_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
  13 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  14 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  15 use crate::ln::channel;
  16 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId};
  17 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
  18 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  19
  20 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  21 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  23 use bitcoin::Transaction;
  24
  25 use crate::prelude::*;
  26
  27 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  28
  29 #[test]
  30 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  31         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  32         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  33         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  34         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  35         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  36         // HTLC.
  37         //
  38         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  39         //
  40         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  41         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  42         //
  43         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  44         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  45         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  46         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  47         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  48         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  49         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  50
  51         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
  52         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
  53
  54         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  55         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
  56         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  57
  58         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  59
  60         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  61         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  62         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  63
  64         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  65         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  66         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  67
  68         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  69         // transaction for nodes[1].
  70         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  71         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  72         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  73         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
  74         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
  75
  76         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
  77         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
  78         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  79         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  80
  81         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
  82         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
  83         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
  84 }
  85
  86 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) {
  87         let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
  88         assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1);
  89         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
  90                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
  91                 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
  92                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
  93                 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
  94         } else { panic!(); }
  95 }
  96
  97 #[test]
  98 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
  99         // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
 100         // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
 101         // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
 102         // confirmations.
 103         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 104         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 105         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 106         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 107
 108         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 109
 110         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
 111
 112         // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
 113         // before forwarding.
 114         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
 115         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
 116
 117         // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
 118         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
 119
 120         // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
 121         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
 122         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 123         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 124         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 125
 126         let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 127         assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
 128         check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
 129
 130         // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
 131         // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
 132         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 133         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 134         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 135
 136         // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
 137         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
 138         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 139         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 140
 141         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 142         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
 143 }
 144
 145 #[test]
 146 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
 147         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
 148         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
 149         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
 150         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
 151         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 152         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 153         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 154         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 155
 156         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 157                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 158         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 159         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 160
 161         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 162         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 163
 164         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 165                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000
 166                 }],
 167                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 168         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
 169                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 170
 171         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 172         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 173         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node_0_shutdown);
 174         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 175         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node_1_shutdown);
 176
 177         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 178         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 179         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 180         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 181         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 182         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 183         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 184         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 185
 186         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 187         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 188         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 189
 190         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 191         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 192
 193         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 194         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 195
 196         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 197         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 198
 199         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 200                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000,
 201                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 202                 }],
 203                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 204         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 205                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
 206                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 207                 }],
 208                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 209
 210         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 211         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 212
 213         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 214                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 215         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 216                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 217
 218         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 219         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 220
 221         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 222         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 223 }
 224
 225 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 226         v.sort_unstable();
 227         v
 228 }
 229
 230 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
 231 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
 232 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
 233 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
 234         let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 235         let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 236         eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
 237         assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
 238         assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
 239 }
 240
 241 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 242         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 243         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 244         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 245         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 246         if prev_commitment_tx {
 247                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 248                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 249                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 250                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 251                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 252         }
 253         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 254         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 255         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 256
 257         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 258                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 259         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 260         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 261
 262         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 263         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
 264         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 265         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 266         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 267         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 268         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 269
 270         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 271
 272         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 273         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 274
 275         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 276         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 277         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 278         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 279                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 280                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 281                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 282                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 283                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 284                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 285                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 286                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 287                 }]),
 288                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 289         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 290                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 291                 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 292                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 293                         expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 294                 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 295                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 296                         expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 297                 }]),
 298                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 299
 300         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 302         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
 303
 304         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 305         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 306         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 307         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 309         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
 310
 311         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 312         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 313         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
 314
 315         if prev_commitment_tx {
 316                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 317                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 318                 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 319                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 320                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 321                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 322                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 323                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 324                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 325                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 326                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 327                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 328         }
 329
 330         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 331         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 332         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 333                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 334                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 335                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 336                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 337                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 338                                 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
 339                                 chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) +
 340                                                                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
 341                                                                 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 342                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 343                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 344                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 345                 }];
 346         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 347                 a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 348                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 349                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 350                 });
 351         }
 352         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 353                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 354         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 355                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 356                 }],
 357                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 358
 359         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 360         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 361         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 362         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 363         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 364
 365         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 366         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 367         // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
 368         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 369         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 370         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 371         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 372         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 373         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 374
 375         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 376         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 377         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 378         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 379         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 380         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 381         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 382         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 383         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 384         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 385
 386         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 387         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 388         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 389         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 390         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 391         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 392
 393         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 394                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 395                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 396                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 397                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 398                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 399                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 400                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 401                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 402                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 403                 }]),
 404                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 405         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 406         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 407         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 408                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 409                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 410                 },
 411                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 412                 // long.
