_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
  13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
  14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
  16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
  17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  18 use crate::ln::channel;
  19 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
  20 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
  21 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  22 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
  23 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
  24 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
  25 use crate::util::test_utils;
  26
  27 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
  28 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  29 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
  31 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
  32 use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
  33
  34 use crate::prelude::*;
  35
  36 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  37
  38 #[test]
  39 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  40         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  41         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  42         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  43         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  44         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  45         // HTLC.
  46         //
  47         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  48         //
  49         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  50         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  51         //
  52         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  53         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  54         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  55         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  56         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  57         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  58         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  59
  60         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
  61         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
  62
  63         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  64         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
  65                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
  66         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  67
  68         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  69
  70         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  71         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  72         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  73
  74         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  75         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  76         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  77
  78         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  79         // transaction for nodes[1].
  80         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  81         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  82         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  83         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
  84         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
  85
  86         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
  87         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
  88         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  89         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  90
  91         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
  92         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
  93         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
  94 }
  95
  96 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) -> SpendableOutputDescriptor {
  97         let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
  98         assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1);
  99         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 100                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 101                 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 102                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 103                 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
 104                 outputs.pop().unwrap()
 105         } else { panic!(); }
 106 }
 107
 108 #[test]
 109 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
 110         // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
 111         // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
 112         // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
 113         // confirmations.
 114         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 115         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 116         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 117         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 118
 119         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 120
 121         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
 122
 123         // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
 124         // before forwarding.
 125         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
 126         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
 127
 128         // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
 129         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
 130
 131         // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
 132         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
 133         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 134         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 135         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 136
 137         let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 138         assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
 139         check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
 140
 141         // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
 142         // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
 143         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 144         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 145         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 146
 147         // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
 148         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
 149         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 150         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 151
 152         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 153         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
 154 }
 155
 156 #[test]
 157 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
 158         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
 159         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
 160         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
 161         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
 162         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 163         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 164         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 165         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 166
 167         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 168                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 169         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 170         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 171
 172         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 173         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 174
 175         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 176                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000
 177                 }],
 178                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 179         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
 180                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 181
 182         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 183         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 184         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
 185         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 186         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
 187
 188         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 189         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 190         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 191         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 192         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 193         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 194         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 195         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 196
 197         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 198         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 199         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 200
 201         let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
 202         let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
 203
 204         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 205         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 206
 207         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 208         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 209
 210         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 211                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000,
 212                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 213                 }],
 214                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 215         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 216                         amount_satoshis: 1000,
 217                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 218                 }],
 219                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 220
 221         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 222         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 223
 224         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
 225                 .get_spendable_output(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_none());
 226         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
 227                 .get_spendable_output(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_none());
 228
 229         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 230         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 231
 232         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 233                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 234         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 235                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 236
 237         let spendable_output_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 238         assert_eq!(
 239                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
 240                         .get_spendable_output(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).unwrap(),
 241                 spendable_output_a
 242         );
 243
 244         let spendable_output_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 245         assert_eq!(
 246                 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
 247                         .get_spendable_output(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).unwrap(),
 248                 spendable_output_b
 249         );
 250
 251         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 252         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 253 }
 254
 255 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 256         v.sort_unstable();
 257         v
 258 }
 259
 260 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
 261 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
 262 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
 263 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
 264         let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 265         let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 266         eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
 267         assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
 268         assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
 269 }
 270
 271 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 272         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 273         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 274         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 275         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 276         if prev_commitment_tx {
 277                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 278                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 279                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 280                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 281                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 282         }
 283         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 284         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 285         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 286
 287         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 288                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 289         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 290         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 291
 292         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 293         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
 294         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 295         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 296         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 297         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 298         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 299
 300         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 301
 302         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 303         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 304
 305         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 306         let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 307                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 308                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 309                 payment_hash,
 310         };
 311         let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 312                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 313                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 314                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 315         };
 316         let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 317                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 318                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 319                 payment_hash,
 320         };
 321         let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 322                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 323                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 324                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 325         };
 326         let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 327                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 328                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 329                 payment_hash,
 330                 payment_preimage,
 331         };
 332         let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 333                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 334                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 335                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 336                 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
 337         };
 338
 339         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 340         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 341         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 342                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 343                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 344                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 345                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 346         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 347                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 348                 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 349                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 350
 351         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 352         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 353         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
 354
 355         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 356         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 357         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 358         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 359         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 360         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
 361
 362         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 363         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 364         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
 365
 366         if prev_commitment_tx {
