_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
  21 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  22 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  23 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  24 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  25 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  26 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  27 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  28 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  30 use crate::ln::msgs;
  31 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  32 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  33 use crate::util::test_utils;
  34 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  38
  39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
  46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  47
  48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  50
  51 use regex;
  52
  53 use crate::io;
  54 use crate::prelude::*;
  55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  56 use core::default::Default;
  57 use core::iter::repeat;
  58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  59 use crate::sync::Mutex;
  60
  61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  63
  64 #[test]
  65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  66         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  67         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  68         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  69         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  70         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  71         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  72         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  73         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  74
  75         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  76         // funding satoshis
  77         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  78         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
  79         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  80
  81         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  82         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  83
  84         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  85         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  86
  87         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  88         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  89         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  90                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  91                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  92                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  93                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  94                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  95                         match action {
  96                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  97                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  98                                 },
  99                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 100                         }
 101                 } else { assert!(false); }
 102         };
 103
 104         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 105
 106         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 107         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 108         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 109
 110         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 111
 112         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 113
 114         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 115
 116         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 117
 118         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 119
 120         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 121
 122         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 123 }
 124
 125 #[test]
 126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 127         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 128         // them.
 129         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 130         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 131         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 132         node_cfgs[1].features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_wumbo();
 133         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 134         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 135
 136         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
 137                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 138                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 139                 },
 140                 _ => panic!()
 141         }
 142 }
 143
 144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 145         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 146         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 147         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 148         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 149         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 150         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 151         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 152         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 153         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 154
 155         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 156         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 157         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 158         let opt_anchors = false;
 159         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 160         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 161
 162         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 163         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 164         if !send_from_initiator {
 165                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 166                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 167         }
 168         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
 169
 170         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 171         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 172         if send_from_initiator {
 173                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 174                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 175         }
 176         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
 177         {
 178                 let mut lock;
 179                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
 180                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 181                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 182         }
 183
 184         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 185         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 186         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 187
 188         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 189         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 190         if send_from_initiator {
 191                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 192                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 193                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 194                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 195                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 196         } else {
 197                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 198         }
 199 }
 200
 201 #[test]
 202 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 203         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 204         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 205 }
 206
 207 #[test]
 208 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 209         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 210         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 211         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 212         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 213         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 214
 215         // balancing
 216         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 217
 218         // A                                        B
 219         // update_fee                            ->
 220         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 221         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 222         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 223         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 224         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 225         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 226         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 227         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 228         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 229         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 230         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 231         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 232         //                                       <- RAA
 233         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 234
 235         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 236         {
 237                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 238                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 239         }
 240         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 241         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 242
 243         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 244         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 245         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 246                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 247                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 248                 },
 249                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 250         };
 251
 252         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 253
 254         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 255         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 256         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 257         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 258
 259         let payment_event = {
 260                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 261                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 262                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 263         };
 264         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 265         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 266
 267         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 268         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 269         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 270         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 271         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 272         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 273
 274         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 275         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 276         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 277         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 278         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 279
 280         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 281         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 282         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 283         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 284         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 285         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 286         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 287         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 288
 289         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 290         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 291         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 292         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 293         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 294         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 295         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 296         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 297
 298         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 299         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 300         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 302
 303         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 304         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 306
 307         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 309
 310         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 311         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 312         match events_2[0] {
 313                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 314                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 315         }
 316
 317         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 318         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 319 }
 320
 321 #[test]
 322 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 323         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 324         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 325         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 326         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 327         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 328         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 329         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 330
 331         // balancing
 332         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 333
 334         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 335         {
 336                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 337                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 338         }
 339         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 341
 342         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 343         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 344         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 345                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 346                         update_fee.as_ref()
 347                 },
 348                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 349         };
 350
 351         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 352
 353         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 354         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 355         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 356         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 357
 358         let payment_event = {
 359                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 360                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 361                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 362         };
 363         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 364         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 365
 366         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 367         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 368         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 369         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 370         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 372
 373         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 374         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 375
 376         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 377 }
 378
 379 #[test]
 380 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 381         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 382         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 383         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 384         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 385         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 386
 387         // A                                        B
 388         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 389         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 390         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 391         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 392         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 393         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 394         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 395         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 396         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 397         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 398         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 399         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 400         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 401         //                                          B should send no response here
 402         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 403         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 404         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 405
 406         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 407         let initial_feerate;
 408         {
 409                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 410                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 411                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 412         }
 413         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 414         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 415
 416         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 417         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 418         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 419                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 420                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 421                 },
 422                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 423         };
 424
 425         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 426         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 427         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 428         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 429         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 430
 431         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 432         // transaction:
 433         {
 434                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 435                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 436         }
 437         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 438         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 439         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 440
 441         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 442         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 443                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 444                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 445         };
 446
 447         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 448
 449         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 450         // Deliver (3)
 451         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 452
 453         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 454         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 455         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 456         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 457         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 458         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 459         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 460         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 461         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 462         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 463         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 464
 465         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 466         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 467         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 468         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 469         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 470
 471         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 472         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 474
 475         // Delever (4)
 476         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 477         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 478         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 479
 480         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 481         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 483
 484         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 485         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 486         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 488
 489         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 490         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 491         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 492 }
 493
 494 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 495         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 496         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 497         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 498         // Node objects.
 499
 500         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 501         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 502         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 503         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 504
 505         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 506                 let block = Block {
 507                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 508                         txdata: vec![],
 509                 };
 510                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 511                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 512         }
 513
 514         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 515         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 516         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 517
 518         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 519         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
 520         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 521
 522         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 523         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
 524
 525         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 526
 527         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 528         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 529         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 530         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 531
 532         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 533         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 534         {
 535                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 536                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 537                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 538                 added_monitors.clear();
 539         }
 540         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 541
 542         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 543         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 544         {
 545                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 546                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 547                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 548                 added_monitors.clear();
 549         }
 550
 551         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 552         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 553
 554         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 555         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 556
 557         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 558         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 559         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 560         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 561         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 562 }
 563
 564 #[test]
 565 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 566         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 567         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 568         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 569         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 570         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 571         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 572         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 573         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 574         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 576         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 577         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 578         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 584 }
 585
 586 #[test]
 587 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 588         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 589         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 590         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 591         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 592         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 593
 594         {
 595                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 596                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 597         }
 598         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 599         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 600
 601         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 602         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 603         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 604                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 605                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 606                 },
 607                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 608         };
 609         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 610
 611         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 612         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 613         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 614
 615         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 616         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 617         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 618
 619         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 620         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 621         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 623
 624         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 625         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 626         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 627 }
 628
 629 #[test]
 630 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 631         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 632         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 633         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 634         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 635         let channel_value = 5000;
 636         let push_sats = 700;
 637         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 638         let channel_id = chan.2;
 639         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 640         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 641         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 642
 643         let opt_anchors = false;
 644
 645         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 646         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 647         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 648         // remote limit.
 649         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 650         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 651         {
 652                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 653                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 654         }
 655         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 656         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 657         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 658
 659         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 660
 661         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 662
 663         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 664         {
 665                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 666
 667                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 668                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 669                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 670                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 671                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 672                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 673         }
 674
 675         {
 676                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 677                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 678                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 679         }
 680         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 681         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 682         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 683
 684         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 685
 686         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 687         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 688         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 689                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 690                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 691                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 692                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 693                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 694                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 695         };
 696         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 697                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 698                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 699                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 700                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 701                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 702                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 703                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 704         };
 705
 706         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 707         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 708                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
 709
 710         let res = {
 711                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 712                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 713                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 714                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 715                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 716                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 717                         push_sats,
 718                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 719                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 720                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 721                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 722                         &mut htlcs,
 723                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 724                 );
 725                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 726         };
 727
 728         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 729                 channel_id: chan.2,
 730                 signature: res.0,
 731                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 732         };
 733
 734         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 735                 channel_id: chan.2,
 736                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 737         };
 738
 739         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 740
 741         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 742         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 743         //Should produce and error.
 744         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 745         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 746         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 747         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 748         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 749 }
 750
 751 #[test]
 752 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 753         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 754         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 755         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 756         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 757         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 758
 759         // balancing
 760         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 761
 762         {
 763                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 764                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 765         }
 766         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 767         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 768
 769         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 770         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 771         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 772                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 773                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 774                 },
 775                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 776         };
 777         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 778         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 779         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 780         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 781
 782         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 783
 784         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 785         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 786         {
 787                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 788                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 789                 added_monitors.clear();
 790         }
 791         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 792         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 793         // node[1] has nothing to do
 794
 795         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 796         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 797         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 798
 799         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 800         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 801         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 803         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 804         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 805         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 806
 807         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 808         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 809         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 810         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 811         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 812         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 813
 814         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 815         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 816         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 817         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 818
 819         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 820         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 821         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 822
 823         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 824         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 825         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 826         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 827
 828         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 829         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 830         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 831
 832         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 833
 834         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 835         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 836         match events[0] {
 837                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
 838                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 839         };
 840
 841         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 842
 843         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 844         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 845         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 846         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 847         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 848 }
 849
 850 #[test]
 851 fn test_update_fee() {
 852         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 853         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 854         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 855         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 856         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 857         let channel_id = chan.2;
 858
 859         // A                                        B
 860         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 861         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 862         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 863         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 864         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 865         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 866         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 867         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 868         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 869         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 870         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 871         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 872
 873         // Create and deliver (1)...
 874         let feerate;
 875         {
 876                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 877                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 878                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 879         }
 880         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 881         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 882
 883         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 884         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 885         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 886                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 887                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 888                 },
 889                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 890         };
 891         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 892
 893         // Generate (2) and (3):
 894         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 895         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 897
 898         // Deliver (2):
 899         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 900         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 901         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 902
 903         // Create and deliver (4)...
 904         {
 905                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 906                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 907         }
 908         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 910         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 911         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 912         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 913                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 914                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 915                 },
 916                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 917         };
 918
 919         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 920         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 922         // ... creating (5)
 923         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 924         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 925
 926         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 927         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 928         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 929         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 930         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 931
 932         // Deliver (5):
 933         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 934         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 935         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 936
 937         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 938         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 939         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 940         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 941         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 942         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 943         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 944         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 946
 947         // Deliver (7)
 948         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 949         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 950         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 951         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 952
 953         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 955         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 956
 957         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 958         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 959         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 960         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 961         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 962 }
 963
 964 #[test]
 965 fn fake_network_test() {
 966         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 967         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 968         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 969         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 970         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 971         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 972
 973         // Create some initial channels
 974         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 975         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 976         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 977
 978         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 979         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 980         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 981         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 982         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 983
 984         // Send some more payments
 985         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 986         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 987         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 988
 989         // Test failure packets
 990         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 991         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 992
 993         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 994         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 995
 996         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 997         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 998         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 999         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1000         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1001         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1002         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1003
1004         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1005         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1006         hops.push(RouteHop {
1007                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1008                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1009                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1010                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1011                 fee_msat: 0,
1012                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1013         });
1014         hops.push(RouteHop {
1015                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1016                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1017                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1018                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1019                 fee_msat: 0,
1020                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1021         });
1022         hops.push(RouteHop {
1023                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1024                 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1025                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1026                 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1027                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1028                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1029         });
1030         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1031         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1032         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1033
1034         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1035         hops.push(RouteHop {
1036                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1037                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1038                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1039                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1040                 fee_msat: 0,
1041                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1042         });
1043         hops.push(RouteHop {
1044                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1045                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1046                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1047                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1048                 fee_msat: 0,
1049                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1050         });
1051         hops.push(RouteHop {
1052                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1053                 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1054                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1055                 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1056                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1057                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1058         });
1059         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1060         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1061         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1062
1063         // Claim the rebalances...
1064         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1065         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1066
1067         // Close down the channels...
1068         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1069         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1070         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1071         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1072         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1073         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1074         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1075         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1076         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1077         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1078         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1079         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1080 }
1081
1082 #[test]
1083 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1084         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1085         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1086         // commitment dance rounds.
1087         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1088         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1089         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1090         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1091         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1092         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1093
1094         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1095         for _ in 0..crate::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1096                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1097                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1098                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1099         }
1100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1101
1102         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1103         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1104         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1105         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1106
1107         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1108         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1109         // another HTLC.
