_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
  13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
  14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
  16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
  17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  18 use crate::ln::{channel, ChannelId};
  19 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
  20 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
  21 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  22 use crate::crypto::utils::sign;
  23 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
  24 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
  25 use crate::util::test_utils;
  26
  27 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, ScriptBuf, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
  28 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
  29 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  30 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  31 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
  32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
  33 use bitcoin::sighash::{SighashCache, EcdsaSighashType};
  34
  35 use crate::prelude::*;
  36
  37 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  38
  39 #[test]
  40 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  41         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  42         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  43         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  44         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  45         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  46         // HTLC.
  47         //
  48         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  49         //
  50         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  51         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  52         //
  53         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  54         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  55         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  56         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  57         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  58         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  59         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  60
  61         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
  62         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
  63
  64         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  65         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
  66                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
  67         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  68
  69         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  70
  71         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  72         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  73         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  74
  75         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  76         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  77         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  78
  79         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  80         // transaction for nodes[1].
  81         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  82         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  83         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  84         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
  85         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
  86
  87         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
  88         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
  89         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  90         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  91
  92         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
  93         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
  94         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
  95 }
  96
  97 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction, has_anchors_htlc_event: bool) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
  98         let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
  99         assert_eq!(spendable.len(), if has_anchors_htlc_event { 2 } else { 1 });
 100         if has_anchors_htlc_event {
 101                 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { .. }) = spendable.pop().unwrap() {}
 102                 else { panic!(); }
 103         }
 104         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 105                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 106                 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 107                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 108                 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
 109                 outputs
 110         } else { panic!(); }
 111 }
 112
 113 #[test]
 114 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
 115         // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
 116         // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
 117         // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
 118         // confirmations.
 119         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 120         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 121         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 122         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 123
 124         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 125
 126         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
 127
 128         // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
 129         // before forwarding.
 130         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
 131         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
 132
 133         // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
 134         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
 135
 136         // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
 137         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
 138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 139         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 140         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 141
 142         let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 143         assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
 144         check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
 145
 146         // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
 147         // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
 148         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 149         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 150         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 151
 152         // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
 153         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
 154         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 155         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 156
 157         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 158         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
 159 }
 160
 161 fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) {
 162         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
 163         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
 164         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
 165         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
 166         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 167         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 168         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 169         if anchors {
 170                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 171                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 172         }
 173         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 174         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 175
 176         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 177                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 178         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 179         assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
 180
 181         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 182         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 183
 184         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000;
 185         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
 186         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 187                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value
 188                 }],
 189                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 190         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
 191                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 192
 193         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 194         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 195         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
 196         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 197         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
 198
 199         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 200         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 201         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 202         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 203         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 204         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 205         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 206         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 207
 208         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 209         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 210         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 211
 212         let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
 213         let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
 214
 215         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 216         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 217
 218         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 219         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 220
 221         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 222                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 223                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 224                 }],
 225                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 226         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 227                         amount_satoshis: 1000,
 228                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 229                 }],
 230                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 231
 232         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 233         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 234
 235         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
 236                 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
 237         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
 238                 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty());
 239
 240         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 241         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 242
 243         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 244                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 245         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 246                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 247
 248         let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
 249         assert_eq!(
 250                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a),
 251                 spendable_outputs_a
 252         );
 253
 254         let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
 255         assert_eq!(
 256                 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b),
 257                 spendable_outputs_b
 258         );
 259
 260         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 261         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 262 }
 263
 264 #[test]
 265 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
 266         do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(false);
 267         do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(true);
 268 }
 269
 270 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 271         v.sort_unstable();
 272         v
 273 }
 274
 275 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
 276 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
 277 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
 278 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
 279         let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 280         let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 281         eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
 282         assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
 283         assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
 284 }
 285
 286 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(anchors: bool, prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 287         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 288         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 289         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 290         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 291         if prev_commitment_tx {
 292                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 293                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 294                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 295                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 296                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 297         }
 298         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 299         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 300         if anchors {
 301                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 302                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 303         }
 304         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 305         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 306
 307         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
 308                 version: 2,
 309                 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
 310                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
 311                 output: vec![
 312                         TxOut {
 313                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 314                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 315                         },
 316                         TxOut {
 317                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 318                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 319                         },
 320                 ],
 321         };
 322         if anchors {
 323                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
 324                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
 325         }
 326
 327         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 328                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 329         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 330         assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
 331
 332         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 333         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
 334         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 335         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 336         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 337         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 338         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 339
 340         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 341
 342         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 343         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 344
 345         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 346         let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 347                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 348                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 349                 payment_hash,
 350         };
 351         let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 352                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 353                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 354                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 355         };
 356         let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 357                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 358                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 359                 payment_hash,
 360         };
 361         let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 362                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 363                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 364                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 365         };
 366         let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 367                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 368                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 369                 payment_hash,
 370                 payment_preimage,
 371         };
 372         let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 373                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 374                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 375                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 376                 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
 377         };
 378
 379         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 380         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 381         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 382                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 383         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
 384         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 385                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 386                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 387                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 388         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 389                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 390                 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 391                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 392
 393         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 394         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 395         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
 396
 397         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 398         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 399         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 400         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 401         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 402         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
 403
 404         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 405         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 406         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
 407
 408         if prev_commitment_tx {
 409                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 410                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 411                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
