1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
12 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
18 use crate::ln::channel;
19 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
20 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
21 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
22 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
23 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
24 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
25 use crate::util::test_utils;
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
28 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
29 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
31 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
32 use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
34 use crate::prelude::*;
36 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
39 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
40 // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
41 // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
42 // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
43 // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
44 // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
47 // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
49 // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
50 // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
52 // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
53 // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
54 // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
55 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
56 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
57 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
58 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
60 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
61 let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
63 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
64 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
65 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
66 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
68 let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
70 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
71 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
72 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
74 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
75 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
76 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
78 // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
79 // transaction for nodes[1].
80 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
81 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
82 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
83 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
84 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
86 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
87 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
88 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
89 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
91 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
92 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
93 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
96 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) -> SpendableOutputDescriptor {
97 let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
98 assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1);
99 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
100 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
101 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
102 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
103 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
104 outputs.pop().unwrap()
109 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
110 // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
111 // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
112 // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
114 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
115 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
116 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
117 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
119 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
121 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
123 // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
124 // before forwarding.
125 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
126 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
128 // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
129 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
131 // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
132 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
134 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
135 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
137 let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
138 assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
139 check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
141 // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
142 // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
143 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
144 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
145 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
147 // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
148 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
149 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
150 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
152 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
153 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
157 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
158 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
159 // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
160 // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
161 // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
162 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
163 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
164 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
165 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
167 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
168 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
169 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
170 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
172 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
173 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
175 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
176 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000
178 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
179 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
180 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
182 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
183 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
184 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
185 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
186 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
188 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
189 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
190 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
191 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
192 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
193 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
194 let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
195 assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
197 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
198 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
199 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
201 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
202 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
204 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
205 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
207 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
208 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
210 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
211 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000,
212 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
214 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
215 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
216 amount_satoshis: 1000,
217 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
219 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
221 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
222 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
224 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
225 .get_spendable_output(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_none());
226 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
227 .get_spendable_output(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_none());
229 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
230 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
232 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
233 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
234 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
235 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
237 let spendable_output_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
239 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
240 .get_spendable_output(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).unwrap(),
244 let spendable_output_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
246 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
247 .get_spendable_output(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).unwrap(),
251 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
252 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
255 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
260 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
261 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
262 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
263 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
264 let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
265 let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
266 eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
267 assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
268 assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
271 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
272 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
273 // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
274 // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
275 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
276 if prev_commitment_tx {
277 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
278 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
279 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
280 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
281 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
283 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
284 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
285 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
287 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
288 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
289 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
290 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
292 // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
293 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
294 // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
295 // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
296 let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
297 // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
298 let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
300 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
302 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
303 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
305 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
306 let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
307 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
308 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
311 let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
312 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
313 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
314 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
316 let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
317 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
318 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
321 let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
322 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
323 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
324 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
326 let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
327 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
328 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
332 let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
333 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
334 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
335 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
336 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
339 // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
340 // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
341 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
342 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
343 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
344 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
345 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
346 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
347 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
348 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
349 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
351 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
353 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
355 let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
356 // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
357 // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
358 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
360 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
362 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
363 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
364 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
366 if prev_commitment_tx {
367 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
368 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
369 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
370 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
372 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
373 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
374 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
376 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
377 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
381 // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
382 // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
383 let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
384 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
385 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
386 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
387 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
388 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
389 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
390 chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
391 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
392 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
393 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
394 if !prev_commitment_tx {
395 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
397 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
398 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
399 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
400 amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
402 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
404 // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
405 // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
406 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
407 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
408 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
410 let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
411 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
412 // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
413 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
414 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
415 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
416 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
417 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
418 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
420 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
421 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
423 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
424 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
425 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
427 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
428 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
429 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
431 // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
432 // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
433 // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
434 // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
435 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
436 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
438 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
439 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
440 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
441 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
442 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
443 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
444 // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
445 // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
446 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
447 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
448 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
450 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
452 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
453 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
455 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
456 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
457 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
459 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
460 // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
461 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
462 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
463 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
464 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
465 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
466 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
467 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
469 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
470 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
472 // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
473 // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
474 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
475 if prev_commitment_tx {
476 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
478 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
480 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
481 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
482 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
483 assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
484 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
486 // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
487 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
488 let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
489 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
490 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
491 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
492 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
493 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
494 assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
495 a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
496 // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
497 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
498 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
500 // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
501 // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
502 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
503 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
504 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
505 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
506 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
508 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
509 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
511 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
512 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
513 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
514 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
516 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
518 // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
519 // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
520 // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
521 let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
522 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
524 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
525 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
526 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
527 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
528 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
529 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
530 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
531 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
533 // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
534 // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
535 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
536 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
538 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
539 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
540 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
541 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
542 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
544 // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
545 // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
546 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
547 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
549 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
550 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
552 // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
553 // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
554 // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
555 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
556 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
557 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
558 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
559 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
560 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
562 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
563 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
564 // monitor events or claimable balances.