1110         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1111         {
1112                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1113                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1114                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1115                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1116         }
1117
1118         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1119         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1120         {
1121                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1122                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1123         }
1124
1125         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1126         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1127         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1128         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1129
1130         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1131         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1132         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1133         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1134         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1135         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1136         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1137
1138         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1139         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1140         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1141
1142         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1143
1144         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1145         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1146         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1148
1149         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1150         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1152         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1153
1154         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1156         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1157
1158         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1159                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1160         }
1161         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1163         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1165         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1166
1167         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1169         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1170         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1171         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1172
1173         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1175
1176         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1177
1178         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1179         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1180         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1181                 match event {
1182                         &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1183                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1184                         },
1185                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1186                 };
1187         }
1188
1189         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1190                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1191         }
1192
1193         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1194 }
1195
1196 #[test]
1197 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1198         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1199         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1200         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1201         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1202         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1203         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1204
1205         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1206         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1207         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1208         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1209         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1210         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1211
1212         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1213
1214         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1215         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1216
1217         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1218         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1219
1220         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1221         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1222         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1223 }
1224
1225 #[test]
1226 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1227         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1228         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1229         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1230         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1231         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1232         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1233         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1234
1235         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1236
1237         // balancing
1238         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1239
1240         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1241
1242         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1243         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1244         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1245
1246         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1247         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1248         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1250
1251         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1252         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1253
1254         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1255         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1256         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1257                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1258                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1259                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1260                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1261                 }
1262         }
1263         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1264
1265         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1266         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1267         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1268         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1269
1270         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1271         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1272
1273         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1274         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1275         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1276         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1277         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1278                 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1279         } else {
1280                 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1281         };
1282
1283         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1284         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1285
1286         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1287         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1288         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1289
1290         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1291         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1292         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1293         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1294
1295         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1296         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1297         for e in events {
1298                 match e {
1299                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1300                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1301                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1302                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1303                         },
1304                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1305                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1306                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1307                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1308                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1309                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1310                         },
1311                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1312                 }
1313         }
1314 }
1315
1316 #[test]
1317 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1318         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1319         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1320         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1321         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1322         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1323
1324         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1325         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1326
1327         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1328         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1329         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1330         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1331         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1332         match err {
1333                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1334                         match &fails[0] {
1335                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1336                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1337                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1338                         }
1339                 },
1340                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1341         }
1342         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1343         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1344
1345         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1346 }
1347
1348 #[test]
1349 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1350         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1351         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1352         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1353         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1354         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1355
1356         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1357         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1358         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1359         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1360
1361         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1362
1363         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1364         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1365         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1366         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1367                 channel_id: chan.2,
1368                 htlc_id: 0,
1369                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1370                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1371                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1372                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1373         };
1374
1375         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1376
1377         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1378         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1379         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1380
1381         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1382
1383         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1384
1385         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1386         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1387         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1388                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1389                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1390                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1391                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1392                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1393
1394                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1395                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1396                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1397                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1398                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1399         };
1400         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1401                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1402                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1403                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1404                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1405                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1406                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1407                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1408         };
1409
1410         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1411         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1412                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1413
1414         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1415         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1416         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1417
1418         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1419                 offered: false,
1420                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1421                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1422                 payment_hash,
1423                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1424         };
1425
1426         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1427
1428         let res = {
1429                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1430                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1431                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1432                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1433                         commitment_number,
1434                         95000,
1435                         local_chan_balance,
1436                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1437                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1438                         feerate_per_kw,
1439                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1440                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1441                 );
1442                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1443         };
1444
1445         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1446                 channel_id: chan.2,
1447                 signature: res.0,
1448                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1449         };
1450
1451         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1452         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1453         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1454
1455         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1456         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1457                 channel_id: chan.2,
1458                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1459                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1460         };
1461         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1462
1463         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1464         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1465         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1466         match events[0] {
1467                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1468                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1469                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1470                 },
1471                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1472         };
1473         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1474                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1475
1476         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1477 }
1478
1479 #[test]
1480 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1481         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1482         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1483         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1484         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1485         // this situation.
1486         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1487         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1488         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1489         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1490         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1491         let opt_anchors = false;
1492
1493         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1494         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1495
1496         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1497
1498         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1499
1500         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1501         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1502                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1503         }
1504
1505         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1506         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1507         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1508                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1509         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1510         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1511 }
1512
1513 #[test]
1514 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1515         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1516         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1517         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1518         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1519         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1520         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1521         let opt_anchors = false;
1522
1523         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1524         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1525         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1526         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1527         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1528         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1529         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1530
1531         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1532         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1533                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1534         }
1535
1536         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1537         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1538         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1539         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1540         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1541         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1542         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1543         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1544         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1545                 channel_id: chan.2,
1546                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1547                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1548                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1549                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1550                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1551         };
1552
1553         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1554         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1555         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1556         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1557         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1558         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1559         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1560         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1561 }
1562
1563 #[test]
1564 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1565         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1566         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1567         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1568         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1569
1570         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1571         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1572         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1573         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1574         let opt_anchors = false;
1575
1576         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1577         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1578         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1579         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1580         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1581         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1582         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1583
1584         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1585                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1586         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1587         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1588         // commitment transaction fee.
1589         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1590
1591         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1592         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1593                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1594         }
1595
1596         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1597         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1598         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1599                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1600 }
1601
1602 #[test]
1603 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1604         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1605         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1606         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1607         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1608         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1609         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1610         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1611         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1612         let opt_anchors = false;
1613
1614         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1615         // HTLC.
1616         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1617         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1618         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1619                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1620
1621         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1622         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1623         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1624         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1625         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1626         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1627         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg);
1628
1629         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1630         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1631         match msg_events[0] {
1632                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1633                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1634                 },
1635                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1636         }
1637 }
1638
1639 #[test]
1640 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1641         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1642         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1643         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1644         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1645         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1646         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1647         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1648
1649         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1650         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1651         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1652         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1653         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1654         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1655
1656         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1657         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1658         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1659         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1660         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662
1663         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1664         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1665         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1666         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1667 }
1668
1669 #[test]
1670 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1671         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1672         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1673         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1674         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1675         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1676         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1677
1678         let feemsat = 239;
1679         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1680         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1681         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1682         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1683
1684         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1685         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1686         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1687         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1688
1689         // Add a pending HTLC.
1690         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1691         let payment_event_1 = {
1692                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1693                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1694
1695                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1696                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1697                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1698         };
1699         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1700
1701         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1702         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1703         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1704         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1705         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1706
1707         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1708         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1709         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1710         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1711         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1712         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1713         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1714         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1715                 channel_id: chan.2,
1716                 htlc_id: 1,
1717                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1718                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1719                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1720                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1721         };
1722
1723         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1724         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1725         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1726         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1727         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1728         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1729         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1730         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1731 }
1732
1733 #[test]
1734 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1735         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1736         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1737         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1738         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1739         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1740         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1741         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1742         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1743         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1744         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1745
1746         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1747         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1748         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1749
1750         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1751         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1752 }
1753
1754 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1755         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1756 }
1757
1758 #[test]
1759 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1760         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1761         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1762         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1763         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1764         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1765         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1766         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1767         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1768         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1769         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1770
1771         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1772         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1773
1774         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1775         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1776
1777         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1778                 ($node: expr) => {{
1779                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1780                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1781                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1782                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1783                         payment_event
1784                 }}
1785         }
1786
1787         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1788         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1789         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1790         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1791
1792         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1793
1794         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1795         {
1796                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1797                         .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1798                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1799                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1800                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1801
1802                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1803                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1804                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1805                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1806         }
1807
1808         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1809         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1810         loop {
1811                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1812                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1813                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1814                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1815                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1816                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1817                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1818                         break;
1819                 }
1820
1821                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1822                         .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1823                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1824                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1825                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1826
1827                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1828                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1829                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1830                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1831                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1832                 );
1833
1834                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1835                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1836                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1837                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1838                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1839         }
1840
1841         // adding pending output.
1842         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1843         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1844         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1845         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1846         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1847         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1848         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1849         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1850         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1851         // policy.
1852         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1853         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1854         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1855
1856         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1857         let payment_event_1 = {
1858                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1859                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1860
1861                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1862                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1863                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1864         };
1865         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1866
1867         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1868         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1869         {
1870                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1871                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1872                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1873                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1874         }
1875
1876         // split the rest to test holding cell
1877         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1878         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1879         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1880         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1881         {
1882                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1883                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1884         }
1885
1886         // now see if they go through on both sides
1887         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1888         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1889         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1890         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1891         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1892         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1893
1894         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1895         {
1896                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1897                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1898                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1899                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1900                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1901         }
1902
1903         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1904         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1905         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1906         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1907         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1908         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1909
1910         // flush the pending htlc
1911         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1912         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1913         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1914
1915         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1916         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1918         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1919
1920         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1921         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1922         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1923         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1924
1925         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1926         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1927         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1928
1929         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1930
1931         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1932         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1933         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1934
1935         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1936         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1937
1938         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1939         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1940         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1941         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1942         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1943         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1944
1945         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1946         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1947         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1948         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1949
1950         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1951         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1952
1953         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1954         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1955         match events[0] {
1956                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1957                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1958                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1959                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1960                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1961                         match &purpose {
1962                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1963                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1964                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1965                                 },
1966                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1967                         }
1968                 },
1969                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1970         }
1971         match events[1] {
1972                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1973                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1974                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1975                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1976                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1977                         match &purpose {
1978                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1979                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1980                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1981                                 },
1982                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1983                         }
1984                 },
1985                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1986         }
1987
1988         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1989         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1990         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1991
1992         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1993         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1994         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1995
1996         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
1997         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1998         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1999         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2000         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2001
2002         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2003         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2004 }
2005
2006 #[test]
2007 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2008         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2009         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2010         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2011         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2012         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2013         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2014         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2015         // To test this we:
2016         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2017         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2018         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2019         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2020         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2021         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2022         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2023         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2024         //    claim,
2025         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2026         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2027         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2028         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2029         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2030         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2031         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2032         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2033         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2034         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2035
2036         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2037         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2038         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2039         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2040         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2041
2042         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2043         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2044         let send_1 = {
2045                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2046                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2047                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2048                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2049                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2050         };
2051
2052         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2053         // initial fulfill/CS.
2054         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2055         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2056         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2057         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2058
2059         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2060         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2061         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2062         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2063         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2064         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2065
2066         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2067         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2068         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2069         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2070         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2071
2072         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2073         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2074         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2075         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2076         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2077
2078         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2079         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2080         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2081
2082         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2083         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2084         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2085
2086         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2087         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2088         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2089
2090         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2091         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2092         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2093         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2094         // on-chain as necessary).
2095         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2096         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2097         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2098         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2099         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2100
2101         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2102         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2103         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2104
2105         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2106         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2107
2108         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2109         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2110         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2111         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2112         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2113         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2114
2115         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2116         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2117         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2118         let send_2 = {
2119                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2120                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2121                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2122                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2123                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2124         };
2125
2126         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2127         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2128         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2129         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2130
2131         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2132
2133         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2134         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2135         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2136
2137         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2139
2140         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2141         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2142         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2143         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2144
2145         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2146         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2147         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2148
2149         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2151
2152         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2153         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2154
2155         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2156         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2157 }
2158
2159 #[test]
2160 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2161         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2162         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2163         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2164         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2165         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2166         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2167
2168         // Create some initial channels
2169         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2170         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2171         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2172         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2173
2174         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2175         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2176         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2177         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2178         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2179         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2180
2181         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2182         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2183         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2184         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2185         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2186
2187         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2188         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2189         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2190         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2191         {
2192                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2193                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2194                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2195                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2196                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2197         }
2198         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2199         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2200         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2201         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2202         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2203
2204         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2205         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2206
2207         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2208         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2209         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2210         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2211         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2212         {
2213                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2214                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2215                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2216                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2217                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2218                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2219         }
2220         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2221         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2222         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2223         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2224         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2225
2226         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2227                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2228                         {
2229                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2230                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2231                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2232
2233                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2234                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2235                                 match events[0] {
2236                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2237                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2238                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2239                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2240                                         },
2241                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2242                                 };
2243                         }
2244                 }
2245         }
2246
2247         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2248         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2249         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2250         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2251         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2252         let node2_commitment_txid;
2253         {
2254                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2255                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2256                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2257                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2258
2259                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2260                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2261                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2262                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2263                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2264         }
2265         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2266         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2267         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2268         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2269         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2270
2271         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2272         // confusing us in the following tests.
2273         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2274
2275         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2276         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2277         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2278         // buffer space).
2279
2280         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2281                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2282                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2283                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2284                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2285                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2286                                 msg.clone()
2287                         },
2288                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2289                 };
2290                 match events[1] {
2291                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2292                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2293                         },
2294                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2295                 }
2296                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2297
2298                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2299                 {
2300                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2301                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2302                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2303                                         false
2304                                 } else { true }
2305                         });
2306                 }
2307
2308                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2309
2310                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2311                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2312
2313                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2314                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2315                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2316                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2317                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2318                                 msg.clone()
2319                         },
2320                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2321                 };
2322                 match events[1] {
2323                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2324                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2325                         },
2326                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2327                 }
2328                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2329                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2330
2331                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2332                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2333                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2334         };
2335         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2336         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2337         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2338         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2339
2340         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2341                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2342         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2343         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2344 }
2345
2346 #[test]
2347 fn test_justice_tx() {
2348         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2349         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2350         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2351         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2352         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2353         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2354         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2355         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2356         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2357         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2358         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2359         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2360         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2361         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2362         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2363         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2364         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2365         // Create some new channels:
2366         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2367
2368         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2369         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2370         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2371         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2372         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2373         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2374         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2375         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2376         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2377         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2378         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2379         // Revoke the old state
2380         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2381
2382         {
2383                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2384                 {
2385                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2386                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2387                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2388
2389                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2390                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2391                 }
2392                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2393                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2394                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2395
2396                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2397                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2398                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2399                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2400                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2401                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2402                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2403                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2404                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2405         }
2406         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2407
2408         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2409         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2410
2411         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2412         // Create some new channels:
2413         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2414         {
2415                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2416                 node_txn.clear();
2417         }
2418
2419         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2420         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2421         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2422         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2423         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2424         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2425         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2426         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2427         // Revoke the old state
2428         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2429         {
2430                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2431                 {
2432                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2433                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2434                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2435
2436                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2437                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2438                 }
2439                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2440                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2441
2442                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2443                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2444                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2445                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2446                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2447                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2448                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2449         }
2450         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2451         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2452         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2453 }
2454
2455 #[test]
2456 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2457         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2458         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2459         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2460         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2461         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2462         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2463         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2464         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2465         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2466         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2467         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2468         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2469         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2470         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2471
2472         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2473         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2474         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2475         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2476         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2477         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2478
2479         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2480
2481         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2482         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2483         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2484         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2485         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2486 }
2487
2488 #[test]
2489 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2490         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2491         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2492         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2493         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2494         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2495         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2496
2497         // Create some new channel:
2498         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2499
2500         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2501         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2502         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2503         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2504         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2505
2506         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2507         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2508         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2509         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2510         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2511         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2512         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2513         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2514         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2515
2516         //Revoke the old state
2517         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2518
2519         {
2520                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2521                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2522                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2523                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2524                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2525                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2526                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2527                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2528
2529                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2530                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2531
2532                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2533                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2534
2535                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2536                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2537                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2538                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2539                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2540                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2541                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2542                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2543
2544                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2545                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2546                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2547                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2548                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2549         }
2550         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2551         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2552         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2553 }
2554
2555 #[test]
2556 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2557         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2558         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2559         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2560         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2561         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2562         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2563
2564         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2565
2566         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2567         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2568         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2569         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2570         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2571         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2572
2573         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2574         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2575
2576         //Revoke the old state
2577         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2578
2579         {
2580                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2581                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2582                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2583                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2584                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2585                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2586                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2587                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2588                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2589                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2590                 }
2591
2592                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2593                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2594
2595                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2596                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
2597
2598                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2599                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2600                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2601                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2602                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2603                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2604                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2605
2606                 // Justice transactions are indices 2-3-4
2607                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2608                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2609                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2610
2611                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2612                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2613                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2614
2615                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2616                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2617                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2618                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2619                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2620                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2621                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2622                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2623
2624                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2625                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2626                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2627                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2628                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2629                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2630                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2631         }
2632         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2633         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2634         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2635 }
2636
2637 #[test]
2638 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2639         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2640         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2641         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2642         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2643         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2644         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2645         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2646         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2647         // towards B.