 412                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 413                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 414                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 415                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 416                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 417                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 418                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 419                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 420                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 421         }
 422
 423         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 424         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 425         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 426                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
 427                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 428         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 429                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 430                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 431                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 432                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 433                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 434                                 commitment_tx_fee - // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs
 435                                 anchor_outputs_value, // The anchor outputs value in satoshis
 436                 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
 437         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 438                 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
 439         }
 440         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 441                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 442         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 443                         amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 444                 }],
 445                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 446
 447         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 448         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 449         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 450         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 451         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 452
 453         if anchors {
 454                 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 455                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 456                 match events.pop().unwrap() {
 457                         Event::BumpTransaction(bump_event) => {
 458                                 let mut first_htlc_event = bump_event.clone();
 459                                 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut first_htlc_event {
 460                                         htlc_descriptors.remove(1);
 461                                 } else {
 462                                         panic!("Unexpected event");
 463                                 }
 464                                 let mut second_htlc_event = bump_event;
 465                                 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut second_htlc_event {
 466                                         htlc_descriptors.remove(0);
 467                                 } else {
 468                                         panic!("Unexpected event");
 469                                 }
 470                                 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&first_htlc_event);
 471                                 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&second_htlc_event);
 472                         },
 473                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 474                 }
 475         }
 476
 477         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
 478         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 479         // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
 480         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
 481         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
 482         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
 483         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
 484         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 485         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 486
 487         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 488         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 489         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 490         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 491         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 492         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 493         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 494         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 495         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 496         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 497
 498         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 499         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 500         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 501         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 502         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 503         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 504         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 505                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 506         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 507                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 508                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 509                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 510                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 511         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 512         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 513         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 514                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 515                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 516                 },
 517                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 518                 // long.
 519                 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 520                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 521
 522         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 523         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
 524         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 525
 526         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 527         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 528         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 529                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 530         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 531                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 532                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 533                 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 534                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 535
 536         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0], false);
 537         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 538
 539         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 540         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 541         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 542         if prev_commitment_tx {
 543                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
 544         } else {
 545                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
 546         }
 547         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 548                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 549         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 550         assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
 551                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 552
 553         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 554         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 555         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 556         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 557         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 558         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 559         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 560         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 561         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 562                    a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 563         // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 564         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 565         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 566
 567         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 568         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 569         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 570         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 571         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 572                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 573                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 574                 }],
 575                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 576         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 577         // balance entry.
 578         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 579         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 580                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 581         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
 582
 583         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1], false);
 584
 585         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 586         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 587         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 588         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 589         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 590
 591         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 592                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 593                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 594                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 595                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 596                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 597                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 598                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 599
 600         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 601         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 602         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 603         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0], anchors);
 604
 605         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 606                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 607                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 608                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 609                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 610
 611         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 612         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 613         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 614         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0], anchors);
 615
 616         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 617                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 618
 619         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 620         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 621         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 622         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 623         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 624                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 625         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 626         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 627                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 628
 629         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 630         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 631         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 632         for node in nodes.iter() {
 633                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 634                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 635                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 636                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 637         }
 638 }
 639
 640 #[test]
 641 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 642         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, true);
 643         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, false);
 644         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, true);
 645         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, false);
 646 }
 647
 648 fn do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(anchors: bool) {
 649         // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
 650         // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
 651         // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
 652         // delay prior to spendability.
 653         //
 654         // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
 655         // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
 656         // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
 657         // claim by our counterparty).
 658         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 659         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 660         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 661         if anchors {
 662                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 663                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 664         }
 665         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 666         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 667
 668         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
 669                 version: 2,
 670                 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
 671                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
 672                 output: vec![
 673                         TxOut {
 674                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 675                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 676                         },
 677                         TxOut {
 678                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 679                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 680                         },
 681                 ],
 682         };
 683         if anchors {
 684                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
 685                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
 686         }
 687
 688         // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
 689         // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
 690         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
 691         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 692
 693         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
 694         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 695         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
 696                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 697         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 698
 699         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 700         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 701         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 702
 703         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 704         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
 705
 706         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
 707         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
 708                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
 709         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 710
 711         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 712         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 713         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 714
 715         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 716         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
 717         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
 718         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 719         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 720         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
 721
 722         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 723         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 724
 725         // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
 726         // claimable balances.
 727         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
 728         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 729         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
 730         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 731         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 732         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 733         let commitment_tx = {
 734                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
 735                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
 736                 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
 737                 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
 738                 commitment_tx
 739         };
 740         let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx));
 741         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
 742                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
 743                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
 744                 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
 745         }
 746
 747         let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 748                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 749                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 750                 payment_hash,
 751         };
 752         let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 753                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 754                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 755                 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
 756         };
 757
 758         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
 759                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 760         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
 761         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 762                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 763                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 764                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 765                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 766
 767         // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
 768         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
 769         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 770         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 771         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 772         let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 773         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
 774         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], commitment_tx);
 775
 776         // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
 777         // transaction.
