424         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3425         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3426         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3427         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3428         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3429
3430         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3431         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3432         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3433
3434         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3435         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3436         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3437         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3438
3439         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3440         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3441         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3442
3443         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3444         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3445         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3446         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3447
3448         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3449         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3450
3451         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3452         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3453
3454         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3455         {
3456                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3457                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3458                 match events[0] {
3459                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3460                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3461                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3462                         },
3463                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3464                 }
3465                 match events[1] {
3466                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3467                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3468                                 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3469                         },
3470                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3471                 }
3472                 match events[2] {
3473                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3474                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3475                 }
3476         }
3477
3478         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3479         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3480 }
3481
3482 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3483         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3484         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3485         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3486         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3487         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3488
3489         let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3490         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3491                 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3492                 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3493                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3494                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3495                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3496         } else {
3497                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3498         }
3499
3500         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3501
3502         let payment_event = {
3503                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3504                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3505
3506                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3507                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3508                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3509         };
3510         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3511
3512         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3513                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3514         } else {
3515                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3516                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3517                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3518                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3519                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3520
3521                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3522                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3523                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3524                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3525
3526                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3527                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3528                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3529                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3530                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3531
3532                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3533                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3534                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3535                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3536                                         }
3537                                 }
3538                         }
3539                 }
3540         }
3541
3542         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3543         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3544         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3545                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3546                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3547                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3548                         //
3549                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3550                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3551                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3552                         //
3553                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3554                         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3555                 }
3556                 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3557                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3558                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3559         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3560                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3561                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3562         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3563                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3564                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3565         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3566                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3567                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3568         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3569                 // Everything was delivered...
3570                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3571         }
3572
3573         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3574         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3575         match events_1[0] {
3576                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3577                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3578         };
3579
3580         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3581         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3582         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3583
3584         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3585
3586         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3587         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3588         match events_2[0] {
3589                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3590                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3591                         assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3592                         match &purpose {
3593                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3594                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3595                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3596                                 },
3597                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3598                         }
3599                 },
3600                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3601         }
3602
3603         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3604         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3605
3606         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3607         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3608         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3609                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3610                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3611                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3612                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3613                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3614                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3615                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3616                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3617                 },
3618                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3619         };
3620
3621         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3622                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3623
3624                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3625                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3626                 match events_4[0] {
3627                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3628                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3629                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3630                         },
3631                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3632                 }
3633
3634                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3635                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3636                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3637                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3638
3639                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3640                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3641                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3642                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3643
3644                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3645                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3646                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3647                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3648                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3649
3650                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3651                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3652                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3653                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3654                                         }
3655                                 }
3656                         }
3657                 }
3658         }
3659
3660         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3661         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3662         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3663                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3664                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3665                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3666                 } else {
3667                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3668                 }
3669         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3670                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3671                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3672         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3673                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3674                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3675         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3676                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3677                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3678         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3679                 // Everything was delivered...
3680                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3681         }
3682
3683         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3684                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3685         }
3686
3687         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3688         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3689         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3690
3691         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3692                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3693         }
3694
3695         // Channel should still work fine...
3696         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3697         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3698         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3699 }
3700
3701 #[test]
3702 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3703         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3704         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3705         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3706         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3707 }
3708
3709 #[test]
3710 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3711         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3712         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3713         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3714         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3715 }
3716
3717 #[test]
3718 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3719         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3720         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3721         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3722         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3723         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3724         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3725         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3726         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3727         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3728
3729         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3730         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3731
3732         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3733         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3734         let chan_id;
3735         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3736         match events_1[0] {
3737                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3738                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3739                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3740                 },
3741                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3742         }
3743
3744         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3745
3746         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3747         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3748
3749         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3750         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3751         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3752         let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3753                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3754                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3755                         msg.clone()
3756                 },
3757                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3758         };
3759         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3760                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3761                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3762                         msg.clone()
3763                 },
3764                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3765         };
3766
3767         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3768
3769         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3770         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3771         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3772         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3773         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3774                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3775                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3776                         msg.clone()
3777                 },
3778                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3779         };
3780         let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3781                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3782                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3783                 },
3784                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3785         };
3786
3787         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3788         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3789         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3790         let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3791                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3792                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3793                 },
3794                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3795         };
3796
3797         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3798         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3799         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3800
3801         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3802         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3803         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3804
3805         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3806         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3807         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3808
3809         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3810         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3811         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3812
3813         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3814         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3815         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3816         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3817         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3818         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3819                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3820         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3821
3822         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3823         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3824                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3825                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3826                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3827                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3828                         keys_manager,
3829                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3830                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3831                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3832                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
3833                         channel_monitors,
3834                 }).unwrap()
3835         };
3836         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3837         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3838
3839         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3840         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3841         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3842
3843         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3844
3845         // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3846         nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3847         let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3848         let mut found_announcement = false;
3849         for event in msgs.iter() {
3850                 match event {
3851                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3852                                 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3853                         },
3854                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3855                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3856                 }
3857         }
3858         assert!(found_announcement);
3859 }
3860
3861 #[test]
3862 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3863         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3864         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3865         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3866         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3867         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3868         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3869         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3870
3871         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3872
3873         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3874         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3875         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3876         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3877
3878         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3879         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3880         match events_1[0] {
3881                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3882                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3883         }
3884
3885         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3886         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3887
3888         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3889         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3890         match events_2[0] {
3891                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3892                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3893                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3894                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3895                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3896                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3897                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3898
3899                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3900                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3901                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3902                         match events_3[0] {
3903                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3904                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3905                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3906                                 },
3907                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3908                         }
3909
3910                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3911                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3912                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3913                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3914                 },
3915                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3916         }
3917
3918         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3919         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3920
3921         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3922         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3923         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3924         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3925         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3926         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3927
3928         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3929         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3930         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3931         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3932
3933         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3934         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3935
3936         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3937         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3938
3939         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3940
3941         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3942         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3943         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3944         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3945         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3946         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3947         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3948         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3949         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3950         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3951
3952         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3953         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3954         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3955         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3956         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3957         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3958         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3959         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3960
3961         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3962         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3963         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3964         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3965         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3966         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3967         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3968         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3969
3970         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3971         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3972         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3973         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3974
3975         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3976         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3977         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3978         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3979
3980         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3981         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3982         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3983
3984         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3985
3986         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3987         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3988         match events_5[0] {
3989                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
3990                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
3991                         match &purpose {
3992                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3993                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3994                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
3995                                 },
3996                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3997                         }
3998                 },
3999                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4000         }
4001
4002         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4003         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4004         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4005
4006         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4007         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4008 }
4009
4010 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4011         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4012         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4013         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4014         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4015         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4016         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4017
4018         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4019
4020         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4021                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4022                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4023                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4024                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4025                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4026                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4027                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4028                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4029                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4030                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4031                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4032                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4033                 our_payment_hash
4034         } else {
4035                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4036         };
4037
4038         let mut block = Block {
4039                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4040                 txdata: vec![],
4041         };
4042         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4043         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4044         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4045         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4046                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4047                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4048                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4049         }
4050
4051         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4052
4053         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4054         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4055         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4056         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4057         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4058         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4059
4060         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4061         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4062         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4063         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4064         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4065         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4066 }
4067
4068 #[test]
4069 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4070         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4071         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4072 }
4073
4074 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4075         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4076         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4077         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4078         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4079         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4080         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4081         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4082
4083         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4084         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4085         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4086         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4087
4088         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4089         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4090         {
4091                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4092         }
4093         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4094         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4095
4096         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4097         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4098         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4099         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4100         if forwarded_htlc {
4101                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4102                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4103                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4104                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4105                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4106         }
4107         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4108
4109         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4110         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4111         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4112         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4113
4114         if forwarded_htlc {
4115                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4116                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4117                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4118                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4119                 match fail_commit[0] {
4120                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4121                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4122                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4123                         },
4124                         _ => unreachable!(),
4125                 }
4126                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4127         } else {
4128                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, true);
4129         }
4130 }
4131
4132 #[test]
4133 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4134         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4135         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4136 }
4137
4138 #[test]
4139 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4140         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4141         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4142         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4143         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4144         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4145         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4146         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4147         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4148         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4149
4150         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4151
4152         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4153
4154         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4155         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4156         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4157                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4158
4159         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4160         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4161         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4162         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4163         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4164         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4165         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4166         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4167                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4168         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4169
