_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
  21 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  22 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  23 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS};
  24 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  25 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  26 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  27 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  28 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  30 use crate::ln::msgs;
  31 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  32 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  33 use crate::util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  34 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  38
  39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
  46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  47
  48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  50
  51 use regex;
  52
  53 use crate::io;
  54 use crate::prelude::*;
  55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  56 use core::default::Default;
  57 use core::iter::repeat;
  58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  59 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  60
  61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  63
  64 #[test]
  65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  66         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  67         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  68         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  69         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  70         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  71         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  72         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  73         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  74
  75         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  76         // funding satoshis
  77         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  78         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
  79         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  80
  81         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  82         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  83
  84         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  85         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  86
  87         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  88         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  89         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  90                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  91                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  92                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  93                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  94                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  95                         match action {
  96                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  97                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  98                                 },
  99                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 100                         }
 101                 } else { assert!(false); }
 102         };
 103
 104         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 105
 106         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 107         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 108         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 109
 110         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 111
 112         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 113
 114         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 115
 116         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 117
 118         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 119
 120         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 121
 122         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 123 }
 124
 125 #[test]
 126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 127         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 128         // them.
 129         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 130         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 131         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 132         node_cfgs[1].features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_wumbo();
 133         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 134         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 135
 136         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
 137                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 138                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 139                 },
 140                 _ => panic!()
 141         }
 142 }
 143
 144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 145         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 146         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 147         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 148         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 149         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 150         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 151         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 152         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 153         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 154
 155         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 156         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 157         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 158         let opt_anchors = false;
 159         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 160         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 161
 162         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 163         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 164         if !send_from_initiator {
 165                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 166                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 167         }
 168         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
 169
 170         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 171         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 172         if send_from_initiator {
 173                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 174                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 175         }
 176         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
 177         {
 178                 let mut lock;
 179                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
 180                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 181                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 182         }
 183
 184         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 185         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 186         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 187
 188         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 189         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 190         if send_from_initiator {
 191                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 192                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 193                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 194                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 195                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 196         } else {
 197                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 198         }
 199 }
 200
 201 #[test]
 202 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 203         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 204         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 205 }
 206
 207 #[test]
 208 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 209         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 210         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 211         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 212         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 213         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 214
 215         // balancing
 216         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 217
 218         // A                                        B
 219         // update_fee                            ->
 220         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 221         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 222         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 223         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 224         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 225         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 226         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 227         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 228         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 229         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 230         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 231         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 232         //                                       <- RAA
 233         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 234
 235         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 236         {
 237                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 238                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 239         }
 240         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 241         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 242
 243         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 244         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 245         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 246                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 247                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 248                 },
 249                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 250         };
 251
 252         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 253
 254         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 255         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 256         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 257         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 258
 259         let payment_event = {
 260                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 261                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 262                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 263         };
 264         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 265         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 266
 267         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 268         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 269         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 270         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 271         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 272         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 273
 274         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 275         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 276         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 277         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 278         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 279
 280         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 281         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 282         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 283         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 284         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 285         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 286         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 287         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 288
 289         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 290         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 291         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 292         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 293         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 294         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 295         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 296         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 297
 298         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 299         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 300         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 302
 303         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 304         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 306
 307         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 309
 310         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 311         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 312         match events_2[0] {
 313                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 314                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 315         }
 316
 317         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 318         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 319 }
 320
 321 #[test]
 322 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 323         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 324         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 325         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 326         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 327         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 328         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 329         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 330
 331         // balancing
 332         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 333
 334         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 335         {
 336                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 337                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 338         }
 339         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 341
 342         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 343         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 344         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 345                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 346                         update_fee.as_ref()
 347                 },
 348                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 349         };
 350
 351         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 352
 353         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 354         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 355         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 356         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 357
 358         let payment_event = {
 359                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 360                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 361                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 362         };
 363         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 364         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 365
 366         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 367         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 368         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 369         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 370         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 372
 373         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 374         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 375
 376         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 377 }
 378
 379 #[test]
 380 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 381         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 382         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 383         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 384         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 385         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 386
 387         // A                                        B
 388         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 389         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 390         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 391         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 392         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 393         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 394         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 395         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 396         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 397         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 398         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 399         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 400         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 401         //                                          B should send no response here
 402         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 403         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 404         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 405
 406         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 407         let initial_feerate;
 408         {
 409                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 410                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 411                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 412         }
 413         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 414         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 415
 416         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 417         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 418         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 419                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 420                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 421                 },
 422                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 423         };
 424
 425         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 426         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 427         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 428         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 429         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 430
 431         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 432         // transaction:
 433         {
 434                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 435                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 436         }
 437         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 438         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 439         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 440
 441         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 442         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 443                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 444                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 445         };
 446
 447         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 448
 449         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 450         // Deliver (3)
 451         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 452
 453         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 454         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 455         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 456         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 457         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 458         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 459         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 460         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 461         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 462         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 463         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 464
 465         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 466         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 467         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 468         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 469         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 470
 471         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 472         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 474
 475         // Delever (4)
 476         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 477         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 478         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 479
 480         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 481         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 483
 484         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 485         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 486         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 488
 489         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 490         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 491         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 492 }
 493
 494 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 495         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 496         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 497         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 498         // Node objects.
 499
 500         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 501         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 502         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 503         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 504
 505         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 506                 let block = Block {
 507                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 508                         txdata: vec![],
 509                 };
 510                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 511                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 512         }
 513
 514         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 515         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 516         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 517
 518         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 519         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
 520         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 521
 522         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 523         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
 524
 525         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 526
 527         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 528         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 529         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 530         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 531
 532         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 533         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 534         {
 535                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 536                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 537                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 538                 added_monitors.clear();
 539         }
 540         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 541
 542         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 543         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 544         {
 545                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 546                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 547                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 548                 added_monitors.clear();
 549         }
 550
 551         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 552         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 553
 554         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 555         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 556
 557         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 558         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 559         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 560         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 561         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 562 }
 563
 564 #[test]
 565 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 566         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 567         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 568         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 569         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 570         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 571         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 572         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 573         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 574         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 576         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 577         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 578         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 584 }
 585
 586 #[test]
 587 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 588         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 589         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 590         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 591         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 592         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 593
 594         {
 595                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 596                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 597         }
 598         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 599         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 600
 601         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 602         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 603         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 604                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 605                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 606                 },
 607                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 608         };
 609         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 610
 611         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 612         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 613         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 614
 615         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 616         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 617         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 618
 619         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 620         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 621         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 623
 624         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 625         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 626         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 627 }
 628
 629 #[test]
 630 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 631         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 632         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 633         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 634         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 635         let channel_value = 5000;
 636         let push_sats = 700;
 637         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 638         let channel_id = chan.2;
 639         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 640         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 641         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 642
 643         let opt_anchors = false;
 644
 645         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 646         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 647         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 648         // remote limit.
 649         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 650         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 651         {
 652                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 653                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 654         }
 655         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 656         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 657         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 658
 659         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 660
 661         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 662
 663         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 664         {
 665                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 666
 667                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 668                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 669                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 670                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 671                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 672                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 673         }
 674
 675         {
 676                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 677                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 678                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 679         }
 680         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 681         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 682         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 683
 684         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 685
 686         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 687         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 688         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 689                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 690                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 691                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 692                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 693                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 694                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 695         };
 696         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 697                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 698                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 699                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 700                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 701                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 702                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 703                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 704         };
 705
 706         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 707         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 708                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 709
 710         let res = {
 711                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 712                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 713                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 714                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 715                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 716                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 717                         push_sats,
 718                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 719                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 720                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 721                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 722                         &mut htlcs,
 723                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 724                 );
 725                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 726         };
 727
 728         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 729                 channel_id: chan.2,
 730                 signature: res.0,
 731                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 732         };
 733
 734         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 735                 channel_id: chan.2,
 736                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 737         };
 738
 739         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 740
 741         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 742         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 743         //Should produce and error.
 744         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 745         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 746         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 747         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 748         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 749 }
 750
 751 #[test]
 752 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 753         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 754         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 755         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 756         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 757         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 758
 759         // balancing
 760         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 761
 762         {
 763                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 764                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 765         }
 766         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 767         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 768
 769         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 770         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 771         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 772                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 773                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 774                 },
 775                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 776         };
 777         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 778         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 779         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 780         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 781
 782         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 783
 784         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 785         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 786         {
 787                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 788                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 789                 added_monitors.clear();
 790         }
 791         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 792         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 793         // node[1] has nothing to do
 794
 795         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 796         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 797         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 798
 799         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 800         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 801         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 803         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 804         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 805         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 806
 807         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 808         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 809         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 810         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 811         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 812         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 813
 814         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 815         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 816         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 817         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 818
 819         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 820         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 821         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 822
 823         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 824         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 825         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 826         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 827
 828         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 829         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 830         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 831
 832         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 833
 834         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 835         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 836         match events[0] {
 837                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 838                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 839         };
 840
 841         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 842
 843         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 844         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 845         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 846         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 847         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 848 }
 849
 850 #[test]
 851 fn test_update_fee() {
 852         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 853         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 854         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 855         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 856         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 857         let channel_id = chan.2;
 858
 859         // A                                        B
 860         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 861         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 862         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 863         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 864         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 865         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 866         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 867         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 868         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 869         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 870         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 871         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 872
 873         // Create and deliver (1)...
 874         let feerate;
 875         {
 876                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 877                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 878                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 879         }
 880         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 881         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 882
 883         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 884         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 885         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 886                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 887                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 888                 },
 889                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 890         };
 891         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 892
 893         // Generate (2) and (3):
 894         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 895         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 897
 898         // Deliver (2):
 899         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 900         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 901         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 902
 903         // Create and deliver (4)...
 904         {
 905                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 906                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 907         }
 908         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 910         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 911         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 912         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 913                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 914                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 915                 },
 916                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 917         };
 918
 919         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 920         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 922         // ... creating (5)
 923         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 924         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 925
 926         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 927         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 928         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 929         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 930         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 931
 932         // Deliver (5):
 933         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 934         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 935         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 936
 937         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 938         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 939         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 940         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 941         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 942         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 943         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 944         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 946
 947         // Deliver (7)
 948         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 949         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 950         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 951         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 952
 953         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 955         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 956
 957         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 958         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 959         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 960         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 961         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 962 }
 963
 964 #[test]
 965 fn fake_network_test() {
 966         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 967         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 968         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 969         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 970         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 971         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 972
 973         // Create some initial channels
 974         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 975         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 976         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 977
 978         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 979         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 980         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 981         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 982         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 983
 984         // Send some more payments
 985         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 986         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 987         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 988
 989         // Test failure packets
 990         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 991         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 992
 993         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 994         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 995
 996         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 997         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 998         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 999         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1000         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1001         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1002         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1003
1004         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1005         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1006         hops.push(RouteHop {
1007                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1008                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1009                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1010                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1011                 fee_msat: 0,
1012                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1013         });
1014         hops.push(RouteHop {
1015                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1016                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1017                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1018                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1019                 fee_msat: 0,
1020                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1021         });
1022         hops.push(RouteHop {
1023                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1024                 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1025                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1026                 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1027                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1028                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1029         });
1030         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1031         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1032         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1033
1034         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1035         hops.push(RouteHop {
1036                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1037                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1038                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1039                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1040                 fee_msat: 0,
1041                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1042         });
1043         hops.push(RouteHop {
1044                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1045                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1046                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1047                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1048                 fee_msat: 0,
1049                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1050         });
1051         hops.push(RouteHop {
1052                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1053                 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1054                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1055                 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1056                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1057                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1058         });
1059         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1060         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1061         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1062
1063         // Claim the rebalances...
1064         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1065         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1066
1067         // Close down the channels...
1068         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1069         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1070         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1071         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1072         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1073         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1074         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1075         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1076         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1077         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1078         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1079         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1080 }
1081
1082 #[test]
1083 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1084         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1085         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1086         // commitment dance rounds.
1087         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1088         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1089         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1090         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1091         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1092         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1093
1094         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1095         for _ in 0..crate::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1096                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1097                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1098                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1099         }
1100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1101
1102         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1103         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1104         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1105         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1106
1107         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1108         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1109         // another HTLC.
1110         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1111         {
1112                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1113                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1114                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1115                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1116         }
1117
1118         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1119         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1120         {
1121                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1122                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1123         }
1124
1125         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1126         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1127         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1128         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1129
1130         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1131         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1132         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1133         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1134         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1135         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1136         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1137
1138         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1139         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1140         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1141
1142         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1143
1144         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1145         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1146         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1148
1149         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1150         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1152         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1153
1154         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1156         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1157
1158         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1159                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1160         }
1161         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1163         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1165         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1166
1167         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1169         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1170         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1171         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1172
1173         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1175
1176         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1177
1178         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1179         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1180         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1181                 match event {
1182                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1183                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1184                         },
1185                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1186                 };
1187         }
1188
1189         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1190                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1191         }
1192
1193         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1194 }
1195
1196 #[test]
1197 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1198         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1199         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1200         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1201         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1202         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1203         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1204
1205         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1206         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1207         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1208         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1209         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1210         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1211
1212         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1213
1214         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1215         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1216
1217         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1218         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1219
1220         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1221         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1222         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1223 }
1224
1225 #[test]
1226 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1227         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1228         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1229         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1230         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1231         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1232         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1233         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1234
1235         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1236
1237         // balancing
1238         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1239
1240         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1241
1242         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1243         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1244         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1245
1246         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1247         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1248         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1250
1251         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1252         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1253
1254         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1255         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1256         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1257                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1258                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1259                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1260                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1261                 }
1262         }
1263         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1264
1265         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1266         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1267         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1268         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1269
1270         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1271         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 5);
1272
1273         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1274         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
1275         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
1276
1277         check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
1278         check_spends!(claim_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
1279         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1280         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1281                 (&claim_txn[3], &claim_txn[4])
1282         } else {
1283                 (&claim_txn[4], &claim_txn[3])
1284         };
1285
1286         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1287         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1288
1289         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1290         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1291         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1292
1293         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1294         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1295         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1296         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1297
1298         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1299         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1300         for e in events {
1301                 match e {
1302                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1303                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1304                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1305                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1306                         },
1307                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1308                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1309                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1310                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1311                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1312                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1313                         },
1314                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1315                 }
1316         }
1317 }
1318
1319 #[test]
1320 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1321         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1322         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1323         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1324         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1325         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1326
1327         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1328         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1329
1330         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1331         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1332         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1333         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1334         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1335         match err {
1336                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1337                         match &fails[0] {
1338                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1339                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1340                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1341                         }
1342                 },
1343                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1344         }
1345         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1346         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1347
1348         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1349 }
1350
1351 #[test]
1352 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1353         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1354         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1355         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1356         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1357         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1358
1359         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1360         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1361         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1362         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1363
1364         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1365
1366         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1367         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1368         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1369         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1370                 channel_id: chan.2,
1371                 htlc_id: 0,
1372                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1373                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1374                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1375                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1376         };
1377
1378         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1379
1380         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1381         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1382         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1383
1384         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1385
1386         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1387
1388         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1389         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1390         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1391                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1392                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1393                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1394                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1395                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1396
1397                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1398                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1399                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1400                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1401                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1402         };
1403         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1404                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1405                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1406                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1407                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1408                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1409                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1410                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1411         };
1412
1413         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1414         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1415                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1416
1417         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1418         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1419         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1420
1421         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1422                 offered: false,
1423                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1424                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1425                 payment_hash,
1426                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1427         };
1428
1429         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1430
1431         let res = {
1432                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1433                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1434                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1435                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1436                         commitment_number,
1437                         95000,
1438                         local_chan_balance,
1439                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1440                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1441                         feerate_per_kw,
1442                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1443                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1444                 );
1445                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1446         };
1447
1448         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1449                 channel_id: chan.2,
1450                 signature: res.0,
1451                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1452         };
1453
1454         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1455         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1456         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1457
1458         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1459         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1460                 channel_id: chan.2,
1461                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1462                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1463         };
1464         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1465
1466         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1467         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1468         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1469         match events[0] {
1470                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1471                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1472                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1473                 },
1474                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1475         };
1476         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1477                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1478
1479         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1480 }
1481
1482 #[test]
1483 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1484         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1485         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1486         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1487         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1488         // this situation.