 778         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
 779         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 780                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 781                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 782                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 783                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 784         if anchors {
 785                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 2);
 786         }
 787         let timeout_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
 788         assert_eq!(timeout_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
 789         check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[0], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
 790         check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[1], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
 791
 792         // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
 793         // "awaiting confirmations" one.
 794         let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 795         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0]);
 796         // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
 797         // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
 798         // call, as described, two hunks down.
 799         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 800                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 801                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 802                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 803                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 804                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 805                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 806                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 807
 808         // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
 809         // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
 810         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
 811         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
 812         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 813                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 814                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 815                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 816                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 817                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 818                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 819                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 820
 821         // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
 822         // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
 823         // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
 824         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 825         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
 826
 827         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 828                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 829                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 830                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 831                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 832                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 833                 }]),
 834                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 835
 836         // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 837         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 838         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
 839         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
 840                 .get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
 841         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 842         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 843                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 844                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 845                 }],
 846                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 847         let to_self_spendable_output = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
 848         assert_eq!(
 849                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a),
 850                 to_self_spendable_output
 851         );
 852
 853         // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 854         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 855         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 856         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 857         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0], false);
 858
 859         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 860         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 861         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 862         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 863         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 864         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 865         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 866 }
 867
 868 #[test]
 869 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
 870         do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(false);
 871         do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(true);
 872 }
 873
 874 #[test]
 875 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
 876         // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
 877         // have a preimage.
 878         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 879         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 880         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 881         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 882
 883         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 884         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 885
 886         // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
 887         let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
 888         let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
 889         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 890
 891         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 892         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 893
 894         let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 895                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 896                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 897                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 898         };
 899         let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 900                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 901                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 902                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 903         };
 904         let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 905                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 906                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 907                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 908         };
 909         let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 910                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 911                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 912                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 913         };
 914
 915         // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
 916         // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
 917         // HTLC output is spent.
 918
 919         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 920                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 921                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 922                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 923                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 924
 925         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 926                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 927                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 928                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 929
 930         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
 931         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 932         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
 933         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 934         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 935
 936         // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
 937         // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
 938         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 939         let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 940                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 941                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 942                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 943                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 944
 945         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 946         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 947         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 948         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 949         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 950
 951         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 952                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 953
 954         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 955         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 956         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 957         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 958
 959         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
 960         let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 961                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 962                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 963                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 964         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 965                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 966
 967         // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
 968         // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
 969         // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
 970         // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
 971
 972         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
 973         let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 974         assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 975         check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 976         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
 977                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
 978
 979         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 980                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 981
 982         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 983         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 984                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 985
 986         // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
 987         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 988         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0], false);
 989         bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
 990
 991         // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
 992         nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 993         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
 994         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
 995                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
 996         let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 997         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 998         check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 999
1000         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1001                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1002
1003         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1004         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1005                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1006
1007         // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
1008         // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
1009         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1010         let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
1011         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1012                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1013                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1014                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1015                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1016                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1017                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1018                 }]),
1019                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1020
1021         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1022         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1023                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1024                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1025                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1026                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1027                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1028                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1029                 }]),
1030                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1031
1032         // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
1033         // payment failure event.
1034         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1035         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
1036
1037         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1038         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1039                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1040                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1041                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1042                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1043                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1044                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1045                 }]),
1046                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1047
1048         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1049         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1050                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1051                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1052                 }],
1053                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1054         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0], false);
1055
1056         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1057         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1058         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1059
1060         // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
1061         // was already claimed.
1062         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1063         let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1064         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1065                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1066                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1067                 }]),
1068                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1069
1070         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1071         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1072                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1073                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1074                 }]),
1075                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1076
1077         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1078         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
1079
1080         assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
1081                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1082         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1083
1084         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1085         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1086
1087         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1088         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1089         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1090         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1091         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1092         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1093         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1094 }
1095
1096 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
1097         let mut v = v_orig.clone();
1098         for t in extra_ts {
1099                 v.push((*t).clone());
1100         }
1101         v.sort_unstable();
1102         v
1103 }
1104
1105 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(anchors: bool, confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
1106         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
1107         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1108         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1109         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1110         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1111         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1112         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1113         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1114         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1115         if anchors {
1116                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1117                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1118         }
1119         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1120         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1121
1122         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1123                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1124         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1125         assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
1126
1127         // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1128         //
1129         // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1130         // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1131         // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1132         // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1133         // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1134         //     later commitment transaction updates
1135         //
1136         // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1137         // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1138         // HTLCs individually.