4170         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4171         let config = UserConfig::default();
4172         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4173                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4174                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4175                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4176                         default_config: config,
4177                         keys_manager,
4178                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4179                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4180                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4181                         logger: &logger,
4182                         channel_monitors,
4183                 }).unwrap()
4184         };
4185         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4186         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4187
4188         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4189         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4190         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4191         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4192
4193         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4194         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4195         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4196         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4197
4198         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4199         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4200         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4201         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4202
4203         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4204         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4205         for node in nodes.iter() {
4206                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4207                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4208                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4209         }
4210
4211         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4212 }
4213
4214 #[test]
4215 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4216         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4217         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4218         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4219         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4220         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4221         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4222         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4223         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4224         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4225         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4226
4227         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4228         let channel_value = 100000;
4229         let push_msat = 10001;
4230         let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4231         let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4232         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4233         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4234         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4235         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4236         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4237
4238         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4239
4240         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4241         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4242
4243         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4244         {
4245                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4246                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4247                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4248                 added_monitors.clear();
4249         }
4250
4251         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4252         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4253         {
4254                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4255                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4256                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4257                 added_monitors.clear();
4258         }
4259         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4260
4261         nodes.push(node_a);
4262         nodes.push(node_b);
4263
4264         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4265         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4266         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4267         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4268
4269         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4270         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4271         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4272         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4273         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4274         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4275         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4276         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4277                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4278         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4279
4280         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4281         let config = UserConfig::default();
4282         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4283                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4284                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4285                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4286                         default_config: config,
4287                         keys_manager,
4288                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4289                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4290                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4291                         logger: &logger,
4292                         channel_monitors,
4293                 }).unwrap()
4294         };
4295         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4296         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4297
4298         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4299
4300         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4301         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4302
4303         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4304         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4305         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4306         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4307         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4308
4309         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4310         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4311         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4312
4313         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4314         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4315         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4316         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4317
4318         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4319         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4320         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4321         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4322
4323         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4324         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4325         for node in nodes.iter() {
4326                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4327                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4328                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4329         }
4330
4331         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4332 }
4333
4334 #[test]
4335 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4336         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4337         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4338         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4339         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4340         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4341         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4342         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4343         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4344         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4345         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4346
4347         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4348         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4349
4350         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4351
4352         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4353         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4354         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4355
4356         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4357         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4358         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4359         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4360         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4361         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4362         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4363         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4364                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4365         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4366
4367         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4368         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4369                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4370                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4371                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4372                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4373                         keys_manager,
4374                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4375                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4376                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4377                         logger: &logger,
4378                         channel_monitors,
4379                 }).unwrap()
4380         };
4381         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4382         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4383
4384         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4385         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4386         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4387
4388         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4389
4390         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4391         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4392 }
4393
4394 #[test]
4395 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4396         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4397         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4398         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4399         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4400         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4401         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4402         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4403         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4404         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4405         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4406         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4407         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4408         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4409
4410         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4411         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4412                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4413                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4414                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4415         }
4416
4417         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4418
4419         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4420         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4421
4422         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4423         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4424         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4425         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4426
4427         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4428         // nodes[3])
4429         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4430         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4431                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4432                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4433                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4434         }
4435
4436         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4437         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4438         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4439         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4440         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4441         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4442
4443
4444         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4445         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4446                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4447                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4448                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4449                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4450         }
4451
4452         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4453         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4454                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4455                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4456                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4457                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4458         }
4459
4460         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4461         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4462                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4463                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4464                 keys_manager,
4465                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4466                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4467                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4468                 logger: &logger,
4469                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4470         }) { } else {
4471                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4472         };
4473
4474         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4475         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4476                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4477                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4478                 keys_manager,
4479                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4480                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4481                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4482                 logger: &logger,
4483                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4484         }).unwrap();
4485         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4486         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4487
4488         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4489                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4490                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4491                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4492                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4493         }
4494
4495         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4496                 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4497                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4498         }
4499         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4500         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4501
4502         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4503         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4504         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4505         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4506         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4507
4508         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4509         let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4510         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4511         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4512         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4513         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4514         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4515                 match action {
4516                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4517                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4518                         },
4519                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4520                 }
4521         }
4522 }
4523
4524 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4525         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4526                 {
4527                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4528                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4529                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4530                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4531                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4532                                 match event {
4533                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4534                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4535                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4536                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4537                                                 }
4538                                         },
4539                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4540                                 };
4541                         }
4542                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4543                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4544                                         txn.push(tx);
4545                                 }
4546                         }
4547                         txn
4548                 }
4549         }
4550 }
4551
4552 #[test]
4553 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4554         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4555         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4556         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4557         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4558         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4559
4560         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4561         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4562         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4563         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4564         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4565         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4566         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4567         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4568         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4569
4570         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4571         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4572
4573         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4574         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4575         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4576         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4577         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4578 }
4579
4580 #[test]
4581 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4582         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4583         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4584         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4585         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4586         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4587         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4588
4589         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4590         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4591         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4592         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4593         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4594
4595         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4596         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4597         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4598         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4599
4600         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4601         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4602         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4603         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4604         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4605
4606         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4607         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4608         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4609 }
4610
4611 #[test]
4612 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4613         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4614         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4615
4616         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4617         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4618         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4619         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4620
4621         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4622         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4623         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4624         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4625         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4626
4627         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4628         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4629         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4630         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4631         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4632
4633         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4634         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4635         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4636
4637         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4638         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4639         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4640         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4641         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4642 }
4643
4644 #[test]
4645 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4646         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4647         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4648         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4649         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4650
4651         // Create some initial channels
4652         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4653
4654         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4655
4656         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4657         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4658         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4659
4660         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4661         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4662         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4663         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4664         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4665         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4666         match events[0] {
4667                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4668                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4669         }
4670         match events[1] {
4671                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4672                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4673         }
4674
4675         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4676         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4677         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4678         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4679         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4680         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4681         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4682
4683         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4684         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4685         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4686
4687         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4688         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4689         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4690 }
4691
4692 #[test]
4693 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4694         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4695         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4696         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4697         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4698
4699         // Create some initial channels
4700         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4701
4702         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4703         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4704
4705         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4706
4707         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4708         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4709         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4710
4711         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4712         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4713         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4714         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4715         match events[0] {
4716                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4717                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4718         }
4719         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4720
4721         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4722         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4723         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4724         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4725         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4726         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4727
4728         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4729         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4730         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4731         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4732
4733         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4734         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4735         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4736         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4737         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4738 }
4739
4740 #[test]
4741 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4742         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4743         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4744         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4745         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4746
4747         // Create some initial channels
4748         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4749
4750         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4751         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4752         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4753         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4754
4755         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4756
4757         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4758         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4759         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4760         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4761
4762         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4763         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4764         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4765         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4766
4767         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4768         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4769
4770         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4771         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4772         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4773 }
4774
4775 #[test]
4776 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4777         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4778         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4779         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4780         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4781         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4782
4783         // Create some initial channels
4784         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4785
4786         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4787         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4788         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4789         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4790
4791         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4792
4793         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4794         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4795         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4796         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4797         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4798         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4799
4800         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4801         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4802         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4803         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4804         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4805         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4806         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4807
4808         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4809         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4810         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4811         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4812         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4813         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4814
4815         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4816         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4817         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4818         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4819         // transactions next...
4820         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4821         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4822
4823         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4824         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4825         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4826                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4827         } else {
4828                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4829                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4830         }
4831
4832         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4833         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4834
4835         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4836         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4837
4838         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4839         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4840         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4841         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4842         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4843 }
4844
4845 #[test]
4846 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4847         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4848         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4849         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4850         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4851         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4852
4853         // Create some initial channels
4854         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4855
4856         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4857         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4858         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4859         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4860
4861         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4862         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4863
4864         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4865
4866         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4867         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4868         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4869         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4870         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4871         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4872
4873         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4874         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4875         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4876         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4877
4878         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4879         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4880         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4881
4882         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4883         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4884         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4885         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4886         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4887         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4888
4889         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4890         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4891
4892         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4893         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4894         // transactions next...
4895         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4896         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4897         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4898                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4899         } else {
4900                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4901                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4902         }
4903
4904         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4905         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4906
4907         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4908
4909         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4910         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4911
4912         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4913         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4914
4915         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4916         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4917         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4918         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4919         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4920         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4921         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4922         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4923 }
4924
4925 #[test]
4926 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4927         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4928         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4929         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4930         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4931         // channel.
4932         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4933         // gets broadcast.