 413                 Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 414                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 415                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 416                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 417                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 418                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 419                 }]),
 420                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 421
 422         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 423         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
 424         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 425
 426         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 427         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 428         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 429                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 430                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 431                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 432                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 433                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 434                 }]),
 435                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 436         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 437                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 438                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 439                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 440                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 441                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 442                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 443                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 444                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 445                 }]),
 446                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 447
 448         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 449         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 450
 451         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 452         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 453         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 454         if prev_commitment_tx {
 455                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
 456         } else {
 457                 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 458         }
 459         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 460                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 461                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 462                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 463                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 464                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 465                 }]),
 466                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 467         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 468         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 469                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 470                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 471                 }],
 472                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 473
 474         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 475         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
 476         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 477         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 478         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 479         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 480         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 481         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 482         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 483                    a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 484         // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 485         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 486         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 487
 488         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 489         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 490         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 491         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 492         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 493                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 494                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 495                 }],
 496                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 497         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 498         // balance entry.
 499         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 500         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 501                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 502         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
 503
 504         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 505
 506         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 507         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 508         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 509         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 510         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 511
 512         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 513                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 514                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 515                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 516                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 517                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 518                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 519                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 520                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 521                 }]),
 522                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 523
 524         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 525         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 526         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 527         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 528
 529         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 530                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 531                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 532                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 533                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 534                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 535                 }]),
 536                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 537
 538         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 539         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 540         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 541         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 542
 543         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 544                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 545                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 546                 }],
 547                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 548
 549         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 550         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 551         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 552         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 553         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 554                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 555                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 556                 }],
 557                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 558         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 559         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 560                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 561
 562         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 563         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 564         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 565         for node in nodes.iter() {
 566                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 567                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 568                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 569                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 570         }
 571 }
 572
 573 #[test]
 574 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 575         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
 576         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
 577 }
 578
 579 #[test]
 580 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
 581         // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
 582         // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
 583         // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
 584         // delay prior to spendability.
 585         //
 586         // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
 587         // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
 588         // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
 589         // claim by our counterparty).
 590         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 591         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 592         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 593         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 594
 595         // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
 596         // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
 597         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 598         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 599
 600         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
 601         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 602         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 603         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 604
 605         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 606         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 607         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 608
 609         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 610         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
 611
 612         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
 613         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
 614         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 615
 616         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 617         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 618         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 619
 620         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 621         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
 622         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
 623         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 624         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 625         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
 626
 627         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 628         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 629
 630         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
 631         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 632         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3);
 633         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 634         check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]);
 635         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 636
 637         // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
 638         // claimable balances.
 639         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 640         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 641         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 642         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 643         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 644
 645         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 646                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 647                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 648                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 649                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 650                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 651                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 652                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 653                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 654                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 655                 }]),
 656                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 657
 658         // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
 659         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 660         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 661         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 662         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 663         let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 664         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
 665         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);
 666
 667         // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
 668         // transaction.
 669         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
 670         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 671                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 672                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 673                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 674                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 675                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 676                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 677                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 678                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 679                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 680                 }]),
 681                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 682         assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time.0, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block
 683
 684         // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
 685         // "awaiting confirmations" one.
 686         let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 687         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
 688         // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
 689         // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
 690         // call, as described, two hunks down.