1489         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1490         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1491         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1492         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1493         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1494         let opt_anchors = false;
1495
1496         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1497         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1498
1499         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1500
1501         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1502
1503         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1504         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1505                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1506         }
1507
1508         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1509         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1510         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1511                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1512         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1513         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1514 }
1515
1516 #[test]
1517 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1518         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1519         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1520         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1521         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1522         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1523         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1524         let opt_anchors = false;
1525
1526         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1527         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1528         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1529         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1530         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1531         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1532         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1533
1534         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1535         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1536                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1537         }
1538
1539         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1540         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1541         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1542         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1543         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1544         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1545         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1546         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1547         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1548                 channel_id: chan.2,
1549                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1550                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1551                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1552                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1553                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1554         };
1555
1556         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1557         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1558         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1559         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1560         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1561         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1562         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1563         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1564 }
1565
1566 #[test]
1567 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1568         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1569         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1570         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1571         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1572
1573         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1574         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1575         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1576         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1577         let opt_anchors = false;
1578
1579         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1580         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1581         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1582         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1583         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1584         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1585         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1586
1587         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1588                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1589         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1590         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1591         // commitment transaction fee.
1592         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1593
1594         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1595         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1596                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1597         }
1598
1599         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1600         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1601         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1602                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1603 }
1604
1605 #[test]
1606 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1607         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1608         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1609         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1610         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1611         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1612         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1613         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1614         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1615         let opt_anchors = false;
1616
1617         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1618         // HTLC.
1619         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1620         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1621         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1622                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1623
1624         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1625         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1626         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1627         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1628         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1629         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1630         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg);
1631
1632         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1633         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1634         match msg_events[0] {
1635                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1636                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1637                 },
1638                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1639         }
1640 }
1641
1642 #[test]
1643 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1644         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1645         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1646         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1647         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1648         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1649         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1650         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1651
1652         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1653         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1654         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1655         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1656         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1657         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1658
1659         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1660         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1664         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1665
1666         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1667         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1668         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1669         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670 }
1671
1672 #[test]
1673 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1674         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1675         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1676         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1677         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1678         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1679         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1680
1681         let feemsat = 239;
1682         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1683         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1684         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1685         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1686
1687         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1688         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1689         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1690         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1691
1692         // Add a pending HTLC.
1693         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1694         let payment_event_1 = {
1695                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1696                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1697
1698                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1699                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1700                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1701         };
1702         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1703
1704         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1705         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1706         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1707         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1708         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1709
1710         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1711         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1712         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1713         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1714         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1715         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1716         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1717         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1718                 channel_id: chan.2,
1719                 htlc_id: 1,
1720                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1721                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1722                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1723                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1724         };
1725
1726         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1727         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1728         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1729         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1730         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1731         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1732         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1733         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1734 }
1735
1736 #[test]
1737 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1738         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1739         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1740         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1741         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1742         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1743         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1744         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1745         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1746         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1747         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1748
1749         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1750         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1751         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1752
1753         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1754         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1755 }
1756
1757 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1758         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1759 }
1760
1761 #[test]
1762 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1763         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1764         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1765         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1766         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1767         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1768         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1769         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1770         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1771         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1772         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1773
1774         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1775         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1776
1777         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1778         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1779
1780         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1781                 ($node: expr) => {{
1782                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1783                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1784                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1785                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1786                         payment_event
1787                 }}
1788         }
1789
1790         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1791         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1792         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1793         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1794
1795         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1796
1797         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1798         {
1799                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1800                         .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1801                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1802                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1803                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1804
1805                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1806                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1807                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1808                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1809         }
1810
1811         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1812         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1813         loop {
1814                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1815                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1816                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1817                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1818                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1819                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1820                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1821                         break;
1822                 }
1823
1824                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1825                         .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1826                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1827                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1828                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1829
1830                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1831                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1832                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1833                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1834                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1835                 );
1836
1837                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1838                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1839                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1840                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1841                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1842         }
1843
1844         // adding pending output.
1845         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1846         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1847         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1848         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1849         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1850         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1851         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1852         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1853         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1854         // policy.
1855         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1856         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1857         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1858
1859         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1860         let payment_event_1 = {
1861                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1862                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1863
1864                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1865                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1866                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1867         };
1868         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1869
1870         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1871         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1872         {
1873                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1874                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1875                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1876                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1877         }
1878
1879         // split the rest to test holding cell
1880         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1881         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1882         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1883         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1884         {
1885                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1886                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1887         }
1888
1889         // now see if they go through on both sides
1890         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1891         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1892         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1893         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1894         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1895         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1896
1897         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1898         {
1899                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1900                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1901                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1902                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1903                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1904         }
1905
1906         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1907         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1908         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1910         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1911         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1912
1913         // flush the pending htlc
1914         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1915         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1916         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1917
1918         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1919         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1921         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1922
1923         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1924         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1925         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1926         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1927
1928         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1929         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1930         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1931
1932         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1933
1934         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1935         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1936         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1937
1938         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1939         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1940
1941         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1942         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1943         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1944         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1945         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1946         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1947
1948         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1949         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1950         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1951         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1952
1953         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1954         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1955
1956         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1957         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1958         match events[0] {
1959                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1960                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1961                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1962                         match &purpose {
1963                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1964                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1965                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1966                                 },
1967                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1968                         }
1969                 },
1970                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1971         }
1972         match events[1] {
1973                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1974                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1975                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1976                         match &purpose {
1977                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1978                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1979                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1980                                 },
1981                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1982                         }
1983                 },
1984                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1985         }
1986
1987         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1988         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1989         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1990
1991         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1992         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1993         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1994
1995         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
1996         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1997         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1998         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1999         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2000
2001         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2002         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2003 }
2004
2005 #[test]
2006 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2007         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2008         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2009         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2010         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2011         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2012         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2013         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2014         // To test this we:
2015         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2016         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2017         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2018         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2019         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2020         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2021         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2022         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2023         //    claim,
2024         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2025         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2026         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2027         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2028         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2029         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2030         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2031         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2032         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2033         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2034
2035         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2036         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2037         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2038         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2039         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2040
2041         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2042         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2043         let send_1 = {
2044                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2045                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2046                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2047                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2048                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2049         };
2050
2051         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2052         // initial fulfill/CS.
2053         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2054         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2055         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2056         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2057
2058         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2059         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2060         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2061         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2062         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2063         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2064
2065         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2066         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2067         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2068         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2069         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2070
2071         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2072         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2074         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2075         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2076
2077         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2078         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2079         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2080
2081         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2083         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2084
2085         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2086         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2087         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2088
2089         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2090         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2091         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2092         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2093         // on-chain as necessary).
2094         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2095         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2096         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2097         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2098         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2099
2100         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2101         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2102         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2103
2104         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2105         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2106
2107         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2108         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2109         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2110         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2111         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2112         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2113
2114         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2115         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2116         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2117         let send_2 = {
2118                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2119                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2120                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2121                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2122                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2123         };
2124
2125         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2126         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2127         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2128         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2129
2130         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2131
2132         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2133         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2134         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2135
2136         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2137         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2138
2139         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2141         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2142         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2143
2144         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2145         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2146         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2147
2148         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2149         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2150
2151         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2152         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2153
2154         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2155         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2156 }
2157
2158 #[test]
2159 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2160         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2161         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2162         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2163         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2164         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2165         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2166
2167         // Create some initial channels
2168         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2169         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2170         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2171         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2172
2173         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2174         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2175         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2176         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2177         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2178         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2179
2180         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2181         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2182         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2183         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2184         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2185
2186         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2187         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2189         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2190         {
2191                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2192                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2193                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2194                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2195                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2196         }
2197         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2198         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2199         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2200         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2201         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2202
2203         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2204         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2205
2206         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2207         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2208         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2209         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2210         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2211         {
2212                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2213                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2214                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2215                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2216                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2217                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2218         }
2219         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2220         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2221         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2222         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2223         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2224
2225         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2226                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2227                         {
2228                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2229                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2230                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2231
2232                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2233                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2234                                 match events[0] {
2235                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2236                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2237                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2238                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2239                                         },
2240                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2241                                 };
2242                         }
2243                 }
2244         }
2245
2246         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2247         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2248         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2250         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2251         let node2_commitment_txid;
2252         {
2253                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2254                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2255                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2256                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2257
2258                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2259                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2260                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2261                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2262                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2263         }
2264         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2265         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2266         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2267         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2268         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2269
2270         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2271         // confusing us in the following tests.
2272         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2273
2274         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2275         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2276         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2277         // buffer space).
2278
2279         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2280                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2281                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2282                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2283                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2284                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2285                                 msg.clone()
2286                         },
2287                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2288                 };
2289                 match events[1] {
2290                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2291                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2292                         },
2293                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2294                 }
2295                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2296
2297                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2298                 {
2299                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2300                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2301                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2302                                         false
2303                                 } else { true }
2304                         });
2305                 }
2306
2307                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2308
2309                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2310                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2311
2312                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2313                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2314                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2315                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2316                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2317                                 msg.clone()
2318                         },
2319                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2320                 };
2321                 match events[1] {
2322                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2323                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2324                         },
2325                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2326                 }
2327                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2328                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2329
2330                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2331                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2332                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2333         };
2334         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2335         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2336         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2337         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2338
2339         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2340                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2341         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2342         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2343 }
2344
2345 #[test]
2346 fn test_justice_tx() {
2347         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2348         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2349         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2350         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2351         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2352         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2353         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2354         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2355         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2356         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2357         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2358         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2359         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2360         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2361         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2362         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2363         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2364         // Create some new channels:
2365         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2366
2367         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2368         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2369         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2370         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2371         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2372         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2373         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2374         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2375         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2376         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2377         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2378         // Revoke the old state
2379         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2380
2381         {
2382                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2383                 {
2384                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2385                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2386                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2387
2388                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2389                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2390                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2391                 }
2392                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2393                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2394                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2395
2396                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2397                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2398                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2399                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2400                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2401                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2402                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2403                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2404                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2405         }
2406         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2407
2408         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2409         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2410
2411         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2412         // Create some new channels:
2413         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2414         {
2415                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2416                 node_txn.clear();
2417         }
2418
2419         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2420         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2421         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2422         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2423         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2424         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2425         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2426         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2427         // Revoke the old state
2428         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2429         {
2430                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2431                 {
2432                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2433                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2434                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2435
2436                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2437                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2438                 }
2439                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2440                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2441
2442                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2443                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2444                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2445                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2446                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2447                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2448                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2449         }
2450         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2451         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2452         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2453 }
2454
2455 #[test]
2456 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2457         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2458         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2459         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2460         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2461         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2462         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2463         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2464         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2465         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2466         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2467         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2468         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2469         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2470         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2471
2472         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2473         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2474         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2475         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2476         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2477         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2478
2479         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2480         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2481
2482         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2483         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2484         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2485         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2486         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2487 }
2488
2489 #[test]
2490 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2491         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2492         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2493         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2494         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2495         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2496         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2497
2498         // Create some new channel:
2499         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2500
2501         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2502         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2503         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2504         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2505         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2506
2507         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2508         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2509         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2510         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2511         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2512         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2513         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2514         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2515         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2516
2517         //Revoke the old state
2518         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2519
2520         {
2521                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2522                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2523                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2524                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2525                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2526                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2527                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2528                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2529
2530                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2531                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2532
2533                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2534                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2535
2536                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2537                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2538                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2539                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2540                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2541                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2542                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2543                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2544
2545                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2546                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2547                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2548
2549                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2550                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2551                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2552                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2553                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2554         }
2555         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2556         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2557         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2558 }
2559
2560 #[test]
2561 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2562         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2563         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2564         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2565         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2566         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2567         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2568
2569         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2570
2571         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2572         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2573         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2574         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2575         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2576         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2577
2578         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2579         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2580
2581         //Revoke the old state
2582         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2583
2584         {
2585                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2586                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2587                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2588                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2589                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2590                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2591                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2592                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2593                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2594                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2595                 }
2596
2597                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2598                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2599
2600                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2601                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
2602
2603                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2604                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2605                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2606                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2607                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2608                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2609                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2610
2611                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2612                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2613                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2614                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2615
2616                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2617                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2618                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2619
2620                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2621                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2622                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2623                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2624                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2625                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2626                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2627                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2628
2629                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2630                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2631                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2632                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2633                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2634                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2635                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2636         }
2637         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2638         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2639         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2640 }
2641
2642 #[test]
2643 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2644         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2645         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2646         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2647         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2648         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2649         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2650         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2651         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2652         // towards B.
2653         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2654         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2655         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2656         // PaymentSent event).
2657
2658         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2659         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2660         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2661         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2662
2663         // Create some initial channels
2664         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2665         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2666
2667         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2668         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2669         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2670         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2671         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2672
2673         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2674         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2675         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2676
2677         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2678         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2679
2680         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2681         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2682         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2683         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2684         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2685         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2686         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2687         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2688         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2689         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2690         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2691         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2692         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2693         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2694         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2695
2696         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2697         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2698         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2699         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2700         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2701         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2702         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2703         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2704         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2705         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2706         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2707         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2708         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2709         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2710         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2711         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2712         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2713
2714         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2715         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2716         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2717         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2718         {
2719                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2720                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2721                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2722                 added_monitors.clear();
2723         }
2724         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2725         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2726         match forwarded_events[0] {
2727                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2728                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2729         }
2730         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2731         match forwarded_events[1] {
2732                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2733                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2734                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2735                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2736                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2737                 },
2738                 _ => panic!()
2739         }
2740         match forwarded_events[2] {
2741                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2742                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2743                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2744                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2745                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2746                 },
2747                 _ => panic!()
2748         }
2749         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2750         {
2751                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2752                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2753                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2754                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2755                 added_monitors.clear();
2756         }
2757         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2758         match events[0] {
2759                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2760                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2761         }
2762         match events[1] {
2763                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2764                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2765         }
2766
2767         match events[2] {
2768                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2769                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2770                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2771                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2772                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2773                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2774                 },
2775                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2776         };
2777         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2778                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2779                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2780                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2781                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2782                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2783                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2784                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2785                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2786                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time.0, 0);
2787                         if $htlc_offered {
2788                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2789                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2790                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2791                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2792                         } else {
2793                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2794                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2795                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2796                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2797                         }
2798                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2799                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2800                         node_txn.clear();
2801                 } }
2802         }
2803         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2804         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2805         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2806         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2807
2808         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2809         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2810         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2811         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2812         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2813         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2814         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2815         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2816         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2817         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2818         let commitment_spend =
2819                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2820                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2821                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2822                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2823                         &node_txn[0]
2824                 } else {
2825                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2826                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2827                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2828                         &node_txn[2]
2829                 };
2830
2831         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2832         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2833         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2834         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2835         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, 0);
2836         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2837         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2838         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2839         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2840         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2841         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2842         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2843
2844         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2845         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2846         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2847         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2848         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2849         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2850         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2851         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2852         let mut first_claimed = false;
2853         for event in events {
2854                 match event {
2855                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2856                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2857                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2858                                         first_claimed = true;
2859                                 } else {
2860                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2861                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2862                                 }
2863                         },
2864                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2865                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2866                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2867                 }
2868         }
2869         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2870 }
2871
2872 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2873         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2874         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2875         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2876         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2877         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2878         //            \                                  \
2879         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2880
2881         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2882         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2883         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2884         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2885         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2886         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2887         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2888
2889         // Create some intial channels
2890         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2891         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2892
2893         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2894         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2895         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2896
2897         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2898
2899         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2900         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2901         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2902         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2903         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2904         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2905         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2906
2907         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2908         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2909         match events[0] {
2910                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2911                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2912                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2913                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2914                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2915                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2916                 },
2917                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2918         };
2919         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2920         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2922         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2923         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2924         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2925         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2926         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2927
2928         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2929         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2930         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2931         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2932         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2933         let timeout_tx;
2934         {
2935                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2936                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2937                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2938                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2939
2940                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2941                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2942
2943                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2944                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2945                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2946                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2947
2948                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2949                 node_txn.clear();
2950         }
2951
2952         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2953         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2954         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2955         {
2956                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2957                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2958                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2959                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2960         }
2961
2962         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2963         {
2964                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2965                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2966                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2967                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2968                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2969                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2970                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2971                 } else {
2972                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2973                 }
2974         }
2975
2976         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2977         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2978         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2979         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2980         match events[0] {
2981                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2982                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2983                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2984                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2985                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2986                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2987                 },
2988                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2989         };
2990
2991         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2992         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2993         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2994
2995         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2996         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2997
2998         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2999         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3000         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3001         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
3002         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3003         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
3004         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
3005         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3006         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3007 }
3008
3009 #[test]
3010 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3011         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3012         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3013         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3014 }
3015
3016 #[test]
3017 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3018         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3019         // and fail backward accordingly.