565 for node in nodes.iter() {
566 connect_blocks(node, 6);
567 connect_blocks(node, 6);
568 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
569 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
574 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
575 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
576 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
580 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
581 // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
582 // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
583 // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
584 // delay prior to spendability.
586 // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
587 // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
588 // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
589 // claim by our counterparty).
590 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
591 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
592 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
593 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
595 // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
596 // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
597 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
598 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
600 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
601 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
602 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
603 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
604 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
606 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
607 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
608 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
610 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
611 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
613 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
614 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
615 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
618 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
619 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
620 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
622 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
623 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
624 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
625 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
627 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
629 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
630 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
632 // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
633 let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
634 assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3);
635 check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
636 check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]);
637 check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
639 // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
640 // claimable balances.
641 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
642 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
643 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
644 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
645 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
647 let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
648 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
649 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
652 let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
653 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
654 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
655 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
658 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
659 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
660 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
661 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
662 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
663 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
665 // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
666 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
667 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
668 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
669 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
670 let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
671 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
672 check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);
674 // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
676 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
677 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
678 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
679 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
680 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
681 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
682 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
683 assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time.0, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block
685 // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
686 // "awaiting confirmations" one.
687 let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
688 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
689 // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
690 // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
691 // call, as described, two hunks down.
692 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
693 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
694 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
695 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
696 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
697 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
698 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
699 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
700 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
702 // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
703 // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
704 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
705 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
706 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
707 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
708 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
709 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
710 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
711 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
712 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
713 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
714 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
716 // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
717 // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
718 // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
719 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
720 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
722 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
723 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
724 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
725 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
726 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
727 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
728 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
730 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
732 // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
733 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
734 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
735 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
736 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
737 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
739 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
740 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
742 // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
743 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
744 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
745 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
746 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
748 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
749 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
750 // monitor events or claimable balances.
751 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
752 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
753 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
754 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
758 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
759 // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
761 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
762 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
763 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
764 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
766 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
767 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
769 // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
770 let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
771 let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
772 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
774 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
775 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
777 let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
778 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
779 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
780 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
782 let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
783 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
784 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
785 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
787 let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
788 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
789 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
790 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
792 let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
793 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
794 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
795 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
798 // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
799 // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
800 // HTLC output is spent.
802 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
803 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
804 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
805 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
806 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
808 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
809 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
810 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
811 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
813 // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
814 let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
815 assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
816 check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
817 check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
819 // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
820 // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
821 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
822 let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
823 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
824 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
825 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
826 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
828 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
829 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
831 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
832 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
834 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
835 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
837 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
839 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
840 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
842 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
843 let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
844 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
845 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
846 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
847 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
848 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
850 // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
851 // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
852 // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
853 // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
855 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
856 let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
857 assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
858 check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
859 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
860 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
862 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
863 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
865 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
866 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
867 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
869 // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
870 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
871 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
872 bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
874 // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
875 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
876 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
877 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
878 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
879 let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
880 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
881 check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
883 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
884 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
886 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
887 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
888 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
890 // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
891 // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
892 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
893 let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
894 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
895 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
896 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
897 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
898 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
899 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
900 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
902 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
904 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
905 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
906 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
907 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
908 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
909 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
910 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
911 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
913 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
915 // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
916 // payment failure event.