1139
1140         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1141         let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1142         let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1143
1144         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1145
1146         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1147         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1148
1149         let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1150         let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1151
1152         // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1153         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1154         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1155
1156         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1157
1158         let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1159         let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1160
1161         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1162         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1163         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1164         let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1165
1166         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1167         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1169
1170         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1171         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1172         let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1173                 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1174                 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1175         events.retain(|ev| {
1176                 match ev {
1177                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1178                                 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1179                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1180                                 false
1181                         },
1182                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1183                                 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1184                                 false
1185                         },
1186                         _ => true,
1187                 }
1188         });
1189         assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1190         if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1191         match &events[1] {
1192                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, .. } => {},
1193                 _ => panic!(),
1194         }
1195
1196         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1197         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1198         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1199         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1200
1201         // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1202         // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1203         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1204                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1205                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1206                         amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1207                         claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1208                         payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1209                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1210                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1211                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1212                         payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1213                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1214                         amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1215                         claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1216                         payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1217                 }]),
1218                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1219
1220         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1221         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1222         // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1223         // quite soon.
1224         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1225         claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1226
1227         // The following constants were determined experimentally
1228         const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: u64 = 483;
1229         let outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: u64 = if anchors { 574 } else { 571 };
1230         let inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: u64 = if anchors { 582 } else { 578 };
1231
1232         // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1233         // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1234         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight().to_wu(), outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1235         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight().to_wu(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1236         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight().to_wu(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1237         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight().to_wu(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1238
1239         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1240                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1241         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1242         let inbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight / 1000;
1243         let outbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight / 1000;
1244         let to_self_claim_fee = chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight().to_wu() / 1000;
1245
1246         // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1247         // claim balances separated out.
1248         let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1249                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1250                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1251                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1252                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1253                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1254                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1255                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1256                 }];
1257
1258         let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1259                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1260         };
1261         let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1262         let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1263                 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1264         };
1265         let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1266
1267         // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1268         // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1269         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1270                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1271
1272         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1273                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1274                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1275                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1276         } else {
1277                 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1278                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1279                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1280                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1281         }
1282
1283         let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1284                 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1285                 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1286         };
1287         let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1288                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1289                 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1290         };
1291
1292         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1293                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1294                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1295         } else {
1296                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1297                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1298         }
1299
1300         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1301                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1302         } else {
1303                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1304         }
1305         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1306                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1307
1308         // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1309         // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1310         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1311         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1312
1313         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1314                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1315                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1316                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1317                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1318                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1319                         confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1320                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1321                         amount_satoshis: 3_000 - outbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1322                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1323                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1324                         amount_satoshis: 4_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1325                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1326                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1327                         amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1328                         confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1329                 }]),
1330                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1331
1332         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1333         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1334
1335         let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1336         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1337                 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1338         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1339                 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1340
1341         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1342         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }], false);
1343         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1344         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }], false);
1345         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1346         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1347         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0], false);
1348         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1349         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1], false);
1350         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1351         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1352
1353         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1354         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1355         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1356         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1357         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1358         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1359         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1360 }
1361
1362 #[test]
1363 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1364         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, true);
1365         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, false);
1366         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, true);
1367         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, false);
1368 }
1369
1370 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) {
1371         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1372         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1373         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1374         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1375         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1376         if anchors {
1377                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1378                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1379         }
1380         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1381         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1382
1383         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1384                 version: 2,
1385                 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
1386                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1387                 output: vec![
1388                         TxOut {
1389                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1390                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1391                         },
1392                         TxOut {
1393                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1394                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1395                         },
1396                 ],
1397         };
1398         if anchors {
1399                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1400                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
1401         }
1402
1403         // Create some initial channels
1404         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1405                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 12_000_000);
1406         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1407         assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
1408
1409         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1410         let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1411         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1412         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1413         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1414         if anchors {
1415                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[4].value, 11000); // to_self output
1416         } else {
1417                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[2].value, 11000); // to_self output
1418         }
1419
1420         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs, an output for each side, and an
1421         // anchor output for each side if enabled.
1422         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if anchors { 6 } else { 4 });
1423
1424         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1425
1426         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1427         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1428
1429         // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1430         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1431         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1432         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1433         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1434         if anchors {
1435                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 1);
1436         }
1437         let revoked_htlc_success = {
1438                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1439                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1440                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1441                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, if anchors { 3 } else { 1 });
1442                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(),
1443                         if anchors { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS } else { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT });
1444                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1445                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1446         };
1447         let revoked_htlc_success_fee = chan_feerate * revoked_htlc_success.weight().to_wu() / 1000;
1448
1449         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1450         if anchors {
1451                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 2);
1452         }
1453         let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1454                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1455                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1456                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1457                         txn.remove(1)
1458                 } else {
1459                         txn.remove(0)
1460                 }
1461         };
1462         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1463         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1464         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
1465         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
1466
1467         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1468         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1469         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1470         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1471         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1472         let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1473
1474         let revoked_to_self_claim = {
1475                 let mut as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1476                 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1477                 if anchors {
1478                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1479                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 4); // Separate to_remote claim
1480                         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1481                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1482                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1483                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1484                         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1485                         Some(as_commitment_claim_txn.remove(0))
1486                 } else {
1487                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1488                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1489                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1490                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1491                         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1492                         None
1493                 }
1494         };
1495
1496         // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1497         // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1498         // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1499         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1500                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1501         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1502         let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1503                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1504                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1505                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1506                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1507                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1508                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1509                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1510                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1511                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1512                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1513                 }]);
1514         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1515                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1516
1517         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1518         let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1519         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1520         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1521         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1522         // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked outputs (which no longer includes the
1523         // spent HTLC output)
1524         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1525         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1526         if !anchors {
1527                 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1528         }
1529         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1530
1531         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1532                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1533
1534         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1535         let as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee = chan_feerate * as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight().to_wu() / 1000;
1536         if anchors {
1537                 // With anchors, B can pay for revoked_htlc_success's fee with additional inputs, rather
1538                 // than with the HTLC itself.