 691         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 692                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 693                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 694                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 695                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 696                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 697                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 698                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 699                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 700                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 701                 }]),
 702                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 703
 704         // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
 705         // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
 706         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
 707         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
 708         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 709                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 710                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 711                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 712                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 713                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 714                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 715                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 716                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 717                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 718                 }]),
 719                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 720
 721         // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
 722         // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
 723         // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
 724         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 725         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
 726
 727         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 728                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 729                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 730                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 731                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 732                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 733                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 734                 }]),
 735                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 736
 737         // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 738         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 739         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 740         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 741                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 742                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 743                 }],
 744                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 745         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 746
 747         // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 748         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 749         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 750         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 751         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
 752
 753         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 754         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 755         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 756         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 757         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 758         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 759         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 760 }
 761
 762 #[test]
 763 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
 764         // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
 765         // have a preimage.
 766         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 767         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 768         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 769         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 770
 771         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 772         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 773
 774         // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
 775         let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
 776         let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
 777         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 778
 779         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 780         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 781
 782         // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
 783         // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
 784         // HTLC output is spent.
 785
 786         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 787                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 788                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 789                 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 790                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 791                         expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 792                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 793                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 794                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 795                 }]),
 796                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 797
 798         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 799                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 800                 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 801                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 802                         expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 803                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 804                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 805                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 806                 }]),
 807                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 808
 809         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
 810         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 811         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
 812         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 813         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 814
 815         // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
 816         // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
 817         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 818         let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 819                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 820                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 821                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 822                 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 823                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 824                         expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 825                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 826                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 827                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 828                 }]);
 829
 830         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 831         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 832         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 833         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 834         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 835
 836         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 837                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 838
 839         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 840         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 841         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 842         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 843
 844         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
 845         let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 846                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 847                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 848                 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 849                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 850                         expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 851                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 852                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 853                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 854                 }]);
 855         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 856                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 857
 858         // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
 859         // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
 860         // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
 861         // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
 862
 863         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
 864         let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 865         assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 866         check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 867         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
 868                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
 869
 870         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 871                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 872
 873         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 874         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 875                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 876
 877         // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
 878         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 879         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 880         bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
 881
 882         // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
 883         nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 884         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) - 1);
 885         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
 886                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
 887         let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 888         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 889         check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 890
 891         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 892                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 893
 894         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 895         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 896                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 897
 898         // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
 899         // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
 900         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 901         let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
 902         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 903                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 904                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 905                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 906                 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 907                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 908                         expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 909                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 910                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 911                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
 912                 }]),
 913                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 914
 915         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 916         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 917                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 918                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 919                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 920                 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 921                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 922                         expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 923                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 924                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 925                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
 926                 }]),
 927                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 928
 929         // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
 930         // payment failure event.
 931         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 932         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
 933
 934         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 935         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 936                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 937                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 938                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 939                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 940                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 941                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
 942                 }]),
 943                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 944
 945         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 946         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 947                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 948                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
 949                 }],
 950                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 951         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 952
 953         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 954         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 955         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 956
 957         // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
 958         // was already claimed.
 959         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 960         let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
 961         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 962                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 963                         expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 964                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 965                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 966                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
 967                 }]),
 968                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 969
 970         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 971         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 972                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 973                         expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 974                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 975                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 976                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
 977                 }]),
 978                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 979
 980         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 981         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
 982
 983         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 984                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 985                         expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 986                 }],
 987                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 988         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 989
 990         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 991         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 992
 993         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 994         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 995         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 996         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
 997         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
 998         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 999         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1000 }
1001
1002 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
1003         let mut v = v_orig.clone();
1004         for t in extra_ts {
1005                 v.push((*t).clone());
1006         }
1007         v.sort_unstable();
1008         v
1009 }
1010
1011 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
1012         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
1013         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1014         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1015         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1016         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1017         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1018         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1019         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1020         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1021         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1022
1023         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1024                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1025         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1026         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1027
1028         // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1029         //
1030         // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1031         // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1032         // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1033         // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1034         // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1035         //     later commitment transaction updates
1036         //
1037         // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1038         // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1039         // HTLCs individually.