3020
3021         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3022         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3023         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3024         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3025
3026         // Create some initial channels
3027         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3028         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3029
3030         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3031         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3032         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3033         // Revoke the old state
3034         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3035
3036         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3037
3038         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3039         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3040         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3041         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3042         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3043
3044         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3045         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3046         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3047         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3048         match events[0] {
3049                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3050                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3051                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3052                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3053                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3054                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3055
3056                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3057                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3058                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3059                 },
3060                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3061         }
3062 }
3063
3064 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3065         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3066         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3067         // commitment transaction anymore.
3068         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3069         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3070         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3071         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3072         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3073         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3074         // transactions:
3075         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3076         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3077         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3078         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3079         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3080         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3081         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3082         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3083         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3084
3085         // Create some initial channels
3086         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3087         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3088
3089         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3090         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3091         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3092         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3093         // Revoke the old state
3094         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3095
3096         let value = if use_dust {
3097                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3098                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3099                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3100         } else { 3000000 };
3101
3102         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3103         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3104         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3105
3106         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3107         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3108         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3109         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3110         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3111         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3112         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3113         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3114         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3115         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3116         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3117         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3118
3119         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3120         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3122         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3123         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3124         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3125         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3126         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3127         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3128         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3129         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3130         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3131         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3132         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3133         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3134         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3135
3136         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3137         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3139         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3140         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3141         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3142         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3143         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3144         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3145         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3146         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3147         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3148         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3149         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3150         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3151         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3152         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3153         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3154
3155         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3156         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3157         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3158         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3159         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3160         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3161         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3162
3163         if deliver_bs_raa {
3164                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3165                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3166                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3167                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3168                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3169                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3170                 match events[0] {
3171                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3172                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3173                 };
3174                 match events[1] {
3175                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3176                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3177                 }
3178                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3179                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3180         }
3181
3182         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3183         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3184
3185         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3186         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3187         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3188         assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3189
3190         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3191         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 + (nodes.len() - 1) } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3192         match events[0] {
3193                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3194                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3195         }
3196         match events[1] {
3197                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3198                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3199                 },
3200                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3201         }
3202         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3203                 match events[2] {
3204                         Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3205                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3206                         },
3207                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3208                 }
3209                 match events[3] {
3210                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3211                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3212                 };
3213         }
3214         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3215         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3216
3217         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3218         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3219         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3220                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3221                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3222         }
3223         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3224                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3225                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3226                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3227                 },
3228                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3229         }
3230         if deliver_bs_raa {
3231                 match events[0] {
3232                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3233                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3234                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3235                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3236                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3237                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3238                         },
3239                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3240                 }
3241         }
3242         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3243                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3244                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3245                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3246                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3247                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3248                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3249
3250                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3251                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3252                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3253
3254                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3255
3256                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3257                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3258                         match events[0] {
3259                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3260                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3261                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3262                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3263                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3264                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3265                                         }
3266                                 },
3267                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3268                         }
3269                         match events[1] {
3270                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3271                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3272                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3273                                 },
3274                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3275                         }
3276                         match events[2] {
3277                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3278                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3279                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3280                                 },
3281                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3282                         }
3283                 },
3284                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3285         }
3286
3287         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3288         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3289         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3290 }
3291
3292 #[test]
3293 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3294         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3295         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3296         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3297         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3298 }
3299
3300 #[test]
3301 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3302         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3303         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3304         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3305         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3306 }
3307
3308 #[test]
3309 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3310         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3311         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3312         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3313         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3314         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3315
3316         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3317         {
3318                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3319                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3320                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3321
3322                 let payment_event = {
3323                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3324                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3325                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3326                 };
3327                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3328                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3329         }
3330
3331         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3332         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3333         {
3334                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3335                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3336
3337                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3338         }
3339
3340         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3341         {
3342                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3343
3344                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3345                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3346                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3347                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3348                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3349                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3350
3351                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3352                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3353                         channel_id: chan.2,
3354                         htlc_id: 0,
3355                         amount_msat: 0,
3356                         payment_hash,
3357                         cltv_expiry,
3358                         onion_routing_packet,
3359                 };
3360                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3361         }
3362         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3363         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3364         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3365         match events[0] {
3366                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3367                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3368                 },
3369                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3370         }
3371         match events[1] {
3372                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3373                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3374                 },
3375                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3376         }
3377         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3378         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3379 }
3380
3381 #[test]
3382 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3383         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3384         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3385         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3386         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3387         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3388         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3389         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3390
3391         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3392         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3393         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3394         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3395         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3396         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3397
3398         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3399         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3400         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3401
3402         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3403         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3404         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3405         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3406         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3407
3408         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3409         // registering new transactions
3410         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3411         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3412 }
3413
3414 #[test]
3415 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3416         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3417         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3418         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3419         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3420         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3421         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3422         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3423
3424         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3425
3426         let mut payment_event = {
3427                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3428                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3429
3430                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3431                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3432                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3433         };
3434
3435         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3436         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3437
3438         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3439
3440         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3441         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3442         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3443         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3444
3445         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3446         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3447         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3448         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3449         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3450
3451         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3452         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3453         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3454
3455         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3456         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3457         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3458         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3459         let tx = {
3460                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3461                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3462                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3463                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3464                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3465                 node_txn.remove(0)
3466         };
3467
3468         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3469
3470         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3471         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3472         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3473         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3474
3475         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3476         {
3477                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3478                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3479         }
3480         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3481         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3482         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3483         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3484         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3485         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3486         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3487
3488         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3489 }
3490
3491 #[test]
3492 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3493         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3494         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3495         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3496         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3497
3498         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3499         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3500         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3501         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3502         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3503
3504         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3505
3506         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3507         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3508         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3509         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3510         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3511         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3512
3513         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3514         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3515
3516         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3517         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3518 }
3519
3520 #[test]
3521 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3522         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3523         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3524         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3525         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3526         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3527         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3528
3529         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3530         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3531         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3532         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3533         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
3534         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3535         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
3536
3537         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3538         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3539
3540         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3541
3542         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3543         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3544
3545         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3546         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3547         // broadcasted.
3548         {
3549                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3550         }
3551
3552         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3553         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3554         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3555         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3556
3557         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3558         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3559 }
3560
3561 #[test]
3562 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3563         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3564         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3565         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3566         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3567         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3568         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3569         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3570
3571         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3572         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3573         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3574
3575         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3576         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3577         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3578         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3579
3580         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3581         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3582         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3583
3584         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3585         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3586         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3587         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3588
3589         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3590         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3591
3592         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3593         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3594
3595         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3596         {
3597                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3598                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3599                 match events[0] {
3600                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3601                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3602                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3603                         },
3604                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3605                 }
3606                 match events[1] {
3607                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3608                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3609                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3610                         },
3611                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3612                 }
3613                 match events[2] {
3614                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3615                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3616                 }
3617         }
3618
3619         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3620         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3621 }
3622
3623 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3624         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3625         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3626         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3627         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3628         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3629
3630         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3631         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3632                 let (channel_ready, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3633                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3634                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3635                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3636                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3637         } else {
3638                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3639         }
3640
3641         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3642
3643         let payment_event = {
3644                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3645                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3646
3647                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3648                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3649                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3650         };
3651         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3652
3653         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3654                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3655         } else {
3656                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3657                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3658                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3659                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3660                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3661
3662                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3663                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3664                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3665                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3666
3667                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3668                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3669                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3670                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3671                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3672
3673                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3674                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3675                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3676                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3677                                         }
3678                                 }
3679                         }
3680                 }
3681         }
3682
3683         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3684         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3685         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3686                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3687                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3688                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3689                         //
3690                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3691                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3692                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3693                         //
3694                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3695                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3696                 }
3697                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3698                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3699                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3700         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3701                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3702                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3703         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3704                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3705                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3706         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3707                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3708                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3709         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3710                 // Everything was delivered...
3711                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3712         }
3713
3714         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3715         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3716                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3717                 match events_1[0] {
3718                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3719                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3720                 };
3721                 match events_1[1] {
3722                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3723                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3724                 };
3725         } else {
3726                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3727                 match events_1[0] {
3728                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3729                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3730                 };
3731         }
3732
3733         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3734         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3735         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3736
3737         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3738
3739         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3740         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3741         match events_2[0] {
3742                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
3743                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3744                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3745                         match &purpose {
3746                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3747                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3748                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3749                                 },
3750                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3751                         }
3752                 },
3753                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3754         }
3755
3756         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3757         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3758         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3759
3760         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3761         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3762         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3763                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3764                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3765                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3766                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3767                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3768                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3769                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3770                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3771                 },
3772                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3773         };
3774
3775         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3776                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3777
3778                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3779                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3780                 match events_4[0] {
3781                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3782                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3783                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3784                         },
3785                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3786                 }
3787
3788                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3789                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3790                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3791                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3792
3793                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3794                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3795                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3796                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3797
3798                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3799                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3800                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3801                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3802                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3803
3804                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3805                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3806                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3807                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3808                                         }
3809                                 }
3810                         }
3811                 }
3812         }
3813
3814         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3815         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3816         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3817                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3818                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3819                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3820                 } else {
3821                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3822                 }
3823         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3824                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3825                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3826         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3827                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3828                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3829         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3830                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3831                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3832         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3833                 // Everything was delivered...
3834                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3835         }
3836
3837         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3838                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3839         }
3840
3841         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3842         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3843         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3844
3845         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3846                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3847         }
3848
3849         // Channel should still work fine...
3850         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3851         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3852         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3853 }
3854
3855 #[test]
3856 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3857         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3858         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3859         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3860         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3861 }
3862
3863 #[test]
3864 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3865         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3866         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3867         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3868         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3869 }
3870
3871 #[test]
3872 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3873         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3874         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3875         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3876         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3877         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3878         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3879         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3880         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3881         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3882
3883         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3884         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3885
3886         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3887         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3888         assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3889
3890         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3891
3892         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3893         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3894
3895         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3896         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3897         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3898
3899         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3900         let as_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]).pop().unwrap();
3901         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3902         let bs_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
3903
3904         // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a channel_ready, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3905         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3906         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3907         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3908         let as_channel_ready = match events_3[0] {
3909                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3910                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3911                         msg.clone()
3912                 },
3913                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3914         };
3915
3916         // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s channel_ready on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3917         // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3918         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3919         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3920         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3921         let chan_id;
3922         let bs_channel_ready = match events_4[0] {
3923                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3924                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3925                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3926                         msg.clone()
3927                 },
3928                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3929         };
3930         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3931                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3932                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3933                         msg.clone()
3934                 },
3935                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3936         };
3937         match events_4[2] {
3938                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3939                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3940                 },
3941                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3942         }
3943
3944         // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s channel_ready, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3945         // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3946         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3947         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3948         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3949         match events_5[0] {
3950                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3951                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3952                 },
3953                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3954         };
3955
3956         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s channel_ready, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3957         // announcement_signatures.
3958         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_channel_ready);
3959         let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3960         assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3961         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3962                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3963                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3964                         msg.clone()
3965                 },
3966                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3967         };
3968         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3969         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3970
3971         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3972         // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3973         // channel_update.
3974         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3975         let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3976         assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3977         let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3978                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3979                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3980                 },
3981                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3982         };
3983
3984         // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3985         // same channel_announcement.
3986         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3987         let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3988         assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3989         let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3990                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3991                         assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3992                         update_msg.clone()
3993                 },
3994                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3995         };
3996
3997         // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3998         nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3999         nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4000         nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4001
4002         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4003         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
4004         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
4005
4006         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
4007         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
4008         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4009
4010         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4011         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4012         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4013
4014         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4015         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4016         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4017         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4018         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4019         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4020                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4021         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4022
4023         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4024         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4025                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4026                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4027                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4028                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4029                         keys_manager,
4030                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
4031                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4032                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4033                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
4034                         channel_monitors,
4035                 }).unwrap()
4036         };
4037         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4038         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4039
4040         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4041                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4042         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4043         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4044
4045         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4046 }
4047
4048 #[test]
4049 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4050         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4051         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4052         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4053         // channel_ready immediately instead.