1539                 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1540                         3_000 - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1541         } else {
1542                 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1543                         3_000 - revoked_htlc_success_fee - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1544         }
1545
1546         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1547         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1548                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1549                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1550                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1551                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1552                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1553                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1554                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1555                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1556                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1557                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1558                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1559                 }]),
1560                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1561
1562         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1563         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], false);
1564         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1565                         // to_self output to B
1566                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1567                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1568                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1569                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1570                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1571                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1572                 }]),
1573                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1574
1575         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1576         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0], false);
1577         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1578                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1579                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1580                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1581                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1582                 }]),
1583                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1584
1585         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1586         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1587                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1588         // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1589         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1590         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1591                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1592         }
1593
1594         // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1595         // claiming.
1596         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1597         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1598         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1599                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1600         }
1601
1602         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1603         let (revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, revoked_to_self_claim) = {
1604                 let mut as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1605                 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1606                 if anchors {
1607                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1608                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1609                         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1610                         (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), revoked_to_self_claim.unwrap())
1611                 } else {
1612                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1613                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1614                         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1615                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), 1);
1616                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1617                         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1618                         (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0))
1619                 }
1620         };
1621
1622         // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1623         // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1624         // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1625         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1626         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1627                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1628                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1629                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1630                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1631                 }]),
1632                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1633
1634         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim);
1635         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1636                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1637                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1638                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1639                         amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1640                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1641                 }]),
1642                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1643
1644         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim);
1645         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1646                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1647                         amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.output[0].value,
1648                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1649                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1650                         amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1651                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1652                 }]),
1653                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1654
1655         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1656         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, false);
1657         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1658         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim, false);
1659
1660         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1661
1662         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1663         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1664         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1665         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1666         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1667         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1668         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1669 }
1670
1671 #[test]
1672 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1673         do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(false);
1674         do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(true);
1675 }
1676
1677 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(anchors: bool) {
1678         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1679         // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1680         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1681         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1682         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1683         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1684         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1685         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1686         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1687         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1688         if anchors {
1689                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1690                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1691         }
1692         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1693         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1694
1695         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1696                 version: 2,
1697                 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
1698                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1699                 output: vec![TxOut {
1700                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1701                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1702                 }],
1703         };
1704         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1705
1706         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1707                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1708         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1709         assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
1710
1711         // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1712         // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1713         // revocation-claim transaction.
1714
1715         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1716         let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1717
1718         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1719
1720         // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1721         // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1722         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1723                 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1724
1725         // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1726         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1727
1728         assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1729         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1730         if !anchors {
1731                 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1732         }
1733
1734         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1735         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1736
1737         {
1738                 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1739                 *feerate += 1;
1740         }
1741         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1742         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1743
1744         let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1745         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1746         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1747
1748         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1749         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1750         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1751         let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1752
1753         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1754                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1755                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1756                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1757                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1758                         payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1759                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1760                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1761                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1762                         payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1763                 }]),
1764                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1765
1766         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1767         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1768         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1769         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1770
1771         let mut claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1772         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1773         let revoked_to_self_claim = if anchors {
1774                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1775                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 5); // Separate to_remote claim
1776                 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1777                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1778                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1779                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1780                 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1781                 Some(claim_txn.remove(0))
1782         } else {
1783                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1784                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1785                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1786                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1787                 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1788                 None
1789         };
1790
1791         let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1792
1793         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1794                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1795         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1796         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1797                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1798                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1799                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1800                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1801                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1802                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1803                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1804                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1805                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1806                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1807                 }]),
1808                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1809
1810         // Confirm A's HTLC-Success transaction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1811         // new claim.