4934
4935         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4936         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4937         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4938         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4939
4940         // Create some initial channels
4941         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4942         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4943
4944         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4945         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4946         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4947         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4948         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4949
4950         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4951         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4952         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4953
4954         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
4955         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4956         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4957         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4958         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4959         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4960         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4961         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4962         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4963         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4964
4965         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4966         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4968         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4969
4970         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4971         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4972         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
4973         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
4974         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
4975         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
4976         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
4977         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4978         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4979         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4980
4981         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4982         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4983         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
4984         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4985         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4986         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4987         match events[0] {
4988                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4989                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4990         }
4991         match events[1] {
4992                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
4993                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4994                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4995                 },
4996                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4997         }
4998         {
4999                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5000                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5001                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5002                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5003                 b_txn.clear();
5004         }
5005         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5006         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5007         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5008         match msg_events[0] {
5009                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5010                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5011         }
5012         match msg_events[1] {
5013                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5014                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5015         }
5016         match msg_events[2] {
5017                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5018                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5019                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5020                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5021                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5022                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5023                 },
5024                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5025         };
5026         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5027         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5028         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5029         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5030         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5031         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5032         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5033         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5034         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5035         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5036         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5037         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5038         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5039
5040         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5041         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5042 }
5043
5044 #[test]
5045 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5046         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5047         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5048         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5049         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5050         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5051         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5052         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5053         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5054         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5055         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5056         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5057                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5058         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5059
5060         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5061         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5062         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5063
5064         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5065         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5066         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5067         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5068         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5069
5070         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5071
5072         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5073         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5074         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5075         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5076         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5077         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5078
5079         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5080         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5081         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5082
5083         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5084         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5085         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5086         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5087         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5088
5089         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5090         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5091                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5092                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5093                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5094                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5095
5096                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5097                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5098                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5099                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5100                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5101                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5102                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5103
5104                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5105                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5106                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5107                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5108         }
5109
5110         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5111         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5112         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5113         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5114         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5115         match events[0] {
5116                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5117                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5118         }
5119         match events[1] {
5120                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5121                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5122         }
5123         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5124         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5125         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5126         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5127         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5128         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5129         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5130         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5131         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5132         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5133         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5134         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5135         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5136
5137         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5138         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5139         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5140         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5141         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5142         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5143         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5144         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5145         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5146         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5147
5148         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5149         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5150         {
5151                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5152         }
5153         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5154
5155         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5156         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5157         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5158         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5159         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5160         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5161         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5162         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5163         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5164         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5165         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5166         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5167
5168         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5169         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5170
5171         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5172         match events[0] {
5173                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5174                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5175                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5176                 }
5177                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5178         }
5179 }
5180
5181 #[test]
5182 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5183         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5184         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5185         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5186         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5187
5188         // Create some initial channels
5189         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5190
5191         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5192         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5193         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5194         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5195         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5196
5197         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5198         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5199         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5200         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5201         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5202         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5203         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5204         match events[0] {
5205                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5206                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5207         }
5208         match events[1] {
5209                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5210                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5211         }
5212         let node_tx = {
5213                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5214                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5215                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5216                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5217                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5218                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5219                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5220                 node_txn[0].clone()
5221         };
5222
5223         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5224         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5225
5226         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5227         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5228         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5229         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5230         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5231         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5232 }
5233
5234 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5235         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5236         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5237         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5238         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5239         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5240         // use the same payment hashes.
5241         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5242         //
5243         // A \         / E
5244         //    - C - D -
5245         // B /         \ F
5246         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5247         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5248         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5249         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5250         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5251         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5252         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5253         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5254                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5255         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5256
5257         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5258         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5259         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5260         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5261         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5262
5263         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5264         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5265         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5266         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5267
5268         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5269         // 0th HTLC:
5270         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5271         // 1st HTLC:
5272         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5273         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5274         // 2nd HTLC:
5275         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5276         // 3rd HTLC:
5277         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5278         // 4th HTLC:
5279         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5280         // 5th HTLC:
5281         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5282         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5283         // 6th HTLC:
5284         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5285         // 7th HTLC:
5286         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5287
5288         // 8th HTLC:
5289         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5290         // 9th HTLC:
5291         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5292         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5293
5294         // 10th HTLC:
5295         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5296         // 11th HTLC:
5297         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5298         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5299
5300         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5301         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5302         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5303         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5304         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5305
5306         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5307         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5308         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5309         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5310         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5311         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5312         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5313         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5314         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5315
5316         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5317         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5318         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5319         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5320         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5321         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5322
5323         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5324         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5325         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5326         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5327         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5328         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5329
5330         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5331         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5332         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5333         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5334
5335         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5336
5337         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5338         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5339         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5340         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5341         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5342         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5343         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5344         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5345         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5346         if deliver_last_raa {
5347                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5348         } else {
5349                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5350         }
5351
5352         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5353         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5354         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5355         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5356         //
5357         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5358         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5359         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5360         //
5361         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5362         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5363         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5364
5365         if announce_latest {
5366                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5367         } else {
5368                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5369         }
5370         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5371         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5372                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5373                 events[1].clone()
5374         } else {
5375                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5376                 events[0].clone()
5377         };
5378         match close_event {
5379                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5380                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5381         }
5382
5383         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5384         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5385         if deliver_last_raa {
5386                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5387         } else {
5388                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5389         }
5390         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5391
5392         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5393         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5394         let mut a_done = false;
5395         for msg in cs_msgs {
5396                 match msg {
5397                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5398                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5399                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5400                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5401                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5402                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5403                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5404                                         }
5405                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5406                                         assert!(!a_done);
5407                                         a_done = true;
5408                                         &nodes[0]
5409                                 } else {
5410                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5411                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5412                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5413                                         }
5414                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5415                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5416                                         &nodes[1]
5417                                 };
5418                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5419                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5420                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5421                                 if announce_latest {
5422                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5423                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5424                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5425                                         }
5426                                 }
5427                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5428                         },
5429                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5430                 }
5431         }
5432
5433         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5434         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5435         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5436         let mut as_updates = 0;
5437         for event in as_events.iter() {
5438                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5439                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5440                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5441                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5442                         } else {
5443                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5444                         }
5445                         if network_update.is_some() {
5446                                 as_updates += 1;
5447                         }
5448                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5449         }
5450         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5451         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5452         if announce_latest {
5453                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5454                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5455         }
5456         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5457
5458         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5459         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5460         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5461         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5462         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5463                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5464                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5465                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5466                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5467                         } else {
5468                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5469                         }
5470                         if network_update.is_some() {
5471                                 bs_updates += 1;
5472                         }
5473                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5474         }
5475         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5476         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5477         if announce_latest {
5478                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5479         }
5480         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5481
5482         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5483         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5484         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5485         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5486         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5487         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5488 }
5489
5490 #[test]
5491 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5492         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5493 }
5494
5495 #[test]
5496 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5497         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5498 }
5499
5500 #[test]
5501 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5502         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5503         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5504         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5505 }
5506
5507 #[test]
5508 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5509         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5510         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5511         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5512         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5513
5514         // Create some initial channels
5515         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5516
5517         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5518         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5519         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5520         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5521
5522         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5523         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5524         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5525         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5526         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5527         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5528
5529         let htlc_timeout = {
5530                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5531                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5532                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5533                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5534                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5535                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5536                 node_txn[1].clone()
5537         };
5538
5539         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5540         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5541         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5542
5543         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5544         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5545         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5546         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5547         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5548         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5549         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5550         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5551         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5552         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5553                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5554 }
5555
5556 #[test]
5557 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5558         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5559         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5560         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5561
5562         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5563
5564         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5565         let seed = [42; 32];
5566         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5567         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5568         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5569         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5570         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5571         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5572
5573         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5574         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5575
5576         // Create some initial channels
5577         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5578         // for node 0
5579         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5580         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5581         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5582
5583         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5584         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5585         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5586         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5587         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5588
5589         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5590         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5591         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5592         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5593         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5594
5595         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5596         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5597         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5598         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5599             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5600             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5601             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5602                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5603         }
5604
5605         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5606         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5607         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5608         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5609         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5610         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5611
5612         let htlc_timeout = {
5613                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5614                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5615                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5616                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5617                 node_txn[1].clone()
5618         };
5619
5620         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5621         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5622         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5623
5624         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5625         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5626         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5627         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5628         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5629         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5630         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5631         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5632         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5633         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5634         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5635                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5636 }
5637
5638 #[test]
5639 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5640         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5641         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5642         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5643         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5644
5645         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5646
5647         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5648         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5649
5650         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5651         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5652         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5653
5654         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5655         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5656         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5657
5658         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5659         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5660         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5661
5662         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5663         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5664         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5665 }
5666
5667 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5668         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5669         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5670         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5671         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5672         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5673
5674         let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5675
5676         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5677         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5678         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5679         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5680
5681         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5682         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5683         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5684
5685         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5686         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5687         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5688         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5689         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5690
5691         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5692         let mut block = Block {
5693                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5694                 txdata: vec![],
5695         };
5696         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5697                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5698                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5699         }
5700         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5701         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5702         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5703         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5704 }
5705
5706 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5707         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5708         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5709         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5710         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5711         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5712
5713         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5714         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5715         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5716
5717         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5718
5719         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5720         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5721         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5722
5723         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5724         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5725
5726         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5727                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5728                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5729         }
5730         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5731         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5732         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5733         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5734 }
5735
5736 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5737         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5738         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5739         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5740         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5741         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5742
5743         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5744         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5745         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5746         // actually revoked.