2648         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2649         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2650         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2651         // PaymentSent event).
2652
2653         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2654         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2655         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2656         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2657
2658         // Create some initial channels
2659         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2660         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2661
2662         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2663         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2664         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2665         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2666         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2667
2668         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2669         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2670         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2671
2672         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2673         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2674
2675         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2676         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2677         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2678         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2679         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2680         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2681         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2682         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2683         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2684         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2685         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2686         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2687         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2688         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2689         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2690
2691         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2692         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2693         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2694         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2695         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2696         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2697         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2698         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2699         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2700         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2701         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2702         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2703         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2704         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2705
2706         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2707         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2708         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
2709         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2710         {
2711                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2712                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2713                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2714                 added_monitors.clear();
2715         }
2716         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2717         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2718         match forwarded_events[0] {
2719                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2720                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2721         }
2722         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2723         match forwarded_events[1] {
2724                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2725                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2726                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2727                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2728                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2729                 },
2730                 _ => panic!()
2731         }
2732         match forwarded_events[2] {
2733                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2734                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2735                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2736                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2737                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2738                 },
2739                 _ => panic!()
2740         }
2741         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2742         {
2743                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2744                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2745                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2746                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2747                 added_monitors.clear();
2748         }
2749         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2750         match events[0] {
2751                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2752                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2753         }
2754         match events[1] {
2755                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2756                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2757         }
2758
2759         match events[2] {
2760                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2761                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2762                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2763                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2764                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2765                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2766                 },
2767                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2768         };
2769         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2770                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2771                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2772                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2773                         // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2774                         // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2775                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2776                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2777                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2778                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2779                         if $htlc_offered {
2780                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2781                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2782                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2783                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2784                         } else {
2785                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2786                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2787                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2788                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2789                         }
2790                         node_txn.clear();
2791                 } }
2792         }
2793         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2794         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2795
2796         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2797         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2798         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2799         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2800         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2801         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2803         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2804         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2805         assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2806         let commitment_spend =
2807                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2808                         &node_txn[0]
2809                 } else {
2810                         // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2811                         // FullBlockViaListen
2812                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2813                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2814                                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2815                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2816                                 &node_txn[0]
2817                         } else {
2818                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2819                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2820                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2821                                 &node_txn[2]
2822                         }
2823                 };
2824
2825         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2826         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2827         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2828         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2829         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, 0);
2830         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2831         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2832         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2833
2834         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2835         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2836         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2837         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2838         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2839         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2840         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2841         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2842         let mut first_claimed = false;
2843         for event in events {
2844                 match event {
2845                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2846                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2847                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2848                                         first_claimed = true;
2849                                 } else {
2850                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2851                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2852                                 }
2853                         },
2854                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2855                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2856                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2857                 }
2858         }
2859         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2860 }
2861
2862 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2863         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2864         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2865         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2866         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2867         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2868         //            \                                  \
2869         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2870
2871         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2872         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2873         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2874         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2875         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2876         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2877         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2878
2879         // Create some intial channels
2880         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2881         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2882
2883         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2884         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2885         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2886
2887         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2888
2889         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2890         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2891         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2892         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2893         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2894         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2895         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2896
2897         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2898         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2899         match events[0] {
2900                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2901                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2902                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2903                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2904                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2905                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2906                 },
2907                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2908         };
2909         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2910         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2911         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2912         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2913         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2914         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2915
2916         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2917         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2918         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2919         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2920         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2921         let timeout_tx;
2922         {
2923                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2924                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2925
2926                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2927                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2928
2929                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2930                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2931                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2932                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2933
2934                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2935                 node_txn.clear();
2936         }
2937
2938         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2939         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2940         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2941
2942         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2943
2944         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2946         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2947         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2948         match events[0] {
2949                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2950                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2951                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2952                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2953                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2954                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2955                 },
2956                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2957         };
2958
2959         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2960         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2961         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2962
2963         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2964         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2965
2966         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2968         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2969         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
2970         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2971         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2972         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2973 }
2974
2975 #[test]
2976 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2977         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2978         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2979         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2980 }
2981
2982 #[test]
2983 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2984         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2985         // and fail backward accordingly.
2986
2987         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2988         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2989         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2990         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2991
2992         // Create some initial channels
2993         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2994         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2995
2996         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2997         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2998         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2999         // Revoke the old state
3000         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3001
3002         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3003
3004         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3005         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3006         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3007         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3008         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3009
3010         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3011         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3012         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3013         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3014         match events[0] {
3015                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3016                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3017                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3018                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3019                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3020                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3021
3022                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3023                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3024                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3025                 },
3026                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3027         }
3028 }
3029
3030 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3031         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3032         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3033         // commitment transaction anymore.
3034         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3035         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3036         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3037         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3038         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3039         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3040         // transactions:
3041         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3042         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3043         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3044         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3045         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3046         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3047         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3048         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3049         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3050
3051         // Create some initial channels
3052         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3053         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3054
3055         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3056         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3057         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3058         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3059         // Revoke the old state
3060         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3061
3062         let value = if use_dust {
3063                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3064                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3065                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3066         } else { 3000000 };
3067
3068         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3069         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3070         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3071
3072         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3073         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3074         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3075         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3076         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3077         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3078         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3079         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3080         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3081         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3082         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3083         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3084
3085         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3086         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3087         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3088         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3089         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3090         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3091         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3092         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3093         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3094         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3095         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3096         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3097         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3098         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3099         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3101
3102         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3103         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3104         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3105         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3106         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3107         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3108         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3109         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3110         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3111         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3112         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3113         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3114         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3115         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3116         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3117         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3118         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3119         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3120
3121         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3122         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3123         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3124         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3125         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3126         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3127         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3128
3129         if deliver_bs_raa {
3130                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3131                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3132                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3133                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3134                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3135                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3136                 match events[0] {
3137                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3138                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3139                 };
3140                 match events[1] {
3141                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3142                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3143                 }
3144                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3145                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3146         }
3147
3148         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3149         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3150
3151         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3152         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3153         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3154
3155         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3156         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 3 + nodes.len() });
3157         match events[0] {
3158                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3159                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3160         }
3161         match events[1] {
3162                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3163                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3164                 },
3165                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3166         }
3167         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3168                 match events[2] {
3169                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3170                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3171                 };
3172                 nodes[1].node.abandon_payment(PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0));
3173                 let payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3174                 assert_eq!(payment_failed_events.len(), 1);
3175                 match payment_failed_events[0] {
3176                         Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3177                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3178                         },
3179                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3180                 }
3181         }
3182         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3184
3185         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3186         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3187         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3188                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3189                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3190         }
3191         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3192                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3193                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3194                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3195                 },
3196                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3197         }
3198         if deliver_bs_raa {
3199                 match events[0] {
3200                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3201                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3202                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3203                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3204                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3205                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3206                         },
3207                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3208                 }
3209         }
3210         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3211                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3212                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3213                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3214                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3215                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3216                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3217
3218                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3219                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3220                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3221
3222                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3223
3224                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3225                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3226                         match events[0] {
3227                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3228                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3229                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3230                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3231                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3232                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3233                                         }
3234                                 },
3235                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3236                         }
3237                         match events[1] {
3238                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3239                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3240                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3241                                 },
3242                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3243                         }
3244                         match events[2] {
3245                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3246                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3247                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3248                                 },
3249                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3250                         }
3251                 },
3252                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3253         }
3254
3255         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3256         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3257         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3258 }
3259
3260 #[test]
3261 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3262         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3263         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3264         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3265         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3266 }
3267
3268 #[test]
3269 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3270         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3271         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3272         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3273         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3274 }
3275
3276 #[test]
3277 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3278         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3279         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3280         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3281         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3282         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3283
3284         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3285         {
3286                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3287                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3288                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3289
3290                 let payment_event = {
3291                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3292                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3293                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3294                 };
3295                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3296                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3297         }
3298
3299         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3300         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3301         {
3302                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3303                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3304
3305                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3306         }
3307
3308         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3309         {
3310                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3311
3312                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3313                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3314                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3315                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3316                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3317                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3318
3319                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3320                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3321                         channel_id: chan.2,
3322                         htlc_id: 0,
3323                         amount_msat: 0,
3324                         payment_hash,
3325                         cltv_expiry,
3326                         onion_routing_packet,
3327                 };
3328                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3329         }
3330         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3331         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3332         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3333         match events[0] {
3334                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3335                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3336                 },
3337                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3338         }
3339         match events[1] {
3340                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3341                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3342                 },
3343                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3344         }
3345         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3346         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3347 }
3348
3349 #[test]
3350 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3351         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3352         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3353         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3354         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3355         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3356         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3357         if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3358                 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3359                 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3360                 // connect_style.
3361                 return;
3362         }
3363         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3364
3365         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3366         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3367         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3368         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3369         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3370         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3371
3372         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3373         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3374         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3375
3376         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3377         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3378         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3379         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3380         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3381
3382         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3383         // registering new transactions
3384         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3385 }
3386
3387 #[test]
3388 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3389         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3390         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3391         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3392         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3393         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3394         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3395         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3396
3397         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3398
3399         let mut payment_event = {
3400                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3401                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3402
3403                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3404                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3405                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3406         };
3407
3408         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3409         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3410
3411         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3412
3413         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3414         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3415         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3416         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3417
3418         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3419         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3420         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3421         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3422         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3423
3424         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3425         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3426         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3427
3428         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3429         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3430         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3431         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3432         let tx = {
3433                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3434                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3435                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3436                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3437                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3438                 node_txn.remove(0)
3439         };
3440
3441         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3442
3443         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3444         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3445         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3446         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3447
3448         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3449         {
3450                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3451                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3452         }
3453         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3454         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3455         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3456         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3457         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3458         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3459         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3460
3461         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3462 }
3463
3464 #[test]
3465 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3466         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3467         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3468         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3469         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3470
3471         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3472         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3473         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3474         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3475         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3476
3477         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3478
3479         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3480         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3481         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3482         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3483         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3484         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3485
3486         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3487         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3488
3489         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3490         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3491 }
3492
3493 #[test]
3494 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3495         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3496         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3497         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3498         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3499         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3500         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3501
3502         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3503         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3504         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3505         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3506         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
3507         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3508         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
3509
3510         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3511         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3512
3513         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3514
3515         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3516         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3517
3518         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3519         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3520         // broadcasted.
3521         {
3522                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3523         }
3524
3525         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3526         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3527         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3528         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3529
3530         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3531         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3532 }
3533
3534 #[test]
3535 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3536         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3537         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3538         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3539         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3540         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3541         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3542         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3543
3544         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3545         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3546         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3547
3548         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3549         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3550         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3551         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3552
3553         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3554         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3555         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3556
3557         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3558         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3559         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3560         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3561
3562         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3563         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3564
3565         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3566         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3567
3568         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3569         {
3570                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3571                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3572                 match events[0] {
3573                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3574                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3575                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3576                         },
3577                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3578                 }
3579                 match events[1] {
3580                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3581                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3582                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3583                         },
3584                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3585                 }
3586                 match events[2] {
3587                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3588                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3589                 }
3590         }
3591
3592         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3593         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3594 }
3595
3596 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3597         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3598         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3599         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3600         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3601         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3602
3603         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3604         let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3605                 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3606                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3607                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3608                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3609                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3610                 chan_id
3611         } else {
3612                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2
3613         };
3614
3615         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3616
3617         let payment_event = {
3618                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3619                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3620
3621                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3622                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3623                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3624         };
3625         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3626
3627         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3628                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3629         } else {
3630                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3631                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3632                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3633                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3634                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3635
3636                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3637                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3638                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3639                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3640
3641                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3642                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3643                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3644                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3645                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3646
3647                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3648                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3649                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3650                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3651                                         }
3652                                 }
3653                         }
3654                 }
3655         }
3656
3657         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3658         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3659         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3660                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3661                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3662                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3663                         //
3664                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3665                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3666                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3667                         //
3668                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3669                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3670                 }
3671                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3672                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3673                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3674         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3675                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3676                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3677         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3678                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3679                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3680         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3681                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3682                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3683         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3684                 // Everything was delivered...