 367                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 368                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 369                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
 370                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 371                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 372                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 373                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 374                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 375                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 376                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 377                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 378                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 379         }
 380
 381         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 382         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 383         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 384                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 385                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 386                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 387                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 388                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 389                                 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
 390                                 chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
 391                                                                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
 392                                                                 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 393                 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
 394         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 395                 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
 396         }
 397         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 398                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 399         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 400                         amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 401                 }],
 402                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 403
 404         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 405         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 406         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 407         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 408         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 409
 410         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 411         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 412         // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
 413         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 414         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 415         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 416         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 417         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 418         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 419
 420         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 421         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 422         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 423         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 424         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 425         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 426         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 427         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 428         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 429         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 430
 431         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 432         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 433         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 434         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 435         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 436         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 437
 438         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 439                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 440                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 441                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 442                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 443                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 444         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 445         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 446         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 447                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 448                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 449                 },
 450                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 451                 // long.
 452                 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 453                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 454
 455         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 456         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
 457         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 458
 459         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 460         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 461         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 462                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 463         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 464                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 465                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 466                 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 467                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 468
 469         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 470         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 471
 472         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 473         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 474         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 475         if prev_commitment_tx {
 476                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
 477         } else {
 478                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
 479         }
 480         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 481                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 482         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 483         assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
 484                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 485
 486         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 487         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 488         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 489         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 490         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 491         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 492         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 493         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 494         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 495                    a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 496         // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 497         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 498         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 499
 500         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 501         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 502         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 503         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 504         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 505                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 506                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 507                 }],
 508                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 509         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 510         // balance entry.
 511         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 512         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 513                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 514         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
 515
 516         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 517
 518         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 519         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 520         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 521         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 522         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 523
 524         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 525                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 526                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 527                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 528                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 529                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 530                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 531                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 532
 533         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 534         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 535         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 536         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 537
 538         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 539                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 540                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 541                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 542                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 543
 544         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 545         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 546         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 547         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 548
 549         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 550                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 551
 552         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 553         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 554         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 555         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 556         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 557                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 558         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 559         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 560                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 561
 562         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 563         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 564         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 565         for node in nodes.iter() {
 566                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 567                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 568                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 569                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 570         }
 571 }
 572
 573 #[test]
 574 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 575         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
 576         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
 577 }
 578
 579 #[test]
 580 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
 581         // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
 582         // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
 583         // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
 584         // delay prior to spendability.
 585         //
 586         // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
 587         // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
 588         // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
 589         // claim by our counterparty).
 590         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 591         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 592         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 593         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 594
 595         // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
 596         // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
 597         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
 598         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 599
 600         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
 601         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 602         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
 603                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 604         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 605
 606         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 607         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 608         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 609
 610         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 611         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
 612
 613         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
 614         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
 615                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
 616         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 617
 618         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 619         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 620         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 621
 622         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 623         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
 624         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
 625         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 626         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 627         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
 628
 629         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 630         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 631
 632         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
 633         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 634         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3);
 635         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 636         check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]);
 637         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 638
 639         // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
 640         // claimable balances.
 641         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 642         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 643         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 644         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 645         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 646
 647         let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 648                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 649                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 650                 payment_hash,
 651         };
 652         let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 653                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 654                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 655                 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
 656         };
 657
 658         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 659                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 660                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 661                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 662                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 663                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 664
 665         // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
 666         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 667         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 668         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 669         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 670         let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 671         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
 672         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);
 673
 674         // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
 675         // transaction.
 676         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
 677         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 678                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 679                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 680                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 681                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 682                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 683         assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time.0, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block
 684
 685         // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
 686         // "awaiting confirmations" one.