5747         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5748         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5749         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5750         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5751         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5752
5753         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5754         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5755         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5756         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5757         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5758         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5759         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5760         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5761         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5762         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5763
5764         if check_revoke_no_close {
5765                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5766                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5767         }
5768
5769         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5770         let mut block = Block {
5771                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5772                 txdata: vec![],
5773         };
5774         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5775                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5776                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5777         }
5778         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5779                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5780                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5781                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5782                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5783         } else {
5784                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5785         }
5786 }
5787
5788 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5789 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5790 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5791 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5792 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5793 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5794 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5795 // non-dust HTLCs.
5796 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5797 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5798 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5799 #[test]
5800 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5801         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5802         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5803
5804         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5805         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5806 }
5807
5808 #[test]
5809 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5810         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5811         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5812         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5813         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5814 }
5815
5816 #[test]
5817 #[should_panic]
5818 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5819         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5820         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5821         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5822         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5823         //Force duplicate channel ids
5824         for node in nodes.iter() {
5825                 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5826         }
5827
5828         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5829         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5830         let push_msat=10001;
5831         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5832         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5833         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5834
5835         //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5836         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5837 }
5838
5839 #[test]
5840 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5841         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5842         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5843         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5844         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5845
5846         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5847         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5848         let push_msat=10001;
5849         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5850
5851         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5852         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5853         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5854         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5855         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5856
5857         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5858         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5859         let push_msat=10001;
5860         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5861         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5862         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5863
5864         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5865         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5866         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5867
5868         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5869         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5870         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5871
5872         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5873         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5874         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5875
5876         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5877         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5878         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5879         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5880         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5881         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5882 }
5883
5884 #[test]
5885 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5886         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5887         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5888         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5889         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5890
5891         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5892         let push_msat=10001;
5893         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5894         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5895         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5896         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5897
5898         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5899         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5900         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5901                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5902                         msg.clone()
5903                 },
5904                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5905         };
5906         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5907 }
5908
5909 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5910 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5911 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5912 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5913 #[test]
5914 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5915         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5916         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5917         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5918         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5919         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5920
5921         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5922         // pending_update_fee.
5923         {
5924                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5925                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5926         }
5927         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5928         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5929
5930         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5931         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5932         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5933                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5934                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5935                 },
5936                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5937         };
5938
5939         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5940
5941         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5942         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5943         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5944
5945         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5946         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
5947         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5948
5949         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5950         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
5951         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5952         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5953
5954         // Flush the pending fee update.
5955         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5956         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5957         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5958         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5959         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5960
5961         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5962         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5963         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5964         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5965         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5966         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5967         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5968                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5969         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5970
5971         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5972         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5973         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5974         match &events[0] {
5975                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
5976                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5977                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5978                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
5979                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5980                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5981                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
5982                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
5983                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
5984                 },
5985                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5986         }
5987 }
5988
5989 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5990 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5991 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5992 #[test]
5993 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5994         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5995         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5996         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5997         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5998         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5999
6000         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6001         // pending_update_fee.
6002         {
6003                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6004                 *feerate_lock += 200;
6005         }
6006         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6007         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6008
6009         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6010         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6011         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6012                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6013                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6014                 },
6015                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6016         };
6017
6018         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6019
6020         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6021         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6022         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6023
6024         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6025         let amt_1 = 20000;
6026         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
6027         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6028         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6029
6030         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6031         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6032         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6033         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6034         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6035         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6036         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6037
6038         // Flush the pending fee update.
6039         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6040         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6041         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6042         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6043         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6044         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6045
6046         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6047         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6048         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6049         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6050         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6051         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6052         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6053                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6054         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6055
6056         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6057         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6058         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6059         match &events[0] {
6060                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6061                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6062                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6063                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6064                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6065                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6066                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6067                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6068                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6069                 },
6070                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6071         }
6072
6073         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6074         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6075                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6076                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6077                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6078         };
6079         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6080                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6081                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6082         };
6083         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6084         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6085         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6086         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6087         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6088         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6089         match events[0] {
6090                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6091                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6092         }
6093         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6094         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6095         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6096         match events[0] {
6097                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6098                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6099         }
6100         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6101         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6102         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6103         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6104         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6105         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6106 }
6107
6108 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6109 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6110 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6111 // once it's freed.
6112 #[test]
6113 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6114         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6115         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6116         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6117         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6118         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6119         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6120         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6121         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6122         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6123         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6124
6125         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6126         // pending_update_fee.
6127         {
6128                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6129                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6130         }
6131         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6132         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6133
6134         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6135         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6136         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6137                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6138                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6139                 },
6140                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6141         };
6142
6143         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6144
6145         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6146         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6147         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6148
6149         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6150         let feemsat = 239;
6151         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6152         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6153         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6154         let payment_event = {
6155                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6156                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6157
6158                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6159                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6160
6161                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6162         };
6163         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6165         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6166         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6167
6168         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6169         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6170
6171         // Flush the pending fee update.
6172         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6173         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6175         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6176         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6177         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6178
6179         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6180         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6181         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6182
6183         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6184                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6185                         msg.clone()
6186                 },
6187                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6188         };
6189
6190         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6191         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6192         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6193
6194         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6195         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6196         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6197         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6198                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6199                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6200         }
6201
6202         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6203         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6204         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6205
6206         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6207         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6208         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6209         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6210                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6211                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6212                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6213                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6214                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6215                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6216                 },
6217                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6218         };
6219
6220         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6221         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6222         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6223
6224         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6225         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6226         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6227         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6228         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6229         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6230         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6231         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6232         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6233                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6234                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6235         };
6236         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6237         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6238         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6239 }
6240
6241 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6242 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6243 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6244
6245 #[test]
6246 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6247         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6248         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6249         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6250         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6251         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6252         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6253
6254         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6255         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6256
6257         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6258                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6259         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6260         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6261 }
6262
6263 #[test]
6264 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6265         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6266         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6267         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6268         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6269         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6270         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6271
6272         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6273         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6274         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6275                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6276
6277         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6278         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6279 }
6280
6281 #[test]
6282 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6283         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6284         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6285         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6286         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6287         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6288         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6289
6290         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6291         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6293         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6294         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6295
6296         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6297         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6298         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6299         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6300         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6301 }
6302
6303 #[test]
6304 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6305         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6306         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6307         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6308         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6309         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6310         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6311         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6312
6313         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6314         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6315                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6316 }
6317
6318 #[test]
6319 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6320         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6321         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6322         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6323         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6324         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6325         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6326         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6327         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6328         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6329
6330         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6331                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6332                 let payment_event = {
6333                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6334                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6335
6336                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6337                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6338                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6339                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6340                         } else {
6341                                 assert!(false);
6342                         }
6343                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6344                 };
6345                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6346                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6347                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6348
6349                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6350                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6351         }
6352         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6353         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6354                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6355
6356         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6357         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6358 }
6359
6360 #[test]
6361 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6362         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6363         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6364         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6365         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6366         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6367         let channel_value = 100000;
6368         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6369         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6370
6371         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6372
6373         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6374         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6375         // limits us to.