3685                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3686         }
3687
3688         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3689         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3690                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3691                 match events_1[0] {
3692                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3693                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3694                 };
3695                 match events_1[1] {
3696                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3697                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3698                 };
3699         } else {
3700                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3701                 match events_1[0] {
3702                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3703                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3704                 };
3705         }
3706
3707         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3708         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3709         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3710
3711         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3712
3713         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3714         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3715         match events_2[0] {
3716                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
3717                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3718                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3719                         assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3720                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3721                         match &purpose {
3722                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3723                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3724                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3725                                 },
3726                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3727                         }
3728                 },
3729                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3730         }
3731
3732         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3733         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3734         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3735
3736         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3737         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3738         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3739                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3740                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3741                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3742                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3743                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3744                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3745                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3746                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3747                 },
3748                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3749         };
3750
3751         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3752                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3753
3754                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3755                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3756                 match events_4[0] {
3757                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3758                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3759                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3760                         },
3761                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3762                 }
3763
3764                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3765                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3766                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3767                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3768
3769                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3770                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3771                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3772                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3773
3774                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3775                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3776                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3777                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3778                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3779
3780                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3781                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3782                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3783                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3784                                         }
3785                                 }
3786                         }
3787                 }
3788         }
3789
3790         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3791         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3792         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3793                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3794                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3795                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3796                 } else {
3797                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3798                 }
3799         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3800                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3801                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3802         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3803                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3804                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3805         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3806                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3807                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3808         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3809                 // Everything was delivered...
3810                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3811         }
3812
3813         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3814                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3815         }
3816
3817         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3818         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3819         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3820
3821         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3822                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3823         }
3824
3825         // Channel should still work fine...
3826         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3827         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3828         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3829 }
3830
3831 #[test]
3832 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3833         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3834         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3835         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3836         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3837 }
3838
3839 #[test]
3840 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3841         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3842         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3843         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3844         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3845 }
3846
3847 #[test]
3848 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3849         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3850         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3851         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3852         // channel_ready immediately instead.
3853         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3854         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3855         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3856         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3857         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3858
3859         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3860
3861         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3862         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3863         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3864         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3865         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3866         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3867
3868         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3869         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3870         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3871 }
3872
3873 #[test]
3874 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3875         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3876         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3877         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3878         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3879         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3880         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3881         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3882
3883         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3884
3885         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3886         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3887         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3888         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3889
3890         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3891         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3892         match events_1[0] {
3893                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3894                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3895         }
3896
3897         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3898         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3899         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3900
3901         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3902         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3903         match events_2[0] {
3904                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3905                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3906                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3907                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3908                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3909                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3910                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3911
3912                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3913                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3914                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3915                         match events_3[0] {
3916                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3917                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3918                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3919                                 },
3920                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3921                         }
3922
3923                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3924                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3925                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3926                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3927                 },
3928                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3929         }
3930
3931         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3932         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3933
3934         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3935         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3936         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3937         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3938         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3939         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3940
3941         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3942         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3943         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3944         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3945
3946         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3947         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3948
3949         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3950         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3951
3952         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3953
3954         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3955         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3956         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3957         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3958         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3959         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3960         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3961         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3962         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3963         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3964
3965         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3966         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3967         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3968         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3969         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3970         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3971         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3972         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3973
3974         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3975         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3976         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3977         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3978         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3979         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3980         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3981         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3982
3983         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3984         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3985         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3986         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3987
3988         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3989         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3990         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3991         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3992
3993         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3994         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3995         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3996
3997         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3998
3999         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4000         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4001         match events_5[0] {
4002                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4003                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4004                         match &purpose {
4005                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4006                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4007                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4008                                 },
4009                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4010                         }
4011                 },
4012                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4013         }
4014
4015         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4016         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4017         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4018
4019         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4020         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4021 }
4022
4023 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4024         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4025         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4026         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4027         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4028         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4029         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4030
4031         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4032
4033         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4034                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4035                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4036                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4037                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4038                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4039                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4040                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4041                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4042                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4043                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4044                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4045                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4046                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4047                 our_payment_hash
4048         } else {
4049                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4050         };
4051
4052         let mut block = Block {
4053                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4054                 txdata: vec![],
4055         };
4056         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4057         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4058         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4059         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4060                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4061                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4062                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4063         }
4064
4065         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4066
4067         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4068         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4069         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4070         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4071         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4072         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4073
4074         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4075         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4076         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4077         let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4078         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4079         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4080 }
4081
4082 #[test]
4083 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4084         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4085         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4086 }
4087
4088 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4089         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4090         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4091         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4092         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4093         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4094         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4095         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4096
4097         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4098         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4099         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4100         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4101
4102         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4103         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4104         {
4105                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4106         }
4107         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4108         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4109
4110         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4111         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4112         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4113         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4114         if forwarded_htlc {
4115                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4116                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4117                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4118                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4119                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4120         }
4121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4122
4123         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4124         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4125         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4126         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4127
4128         if forwarded_htlc {
4129                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4130                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4131                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4132                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4133                 match fail_commit[0] {
4134                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4135                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4136                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4137                         },
4138                         _ => unreachable!(),
4139                 }
4140                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4141         } else {
4142                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4143         }
4144 }
4145
4146 #[test]
4147 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4148         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4149         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4150 }
4151
4152 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4153         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4154                 {
4155                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4156                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4157                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4158                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4159                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4160                                 match event {
4161                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4162                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4163                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4164                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4165                                                 }
4166                                         },
4167                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4168                                 };
4169                         }
4170                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4171                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4172                                         txn.push(tx);
4173                                 }
4174                         }
4175                         txn
4176                 }
4177         }
4178 }
4179
4180 #[test]
4181 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4182         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4183         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4184         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4185         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4186         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4187
4188         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4189         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4190         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4191         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4192         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4193         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4194         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4195         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4196         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4197
4198         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4199         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4200
4201         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4202         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4203         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4204         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4205         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4206 }
4207
4208 #[test]
4209 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4210         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4211         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4212         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4213         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4214         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4215         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4216
4217         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4218         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4219         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4221         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4222
4223         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4224         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4225         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4226         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4227
4228         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4229         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4230         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4231         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4232         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4233
4234         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4235         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4236         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4237 }
4238
4239 #[test]
4240 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4241         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4242         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4243
4244         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4245         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4246         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4247         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4248
4249         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4250         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4251         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4252         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4253         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4254
4255         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4256         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4257         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4258         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4259         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4260
4261         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4262         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4263         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4264
4265         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4266         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4267         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4268         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4269         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4270 }
4271
4272 #[test]
4273 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4274         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4275         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4276         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4277         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4278
4279         // Create some initial channels
4280         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4281
4282         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4283
4284         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4285         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4286         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4287
4288         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4289         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4290         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4291         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4292         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4293         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4294         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4295         match events[0] {
4296                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4297                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4298         }
4299         match events[1] {
4300                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4301                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4302         }
4303
4304         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4305         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4306         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4307         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4308         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4309
4310         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4311         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4312         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4313
4314         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4315         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4316         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4317 }
4318
4319 #[test]
4320 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4321         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4322         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4323         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4324         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4325
4326         // Create some initial channels
4327         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4328
4329         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4330         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4331
4332         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4333
4334         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4335         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4336         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4337
4338         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4339         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4341         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4342         match events[0] {
4343                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4344                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4345         }
4346         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4347
4348         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4349         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4350         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4351         check_spends!(node_txn[0],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4352         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4353
4354         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4355         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4356         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4357         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4358
4359         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4360         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4361         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4362         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4363         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4364 }
4365
4366 #[test]
4367 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4368         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4369         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4370         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4371         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4372
4373         // Create some initial channels
4374         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4375
4376         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4377         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4378         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4379         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4380
4381         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4382
4383         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4384         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4385         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4386         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4387
4388         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4389         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4390         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4391         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4392
4393         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4394         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4395
4396         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4397         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4398         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4399 }
4400
4401 #[test]
4402 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4403         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4404         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4405         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4406         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4407         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4408
4409         // Create some initial channels
4410         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4411
4412         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4413         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4414         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4415         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4416
4417         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4418
4419         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4420         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4421         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4422         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4423         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4424         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4425
4426         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4427         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4428         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4429         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4430         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4431         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4432
4433         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4434         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4435         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4436         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4437         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4438         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4439
4440         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4441         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4442         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4443         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4444         // transactions next...
4445         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4446         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4447
4448         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4449         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4450         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4451                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4452         } else {
4453                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4454                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4455         }
4456
4457         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4458         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4459
4460         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4461         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4462         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4463         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4464         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4465 }
4466
4467 #[test]
4468 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4469         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4470         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4471         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4472         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4473         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4474
4475         // Create some initial channels
4476         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4477
4478         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4479         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4480         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4481         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4482
4483         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4484         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4485
4486         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4487
4488         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4489         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4490         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4491         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4492         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4493         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4494
4495         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4496         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4497         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4498         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4499
4500         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4501         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4502         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4503
4504         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4505         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4506         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4507         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4508         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4509         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4510
4511         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4512         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4513
4514         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4515         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4516         // transactions next...
4517         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4518         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4519         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4520                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4521         } else {
4522                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4523                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4524         }
4525
4526         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4527         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4528
4529         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4530         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4531
4532         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4533         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4534
4535         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4536         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4537         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4538         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4539         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4540         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4541         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4542         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4543 }
4544
4545 #[test]
4546 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4547         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4548         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4549         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4550         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4551         // channel.
4552         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4553         // gets broadcast.
4554
4555         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4556         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4557         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4558         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4559
4560         // Create some initial channels
4561         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4562         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4563
4564         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4565         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4566         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4567         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4568         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4569
4570         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4571         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4572         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4573
4574         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4575         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4576         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4577         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4578         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4579         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4580         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4581         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4582         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4583         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4584         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4585
4586         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4587         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4588         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4589         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4590
4591         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4592         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4593         check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4594         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4595         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4596         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4597
4598         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4599         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4600         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]});
4601         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4602         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4603         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4604         match events[0] {
4605                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4606                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4607         }
4608         match events[1] {
4609                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
4610                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4611                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4612                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4613                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4614                 },
4615                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4616         }
4617         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4618         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4619         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4620         match msg_events[0] {
4621                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4622                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4623         }
4624         match msg_events[1] {
4625                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4626                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4627         }
4628         match msg_events[2] {
4629                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4630                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4631                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4632                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4633                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4634                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4635                 },
4636                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4637         };
4638         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4639         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4640         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4641         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4642         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4643         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4644         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4645         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4646         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4647         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4648         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4649
4650         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4651         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4652 }
4653
4654 #[test]
4655 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4656         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4657         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4658         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4659         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4660         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4661         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4662         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4663         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4664         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4665         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4666         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4667                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4668         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4669
4670         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4671         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4672         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4673
4674         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4675         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4676         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4677         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4678         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4679
4680         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4681
4682         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
4683         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4684         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4685         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4686         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
4687                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
4688         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
4689         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4690
4691         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4692         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4693         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4694
4695         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4696         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4697         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4698         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4699         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4700
4701         let htlc_timeout_tx;
4702         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4703                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4704                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
4705                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4706
4707                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4708                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4709
4710                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4711                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4712                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4713                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4714
4715                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4716                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4717                 } else {
4718                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4719                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4720                 }
4721
4722                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4723                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4724                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4725                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4726                 }
4727                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[0].clone();
4728         }
4729
4730         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4731         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4732
4733         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4734         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4735         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4736         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4737         match events[0] {
4738                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4739                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4740         }
4741         match events[1] {
4742                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4743                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4744         }
4745         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4746         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4747         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4748         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4749         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4750         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4751         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4752         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4753         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4754         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4755
4756         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4757         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4758         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4759         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4760         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4761         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4762         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4763         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4764         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4765         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4766
4767         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4768         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4769         {
4770                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4771         }
4772         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4773
4774         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4775         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
4776         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
4777         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
4778         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
4779         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4780         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4781         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4782         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4783         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4784         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4785         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4786
4787         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4788         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4789
4790         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4791         match events[0] {
4792                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4793                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4794                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
4795                 }
4796                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4797         }
4798 }
4799
4800 #[test]
4801 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4802         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4803         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4804         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4805         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4806
4807         // Create some initial channels
4808         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4809
4810         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4811         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4812         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4813         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4814         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4815
4816         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4817         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4818         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4819         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4820
4821         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4822         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4823         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4824         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4825         match events[0] {
4826                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4827                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4828         }
4829         match events[1] {
4830                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4831                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4832         }
4833         let node_tx = {
4834                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4835                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4836                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4837                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4838                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4839                 node_txn[0].clone()
4840         };
4841
4842         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4843         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4844
4845         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4846         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4847         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4848         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4849         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4850         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4851 }
4852
4853 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4854         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4855         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4856         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4857         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4858         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4859         // use the same payment hashes.
