_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
  13 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  14 use ln::{channel, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
  15 use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
  16 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
  17 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  18 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
  19 use routing::network_graph::NetworkUpdate;
  20 use routing::router::get_route;
  21
  22 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  23 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  24
  25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  27 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  28
  29 use prelude::*;
  30
  31 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  32
  33 #[test]
  34 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  35         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  36         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  37         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  38         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  39         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  40         // HTLC.
  41         //
  42         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  43         //
  44         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  45         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  46         //
  47         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  48         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  49         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  50         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  51         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  52         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  53         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  54
  55         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
  56         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
  57
  58         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  59         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
  60         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  61
  62         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  63
  64         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  65         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  66         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  67
  68         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  69         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  70         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  71
  72         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  73         // transaction for nodes[1].
  74         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  75         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  76         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  77         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
  78         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
  79
  80         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
  81         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  82         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  83         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  84
  85         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
  86         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
  87         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
  88 }
  89
  90 #[test]
  91 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
  92         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
  93         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
  94         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
  95         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
  96         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  97         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  98         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  99         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 100
 101         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 102                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 103         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 104         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 105
 106         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
 107
 108         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 109                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000
 110                 }],
 111                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 112         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
 113                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 114
 115         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id).unwrap();
 116         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 117         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
 118         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 119         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
 120
 121         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 122         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 123         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 124         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 125         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 126         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 127         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 128         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 129
 130         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 131         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 132         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 133
 134         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 135         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 136
 137         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 138         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 139
 140         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 141         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 142
 143         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 144                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000,
 145                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 146                 }],
 147                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 148         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 149                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
 150                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 151                 }],
 152                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 153
 154         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 155         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 156
 157         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 158                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 159         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 160                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 161
 162         let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 163         assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
 164         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 165                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 166                 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 167                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 168                 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
 169         }
 170
 171         let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 172         assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
 173         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 174                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 175                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 176                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 177                 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
 178         }
 179         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 180         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 181 }
 182
 183 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 184         v.sort_unstable();
 185         v
 186 }
 187
 188 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 189         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 190         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 191         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 192         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 193         if prev_commitment_tx {
 194                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 195                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 196                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 197                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 198                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 199         }
 200         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 201         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 202         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 203
 204         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 205                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 206         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 207         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 208
 209         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 210         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
 211         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 212         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 213         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 214         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 215         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 216
 217         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 218
 219         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
 220
 221         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 222         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 223         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 224         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 225                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 226                                 (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 227                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 228                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 229                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 230                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 231                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 232                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 233                 }]),
 234                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 235         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 236                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 237                 }],
 238                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 239
 240         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 241         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 242         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 243         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 244         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 245         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 246         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 247         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 248         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 249
 250         if prev_commitment_tx {
 251                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 252                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 253                 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 254                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 255                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 256                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 257                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 258                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 259                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 260                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 261                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 262                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 263         }
 264
 265         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 266         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 267         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 268                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 269                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 270                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 271                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 272                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 273                                 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
 274                                 chan_feerate * (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT +
 275                                                                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
 276                                                                 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 277                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 278                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 279                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 280                 }];
 281         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 282                 a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 283                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 284                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 285                 });
 286         }
 287         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 288                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 289         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 290                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 291                 }],
 292                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 293
 294         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 295         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 296         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 297         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 298         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 299
 300         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 301         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 });
 302         if prev_commitment_tx {
 303                 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]);
 304         } else {
 305                 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]);
 306                 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]);
 307         }
 308         // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats
 309         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 310         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 311         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 312         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 313         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 314         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 315         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx);
 316
 317         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 318         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 319         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 320         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 321         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 322         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 323         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 324         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 325         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 326         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 327
 328         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 329         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 330         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 331         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 332         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 333         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 334
 335         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 336                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 337                                 (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 338                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 339                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 340                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 341                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 342                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 343                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 344                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 345                 }]),
 346                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 347         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 348         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 349         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 350                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 351                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 352                 },
 353                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 354                 // long.
 355                 Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 356                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 357                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 358                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 359                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 360                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 361                 }]),
 362                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 363
 364         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 365         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, true);
 366         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 367
 368         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 369         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 370         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 371                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 372                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 373                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 374                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 375                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 376                 }]),
 377                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 378         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 379                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 380                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 381                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 382                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 383                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 384                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 385                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 386                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 387                 }]),
 388                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 389
 390         let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 391         assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
 392         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 393                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 394                 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 395                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 396                 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
 397         }
 398
 399         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 400
 401         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 402         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 403         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 404         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 405                 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 406         }
 407         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 408                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 409                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 410                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 411                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 412                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 413                 }]),
 414                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 415         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 416         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 417                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 418                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 419                 }],
 420                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 421
 422         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 423         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
 424         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 425         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3);
 426         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx);
 427         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 428         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 429         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
 430         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
 431         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 432                    a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 433         // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 434         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 435         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 436
 437         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 438         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 439         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 440         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 441         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 442                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 443                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 444                 }],
 445                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 446         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 447         // balance entry.
 448         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 449         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 450                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 451         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true);
 452
 453         let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 454         assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
 455         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 456                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 457                 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 458                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 459                 check_spends!(spend_tx, a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 460         } else { panic!(); }
 461
 462         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 463         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 464         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 465         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 466         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 467
 468         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 469                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 470                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 471                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 472                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 473                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 474                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 475                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 476                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 477                 }]),
 478                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 479
 480         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 481         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 482         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 483
 484         let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 485         assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
 486         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 487                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 488                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 489                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 490                 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
 491         }
 492
 493         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 494                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 495                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 496                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 497                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 498                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 499                 }]),
 500                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 501
 502         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 503         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 504         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 505
 506         let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 507         assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
 508         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 509                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 510                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 511                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 512                 check_spends!(spend_tx, b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 513         } else { panic!(); }
 514
 515         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 516                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 517                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 518                 }],
 519         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 520
 521         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 522         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 523         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 524         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 525         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 526                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 527                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 528                 }],
 529         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 530         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 531         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 532                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 533 }
 534
 535 #[test]
 536 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 537         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
 538         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
 539 }