 687         let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 688         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
 689         // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
 690         // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
 691         // call, as described, two hunks down.
 692         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 693                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 694                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 695                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 696                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 697                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 698                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 699                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 700                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 701
 702         // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
 703         // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
 704         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
 705         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
 706         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 707                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 708                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 709                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 710                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 711                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 712                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 713                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 714                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 715
 716         // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
 717         // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
 718         // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
 719         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 720         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
 721
 722         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 723                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 724                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 725                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 726                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 727                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 728                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 729                 }]),
 730                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 731
 732         // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 733         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 734         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 735         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 736                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 737                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 738                 }],
 739                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 740         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 741
 742         // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 743         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 744         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 745         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 746         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
 747
 748         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 749         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 750         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 751         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 752         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 753         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 754         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 755 }
 756
 757 #[test]
 758 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
 759         // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
 760         // have a preimage.
 761         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 762         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 763         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 764         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 765
 766         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 767         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 768
 769         // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
 770         let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
 771         let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
 772         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 773
 774         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 775         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 776
 777         let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 778                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 779                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 780                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 781         };
 782         let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 783                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 784                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 785                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 786         };
 787         let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 788                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 789                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 790                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 791         };
 792         let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 793                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 794                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 795                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 796         };
 797
 798         // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
 799         // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
 800         // HTLC output is spent.
 801
 802         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 803                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 804                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 805                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 806                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 807
 808         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 809                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 810                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 811                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 812
 813         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
 814         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 815         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
 816         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 817         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 818
 819         // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
 820         // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
 821         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 822         let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 823                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 824                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 825                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 826                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 827
 828         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 829         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 830         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 831         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 832         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 833
 834         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 835                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 836
 837         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 838         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 839         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 840         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 841
 842         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
 843         let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 844                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 845                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 846                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 847         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 848                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 849
 850         // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
 851         // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
 852         // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
 853         // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
 854
 855         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
 856         let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 857         assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 858         check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 859         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
 860                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
 861
 862         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 863                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 864
 865         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 866         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 867                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 868
 869         // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
 870         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 871         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 872         bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
 873
 874         // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
 875         nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 876         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
 877         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
 878                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
 879         let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 880         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 881         check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 882
 883         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 884                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 885
 886         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 887         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 888                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 889
 890         // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
 891         // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
 892         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 893         let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
 894         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 895                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 896                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 897                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 898                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 899                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 900                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
 901                 }]),
 902                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 903
 904         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 905         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 906                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 907                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 908                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 909                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 910                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 911                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
 912                 }]),
 913                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 914
 915         // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
 916         // payment failure event.
 917         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 918         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
 919
 920         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 921         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 922                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 923                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 924                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 925                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 926                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 927                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
 928                 }]),
 929                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 930
 931         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 932         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 933                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 934                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
 935                 }],
 936                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 937         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 938
 939         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 940         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 941         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 942
 943         // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
 944         // was already claimed.
 945         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 946         let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
 947         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 948                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 949                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
 950                 }]),
 951                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 952
 953         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 954         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 955                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 956                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
 957                 }]),
 958                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 959
 960         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 961         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
 962
 963         assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
 964                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 965         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 966
 967         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 968         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 969
 970         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 971         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 972         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 973         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
 974         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
 975         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 976         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 977 }
 978
 979 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
 980         let mut v = v_orig.clone();
 981         for t in extra_ts {
 982                 v.push((*t).clone());
 983         }
 984         v.sort_unstable();
 985         v
 986 }
 987
 988 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
 989         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
 990         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 991         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 992         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 993         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 994         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 995         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 996         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 997         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 998         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 999
1000         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1001                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1002         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1003         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1004
1005         // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1006         //
1007         // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1008         // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1009         // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1010         // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1011         // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1012         //     later commitment transaction updates
1013         //
1014         // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1015         // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1016         // HTLCs individually.