4054         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4055         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4056         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4057         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4058         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4059
4060         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4061
4062         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4063         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4064         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4065         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4066         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4067         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4068
4069         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4070         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4071         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4072 }
4073
4074 #[test]
4075 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4076         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4077         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4078         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4079         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4080         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4081         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4082         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4083
4084         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4085
4086         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4087         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4088         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4089         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4090
4091         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4092         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4093         match events_1[0] {
4094                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4095                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4096         }
4097
4098         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4099         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4101
4102         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4103         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4104         match events_2[0] {
4105                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4106                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4107                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4108                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4109                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4110                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4111                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4112
4113                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4114                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4115                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4116                         match events_3[0] {
4117                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4118                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4119                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4120                                 },
4121                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4122                         }
4123
4124                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4125                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4126                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4127                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4128                 },
4129                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4130         }
4131
4132         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4133         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4134
4135         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4136         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4137         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4138         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4139         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4140         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4141
4142         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4143         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4144         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4145         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4146
4147         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4148         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4149
4150         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4151         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4152
4153         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4154
4155         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4156         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4157         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4158         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4159         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4160         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4161         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4162         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4163         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4165
4166         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4167         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4168         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4169         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4170         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4171         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4172         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4173         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4174
4175         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4176         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4177         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4178         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4179         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4180         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4181         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4182         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4183
4184         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4185         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4186         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4188
4189         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4190         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4191         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4192         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4193
4194         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4195         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4196         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4197
4198         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4199
4200         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4201         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4202         match events_5[0] {
4203                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4204                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4205                         match &purpose {
4206                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4207                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4208                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4209                                 },
4210                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4211                         }
4212                 },
4213                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4214         }
4215
4216         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4217         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4218         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4219
4220         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4221         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4222 }
4223
4224 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4225         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4226         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4227         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4228         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4229         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4230         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4231
4232         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4233
4234         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4235                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4236                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4237                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4238                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4239                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4240                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4241                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4242                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4243                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4244                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4245                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4246                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4247                 our_payment_hash
4248         } else {
4249                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4250         };
4251
4252         let mut block = Block {
4253                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4254                 txdata: vec![],
4255         };
4256         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4257         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4258         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4259         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4260                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4261                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4262                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4263         }
4264
4265         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4266
4267         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4268         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4269         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4270         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4271         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4272         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4273
4274         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4275         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4276         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4277         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4278         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4279         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4280 }
4281
4282 #[test]
4283 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4284         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4285         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4286 }
4287
4288 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4289         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4290         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4291         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4292         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4293         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4294         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4295         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4296
4297         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4298         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4299         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4300         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4301
4302         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4303         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4304         {
4305                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4306         }
4307         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4309
4310         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4311         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4312         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4313         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4314         if forwarded_htlc {
4315                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4316                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4317                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4318                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4319                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4320         }
4321         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4322
4323         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4324         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4325         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4326         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4327
4328         if forwarded_htlc {
4329                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4330                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4331                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4332                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4333                 match fail_commit[0] {
4334                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4335                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4336                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4337                         },
4338                         _ => unreachable!(),
4339                 }
4340                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4341         } else {
4342                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4343                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4344                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4345                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4346                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4347                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4348                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4349                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4350         }
4351 }
4352
4353 #[test]
4354 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4355         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4356         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4357 }
4358
4359 #[test]
4360 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4361         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4362         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4363         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4364         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4365         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4366         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4367         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4368         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4369         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4370
4371         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4372
4373         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4374
4375         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4376         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4377         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4378                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4379
4380         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4381         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4382         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4383         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4384         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4385         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4386         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4387         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4388                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4389         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4390
4391         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4392         let config = UserConfig::default();
4393         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4394                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4395                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4396                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4397                         default_config: config,
4398                         keys_manager,
4399                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4400                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4401                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4402                         logger: &logger,
4403                         channel_monitors,
4404                 }).unwrap()
4405         };
4406         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4407         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4408
4409         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4410                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4411         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4412         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4413         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4414
4415         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4416         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4417         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4418         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4419
4420         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4421         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4422         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4423         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4424
4425         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4426         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4427         for node in nodes.iter() {
4428                 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4429                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4430                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4431         }
4432
4433         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4434 }
4435
4436 #[test]
4437 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4438         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4439         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4440         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4441         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4442         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4443         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4444         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4445         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4446         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4447         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4448
4449         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4450         let channel_value = 100000;
4451         let push_msat = 10001;
4452         let a_flags = channelmanager::provided_init_features();
4453         let b_flags = channelmanager::provided_init_features();
4454         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4455         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4456         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4457         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4458         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4459
4460         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
4461
4462         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
4463         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4464
4465         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4466         {
4467                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4468                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4469                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4470                 added_monitors.clear();
4471         }
4472
4473         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4474         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4475         {
4476                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4477                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4478                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4479                 added_monitors.clear();
4480         }
4481         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4482
4483         nodes.push(node_a);
4484         nodes.push(node_b);
4485
4486         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4487         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4488         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4489         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4490
4491         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4492         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4493         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4494         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4495         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4496         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4497         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4498         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4499                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4500         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4501
4502         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4503         let config = UserConfig::default();
4504         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4505                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4506                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4507                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4508                         default_config: config,
4509                         keys_manager,
4510                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4511                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4512                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4513                         logger: &logger,
4514                         channel_monitors,
4515                 }).unwrap()
4516         };
4517         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4518         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4519
4520         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4521
4522         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4523                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4524         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4525
4526         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4527         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4528         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4529         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4530         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4531
4532         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4533         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4534         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4535
4536         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4537         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4538         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4539         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4540
4541         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4542         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4543         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4544         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4545
4546         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4547         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4548         for node in nodes.iter() {
4549                 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4550                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4551                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4552         }
4553
4554         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4555 }
4556
4557 #[test]
4558 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4559         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4560         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4561         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4562         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4563         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4564         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4565         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4566         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4567         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4568         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
4569
4570         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4571         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4572
4573         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4574
4575         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4576         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4577         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4578
4579         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4580         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4581         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4582         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4583         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4584         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4585         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4586         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4587                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4588         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4589
4590         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4591         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4592                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4593                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4594                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4595                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4596                         keys_manager,
4597                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4598                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4599                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4600                         logger: &logger,
4601                         channel_monitors,
4602                 }).unwrap()
4603         };
4604         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4605         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4606
4607         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4608                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4609         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4610         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4611
4612         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4613
4614         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4615         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4616 }
4617
4618 #[test]
4619 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4620         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4621         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4622         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4623         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4624         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4625         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4626         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4627         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4628         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4629         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4630         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
4631         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
4632         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4633
4634         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4635         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4636                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4637                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4638                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4639         }
4640
4641         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4642
4643         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4644         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4645
4646         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4647         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4648         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4649         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4650
4651         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4652         // nodes[3])
4653         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4654         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4655                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4656                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4657                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4658         }
4659
4660         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4661         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4662         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4663         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4664         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4665         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4666
4667
4668         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4669         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4670                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4671                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4672                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4673                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4674         }
4675
4676         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4677         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4678                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4679                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4680                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4681                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4682         }
4683
4684         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4685         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4686                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4687                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4688                 keys_manager,
4689                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4690                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4691                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4692                 logger: &logger,
4693                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4694         }) { } else {
4695                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4696         };
4697
4698         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4699         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4700                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4701                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4702                 keys_manager,
4703                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4704                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4705                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4706                 logger: &logger,
4707                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4708         }).unwrap();
4709         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4710         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4711
4712         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4713                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4714                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4715                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4716                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4717         }
4718
4719         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4720                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor),
4721                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4722                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4723         }
4724         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4725         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4726
4727         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4728         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4729         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4730         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4731         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4732
4733         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4734         let reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
4735         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4736         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4737         let mut found_err = false;
4738         for msg_event in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
4739                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_event {
4740                         match action {
4741                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4742                                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4743                                         assert!(!found_err);
4744                                         found_err = true;
4745                                 },
4746                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4747                         }
4748                 }
4749         }
4750         assert!(found_err);
4751 }
4752
4753 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4754         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4755                 {
4756                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4757                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4758                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4759                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4760                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4761                                 match event {
4762                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4763                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4764                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4765                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4766                                                 }
4767                                         },
4768                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4769                                 };
4770                         }
4771                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4772                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4773                                         txn.push(tx);
4774                                 }
4775                         }
4776                         txn
4777                 }
4778         }
4779 }
4780
4781 #[test]
4782 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4783         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4784         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4785         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4786         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4787         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4788
4789         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4790         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4791         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4792         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4793         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4794         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4795         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4796         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4797         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4798
4799         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4800         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4801
4802         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4803         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4804         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4805         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4806         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4807 }
4808
4809 #[test]
4810 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4811         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4812         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4813         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4814         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4815         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4816         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4817
4818         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4819         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4820         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4821         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4822         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4823
4824         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4825         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4826         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4827         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4828
4829         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4830         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4831         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4832         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4833         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4834
4835         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4836         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4837         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4838 }
4839
4840 #[test]
4841 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4842         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4843         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4844
4845         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4846         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4847         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4848         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4849
4850         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4851         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4852         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4853         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4854         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4855
4856         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4857         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4858         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4859         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4860         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4861
4862         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4863         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4864         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4865
4866         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4867         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4868         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4869         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4870         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4871 }
4872
4873 #[test]
4874 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4875         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4876         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4877         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4878         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4879
4880         // Create some initial channels
4881         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4882
4883         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4884
4885         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4886         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4887         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4888
4889         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4890         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4891         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4892         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4893         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4894         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4895         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4896         match events[0] {
4897                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4898                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4899         }
4900         match events[1] {
4901                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4902                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4903         }
4904
4905         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4906         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4907         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4908         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4909         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4910         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4911         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4912
4913         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4914         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4915         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4916
4917         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4918         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4919         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4920 }
4921
4922 #[test]
4923 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4924         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4925         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4926         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4927         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4928
4929         // Create some initial channels
4930         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4931
4932         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4933         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4934
4935         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4936
4937         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4938         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4939         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4940
4941         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4942         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4943         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4944         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4945         match events[0] {
4946                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4947                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4948         }
4949         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4950
4951         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4952         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4953         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4954         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4955         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4956         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4957
4958         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4959         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4960         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4961         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4962
4963         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4964         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4965         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4966         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4967         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4968 }
4969
4970 #[test]
4971 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4972         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4973         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4974         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4975         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4976
4977         // Create some initial channels
4978         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4979
4980         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4981         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4982         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4983         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4984
4985         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4986
4987         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4988         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4989         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4990         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4991
4992         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4993         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4994         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4995         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4996
4997         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4998         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4999
5000         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5001         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5002         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
5003 }
5004
5005 #[test]
5006 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5007         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5008         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5009         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5010         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5011         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5012
5013         // Create some initial channels
5014         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5015
5016         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5017         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5018         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5019         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5020
5021         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5022
5023         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
5024         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5025         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5026         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5027         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5028         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5029
5030         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
5031         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5032         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5033         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5034         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5035         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5036         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
5037
5038         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5039         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5040         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
5041         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5042         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5043         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5044
5045         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5046         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5047         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5048         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5049         // transactions next...
5050         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
5051         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5052
5053         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
5054         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5055         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
5056                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5057         } else {
5058                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5059                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5060         }
5061
5062         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5063         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5064
5065         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5066         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5067
5068         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5069         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5070         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5071         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5072         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5073 }
5074
5075 #[test]
5076 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5077         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5078         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5079         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5080         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5081         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5082
5083         // Create some initial channels
5084         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5085
5086         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5087         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5088         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5089         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5090
5091         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5092         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5093
5094         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5095
5096         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5097         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5098         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5099         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5100         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5101         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5102
5103         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5104         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5105         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5106         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5107
5108         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5109         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5110         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5111
5112         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5113         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5114         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5115         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5116         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5117         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5118
5119         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5120         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5121
5122         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5123         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5124         // transactions next...
5125         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5126         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5127         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5128                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5129         } else {
5130                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5131                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5132         }
5133
5134         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5135         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5136
5137         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5138
5139         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5140         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5141
5142         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5143         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5144
5145         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5146         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5147         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5148         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5149         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5150         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5151         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5152         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5153 }
5154
5155 #[test]
5156 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5157         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5158         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5159         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5160         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5161         // channel.
5162         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5163         // gets broadcast.
5164
5165         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5166         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5167         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5168         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5169
5170         // Create some initial channels
5171         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5172         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5173
5174         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5175         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5176         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5177         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5178         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5179
5180         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5181         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5182         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5183
5184         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
5185         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5186         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5187         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5188         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
5189         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5190         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5191         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5192         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5193         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5194         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5195
5196         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5197         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5198         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5199         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5200
5201         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5202         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5203         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5204         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5205         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5206         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5207         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5208         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5209         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5210         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
5211
5212         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5213         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5214         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5215         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5216         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5217         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5218         match events[0] {
5219                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5220                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5221         }
5222         match events[1] {
5223                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
5224                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5225                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
5226                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5227                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
5228                 },
5229                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5230         }
5231         {
5232                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5233                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5234                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5235                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5236                 b_txn.clear();
5237         }
5238         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5239         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5240         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5241         match msg_events[0] {
5242                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5243                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5244         }
5245         match msg_events[1] {
5246                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5247                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5248         }
5249         match msg_events[2] {
5250                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5251                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5252                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5253                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5254                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5255                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5256                 },
5257                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5258         };
5259         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5260         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5261         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5262         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5263         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5264         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5265         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5266         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5267         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5268         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5269         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5270         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5271         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
5272
5273         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5274         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5275 }
5276
5277 #[test]
5278 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5279         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5280         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5281         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5282         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5283         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5284         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5285         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5286         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5287         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5288         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5289         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5290                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5291         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5292
5293         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5294         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5295         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5296
5297         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5298         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5299         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5300         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5301         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5302
5303         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5304
5305         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5306         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5307         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5308         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5309         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5310                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
5311         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5312         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5313
5314         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5315         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5316         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5317
5318         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5319         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5320         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5321         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5322         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5323
5324         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5325         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5326                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5327                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5328                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5329                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5330
5331                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5332                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5333
5334                 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5335                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5336                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5337                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5338
5339                         check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5340                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5341                 } else {
5342                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5343                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5344                 }
5345
5346                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5347                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5348                 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5349                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5350                 }
5351                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5352         }
5353
5354         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5355         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5356
5357         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5358         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5359         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5360         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5361         match events[0] {
5362                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5363                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5364         }
5365         match events[1] {
5366                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5367                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5368         }
5369         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5370         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5371         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5372         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5373         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5374         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5375         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5376         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5377         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5378         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5379         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5380         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5381         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5382
5383         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5384         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5385         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5386         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5387         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5388         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5389         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5390         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5391         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5392         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5393
5394         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5395         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5396         {
5397                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5398         }
5399         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5400
5401         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5402         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5403         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5404         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5405         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
5406         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5407         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5408         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5409         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5410         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5411         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5412         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5413
5414         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5415         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5416
5417         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5418         match events[0] {
5419                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5420                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5421                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5422                 }
5423                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5424         }
5425 }
5426
5427 #[test]
5428 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5429         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5430         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5431         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5432         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5433
5434         // Create some initial channels
5435         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5436
5437         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5438         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5439         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5440         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5441         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5442
5443         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5444         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5445         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5446         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5447
5448         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5449         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5450         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5451         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5452         match events[0] {
5453                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5454                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5455         }
5456         match events[1] {
5457                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5458                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5459         }
5460         let node_tx = {
5461                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5462                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5463                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5464                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5465                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5466                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5467                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5468                 node_txn[0].clone()
5469         };
5470
5471         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5472         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5473
5474         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5475         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5476         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5477         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5478         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5479         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5480 }
5481
5482 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5483         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5484         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5485         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5486         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5487         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5488         // use the same payment hashes.