4860         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4861         //
4862         // A \         / E
4863         //    - C - D -
4864         // B /         \ F
4865         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4866         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4867         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4868         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4869         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4870         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4871         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4872         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4873                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4874         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4875
4876         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4877         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4878         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4879         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4880         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4881
4882         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4883         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4884         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
4885         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
4886
4887         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4888         // 0th HTLC:
4889         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4890         // 1st HTLC:
4891         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4892         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4893         // 2nd HTLC:
4894         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4895         // 3rd HTLC:
4896         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4897         // 4th HTLC:
4898         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4899         // 5th HTLC:
4900         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4901         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4902         // 6th HTLC:
4903         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
4904         // 7th HTLC:
4905         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
4906
4907         // 8th HTLC:
4908         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4909         // 9th HTLC:
4910         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4911         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4912
4913         // 10th HTLC:
4914         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4915         // 11th HTLC:
4916         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4917         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
4918
4919         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
4920         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
4921         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
4922         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
4923         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
4924
4925         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
4926         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
4927         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
4928         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
4929         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
4930         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
4931         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
4932
4933         let failed_destinations = vec![
4934                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
4935                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
4936                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
4937                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
4938         ];
4939         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
4940         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
4941
4942         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
4943         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4944         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
4945         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
4946         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
4947         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
4948
4949         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
4950         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
4951         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
4952         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
4953
4954         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
4955                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
4956                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
4957         ];
4958         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
4959         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
4960
4961         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
4962         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4963         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
4964         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
4965
4966         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
4967
4968         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
4969         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
4970                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
4971                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
4972                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
4973                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
4974                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
4975                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
4976         ];
4977         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
4978         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
4979         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
4980         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4981         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
4982         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
4983         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
4984         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
4985         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
4986         if deliver_last_raa {
4987                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
4988         } else {
4989                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
4990         }
4991
4992         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
4993         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
4994         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
4995         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
4996         //
4997         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
4998         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
4999         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5000         //
5001         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5002         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5003         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5004
5005         if announce_latest {
5006                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5007         } else {
5008                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5009         }
5010         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5011         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5012                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5013                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5014         } else {
5015                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5016                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5017         };
5018         match close_event {
5019                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5020                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5021         }
5022
5023         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5024         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5025         if deliver_last_raa {
5026                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5027
5028                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5029                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5030         } else {
5031                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5032                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5033                 } else {
5034                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5035                 };
5036
5037                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5038         }
5039         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5040
5041         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5042         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5043         let mut a_done = false;
5044         for msg in cs_msgs {
5045                 match msg {
5046                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5047                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5048                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5049                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5050                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5051                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5052                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5053                                         }
5054                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5055                                         assert!(!a_done);
5056                                         a_done = true;
5057                                         &nodes[0]
5058                                 } else {
5059                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5060                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5061                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5062                                         }
5063                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5064                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5065                                         &nodes[1]
5066                                 };
5067                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5068                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5069                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5070                                 if announce_latest {
5071                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5072                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5073                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5074                                         }
5075                                 }
5076                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5077                         },
5078                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5079                 }
5080         }
5081
5082         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5083         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5084         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5085         let mut as_updates = 0;
5086         for event in as_events.iter() {
5087                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5088                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5089                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5090                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5091                         } else {
5092                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5093                         }
5094                         if network_update.is_some() {
5095                                 as_updates += 1;
5096                         }
5097                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5098         }
5099         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5100         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5101         if announce_latest {
5102                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5103                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5104         }
5105         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5106
5107         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5108         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5109         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5110         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5111         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5112                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5113                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5114                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5115                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5116                         } else {
5117                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5118                         }
5119                         if network_update.is_some() {
5120                                 bs_updates += 1;
5121                         }
5122                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5123         }
5124         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5125         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5126         if announce_latest {
5127                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5128         }
5129         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5130
5131         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5132         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5133         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5134         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5135         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5136         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5137 }
5138
5139 #[test]
5140 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5141         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5142 }
5143
5144 #[test]
5145 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5146         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5147 }
5148
5149 #[test]
5150 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5151         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5152         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5153         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5154 }
5155
5156 #[test]
5157 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5158         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5159         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5160         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5161         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5162
5163         // Create some initial channels
5164         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5165
5166         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5167         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5168         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5169         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5170
5171         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5172         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5173         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5175         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5176         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5177
5178         let htlc_timeout = {
5179                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5180                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5181                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5182                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5183                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5184                 node_txn[0].clone()
5185         };
5186
5187         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5188         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5189         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5190
5191         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5192         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5193         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5194         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5195         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5196         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5197         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5198         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5199         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5200         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5201                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5202 }
5203
5204 #[test]
5205 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5206         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5207         // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5208         // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5209         // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5210
5211         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5212
5213         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5214         let seed = [42; 32];
5215         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5216         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5217         let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger);
5218         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: channelmanager::provided_init_features() };
5219         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5220         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5221         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5222
5223         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5224         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5225
5226         // Create some initial channels
5227         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5228         // for node 0
5229         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5230         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5231         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5232
5233         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5234         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5235         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5236         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5237         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5238
5239         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5240         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5241         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5242         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5243         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5244
5245         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5246         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5247         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5248         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5249             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5250             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5251             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5252                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5253         }
5254
5255         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5256         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5257         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5258         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5259         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5260         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5261
5262         let htlc_timeout = {
5263                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5264                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5265                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5266                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5267                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5268                 node_txn[0].clone()
5269         };
5270
5271         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5272         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5273         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5274
5275         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5276         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5277         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5278         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5279         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5280         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5281         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5282         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5283         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5284         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5285         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5286                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5287 }
5288
5289 #[test]
5290 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5291         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5292         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5293         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5294         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5295
5296         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5297
5298         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5299         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5300
5301         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5302         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5303         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5304
5305         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5306         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5307         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5308
5309         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5310         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5311         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5312
5313         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5314         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5315         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5316 }
5317
5318 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5319         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5320         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5321         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5322         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5323         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5324
5325         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5326
5327         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5328         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5329         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5330         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5331         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5332
5333         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5334         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5335         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5336
5337         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5338         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5339         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5340         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5341         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5342
5343         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5344         let mut block = Block {
5345                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5346                 txdata: vec![],
5347         };
5348         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5349                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5350                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5351         }
5352         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5353         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5354         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5355         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5356 }
5357
5358 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5359         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5360         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5361         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5362         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5363         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5364
5365         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5366         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5367         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5368
5369         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5370
5371         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5372         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5373         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5374
5375         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5376         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5377
5378         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5379                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5380                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5381         }
5382         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5383         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5384         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5385         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5386 }
5387
5388 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5389         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5390         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5391         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5392         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5393         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5394
5395         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5396         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5397         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5398         // actually revoked.
5399         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5400         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5401         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5402         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5403         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5404
5405         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5406         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5407         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5408         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5409         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5410         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5411         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5412         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5413         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5414         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5415
5416         if check_revoke_no_close {
5417                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5418                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5419         }
5420
5421         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5422         let mut block = Block {
5423                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5424                 txdata: vec![],
5425         };
5426         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5427                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5428                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5429         }
5430         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5431                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5432                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5433                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5434                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5435         } else {
5436                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5437         }
5438 }
5439
5440 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5441 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5442 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5443 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5444 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5445 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5446 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5447 // non-dust HTLCs.
5448 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5449 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5450 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5451 #[test]
5452 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5453         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5454         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5455
5456         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5457         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5458 }
5459
5460 #[test]
5461 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5462         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5463         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5464         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5465         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5466 }
5467
5468 #[test]
5469 #[should_panic]
5470 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5471         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5472         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5473         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5474         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5475         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5476         for node in nodes.iter() {
5477                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5478         }
5479
5480         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5481         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5482         let push_msat=10001;
5483         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5484         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5485         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5486         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5487
5488         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5489         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5490         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5491 }
5492
5493 #[test]
5494 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5495         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5496         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5497         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5498         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5499
5500         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5501         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5502         let push_msat=10001;
5503         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5504
5505         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5506         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5507         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5508         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5509         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5510
5511         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5512         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5513         let push_msat=10001;
5514         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5515         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5516         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5517
5518         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5519         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5520         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5521
5522         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5523         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5524         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5525
5526         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5527         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5528         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5529
5530         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5531         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5532         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5533         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5534         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5535         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5536 }
5537
5538 #[test]
5539 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5540         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5541         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5542         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5543         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5544
5545         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5546         let push_msat=10001;
5547         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5548         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5549         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5550         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5551
5552         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5553         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5554         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5555                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5556                         msg.clone()
5557                 },
5558                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5559         };
5560         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5561 }
5562
5563 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5564 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5565 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5566 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5567 #[test]
5568 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5569         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5570         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5571         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5572         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5573         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5574
5575         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5576         // pending_update_fee.
5577         {
5578                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5579                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5580         }
5581         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5582         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5583
5584         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5585         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5586         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5587                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5588                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5589                 },
5590                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5591         };
5592
5593         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5594
5595         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5596         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5597         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5598         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5599
5600         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5601         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5602         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5603
5604         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5605         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5606         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5607         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5608
5609         // Flush the pending fee update.
5610         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5611         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5612         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5613         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5614         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5615
5616         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5617         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5618         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5619         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5620         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5621         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5622         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5623                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5624         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5625
5626         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5627         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5628         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5629         match &events[0] {
5630                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5631                         assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5632                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5633                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5634                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5635                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5636                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5637                 },
5638                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5639         }
5640 }
5641
5642 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5643 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5644 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5645 #[test]
5646 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5647         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5648         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5649         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5650         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5651         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5652
5653         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5654         // pending_update_fee.
5655         {
5656                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5657                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5658         }
5659         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5660         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5661
5662         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5663         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5664         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5665                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5666                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5667                 },
5668                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5669         };
5670
5671         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5672
5673         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5674         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5675         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5676         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5677
5678         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5679         let amt_1 = 20000;
5680         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5681         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5682         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5683
5684         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5685         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5686         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5687         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5688         let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5689         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5690         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5691         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5692
5693         // Flush the pending fee update.
5694         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5695         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5696         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5697         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5698         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5699         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5700
5701         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5702         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5703         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5704         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5705         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5706         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5707         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5708                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5709         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5710
5711         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5712         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5713         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5714         match &events[0] {
5715                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5716                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5717                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5718                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5719                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5720                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5721                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5722                 },
5723                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5724         }
5725
5726         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5727         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5728                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5729                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5730                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5731         };
5732         let raa = match send_raa_event {
5733                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5734                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5735         };
5736         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5737         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5738         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5739         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5740         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5741         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5742         match events[0] {
5743                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5744                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5745         }
5746         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5747         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5748         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5749         match events[0] {
5750                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
5751                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5752         }
5753         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5754         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5755         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5756
5757         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5758         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5759         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5760         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5761 }
5762
5763 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5764 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5765 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5766 // once it's freed.
5767 #[test]
5768 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5769         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5770         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5771         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5772         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5773         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5774         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5775         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5776         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5777         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5778         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5779
5780         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5781         // pending_update_fee.
5782         {
5783                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5784                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5785         }
5786         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5787         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5788
5789         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5790         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5791         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5792                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5793                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5794                 },
5795                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5796         };
5797
5798         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5799
5800         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
5801         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5802         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
5803         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
5804
5805         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5806         let feemsat = 239;
5807         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
5808         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
5809         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5810         let payment_event = {
5811                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5812                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5813
5814                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5815                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5816
5817                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5818         };
5819         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5820         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5821         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5822         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5823
5824         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
5825         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5826
5827         // Flush the pending fee update.
5828         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5829         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5830         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5831         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5832         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5833         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5834
5835         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5836         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5837         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5838
5839         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5840                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5841                         msg.clone()
5842                 },
5843                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5844         };
5845
5846         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5847         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5848         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5849
5850         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5851         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5852         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5853         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5854                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5855                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5856         }
5857
5858         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5859         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5860         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5861
5862         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5863         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5864         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5865         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5866                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5867                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5868                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5869                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5870                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5871                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5872                 },
5873                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5874         };
5875
5876         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
5877         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
5878         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5879
5880         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
5881         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5882         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5883         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5884         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5885         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5886         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5887         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
5888         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
5889                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
5890                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5891         };
5892         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5893         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
5894         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5895 }
5896
5897 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
5898 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
5899 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
5900
5901 #[test]
5902 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
5903         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
5904         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5905         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5906         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5907         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5908         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5909
5910         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5911         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
5912
5913         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5914                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
5915         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5916         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
5917 }
5918
5919 #[test]
5920 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
5921         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
5922         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5923         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5924         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5925         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5926         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5927
5928         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5929         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
5930         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5931                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
5932
5933         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5934         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
5935 }
5936
5937 #[test]
5938 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
5939         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
5940         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5941         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5942         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5943         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5944         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5945
5946         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5947         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5948         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5949         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5950         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
5951
5952         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5953         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
5954         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
5955         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5956         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
5957 }
5958
5959 #[test]
5960 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
5961         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
5962         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
5963         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5964         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5965         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5966         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5967         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5968
5969         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
5970                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
5971         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
5972         route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
5973         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
5974                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
5975 }
5976
5977 #[test]
5978 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
5979         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
5980         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
5981         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
5982         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5983         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5984         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5985         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5986         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5987         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
5988
5989         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
5990                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5991                 let payment_event = {
5992                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5993                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5994
5995                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5996                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5997                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
5998                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
5999                         } else {
6000                                 assert!(false);
6001                         }
6002                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6003                 };
6004                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6005                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6006                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6007
6008                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6009                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6010         }
6011         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6012         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6013                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6014
6015         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6016         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6017 }
6018
6019 #[test]
6020 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6021         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6022         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6023         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6024         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6025         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6026         let channel_value = 100000;
6027         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6028         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6029
6030         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6031
6032         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6033         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6034         // limits us to.