1017
1018         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1019         let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1020         let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1021
1022         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1023
1024         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1025         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1026
1027         let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1028         let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1029
1030         // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1031         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1032         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1033
1034         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1035
1036         let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1037         let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1038
1039         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1040         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1041         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1042         let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1043
1044         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1045         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1046         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1047
1048         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1049         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1050         let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1051                 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1052                 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1053         events.retain(|ev| {
1054                 match ev {
1055                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1056                                 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1057                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1058                                 false
1059                         },
1060                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1061                                 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1062                                 false
1063                         },
1064                         _ => true,
1065                 }
1066         });
1067         assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1068         if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1069         match &events[1] {
1070                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, .. } => {},
1071                 _ => panic!(),
1072         }
1073
1074         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1075         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1076         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1077         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1078
1079         // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1080         // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1081         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1082                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1083                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1084                         amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1085                         claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1086                         payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1087                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1088                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1089                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1090                         payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1091                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1092                         amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1093                         claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1094                         payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1095                 }]),
1096                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1097
1098         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1099         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1100         // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1101         // quite soon.
1102         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1103         claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1104
1105         // The following constants were determined experimentally
1106         const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1107         const OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 571;
1108         const INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 578;
1109
1110         // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1111         // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1112         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1113         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1114         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1115         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1116
1117         // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1118         // claim balances separated out.
1119         let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1120                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1121                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1122                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1123                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1124                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1125                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1126                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1127                 }];
1128
1129         let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1130                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1131                         (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1132         };
1133         let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1134         let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1135                 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1136         };
1137         let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1138
1139         // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1140         // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1141         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1142                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1143
1144         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1145                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1146                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1147                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1148         } else {
1149                 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1150                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1151                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1152                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1153         }
1154
1155         let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1156                 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1157                 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1158         };
1159         let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1160                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1161                         (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1162                         - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1163                 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1164         };
1165
1166         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1167                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1168                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1169         } else {
1170                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1171                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1172         }
1173
1174         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1175                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1176         } else {
1177                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1178         }
1179         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1180                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1181
1182         // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1183         // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1184         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1185         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1186
1187         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1188                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1189                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1190                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1191                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1192                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1193                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1194                                 - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1195                         confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1196                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1197                         amount_satoshis: 3_000 - chan_feerate * OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1198                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1199                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1200                         amount_satoshis: 4_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1201                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1202                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1203                         amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1204                         confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1205                 }]),
1206                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1207
1208         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1209         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1210
1211         let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1212         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1213                 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1214         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1215                 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1216
1217         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1218         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }]);
1219         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1220         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }]);
1221         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1222         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1223         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1224         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1225         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1226         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1227         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1228
1229         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1230         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1231         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1232         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1233         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1234         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1235         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1236 }
1237
1238 #[test]
1239 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1240         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true);
1241         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false);
1242 }
1243
1244 #[test]
1245 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1246         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1247         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1248         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1249         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1250         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1251         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1252
1253         // Create some initial channels
1254         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1255                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000);
1256         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1257         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1258
1259         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1260         let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1261         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1262         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1263         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1264
1265         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs and an output for both sides
1266         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
1267
1268         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1269
1270         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1271         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1272
1273         // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1274         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1275         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1277         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1278         let revoked_htlc_success = {
1279                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1280                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1281                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1282                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
1283                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1284                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1285         };
1286
1287         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1288         let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1289                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1290                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1291                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1292                         txn.remove(1)
1293                 } else {
1294                         txn.remove(0)
1295                 }
1296         };
1297         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1298         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1299         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
1300         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);
1301
1302         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1303         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1304         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1306         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1307         let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1308
1309         let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1310         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 1);
1311         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1312
1313         // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1314         // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1315         // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1316         let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1317                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1318                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1319                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1320                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1321                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1322                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1323                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1324                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1325                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1326                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1327                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1328                 }]);
1329         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1330                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1331
1332         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1333         let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1334         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1335         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1336         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked
1337                                                                   // outputs (which no longer includes the spent HTLC output)
1338
1339         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1340                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1341
1342         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1343         fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1344                 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success.weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000);
1345
1346         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1347         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1348                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1349                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1350                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1351                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1352                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1353                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1354                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1355                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1356                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1357                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1358                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1359                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1360                 }]),
1361                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1362
1363         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1364         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1365         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1366                         // to_self output to B
1367                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1368                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1369                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1370                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1371                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1372                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1373                 }]),
1374                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1375
1376         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1377         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1378         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1379                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1380                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1381                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1382                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1383                 }]),
1384                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1385
1386         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1387         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1388                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1389         // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1390         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1391         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1392                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1393         }
1394
1395         // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1396         // claiming.