5489         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5490         //
5491         // A \         / E
5492         //    - C - D -
5493         // B /         \ F
5494         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5495         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5496         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5497         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5498         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5499         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5500         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5501         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5502                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5503         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5504
5505         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5506         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5507         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5508         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5509         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5510
5511         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5512         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5513         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5514         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5515
5516         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5517         // 0th HTLC:
5518         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5519         // 1st HTLC:
5520         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5521         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5522         // 2nd HTLC:
5523         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5524         // 3rd HTLC:
5525         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5526         // 4th HTLC:
5527         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5528         // 5th HTLC:
5529         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5530         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5531         // 6th HTLC:
5532         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5533         // 7th HTLC:
5534         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5535
5536         // 8th HTLC:
5537         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5538         // 9th HTLC:
5539         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5540         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5541
5542         // 10th HTLC:
5543         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5544         // 11th HTLC:
5545         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5546         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5547
5548         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5549         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5550         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5551         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5552         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5553
5554         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5555         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5556         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5557         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5558         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5559         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5560         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5561
5562         let failed_destinations = vec![
5563                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5564                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5565                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5566                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5567         ];
5568         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5569         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5570
5571         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5572         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5573         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5574         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5575         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5576         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5577
5578         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5579         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5580         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5581         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5582
5583         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5584                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5585                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5586         ];
5587         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5588         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5589
5590         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5591         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5592         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5593         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5594
5595         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5596
5597         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5598         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5599                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5600                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5601                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5602                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5603                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5604                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5605         ];
5606         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5607         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5608         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5609         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5610         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5611         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5612         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5613         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5614         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5615         if deliver_last_raa {
5616                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5617         } else {
5618                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5619         }
5620
5621         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5622         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5623         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5624         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5625         //
5626         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5627         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5628         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5629         //
5630         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5631         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5632         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5633
5634         if announce_latest {
5635                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5636         } else {
5637                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5638         }
5639         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5640         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5641                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5642                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5643         } else {
5644                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5645                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5646         };
5647         match close_event {
5648                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5649                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5650         }
5651
5652         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5653         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5654         if deliver_last_raa {
5655                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5656
5657                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5658                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5659         } else {
5660                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5661                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5662                 } else {
5663                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5664                 };
5665
5666                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5667         }
5668         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5669
5670         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5671         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5672         let mut a_done = false;
5673         for msg in cs_msgs {
5674                 match msg {
5675                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5676                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5677                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5678                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5679                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5680                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5681                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5682                                         }
5683                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5684                                         assert!(!a_done);
5685                                         a_done = true;
5686                                         &nodes[0]
5687                                 } else {
5688                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5689                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5690                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5691                                         }
5692                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5693                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5694                                         &nodes[1]
5695                                 };
5696                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5697                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5698                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5699                                 if announce_latest {
5700                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5701                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5702                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5703                                         }
5704                                 }
5705                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5706                         },
5707                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5708                 }
5709         }
5710
5711         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5712         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5713         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5714         let mut as_updates = 0;
5715         for event in as_events.iter() {
5716                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5717                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5718                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5719                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5720                         } else {
5721                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5722                         }
5723                         if network_update.is_some() {
5724                                 as_updates += 1;
5725                         }
5726                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5727         }
5728         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5729         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5730         if announce_latest {
5731                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5732                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5733         }
5734         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5735
5736         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5737         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5738         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5739         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5740         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5741                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5742                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5743                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5744                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5745                         } else {
5746                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5747                         }
5748                         if network_update.is_some() {
5749                                 bs_updates += 1;
5750                         }
5751                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5752         }
5753         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5754         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5755         if announce_latest {
5756                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5757         }
5758         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5759
5760         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5761         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5762         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5763         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5764         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5765         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5766 }
5767
5768 #[test]
5769 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5770         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5771 }
5772
5773 #[test]
5774 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5775         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5776 }
5777
5778 #[test]
5779 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5780         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5781         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5782         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5783 }
5784
5785 #[test]
5786 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5787         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5788         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5789         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5790         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5791
5792         // Create some initial channels
5793         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5794
5795         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5796         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5797         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5798         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5799
5800         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5801         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5802         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5803         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5804         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5805         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5806
5807         let htlc_timeout = {
5808                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5809                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5810                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5811                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5812                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5813                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5814                 node_txn[1].clone()
5815         };
5816
5817         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5818         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5819         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5820
5821         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5822         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5823         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5824         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5825         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5826         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5827         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5828         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5829         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5830         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5831                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5832 }
5833
5834 #[test]
5835 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5836         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5837         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5838         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5839
5840         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5841
5842         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5843         let seed = [42; 32];
5844         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5845         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5846         let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger);
5847         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: channelmanager::provided_init_features() };
5848         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5849         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5850         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5851
5852         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5853         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5854
5855         // Create some initial channels
5856         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5857         // for node 0
5858         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5859         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5860         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5861
5862         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5863         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5864         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5865         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5866         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5867
5868         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5869         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5870         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5871         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5872         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5873
5874         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5875         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5876         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5877         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5878             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5879             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5880             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5881                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5882         }
5883
5884         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5885         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5886         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5887         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5888         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5889         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5890
5891         let htlc_timeout = {
5892                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5893                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5894                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5895                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5896                 node_txn[1].clone()
5897         };
5898
5899         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5900         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5901         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5902
5903         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5904         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5905         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5906         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5907         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5908         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5909         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5910         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5911         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5912         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5913         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5914                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5915 }
5916
5917 #[test]
5918 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5919         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5920         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5921         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5922         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5923
5924         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5925
5926         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5927         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5928
5929         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5930         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5931         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5932
5933         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5934         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5935         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5936
5937         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5938         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5939         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5940
5941         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5942         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5943         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5944 }
5945
5946 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5947         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5948         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5949         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5950         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5951         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5952
5953         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5954
5955         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5956         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5957         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5958         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5959         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5960
5961         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5962         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5963         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5964
5965         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5966         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5967         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5968         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5969         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5970
5971         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5972         let mut block = Block {
5973                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5974                 txdata: vec![],
5975         };
5976         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5977                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5978                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5979         }
5980         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5981         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5982         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5983         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5984 }
5985
5986 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5987         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5988         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5989         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5990         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5991         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5992
5993         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5994         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5995         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5996
5997         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5998
5999         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
6000         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
6001         // to "time out" the HTLC.
6002
6003         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
6004         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6005
6006         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
6007                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
6008                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
6009         }
6010         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
6011         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6012         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6013         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6014 }
6015
6016 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
6017         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6018         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6019         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6020         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6021         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6022
6023         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
6024         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
6025         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
6026         // actually revoked.
6027         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
6028         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
6029         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
6030         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6031         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6032
6033         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6034         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6035         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
6036         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6037         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6038         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
6039         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6040         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
6041         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6042         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6043
6044         if check_revoke_no_close {
6045                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
6046                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6047         }
6048
6049         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
6050         let mut block = Block {
6051                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6052                 txdata: vec![],
6053         };
6054         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
6055                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
6056                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
6057         }
6058         if !check_revoke_no_close {
6059                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
6060                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6061                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6062                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6063         } else {
6064                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6065                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6066                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
6067                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6068                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6069                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
6070                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6071                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6072         }
6073 }
6074
6075 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
6076 // There are only a few cases to test here:
6077 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
6078 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
6079 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
6080 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
6081 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
6082 // non-dust HTLCs.
6083 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
6084 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
6085 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
6086 #[test]
6087 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
6088         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
6089         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
6090
6091         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
6092         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
6093 }
6094
6095 #[test]
6096 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
6097         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
6098         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
6099         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
6100         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
6101 }
6102
6103 #[test]
6104 #[should_panic]
6105 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
6106         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6107         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6108         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6109         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6110         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
6111         for node in nodes.iter() {
6112                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6113         }
6114
6115         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6116         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6117         let push_msat=10001;
6118         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6119         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6120         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6121         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6122
6123         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
6124         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
6125         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6126 }
6127
6128 #[test]
6129 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6130         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6131         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6132         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6133         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6134
6135         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6136         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6137         let push_msat=10001;
6138         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6139
6140         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6141         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6142         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6143         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6144         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6145
6146         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6147         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6148         let push_msat=10001;
6149         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6150         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6151         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6152
6153         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6154         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6155         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6156
6157         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6158         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6159         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6160
6161         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6162         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6163         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6164
6165         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6166         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6167         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6168         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6169         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6170         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6171 }
6172
6173 #[test]
6174 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6175         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6176         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6177         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6178         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6179
6180         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6181         let push_msat=10001;
6182         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6183         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6184         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6185         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6186
6187         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6188         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6189         let err_msg = match events[0] {
6190                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6191                         msg.clone()
6192                 },
6193                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6194         };
6195         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6196 }
6197
6198 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6199 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6200 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6201 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6202 #[test]
6203 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6204         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6205         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6206         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6207         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6208         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6209
6210         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6211         // pending_update_fee.
6212         {
6213                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6214                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6215         }
6216         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6217         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6218
6219         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6220         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6221         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6222                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6223                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6224                 },
6225                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6226         };
6227
6228         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6229
6230         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6231         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6232         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6233         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6234
6235         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6236         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6237         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6238
6239         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6240         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6241         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6242         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6243
6244         // Flush the pending fee update.
6245         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6246         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6247         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6248         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6250
6251         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6252         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6253         // us to surface its failure to the user.
6254         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6255         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6256         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6257         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6258                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6259         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6260
6261         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6262         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6263         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6264         match &events[0] {
6265                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6266                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6267                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6268                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6269                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6270                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6271                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
6272                 },
6273                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6274         }
6275 }
6276
6277 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6278 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6279 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6280 #[test]
6281 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6282         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6283         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6284         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6285         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6286         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6287
6288         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6289         // pending_update_fee.
6290         {
6291                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6292                 *feerate_lock += 200;
6293         }
6294         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6295         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6296
6297         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6298         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6299         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6300                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6301                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6302                 },
6303                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6304         };
6305
6306         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6307
6308         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6309         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6310         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6311         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6312
6313         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6314         let amt_1 = 20000;
6315         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6316         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6317         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6318
6319         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6320         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6321         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6322         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6323         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6324         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6325         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6326
6327         // Flush the pending fee update.
6328         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6329         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6330         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6331         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6332         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6333         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6334
6335         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6336         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6337         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6338         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6339         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6340         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6341         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6342                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6343         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6344
6345         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6346         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6347         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6348         match &events[0] {
6349                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6350                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6351                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6352                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6353                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6354                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6355                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
6356                 },
6357                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6358         }
6359
6360         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6361         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6362                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6363                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6364                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6365         };
6366         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6367                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6368                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6369         };
6370         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6372         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6373         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6374         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6375         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6376         match events[0] {
6377                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6378                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6379         }
6380         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6381         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6382         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6383         match events[0] {
6384                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6385                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6386         }
6387         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6388         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6389         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6390
6391         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6392         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6393         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6394         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6395 }
6396
6397 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6398 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6399 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6400 // once it's freed.
6401 #[test]
6402 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6403         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6404         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6405         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6406         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6407         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6408         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6409         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6410         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6411         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6412         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6413
6414         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6415         // pending_update_fee.
6416         {
6417                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6418                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6419         }
6420         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6421         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6422
6423         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6424         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6425         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6426                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6427                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6428                 },
6429                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6430         };
6431
6432         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6433
6434         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6435         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6436         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6437         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6438
6439         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6440         let feemsat = 239;
6441         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6442         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6443         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6444         let payment_event = {
6445                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6446                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6447
6448                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6449                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6450
6451                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6452         };
6453         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6454         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6455         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6456         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6457
6458         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6459         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6460
6461         // Flush the pending fee update.
6462         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6463         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6464         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6465         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6466         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6467         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6468
6469         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6470         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6471         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6472
6473         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6474                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6475                         msg.clone()
6476                 },
6477                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6478         };
6479
6480         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6481         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6482         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6483
6484         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6485         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6486         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6487         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6488                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6489                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6490         }
6491
6492         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6493         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6494         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6495
6496         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6497         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6498         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6499         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6500                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6501                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6502                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6503                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6504                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6505                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6506                 },
6507                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6508         };
6509
6510         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6511         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6512         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6513
6514         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6515         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6516         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6517         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6518         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6519         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6520         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6521         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6522         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6523                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6524                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6525         };
6526         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6527         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6528         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6529 }
6530
6531 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6532 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6533 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6534
6535 #[test]
6536 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6537         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6538         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6539         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6540         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6541         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6542         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6543
6544         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6545         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6546
6547         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6548                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6549         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6550         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6551 }
6552
6553 #[test]
6554 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6555         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6556         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6557         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6558         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6559         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6560         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6561
6562         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6563         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6564         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6565                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6566
6567         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6568         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6569 }
6570
6571 #[test]
6572 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6573         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6574         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6575         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6576         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6577         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6578         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6579
6580         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6581         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6582         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6583         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6584         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6585
6586         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6587         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6588         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6589         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6590         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6591 }
6592
6593 #[test]
6594 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6595         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6596         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6597         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6598         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6599         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6600         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6601         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6602
6603         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6604                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
6605         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6606         route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6607         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6608                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6609 }
6610
6611 #[test]
6612 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6613         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6614         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6615         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6616         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6617         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6618         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6619         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6620         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6621         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6622
6623         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6624                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6625                 let payment_event = {
6626                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6627                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6628
6629                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6630                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6631                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6632                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6633                         } else {
6634                                 assert!(false);
6635                         }
6636                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6637                 };
6638                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6639                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6640                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6641
6642                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6643                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6644         }
6645         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6646         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6647                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6648
6649         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6650         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6651 }
6652
6653 #[test]
6654 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6655         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6656         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6657         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6658         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6659         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6660         let channel_value = 100000;
6661         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6662         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6663
6664         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6665
6666         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6667         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6668         // limits us to.