1812         if anchors {
1813                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1814                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1815                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1816                 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
1817                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
1818         }
1819         let htlc_success_claim = if anchors {
1820                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1821                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1822                 check_spends!(txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1823                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1824         } else {
1825                 as_revoked_txn[1].clone()
1826         };
1827         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_claim);
1828         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1829
1830         let mut claim_txn_2 = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1831         // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1832         // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1833         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1834         if anchors {
1835                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1836                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1837                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], &htlc_success_claim);
1838                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1839                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1840                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1841         } else {
1842                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1843                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1844                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1845                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 2);
1846                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1847                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 1);
1848                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1849         }
1850
1851         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1852                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1853                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1854                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1855                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1856                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1857                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1858                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1859                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1860                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1861                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1862                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1863                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1864                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1865                 }]),
1866                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1867
1868         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1869         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1870
1871         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1872                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1873                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1874                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1875                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1876                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1877                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1878                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1879                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1880                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1881                 }]),
1882                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1883
1884         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1885         let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1886
1887         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1888                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1889                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1890                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1891                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1892                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1893                         amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1894                         confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1895                 }]),
1896                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1897
1898         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1899         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0], false);
1900
1901         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1902                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1903                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1904                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1905                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1906                 }]),
1907                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1908
1909         if anchors {
1910                 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&claim_txn_2[1], revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap()]);
1911         } else {
1912                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1913         }
1914         let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1915
1916         if anchors {
1917                 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1918                                 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1919                                 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1920                         }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1921                                 amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap().output[0].value,
1922                                 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1923                         }],
1924                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1925         } else {
1926                 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1927                                 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1928                                 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1929                         }],
1930                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1931         }
1932
1933         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1934
1935         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1936         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1937         if anchors {
1938                 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1939                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1940                 for (i, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
1941                         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = event {
1942                                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
1943                                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
1944                                         &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
1945                                         253, None, &Secp256k1::new()
1946                                 ).unwrap();
1947                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, if i == 0 { &claim_txn_2[1] } else { revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap() });
1948                         } else { panic!(); }
1949                 }
1950         } else {
1951                 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1], false);
1952         }
1953         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1954
1955         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1956         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1957         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1958         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1959         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1960         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1961         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1962 }
1963
1964 #[test]
1965 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1966         do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(false);
1967         do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(true);
1968 }
1969
1970 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
1971         // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
1972         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1973         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1974         let persister;
1975         let new_chain_monitor;
1976
1977         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1978         let node_deserialized;
1979
1980         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1981
1982         // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
1983         // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
1984         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
1985         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
1986         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
1987         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
1988         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1989         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1990         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
1991                  [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1992
1993         let commitment_tx = {
1994                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1995                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1996                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
1997                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1998                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1999         };
2000
2001         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2002         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2003                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2004                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2005                 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
2006         }
2007
2008         // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
2009         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2010         let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2011                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2012                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2013                 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
2014                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2015         };
2016
2017         // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
2018         // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
2019         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2020                 let serialized_monitor = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(
2021                         "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2022                 ).unwrap();
2023                 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2024         }
2025
2026         // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
2027         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
2028         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2029                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2030         }
2031         {
2032                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2033                 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
2034                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
2035                 } else {
2036                         assert!(txn.len() < 6);
2037                 }
2038                 for tx in txn {
2039                         assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
2040                         assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
2041                         assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
2042                         assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
2043                 }
2044         }
2045 }
2046
2047 #[test]
2048 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
2049         do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
2050         do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
2051 }
2052
2053 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
2054         // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
2055         // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
2056         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2057         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2058         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
2059         if anchors {
2060                 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2061                 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2062         }
2063         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
2064         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2065
2066         let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2067                 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2068         );
2069         const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
2070         const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
2071         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
2072
2073         let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
2074
2075         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
2076         assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
2077         check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
2078         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
2079         check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
2080         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
2081                  false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
2082         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2083
2084         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2085                 version: 2,
2086                 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2087                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2088                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
2089                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2090                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2091                 }],
2092         };
2093         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2094
2095         // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
2096         // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
2097         // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
2098         let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
2099         let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
2100                 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
2101                         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2102                         let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2103                         assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2104                         if !should_retry {
2105                                 return None;
2106                         }
2107                         match &events[0] {
2108                                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2109                                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2110                                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2111                                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2112                                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2113                                         check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
2114                                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
2115                                                 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
2116                                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight().to_wu();
2117                                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2118                                 }
2119                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2120                         }
2121                 } else {
2122                         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2123                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2124                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2125                         if !should_retry {
2126                                 return None;
2127                         }
2128                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2129                         check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
2130                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
2131                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight().to_wu();
2132                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2133                 };
2134                 if should_bump {
2135                         assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
2136                 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
2137                         assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
2138                 }
2139                 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
2140                 Some(htlc_tx)
2141         };
2142
2143         // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
2144         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
2145         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2146
2147         // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
2148         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2149         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2150
2151         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2152         // transactions pre-anchors.
2153         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2154         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2155
2156         // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
2157         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2158         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2159
2160         // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
2161         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2162         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2163         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2164
2165         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2166         // transactions pre-anchors.