1397         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1398         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1399         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1400                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1401         }
1402
1403         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1404         let as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1405         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1406
1407         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1408         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1409
1410         // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1411         // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1412         // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1413         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1414         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1415                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1416                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1417                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1418                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1419                 }]),
1420                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1421
1422         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1423         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1424                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1425                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1426                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1427                         amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1428                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1429                 }]),
1430                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1431
1432         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1433         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1434                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1435                         amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].output[0].value,
1436                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1437                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1438                         amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1439                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1440                 }]),
1441                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1442
1443         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1444         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1445         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1446         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1447
1448         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1449
1450         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1451         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1452         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1453         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1454         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1455         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1456         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1457 }
1458
1459 #[test]
1460 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1461         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1462         // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1463         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1464         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1465         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1466         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1467         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1468         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1469         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1470         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1471         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1472
1473         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1474                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1475         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1476         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1477
1478         // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1479         // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1480         // revocation-claim transaction.
1481
1482         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1483         let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1484
1485         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1486
1487         // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1488         // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1489         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1490                 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1491
1492         // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1493         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1494
1495         assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), 2);
1496         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1497         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1498
1499         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1500         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1501
1502         {
1503                 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1504                 *feerate += 1;
1505         }
1506         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1507         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1508
1509         let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1510         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1511         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1512
1513         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1514         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1515         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1516         let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1517
1518         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1519                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1520                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1521                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1522                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1523                         payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1524                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1525                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1526                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1527                         payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1528                 }]),
1529                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1530
1531         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1532         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1533         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1534         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1535
1536         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1537         // Currently the revoked commitment outputs are all claimed in one aggregated transaction
1538         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 1);
1539         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1540         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1541
1542         let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1543
1544         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1545                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1546                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1547                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1548                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1549                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1550                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1551                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1552                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1553                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1554                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1555                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1556                 }]),
1557                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1558
1559         // Confirm A's HTLC-Success tranasction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1560         // new claim.
1561         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[1]);
1562         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1563         let mut claim_txn_2: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1564         claim_txn_2.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| if tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid()) { 0 } else { 1 });
1565         // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1566         // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1567         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1568         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 2);
1569         check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1570         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1571         check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1572
1573         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1574                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1575                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1576                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1577                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1578                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1579                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1580                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1581                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1582                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1583                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1584                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1585                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1586                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1587                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1588                 }]),
1589                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1590
1591         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1592         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1593
1594         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1595                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1596                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1597                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1598                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1599                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1600                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1601                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1602                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1603                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1604                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1605                 }]),
1606                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1607
1608         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1609         let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1610
1611         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1612                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1613                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1614                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1615                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1616                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1617                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1618                         amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1619                         confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1620                 }]),
1621                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1622
1623         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1624         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1625
1626         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1627                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1628                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1629                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1630                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1631                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1632                 }]),
1633                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1634
1635         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1636         let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1637
1638         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1639                         amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1640                         confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1641                 }],
1642                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1643
1644         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1645
1646         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1647         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1648         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1649         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1650
1651         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1652         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1653         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1654         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1655         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1656         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1657         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1658 }
1659
1660 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
1661         // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
1662         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1663         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1664         let persister;
1665         let new_chain_monitor;
1666
1667         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1668         let node_deserialized;
1669
1670         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1671
1672         // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
1673         // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
1674         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
1675         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
1676
1677         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
1678         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1679         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1680         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
1681                  [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1682
1683         let commitment_tx = {
1684                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1685                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1686                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
1687                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1688                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1689         };