917 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
918 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
920 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
921 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
922 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
923 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
924 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
925 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
926 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
927 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
929 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
931 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
932 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
933 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
934 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
936 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
937 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
939 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
940 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
941 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
943 // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
944 // was already claimed.
945 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
946 let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
947 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
948 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
949 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
951 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
953 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
954 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
955 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
956 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
958 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
960 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
961 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
963 assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
964 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
965 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
967 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
968 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
970 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
971 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
972 // monitor events or claimable balances.
973 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
974 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
975 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
976 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
979 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
980 let mut v = v_orig.clone();
982 v.push((*t).clone());
988 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
989 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
990 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
991 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
992 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
993 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
994 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
995 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
996 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
997 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
998 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1000 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1001 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1002 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1003 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1005 // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1007 // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1008 // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1009 // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1010 // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1011 // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1012 // later commitment transaction updates
1014 // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1015 // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1016 // HTLCs individually.
1018 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1019 let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1020 let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1022 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1024 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1025 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1027 let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1028 let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1030 // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1031 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1032 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1034 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1036 let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1037 let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1039 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1040 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1042 let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1044 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1045 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1048 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1049 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1050 let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1051 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1052 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1053 events.retain(|ev| {
1055 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1056 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1057 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1060 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1061 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1067 assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1068 if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1070 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, .. } => {},
1074 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1075 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1077 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1079 // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1080 // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1081 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1082 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1083 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1084 amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1085 claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1086 payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1087 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1088 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1089 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1090 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1091 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1092 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1093 claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1094 payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1096 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1098 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1099 let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1100 // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1102 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1103 claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1105 // The following constants were determined experimentally
1106 const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1107 const OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 571;
1108 const INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 578;
1110 // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1111 // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1112 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1113 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1114 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1115 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1117 // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1118 // claim balances separated out.
1119 let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1120 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1121 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1122 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1123 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1124 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1125 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1126 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1129 let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1130 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1131 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1133 let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1134 let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1135 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1137 let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1139 // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1140 // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1141 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1142 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1144 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1145 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1146 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1147 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1149 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1150 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1151 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1152 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1155 let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1156 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1157 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1159 let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1160 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1161 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1162 - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1163 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1166 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1167 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1168 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1170 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1171 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1174 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1175 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1177 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1179 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1180 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1182 // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1183 // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1184 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1185 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1187 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1188 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1189 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1190 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1191 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1192 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1193 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1194 - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1195 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1196 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1197 amount_satoshis: 3_000 - chan_feerate * OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1198 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1199 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1200 amount_satoshis: 4_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1201 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1202 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1203 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1204 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1206 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1208 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1209 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1211 let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1212 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1213 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1214 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1215 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1217 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1218 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }]);
1219 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1220 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }]);
1221 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1222 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1223 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1224 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1225 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1226 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1227 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1229 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1230 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1231 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1232 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1233 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1234 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1235 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1239 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1240 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true);
1241 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false);
1245 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1246 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1247 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1248 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1249 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1250 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1251 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1253 // Create some initial channels
1254 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1255 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000);
1256 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1257 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1259 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1260 let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1261 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1262 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1263 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1265 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs and an output for both sides
1266 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
1268 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1270 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1271 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1273 // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1274 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1275 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1277 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1278 let revoked_htlc_success = {
1279 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1280 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1281 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1282 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
1283 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1287 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1288 let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1289 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1290 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1291 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1297 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1298 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1299 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
1300 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);
1302 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1303 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1304 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1306 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1307 let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1309 let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1310 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 1);
1311 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1313 // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1314 // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1315 // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1316 let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1317 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1318 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1319 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1320 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1321 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1322 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1323 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1324 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1325 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1326 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1327 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1329 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1330 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1332 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1333 let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1334 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1335 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1336 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked
1337 // outputs (which no longer includes the spent HTLC output)
1339 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1340 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1342 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1343 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1344 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success.weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000);
1346 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1347 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1348 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1349 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1350 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1351 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1352 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1353 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1354 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1355 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1356 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1357 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1358 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1359 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1361 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1363 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1364 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1365 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1366 // to_self output to B
1367 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1368 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1369 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1370 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1371 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1372 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1374 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1376 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1377 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1378 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1379 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1380 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1381 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1382 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1384 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1386 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1387 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1388 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1389 // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1390 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1391 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1392 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1395 // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1397 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1398 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1399 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1400 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1403 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1404 let as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1405 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1407 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1408 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1410 // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1411 // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1412 // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1413 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1414 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1415 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1416 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1417 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1418 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1420 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1422 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1423 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1424 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1425 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1426 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1427 amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1428 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1430 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1432 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1433 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1434 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1435 amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].output[0].value,
1436 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1437 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1438 amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1439 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1441 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1443 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1444 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1445 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1446 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1448 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1450 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1451 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1452 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1453 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1454 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1455 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1456 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1460 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1461 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1462 // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1463 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1464 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1465 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1466 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1467 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1468 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1469 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1470 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1471 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1473 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1474 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1475 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1476 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1478 // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1479 // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1480 // revocation-claim transaction.