6669         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6670         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6671                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6672
6673         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6674         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6675
6676         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6677 }
6678
6679 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6680 #[test]
6681 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6682         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6683         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6684         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6685         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6686         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6687         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6688         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6689         {
6690                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6691                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6692                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6693         }
6694
6695         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6696         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6697         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6698         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6699         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6700         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6701         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6702         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6703         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6704         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6705         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6706 }
6707
6708 #[test]
6709 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6710         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6711         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6712         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6713         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6714         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6715         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6716
6717         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6718         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6719         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6720         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6721         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6722         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6723
6724         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6725         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6726         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6727         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6728         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6729
6730         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6731         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6732         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6733         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6734         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6735
6736         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6737         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6738         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6739         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6740         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6741 }
6742
6743 #[test]
6744 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6745         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6746         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6747         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6748         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6749         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6750         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6751         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6752
6753         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6754         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6755         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6756         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6757         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6758         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6759
6760         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6761                 channel_id: chan.2,
6762                 htlc_id: 0,
6763                 amount_msat: 1000,
6764                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6765                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6766                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6767         };
6768
6769         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6770                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6771                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6772         }
6773         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6774         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6775
6776         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6777         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6778         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6779         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6780         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6781 }
6782
6783 #[test]
6784 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6785         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6786         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6787         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6788         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6789         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6790         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6791
6792         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6793         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6794         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6795         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6796         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6797         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6798
6799         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6800         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6801         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6803         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6804 }
6805
6806 #[test]
6807 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6808         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6809         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6810         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6811         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6812         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6813
6814         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6815         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6816         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6817         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6818         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6819         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6820         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6821
6822         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6823         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6824         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6825         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6826         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6827 }
6828
6829 #[test]
6830 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6831         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6832         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6833         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6834         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6835         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6836         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6837         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6838
6839         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6840         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6841         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6842         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6843         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6844         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6845
6846         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6847         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6848         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6849         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6850         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6851         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6852         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6853         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6854         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6855         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6856         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6857         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6858         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6859
6860         //Resend HTLC
6861         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6862         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6863         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6864         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6865         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6866
6867         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6868
6869         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6870         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6871         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6872         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6873         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6874 }
6875
6876 #[test]
6877 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6878         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6879
6880         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6881         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6882         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6883         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6884         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6885         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6886         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6887
6888         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6889         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6890         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6891
6892         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6893                 channel_id: chan.2,
6894                 htlc_id: 0,
6895                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6896         };
6897
6898         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6899
6900         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6901         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6902         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6903         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6904         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6905 }
6906
6907 #[test]
6908 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6909         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6910
6911         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6912         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6913         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6914         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6915         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6916
6917         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6918         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6919         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6920         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6921         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6922
6923         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6924                 channel_id: chan.2,
6925                 htlc_id: 0,
6926                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6927         };
6928
6929         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6930
6931         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6932         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6933         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6934         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6935         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6936 }
6937
6938 #[test]
6939 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6940         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6941
6942         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6943         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6944         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6945         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6946         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6947
6948         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6949         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6950         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6951         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6952         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6953         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6954                 channel_id: chan.2,
6955                 htlc_id: 0,
6956                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6957                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6958         };
6959
6960         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6961
6962         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6963         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6964         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6965         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6966         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6967 }
6968
6969 #[test]
6970 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6971         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6972
6973         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6974         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6975         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6976         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6977         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6978
6979         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6980
6981         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6982         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6983         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6984
6985         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6986         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6987         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6988                 match events[0] {
6989                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6990                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6991                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6992                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6993                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6994                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6995                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6996                         },
6997                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6998                 }
6999         };
7000
7001         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
7002
7003         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
7004
7005         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7006         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7007         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
7008         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7009         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7010 }
7011
7012 #[test]
7013 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
7014         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
7015
7016         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7017         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7018         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7019         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7020         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7021
7022         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
7023
7024         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
7025         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7026         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
7027
7028         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7029         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7030         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
7031                 match events[0] {
7032                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7033                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7034                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7035                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7036                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7037                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7038                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
7039                         },
7040                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7041                 }
7042         };
7043
7044         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
7045
7046         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
7047
7048         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7049         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7050         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
7051         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7052         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7053 }
7054
7055 #[test]
7056 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
7057         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
7058
7059         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7060         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7061         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7062         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7063         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7064
7065         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
7066         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7067         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7068
7069         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7070         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7071
7072         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7074         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7075
7076         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7077
7078         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
7079                 match events[0] {
7080                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7081                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7082                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7083                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7084                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7085                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7086                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
7087                         },
7088                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7089                 }
7090         };
7091         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
7092         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7093
7094         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7095         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7096         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
7097         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7098         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7099 }
7100
7101 #[test]
7102 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
7103         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
7104         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
7105
7106         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7107         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7108         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7109         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7110         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7111         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7112
7113         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7114
7115         //First hop
7116         let mut payment_event = {
7117                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7118                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7119                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7120                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7121                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7122         };
7123         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7124         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7125         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7126         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7127         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7128         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7129         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7130         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7131         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7132
7133         //Second Hop
7134         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7135         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7136         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7137         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7138
7139         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7140         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7141         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7142                 match events_3[0] {
7143                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7144                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7145                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7146                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7147                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7148                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7149                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7150                         },
7151                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7152                 }
7153         };
7154
7155         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7156
7157         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7158         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7159         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
7160         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7161         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7162
7163         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7164         match events_4[0] {
7165                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7166                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7167                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7168                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7169                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7170                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7171                 },
7172                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7173         };
7174
7175         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7176 }
7177
7178 #[test]
7179 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
7180         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7181         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7182         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7183         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7184         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7185         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7186
7187         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
7188
7189         // First hop
7190         let mut payment_event = {
7191                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7192                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7193                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
7194         };
7195
7196         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7197         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7198         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7199         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7200         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
7201         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7202
7203         // Second Hop
7204         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
7205         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7206         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7207         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7208
7209         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7210         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7211         match events_3[0] {
7212                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
7213                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
7214                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
7215                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
7216
7217                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7218                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7219                 },
7220                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7221         }
7222
7223         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
7224                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
7225                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
7226         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7227         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7228         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7229
7230         match events_4[0] {
7231                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
7232                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7233                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7234                 },
7235                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7236         }
7237
7238         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7239         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7240
7241         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
7242         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
7243         match events_5[0] {
7244                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update:
7245                         Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }), error_code, ..
7246                 } => {
7247                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
7248                         assert!(is_permanent);
7249                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
7250                 },
7251                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7252         }
7253
7254         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
7255 }
7256
7257 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7258         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7259         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7260         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7261
7262         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7263         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7264         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7265         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7266         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7267         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7268
7269         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7270
7271         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7272         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7273         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7274         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7275
7276         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7277         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7278
7279         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7280         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7281         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7282         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7283         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7284
7285         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7286         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7287         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7288         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7289
7290         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7291         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7292
7293         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7294         match events[0] {
7295                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7296                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7297                 },
7298                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7299         }
7300         match events[1] {
7301                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7302                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7303                 },
7304                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7305         }
7306
7307         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7308         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7309         if announce_latest {
7310                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7311         } else {
7312                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7313         }
7314
7315         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7316         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7317         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7318
7319         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7320         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7321         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7322         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7323         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7324         let mut first_failed = false;
7325         for event in events {
7326                 match event {
7327                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7328                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7329                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7330                                         first_failed = true;
7331                                 } else {
7332                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7333                                 }
7334                         }
7335                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7336                 }
7337         }
7338 }
7339
7340 #[test]
7341 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7342         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7343         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7344 }
7345
7346 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7347         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7348         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7349         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7350         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7351         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7352         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7353
7354         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7355         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7356         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7357         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7358         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7359
7360         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7361
7362         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7363         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7364
7365         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7366         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7367
7368         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7369         if revoked {
7370                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7371                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7372         }
7373
7374         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7375         if local {
7376                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7377                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7378                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7379                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7380                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7381
7382                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7383                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7384                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7385                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7386                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7387                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7388                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7389                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7390                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7391                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7392                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7393         } else {
7394                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7395                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7396                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7397                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7398                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7399                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7400
7401                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7402                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7403                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7404                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7405                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7406                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7407                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7408
7409                 if !revoked {
7410                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7411                 } else {
7412                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 0);
7413                 }
7414                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7415                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7416                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7417                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7418                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7419         }
7420 }
7421
7422 #[test]
7423 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7424         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7425         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7426         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7427 }
7428
7429 #[test]
7430 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7431         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7432
7433         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7434         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7435         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7436         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7437         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7438         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7439         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7440         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7441         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7442
7443         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7444         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7445                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7446                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7447         {
7448                 match error {
7449                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7450                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7451                 }
7452         } else { assert!(false) }
7453
7454         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7455         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7456         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7457         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7458         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7459                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7460                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7461         {
7462                 match error {
7463                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7464                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7465                 }
7466         } else { assert!(false); }
7467
7468         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7469         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7470         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7471         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7472         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7473         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
7474         let reason_msg;
7475         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7476                 match action {
7477                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7478                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7479                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7480                         },
7481                         _ => { panic!(); }
7482                 }
7483         } else { panic!(); }
7484         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7485
7486         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7487         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7488         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7489         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7490         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7491                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7492                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7493         {
7494                 match error {
7495                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7496                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7497                 }
7498         } else { assert!(false); }
7499 }
7500
7501 fn do_test_data_loss_protect(reconnect_panicing: bool) {
7502         // When we get a data_loss_protect proving we're behind, we immediately panic as the
7503         // chain::Watch API requirements have been violated (e.g. the user restored from a backup). The
7504         // panic message informs the user they should force-close without broadcasting, which is tested
7505         // if `reconnect_panicing` is not set.
7506         let persister;
7507         let logger;
7508         let fee_estimator;
7509         let tx_broadcaster;
7510         let chain_source;
7511         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7512         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7513         // during signing due to revoked tx
7514         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7515         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7516         let monitor;
7517         let node_state_0;
7518         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7519         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7520         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7521
7522         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7523
7524         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7525         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7526         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7527         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7528
7529         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7530         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7531
7532         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7533         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7534
7535         // Restore node A from previous state
7536         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7537         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7538         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7539         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
7540         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7541         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7542         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7543         node_state_0 = {
7544                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7545                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7546                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7547                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7548                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7549                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7550                         logger: &logger,
7551                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7552                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7553                         channel_monitors,
7554                 }).unwrap().1
7555         };
7556         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7557         assert_eq!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor),
7558                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
7559         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7560         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7561
7562         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7563
7564         if reconnect_panicing {
7565                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7566                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7567
7568                 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7569
7570                 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7571                 // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
7572                 // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
7573                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7574                 let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
7575                 assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
7576
7577                 {
7578                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7579                         // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
7580                         assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
7581                 }
7582
7583                 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7584                 // Check A panics upon seeing proof it has fallen behind.
7585                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7586                 return; // By this point we should have panic'ed!
7587         }
7588
7589         nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7590         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7591         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7592         {
7593                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7594                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7595         }
7596
7597         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7598                 if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7599                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7600                         match action {
7601                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7602                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel force-closed");
7603                                 },
7604                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7605                         }
7606                 } else {
7607                         panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", msg)
7608                 }
7609         }
7610
7611         // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
7612         // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
7613         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7614         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7615         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7616         let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7617
7618         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
7619         let mut err_msgs_0 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7620         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7621                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7622                         match action {
7623                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7624                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel");
7625                                         err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone());
7626                                 },
7627                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7628                         }
7629                 } else {
7630                         panic!("Unexpected event!");
7631                 }
7632         }
7633         assert_eq!(err_msgs_0.len(), 1);
7634         nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]);
7635         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7636         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7637         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() });
7638         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
7639 }
7640
7641 #[test]
7642 #[should_panic]
7643 fn test_data_loss_protect_showing_stale_state_panics() {
7644         do_test_data_loss_protect(true);
7645 }
7646
7647 #[test]
7648 fn test_force_close_without_broadcast() {
7649         do_test_data_loss_protect(false);
7650 }
7651
7652 #[test]
7653 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7654         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7655         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7656         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7657
7658         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7659         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7660         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7661         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7662
7663         // Create some initial channels
7664         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7665
7666         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7667         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7668         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7669         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7670         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7671         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7672         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7673         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7674
7675         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7676         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7677         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7678         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7679         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7680
7681         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7682         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7683         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7684         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7685
7686         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7687         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7688         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7689
7690         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7691         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7692         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7693                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7694                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7695                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7696                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7697                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7698                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7699                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7700                 },
7701                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7702         };
7703         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7704
7705         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7706         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7707
7708         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7709         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7710         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7711         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7712 }
7713
7714 #[test]
7715 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7716         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7717         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7718
7719         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7720         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7721         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7722         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7723
7724         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7725         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7726         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7727
7728         // Disconnect peers
7729         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7730         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7731
7732         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7733         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7734         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7735         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7736         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7737         for e in msg_events {
7738                 match e {
7739                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7740                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7741                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7742                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7743                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7744                                 }
7745                         },
7746                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7747                 }
7748         }
7749         // Reconnect peers
7750         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7751         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7752         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7753         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7754         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7755         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7756
7757         // Reestablish chan_1
7758         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7759         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7760         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7761         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7762         // Reestablish chan_2
7763         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7764         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7765         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7766         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7767         // Reestablish chan_3
7768         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7769         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7770         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7771         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7772
7773         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7774         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7775         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7776         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7777         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7778         for e in msg_events {
7779                 match e {
7780                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7781                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7782                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7783                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7784                                         // the old one.
7785                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7786                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7787                                 }
7788                         },
7789                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7790                 }
7791         }
7792         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7793         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7794 }
7795
7796 #[test]
7797 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7798         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7799         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7800
7801         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7802         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7803         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7804         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7805
7806         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7807
7808         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7809         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7810                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7811         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7812         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7813
7814         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7815         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7816         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7817         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7818         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7819         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7820
7821         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7822         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7823                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7824                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7825                 }
7826         }
7827
7828         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7829         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7830
7831         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7832         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7833         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7834         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7835         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7836
7837         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7838         let penalty_1;
7839         let feerate_1;
7840         {
7841                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7842                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7843                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7844                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7845                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7846                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7847                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7848                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7849                 node_txn.clear();
7850         };
7851
7852         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7853         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7854         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7855         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7856         {
7857                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7858                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7859                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7860                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7861                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7862                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7863                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7864                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7865                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7866                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7867                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7868                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7869                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7870                         node_txn.clear();
7871                 }
7872         }
7873         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7874
7875         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7876         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7877         let penalty_3;
7878         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7879         {
7880                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7881                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7882                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7883                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7884                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7885                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7886                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7887                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7888                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7889                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7890                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7891                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7892                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7893                         node_txn.clear();
7894                 }
7895         }
7896         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7897
7898         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7899         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7900 }
7901
7902 #[test]
7903 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7904         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7905         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7906
7907         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7908         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7909         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7910         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7911         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7912
7913         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7914         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7915         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7916         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7917         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7918         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7919                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7920         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7921         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7922         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7923                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7924         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7925
7926         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7927         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7928         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7929
7930         // Revoke local commitment tx
7931         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7932
7933         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7934         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7935         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7936         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7937         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7938         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7939         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7940
7941         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7942         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7943         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7944
7945         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7946         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7947         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7948
7949         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7950         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7951         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7952         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7953
7954         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7955         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7956         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7957         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7958         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7959         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7960         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7961         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7962         match events.last().unwrap() {
7963                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7964                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7965         }
7966         let first;
7967         let feerate_1;
7968         let penalty_txn;
7969         {
7970                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7971                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7972                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7973
7974                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7975                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7976                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7977                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7978                 // future).
7979                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7980                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7981                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7982                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7983                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7984                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7985
7986                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7987                 // available, which we check here:
7988                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7989                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7990                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7991
7992                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7993                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7994
7995                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7996                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7997                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7998                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7999
8000                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
8001                 // output, checked above).
8002                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
8003                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
8004                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
8005
8006                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
8007                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
8008                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
8009                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
8010                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
8011                 node_txn.clear();
8012         }
8013
8014         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
8015         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8016         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8017         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8018         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
8019         {
8020                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8021                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
8022
8023                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8024                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8025                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
8026                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
8027                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
8028                 } else {
8029                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
8030                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
8031                 }
8032
8033                 node_txn.clear();
8034         };
8035
8036         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
8037         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
8038         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8039         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
8040         let node_txn = {
8041                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8042                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8043
8044                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
8045                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
8046                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
8047                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
8048                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8049                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8050                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
8051                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
8052                 node_txn.clear();
8053                 txn
8054         };
8055         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
8056         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8057         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
8058         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
8059         {
8060                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8061                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
8062                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
8063                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
8064                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
8065                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
8066                 // up bumped justice generation.
8067                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
8068                 node_txn.clear();
8069         }
8070         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8071         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8072 }
8073
8074 #[test]
8075 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
8076         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
8077         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
8078
8079         // Create 2 HTLCs
8080         // Provide preimage for one
8081         // Check aggregation
8082
8083         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8084         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8085         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8086         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8087
8088         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8089         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
8090         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
8091
8092         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
8093         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
8094         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
8095         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8096         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8097
8098         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
8099         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8100         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8101         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
8102         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8103         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
8104
8105         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
8106         let timeout;
8107         let preimage;
8108         let preimage_bump;
8109         let feerate_timeout;
8110         let feerate_preimage;
8111         {
8112                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8113                 // 5 transactions including:
8114                 //   local commitment + HTLC-Success
8115                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
8116                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
8117                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8118                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
8119                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
8120                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8121                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
8122                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
8123
8124                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3); // local commitment
8125                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]); // local HTLC-Success
8126
8127                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8128                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8129                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8130                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8131
8132                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
8133                         (node_txn[3].clone(), node_txn[4].clone())
8134                 } else {
8135                         (node_txn[4].clone(), node_txn[3].clone())
8136                 };
8137
8138                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
8139                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8140                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
8141
8142                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
8143                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8144                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
8145                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
8146
8147                 node_txn.clear();
8148         };
8149         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8150         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8151
8152         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8153         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8154         {
8155                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8156                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8157                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8158                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8159                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8160                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8161
8162                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8163                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8164                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
8165                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8166                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8167
8168                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8169                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8170                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8171                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8172                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8173
8174                 node_txn.clear();
8175         }
8176
8177         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8178         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8179 }
8180
8181 #[test]
8182 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8183         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8184         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8185         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8186         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8187         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8188         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8189         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8190         // implement that).