6376         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6377         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6378                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6379
6380         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6381         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6382
6383         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6384 }
6385
6386 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6387 #[test]
6388 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6389         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6390         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6391         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6392         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6393         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6394         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6395         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6396         {
6397                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6398                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6399                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6400         }
6401
6402         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6403         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6404         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6405         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6406         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6407         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6408         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6409         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6410         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6411         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6412         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6413 }
6414
6415 #[test]
6416 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6417         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6418         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6419         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6420         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6421         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6422         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6423
6424         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6425         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6426         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6427         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6428         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6429
6430         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6431         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6432         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6433         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6434         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6435
6436         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6437         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6438         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6439         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6440         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6441
6442         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6443         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6444         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6445         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6446         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6447 }
6448
6449 #[test]
6450 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6451         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6452         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6453         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6454         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6455         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6456         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6457         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6458
6459         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6460         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6461         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6462         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6463         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6464         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6465
6466         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6467                 channel_id: chan.2,
6468                 htlc_id: 0,
6469                 amount_msat: 1000,
6470                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6471                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6472                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6473         };
6474
6475         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6476                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6477                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6478         }
6479         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6480         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6481
6482         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6483         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6484         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6485         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6486         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6487 }
6488
6489 #[test]
6490 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6491         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6492         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6493         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6494         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6495         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6496         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6497
6498         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6499         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6500         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6501         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6502         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6503         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6504
6505         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6506         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6507         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6508         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6509         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6510 }
6511
6512 #[test]
6513 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6514         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6515         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6516         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6517         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6518         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6519
6520         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6521         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6522         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6523         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6524         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6525         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6526         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6527
6528         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6529         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6530         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6531         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6532         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6533 }
6534
6535 #[test]
6536 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6537         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6538         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6539         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6540         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6541         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6542         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6543         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6544
6545         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6546         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6547         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6548         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6549         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6550         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6551
6552         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6553         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6554         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6555         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6556         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6557         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6558         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6559         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6560         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6561         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6562         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6563         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6564         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6565
6566         //Resend HTLC
6567         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6568         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6569         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6570         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6571         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6572
6573         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6574
6575         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6576         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6577         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6578         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6579         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6580 }
6581
6582 #[test]
6583 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6584         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6585
6586         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6587         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6588         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6589         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6590         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6591         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6592         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6593
6594         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6595         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6596         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6597
6598         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6599                 channel_id: chan.2,
6600                 htlc_id: 0,
6601                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6602         };
6603
6604         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6605
6606         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6607         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6608         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6609         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6610         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6611 }
6612
6613 #[test]
6614 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6615         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6616
6617         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6618         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6619         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6620         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6621         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6622
6623         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6624         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6625         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6626         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6627         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6628
6629         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6630                 channel_id: chan.2,
6631                 htlc_id: 0,
6632                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6633         };
6634
6635         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6636
6637         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6638         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6639         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6640         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6641         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6642 }
6643
6644 #[test]
6645 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6646         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6647
6648         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6649         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6650         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6651         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6652         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6653
6654         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6655         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6656         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6657         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6658         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6659         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6660                 channel_id: chan.2,
6661                 htlc_id: 0,
6662                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6663                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6664         };
6665
6666         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6667
6668         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6669         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6670         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6671         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6672         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6673 }
6674
6675 #[test]
6676 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6677         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6678
6679         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6680         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6681         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6682         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6683         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6684
6685         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6686
6687         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6688         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6689
6690         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6691         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6692         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6693                 match events[0] {
6694                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6695                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6696                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6697                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6698                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6699                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6700                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6701                         },
6702                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6703                 }
6704         };
6705
6706         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6707
6708         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6709
6710         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6711         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6712         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6713         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6714         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6715 }
6716
6717 #[test]
6718 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6719         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6720
6721         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6722         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6723         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6724         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6725         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6726
6727         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6728
6729         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6730         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6731
6732         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6733         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6734         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6735                 match events[0] {
6736                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6737                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6738                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6739                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6740                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6741                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6742                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6743                         },
6744                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6745                 }
6746         };
6747
6748         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6749
6750         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6751
6752         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6753         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6754         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6755         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6756         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6757 }
6758
6759 #[test]
6760 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6761         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6762
6763         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6764         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6765         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6766         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6767         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6768
6769         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6770         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6771         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6772
6773         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6774         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6775
6776         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6777         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6778         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6779
6780         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6781
6782         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6783                 match events[0] {
6784                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6785                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6786                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6787                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6788                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6789                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6790                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6791                         },
6792                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6793                 }
6794         };
6795         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6796         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6797
6798         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6799         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6800         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6801         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6802         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6803 }
6804
6805 #[test]
6806 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6807         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6808         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6809
6810         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6811         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6812         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6813         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6814         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6815         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6816
6817         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6818
6819         //First hop
6820         let mut payment_event = {
6821                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6822                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6823                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6824                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6825                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6826         };
6827         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6828         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6829         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6830         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6831         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6832         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6833         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6834         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6835         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6836
6837         //Second Hop
6838         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6839         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6840         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6841         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6842
6843         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6844         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6845         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6846                 match events_3[0] {
6847                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6848                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6849                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6850                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6851                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6852                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6853                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6854                         },
6855                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6856                 }
6857         };
6858
6859         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6860
6861         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6862         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6863         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6864         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6865         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6866
6867         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6868         match events_4[0] {
6869                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6870                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6871                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6872                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6873                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6874                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6875                 },
6876                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6877         };
6878
6879         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6880 }
6881
6882 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6883         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6884         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6885         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6886
6887         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6888         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6889         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6890         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6891         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6892         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6893
6894         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6895
6896         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6897         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6898         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6899         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6900
6901         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6902         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6903
6904         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6905         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6906         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6907         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6908         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6909
6910         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6911         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6912         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6913         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6914
6915         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6916         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6917
6918         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6919         match events[0] {
6920                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6921                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6922                 },
6923                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6924         }
6925         match events[1] {
6926                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6927                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6928                 },
6929                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6930         }
6931
6932         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6933         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6934         if announce_latest {
6935                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6936         } else {
6937                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6938         }
6939
6940         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6941         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6942         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6943
6944         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6945         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6946         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6947         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6948         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6949         let mut first_failed = false;
6950         for event in events {
6951                 match event {
6952                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6953                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6954                                         assert!(!first_failed);
6955                                         first_failed = true;
6956                                 } else {
6957                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6958                                 }
6959                         }
6960                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6961                 }
6962         }
6963 }
6964
6965 #[test]
6966 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6967         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6968         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6969 }
6970
6971 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6972         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6973         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6974         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6975         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6976         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6977         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6978
6979         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6980         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6981         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6982         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6983         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6984
6985         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6986
6987         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6988         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6989
6990         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6991         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6992
6993         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6994         if revoked {
6995                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6996                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6997         }
6998
6999         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7000         if local {
7001                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7002                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7003                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7004                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7005                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7006
7007                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7008                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7009                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7010                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7011                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7012                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7013                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7014                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7015                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7016                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7017                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7018         } else {
7019                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7020                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7021                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7022                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7023                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7024                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7025                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7026                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7027                 if !revoked {
7028                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7029                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7030                         // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7031                         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7032                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7033                         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7034                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7035                 } else {
7036                         // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7037                         // commitment tx
7038                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7039                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7040                         let first;
7041                         match events[0] {
7042                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7043                                         if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7044                                         else { first = false; }
7045                                 },
7046                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7047                         }
7048                         match events[1] {
7049                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7050                                         if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7051                                         else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7052                                 },
7053                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7054                         }
7055                 }
7056         }
7057 }
7058
7059 #[test]
7060 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7061         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7062         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7063         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7064 }
7065
7066 #[test]
7067 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7068         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7069
7070         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7071         low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7072         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7073         high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7074         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7075         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7076         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7077         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7078         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7079
7080         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7081         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7082                 match error {
7083                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7084                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7085                 }
7086         } else { assert!(false) }
7087
7088         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7089         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7090         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7091         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7092         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7093                 match error {
7094                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7095                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7096                 }
7097         } else { assert!(false); }
7098
7099         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7100         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7101         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7102         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7103         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7104         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7105         let reason_msg;
7106         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7107                 match action {
7108                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7109                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7110                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7111                         },
7112                         _ => { panic!(); }
7113                 }
7114         } else { panic!(); }
7115         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7116
7117         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7118         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7119         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7120         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7121         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0) {
7122                 match error {
7123                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7124                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7125                 }
7126         } else { assert!(false); }
7127 }
7128
7129 #[test]
7130 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7131         // We want to be sure that :
7132         // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7133         //   (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7134         // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7135         // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7136         // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7137         let persister;
7138         let logger;
7139         let fee_estimator;
7140         let tx_broadcaster;
7141         let chain_source;
7142         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7143         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7144         // during signing due to revoked tx
7145         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7146         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7147         let monitor;
7148         let node_state_0;
7149         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7150         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7151         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7152
7153         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7154
7155         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7156         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7157         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7158         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7159
7160         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7161         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7162
7163         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7164         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7165
7166         // Restore node A from previous state
7167         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7168         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7169         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7170         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7171         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7172         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7173         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7174         node_state_0 = {
7175                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7176                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7177                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7178                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7179                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7180                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7181                         logger: &logger,
7182                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7183                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7184                         channel_monitors,
7185                 }).unwrap().1
7186         };
7187         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7188         assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7189         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7190         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7191
7192         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7193
7194         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7195         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7196
7197         let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7198
7199         // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7200         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7201         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7202
7203         {
7204                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7205                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7206         }
7207
7208         let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7209         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7210                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7211                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7212                         reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7213                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7214                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7215                         match action {
7216                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7217                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7218                                 },
7219                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7220                         }
7221                 } else {
7222                         panic!("Unexpected event")
7223                 }
7224         }
7225
7226         // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7227         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7228         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7229         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7230         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7231
7232         // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7233         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7234         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7235         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7236         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7237         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7238         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7239         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7240         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7241         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7242         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7243 }
7244
7245 #[test]
7246 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7247         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7248         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7249         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7250
7251         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7252         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7253         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7254         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7255
7256         // Create some initial channels
7257         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7258
7259         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7260         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7261         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[0].network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7262         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7263         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7264         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7265         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7266
7267         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7268         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7269         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7270         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7271         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7272
7273         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7274         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7275         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7276         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7277
7278         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7279         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7280         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7281
7282         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7283         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7284         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7285                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7286                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7287                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7288                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7289                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7290                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7291                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7292                 },
7293                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7294         };
7295         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7296
7297         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7298         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7299
7300         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7301         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7302         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7303         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7304 }
7305
7306 #[test]
7307 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7308         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7309         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7310
7311         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7312         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7313         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7314         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7315
7316         let short_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7317         let short_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7318         let short_id_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7319
7320         // Disconnect peers
7321         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7322         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7323
7324         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7325         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7326         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7327         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7328         let mut chans_disabled: HashSet<u64> = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7329         for e in msg_events {
7330                 match e {
7331                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7332                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7333                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7334                                 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7335                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7336                                 }
7337                         },
7338                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7339                 }
7340         }
7341         // Reconnect peers
7342         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7343         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7344         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7345         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7346         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7347         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7348
7349         // Reestablish chan_1
7350         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7351         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7352         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7353         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7354         // Reestablish chan_2
7355         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7356         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7357         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7358         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7359         // Reestablish chan_3
7360         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7361         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7362         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7363         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7364
7365         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7366         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7367         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7368         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7369         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7370         chans_disabled = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7371         for e in msg_events {
7372                 match e {
7373                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7374                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7375                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7376                                 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7377                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7378                                 }
7379                         },
7380                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7381                 }
7382         }
7383 }
7384
7385 #[test]
7386 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7387         // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7388         // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7389         // to forward through that channel.