6035         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6036         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6037                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6038
6039         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6040         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6041
6042         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6043 }
6044
6045 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6046 #[test]
6047 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6048         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6049         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6050         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6051         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6052         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6053         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6054         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6055         {
6056                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6057                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6058                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6059         }
6060
6061         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6062         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6063         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6064         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6065         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6066         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6067         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6068         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6069         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6070         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6071         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6072 }
6073
6074 #[test]
6075 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6076         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6077         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6078         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6079         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6080         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6081         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6082
6083         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6084         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6085         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6086         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6087         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6088         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6089
6090         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6091         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6092         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6093         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6094         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6095
6096         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6097         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6098         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6099         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6100         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6101
6102         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6103         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6104         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6105         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6106         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6107 }
6108
6109 #[test]
6110 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6111         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6112         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6113         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6114         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6115         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6116         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6117         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6118
6119         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6120         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6121         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6122         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6123         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6124         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6125
6126         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6127                 channel_id: chan.2,
6128                 htlc_id: 0,
6129                 amount_msat: 1000,
6130                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6131                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6132                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6133         };
6134
6135         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6136                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6137                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6138         }
6139         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6140         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6141
6142         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6143         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6144         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6145         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6146         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6147 }
6148
6149 #[test]
6150 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6151         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6152         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6153         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6154         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6155         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6156         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6157
6158         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6159         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6160         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6161         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6162         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6163         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6164
6165         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6166         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6167         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6169         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6170 }
6171
6172 #[test]
6173 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6174         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6175         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6176         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6177         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6178         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6179
6180         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6181         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6182         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6184         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6185         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6186         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6187
6188         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6189         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6190         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6191         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6192         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6193 }
6194
6195 #[test]
6196 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6197         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6198         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6199         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6200         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6201         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6202         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6203         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6204
6205         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6206         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6207         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6208         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6209         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6210         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6211
6212         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6213         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6214         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6215         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6216         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6217         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6218         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6219         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6220         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6221         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6222         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6223         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6224         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6225
6226         //Resend HTLC
6227         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6228         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6229         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6230         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6231         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6232
6233         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6234
6235         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6236         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6237         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6238         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6239         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6240 }
6241
6242 #[test]
6243 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6244         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6245
6246         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6247         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6248         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6249         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6250         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6251         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6252         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6253
6254         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6255         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6256         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6257
6258         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6259                 channel_id: chan.2,
6260                 htlc_id: 0,
6261                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6262         };
6263
6264         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6265
6266         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6267         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6268         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6269         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6270         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6271 }
6272
6273 #[test]
6274 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6275         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6276
6277         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6278         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6279         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6280         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6281         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6282
6283         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6284         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6285         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6286         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6287         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6288
6289         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6290                 channel_id: chan.2,
6291                 htlc_id: 0,
6292                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6293         };
6294
6295         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6296
6297         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6298         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6299         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6300         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6301         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6302 }
6303
6304 #[test]
6305 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6306         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6307
6308         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6309         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6310         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6311         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6312         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6313
6314         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6315         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6316         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6317         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6318         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6319         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6320                 channel_id: chan.2,
6321                 htlc_id: 0,
6322                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6323                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6324         };
6325
6326         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6327
6328         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6329         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6330         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6331         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6332         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6333 }
6334
6335 #[test]
6336 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6337         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6338
6339         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6340         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6341         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6342         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6343         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6344
6345         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6346
6347         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6348         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6349         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6350
6351         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6352         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6353         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6354                 match events[0] {
6355                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6356                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6357                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6358                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6359                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6360                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6361                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6362                         },
6363                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6364                 }
6365         };
6366
6367         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6368
6369         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6370
6371         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6372         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6373         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6374         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6375         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6376 }
6377
6378 #[test]
6379 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6380         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6381
6382         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6383         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6384         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6385         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6386         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6387
6388         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6389
6390         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6391         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6392         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6393
6394         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6395         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6396         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6397                 match events[0] {
6398                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6399                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6400                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6401                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6402                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6403                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6404                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6405                         },
6406                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6407                 }
6408         };
6409
6410         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6411
6412         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6413
6414         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6415         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6416         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6417         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6418         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6419 }
6420
6421 #[test]
6422 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6423         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6424
6425         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6426         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6427         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6428         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6429         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6430
6431         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6432         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6433         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6434
6435         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6436         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6437
6438         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6439         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6440         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6441
6442         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6443
6444         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6445                 match events[0] {
6446                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6447                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6448                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6449                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6450                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6451                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6452                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6453                         },
6454                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6455                 }
6456         };
6457         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6458         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6459
6460         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6461         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6462         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6463         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6464         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6465 }
6466
6467 #[test]
6468 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6469         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6470         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6471
6472         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6473         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6474         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6475         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6476         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6477         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6478
6479         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6480
6481         //First hop
6482         let mut payment_event = {
6483                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6484                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6485                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6486                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6487                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6488         };
6489         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6490         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6491         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6492         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6493         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6494         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6495         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6496         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6497         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6498
6499         //Second Hop
6500         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6501         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6502         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6503         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6504
6505         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6506         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6507         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6508                 match events_3[0] {
6509                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6510                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6511                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6512                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6513                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6514                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6515                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6516                         },
6517                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6518                 }
6519         };
6520
6521         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6522
6523         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6524         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6525         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6526         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6527         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6528
6529         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6530         match events_4[0] {
6531                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6532                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6533                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6534                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6535                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6536                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6537                 },
6538                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6539         };
6540
6541         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6542 }
6543
6544 #[test]
6545 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6546         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6547         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6548         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6549         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6550         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6551         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6552
6553         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6554
6555         // First hop
6556         let mut payment_event = {
6557                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6558                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6559                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6560         };
6561
6562         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6563         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6564         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6565         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6566         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6567         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6568
6569         // Second Hop
6570         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6571         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6572         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6573         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6574
6575         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6576         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6577         match events_3[0] {
6578                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6579                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6580                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6581                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6582
6583                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6584                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6585                 },
6586                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6587         }
6588
6589         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6590                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6591                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6592         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6593         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6594         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6595
6596         match events_4[0] {
6597                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6598                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6599                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6600                 },
6601                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6602         }
6603
6604         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6605         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6606
6607         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6608         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6609         match events_5[0] {
6610                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update:
6611                         Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }), error_code, ..
6612                 } => {
6613                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6614                         assert!(is_permanent);
6615                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6616                 },
6617                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6618         }
6619
6620         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6621 }
6622
6623 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6624         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6625         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6626         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6627
6628         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6629         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6630         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6631         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6632         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6633         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6634
6635         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6636
6637         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6638         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6639         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6640         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6641
6642         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6643         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6644
6645         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6646         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6647         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6648         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6649         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6650
6651         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6652         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6653         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6654         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6655
6656         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6657         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6658
6659         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6660         match events[0] {
6661                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6662                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6663                 },
6664                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6665         }
6666         match events[1] {
6667                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6668                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6669                 },
6670                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6671         }
6672
6673         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6674         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6675         if announce_latest {
6676                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6677         } else {
6678                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6679         }
6680
6681         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6682         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6683         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6684
6685         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6686         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6687         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6688         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6689         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6690         let mut first_failed = false;
6691         for event in events {
6692                 match event {
6693                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6694                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6695                                         assert!(!first_failed);
6696                                         first_failed = true;
6697                                 } else {
6698                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6699                                 }
6700                         }
6701                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6702                 }
6703         }
6704 }
6705
6706 #[test]
6707 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6708         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6709         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6710 }
6711
6712 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6713         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6714         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6715         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6716         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6717         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6718         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6719
6720         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6721         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6722         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6723         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6724         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6725
6726         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6727
6728         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6729         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6730
6731         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6732         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6733
6734         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6735         if revoked {
6736                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6737                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6738         }
6739
6740         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6741         if local {
6742                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6743                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6744                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6745                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6746                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6747
6748                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6749                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6750                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6751                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6752                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
6753                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6754                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6755                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6756                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6757                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6758                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6759         } else {
6760                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6761                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6762                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6763                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6764                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6765                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6766
6767                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6768                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6769                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6770                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6771                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6772                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6773                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6774
6775                 if !revoked {
6776                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6777                 } else {
6778                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 0);
6779                 }
6780                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6781                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6782                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6783                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6784                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6785         }
6786 }
6787
6788 #[test]
6789 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6790         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6791         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6792         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6793 }
6794
6795 #[test]
6796 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6797         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6798
6799         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6800         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6801         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6802         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6803         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6804         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6805         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6806         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6807         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6808
6809         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6810         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6811                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6812                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6813         {
6814                 match error {
6815                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6816                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6817                 }
6818         } else { assert!(false) }
6819
6820         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6821         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6822         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6823         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6824         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6825                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6826                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6827         {
6828                 match error {
6829                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
6830                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6831                 }
6832         } else { assert!(false); }
6833
6834         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6835         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6836         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6837         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6838         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6839         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
6840         let reason_msg;
6841         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
6842                 match action {
6843                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
6844                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
6845                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
6846                         },
6847                         _ => { panic!(); }
6848                 }
6849         } else { panic!(); }
6850         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
6851
6852         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6853         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6854         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6855         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6856         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6857                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6858                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6859         {
6860                 match error {
6861                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6862                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6863                 }
6864         } else { assert!(false); }
6865 }
6866
6867 #[test]
6868 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
6869         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
6870         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
6871         // to B, B should refuse payment.
6872
6873         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6874         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6875         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6876         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6877
6878         // Create some initial channels
6879         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6880
6881         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
6882         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
6883         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
6884         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
6885         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6886         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
6887         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6888         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6889
6890         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6891         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6892         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
6893         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6894         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6895
6896         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
6897         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
6898         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6899         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6900
6901         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
6902         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
6903         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6904
6905         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6906         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6907         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6908                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6909                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6910                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6911                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6912                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6913                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6914                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
6915                 },
6916                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6917         };
6918         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6919
6920         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
6921         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
6922
6923         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
6924         let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6925         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
6926         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
6927 }
6928
6929 #[test]
6930 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
6931         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
6932         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
6933
6934         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6935         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6936         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6937         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6938
6939         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6940         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6941         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6942
6943         // Disconnect peers
6944         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6945         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6946
6947         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
6948         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
6949         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6950         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
6951         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
6952         for e in msg_events {
6953                 match e {
6954                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
6955                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
6956                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
6957                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
6958                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
6959                                 }
6960                         },
6961                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6962                 }
6963         }
6964         // Reconnect peers
6965         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6966         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6967         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
6968         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6969         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6970         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
6971
6972         // Reestablish chan_1
6973         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6974         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6975         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6976         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6977         // Reestablish chan_2
6978         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
6979         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6980         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
6981         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6982         // Reestablish chan_3
6983         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
6984         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6985         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
6986         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6987
6988         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6989         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6990         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6991         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6992         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
6993         for e in msg_events {
6994                 match e {
6995                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
6996                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
6997                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6998                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
6999                                         // the old one.
7000                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7001                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7002                                 }
7003                         },
7004                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7005                 }
7006         }
7007         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7008         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7009 }
7010
7011 #[test]
7012 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7013         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7014         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7015
7016         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7017         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7018         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7019         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7020
7021         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7022
7023         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7024         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7025                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7026         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7027         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7028
7029         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7030         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7031         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7032         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7033         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7034         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7035
7036         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7037         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7038                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7039                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7040                 }
7041         }
7042
7043         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7044         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7045
7046         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7047         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7048         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7049         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7050         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7051
7052         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7053         let penalty_1;
7054         let feerate_1;
7055         {
7056                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7057                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7058                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7059                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7060                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7061                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7062                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7063                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7064                 node_txn.clear();
7065         };
7066
7067         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7068         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7069         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7070         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7071         {
7072                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7073                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7074                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7075                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7076                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7077                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7078                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7079                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7080                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7081                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7082                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7083                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7084                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7085                         node_txn.clear();
7086                 }
7087         }
7088         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7089
7090         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7091         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7092         let penalty_3;
7093         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7094         {
7095                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7096                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7097                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7098                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7099                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7100                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7101                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7102                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7103                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7104                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7105                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7106                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7107                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7108                         node_txn.clear();
7109                 }
7110         }
7111         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7112
7113         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7114         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7115 }
7116
7117 #[test]
7118 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7119         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7120         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7121
7122         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7123         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7124         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7125         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7126         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7127
7128         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7129         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7130         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7131         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7132         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7133         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7134                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7135         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7136         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7137         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7138                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7139         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7140
7141         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7142         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7143         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7144
7145         // Revoke local commitment tx
7146         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7147
7148         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7149         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7150         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7151         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7152         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7153         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7154         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7155
7156         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7157         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7158
7159         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7160         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7161         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7162
7163         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7164         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7165         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7166         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7167
7168         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7169         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7170         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7171         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7172         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7173         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
7174         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7175         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7176         match events.last().unwrap() {
7177                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7178                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7179         }
7180         let first;
7181         let feerate_1;
7182         let penalty_txn;
7183         {
7184                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7185                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7186                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7187
7188                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7189                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7190                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7191                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7192                 // future).