2167         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2168         let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
2169
2170         // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
2171         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
2172         // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
2173         // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
2174         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2175                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2176                 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
2177                 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2178         }
2179         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2180         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2181 }
2182
2183 #[test]
2184 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
2185         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
2186         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
2187 }
2188
2189 #[test]
2190 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
2191         // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
2192         // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
2193         // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
2194         // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
2195         // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
2196         // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
2197         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2198         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2199         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2200         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2201         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2202         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2203         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2204         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2205
2206         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2207                 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2208         );
2209         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2210         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
2211
2212         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2213         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2214
2215         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2216
2217         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2218         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2219
2220         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2221         {
2222                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2223                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2224                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2225         }
2226
2227         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2228                 &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
2229                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
2230         );
2231         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2232                 &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2233                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2234         );
2235
2236         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2237         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
2238         let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
2239                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2240                         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2241                                 version: 2,
2242                                 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2243                                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2244                                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2245                                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2246                                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2247                                 }],
2248                         };
2249                         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2250                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2251                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2252                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2253                         let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2254                         let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2255                         check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2256                         check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2257                         (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
2258                 },
2259                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2260         };
2261
2262         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
2263         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
2264
2265         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2266         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2267         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2268         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2269
2270         {
2271                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2272                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
2273
2274                 let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2275                 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
2276                 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
2277                 check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
2278
2279                 let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2280                 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
2281                 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
2282                 check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
2283
2284                 if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
2285                         check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2286                 }
2287         }
2288
2289         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2290         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2291         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2292         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2293                 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2294                 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
2295                 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2296         } else {
2297                 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
2298         }
2299         let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2300         for event in holder_events {
2301                 match event {
2302                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2303                                 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2304                                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2305                                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2306                                 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2307                                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
2308                                 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
2309                         },
2310                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2311                 }
2312         }
2313
2314         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
2315         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2316
2317         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2318
2319         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
2320
2321         let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2322         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2323         for event in holder_events {
2324                 match event {
2325                         Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
2326                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2327                 }
2328         }
2329
2330         // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
2331         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2332         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2333         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2334         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2335 }
2336
2337 #[test]
2338 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
2339         // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
2340         // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
2341         // revoked commitment.
2342         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2343         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2344         // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
2345         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2346         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2347         let bob_persister;
2348         let bob_chain_monitor;
2349
2350         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2351         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2352         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2353         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2354         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2355         let bob_deserialized;
2356
2357         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2358
2359         let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2360         let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2361
2362         // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2363         let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2364
2365         // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2366         let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2367         let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2368         let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2369         let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2370
2371         // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2372         // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2373         // present.
2374         let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2375         let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2376
2377         // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2378         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2379         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2380         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2381         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2382
2383         // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2384         // revoked state.
2385         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2386         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2387
2388         // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2389         reload_node!(
2390                 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2391                 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2392         );
2393         for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2394                 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2395                 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2396                         monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2397                                 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2398                                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2399                         );
2400                 }
2401         }
2402
2403         // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2404         // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2405         // the HTLCs still pending.
2406         *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2407         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2408         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2409         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2410
2411         // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2412         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2413         let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2414         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2415         let mut revoked_commitment_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2416         let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2417         for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2418                 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
2419                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2420                         version: 2,
2421                         lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2422                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2423                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2424                                 value: utxo_value,
2425                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2426                         }],
2427                 };
2428                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2429                 match event {
2430                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2431                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2432                 };
2433                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2434                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2435                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2436                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2437                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2438                 } else {
2439                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2440                 }
2441                 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2442                 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2443
2444                 revoked_commitment_txs.push(commitment_tx.clone());
2445                 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2446         };
2447
2448         for node in &nodes {
2449                 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_txs[0], &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1], &anchor_txs[1]]);
2450         }
2451         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2452         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2453         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2454
2455         // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2456         // revoked outputs.
2457         {
2458                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2459                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2460
2461                 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_txs[0].txid() {
2462                         (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2463                 } else {
2464                         (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2465                 };
2466
2467                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2468                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2469                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_txs[0]);
2470                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2471                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2472                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
2473         }
2474
2475         // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2476         // through the success path.
2477         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2478         let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2479         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2480         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2481         match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2482                 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2483                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2484                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2485                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2486                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2487                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2488
2489                 },
2490                 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2491         };
2492         let htlc_tx = {
2493                 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2494                 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2495                 let fee_utxo_script = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2496                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2497                         version: 2,
2498                         lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2499                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2500                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2501                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2502                                 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2503                         }],
2504                 };
2505                 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2506                         version: 2,
2507                         lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2508                         input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2509                                 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2510                                 ..Default::default()
2511                         }],
2512                         output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2513                                 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2514                                 script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new_op_return(&[]),
2515                         }],
2516                 };
2517                 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2518                 for event in events {
2519                         // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2520                         // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2521                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2522                                 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2523                                 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2524                                         assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2525                                         htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2526                                         htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2527                                 }
2528                                 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2529                                 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2530                         } else {
2531                                 panic!("Unexpected event");
2532                         }
2533                 }
2534                 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2535                         let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2536                         let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2537                         let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2538                         let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2539                         htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2540                 }
2541                 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2542                         let witness_script = ScriptBuf::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2543                         let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2544                                 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2545                         ).unwrap()[..]);
2546                         let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2547                         let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2548                         sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2549                         sig
2550                 };
2551                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_slice(&[fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2552                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_txs[0], revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
2553                 htlc_tx
2554         };
2555
2556         for node in &nodes {
2557                 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2558         }
2559
2560         // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2561         // the second level instead.
2562         let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2563                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2564                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2565
2566                 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2567                         tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2568                         tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2569                         tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2570                 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2571                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2572                 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2573                         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2574                 }
2575
2576                 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = new_hash_map();
2577                 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2578                         revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2579                 }
2580                 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2581         };
2582         for node in &nodes {
2583                 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2584         }
2585
2586
2587         // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2588         // been reached.