7390         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7391         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7392         let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7393         no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7394         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7395         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7396         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7397         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7398         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7399         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7400
7401         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7402
7403         // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7404         // not send for private channels.
7405         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7406         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7407         nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7408         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7409         nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7410
7411         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7412         nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7413         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7414         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7415
7416         let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7417         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7418         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7419
7420         let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7421         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7422         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7423         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7424         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7425         let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7426         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7427         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7428         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7429         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7430
7431         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7432         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7433         assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7434
7435         // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7436         // channel:
7437         send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7438
7439         // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7440         // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7441         let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7442                 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7443                 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7444                 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7445                 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7446                 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7447                 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7448         }]);
7449         let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7450         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7451
7452         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7453         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7454         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7455         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7456         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7457
7458         let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7459         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7460         assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7461         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7462         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7463
7464         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7465         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7466         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7467
7468         // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7469         // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7470
7471         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7472         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7473
7474         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7475         let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7476         let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7477         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7478         get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7479
7480         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7481         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7482         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7483         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7484
7485         let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7486         let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7487         let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7488         let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7489         assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7490         assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7491
7492         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7493
7494         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7495         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7496                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7497                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7498                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7499                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7500                         default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7501                         keys_manager,
7502                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7503                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7504                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7505                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
7506                         channel_monitors,
7507                 }).unwrap()
7508         };
7509         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7510         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7511
7512         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7513         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7514         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7515         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7516
7517         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7518         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7519         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7520         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7521         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7522         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7523         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7524         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7525
7526         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7527         nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7528         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7529         let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7530         nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7531         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7532         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7533         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7534
7535         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7536         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7537         pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7538         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7539 }
7540
7541 #[test]
7542 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7543         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7544         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7545
7546         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7547         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7548         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7549         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7550
7551         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7552
7553         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7554         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7555         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7556
7557         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7558         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7559         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7560         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7561         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7562         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7563
7564         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7565         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7566                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7567                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7568                 }
7569         }
7570
7571         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7572         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7573
7574         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7575         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7576         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7577         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7578         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7579
7580         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7581         let penalty_1;
7582         let feerate_1;
7583         {
7584                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7585                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7586                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7587                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7588                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7589                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7590                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7591                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7592                 node_txn.clear();
7593         };
7594
7595         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7596         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7597         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7598         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7599         {
7600                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7601                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7602                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7603                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7604                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7605                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7606                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7607                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7608                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7609                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7610                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7611                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7612                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7613                         node_txn.clear();
7614                 }
7615         }
7616         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7617
7618         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7619         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7620         let penalty_3;
7621         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7622         {
7623                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7624                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7625                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7626                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7627                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7628                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7629                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7630                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7631                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7632                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7633                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7634                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7635                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7636                         node_txn.clear();
7637                 }
7638         }
7639         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7640
7641         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7642         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7643 }
7644
7645 #[test]
7646 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7647         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7648         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7649
7650         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7651         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7652         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7653         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7654         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7655
7656         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7657         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7658         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7659         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7660         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7661                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7662         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7663         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7664         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[1].network_graph, None,
7665                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7666         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7667
7668         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7669         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7670         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7671
7672         // Revoke local commitment tx
7673         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7674
7675         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7676         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7677         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7678         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7679         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7680         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7681         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7682
7683         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7684         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7685         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7686
7687         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7688         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7689         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7690
7691         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7692         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7693         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7694         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7695
7696         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7697         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7698         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7699         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7700         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7701         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7702         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7703         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7704         match events[1] {
7705                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7706                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7707         }
7708         let first;
7709         let feerate_1;
7710         let penalty_txn;
7711         {
7712                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7713                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7714                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7715
7716                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7717                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7718                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7719                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7720                 // future).
7721                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7722                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7723                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7724                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7725                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7726                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7727
7728                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7729                 // available, which we check here:
7730                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7731                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7732                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7733
7734                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7735                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7736
7737                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7738                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7739                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7740                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7741
7742                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7743                 // output, checked above).
7744                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7745                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7746                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7747
7748                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7749                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7750                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7751                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7752                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7753                 node_txn.clear();
7754         }
7755
7756         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7757         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7758         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7759         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7760         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7761         {
7762                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7763                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7764
7765                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7766                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7767                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7768                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
7769                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7770                 } else {
7771                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7772                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7773                 }
7774
7775                 node_txn.clear();
7776         };
7777
7778         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7779         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7780         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7781         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7782         let node_txn = {
7783                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7784                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7785
7786                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7787                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7788                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7789                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7790                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7791                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7792                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7793                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7794                 node_txn.clear();
7795                 txn
7796         };
7797         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7798         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7799         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7800         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7801         {
7802                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7803                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7804                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7805                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7806                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7807                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7808                 // up bumped justice generation.
7809                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7810                 node_txn.clear();
7811         }
7812         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7813         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7814 }
7815
7816 #[test]
7817 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7818         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7819         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7820
7821         // Create 2 HTLCs
7822         // Provide preimage for one
7823         // Check aggregation
7824
7825         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7826         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7827         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7828         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7829
7830         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7831         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7832         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7833
7834         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7835         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7836         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7837         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7838         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7839
7840         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7841         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7842         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7843         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7844         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7845
7846         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7847         let timeout;
7848         let preimage;
7849         let preimage_bump;
7850         let feerate_timeout;
7851         let feerate_preimage;
7852         {
7853                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7854                 // 9 transactions including:
7855                 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7856                 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7857                 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7858                 // 1 * HTLC-Timeout
7859                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7860                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7861                 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7862                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7863                 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7864                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7865                 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7866
7867                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7868                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7869                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7870                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7871
7872                 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7873                 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7874                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7875                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7876
7877                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7878                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7879                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7880                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7881
7882                 node_txn.clear();
7883         };
7884         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7885         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7886
7887         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7888         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7889         {
7890                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7891                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7892                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7893                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7894                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7895                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7896
7897                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7898                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7899                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7900                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7901                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7902
7903                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7904                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7905                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7906                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7907                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7908
7909                 node_txn.clear();
7910         }
7911
7912         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7913         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7914 }
7915
7916 #[test]
7917 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7918         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7919         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7920         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7921         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7922         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7923         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7924         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7925         // implement that).