7193                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7194                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7195                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7196                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7197                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7198                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7199
7200                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7201                 // available, which we check here:
7202                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7203                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7204                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7205
7206                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7207                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7208
7209                 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7210                 // output, checked above).
7211                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7212                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7213                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7214
7215                 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7216                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7217                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7218                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
7219                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7220                 node_txn.clear();
7221         }
7222
7223         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7224         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7225         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7226         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7227         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7228
7229         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7230         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7231         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7232         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7233         let node_txn = {
7234                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7235                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7236
7237                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7238                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7239                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7240                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7241                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7242                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7243                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7244                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7245                 node_txn.clear();
7246                 txn
7247         };
7248         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7249         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7250         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7251         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7252         {
7253                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7254                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7255                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7256                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7257                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7258                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7259                 // up bumped justice generation.
7260                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7261                 node_txn.clear();
7262         }
7263         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7264         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7265 }
7266
7267 #[test]
7268 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7269         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7270         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7271
7272         // Create 2 HTLCs
7273         // Provide preimage for one
7274         // Check aggregation
7275
7276         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7277         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7278         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7279         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7280
7281         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7282         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7283         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7284
7285         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7286         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7287         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7288         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7289         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7290
7291         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7292         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7293         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7294         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7295         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7296         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7297
7298         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7299         let timeout;
7300         let preimage;
7301         let preimage_bump;
7302         let feerate_timeout;
7303         let feerate_preimage;
7304         {
7305                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7306                 // 3 transactions including:
7307                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7308                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7309                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7310                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7311                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7312                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7313                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7314                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7315
7316                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7317                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7318                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7319                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7320
7321                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7322                         (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7323                 } else {
7324                         (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7325                 };
7326
7327                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7328                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7329                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7330
7331                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7332                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7333                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7334                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7335
7336                 node_txn.clear();
7337         };
7338         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7339         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7340
7341         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7342         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7343         {
7344                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7345                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7346                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7347                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7348                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7349                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7350
7351                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7352                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7353                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7354                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7355                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7356
7357                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7358                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7359                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7360                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7361                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7362
7363                 node_txn.clear();
7364         }
7365
7366         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7367         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7368 }
7369
7370 #[test]
7371 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7372         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7373         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7374         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7375         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7376         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7377         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7378         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7379         // implement that).
7380         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7381         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7382         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7383         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7384         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
7385
7386         let per_commitment_secret;
7387         let next_per_commitment_point;
7388         {
7389                 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7390                 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7391
7392                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7393
7394                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7395                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7396                 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7397
7398                 // Must revoke without gaps
7399                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7400                 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7401
7402                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7403                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7404                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7405         }
7406
7407         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7408                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7409         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7410         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7411         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7412 }
7413
7414 #[test]
7415 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7416         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7417         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7418
7419         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7420         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7421         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7422         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7423
7424         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7425         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7426         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7427         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7428
7429         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7430         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7431         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7432
7433         // Revoke local commitment tx
7434         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7435
7436         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7437         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7438         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7439         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7440
7441         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7442         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7443         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7444         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7445         let penalty_txn = {
7446                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7447                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7448                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7449                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7450                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7451                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7452                 node_txn.clear();
7453                 penalty_txn
7454         };
7455         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7456         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7457         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7458         {
7459                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7460                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7461                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7462         }
7463 }
7464
7465 #[test]
7466 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
7467         // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
7468         // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
7469         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7470         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7471         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7472         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7473         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7474
7475         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
7476         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7477         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
7478         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7479         let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7480
7481         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7482         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
7483         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
7484         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7485         let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7486
7487         // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
7488         // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
7489         // can get our balance.
7490
7491         // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
7492         // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
7493         // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
7494         let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
7495         route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
7496         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7497         let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7498         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
7499
7500         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
7501 }
7502
7503 #[test]
7504 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7505         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7506         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7507         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7508         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7509         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7510         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7511
7512         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7513
7514         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7515         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7516         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7517         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7518         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7519
7520         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7521         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7522         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7523         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7524
7525         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7526         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7527         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7528         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7529         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7530         match close_ev[0] {
7531                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7532                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7533                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7534                 },
7535                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7536         }
7537 }
7538
7539 #[test]
7540 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7541         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7542         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7543         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7544         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7545
7546         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7547         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7548         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7549
7550         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7551
7552         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7553         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7554         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7555         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7556 }
7557
7558 #[test]
7559 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7560         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7561         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7562         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7563         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7564         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7565         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7566
7567         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7568         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7569         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7570
7571         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7572         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7573         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7574 }
7575
7576 #[test]
7577 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7578         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7579         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7580         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7581         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7582         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7583
7584         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7585         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7586         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7587         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7588         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7589         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7590         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7591         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7592         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7593         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7594         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7595         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7596
7597         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7598         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7599         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7600         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7601
7602         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7603         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7604         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7605         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7606         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7607
7608         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7609         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7610
7611         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7612         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7613         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7614         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7615         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7616         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7617
7618         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7619         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7620         // `channel_value`.
7621         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7622         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7623         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7624         // `channel_value`.
7625         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7626 }
7627
7628 #[test]
7629 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7630         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7631         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7632         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7633         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7634         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7635         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7636
7637         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7638         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7639
7640         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7641
7642         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7643         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7644         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7645
7646         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7647         match events[0] {
7648                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7649                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7650                 }
7651                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7652         }
7653
7654         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7655         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7656
7657         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7658                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7659                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7660                 }
7661                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7662         }
7663
7664         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7665
7666         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7667         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7668
7669         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7670         match events[0] {
7671                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7672                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7673                 }
7674                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7675         }
7676 }
7677
7678 #[test]
7679 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7680         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7681         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7682         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7683         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7684         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7685         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7686
7687         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7688         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7689
7690         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7691
7692         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7693         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7694         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7695
7696         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7697         match events[0] {
7698                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7699                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7700                 }
7701                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7702         }
7703
7704         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7705         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7706
7707         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7708                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7709                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7710                 }
7711                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7712         }
7713         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7714 }
7715
7716 #[test]
7717 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7718         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7719         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7720         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7721         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7722         // and the channel should be closed.
7723         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7724         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7725         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7726         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7727         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7728         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7729
7730         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7731         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7732         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7733
7734         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7735
7736         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7737         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7738
7739         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7740         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7741
7742         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7743         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7744         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7745         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7746         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7747         let accept_chan_msg = {
7748                 let mut lock;
7749                 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
7750                 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7751         };
7752         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
7753
7754         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7755
7756         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7757         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7758
7759         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7760         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7761
7762         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7763         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7764
7765         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7766         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7767                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7768                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7769                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7770                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7771                 }
7772                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7773         }
7774
7775         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7776 }
7777
7778 #[test]
7779 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7780         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7781         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7782         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7783         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7784         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7785         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7786
7787         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7788         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7789
7790         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7791
7792         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7793         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7794         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7795
7796         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7797         match events[0] {
7798                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7799                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7800                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7801                         match api_res {
7802                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7803                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7804                                 },
7805                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7806                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7807                         }
7808                 }
7809                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7810         }
7811
7812         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7813         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7814         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7815
7816         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7817                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7818                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7819                 }
7820                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7821         }
7822 }
7823
7824 #[test]
7825 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7826         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7827         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7828         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7829         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7830
7831         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7832         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7833         match api_res {
7834                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
7835                         assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
7836                 },
7837                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7838                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7839         }
7840 }
7841
7842 #[test]
7843 fn test_simple_mpp() {
7844         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
7845         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7846         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7847         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7848         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7849
7850         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7851         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7852         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7853         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7854
7855         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7856         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7857         route.paths.push(path);
7858         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7859         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7860         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7861         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7862         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7863         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7864         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
7865         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
7866 }
7867
7868 #[test]
7869 fn test_preimage_storage() {
7870         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
7871         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7872         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7873         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7874         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7875
7876         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7877
7878         {
7879                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7880                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7881                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7882                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7883                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7884                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7885                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7886                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7887         }
7888         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
7889         // values from previous calls.
7890         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7891         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7892         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7893         match events[0] {
7894                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
7895                         match &purpose {
7896                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
7897                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
7898                                 },
7899                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
7900                         }
7901                 },
7902                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7903         }
7904 }
7905
7906 #[test]
7907 #[allow(deprecated)]
7908 fn test_secret_timeout() {
7909         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
7910         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
7911         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7912         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7913         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7914         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7915
7916         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7917
7918         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
7919
7920         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
7921         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
7922         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
7923                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
7924         } else { panic!(); }
7925         let mut block = {
7926                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
7927                 Block {
7928                         header: BlockHeader {
7929                                 version: 0x2000000,
7930                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
7931                                 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
7932                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7933                         txdata: vec![],
7934                 }
7935         };
7936         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
7937         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
7938                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
7939         } else { panic!(); }
7940
7941         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
7942         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
7943         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
7944         block.header.time += 1;
7945         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
7946         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
7947         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
7948
7949         {
7950                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7951                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7952                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7953                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7954                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7955                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7956                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7957         }
7958         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
7959         // values from previous calls.
7960         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7961         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7962         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7963         match events[0] {
7964                 Event::PaymentClaimable { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
7965                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
7966                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
7967                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
7968                 },
7969                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7970         }
7971 }
7972
7973 #[test]
7974 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
7975         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
7976         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7977         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7978         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7979         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7980
7981         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7982
7983         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
7984         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7985         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
7986         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7987
7988         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
7989         // resulting events.
7990         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
7991                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
7992                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7993                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7994                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7995                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7996                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7997
7998                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
7999                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8000                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8001                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8002                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8003
8004                         // We should fail the payment back
8005                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8006                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8007                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8008                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8009                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8010                                 },
8011                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8012                         }
8013                 }
8014         }
8015
8016         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8017         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8018         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8019
8020         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8021         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8022         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8023         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8024
8025         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8026         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8027         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8028         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8029
8030         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8031         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8032         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8033         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8034 }
8035
8036 #[test]
8037 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8038         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8039         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8040         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8041         // error.
8042         //
8043         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8044         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8045         // commitment at same time.
8046
8047         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8048         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8049         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8050         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8051
8052         // Create some initial channel
8053         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8054         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8055
8056         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8057         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8058
8059         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8060         let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8061
8062         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8063         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8064         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8065         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8066         let watchtower = {
8067                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8068                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8069                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8070                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8071                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), nodes[0].keys_manager).unwrap().1;
8072                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8073                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8074                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8075                 watchtower
8076         };
8077         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8078         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8079         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8080         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8081         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8082         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8083
8084         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8085         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8086         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8087         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8088
8089         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8090         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8091         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8092         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8093                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8094                         assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8095                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8096                 } else { assert!(false); }
8097         } else { assert!(false); };
8098         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8099         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8100         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8101         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8102 }
8103
8104 #[test]
8105 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8106         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8107         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8108         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8109         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8110
8111         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8112         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8113         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8114         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8115
8116         // Create some initial channel
8117         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8118         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8119
8120         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8121         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8122
8123         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8124         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8125
8126         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8127         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8128         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8129         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8130         let watchtower_alice = {
8131                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8132                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8133                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8134                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8135                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), nodes[0].keys_manager).unwrap().1;
8136                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8137                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8138                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8139                 watchtower
8140         };
8141         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8142         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8143         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8144         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8145         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8146         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8147
8148         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8149         {
8150                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8151                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8152                 txn.clear();
8153         }
8154
8155         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8156         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8157         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8158         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8159         let watchtower_bob = {
8160                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8161                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8162                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8163                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8164                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), nodes[0].keys_manager).unwrap().1;
8165                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8166                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8167                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8168                 watchtower
8169         };
8170         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8171         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8172
8173         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8174         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8175         {
8176                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8177         }
8178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8179
8180         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8181         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8182         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8183         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8184                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8185                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8186                         assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8187                         assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8188                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8189                 } else { assert!(false); }
8190         } else { assert!(false); };
8191         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8192         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8193
8194         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8195         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8196         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8197
8198         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8199         let bob_state_y;
8200         {
8201                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8202                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8203                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8204                 txn.clear();
8205         };
8206
8207         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8208         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8209         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8210         {
8211                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8212                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8213                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8214         }
8215 }
8216
8217 #[test]
8218 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8219         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8220         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8221         // message).
8222         //
8223         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8224         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8225         //
8226         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8227         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8228         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8229         // before receiving funding_signed.
8230         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8231         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8232         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8233         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8234
8235         // Create an initial channel
8236         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8237         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8238         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8239         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8240         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
8241
8242         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8243         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8244
8245         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8246         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8247
8248         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8249         let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8250         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8251         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8252         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8253 }
8254
8255 #[test]
8256 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8257         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8258         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8259         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8260         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8261         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8262         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8263
8264         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8265         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8266         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8267         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8268
8269         // Create some initial channels
8270         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8271
8272         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8273         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8274         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8275         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8276         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8277         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8278
8279         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8280         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8281         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8282         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8283         // this test before #653 fix.