8191         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8192         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8193         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8194         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8195         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
8196
8197         let per_commitment_secret;
8198         let next_per_commitment_point;
8199         {
8200                 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8201                 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8202
8203                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8204
8205                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8206                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8207                 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8208
8209                 // Must revoke without gaps
8210                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8211                 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8212
8213                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8214                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8215                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8216         }
8217
8218         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8219                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8220         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8221         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8222         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8223 }
8224
8225 #[test]
8226 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8227         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8228         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8229
8230         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8231         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8232         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8233         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8234
8235         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8236         // Lock HTLC in both directions
8237         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
8238         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
8239
8240         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8241         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8242         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8243
8244         // Revoke local commitment tx
8245         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
8246
8247         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8248         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8249         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
8250         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8251
8252         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8253         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8254         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8255         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8256         let penalty_txn = {
8257                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8258                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8259                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8260                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8261                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8262                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8263                 node_txn.clear();
8264                 penalty_txn
8265         };
8266         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8267         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8268         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8269         {
8270                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8271                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8272                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8273         }
8274 }
8275
8276 #[test]
8277 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8278         // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8279         // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8280         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8281         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8282         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8283         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8284         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8285
8286         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
8287         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8288         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
8289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8290         let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8291
8292         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8293         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8294         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8295         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8296         let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8297
8298         // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8299         // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8300         // can get our balance.
8301
8302         // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8303         // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8304         // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8305         let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8306         route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8307         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8308         let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8309         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8310
8311         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8312 }
8313
8314 #[test]
8315 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8316         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8317         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8318         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8319         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8320         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8321         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8322
8323         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8324
8325         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8326         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8327         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8328         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8329         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8330
8331         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8332         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8333         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8334         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8335
8336         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8337         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8338         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8339         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8340         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8341         match close_ev[0] {
8342                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8343                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8344                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8345                 },
8346                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8347         }
8348 }
8349
8350 #[test]
8351 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8352         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8353         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8354         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8355         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8356
8357         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8358         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8359         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8360
8361         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8362
8363         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8364         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8365         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8366         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8367 }
8368
8369 #[test]
8370 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8371         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8372         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8373         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8374         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8375         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8376         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8377
8378         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8379         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8380         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8381
8382         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8383         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8384         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8385 }
8386
8387 #[test]
8388 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
8389         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
8390         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
8391         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
8392         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
8393         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8394
8395         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8396         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8397         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8398         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8399         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8400         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8401         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8402         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8403         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8404         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8405         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8406         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8407
8408         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8409         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8410         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8411         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8412
8413         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8414         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8415         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8416         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8417         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8418
8419         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8420         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8421
8422         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8423         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8424         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
8425         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8426         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8427         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
8428
8429         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8430         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8431         // `channel_value`.
8432         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8433         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8434         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8435         // `channel_value`.
8436         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8437 }
8438
8439 #[test]
8440 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8441         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8442         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8443         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8444         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8445         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8446         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8447
8448         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8449         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8450
8451         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8452
8453         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8454         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8455         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8456
8457         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8458         match events[0] {
8459                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8460                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8461                 }
8462                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8463         }
8464
8465         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8466         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8467
8468         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8469                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8470                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8471                 }
8472                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8473         }
8474
8475         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8476
8477         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8478         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8479
8480         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8481         match events[0] {
8482                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8483                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8484                 }
8485                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8486         }
8487 }
8488
8489 #[test]
8490 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8491         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8492         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8493         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8494         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8495         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8496         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8497
8498         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8499         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8500
8501         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8502
8503         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8504         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8505         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8506
8507         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8508         match events[0] {
8509                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8510                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8511                 }
8512                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8513         }
8514
8515         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8516         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8517
8518         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8519                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8520                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8521                 }
8522                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8523         }
8524         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8525 }
8526
8527 #[test]
8528 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8529         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8530         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8531         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8532         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8533         // and the channel should be closed.
8534         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8535         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8536         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8537         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8538         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8539         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8540
8541         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8542         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8543         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8544
8545         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8546
8547         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8548         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8549
8550         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8551         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8552
8553         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8554         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8555         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8556         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8557         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8558         let accept_chan_msg = {
8559                 let mut lock;
8560                 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8561                 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
8562         };
8563         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
8564
8565         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8566
8567         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8568         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8569
8570         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8571         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8572
8573         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8574         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8575
8576         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8577         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8578                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8579                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8580                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8581                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8582                 }
8583                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8584         }
8585
8586         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8587 }
8588
8589 #[test]
8590 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8591         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8592         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8593         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8594         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8595         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8596         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8597
8598         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8599         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8600
8601         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8602
8603         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8604         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8605         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8606
8607         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8608         match events[0] {
8609                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8610                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8611                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8612                         match api_res {
8613                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8614                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8615                                 },
8616                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8617                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8618                         }
8619                 }
8620                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8621         }
8622
8623         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8624         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8625         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8626
8627         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8628                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8629                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8630                 }
8631                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8632         }
8633 }
8634
8635 #[test]
8636 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8637         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8638         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8639         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8640         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8641
8642         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8643         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8644         match api_res {
8645                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8646                         assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8647                 },
8648                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8649                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8650         }
8651 }
8652
8653 #[test]
8654 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8655         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8656         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8657         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8658         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8659         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8660
8661         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8662         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8663         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8664         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8665
8666         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8667         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8668         route.paths.push(path);
8669         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8670         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8671         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8672         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8673         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8674         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8675         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8676         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8677 }
8678
8679 #[test]
8680 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8681         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8682         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8683         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8684         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8685         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8686
8687         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8688
8689         {
8690                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8691                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8692                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8693                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8694                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8695                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8696                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8697                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8698         }
8699         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8700         // values from previous calls.
8701         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8702         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8703         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8704         match events[0] {
8705                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8706                         match &purpose {
8707                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8708                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8709                                 },
8710                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8711                         }
8712                 },
8713                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8714         }
8715 }
8716
8717 #[test]
8718 #[allow(deprecated)]
8719 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8720         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8721         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8722         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8723         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8724         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8725         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8726
8727         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8728
8729         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8730
8731         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8732         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8733         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8734                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8735         } else { panic!(); }
8736         let mut block = {
8737                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8738                 Block {
8739                         header: BlockHeader {
8740                                 version: 0x2000000,
8741                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8742                                 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
8743                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8744                         txdata: vec![],
8745                 }
8746         };
8747         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8748         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8749                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8750         } else { panic!(); }
8751
8752         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8753         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8754         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8755         block.header.time += 1;
8756         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8757         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8758         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8759
8760         {
8761                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8762                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8763                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8764                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8765                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8766                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8767                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8768         }
8769         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8770         // values from previous calls.
8771         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8772         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8773         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8774         match events[0] {
8775                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8776                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8777                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8778                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8779                 },
8780                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8781         }
8782 }
8783
8784 #[test]
8785 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8786         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8787         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8788         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8789         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8790         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8791
8792         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8793
8794         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8795         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8796         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8797         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8798
8799         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8800         // resulting events.
8801         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8802                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8803                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8804                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8805                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8806                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8807                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8808
8809                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8810                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8811                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8812                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8813                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8814
8815                         // We should fail the payment back
8816                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8817                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8818                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8819                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8820                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8821                                 },
8822                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8823                         }
8824                 }
8825         }
8826
8827         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8828         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8829         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8830
8831         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8832         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8833         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8834         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8835
8836         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8837         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8838         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8839         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8840
8841         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8842         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8843         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8844         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8845 }
8846
8847 #[test]
8848 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8849         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8850         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8851         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8852         // error.
8853         //
8854         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8855         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8856         // commitment at same time.
8857
8858         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8859         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8860         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8861         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8862
8863         // Create some initial channel
8864         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8865         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8866
8867         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8868         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8869
8870         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8871         let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8872
8873         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8874         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8875         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8876         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8877         let watchtower = {
8878                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8879                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8880                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8881                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8882                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8883                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8884                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8885                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8886                 watchtower
8887         };
8888         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8889         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8890         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8891         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8892         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8893         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8894
8895         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8896         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8897         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8898         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8899
8900         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8901         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8902         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8903         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8904                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8905                         assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8906                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8907                 } else { assert!(false); }
8908         } else { assert!(false); };
8909         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8910         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8911         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8912         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8913 }
8914
8915 #[test]
8916 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8917         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8918         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8919         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8920         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8921
8922         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8923         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8924         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8925         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8926
8927         // Create some initial channel
8928         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8929         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8930
8931         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8932         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8933
8934         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8935         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8936
8937         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8938         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8939         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8940         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8941         let watchtower_alice = {
8942                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8943                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8944                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8945                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8946                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8947                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8948                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8949                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8950                 watchtower
8951         };
8952         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8953         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8954         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8955         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8956         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8957         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8958
8959         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8960         {
8961                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8962                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8963                 txn.clear();
8964         }
8965
8966         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8967         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8968         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8969         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8970         let watchtower_bob = {
8971                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8972                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8973                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8974                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8975                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8976                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8977                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8978                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8979                 watchtower
8980         };
8981         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8982         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8983
8984         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8985         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8986         {
8987                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8988         }
8989         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8990
8991         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8992         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8993         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8994         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8995                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8996                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8997                         assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8998                         assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8999                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
9000                 } else { assert!(false); }
9001         } else { assert!(false); };
9002         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
9003         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9004
9005         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
9006         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9007         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
9008
9009         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
9010         let bob_state_y;
9011         {
9012                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9013                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
9014                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
9015                 txn.clear();
9016         };
9017
9018         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
9019         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9020         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
9021         {
9022                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9023                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
9024                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
9025         }
9026 }
9027
9028 #[test]
9029 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
9030         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
9031         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
9032         // message).
9033         //
9034         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
9035         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
9036         //
9037         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
9038         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
9039         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
9040         // before receiving funding_signed.
9041         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9042         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9043         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9044         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9045
9046         // Create an initial channel
9047         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9048         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9049         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9050         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9051         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
9052
9053         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9054         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9055
9056         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9057         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9058
9059         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9060         let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
9061         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
9062         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9063         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
9064 }
9065
9066 #[test]
9067 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
9068         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
9069         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
9070         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
9071         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
9072         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
9073         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
9074
9075         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9076         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9077         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9078         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9079
9080         // Create some initial channels
9081         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9082
9083         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
9084         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
9085         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
9086         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9087         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
9088         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
9089
9090         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
9091         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9092         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
9093         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
9094         // this test before #653 fix.
9095         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
9096         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9097         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9098         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9099         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
9100
9101         let htlc_timeout = {
9102                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9103                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9104                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9105                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
9106                 node_txn[1].clone()
9107         };
9108
9109         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9110         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
9111         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
9112         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
9113 }
9114
9115 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
9116         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
9117         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
9118         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
9119         //
9120         // Steps of the test:
9121         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
9122         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
9123         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
9124         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
9125         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
9126         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
9127         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
9128         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
9129         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9130         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9131         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9132         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9133
9134         // Create some initial channels
9135         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9136         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9137
9138         // Steps (1) and (2):
9139         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
9140         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
9141
9142         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
9143         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
9144         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9145         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
9146         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
9147         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9148         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
9149
9150         // Steps (3) and (4):
9151         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
9152         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
9153         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
9154         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
9155
9156         // Bob force-closes
9157         if !broadcast_alice {
9158                 force_closing_node = 1;
9159                 counterparty_node = 0;
9160         }
9161         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9162         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
9163         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
9164         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9165         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9166                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
9167                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
9168                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
9169                 };
9170                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9171                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9172                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9173                 if broadcast_alice {
9174                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9175                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9176                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9177                 }
9178                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
9179                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9180         }
9181
9182         // Step (5):
9183         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
9184         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
9185         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9186         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9187         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
9188
9189         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9190         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9191         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9192         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9193         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
9194         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9195
9196         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9197         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
9198         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
9199         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
9200                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9201                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9202                 match events[0] {
9203                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
9204                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9205                         },
9206                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9207                 };
9208         }
9209         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
9210         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
9211         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
9212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9213
9214         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9215         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9216         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
9217                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9218                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9219                         (*msg).clone()
9220                 },
9221                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9222         };
9223         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
9224                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
9225                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9226                         (*updates).clone()
9227                 },
9228                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9229         };
9230
9231         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
9232         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9233         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
9234         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9235
9236         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9237         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9238         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
9239                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9240                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9241                         (*msg).clone()
9242                 },
9243                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9244         };
9245         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
9246         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9247
9248         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
9249         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
9250         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
9251         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
9252         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9253                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9254                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9255                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
9256                 if broadcast_alice {
9257                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9258                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9259                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9260                 }
9261                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9262                 if broadcast_alice {
9263                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
9264                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
9265                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
9266                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
9267                         // broadcasted.
9268                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
9269                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
9270                 } else {
9271                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9272                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9273                 }
9274         }
9275
9276         // Step (6):
9277         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
9278         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
9279         {
9280                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9281                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9282                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
9283                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9284                 }
9285                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
9286                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
9287                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
9288                 };
9289                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
9290                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
9291                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
9292                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
9293                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9294                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9295                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9296                 } else {
9297                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9298                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9299                 }
9300         }
9301 }
9302
9303 #[test]
9304 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9305         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9306         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9307         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9308         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9309 }
9310
9311 #[test]
9312 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9313         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9314         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9315         //
9316         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9317         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9318         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9319         // updating logic for the existing channel.
9320         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9321         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9322         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9323         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9324
9325         // Create an initial channel
9326         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9327         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9328         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9329         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9330
9331         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9332         // that it is rejected.
9333         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9334         {
9335                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9336                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9337                 match events[0] {
9338                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9339                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9340                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9341                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9342                                 // move forward with it.
9343                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9344                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9345                         },
9346                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9347                 }
9348         }
9349
9350         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9351         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9352
9353         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9354         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9355
9356         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9357         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9358         {
9359                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9360                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9361                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9362                 added_monitors.clear();
9363         }
9364         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9365
9366         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9367         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9368
9369         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9370         // temporary one).
9371
9372         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9373         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9374         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9375         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9376         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9377         {
9378                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9379                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9380                 match events[0] {
9381                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9382                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9383                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9384                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9385                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9386                         },
9387                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9388                 }
9389         }
9390
9391         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9392         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9393         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9394         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9395         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9396         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9397
9398         let funding_created = {
9399                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9400                 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9401                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9402                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9403                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9404                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9405                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9406                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9407         };
9408         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9409         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9410         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9411         // still needs to be cleared here.
9412         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9413
9414         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9415         {
9416                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9417                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9418                 match events[0] {
9419                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9420                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9421                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9422                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9423                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9424                         },
9425                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9426                 }
9427         }
9428
9429         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9430         // everything is functional.
9431         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9432         {
9433                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9434                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9435                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9436                 added_monitors.clear();
9437         }
9438
9439         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9440         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9441         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9442         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9443
9444         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9445         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9446         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9447
9448         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9449 }
9450
9451 #[test]
9452 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9453         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9454         //
9455         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9456         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9457         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9458         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9459         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9460         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9461         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9462
9463         // Create some initial channels
9464         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9465         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9466         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9467
9468         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9469         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9470         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9471
9472         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9473         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9474         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9475
9476         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9477         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9478         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9479         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9480         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9481         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9482         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9483         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9484         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9485
9486         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9487         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9488         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9489         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9490         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9491         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9492         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9493         match events[0] {
9494                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9495                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9496                 },
9497                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9498         }
9499         match events[1] {
9500                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9501                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9502                 },
9503                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9504         }
9505         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9506         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9507         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9508         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9509         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9510         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9511
9512         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9513         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9514         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9515 }
9516
9517 #[test]
9518 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9519         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9520         //
9521         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9522         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9523         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9524         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9525         //
9526         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9527         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9528         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9529         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9530         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9531         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9532         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9533
9534         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9535         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9536         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9537
9538         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9539
9540         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9541         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9542         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9543         // its length.
