1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
12 use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
13 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
14 use ln::{channel, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
15 use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
16 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
17 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
18 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
19 use routing::network_graph::NetworkUpdate;
20 use routing::router::get_route;
22 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
23 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
27 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
34 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
35 // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
36 // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
37 // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
38 // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
39 // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
42 // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
44 // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
45 // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
47 // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
48 // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
49 // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
50 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
51 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
52 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
53 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
55 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
56 let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
58 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
59 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
60 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
62 let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
64 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
65 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
66 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
68 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
69 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1], events);
70 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
71 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
73 // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
74 // transaction for nodes[1].
75 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
76 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
77 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
78 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
80 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
81 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
82 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1], events);
83 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
84 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
86 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
87 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
88 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
92 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
93 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
94 // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
95 // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
96 // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
97 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
98 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
99 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
100 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
102 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
103 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
104 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
105 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
107 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
109 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
110 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000
112 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
113 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
114 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
116 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id).unwrap();
117 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
118 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
119 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
120 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
122 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
123 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
124 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
125 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
126 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
127 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
128 let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
129 assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
131 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
132 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
133 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
135 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
136 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
138 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
139 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
141 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
142 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
144 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
145 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000,
146 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
148 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
149 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
150 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
151 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
153 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
155 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
156 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
158 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
159 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
160 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
161 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
163 let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
164 assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
165 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
166 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
167 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
168 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
169 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
172 let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
173 assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
174 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
175 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
176 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
177 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
178 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
182 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
187 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
188 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
189 // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
190 // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
191 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
192 if prev_commitment_tx {
193 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
194 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
195 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
196 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
197 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
199 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
200 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
201 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
203 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
204 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
205 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
206 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
208 // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
209 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
210 // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
211 // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
212 let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
213 // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
214 let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
216 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
218 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
220 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
221 // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
222 // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
223 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
224 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
225 (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
226 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
227 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
228 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
229 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
230 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
231 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
233 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
234 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
235 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
237 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
239 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
241 let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
242 // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
243 // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
244 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
246 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
249 if prev_commitment_tx {
250 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
251 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
252 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
253 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage, events);
254 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
256 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
257 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
258 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
260 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
261 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
262 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
265 // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
266 // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
267 let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
268 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
269 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
270 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
271 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
272 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
273 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
274 chan_feerate * (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT +
275 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
276 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
277 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
278 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
279 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
281 if !prev_commitment_tx {
282 a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
283 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
284 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
287 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
288 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
289 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
290 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
292 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
294 // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
295 // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
296 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
297 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
298 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
300 let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
301 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 });
302 if prev_commitment_tx {
303 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]);
305 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]);
306 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]);
308 // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats
309 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
310 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
311 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
312 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
313 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
314 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
315 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx);
317 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
318 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
320 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
321 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
323 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
324 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
326 // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
327 // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
328 // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
329 // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
330 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
331 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
333 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
334 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
335 (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
336 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
337 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
338 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
339 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
340 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
341 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
342 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
344 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
345 // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
346 // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
347 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
348 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
349 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
351 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
353 Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
354 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
355 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
356 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
357 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
358 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
360 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
362 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
363 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
364 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], events, dust_payment_hash, true);
365 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
367 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
368 // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
369 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
370 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
371 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
372 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
373 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
374 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
376 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
377 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
378 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
379 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
380 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
381 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
382 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
383 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
384 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
385 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
387 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
389 let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
390 assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
391 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
392 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
393 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
394 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
395 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
398 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
400 // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
401 // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
402 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
403 if !prev_commitment_tx {
404 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
405 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage, events);
407 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
408 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
409 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
410 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
411 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
412 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
414 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
415 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
416 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
417 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
418 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
420 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
422 // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
423 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
424 let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
425 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3);
426 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx);
427 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
428 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
429 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
430 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
431 assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout,
432 a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
433 // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
434 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
435 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
437 // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
438 // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
439 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
440 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
441 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
442 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
443 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
445 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
446 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
448 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
449 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
450 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
451 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
452 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], events, timeout_payment_hash, true);
454 let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
455 assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
456 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
457 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
458 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
459 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
460 check_spends!(spend_tx, a_broadcast_txn[2]);
463 // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
464 // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
465 // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
466 let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
467 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
469 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
470 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
471 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
472 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
473 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
474 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
475 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
476 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
477 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
479 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
481 // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
482 // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
483 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
485 let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
486 assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
487 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
488 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
489 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
490 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
491 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
494 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
495 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
496 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
497 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
498 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
499 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
501 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
503 // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
504 // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
505 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
507 let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
508 assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
509 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
510 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
511 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
512 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
513 check_spends!(spend_tx, b_broadcast_txn[0]);
516 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
517 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
518 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
520 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
522 // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
523 // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
524 // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
525 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
526 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
527 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
528 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
530 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
531 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
532 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
533 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
537 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
538 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
539 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);