1482 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1483 let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1485 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1487 // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1488 // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1489 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1490 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1492 // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1493 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1495 assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), 2);
1496 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1497 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1499 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1500 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1503 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1506 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1507 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1509 let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1510 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1511 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1513 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1514 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1516 let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1518 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1519 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1520 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1521 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1522 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1523 payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1524 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1525 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1526 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1527 payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1529 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1531 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1532 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1533 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1534 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1536 let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1537 // Currently the revoked commitment outputs are all claimed in one aggregated transaction
1538 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 1);
1539 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1540 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1542 let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1544 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1545 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1546 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1547 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1548 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1549 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1550 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1551 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1552 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1553 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1554 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1555 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1557 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1559 // Confirm A's HTLC-Success tranasction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1561 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[1]);
1562 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1563 let mut claim_txn_2: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1564 claim_txn_2.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| if tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid()) { 0 } else { 1 });
1565 // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1566 // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1567 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1568 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 2);
1569 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1570 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1571 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1573 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1574 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1575 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1576 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1577 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1578 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1579 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1580 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1581 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1582 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1583 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1584 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1585 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1586 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1587 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1589 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1591 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1592 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1594 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1595 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1596 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1597 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1598 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1599 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1600 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1601 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1602 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1603 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1604 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1606 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1608 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1609 let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1611 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1612 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1613 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1614 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1615 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1616 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1617 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1618 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1619 confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1621 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1623 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1624 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1626 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1627 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1628 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1629 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1630 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1631 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1633 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1635 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1636 let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1638 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1639 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1640 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1642 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1644 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1646 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1647 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1648 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1649 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1651 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1652 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1653 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1654 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1655 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1656 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1657 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1660 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
1661 // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
1662 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1663 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1665 let new_chain_monitor;
1667 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1668 let node_deserialized;
1670 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1672 // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
1673 // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
1674 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
1675 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
1677 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
1678 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1679 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1680 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
1681 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1683 let commitment_tx = {
1684 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1685 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1686 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
1687 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1691 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
1693 // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
1694 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1695 let htlc_timeout_tx = {
1696 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1697 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1698 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
1702 // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
1703 // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
1704 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1705 let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
1706 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0",
1708 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
1711 // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
1712 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1713 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1714 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1717 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1718 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
1719 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
1721 assert!(txn.len() < 6);
1724 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
1725 assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
1726 assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1727 assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
1733 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
1734 do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
1735 do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
1738 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
1739 // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
1740 // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
1741 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1742 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1743 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1745 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1746 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1748 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
1749 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1751 let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1752 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1754 const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
1755 const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
1756 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
1758 let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
1760 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
1761 assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
1762 check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
1763 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
1764 check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
1765 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
1766 false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1767 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1769 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1771 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1772 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1773 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
1774 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1775 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1778 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1780 // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
1781 // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
1782 // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
1783 let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
1784 let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
1785 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
1786 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
1787 let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1788 assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
1793 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1794 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1795 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1796 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1797 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1798 check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
1799 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
1800 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
1801 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
1802 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
1804 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1807 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1808 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1809 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
1813 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1814 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
1815 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
1816 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
1817 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
1820 assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
1821 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
1822 assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
1824 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
1828 // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
1829 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
1830 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
1832 // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
1833 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1834 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
1836 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
1837 // transactions pre-anchors.