8284         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8285         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8286         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8287         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8288         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8289
8290         let htlc_timeout = {
8291                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8292                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8293                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8294                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8295                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8296                 node_txn[0].clone()
8297         };
8298
8299         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8300         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8301         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8302         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8303 }
8304
8305 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8306         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8307         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8308         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8309         //
8310         // Steps of the test:
8311         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8312         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8313         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8314         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8315         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8316         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8317         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8318         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8319         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8320         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8321         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8322         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8323
8324         // Create some initial channels
8325         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8326         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8327
8328         // Steps (1) and (2):
8329         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8330         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8331
8332         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8333         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8334         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8335         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8336         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8337         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8338         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8339
8340         // Steps (3) and (4):
8341         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8342         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8343         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8344         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8345
8346         // Bob force-closes
8347         if !broadcast_alice {
8348                 force_closing_node = 1;
8349                 counterparty_node = 0;
8350         }
8351         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8352         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8353         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8354         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8355         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8356                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8357                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8358                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8359                 };
8360                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8361                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8362                 if broadcast_alice {
8363                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8364                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8365                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8366                 }
8367         }
8368
8369         // Step (5):
8370         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8371         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8372         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8373         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8374         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8375
8376         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8377         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8378         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8379         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8380         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8381         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8382
8383         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8384         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8385         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8386         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8387                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8388                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8389                 match events[0] {
8390                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8391                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8392                         },
8393                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8394                 };
8395         }
8396         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8397         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8398         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8399         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8400
8401         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8402         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8403         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8404                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8405                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8406                         (*msg).clone()
8407                 },
8408                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8409         };
8410         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8411                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8412                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8413                         (*updates).clone()
8414                 },
8415                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8416         };
8417
8418         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8419         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8420         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8421         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8422
8423         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8424         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8425         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8426                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8427                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8428                         (*msg).clone()
8429                 },
8430                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8431         };
8432         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8433         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8434
8435         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8436         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8437         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8438         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8439         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8440                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8441                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8442                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8443                 if broadcast_alice {
8444                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8445                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8446                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8447                 }
8448                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8449                 if broadcast_alice {
8450                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8451                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8452                 } else {
8453                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8454                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8455                 }
8456         }
8457
8458         // Step (6):
8459         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8460         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8461         {
8462                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8463                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8464                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8465                 };
8466                 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8467                 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8468                 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8469                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8470                 if broadcast_alice {
8471                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8472                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8473                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8474                 } else {
8475                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8476                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8477                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8478                 }
8479         }
8480 }
8481
8482 #[test]
8483 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8484         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8485         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8486         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8487         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8488 }
8489
8490 #[test]
8491 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8492         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8493         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8494         //
8495         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8496         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8497         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8498         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8499         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8500         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8501         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8502         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8503
8504         // Create an initial channel
8505         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8506         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8507         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8508         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8509
8510         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8511         // that it is rejected.
8512         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8513         {
8514                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8515                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8516                 match events[0] {
8517                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8518                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8519                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8520                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8521                                 // move forward with it.
8522                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8523                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8524                         },
8525                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8526                 }
8527         }
8528
8529         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8530         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8531
8532         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8533         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8534
8535         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8536         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8537         {
8538                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8539                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8540                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8541                 added_monitors.clear();
8542         }
8543         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8544
8545         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8546         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8547
8548         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8549         // temporary one).
8550
8551         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8552         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8553         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8554         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8555         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8556         {
8557                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8558                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8559                 match events[0] {
8560                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8561                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8562                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8563                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8564                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8565                         },
8566                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8567                 }
8568         }
8569
8570         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8571         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8572         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8573         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8574         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8575         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8576
8577         let funding_created = {
8578                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8579                 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8580                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8581                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8582                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8583                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8584                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8585                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8586         };
8587         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8588         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8589         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8590         // still needs to be cleared here.
8591         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8592
8593         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8594         {
8595                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8596                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8597                 match events[0] {
8598                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8599                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8600                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8601                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8602                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8603                         },
8604                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8605                 }
8606         }
8607
8608         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8609         // everything is functional.
8610         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8611         {
8612                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8613                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8614                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8615                 added_monitors.clear();
8616         }
8617
8618         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8619         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8620         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8621         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8622
8623         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8624         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8625         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8626
8627         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8628 }
8629
8630 #[test]
8631 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8632         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8633         //
8634         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8635         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8636         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8637         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8638         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8639         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8640         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8641
8642         // Create some initial channels
8643         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8644         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8645         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8646
8647         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8648         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8649         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8650
8651         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8652         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8653         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8654
8655         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8656         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8657         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8658         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8659         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8660         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8661         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8662         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8663         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8664
8665         // A null channel ID should close all channels
8666         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8667         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8668         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8669         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8670         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8671         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8672         match events[0] {
8673                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8674                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8675                 },
8676                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8677         }
8678         match events[1] {
8679                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8680                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8681                 },
8682                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8683         }
8684         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8685         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8686         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8687         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8688         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8689         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8690
8691         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8692         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8693         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8694 }
8695
8696 #[test]
8697 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8698         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8699         //
8700         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8701         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8702         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8703         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8704         //
8705         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
8706         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
8707         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
8708         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8709         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8710         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8711         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8712
8713         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8714         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8715         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8716
8717         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8718
8719         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
8720         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
8721         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
8722         // its length.
8723         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
8724         let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
8725         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8726                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8727                 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
8728         }
8729
8730         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8731         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8732         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8733
8734         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8735         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8736
8737         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8738         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8739
8740         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8741         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8742         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8743
8744         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
8745         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8746         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8747         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8748         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8749         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8750         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8751                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8752                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8753                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
8754                 } else { panic!(); }
8755         } else { panic!(); }
8756         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8757
8758         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
8759         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
8760         // as its not 32 bytes long.
8761         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8762                 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
8763                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
8764                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
8765                                 txid: tx.txid(),
8766                                 vout: idx as u32,
8767                         },
8768                         script_sig: Script::new(),
8769                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
8770                         witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
8771                 }).collect(),
8772                 output: vec![TxOut {
8773                         value: 1000,
8774                         script_pubkey: Script::new(),
8775                 }]
8776         };
8777         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
8778         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
8779 }
8780
8781 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8782         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8783         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8784         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8785         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8786         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8787         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8788         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8789         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8790         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8791         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8792         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8793         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8794         // until we learned about an additional block.
8795         //
8796         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8797         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8798         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8799         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8800         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8801         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8802         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8803
8804         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8805         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8806         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8807         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8808         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8809
8810         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8811         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8812         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8813         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8814         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8815         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8816
8817         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8818         if !test_height_before_timelock {
8819                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8820         }
8821         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8822                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8823         if test_height_before_timelock {
8824                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8825                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8826                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8827                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8828         } else {
8829                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
8830                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8831                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
8832                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
8833                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
8834                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
8835                 // timelock is up).
8836                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
8837                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
8838
8839                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
8840                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
8841                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
8842                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8843                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
8844                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
8845                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8846
8847                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8848                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8849                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8850                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8851                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8852                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8853                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8854                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8855                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
8856         }
8857 }
8858
8859 #[test]
8860 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
8861         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
8862         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
8863 }
8864
8865 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
8866         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8867         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8868         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8869         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8870
8871         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8872
8873         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
8874                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8875         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8876
8877         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
8878
8879         {
8880                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8881                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8882                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8883                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8884                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8885                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8886                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8887         }
8888         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8889         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
8890
8891         {
8892                 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
8893                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
8894                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8895                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8896                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8897                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8898                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8899                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8900                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
8901                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
8902                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
8903                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
8904         }
8905
8906         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
8907         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8908
8909         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
8910                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
8911                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
8912
8913                 let expected_destinations = vec![
8914                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
8915                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
8916                 ];
8917                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
8918                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8919
8920                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8921                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8922                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
8923
8924                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8925                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
8926                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
8927
8928                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8929                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
8930                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
8931                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
8932         } else {
8933                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
8934                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8935                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8936
8937                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8938                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8939                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8940                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
8941
8942                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
8943
8944                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
8945         }
8946 }
8947
8948 #[test]
8949 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
8950         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
8951         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
8952         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
8953         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
8954         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
8955 }
8956
8957 #[test]
8958 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
8959         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
8960         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
8961         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
8962 }
8963
8964 #[test]
8965 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
8966         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
8967         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
8968         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8969         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8970         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8971         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8972
8973         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8974         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8975         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8976         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8977
8978         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
8979                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8980         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8981         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
8982         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
8983                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
8984                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
8985                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
8986         });
8987         let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
8988
8989         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
8990
8991         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8992         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8993
8994         let session_privs = {
8995                 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
8996                 // ultimately have, just not right away.
8997                 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
8998                 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
8999                 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9000         };
9001         {
9002                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9003                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9004
9005                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9006                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9007                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9008         }
9009         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9010
9011         {
9012                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9013                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9014
9015                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9016                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9017                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9018
9019                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9020                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9021
9022                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9023                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9024
9025                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9026                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9027                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9028
9029                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9030                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9031                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9032
9033                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9034                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9035                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9036         }
9037         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9038         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9039         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9040         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9041
9042         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9043
9044         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9045         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9046         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9047
9048         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9049         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9050
9051         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9052         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9053         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9054
9055         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9056
9057         nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9058         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9059
9060         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9061         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9062         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9063
9064         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9065 }
9066
9067 #[test]
9068 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9069         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9070         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9071         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9072         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9073
9074         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9075         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9076         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9077         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9078         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9079                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9080                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9081                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9082         };
9083         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9084         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9085         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9086
9087         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9088         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9089         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9090         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9091         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9092         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9093         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9094         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9095         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9096 }
9097
9098 #[test]
9099 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9100         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9101         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9102         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9103         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9104
9105         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9106         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9107         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
9108         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
9109
9110         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9111         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9112                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9113                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9114                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9115         };
9116         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9117         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9118         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9119         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9120         let route = find_route(
9121                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9122                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9123         ).unwrap();
9124
9125         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9126         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9127         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9128         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9129         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9130         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9131         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9132         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9133         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9134 }
9135
9136 #[test]
9137 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9138         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9139         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9140         // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9141         // amount.
9142         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9143         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9144         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9145         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9146
9147         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9148         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9149         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9150         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9151
9152         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9153         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9154         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9155                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9156                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9157                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9158         });
9159
9160         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9161         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9162         // amount of time to respond to.
9163
9164         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9165         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9166         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9167
9168         let failed_destinations = vec![
9169                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9170                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9171         ];
9172         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9173
9174         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
9175
9176         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9177         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9179
9180         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9181         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9182         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9183
9184         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9185         // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9186         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9188         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9189 }
9190
9191 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9192 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9193 enum ExposureEvent {
9194         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9195         AtHTLCForward,
9196         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9197         AtHTLCReception,
9198         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9199         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9200 }
9201
9202 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9203         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9204         // policy.
9205         //
9206         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9207         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9208         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9209         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9210         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9211         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9212         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9213         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9214
9215         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9216         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9217         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9218         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9219         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9220         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9221
9222         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9223         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9224         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9225         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9226         if on_holder_tx {
9227                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9228         }
9229         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
9230         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9231         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
9232
9233         let opt_anchors = false;
9234
9235         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9236
9237         if on_holder_tx {
9238                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9239                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9240                 }
9241         }
9242
9243         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9244         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9245         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9246
9247         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9248         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9249
9250         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9251         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9252         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9253
9254         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9255                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9256                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9257                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9258         };
9259         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9260         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9261
9262         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9263         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9264
9265         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9266         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9267
9268         if on_holder_tx {
9269                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9270                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9271                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9272                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9273                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9274                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9275                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9276                         }
9277                 } else {
9278                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9279                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9280                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9281                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9282                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9283                         }
9284                 }
9285         } else {
9286                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9287                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9288                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9289                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9290                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9291                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9292                         }
9293                 } else {
9294                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9295                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9296                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9297                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9298                         }
9299                 }
9300         }
9301
9302         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9303         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9304                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9305                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9306                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9307                 if on_holder_tx {
9308                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9309                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9310                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9311                 } else {
9312                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9313                 }
9314         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9315                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9316                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9317                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9318                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9319                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9320                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9321                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9322                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9323                 if on_holder_tx {
9324                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9325                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9326                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9327                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9328                 } else {
9329                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9330                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9331                 }
9332         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9333                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9334                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9335                 {
9336                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9337                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9338                 }
9339                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9340                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9341                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9342         }
9343
9344         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9345         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9346         added_monitors.clear();
9347 }
9348
9349 #[test]
9350 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9351         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9352         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9353         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9354         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9355         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9356         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9357         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9358         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9359         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9360         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9361         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9362         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9363 }
9364
9365 #[test]
9366 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9367         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9368         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9369         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9370         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9371
9372         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9373         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9374         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
9375         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9376         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
9377
9378         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9379
9380         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9381         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9382         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9383         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9384         let mut tx = match events[0] {
9385                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9386                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
9387                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9388                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9389                         }]}
9390                 },
9391                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9392         };
9393         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9394         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9395                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9396                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9397                 },
9398                 _ => panic!()
9399         }
9400
9401         // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
9402         tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9403         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9404         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9405 }
9406
9407 #[test]
9408 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9409         // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9410         // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9411         // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9412         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9413         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9414         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9415         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9416
9417         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9418
9419         // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9420         {
9421                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9422                 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9423         }
9424
9425         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9426         {
9427                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9428                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9429         }
9430         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9431         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9432
9433         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9434         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9435         match events[0] {
9436                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9437                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9438                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9439                 },
9440                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9441         };
9442
9443         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9444         // it.
9445         {
9446                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9447                 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9448         }
9449         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9450         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9451
9452         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9453         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9454         match events[0] {
9455                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9456                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9457                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9458                 },
9459                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9460         };
9461
9462         // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9463         // channel.
9464         {
9465                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9466                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9467         }
9468         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9469         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9470
9471         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9472         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9473         match events[0] {
9474                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9475                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9476                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9477                                 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() });
9478                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9479                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9480                 },
9481                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9482         };
9483 }