1040
1041         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1042         let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1043         let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1044
1045         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1046
1047         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1048         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1049
1050         let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1051         let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1052
1053         // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1054         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1055         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1056
1057         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1058
1059         let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1060         let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1061
1062         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1063         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1064         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1065         let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1066
1067         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1068         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1069         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1070
1071         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1072         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1073         let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1074                 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1075                 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1076         events.retain(|ev| {
1077                 match ev {
1078                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1079                                 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1080                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1081                                 false
1082                         },
1083                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1084                                 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1085                                 false
1086                         },
1087                         _ => true,
1088                 }
1089         });
1090         assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1091         if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1092         match &events[1] {
1093                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
1094                 _ => panic!(),
1095         }
1096
1097         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1098         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1099         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1100         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1101
1102         // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1103         // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1104         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1105                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1106                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1107                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1108                         claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1109                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1110                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1111                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1112                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1113                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1114                         claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1115                 }]),
1116                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1117
1118         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1119         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1120         // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1121         // quite soon.
1122         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1123         claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1124
1125         // The following constants were determined experimentally
1126         const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1127         const OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 571;
1128         const INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 578;
1129
1130         // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1131         // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1132         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1133         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1134         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1135         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1136
1137         // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1138         // claim balances separated out.
1139         let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1140                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1141                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1142                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1143                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1144                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1145                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1146                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1147                 }];
1148
1149         let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1150                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1151                         (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1152         };
1153         let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1154         let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1155                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1156         };
1157         let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1158
1159         // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1160         // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1161         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1162                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1163
1164         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1165                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1166                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1167                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1168         } else {
1169                 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1170                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1171                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1172                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1173         }
1174
1175         let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1176                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1177                 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1178         };
1179         let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1180                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1181                         (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1182                         - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1183                 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1184         };
1185
1186         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1187                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1188                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1189         } else {
1190                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1191                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1192         }
1193
1194         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1195                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1196         } else {
1197                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1198         }
1199         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1200                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1201
1202         // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1203         // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1204         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1205         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1206
1207         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1208                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1209                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1210                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1211                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1212                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1213                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1214                                 - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1215                         confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1216                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1217                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000 - chan_feerate * OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1218                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1219                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1220                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1221                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1222                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1223                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1224                         confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1225                 }]),
1226                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1227
1228         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1229         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1230
1231         let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1232         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(&nodes[1], payment_failed_events.pop().unwrap(),
1233                 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1234         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(&nodes[1], payment_failed_events.pop().unwrap(),
1235                 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1236         assert!(payment_failed_events.is_empty());
1237
1238         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1239         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }]);
1240         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1241         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }]);
1242         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1243         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1244         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1245         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1246         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1247         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1248         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1249
1250         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1251         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1252         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1253         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1254         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1255         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1256         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1257 }
1258
1259 #[test]
1260 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1261         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true);
1262         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false);
1263 }
1264
1265 #[test]
1266 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1267         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1268         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1269         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1270         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1271         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1272         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1273
1274         // Create some initial channels
1275         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1276                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1277         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1278         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1279
1280         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1281         let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1282         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1283         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1284         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1285
1286         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs and an output for both sides
1287         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
1288
1289         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1290
1291         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1292         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1293
1294         // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1295         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1296         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1297         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1298         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1299         let revoked_htlc_success_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1300
1301         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn.len(), 1);
1302         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1303         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
1304         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1305
1306         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1307         let revoked_htlc_timeout_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1308         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn.len(), 1);
1309         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1310         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
1311         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
1312         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
1313
1314         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1315         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1316         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1317         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1318         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1319         let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1320
1321         let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1322         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 1);
1323         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1324
1325         // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1326         // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1327         // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1328         let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1329                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1330                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1331                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1332                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1333                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1334                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1335                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1336                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1337                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1338                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1339                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1340                 }]);
1341         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1342                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1343
1344         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success_txn[0]);
1345         let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1346         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1347         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success_txn[0]);
1348         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked
1349                                                                   // outputs (which no longer includes the spent HTLC output)
1350
1351         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1352                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1353
1354         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1355         fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1356                 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000);
1357
1358         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1359         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1360                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1361                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1362                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1363                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1364                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1365                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1366                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1367                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1368                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1369                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1370                         claimable_amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1371                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1372                 }]),
1373                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1374
1375         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1376         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1377         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1378                         // to_self output to B
1379                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1380                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1381                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1382                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1383                         claimable_amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1384                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1385                 }]),
1386                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1387
1388         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1389         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1390         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1391                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1392                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1393                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1394                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1395                 }]),
1396                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1397
1398         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1399         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1400                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1401         // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1402         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1403         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1404                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1405         }
1406
1407         // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1408         // claiming.