1838 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1839 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1841 // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
1842 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1843 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
1845 // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
1846 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
1847 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1848 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1850 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
1851 // transactions pre-anchors.
1852 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1853 let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
1855 // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
1856 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
1857 // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
1858 // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
1859 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
1860 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1861 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
1862 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1864 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1865 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
1869 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
1870 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
1871 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
1875 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
1876 // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
1877 // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
1878 // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
1879 // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
1880 // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
1881 // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
1882 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1883 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1884 let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
1885 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
1886 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1887 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1888 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
1889 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1891 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1892 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1894 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
1895 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1897 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1899 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
1900 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
1901 check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
1902 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
1904 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
1905 &payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
1906 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
1909 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1910 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
1911 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
1912 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1913 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1915 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1916 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1917 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
1918 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1919 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1922 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1923 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1924 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1925 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1926 let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1927 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1928 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
1929 (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
1931 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1934 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
1935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1937 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1938 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
1939 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
1940 match *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow() {
1941 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
1942 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
1943 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
1944 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
1947 _ => assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2),
1949 let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1950 for event in holder_events {
1952 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1953 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1954 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1955 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1956 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1957 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
1958 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
1960 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1964 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
1965 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1967 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1969 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
1971 let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1972 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
1973 for event in holder_events {
1975 Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
1976 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1980 // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
1981 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1985 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
1986 // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
1987 // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
1988 // revoked commitment.
1989 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
1990 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1991 // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
1992 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1993 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1995 let bob_chain_monitor;
1997 let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
1998 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
1999 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2000 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2001 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2002 let bob_deserialized;
2004 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2006 let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2007 let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2009 // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2010 let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2012 // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2013 let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2014 let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2015 let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2016 let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2018 // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2019 // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2021 let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2022 let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2024 // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2025 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2026 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2027 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2028 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2030 // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2032 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2033 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2035 // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2037 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2038 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2040 for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2041 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2042 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2043 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2044 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2045 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2050 // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2051 // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2052 // the HTLCs still pending.
2053 *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2054 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2055 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2056 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2057 let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
2058 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2059 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2060 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2061 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2062 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2063 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2064 check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
2065 (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
2067 check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
2068 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2069 (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
2073 // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2074 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2075 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2076 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2077 let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2078 for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2079 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
2080 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2082 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2083 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2084 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2086 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2089 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2091 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2092 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2094 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2095 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2096 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2097 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2098 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2101 for node in &nodes {
2102 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_txs[1]]);
2104 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2105 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2106 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2108 // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2111 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2112 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2114 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
2115 (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2117 (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2120 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2121 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2122 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2123 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2124 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2125 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2128 // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2129 // through the success path.
2130 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2131 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2132 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2133 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2134 match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2135 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2136 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2137 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2138 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2139 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2140 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2143 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2146 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2147 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2148 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2149 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2151 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2152 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2153 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2154 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2155 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2158 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2160 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2161 input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2162 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2163 ..Default::default()
2165 output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2166 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2167 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
2170 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2171 for event in events {
2172 // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2173 // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2174 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2175 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2176 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2177 assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2178 htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2179 htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2181 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2182 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2184 panic!("Unexpected event");
2187 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2188 let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2189 let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2190 let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2191 let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2192 htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2194 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2195 let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2196 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2197 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2199 let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2200 let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2201 sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2204 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2205 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2209 for node in &nodes {
2210 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2213 // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2214 // the second level instead.
2215 let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2216 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2217 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2219 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2220 tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2221 tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2222 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2223 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2224 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2225 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2226 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2229 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new();
2230 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2231 revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2233 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2235 for node in &nodes {
2236 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2240 // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2242 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2243 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2245 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2246 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2248 // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2249 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2250 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2252 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2253 let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2254 assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 2);
2255 for event in spendable_output_events.iter() {
2256 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2257 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2258 assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2259 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2260 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2263 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2265 panic!("unexpected event");
2269 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2270 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2271 // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2272 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2273 // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2274 // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2275 // balances to claim.
2277 // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2278 // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2279 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);