7926         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7927         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7928         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7929         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7930         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7931
7932         let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7933         let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7934
7935         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7936
7937         // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7938         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7939         let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7940
7941         // Must revoke without gaps
7942         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7943         keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7944
7945         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7946         let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7947                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7948
7949         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7950                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7951         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7952         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7953         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7954 }
7955
7956 #[test]
7957 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7958         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7959         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7960
7961         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7962         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7963         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7964         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7965
7966         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7967         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7968         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7969         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7970
7971         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7972         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7973         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7974
7975         // Revoke local commitment tx
7976         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7977
7978         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7979         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7980         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7981         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7982
7983         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7984         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7985         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7986         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7987         let penalty_txn = {
7988                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7989                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7990                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7991                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7992                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7993                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7994                 node_txn.clear();
7995                 penalty_txn
7996         };
7997         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7998         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7999         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8000         {
8001                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8002                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8003                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8004         }
8005 }
8006
8007 #[test]
8008 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8009         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8010         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8011         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8012         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8013         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8014         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8015
8016         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8017
8018         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8019         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8020         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8021         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8022         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8023
8024         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8025         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8026         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8027         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8028
8029         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8030         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8031         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8032         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8033         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8034         match close_ev[0] {
8035                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8036                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8037                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8038                 },
8039                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8040         }
8041 }
8042
8043 #[test]
8044 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8045         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8046         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8047         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8048         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8049
8050         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8051         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8052         override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8053
8054         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8055
8056         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8057         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8058         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8059         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8060 }
8061
8062 #[test]
8063 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8064         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8065         zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8066         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8067         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8068         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8069         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8070
8071         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8072         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8073         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8074
8075         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8076         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8077         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8078 }
8079
8080 #[test]
8081 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8082         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8083         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8084         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8085         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8086         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8087
8088         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8089         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8090         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8091         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8092
8093         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8094         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8095         route.paths.push(path);
8096         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8097         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8098         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8099         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8100         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8101         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8102         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8103         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8104 }
8105
8106 #[test]
8107 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8108         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8109         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8110         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8111         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8112         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8113
8114         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8115
8116         {
8117                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200);
8118                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8119                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8120                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8121                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8122                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8123                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8124                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8125         }
8126         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8127         // values from previous calls.
8128         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8129         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8130         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8131         match events[0] {
8132                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8133                         match &purpose {
8134                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8135                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8136                                 },
8137                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8138                         }
8139                 },
8140                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8141         }
8142 }
8143
8144 #[test]
8145 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8146         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs
8147         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8148         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8149         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8150         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8151
8152         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8153
8154         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8155
8156         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8157         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8158         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8159                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8160         } else { panic!(); }
8161         let mut block = {
8162                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8163                 Block {
8164                         header: BlockHeader {
8165                                 version: 0x2000000,
8166                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8167                                 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8168                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8169                         txdata: vec![],
8170                 }
8171         };
8172         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8173         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8174                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8175         } else { panic!(); }
8176
8177         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8178         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8179         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8180         block.header.time += 1;
8181         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8182         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8183         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8184
8185         {
8186                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8187                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8188                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8189                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8190                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8191                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8192                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8193         }
8194         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8195         // values from previous calls.
8196         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8197         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8198         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8199         match events[0] {
8200                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8201                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8202                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8203                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8204                 },
8205                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8206         }
8207 }
8208
8209 #[test]
8210 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8211         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8212         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8213         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8214         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8215         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8216
8217         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8218
8219         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8220         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8221         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8222         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8223
8224         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8225         // resulting events.
8226         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8227                 () => {
8228                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8229                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8230                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8231                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8232                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8233
8234                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8235                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8236                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8237                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8238                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8239
8240                         // We should fail the payment back
8241                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8242                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8243                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8244                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8245                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8246                                 },
8247                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8248                         }
8249                 }
8250         }
8251
8252         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8253         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8254         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8255
8256         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8257         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8258         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8259         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8260
8261         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8262         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8263         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8264         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8265
8266         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8267         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8268         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8269         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8270 }
8271
8272 #[test]
8273 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8274         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8275         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8276         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8277         //
8278         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8279         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8280         // commitment at same time.
8281
8282         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8283         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8284         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8285         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8286
8287         // Create some initial channel
8288         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8289         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8290
8291         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8292         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8293
8294         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8295         let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8296
8297         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8298         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8299         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8300         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8301         let watchtower = {
8302                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8303                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8304                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8305                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8306                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8307                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8308                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8309                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8310                 watchtower
8311         };
8312         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8313         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8314         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8315         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8316         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8317
8318         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8319         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8320         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8321         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8322         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8323         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8324         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8325                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8326                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8327                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8328                 } else { assert!(false); }
8329         } else { assert!(false); };
8330         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8331         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8332         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8333         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8334 }
8335
8336 #[test]
8337 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8338         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8339         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8340         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8341         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8342
8343         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8344         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8345         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8346         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8347
8348         // Create some initial channel
8349         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8350         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8351
8352         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8353         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8354
8355         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8356         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8357
8358         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8359         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8360         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8361         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8362         let watchtower_alice = {
8363                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8364                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8365                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8366                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8367                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8368                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8369                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8370                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8371                 watchtower
8372         };
8373         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8374         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8375         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8376         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8377         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8378
8379         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8380         {
8381                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8382                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8383                 txn.clear();
8384         }
8385
8386         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8387         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8388         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8389         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8390         let watchtower_bob = {
8391                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8392                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8393                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8394                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8395                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8396                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8397                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8398                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8399                 watchtower
8400         };
8401         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8402         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8403
8404         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8405         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8406         {
8407                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8408         }
8409         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8410
8411         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8412         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8413         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8414         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8415                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8416                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8417                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8418                         if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8419                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8420                 } else { assert!(false); }
8421         } else { assert!(false); };
8422         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8423         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8424
8425         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8426         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8427         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8428
8429         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8430         let bob_state_y;
8431         {
8432                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8433                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8434                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8435                 txn.clear();
8436         };
8437
8438         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8439         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8440         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8441         {
8442                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8443                 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8444                 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8445                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8446                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8447                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8448         }
8449 }
8450
8451 #[test]
8452 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8453         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8454         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8455         // message).
8456         //
8457         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8458         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8459         //
8460         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8461         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8462         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8463         // before receiving funding_signed.
8464         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8465         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8466         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8467         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8468
8469         // Create an initial channel
8470         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8471         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8472         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8473         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8474         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8475
8476         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8477         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8478
8479         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8480         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8481
8482         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8483         let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8484         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8485         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8486         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8487 }
8488
8489 #[test]
8490 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8491         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8492         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8493         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8494         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8495         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8496         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8497
8498         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8499         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8500         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8501         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8502
8503         // Create some initial channels
8504         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8505
8506         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8507         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8508         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8509         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8510         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8511         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8512
8513         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8514         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8515         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8516         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8517         // this test before #653 fix.
8518         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8519         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8520         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8521         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8522         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8523
8524         let htlc_timeout = {
8525                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8526                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8527                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8528                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8529                 node_txn[1].clone()
8530         };
8531
8532         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8533         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8534         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8535         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8536 }
8537
8538 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8539         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8540         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8541         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8542         //
8543         // Steps of the test:
8544         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8545         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8546         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8547         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8548         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8549         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8550         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8551         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8552         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8553         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8554         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8555         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8556
8557         // Create some initial channels
8558         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8559         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8560
8561         // Steps (1) and (2):
8562         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8563         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8564
8565         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8566         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8567         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8568         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8569         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8570         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8571         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8572
8573         // Steps (3) and (4):
8574         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8575         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8576         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8577         if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8578         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8579         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8580         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8581         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8582         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8583                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8584                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8585                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8586                 };
8587                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8588                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8589                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8590                 if broadcast_alice {
8591                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8592                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8593                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8594                 }
8595                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8596                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8597         }
8598
8599         // Step (5):
8600         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8601         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8602         assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8603         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8604         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8605         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8606         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8607         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8608         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8609         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8610
8611         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8612         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8613         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8614         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8615                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8616                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8617                 match events[0] {
8618                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8619                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8620                         },
8621                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8622                 };
8623         }
8624         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8625         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8626         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8627         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8628
8629         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8630         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8631         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8632                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8633                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8634                         (*msg).clone()
8635                 },
8636                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8637         };
8638         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8639                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8640                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8641                         (*updates).clone()
8642                 },
8643                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8644         };
8645
8646         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8647         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8648         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8649         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8650
8651         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8652         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8653         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8654                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8655                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8656                         (*msg).clone()
8657                 },
8658                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8659         };
8660         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8661         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8662
8663         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8664         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8665         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8666         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8667         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8668                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8669                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8670                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8671                 if broadcast_alice {
8672                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8673                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8674                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8675                 }
8676                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8677                 if broadcast_alice {
8678                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8679                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8680                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8681                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8682                         // broadcasted.