1690
1691         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
1692
1693         // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
1694         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1695         let htlc_timeout_tx = {
1696                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1697                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1698                 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
1699                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1700         };
1701
1702         // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
1703         // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
1704         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1705                 let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
1706                         "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",
1707                 ).unwrap();
1708                 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
1709         }
1710
1711         // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
1712         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1713         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1714                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1715         }
1716         {
1717                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1718                 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
1719                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
1720                 } else {
1721                         assert!(txn.len() < 6);
1722                 }
1723                 for tx in txn {
1724                         assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
1725                         assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
1726                         assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1727                         assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
1728                 }
1729         }
1730 }
1731
1732 #[test]
1733 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
1734         do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
1735         do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
1736 }
1737
1738 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
1739         // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
1740         // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
1741         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1742         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1743         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1744         if anchors {
1745                 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1746                 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1747         }
1748         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
1749         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1750
1751         let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1752                 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1753         );
1754         const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
1755         const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
1756         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
1757
1758         let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
1759
1760         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
1761         assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
1762         check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
1763         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
1764         check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
1765         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
1766                  false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1767         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1768
1769         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1770                 version: 2,
1771                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1772                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1773                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
1774                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1775                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1776                 }],
1777         };
1778         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1779
1780         // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
1781         // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
1782         // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
1783         let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
1784         let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
1785                 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
1786                         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
1787                         let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1788                         assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
1789                         if !should_retry {
1790                                 return None;
1791                         }
1792                         match &events[0] {
1793                                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1794                                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1795                                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1796                                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1797                                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1798                                         check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
1799                                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
1800                                                 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
1801                                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
1802                                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
1803                                 }
1804                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1805                         }
1806                 } else {
1807                         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1808                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1809                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
1810                         if !should_retry {
1811                                 return None;
1812                         }
1813                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1814                         check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
1815                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
1816                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
1817                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
1818                 };
1819                 if should_bump {
1820                         assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
1821                 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
1822                         assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
1823                 }
1824                 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
1825                 Some(htlc_tx)
1826         };
1827
1828         // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
1829         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
1830         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
1831
1832         // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
1833         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1834         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
1835
1836         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
1837         // transactions pre-anchors.
1838         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1839         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1840
1841         // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
1842         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1843         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
1844
1845         // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
1846         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
1847         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1848         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1849
1850         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
1851         // transactions pre-anchors.
1852         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1853         let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
1854
1855         // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
1856         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
1857         // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
1858         // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
1859         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
1860                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1861                 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
1862                 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1863         }
1864         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1865         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
1866 }
1867
1868 #[test]
1869 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
1870         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
1871         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
1872 }
1873
1874 #[test]
1875 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
1876         // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
1877         // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
1878         // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
1879         // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
1880         // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
1881         // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
1882         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1883         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1884         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
1885         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
1886         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1887         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1888         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
1889         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1890
1891         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1892                 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1893         ).2;
1894         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
1895         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1896
1897         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1898
1899         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
1900         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
1901         check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
1902         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
1903
1904         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
1905                 &payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
1906                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
1907         );
1908
1909         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1910         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
1911         let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
1912                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1913                         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1914                                 version: 2,
1915                                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1916                                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1917                                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
1918                                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1919                                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1920                                 }],
1921                         };
1922                         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1923                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1924                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1925                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1926                         let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1927                         let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1928                         check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
1929                         (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
1930                 },
1931                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1932         };
1933
1934         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
1935         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1936
1937         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1938         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
1939         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
1940         match *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow() {
1941                 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
1942                         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
1943                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
1944                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
1945
1946                 },
1947                 _ => assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2),
1948         };
1949         let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1950         for event in holder_events {
1951                 match event {
1952                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1953                                 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1954                                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1955                                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1956                                 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1957                                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
1958                                 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
1959                         },
1960                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1961                 }
1962         }
1963
1964         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
1965         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1966
1967         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1968
1969         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
1970
1971         let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1972         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
1973         for event in holder_events {
1974                 match event {
1975                         Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
1976                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1977                 }
1978         }
1979
1980         // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
1981         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1982 }
1983
1984 #[test]
1985 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
1986         // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
1987         // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
1988         // revoked commitment.