9544         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9545         let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
9546         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9547                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9548                 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9549         }
9550
9551         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9552         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9553         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9554
9555         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9556         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9557
9558         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9559         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9560
9561         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9562         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9563         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9564
9565         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9566         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9567         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9568         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9569         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9570         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9571         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9572                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9573                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9574                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9575                 } else { panic!(); }
9576         } else { panic!(); }
9577         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9578
9579         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9580         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9581         // as its not 32 bytes long.
9582         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9583                 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9584                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9585                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9586                                 txid: tx.txid(),
9587                                 vout: idx as u32,
9588                         },
9589                         script_sig: Script::new(),
9590                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9591                         witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9592                 }).collect(),
9593                 output: vec![TxOut {
9594                         value: 1000,
9595                         script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9596                 }]
9597         };
9598         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9599         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9600 }
9601
9602 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9603         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9604         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9605         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9606         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9607         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9608         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9609         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9610         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9611         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9612         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9613         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9614         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9615         // until we learned about an additional block.
9616         //
9617         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9618         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9619         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9620         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9621         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9622         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9623         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9624
9625         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9626         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9627         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9628         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9629         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9630
9631         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9632         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9633         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9634         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9635         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9636         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9637
9638         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9639         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9640                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9641         }
9642         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9643                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9644         if test_height_before_timelock {
9645                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9646                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9647                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9648                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9649         } else {
9650                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9651                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9652                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9653                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9654                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9655                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9656                 // timelock is up).
9657                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9658                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9659
9660                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9661                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9662                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9663                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9664                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9665                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9666                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9667
9668                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9669                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9670                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9671                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9672                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9673                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9674                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9675                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9676                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9677         }
9678 }
9679
9680 #[test]
9681 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9682         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9683         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9684 }
9685
9686 #[test]
9687 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9688         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9689         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9690         // HTLCs.
9691         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9692
9693         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9694         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9695         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9696         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9697         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9698         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9699         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9700         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
9701         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
9702
9703         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9704         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9705         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9706         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9707
9708         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9709         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9710         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9711         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9712         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9713
9714         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9715
9716         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9717         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9718         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9719         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9720
9721         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9722         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9723         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9724         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9725         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9726
9727         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9728         // generated
9729         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9730
9731         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9732         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9733         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9734
9735         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9736         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9737         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9738         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9739         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9740
9741         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9742         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9743         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9744         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9745
9746         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9747         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9748                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9749         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9750         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9751         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9752                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9753         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9754
9755         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9756         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9757                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9758                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9759                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9760                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9761                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9762                         keys_manager,
9763                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9764                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9765                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9766                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9767                         channel_monitors,
9768                 }).unwrap()
9769         };
9770         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9771         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9772
9773         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
9774                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
9775         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor),
9776                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
9777         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9778         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9779
9780         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9781         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their channel_ready here since they haven't updated
9782         // the commitment state.
9783         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9784
9785         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9786
9787         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9788         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9789         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9790
9791         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9792         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9793         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9794         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9795         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9796         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9797         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9798
9799         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9800         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9801 }
9802
9803 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9804         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9805         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9806         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9807         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9808
9809         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9810
9811         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9812                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
9813         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9814
9815         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9816
9817         {
9818                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9819                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9820                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9821                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9822                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9823                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9824                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9825         }
9826         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9827         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9828
9829         {
9830                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9831                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9832                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9833                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9834                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9835                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9836                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9837                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9838                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9839                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9840                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9841         }
9842
9843         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9844         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9845
9846         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9847                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9848                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9849
9850                 let expected_destinations = vec![
9851                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9852                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9853                 ];
9854                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
9855                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9856
9857                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9858                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9859                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9860
9861                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9862                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9863                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9864
9865                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9866                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9867                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9868                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9869         } else {
9870                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9871                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9872                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9873
9874                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9875                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9876                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9877                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9878
9879                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9880
9881                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9882         }
9883 }
9884
9885 #[test]
9886 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9887         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9888         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9889         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9890         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9891         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9892 }
9893
9894 #[test]
9895 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9896         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9897         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9898         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9899 }
9900
9901 #[test]
9902 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9903         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9904         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9905         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9906         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9907         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9908         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9909
9910         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9911         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9912         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9913         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9914
9915         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9916                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
9917         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9918         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9919         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9920                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9921                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9922                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9923         });
9924         let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9925
9926         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9927
9928         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9929         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9930         {
9931                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9932                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9933
9934                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9935                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9936                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9937         }
9938         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9939
9940         {
9941                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9942                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9943
9944                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9945                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9946                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9947
9948                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9949                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9950
9951                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9952                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9953
9954                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9955                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9956                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9957
9958                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9959                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9960                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9961
9962                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9963                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9964                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9965         }
9966         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9967         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9968         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9969         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9970
9971         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9972
9973         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9974         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9975         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9976
9977         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9978         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9979
9980         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9981         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9982         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9983
9984         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9985
9986         nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9987         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9988
9989         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9990         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9991         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9992
9993         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9994 }
9995
9996 #[test]
9997 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9998         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9999         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10000         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10001         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10002
10003         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10004         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
10005         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10006         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10007         let route_params = RouteParameters {
10008                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
10009                 final_value_msat: 10000,
10010                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
10011         };
10012         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
10013         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10014         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
10015
10016         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10017         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
10018         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10019         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10020         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10021         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10022         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10023         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
10024         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
10025 }
10026
10027 #[test]
10028 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
10029         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10030         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10031         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10032         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10033
10034         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10035         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10036         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10037         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10038
10039         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10040         let route_params = RouteParameters {
10041                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
10042                 final_value_msat: 10000,
10043                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
10044         };
10045         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
10046         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10047         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
10048         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10049         let route = find_route(
10050                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10051                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
10052         ).unwrap();
10053
10054         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10055         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
10056         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10057         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10058         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10059         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10060         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10061         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
10062         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
10063 }
10064
10065 #[test]
10066 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
10067         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentReceived event, the HTLCs
10068         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
10069         // PaymentReceived event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
10070         // amount.
10071         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10072         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10073         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10074         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10075
10076         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10077         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10078         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10079         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10080
10081         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10082         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10083         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10084                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10085                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10086                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10087         });
10088
10089         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
10090         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentReceived event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
10091         // amount of time to respond to.
10092
10093         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
10094         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
10095         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
10096
10097         let failed_destinations = vec![
10098                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
10099                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
10100         ];
10101         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
10102
10103         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
10104
10105         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
10106         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10107         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10108
10109         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10110         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10111         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10112
10113         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
10114         // that PaymentReceived event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
10115         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10116         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
10117         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10118 }
10119
10120 fn do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(persist_both_monitors: bool) {
10121         // Test what happens if a node receives an MPP payment, claims it, but crashes before
10122         // persisting the ChannelManager. If `persist_both_monitors` is false, also crash after only
10123         // updating one of the two channels' ChannelMonitors. As a result, on startup, we'll (a) still
10124         // have the PaymentReceived event, (b) have one (or two) channel(s) that goes on chain with the
10125         // HTLC preimage in them, and (c) optionally have one channel that is live off-chain but does
10126         // not have the preimage tied to the still-pending HTLC.
10127         //
10128         // To get to the correct state, on startup we should propagate the preimage to the
10129         // still-off-chain channel, claiming the HTLC as soon as the peer connects, with the monitor
10130         // receiving the preimage without a state update.
10131         //
10132         // Further, we should generate a `PaymentClaimed` event to inform the user that the payment was
10133         // definitely claimed.
10134         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10135         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10136         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10137
10138         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
10139         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
10140         let nodes_3_deserialized: ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
10141
10142         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10143
10144         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10145         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10146         let chan_id_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
10147         let chan_id_not_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
10148
10149         // Create an MPP route for 15k sats, more than the default htlc-max of 10%
10150         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10151         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10152         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10153                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10154                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10155                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10156         });
10157
10158         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10159         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10160
10161         // Send the payment through to nodes[3] *without* clearing the PaymentReceived event
10162         let mut send_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10163         assert_eq!(send_events.len(), 2);
10164         do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[0].clone(), true, false, None);
10165         do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[1].clone(), true, false, None);
10166
10167         // Now that we have an MPP payment pending, get the latest encoded copies of nodes[3]'s
10168         // monitors and ChannelManager, for use later, if we don't want to persist both monitors.
10169         let mut original_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10170         if !persist_both_monitors {
10171                 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10172                         if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10173                                 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10174                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10175                         }
10176                 }
10177         }
10178
10179         let mut original_manager = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10180         nodes[3].node.write(&mut original_manager).unwrap();
10181
10182         expect_payment_received!(nodes[3], payment_hash, payment_secret, 15_000_000);
10183
10184         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10185         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10186         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[3], payment_hash, 15_000_000);
10187
10188         // Now fetch one of the two updated ChannelMonitors from nodes[3], and restart pretending we
10189         // crashed in between the two persistence calls - using one old ChannelMonitor and one new one,
10190         // with the old ChannelManager.
10191         let mut updated_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10192         for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10193                 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_persisted {
10194                         assert!(updated_monitor.0.is_empty());
10195                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut updated_monitor).unwrap();
10196                 }
10197         }
10198         // If `persist_both_monitors` is set, get the second monitor here as well
10199         if persist_both_monitors {
10200                 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10201                         if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10202                                 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10203                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10204                         }
10205                 }
10206         }
10207
10208         // Now restart nodes[3].
10209         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
10210         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[3].keys_manager;
10211         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[3].chain_source), nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[3].logger, node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
10212         nodes[3].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
10213         let mut monitors = Vec::new();
10214         for mut monitor_data in [original_monitor, updated_monitor].iter() {
10215                 let (_, mut deserialized_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut &monitor_data.0[..], keys_manager).unwrap();
10216                 monitors.push(deserialized_monitor);
10217         }
10218
10219         let config = UserConfig::default();
10220         nodes_3_deserialized = {
10221                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
10222                 for monitor in monitors.iter_mut() {
10223                         channel_monitors.insert(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
10224                 }
10225                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut &original_manager.0[..], ChannelManagerReadArgs {
10226                         default_config: config,
10227                         keys_manager,
10228                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator,
10229                         chain_monitor: nodes[3].chain_monitor,
10230                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
10231                         logger: nodes[3].logger,
10232                         channel_monitors,
10233                 }).unwrap().1
10234         };
10235         nodes[3].node = &nodes_3_deserialized;
10236
10237         for monitor in monitors {
10238                 // On startup the preimage should have been copied into the non-persisted monitor:
10239                 assert!(monitor.get_stored_preimages().contains_key(&payment_hash));
10240                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.clone(), monitor),
10241                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
10242         }
10243         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10244
10245         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10246         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10247
10248         // During deserialization, we should have closed one channel and broadcast its latest
10249         // commitment transaction. We should also still have the original PaymentReceived event we
10250         // never finished processing.
10251         let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10252         assert_eq!(events.len(), if persist_both_monitors { 4 } else { 3 });
10253         if let Event::PaymentReceived { amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } = events[0] { } else { panic!(); }
10254         if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[1] { } else { panic!(); }
10255         if persist_both_monitors {
10256                 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[2] { } else { panic!(); }
10257         }
10258
10259         // On restart, we should also get a duplicate PaymentClaimed event as we persisted the
10260         // ChannelManager prior to handling the original one.
10261         if let Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: our_payment_hash, amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } =
10262                 events[if persist_both_monitors { 3 } else { 2 }]
10263         {
10264                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
10265         } else { panic!(); }
10266
10267         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), if persist_both_monitors { 0 } else { 1 });
10268         if !persist_both_monitors {
10269                 // If one of the two channels is still live, reveal the payment preimage over it.
10270
10271                 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10272                 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2]);
10273                 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10274                 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[3]);
10275
10276                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
10277                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
10278                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10279
10280                 nodes[3].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
10281
10282                 // Once we call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` the holding cell is cleared and the HTLC
10283                 // claim should fly.
10284                 let ds_msgs = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10285                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
10286                 assert_eq!(ds_msgs.len(), 2);
10287                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } = ds_msgs[1] {} else { panic!(); }
10288
10289                 let cs_updates = match ds_msgs[0] {
10290                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
10291                                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10292                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10293                                 let cs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10294                                 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[2], nodes[0], nodes[3], Some(1000), false, false);
10295                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10296                                 cs_updates
10297                         }
10298                         _ => panic!(),
10299                 };
10300
10301                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10302                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], cs_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10303                 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
10304         }
10305 }
10306
10307 #[test]
10308 fn test_partial_claim_before_restart() {
10309         do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(false);
10310         do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(true);
10311 }
10312
10313 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
10314 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
10315 enum ExposureEvent {
10316         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
10317         AtHTLCForward,
10318         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
10319         AtHTLCReception,
10320         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
10321         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
10322 }
10323
10324 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
10325         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
10326         // policy.
10327         //
10328         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
10329         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
10330         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
10331         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
10332         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
10333         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
10334         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
10335         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
10336
10337         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10338         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
10339         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
10340         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10341         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
10342         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10343
10344         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10345         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10346         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
10347         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
10348         if on_holder_tx {
10349                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10350         }
10351         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
10352         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10353         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
10354
10355         let opt_anchors = false;
10356
10357         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10358
10359         if on_holder_tx {
10360                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
10361                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10362                 }
10363         }
10364
10365         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10366         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10367         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10368
10369         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10370         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10371
10372         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10373         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10374         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
10375
10376         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
10377                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
10378                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
10379                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
10380         };
10381         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10382         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10383
10384         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10385         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10386
10387         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
10388         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
10389
10390         if on_holder_tx {
10391                 if dust_outbound_balance {
10392                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10393                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10394                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
10395                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10396                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10397                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10398                         }
10399                 } else {
10400                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10401                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10402                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
10403                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10404                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10405                         }
10406                 }
10407         } else {
10408                 if dust_outbound_balance {
10409                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10410                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10411                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10412                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10413                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10414                         }
10415                 } else {
10416                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10417                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10418                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10419                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10420                         }
10421                 }
10422         }
10423
10424         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
10425         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
10426                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10427                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10428                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10429                 if on_holder_tx {
10430                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10431                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10432                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10433                 } else {
10434                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10435                 }
10436         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10437                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10438                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10439                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10440                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10441                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10442                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10443                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10444                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10445                 if on_holder_tx {
10446                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10447                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10448                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10449                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10450                 } else {
10451                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10452                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10453                 }
10454         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10455                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
10456                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
10457                 {
10458                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10459                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10460                 }
10461                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10462                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10463                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
10464         }
10465
10466         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10467         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10468         added_monitors.clear();
10469 }
10470
10471 #[test]
10472 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10473         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10474         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10475         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10476         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10477         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10478         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10479         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10480         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10481         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10482         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10483         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10484         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10485 }
10486
10487 #[test]
10488 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10489         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10490         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10491         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10492         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10493
10494         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10495         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10496         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
10497         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10498         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
10499
10500         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
10501
10502         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10503         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10504         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
10505         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10506         let mut tx = match events[0] {
10507                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10508                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
10509                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10510                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10511                         }]}
10512                 },
10513                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10514         };
10515         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10516         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10517                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10518                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10519                 },
10520                 _ => panic!()
10521         }
10522
10523         // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
10524         tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
10525         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10526         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10527 }