8683                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8684                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8685                 } else {
8686                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8687                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8688                 }
8689         }
8690
8691         // Step (6):
8692         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8693         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8694         {
8695                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8696                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8697                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8698                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8699                 }
8700                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8701                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8702                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8703                 };
8704                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8705                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8706                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8707                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8708                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8709                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8710                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8711                 } else {
8712                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8713                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8714                 }
8715         }
8716 }
8717
8718 #[test]
8719 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8720         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8721         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8722         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8723         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8724 }
8725
8726 #[test]
8727 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8728         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8729         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8730         //
8731         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8732         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8733         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8734         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8735         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8736         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8737         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8738         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8739
8740         // Create an initial channel
8741         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8742         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8743         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8744         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8745
8746         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8747         // that it is rejected.
8748         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8749         {
8750                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8751                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8752                 match events[0] {
8753                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8754                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8755                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8756                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8757                                 // move forward with it.
8758                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8759                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8760                         },
8761                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8762                 }
8763         }
8764
8765         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8766         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8767
8768         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8769         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8770
8771         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8772         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8773         {
8774                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8775                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8776                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8777                 added_monitors.clear();
8778         }
8779         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8780
8781         let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8782         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8783
8784         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8785         // temporary one).
8786
8787         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8788         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8789         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8790         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8791         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8792         {
8793                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8794                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8795                 match events[0] {
8796                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8797                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8798                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8799                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8800                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8801                         },
8802                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8803                 }
8804         }
8805
8806         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8807         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8808         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8809         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8810         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8811         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8812
8813         let funding_created = {
8814                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8815                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8816                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8817                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8818         };
8819         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8820         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8821         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8822         // still needs to be cleared here.
8823         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8824
8825         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8826         {
8827                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8828                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8829                 match events[0] {
8830                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8831                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8832                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8833                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8834                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8835                         },
8836                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8837                 }
8838         }
8839
8840         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8841         // everything is functional.
8842         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8843         {
8844                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8845                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8846                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8847                 added_monitors.clear();
8848         }
8849
8850         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8851         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8852         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8853         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8854
8855         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8856         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8857         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8858         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8859 }
8860
8861 #[test]
8862 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8863         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8864         //
8865         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8866         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8867         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8868         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8869         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8870         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8871         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8872
8873         // Create some initial channels
8874         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8875         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8876         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8877
8878         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8879         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8880         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8881
8882         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8883         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8884         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8885
8886         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8887         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8888         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8889         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8890         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8891         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8892         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8893         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8894         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8895
8896         // A null channel ID should close all channels
8897         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8898         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8899         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8900         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8901         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8902         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8903         match events[0] {
8904                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8905                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8906                 },
8907                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8908         }
8909         match events[1] {
8910                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8911                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8912                 },
8913                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8914         }
8915         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8916         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8917         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8918         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8919         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8920         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8921
8922         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8923         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8924         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8925 }
8926
8927 #[test]
8928 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8929         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8930         //
8931         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8932         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8933         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8934         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8935         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8936         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8937         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8938         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8939
8940         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8941         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8942         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8943
8944         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
8945         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8946                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8947                 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
8948         }
8949
8950         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8951         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8952         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8953
8954         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8955         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8956
8957         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8958         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8959
8960         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8961         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8962         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8963
8964         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
8965         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8966         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8968         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8969         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8970         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8971                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8972                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8973                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
8974                 } else { panic!(); }
8975         } else { panic!(); }
8976         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8977 }
8978
8979 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8980         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8981         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8982         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8983         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8984         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8985         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8986         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8987         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8988         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8989         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8990         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8991         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8992         // until we learned about an additional block.
8993         //
8994         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8995         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8996         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8997         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8998         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8999         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9000         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9001
9002         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9003         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9004         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9005         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9006         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9007
9008         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9009         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9010         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9011         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9012         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9013         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9014
9015         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9016         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9017                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9018         }
9019         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9020                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9021         if test_height_before_timelock {
9022                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9023                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9024                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9025                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9026         } else {
9027                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9028                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9029                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9030                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9031                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9032                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9033                 // timelock is up).
9034                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9035                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9036
9037                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9038                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9039                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9040                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9041                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9042                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9043                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9044
9045                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9046                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9047                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9048                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9049                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9050                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9051                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9052                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9053                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9054         }
9055 }
9056
9057 #[test]
9058 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9059         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9060         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9061 }
9062
9063 #[test]
9064 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9065         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9066         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9067         // HTLCs.
9068         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9069
9070         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9071         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9072         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9073         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9074         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9075         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9076         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9077         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9078         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9079
9080         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9081         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9082         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9083         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9084
9085         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9086         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9087         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9088         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9089         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9090
9091         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9092
9093         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9094         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9095         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9096         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9097
9098         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9099         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9100         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9101         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9102         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9103
9104         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9105         // generated
9106         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9107
9108         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9109         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9110         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9111
9112         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9113         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9114         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9115         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9116         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9117
9118         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9119         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9120         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9121         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9122
9123         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9124         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9125                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9126         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9127         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9128         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9129                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9130         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9131
9132         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9133         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9134                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9135                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9136                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9137                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9138                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9139                         keys_manager,
9140                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9141                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9142                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9143                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9144                         channel_monitors,
9145                 }).unwrap()
9146         };
9147         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9148         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9149
9150         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9151         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9152         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9153         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9154
9155         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9156         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9157         // the commitment state.
9158         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9159
9160         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9161
9162         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9163         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9165
9166         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9167         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9168         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9169         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9170         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9171         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9172         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9173
9174         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9175         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9176 }
9177
9178 #[test]
9179 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9180         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9181         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9182         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9183         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9184
9185         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9186         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9187         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9188         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9189         let params = RouteParameters {
9190                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9191                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9192                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9193         };
9194         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9195         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
9196
9197         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9198         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9199         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9200         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9201         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9202         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9203         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9204         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9205         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9206 }
9207
9208 #[test]
9209 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9210         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9211         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9212         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9213         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9214
9215         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9216         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9217         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9218         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9219
9220         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9221         let params = RouteParameters {
9222                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9223                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9224                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9225         };
9226         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9227         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9228         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9229         let route = find_route(
9230                 &payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9231                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9232         ).unwrap();
9233
9234         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9235         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9236         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9237         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9238         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9239         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9240         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9241         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9242         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9243 }
9244
9245 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9246 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9247 enum ExposureEvent {
9248         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9249         AtHTLCForward,
9250         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9251         AtHTLCReception,
9252         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9253         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9254 }
9255
9256 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9257         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9258         // policy.
9259         //
9260         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9261         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9262         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9263         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9264         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9265         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9266         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9267         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9268
9269         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9270         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9271         config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9272         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9273         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9274         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9275
9276         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9277         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9278         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9279         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9280         if on_holder_tx {
9281                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9282         }
9283         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9284         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9285         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9286
9287         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9288
9289         if on_holder_tx {
9290                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9291                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9292                 }
9293         }
9294
9295         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9296         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9297         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9298
9299         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9300         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9301
9302         let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9303         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9304         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9305
9306         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9307                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9308                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9309                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9310         };
9311         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9312         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9313
9314         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9315         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9316
9317         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9318         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9319
9320         if on_holder_tx {
9321                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9322                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9323                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9324                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9325                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9326                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9327                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9328                         }
9329                 } else {
9330                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9331                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9332                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9333                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9334                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9335                         }
9336                 }
9337         } else {
9338                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9339                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9340                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9341                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9342                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9343                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9344                         }
9345                 } else {
9346                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9347                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9348                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9349                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9350                         }
9351                 }
9352         }
9353
9354         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9355         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9356                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9357                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9358                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9359                 if on_holder_tx {
9360                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9361                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9362                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9363                 } else {
9364                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9365                 }
9366         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9367                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9368                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9369                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9370                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9371                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9372                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9373                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9374                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9375                 if on_holder_tx {
9376                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9377                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9378                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9379                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9380                 } else {
9381                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9382                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9383                 }
9384         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9385                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9386                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9387                 {
9388                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9389                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9390                 }
9391                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9392                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9393                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9394         }
9395
9396         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9397         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9398         added_monitors.clear();
9399 }
9400
9401 #[test]
9402 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9403         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9404         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9405         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9406         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9407         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9408         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9409         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9410         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9411         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9412         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9413         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9414         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9415 }