1409         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1410         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1411         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1412                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1413         }
1414
1415         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0]);
1416         let as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1417         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1418
1419         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0]);
1420         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1421
1422         // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1423         // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1424         // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1425         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1426         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1427                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1428                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1429                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1430                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1431                 }]),
1432                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1433
1434         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1435         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1436                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1437                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1438                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1439                         claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1440                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1441                 }]),
1442                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1443
1444         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1445         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1446                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1447                         claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].output[0].value,
1448                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1449                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1450                         claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1451                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1452                 }]),
1453                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1454
1455         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1456         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1457         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1458         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1459
1460         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1461
1462         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1463         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1464         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1465         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1466         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1467         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1468         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1469 }
1470
1471 #[test]
1472 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1473         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1474         // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1475         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1476         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1477         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1478         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1479         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1480         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1481         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1482         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1483         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1484
1485         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1486                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1487         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1488         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1489
1490         // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1491         // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1492         // revocation-claim transaction.
1493
1494         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1495         let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1496
1497         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1498
1499         // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1500         // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1501         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1502                 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1503
1504         // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1505         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1506
1507         assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), 2);
1508         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1509         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1510
1511         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1512         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1513
1514         {
1515                 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1516                 *feerate += 1;
1517         }
1518         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1519         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1520
1521         let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1522         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1523         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1524
1525         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1526         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1527         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1528         let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1529
1530         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1531                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1532                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1533                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1534                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1535                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1536                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1537                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1538                 }]),
1539                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1540
1541         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1542         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1543         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1544         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1545
1546         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1547         // Currently the revoked commitment outputs are all claimed in one aggregated transaction
1548         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 1);
1549         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1550         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1551
1552         let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1553
1554         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1555                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1556                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1557                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1558                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1559                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1560                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1561                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1562                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1563                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1564                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1565                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1566                 }]),
1567                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1568
1569         // Confirm A's HTLC-Success tranasction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1570         // new claim.
1571         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[1]);
1572         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage);
1573         let mut claim_txn_2: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1574         claim_txn_2.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| if tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid()) { 0 } else { 1 });
1575         // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1576         // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1577         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1578         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 2);
1579         check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1580         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1581         check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1582
1583         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1584                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1585                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1586                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1587                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1588                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1589                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1590                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1591                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1592                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1593                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1594                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1595                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1596                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1597                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1598                 }]),
1599                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1600
1601         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1602         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1603
1604         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1605                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1606                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1607                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1608                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1609                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1610                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1611                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1612                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1613                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1614                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1615                 }]),
1616                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1617
1618         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1619         let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1620
1621         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1622                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1623                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1624                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1625                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1626                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1627                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1628                         claimable_amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1629                         confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1630                 }]),
1631                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1632
1633         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1634         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1635
1636         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1637                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1638                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1639                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1640                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1641                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1642                 }]),
1643                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1644
1645         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1646         let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1647
1648         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1649                         claimable_amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1650                         confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1651                 }],
1652                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1653
1654         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1655
1656         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1657         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1658         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1659         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1660
1661         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1662         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1663         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1664         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1665         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1666         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1667         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1668 }