2589         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2590         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2591
2592         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2593         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2594
2595         // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2596         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2597         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2598
2599         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2600         let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2601         assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2602         for event in spendable_output_events {
2603                 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2604                         assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2605                         assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2606                         let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2607                                 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), ScriptBuf::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2608                         ).unwrap();
2609
2610                         if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
2611                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
2612                         } else {
2613                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2614                         }
2615                 } else {
2616                         panic!("unexpected event");
2617                 }
2618         }
2619
2620         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2621         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2622         // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2623         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2624         // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2625         // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2626         // balances to claim.
2627         //
2628         // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2629         // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2630         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2631 }
2632
2633 fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_commitment_before_reload: bool) {
2634         // Tests that we'll fix a ChannelMonitor's `counterparty_payment_script` for an anchor outputs
2635         // channel upon deserialization.
2636         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2637         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2638         let persister;
2639         let chain_monitor;
2640         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2641         user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2642         user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2643         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2644         let node_deserialized;
2645         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2646
2647         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2648
2649         // Set the monitor's `counterparty_payment_script` to a dummy P2WPKH script.
2650         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2651         let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap();
2652         let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey);
2653         let p2wpkh_script = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2654         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone());
2655         assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script);
2656
2657         // Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such
2658         // that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload.
2659         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
2660         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
2661         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2662         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2663         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2664                  [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2665
2666         let commitment_tx = {
2667                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2668                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2669                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 4);
2670                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2671                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2672         };
2673
2674         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2675         let commitment_tx_conf_height = if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2676                 // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor
2677                 // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script.
2678                 *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id);
2679                 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2680                 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2681                 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2682                 commitment_tx_conf_height
2683         } else {
2684                 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2685                 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2686                 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2687                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2688                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
2689                 commitment_tx_conf_height
2690         };
2691         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2692                  [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2693         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_v0_p2wsh());
2694
2695         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2696         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2697
2698         if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2699                 // If we saw the commitment before our `counterparty_payment_script` was fixed, we'll never
2700                 // get the spendable output event for the `to_remote` output, so we'll need to get it
2701                 // manually via `get_spendable_outputs`.
2702                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2703                 let outputs = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height);
2704                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2705                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2706                         &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2707                         253, None, &secp
2708                 ).unwrap();
2709                 check_spends!(spend_tx, &commitment_tx);
2710         } else {
2711                 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx, false);
2712         }
2713 }
2714
2715 #[test]
2716 fn test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload() {
2717         do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false);
2718         do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true);
2719 }
2720
2721 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2722 fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterparty_commitment: bool) {
2723         // Tests that our monitor claims will always use fresh random signatures (ensuring a unique
2724         // wtxid) to prevent certain classes of transaction replacement at the bitcoin P2P layer.
2725         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2726         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2727         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2728         if anchors {
2729                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2730                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2731         }
2732         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2733         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2734
2735         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2736                 version: 2,
2737                 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2738                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2739                 output: vec![
2740                         TxOut {
2741                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2742                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2743                         },
2744                 ],
2745         };
2746         if anchors {
2747                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2748         }
2749
2750         // Open a channel and route a payment. We'll let it timeout to claim it.
2751         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
2752         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2753
2754         let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2755                 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
2756         } else {
2757                 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
2758         };
2759
2760         get_monitor!(closing_node, chan_id).broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(
2761                 &closing_node.tx_broadcaster, &closing_node.fee_estimator, &closing_node.logger
2762         );
2763
2764         // The commitment transaction comes first.
2765         let commitment_tx = {
2766                 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2767                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2768                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2769                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2770         };
2771
2772         mine_transaction(closing_node, &commitment_tx);
2773         check_added_monitors!(closing_node, 1);
2774         check_closed_broadcast!(closing_node, true);
2775         check_closed_event!(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2776
2777         mine_transaction(other_node, &commitment_tx);
2778         check_added_monitors!(other_node, 1);
2779         check_closed_broadcast!(other_node, true);
2780         check_closed_event!(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2781
2782         // If we update the best block to the new height before providing the confirmed transactions,
2783         // we'll see another broadcast of the commitment transaction.
2784         if !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2785                 let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2786         }
2787
2788         // Then comes the HTLC timeout transaction.
2789         if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2790                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 5);
2791                 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
2792                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
2793         } else {
2794                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2795         }
2796         if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2797                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2798         }
2799         let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2800                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2801                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2802                 let tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2803                 check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
2804                 tx
2805         };
2806
2807         // Check we rebroadcast it with a different wtxid.
2808         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2809         if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2810                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2811         }
2812         {
2813                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2814                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2815                 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), htlc_timeout_tx.txid());
2816                 assert_ne!(txn[0].wtxid(), htlc_timeout_tx.wtxid());
2817         }
2818 }
2819
2820 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2821 #[test]
2822 fn test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures() {
2823         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, false);
2824         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, true);
2825         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, false);
2826         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, true);
2827 }