1989         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
1990         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1991         // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
1992         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1993         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1994         let bob_persister;
1995         let bob_chain_monitor;
1996
1997         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
1998         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
1999         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2000         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2001         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2002         let bob_deserialized;
2003
2004         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2005
2006         let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2007         let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2008
2009         // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2010         let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2011
2012         // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2013         let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2014         let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2015         let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2016         let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2017
2018         // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2019         // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2020         // present.
2021         let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2022         let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2023
2024         // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2025         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2026         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2027         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2028         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2029
2030         // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2031         // revoked state.
2032         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2033         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2034
2035         // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2036         reload_node!(
2037                 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2038                 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2039         );
2040         for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2041                 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2042                 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2043                         monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2044                                 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2045                                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2046                         );
2047                 }
2048         }
2049
2050         // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2051         // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2052         // the HTLCs still pending.
2053         *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2054         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2055         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2056         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2057         let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
2058                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2059                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2060                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2061                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2062                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2063                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2064                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
2065                         (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
2066                 } else {
2067                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
2068                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2069                         (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
2070                 }
2071         };
2072
2073         // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2074         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2075         let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2076         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2077         let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2078         for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2079                 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
2080                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2081                         version: 2,
2082                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2083                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2084                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2085                                 value: utxo_value,
2086                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2087                         }],
2088                 };
2089                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2090                 match event {
2091                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2092                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2093                 };
2094                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2095                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2096                 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2097                 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2098                 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2099         };
2100
2101         for node in &nodes {
2102                 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_txs[1]]);
2103         }
2104         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2105         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2106         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2107
2108         // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2109         // revoked outputs.
2110         {
2111                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2112                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2113
2114                 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
2115                         (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2116                 } else {
2117                         (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2118                 };
2119
2120                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2121                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2122                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2123                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2124                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2125                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2126         }
2127
2128         // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2129         // through the success path.
2130         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2131         let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2132         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2133         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2134         match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2135                 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2136                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2137                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2138                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2139                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2140                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2141
2142                 },
2143                 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2144         };
2145         let htlc_tx = {
2146                 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2147                 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2148                 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2149                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2150                         version: 2,
2151                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2152                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2153                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2154                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2155                                 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2156                         }],
2157                 };
2158                 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2159                         version: 2,
2160                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2161                         input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2162                                 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2163                                 ..Default::default()
2164                         }],
2165                         output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2166                                 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2167                                 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
2168                         }],
2169                 };
2170                 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2171                 for event in events {
2172                         // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2173                         // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2174                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2175                                 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2176                                 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2177                                         assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2178                                         htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2179                                         htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2180                                 }
2181                                 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2182                                 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2183                         } else {
2184                                 panic!("Unexpected event");
2185                         }
2186                 }
2187                 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2188                         let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2189                         let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2190                         let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2191                         let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2192                         htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2193                 }
2194                 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2195                         let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2196                         let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2197                                 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2198                         ).unwrap()[..]);
2199                         let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2200                         let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2201                         sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2202                         sig
2203                 };
2204                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2205                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2206                 htlc_tx
2207         };
2208
2209         for node in &nodes {
2210                 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2211         }
2212
2213         // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2214         // the second level instead.
2215         let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2216                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2217                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2218
2219                 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2220                         tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2221                         tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2222                         tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2223                 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2224                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2225                 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2226                         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2227                 }
2228
2229                 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new();
2230                 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2231                         revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2232                 }
2233                 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2234         };
2235         for node in &nodes {
2236                 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2237         }
2238
2239
2240         // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2241         // been reached.
2242         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2243         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2244
2245         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2246         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2247
2248         // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2249         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2250         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2251
2252         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2253         let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2254         assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 2);
2255         for event in spendable_output_events.iter() {
2256                 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2257                         assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2258                         assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2259                         let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2260                                 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2261                         ).unwrap();
2262
2263                         check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2264                 } else {
2265                         panic!("unexpected event");
2266                 }
2267         }
2268
2269         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2270         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2271         // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2272         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2273         // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2274         // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2275         // balances to claim.
2276         //
2277         // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2278         // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2279         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2280 }